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Tag: states

  • PolitiFact – Did Wisconsin's governor reject Iowa modeled redistricting plan he had earlier endorsed?

    PolitiFact – Did Wisconsin's governor reject Iowa modeled redistricting plan he had earlier endorsed?

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    The State of Wisconsin’s redistricting process has been fraught for years, facing government deadlocks and interventions from the federal courts.  

    The fall 2023 legislative session marked yet another addition to this prickly timeline when Republican Assembly Speaker Robin Vos announced a redistricting bill he said tracked closely with an idea Democrats had long supported: “An Iowa-style nonpartisan redistricting” model that would allow the nonpartisan Legislative Reference Bureau to write new legislative maps.  

    Democratic Gov. Tony Evers quickly dismissed the legislation as “bogus,” prompting Vos to respond in a Sept. 15, 2023 news release: Democrats “rejected our (Iowa model) proposal to enact the very plan they originally endorsed.” 

    So is Vos correct that Democrats are now opposing the very idea they advocated for years? 

    First, what is the Iowa model and how does it compare to the GOP plan? 

    In response to an email from PolitiFact Wisconsin seeking backup, Vos’ spokesperson, Angela Joyce wrote: “There have to be some differences as our Constitution is different than Iowa’s, and in listening to Democrats’ concerns, we made some amendments to the legislation.”

    Let’s start with the Iowa system.

    Since 1980, Iowa’s legislative districts have been drawn by nonpartisan staff with their Legislative Services Agency. Under Iowa law, legislative maps cannot be redrawn with the intent of favoring a political party, incumbent state legislator or member of Congress. Key provisions include:  

    • The state’s Legislative Services Agency holds three public hearings on a proposed set of maps, then submits a report on the maps to the state’s legislature, which may vote to approve or reject them. No amendments are allowed other than corrections to errors. 

    • If lawmakers reject the first proposal, the agency has 35 days to propose a new set of maps addressing the reasons the first set were voted down. This process can happen one more time, with the agency offering a third proposal. If the process makes its way to a third proposal, the legislation can be amended — or lawmakers can draft their own set. If the Legislature adopts its own maps, they are subject to review by the state Supreme Court, which in Iowa is composed of appointed, rather than elected, justices. If the legislature fails to adopt maps the Iowa Supreme Court adopts a plan. 

    The GOP’s plan is almost identical to what Democrats proposed as early as 2003 in its key element: transferring map-drawing authority away from partisans and to the state’s Legislative Reference Bureau. 

    The Republicans’ proposal has some small variations to accommodate for differences between the states’ constitutions, according to a memo prepared by the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau.  

    Per the memo, here are key ways they are similar: 

    • Both Iowa and the GOP’s proposed legislation prohibit the drawing agency from using data on incumbent legislator addresses, voters’ political affiliations, previous election results and demographic information. 

    • Both create a redistricting advisory commission to hold public hearings, report on map proposals, and perform other duties. 

    • The Iowa legislature’s feedback must, to the extent allowed by Iowa’s statutes and the Constitution, be incorporated into the second or third map proposal. If a map proposal is vetoed by the governor, the governor’s feedback must be incorporated into the second or third map proposal. The GOP’s proposed legislation has similar requirements for incorporating the legislature and governor’s feedback between map proposals. 

    Why are Democrats critical of the GOP plan? 

    Democrats point to a provision in the Republican legislation for what happens if the attempt to agree on maps gets to a third try. Evers’ most recent proposals required a three-fourths supermajority to approve changes made on the third attempt. Under the Republican plan, a simple majority could approve changes in the third attempt. Evers wants the supermajority to ensure that one party does not ultimately enact a partisan gerrymander at the end of the process

    As the Journal Sentinel reported in a Sept. 14 article:  

    “Democratic lawmakers who have worked on redistricting bills are put off by the fact that the GOP proposal is most similar to a bill from 2015 — rather than more recent proposals that have been adjusted and still received support from a handful of Republicans….. 

    “Under the GOP bill, the Legislative Reference Bureau would submit maps to the Legislature, which could reject the first two proposals. Once a third proposal is introduced, lawmakers could amend it with a simple majority. It would then require the governor’s approval, and would likely end up in the courts without an agreement — unless the Legislature were able to override the governor’s veto. 

    “Recent bills, and Evers’ budget proposal, would have required a three-fourths majority to approve the final maps.” 

     

    Why do Vos and other Assembly GOP members want this now?  

    Passage of the legislation would bypass lawsuits before the state Supreme Court that seek to rewrite the current Republican-favorable maps that were adopted in 2021.  

    With the election of Justice Janet Protasiewicz earlier this year, liberals hold a majority on the court for the first time in years. Protasiewicz rebuffed calls by Vos and others to recuse herself from the lawsuits  – a move which Vos has warned could lead to her impeachment after she called the current maps “rigged” while campaigning for the court seat. The court heard oral arguments Nov. 21.  

    Our ruling 

    In a news release, Vos claimed Evers and Democrats “rejected our (Iowa model) proposal to enact the very plan they originally endorsed.”  

    There are a lot of key parallels in the Iowa redistricting model and a redistricting bill proposed here in Wisconsin. In fact, Wisconsin’s nonpartisan Legislative Reference Bureau termed them “virtually identical.”

    And Democrats as early as 2003 called for transferring map-drawing authority to the bureau and away from lawmakers. The Republican proposal does that. But the GOP plan also abandons a key provision that Evers introduced in 2019, requiring approval of three-fourths of all members in the Assembly and Senate to pass the maps if a third round of voting becomes necessary. 

    Our definition of Mostly True is that the statement is accurate but needs clarification or additional information.

    That fits here. 

     

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  • PolitiFact – Wisconsin senator's claim that Dems used alternative slates of electors 'repeatedly' is false'

    PolitiFact – Wisconsin senator's claim that Dems used alternative slates of electors 'repeatedly' is false'

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    It’s been three years since a group of Republicans gathered at the state Capitol in Madison, with armed guards, trying to cast electoral votes for then-President Donald Trump, despite not being the official electors for the state and even though Trump lost.  

    But U.S. Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wis., is still defending their actions — even after the group in a court filing acknowledged the group’s actions were used to try to overturn the election

    In a Dec. 11 interview on CNN, Johnson was asked if Robert Spindell, who serves on the Wisconsin Elections Commission and was one of the fake electors, should resign from his position for participating in the scheme. 

    Johnson said Spindell shouldn’t resign, there was an “active court case” and there were “all kinds of irregularities in Wisconsin in the 2020 election.”

    “In order to make sure that the case wasn’t determined to be moot, they had to have an alternate slate of electors just like Democrats have done repeatedly in all kinds of different states,” Johnson said. “There’s nothing untoward about what they did. There was nothing illegal about what they did. They were just an alternate slate of electors.”  

    Kaitlan Collins, host of “The Source wuth Kaitlan Collins” on CNN, pushed back, asking whether he meant they did nothing wrong. 

    “These folks did nothing different than Democrats have done in many states,” Johnson said.  

    Collins then asked whether a person who participated in the fake electors scheme should remain on a state board.  

    “Democrat electors have done that repeatedly,” Johnson said, ignoring the question. “It’s happened in different states.” 

    Is Johnson right that that Democrats have also used alternate slates of electors “repeatedly in all kinds of different states”

    In a word: No. 

    Johnson’s response

    When we asked Johnson’s office to back up the claim, which created a lot of conversation on social media, spokesperson Kiersten Pels said “the senator meant that Democrats have ‘repeatedly’ been denying and challenging elections for decades and cited the below examples in a tweet response to CNN.”

    But that’s not what Johnson said, and it’s not what viewers heard. If anything, it’s an acknowledgement that, at best, the senator misspoke. 

    The response Pels referred to included four examples. We’ll take a look at them, through the prism of the claim Johnson made on CNN. 

    They fall short. For instance, only one of the four even involves a slate of electors.

    1960 election: Hawaii electors  

    Johnson asserted: “In the 1960 election, Democrats in Hawaii chose an alternative slate of electors, allowing JFK to be certified as the winner.”

    That election, in which Democrat John F. Kennedy defeated Republican Richard Nixon, is one of the most memorably close presidential elections in U.S. history.  

    Here is some background from a Aug. 25 Politico article, which sought to debunk the same sort of comparison, which other Republicans were advancing. 

    In December 1960, Hawaii’s election results were still in doubt. Nixon was leading by 140 votes with a recount underway. At the same time, presidential electors were meeting to cast their ballots, as law requires. Hawaii electors for both Nixon and Kennedy met separately to cast their votes for their respective candidates and sent them to Washington, D.C.  

    The recount put Kennedy ahead by roughly 115 votes, giving him the state. The results were then certified and a new slate of Electoral College certificates were signed and sent to Washington.  

    But the Hawaii electors were chosen, on the date prescribed by law, while the recount was underway and the result was still in question. In Wisconsin, the Republican fake electors met after a Trump-backed recount failed and after the courts had already certified Joe Biden as the winner.

    So, contrary to Johnson’s assertion, it was not the alternate slate of electors that allowed Kennedy to be chosen. It was the result of the recount. What’s more, Nixon himself — then the vice president — had slates of electors from both parties before him, and chose the Democratic one after the Hawaii recount was completed and certified for Kennedy. 

    2004 election: Republican George W. Bush and Democrat John Kerry

    Johnson asserted: In 2005, Sen. Barbara Boxer and Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones led a group of 31 representatives in objecting to the certification of Ohio’s electors. Those 31 include Jim Clyburn, Sheila Jackson Lee, Barbara Lee, now-Sen. Ed Markey, Benny Thompson and Maxine Waters.  

    Johnson has the facts right, but applies them incorrectly to support his CNN claim. The Democrats objected to a rightfully-chosen slate of electors. They did not offer an alternate slate of electors. 

    2016 election: “Rogue electors” discuss trying to block Trump

    Johnson asserted: “In 2016, Democrat electors from Washington state and Colorado signed onto an attempt to block Trump from winning an Electoral College majority.”

    When Trump won in 2016, defeating Hillary Clinton, many Democrats were upset at the results.  

    After the election, Politico reported in Nov. 2016, some Democrat electors were trying to rally support for other electors to not vote for Trump — this was what was termed “rogue electors” at the time. Likewise, some electors considered not voting for Clinton in states Clinton won.  

    Again, this is not a slate of fake electors.

    2016 election: More anti-Trump fallout

    Johnson’s final assertion: “In 2017, Reps. Jamie Raskin, Pramila Jayapal, Barbara Lee, Sheila Jackson Lee, Raúl Grijalva, Maxine Waters, and Jim McGovern, all objected to electoral votes for Trump.”

    As in 2005, when the formal certification process was underway in Congress, some Democrats in the House objected to the electoral votes that were cast for Trump. 

    Biden, then vice president, presided over the joint body, heard the objections and at one point told Jayapal, who objected to Georgia’s vote certificate, “it is over.”  

    Again, this did not involve a slate of fake electors.

    Finally, it is worth noting that after the 2020 election many Republicans objected to certifying various electoral votes for Biden. Indeed, that was part of the overall scheme — to have alternate slates of electors put in front of then-Vice President Mike Pence, so he could accept them instead of the legitimate ones.

    Johnson’s role with fake electors 

    It’s worth noting Johnson will always be connected with the issue, based on a text exchange that was revealed by the U.S. House committee investigating the Jan. 6 attack at the capitol.  

    On Jan. 6, 2021, Sean Riley, a Johnson aide, texted Chris Hodgson, a Pence staff member, saying Johnson “needs to hand something to VPOTUS please advise.”  

    “What is it?” Hodgson responded. 

    “Alternate slate of electors for MI and WI because archivist didn’t receive them,” Riley said.  

    “Do not give that to him,” Hodgson said.  

    Hours later the U.S. Capitol was under siege by Trump supporters hoping to delay the Electoral College vote count and overturn the election.  

    Johnson has changed his explanation of his involvement from having “no involvement in an alternate slate of electors” to admitting he was made aware of “Wisconsin electors” by a Dane County attorney and facilitated a text message introduction with a staff member and the attorney

    Our ruling 

    In a CNN interview, Johnson claimed Democrats have also used alternate slates of electors “repeatedly in all kinds of different states.”

    That is wrong. His own aide acknowledged that Johnson meant to make a different point, a more general one about Democrats objecting to past election results. And, in any case, none of the evidence Johnson provided matches the original claim. 

    We rate the claim False.

     

     

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  • PolitiFact – ‘Iowa model’ redistricting was not top priority for Wisconsin GOP until 2023

    PolitiFact – ‘Iowa model’ redistricting was not top priority for Wisconsin GOP until 2023

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    The state of Iowa has played an outsized role in presidential politics for decades. Now, the Hawkeye state’s importance is being played out here in the Badger state, as Republicans and Democrats tussle over Wisconsin’s current gerrymandered Legislative maps. 

    A Calumet County lawmaker is now citing the “Iowa model” when touting a Republican redistricting plan that calls for the Legislature to OK new maps drawn by nonpartisan staff.

    “Wisconsin Republicans will introduce a nonpartisan redistricting plan based off the Iowa Model,” state Rep. Ron Tusler, R-Harrison, said Sept. 12, 2023 on X, formerly known as Twitter. “This plan has been hailed as the ‘gold standard’ redistricting model by Democrats and Republicans alike. Republicans, Democrats, and the Governor pushed this plan last time redistricting happened in 2020.”

    PolitiFact Wisconsin found the Calumet County lawmaker’s statement interesting, particularly the claim that  “Republicans, Democrats, and the Governor pushed this plan last time redistricting happened in 2020.”

    That’s because in the wake of the introduction, there was howling from Democrats about an about-face by Republicans to support the plan. And howling from Republicans that Democrats suddenly were balky about a plan they supported all along.

    Have Republicans, Democrats and the governor really been pushing the “Iowa model” since 2020? And is what’s on the table now, really the “Iowa Model”?

    Let’s take a look.

    What is the Iowa model?

    When asked for backup for the claim, Tusler legislative aide Nick Schultz referred PolitiFact Wisconsin to several news articles, press releases, past lawmaker statements and legislation detailing the Iowa model and why its being hailed as “a gold standard’ redistricting model. 

    But for our purposes here, we are focused on two things: How closely does what was introduced mirror the Iowa model. And have all the parties pushed that approach since 2020?

    The Iowa model, as explained in a Sept. 13, 2023, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article, refers to a redistricting method adopted by Iowa in 1980, which calls for Iowa’s nonpartisan Legislative Services Agency to draw district boundaries for state legislative and congressional seats.

    Legislation to adopt the “Iowa model” has been introduced during every session of Wisconsin’s Legislature since 2011 but until October 2023 had never gotten a hearing during a legislative session. During that period, Republicans controlled both chambers throughout – and for a long stretch, also held the governor’s office.

    The new Assembly Bill 415 has only had one public hearing, Oct. 19, 2023 – and that only came after the recent GOP announcement of support.

    Under that proposal, announced in September by Assembly Speaker Robin Vos, the new maps would take effect in the 2024 election cycle.

    Following three hours of oral arguments on Nov. 21, 2023, a ruling on a bid to overturn the legislative maps now rests with the state Supreme Court

    But there are key differences differences between the Iowa Model and the Wisconsin plan.

    Richard Loeza, senior legislative analyst at the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, said the differences between Iowa’s process and Wisconsin’s largely reflect matters unique to Wisconsin law, such as the timing of the steps in the process and the constitutional power of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In a memo, the LRB said the proposed legislative redistricting is largely the same as that in Iowa, with some exceptions.

    Loeza, in an email to PolitiFact Wisconsin, said the main difference is that, under the Iowa Constitution, if no map proposal is enacted by September 15 of the year ending in 1, the Iowa Supreme Court must intervene to adopt a redistricting plan, or cause a redistricting plan to be adopted. None of the Wisconsin proposals in 2019, 2021, or 2023 include such a provision, although such a dispute would likely end up before the court.

    In addition, Democrats’ recent bills have favored adding a provision that maps adopted after three sets from the state agency are rejected must be passed by a three-fourths supermajority of the Legislature. This is to ensure that one party does not ultimately enact a partisan gerrymander at the end of the process. The GOP bill includes neither the Iowa Supreme Court backstop or this provision.

    Furthermore, unlike the previous Wisconsin bills or Iowa, AB 415’s amendments create even more differences between the two state’s models. Under one example, the amended AB 415 would require the Legislative Reference Bureau to continue drawing maps after a third map was rejected. Additionally, there are still no supermajority requirements in AB 415 as amended. The amendments, Loeza pointed out “have resulted in more differences between AB 415 and the Iowa system.”

    John Johnson, research fellow in the Lubar Center for Public Policy Research and Civic Education at the Marquette University Law School, pointed out that there has been a bill pertaining to the redistricting process proposed in each of the last three legislative biennia. 

    “All of the bills bear similarity to the ‘Iowa model’” but are not the same, Johnson said.

    Bills in 2019 and 2021 were introduced, received limited GOP support and never made it to a hearing. 

    “None of these plans are the same as the ‘Iowa model,’ Johnson said “They all vary in important ways.” 

    Have Republicans previously supported the model or moved to enact it?

    There is little doubt that Democrats have been supportive of the approach in recent years. For instance, Democratic Gov. Tony Evers has proposed nonpartisan redistricting in his first two biennial budget requests. 

    Barry Burden, director of the Elections Research Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, said most Republicans in the state legislature and GOP leaders opposed any kind of independent redistricting commission or process “until Tuesday, September 12, when Speaker Vos led a press conference to announce support for a freshly crafted bill that would implement a system similar but not identical to the Iowa model.” 

    Burden said it was a surprising turn of events given Republicans’ history of standing by the existing system and resisting reforms.

    Jay Heck, executive director of Common Cause Wisconsin, pointed to the change in support of the Iowa model by Republican lawmakers.

    “The short answer is that very few Republicans and certainly not Tusler ever supported any version of the Iowa model legislation before September 11, 2023 — the date Robin Vos announced his plan,” Heck told PolitiFact Wisconsin. 

    Common Cause is a non-partisan national group with state chapters devoted to fighting for reforms to gerrymandering, political spending and other issues.

    In the supporting information shared with us by Schultz, of Tusler’s office, there was mention of “past comments by legislative Democrats, as well as legislation authored by both Republicans and Democrats including the Governor.” 

    It’s true that legislation was co-authored by both Republicans and Democrats, however, Republican support for the earlier measures was very limited. For example, the 2019 measure, AB 303, was introduced in June 2019 by 36 Democratic Representatives and two Republicans. The two Republicans were Reps. Todd Novak, R-Dodgeville, and Travis Tranel, R-Cuba City. Two additional GOP Assembly members, Rep. Joel Kitchens, R-Sturgeon Bay and Rep. Loren Oldenburg, R-Viroqua, signed on as co-authors a month after the introduction.

    In other words, there was no indication of widespread support by Republicans prior to the Vos 2023 news conference, such as public pronouncements or any votes – which could have easily been held, given GOP control of both chambers. In fact:

    AB 395, a proposal to institute nonpartisan redistricting was introduced to the legislature on June 11, 2021 and was referred to the Committee on State Affairs. No action was taken on the bill and no public hearings were held on it. The bill died at the end of the 2021-22 legislative biennium. 

    AB 303 was introduced to the legislature on June 20, 2019 and was referred to the Committee on Campaigns and Elections. No action was taken on the bill and no public hearings were held on it. The bill died at the end of the 2019-20 legislative biennium.

    What’s more, the redistricting maps created by the GOP – the ones being challenged before the state Supreme Court – did not include the Iowa approach at all.

    Indeed, the ongoing dispute and continued disagreement, undermines Tusler’s claim that everyone has fought for Iowa-style maps since 2000.

    Our ruling

    Tusler said “Wisconsin Republicans will introduce a nonpartisan redistricting plan based off the Iowa model.  ….  Republicans, Democrats, and the Governor pushed this plan last time redistricting happened in 2020.”

    The claim, while being largely true, has problems on multiple fronts.

    First, the plan introduced by Republicans in 2023, proposes a nonpartisan legislative redistricting process almost identical to Iowa’s process. But has key differences to earlier measures introduced in 2019 and 2021. 

    Those earlier measures did have Republican support, but political experts pointed out that very few Republicans ever supported any version of the Iowa model legislation before September 11, 2023, when the latest plan, backed by Republicans, was introduced. Therefore, there has been GOP support, albeit very limited. 

    For a statement that is partially accurate but leaves out important details or takes things out of context, our rating is Half True.

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  • PolitiFact – Has a Wisconsin Democratic candidate for Congress passed over 170 bills into law?

    PolitiFact – Has a Wisconsin Democratic candidate for Congress passed over 170 bills into law?

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    The Democratic primary field to challenge U.S. Rep. Derrick Van Orden in 2024 grew to four when state Rep. Katrina Shankland joined in October.

    Shankland, who represents Stevens Point and has served in the Wisconsin Assembly since 2012, faces three other Democratic competitors for the 3rd Congressional District in the western part of the state. 

    Those include La Crosse County Board Chair Tara Johnson, who has picked up endorsements from prominent Democrats, including the outgoing party leader in the Senate.

    Others vying in the primary include Eau Claire small-business owner Rebecca Cooke, who lost last year’s primary, and Aaron Nytes, a Harvard Law School student. 

    Shankland has already highlighted her experience as the only state lawmaker in the field, including in a post on her campaign’s account on X, formerly Twitter.

    “I have been a state legislator for 11 years, passing over 170 bills into law and delivering for Wisconsin families — I get things done,” the Nov. 15 post read.

    Her claim caught our attention, as Shankland is likely to continue promoting her record in the statehouse as she campaigns for higher office.

    And, it seemed like a high number for a Democrat who has served in a Republican-controlled Legislature. 

    Let’s take a look at the numbers.

    Memo shows Shankland’s name has been on 179 bills

    When PolitiFact Wisconsin reached out to Shankland’s campaign for backup, consultant Melissa Baldauff said Shankland’s legislative office had a memo showing the bills. 

    She also clarified that the number referred to bills that Shankland has authored or co-sponsored that were signed into law, rather than bills she’s voted for as a lawmaker.

    Shankland’s chief of staff, Jacob Burbach, provided the memo from the Legislative Reference Bureau that shows the bills her name is on that were enacted by the governor.

    The bureau is a nonpartisan agency that provides research to lawmakers and their staff.

    Burbach first shared a memo prepared by an LRB analyst that found that 173 of the 1,928 bills she authored or co-sponsored were signed into law, as of Sept. 14. 

    Two updated memos prepared by LRB brought the number up to 174 out of 2,091 as of Dec. 5, then 179 out of 2,107 as of Dec. 7.

    So initially, that math appears to add up. 

    Some bills are measures she’s co-authored or co-sponsored

    But in the legislative process, authoring bills is different than co-authoring or co-sponsoring them, which signals a different level of involvement. Legislators who introduce bills are known as authors. 

    If lawmakers want to sign onto a bill to show their support, they are known as co-authors if they’re in the same chamber, or co-sponsors if they’re in the other chamber, according to the Legislature’s glossary.

    Out of the 179 measures cited by Shankland, LRB found 104 bills that she authored. That number could also include some co-authored bills, based on LRB’s classification. 

    So far, in the 2023-24 session, 15 bills Shankland has authored or co-sponsored have been enacted. She was listed as introducing seven of those, including new loan programs for affordable housing. 

    Among the bills she co-sponsored include a measure that expanded how schools and businesses can deliver epinephrine to people having allergic emergencies. 

    Baldauff noted that co-sponsors still play a role in shepherding legislation through, such as getting stakeholders or other lawmakers on board. 

    And sometimes legislators who start drafting measures don’t ultimately get their names put first on a bill, an indicator the LRB tracks. That was the case with a first responder protection bill Shankland started.

    Although those examples provide context for the tally, authoring a bill usually signals more involvement than co-authoring or co-sponsoring the legislation. 

    Our ruling

    Democratic Rep. Katrina Shankland, who is running for Congress, said she has been “a state legislator for 11 years, passing over 170 bills into law and delivering for Wisconsin families.”

    Although the nonpartisan agency’s research does show Shankland has been involved with 179 bills that have been put into law, potential voters may get the impression that she led each of those. 

    Instead, the memo shows she’s authored 104 of that number. Some in that tally include bills she co-authored, similar to co-sponsoring, though she might have been more involved with some of those proposals.

    Our definition of Mostly True is “the statement is accurate but needs clarification or additional information.” 

    That fits here.

     

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  • PolitiFact – Johnson’s line on how to register to be a poll worker is Mostly True

    PolitiFact – Johnson’s line on how to register to be a poll worker is Mostly True

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    With the 2024 presidential contest less than one year away, parties are beginning to mobilize voters and clerks are starting their election preparations. 

    That includes determining who will staff the polls on election days to help register voters, check photo IDs and explain how to mark ballots. 

    In a Nov. 10 video posted to X (formerly Twitter) by the Wisconsin Republican Party, U.S. Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wis., said people concerned about election integrity can “go home and mope” or get involved to help elect Republicans.  

    (Other PolitiFact Wisconsin items have debunked false claims of massive voter fraud and disproved persistent misconceptions about how the 2020 presidential election was administered in the state.)

    Johnson suggested that Republicans who want to “restore confidence in our elections systems” can get trained and paid as poll workers and said: “In order to be a poll worker on the conservative side, you have to register through the Republican Party of Wisconsin.” 

    His claim caught our attention, especially after local clerks were the ones trying to enlist poll workers amid severe shortages during the Covid-19 pandemic

    If you want to become a poll worker, do you have to register through a political party? Let’s take a look. 

    Poll worker positions are first filled through political party lists

    When asked for backup for the claim, Republican Party of Wisconsin Communications Director Matt Fisher shared a section of state law and memos prepared by the Wisconsin Elections Commission.

    Fisher cited Wis. Stat. 7.30, which says that the two dominant political parties (Democrats and Republicans) are responsible for submitting lists of nominees to become election inspectors, another term for poll workers. 

    Under state law, “all inspectors shall be affiliated” with one of the two parties, unless they are appointed as a greeter or if the party list runs out of names. 

    In that case, the mayor, village president or town board chair can appoint a poll worker “without regard to party affiliation.”

    Translation: the names prepared by political parties get first priority for the positions, but it’s still possible to become a poll worker without going through a party.

    According to the commission’s page on becoming a poll worker, voters who are active in a political party can reach out to their county party to be nominated for a two-year term. This year, the parties had to submit their lists by Nov. 30.

    Or, voters can contact their local clerk to learn about applying and become nominated on a nonpartisan basis.

    But it’s becoming less common for poll workers to be assigned through that unaffiliated option, as parties have been preparing longer lists of potential names, a Nov. 2, 2022, Wisconsin Watch article found

    Fisher also referenced Wisconsin Election Commission memos that explain the state law and lay out scenarios to ensure that each polling location has the correct balance of partisan appointees. 

    Our ruling

    Johnson said in the Republican Party video that “in order to be a poll worker on the conservative side, you have to register through the Republican Party of Wisconsin.”

    Although it’s possible for people — even if they have conservative or liberal beliefs — to become nonpartisan poll workers by going through their clerk, it’s less likely they’ll get a spot.. 

    Johnson was referring to people who want to become a poll worker on the “conservative side,” indicating they are involved in Republican politics and want to register that way. But the same is true of the Democratic side; it’s the way the system is built.

    Our definition of Mostly True is “The statement is accurate but needs clarification or additional information.” That fits here.

     

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  • PolitiFact – The Ron DeSantis and Gavin Newsom economies, in 8 charts

    PolitiFact – The Ron DeSantis and Gavin Newsom economies, in 8 charts

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    As California Gov. Gavin Newsom and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis prepare to debate on Fox News, many factors separate their two states, including their ideological leanings and their voting patterns. 

    The Nov. 30 debate between Newsom, a Democrat, and DeSantis, a Republican, is being billed as a blue state versus red state battle in an era of partisan polarization.

    A big comparison — and a topic that will likely arise during the debate — is the economic performance of California, the nation’s most populous state, and Florida, the third most populous.

    We looked at key economic comparisons between the two states. Florida has performed better on some important economic statistics, such as employment and gross domestic product. California fares better on wages, income and poverty.

    Here’s a closer look.

    Employment

    DeSantis likes to tout how his actions during the coronavirus pandemic — such as opening the state to economic activity despite the health risk — positioned his state for a quick rebound from the pandemic recession.

    Florida was in the top one-third of states for COVID-19 death rates with 112 deaths per 100,000 residents in 2021, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

    California — which took a more cautious approach to reopening during the pandemic and ranked around the midpoint among states in COVID-19 death rates — has largely tracked the U.S. as a whole in its jobs comeback. But Florida has fared significantly better. 

    Today, California has 4.8% more jobs than it did in January 2019, the month Newsom and DeSantis took office. But Florida has 10.6% more jobs than in January 2019.

    “Keeping businesses open and allowing people to work was certainly helpful (to Florida),” said Randall G. Holcombe, a Florida State University economist.

    Florida’s unemployment rate has also been lower than the national rate since January 2019; California’s has been higher.

    Florida also performed better in gross domestic product — the sum total of all economic activity within the state. Adjusted for inflation, both states’ GDPs rose faster than the national GDP, but Florida outpaced California. Florida’s GDP is  now 14.2% higher than its January 2019 level, compared with 8.8% higher for California.

    Population

    DeSantis often touts the population flow into Florida from other states as a major plus. And he often knocks California — for decades the nation’s fastest-growing state for population — for not keeping pace.

    Although California remains the more populous state, its share of the nation’s population has stagnated for more than two decades, while Florida’s has risen.

    Housing

    A big reason for Florida’s recent growth spurt has been its relatively low housing costs. Florida’s housing prices are fairly similar to the national average, but they are well below those in California. This does not include insurance costs, which are rising everywhere but particularly in Florida, given climate threats and losses from hurricanes.

    Wages and income

    A notable economic shortcoming for Florida involves wages and income. 

    Average hourly earnings for private-sector workers in Florida are 6.2% below the national average. The same measure for California is 13.1% higher than the national average.

    It’s true even after adjusting for Florida’s lower tax burden; the state’s per capita disposable income — its after-tax income per resident — trails the U.S., while California’s is in the top quarter of states. 

    A caveat is that the higher cost of living in California, including those high housing prices, eats into those wage-and-income advantages.

    Poverty is less common in California. 

    For 2022, California had a 12.2% poverty rate, and 15% for children up to age 18. Both figures were higher in Florida: 12.7% overall and 16.8% for children.

    Finally, California retains an edge in high-paying “knowledge industry” sectors, including Silicon Valley and Hollywood.

    As The New York Times has reported, California leads Florida in the share of adults with at least a bachelor’s degree (37% to 34.3%), the number of universities ranked in the top 50 for research and development funding (7 to 1). and patents issued per 10,000 residents (12.8 to 2.6).

    Florida fared as well or better than California on math test scores for fourth graders and eighth graders, the Times reported.

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  • The Election Reform That Could Help Republicans in a Swing State

    The Election Reform That Could Help Republicans in a Swing State

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    When Governor Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania announced in September that the nation’s largest swing state would implement automatic voter registration, Donald Trump threw a conniption. “Pennsylvania is at it again!” the former president posted on Truth Social, his social-media platform. The switch, Trump said, would be “a disaster for the Election of Republicans, including your favorite President, ME!”

    Trump’s panic is consistent with his (baseless) view that any reforms designed to increase voter turnout, such as expanding mail balloting and early voting, are part of a Democratic conspiracy to rig elections in their favor. But he may be wrong to fear automatic voter registration: Although Shapiro is a Democrat, if either party stands to gain from his move, it’s likely to be the GOP. In Pennsylvania, the reform “really has a potential to lean more Republican,” Seo-young Silvia Kim, an elections expert who has studied the system, told me. It’s “not great news for Democrats.”

    First implemented in Oregon in 2016, automatic voter registration is now used in 23 states, including three—Alaska, Georgia, and West Virginia—that are governed by Republicans. Rather than requiring citizens to proactively register to vote, some states that use the system automatically enroll people who meet eligibility requirements and then give them the option to decline or opt out. The shift is subtler in Pennsylvania; the state has simply started prompting people to register to vote when they obtain a new or renewed driver’s license or state ID.

    The seemingly minor change, which voting-rights advocates still place under the umbrella of “automatic” registration, is based on behavioral research showing that people are less likely to opt out of a choice than to opt in. By including voter registration as part of a commonly used process such as obtaining a driver’s license—and by presenting it as the default option rather than a form that citizens have to request—states have found that they can increase both registration and turnout in elections. “Even though the process isn’t that big of a shift, the effects are great,” Greta Bedekovics, the associate director of democracy policy at the left-leaning Center for American Progress, told me.

    Democrats have led the move toward automatic voter registration, and their 2021 comprehensive voting-rights legislation known as the For the People Act included a requirement that state-elections chiefs implement the policy. (The bill died in the Senate.) But automatic registration does not inherently favor one party or the other, and it has appealed to Republicans in some states because it helps officials clean up voter rolls and safeguard elections. “I don’t know who it will help, and that’s kind of the point,” Sean Morales-Doyle, the director of the voting-rights program at NYU’s Brennan Center for Justice, told me.

    A 2017 study by the Center for American Progress found that the voters who enrolled through Oregon’s automatic-registration system were more likely to be younger, more rural, lower income, and more ethnically diverse than the electorate as a whole—a demographic mix that suggests that Republicans might have benefited as much as Democrats.

    Other research shows a more partisan advantage. While an assistant professor at American University in 2018, Kim, the elections expert, studied the effects of automatic registration in Orange County, California, the site of several hard-fought congressional races that year. She found that among residents who needed to update their registration because they had moved within the county, automatic registration resulted in no meaningful shift for Democrats. But it substantially boosted turnout among Republicans and independents—by 8.1 points and 7.4 points, respectively. “I was actually very surprised,” Kim said, adding that she’d expected that if any party gained, it would be Democrats. She suspects that Democrats may have been unaffected by the change because in 2018, they were already motivated to vote by Trump’s recent election.

    The impact of automatic registration on any one election is likely to be marginal, but even small shifts could be significant in a state such as Pennsylvania, where less than one percentage point separated Trump from Hillary Clinton in 2016 and just more than one point separated Joe Biden from Trump four years later. Several factors suggest that the new system could benefit the GOP in Pennsylvania. Although Democrats have more registered voters in the state, Republicans have been closing the gap during the Trump era as more white working-class and rural voters who stopped voting for Democrats years ago have chosen to join the GOP. Democrats have countered that drift by capturing wealthier suburban voters, a group that helped Shapiro and first-term Democratic Senator John Fetterman win their races during last year’s midterm elections. Because this demographic already goes to the polls pretty reliably, though, automatic registration is more likely to boost turnout among the right-leaning rural working class.

    An early-2020 study also suggested that the GOP stood to gain from higher voter turnout in Pennsylvania. The Knight Foundation surveyed 12,000 “chronic non-voters” nationwide before Democrats had settled on Biden as their nominee. Across the country, nonvoters said that if they cast a ballot, they would support the Democratic candidate over Trump by a slim margin, 33 percent to 30 percent. But in Pennsylvania, nonvoters went strongly in the other direction: By a 36–28 percent margin, they said they’d prefer Trump over the Democrat. The eight-point gap was the second largest (after Arizona) in favor of Trump in any of the 10 swing states that the organization polled.

    “Democrats sometimes have the mistaken opinion that anybody that doesn’t show up is going to vote Democrat,” Mike Mikus, a longtime Democratic strategist in Pennsylvania, told me. “It’s been one of the myths in Democratic circles for years. Quite frankly, given the changing of the respective party bases, it makes sense that [automatic registration] may somewhat benefit Republicans.” Other recent polls have suggested that the political realignment of the Trump era has made the GOP more reliant on infrequent voters.

    The place where Democrats could most use stronger turnout—particularly among the party’s base of Black voters—is Philadelphia, which provided about one-sixth of Biden’s statewide vote in 2020. The city had higher turnout than Pennsylvania as a whole in both 2008 and 2012, when Barack Obama led the Democratic ticket, but it has lagged further and further behind in each election since. Last year, turnout in Philadelphia was just 43 percent, compared with 54 percent statewide.

    Yet automatic voter registration might have less impact in Philadelphia than in other parts of the state. Studies have found that the switch drives higher turnout outside urban areas, where Democratic voters are most concentrated. That’s partly because automatic voter registration is operated through the state Department of Motor Vehicles—an agency with which people who rely on public transit are less likely to interact. For that reason, when New York implemented automatic registration in 2020, voting-rights advocates lobbied aggressively for the state to enroll voters through other agencies in addition to the DMV; as of 2018, a majority of the more than 3 million households in New York City did not own a car.

    Pennsylvania has no plans to implement automatic voter registration beyond the state DMV. Democrats have been adamant that in enacting the new system, Shapiro was not trying to benefit his party but merely trying to reach the 1.6 million Keystone State residents who are eligible but not registered to vote. Although Republicans argued that the change should have gone through the state legislature, they have not formally challenged automatic registration in court. Few of them seemed to agree with Trump that the reform would doom the GOP. “Its impact will be somewhere between inconsequential and a nothingburger,” Christopher Nicholas, a Republican consultant in Pennsylvania, told me.

    Democrats say it’s too early to assess the electoral impact of automatic voter registration, but they acknowledged that Republicans might gain more voters as a result. More than 13,500 Pennsylvanians registered to vote through the new system during its first six weeks of implementation, according to numbers provided by the Shapiro administration. Of that total, Republicans added about 100 more voters than Democrats. “Our former president is almost always wrong,” Joanna McClinton, who leads a narrow Democratic majority as the speaker of the Pennsylvania state House, told me. The fact that Trump is so opposed to the reform, she said, “reveals something we’ve always known, which is Republicans want to keep the electorate small, selective, and they don’t want to expand access to voting even if they could be the beneficiaries of it.”

    Whether Trump regains the presidency next year could hinge on the tightest of margins in Pennsylvania. I asked McClinton if she worried that by implementing automatic voter registration, Shapiro had unintentionally bestowed an electoral gift on Republicans ahead of an enormously significant election. McClinton didn’t hesitate. “Not at all,” she replied quickly. “I look forward to seeing the full data, but I definitely am not looking at this from a political perspective but from a big-D democracy perspective.”

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    Russell Berman

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  • New Study Reveals CBD Searches Jumped Nearly 200% Over Past Decade – Medical Marijuana Program Connection

    New Study Reveals CBD Searches Jumped Nearly 200% Over Past Decade – Medical Marijuana Program Connection

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    HOUSTON — Interest in CBD is on the rise, with certain regions of the United States showing particular curiosity, according to new research by Nature and Bloom, a resource for CBD and hemp.

    The company examined Google Trends data over 12 months of search terms frequently used in relation to CBD, which were then combined to give each state a total search score. The lower the score, the higher a state ranks in interest.

    [Read more: CBD Category Holds Promise for Convenience Channel]

    Alabama is the state most interested in using CBD with a total search score of 62. Additionally, the population of Alabama searches for “CBD shop near me” and “CBD” the second most in America.

    Mississippi ranked second in CBD interest with a search score of 69. The state leads in searches for “What is CBD” and ranks fifth in searches for “Buy CBD.”

    States rounding out the top 10 are:

    • No. 3 West Virginia (total search score: 70) — This state searches the third most for “CBD Oil” and “What is CBD” in the country. It also searches for “Medical marijuana” the fourth most despite not searching for “CBD shop near me.”
    • No. 4 South Carolina and Vermont (total search score for both: 71) — South Carolina searches the most for “CBD Shop near me,” “CBD” and “What is CBD,” while Vermont has the highest number of searched for Buy CBD” and the second highest number of searches for “Cannabidiol” and “CBD.”
    • No. 5 Kentucky and Tennessee (total search score for both: 71) — Kentucky has the highest number of…

    Original Author Link click here to read complete story..

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    MMP News Author

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  • Abortion Is Inflaming the GOP’s Biggest Electoral Problem

    Abortion Is Inflaming the GOP’s Biggest Electoral Problem

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    The escalating political struggle over abortion is compounding the GOP’s challenges in the nation’s largest and most economically vibrant metropolitan areas.

    The biggest counties in Ohio voted last week overwhelmingly against the ballot initiative pushed by Republicans and anti-abortion forces to raise the threshold for passing future amendments to the state constitution to 60 percent. That proposal, known as Issue 1, was meant to reduce the chances that voters would approve a separate initiative on the November ballot to overturn the six-week abortion ban Ohio Republicans approved in 2019.

    The preponderant opposition to Issue 1 in Ohio’s largest counties extended a ringing pattern. Since the Supreme Court overturned the nationwide constitutional right to abortion with its 2022 Dobbs decision, seven states have held ballot initiatives that allowed voters to weigh in on whether the procedure should remain legal: California, Vermont, Montana, Michigan, Kansas, Kentucky, and now Ohio. In addition, voters in Wisconsin chose a new state-supreme-court justice in a race dominated by the question of whether abortion should remain legal in the state.

    In each of those eight contests, the abortion-rights position or candidate prevailed. And in each case, most voters in the states’ largest population centers have voted—usually by lopsided margins—to support legal abortion.

    These strikingly consistent results underline how conflict over abortion is amplifying the interconnected geographic, demographic, and economic realignments reconfiguring American politics. Particularly since Donald Trump emerged as the GOP’s national leader, Republicans have solidified their hold on exurban, small-town, and rural communities, whose populations tend to be predominantly white and Christian and many of whose economies are reliant on the powerhouse industries of the 20th century: manufacturing, energy extraction, and agriculture. Democrats, in turn, are consolidating their advantage inside almost all of the nation’s largest metro areas, which tend to be more racially diverse, more secular, and more integrated into the expanding 21st-century Information Age economy.

    New data provided exclusively to The Atlantic by Brookings Metro, a nonpartisan think tank, show, in fact, that the counties that voted against the proposed abortion restrictions are the places driving most economic growth in their states. Using data from the federal Bureau of Economic Analysis, Brookings Metro at my request calculated the share of total state economic output generated by the counties that voted for and against abortion rights in five of these recent contests. The results were striking: Brookings found that the counties supporting abortion rights accounted for more than four-fifths of the total state GDP in Michigan, more than three-fourths in Kansas, exactly three-fourths in Ohio, and more than three-fifths in both Kentucky and Wisconsin.

    “We are looking at not only two different political systems but two different economies as well within the same states,” Robert Maxim, a senior research associate at Brookings Metro, told me.

    The Ohio vote demonstrated again that abortion is extending the fault line between those diverging systems, with stark electoral implications. Concerns that Republicans would try to ban abortion helped Democrats perform unexpectedly well in the 2022 elections in the key swing states of Arizona, Nevada, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, particularly in well-educated suburbs around major cities. Democrats won four of the six governor contests and four of the five U.S. Senate races in those states despite widespread discontent over the economy and President Joe Biden’s job performance. Even if voters remain unhappy on both of those fronts in 2024, Democratic strategists are cautiously optimistic that fear of Republicans attempting to impose a national abortion ban will remain a powerful asset for Biden and the party’s other candidates.

    When given the chance to weigh in on the issue directly, voters in communities of all sizes have displayed resistance to banning abortion. As Philip Bump of The Washington Post calculated this week, the share of voters supporting abortion rights exceeded Biden’s share of the vote in 500 of the 510 counties that have cast ballots on the issue since last year (outside of Vermont, which Bump did not include in his analysis).

    But across these states, most smaller counties still voted against legal abortion, including this last week in Ohio. A comprehensive analysis of the results by the Cleveland Plain Dealer found that in Ohio’s rural counties, more than three-fifths of voters still backed Issue 1.

    Opponents of Issue 1 overcame that continued resistance with huge margins in the state’s largest urban and suburban counties. Most voters rejected Issue 1 in 14 of the 17 counties that cast the most ballots this week, including all seven that cast the absolute most votes (according to the ranking posted by The New York Times). In several of those counties, voters opposed Issue 1 by ratios of 2 to 1 or even 3 to 1.

    Equally striking were the results in suburban counties around the major cities, almost all of which usually lean toward the GOP. Big majorities opposed Issue 1 in several large suburban counties that Trump won in 2020 (including Delaware and Lorain). Even in more solidly Republican suburban counties that gave Trump more than 60 percent of their vote (Butler, Warren, and Clermont), the “yes” side on Issue 1 eked out only a very narrow win. Turnout in those big urban and suburban counties was enormous as well.

    Jeff Rusnak, a long-time Ohio-based Democratic consultant, says the suburban performance may signal an important shift for the party. One reason that Ohio has trended more solidly Republican than other states in the region, particularly Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, he argues, is that women in Ohio have not moved toward Democrats in the Trump era as much as women in those other states have. But, he told me, the “no” side on Issue 1 could not have run as well as it did in the big suburban counties without significant improvement among independent and even Republican-leaning women. “In Ohio, women who were not necessarily following the Great Lakes–state trends, I think, now woke up and realized, Aha, we better take action,” Rusnak said.

    The Ohio results followed the pattern evident in the other states that have held elections directly affecting abortion rights since last year’s Supreme Court decision. In Kansas, abortion-rights supporters carried all six of the counties that cast the most votes. In the Kentucky and Michigan votes, abortion-rights supporters carried eight of the 10 counties that cast the most votes, and in California they carried the 14 counties with the highest vote totals. Montana doesn’t have as many urban centers as these other states, but its anti-abortion ballot measure was defeated with majority opposition in all three of the counties that cast the most votes. In the Wisconsin state-supreme-court race this spring, Democrat Janet Protasiewicz, who centered her campaign on an unusually explicit pledge to support legal abortion, carried seven of the 10 highest-voting counties. (All of these figures are from the New York Times ranking of counties in those states’ results.) For Republicans hoping to regain ground in urban and suburban communities, abortion has become “a huge challenge because they really are on the wrong side of the issue” with those voters, Charles Franklin, director of the Marquette Law School poll, told me.

    The results in these abortion votes reflect what I’ve called the “class inversion” in American politics. That’s the modern dynamic in which Democrats are running best in the most economically dynamic places in and around the largest cities. Simultaneously, Republicans are relying more on economically struggling communities that generally resist and resent the cultural and demographic changes that are unfolding mostly in those larger metros.

    Tom Davis, a former Republican representative from Northern Virginia who chaired the National Republican Congressional Committee, has described this process to me as Republicans exchanging “the country club for the country.” In some states, trading reduced margins in large suburbs for expanded advantages in small towns and rural areas has clearly improved the GOP position. That’s been true in such states as Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas, as well as in Texas, Iowa, Montana, and, more tenuously, North Carolina. Ohio has fit squarely in that category as well, with GOP gains among blue-collar voters, particularly in counties along the state’s eastern border, propelling its shift from the quintessential late-20th-century swing state to its current position as a Republican redoubt.

    But that reconfiguration just as clearly hurt Republicans in other states, such as Colorado and Virginia earlier in this century and Arizona and Georgia more recently. Growing strength in the largest communities has even allowed Democrats to regain the edge in each of the three pivotal Rust Belt states Trump in 2016 dislodged from the “blue wall”: Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

    In 2022, Democrats swept the governorships in all three states, and won a Senate race as well in Pennsylvania. Support for legal abortion was central to all of those victories: Just over three-fifths of voters in each state said abortion should remain legal in all or most circumstances and vast majorities of them backed the Democratic candidates, according to the exit polls conducted by Edison Research for a consortium of media outlets. The numbers were almost identical in Arizona, where just over three-fifths of voters also backed abortion rights, and commanding majorities of them supported the winning Democratic candidates for governor and U.S. senator.

    Those races made clear that protecting abortion rights was a powerful issue in 2022 for Democrats in blue-leaning or purple states where abortion mostly remains legal. But, as I’ve written, the issue proved much less potent in the more solidly red-leaning states that banned abortion: Republican governors and legislators who passed severe abortion bans cruised to reelection in states including Texas, Georgia, and Florida. Exit polls found that in those more reliably Republican states, even a significant minority of voters who described themselves as pro-choice placed greater priority on other issues, among them crime and immigration, and supported Republican governors who signed abortion restrictions or bans.

    Ohio exemplified that trend as powerfully as any state. Though the exit polls showed that nearly three-fifths of voters said abortion should remain legal in all or most circumstances, Republican Governor Mike DeWine cruised to a landslide reelection after signing the state’s six-week abortion ban. Republican J. D. Vance, who supported a national abortion ban, nonetheless attracted the votes of about one-third of self-described voters who said they supported abortion rights in his winning Ohio Senate campaign last year, the exit polls found.

    The fate of Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio, who’s facing reelection in 2024, may turn on whether he can win a bigger share of the voters who support abortion rights there, as Democrats did last year in states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Arizona. (The same is likely true for Democratic Senator Jon Tester in Republican-leaning Montana, another state that voted down an anti-abortion ballot initiative last year.)

    Brown has some reasons for optimism. After the defeat of Issue 1 last week, the follow-on ballot initiative in November to restore abortion rights in the state will keep the issue front and center. The two leading Republican candidates to oppose Brown are each staunch abortion opponents; Secretary of State Frank LaRose, the probable front-runner in the GOP race, was the chief public advocate for last week’s failed initiative. Most encouraging for Brown, the “no” vote on Issue 1 in the state’s biggest suburban counties far exceeded not only Biden’s performance in the same places in 2020, but also Brown’s own numbers in his last reelection, in 2018.

    For Brown, and virtually every Democrat in a competitive statewide race next year, the road to victory runs through strong showings in such large urban and suburban counties. Given the persistence of discontent over the economy, it will be particularly crucial for Biden to generate big margins among suburban voters who support abortion rights in the very few states likely to decide control of the White House. The resounding defeat of Issue 1 this week showed again that Republicans, in their zeal to revoke the right to legal abortion, have handed Biden and other Democrats their most powerful argument to move those voters.

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    Ronald Brownstein

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  • The Least (and Most) Expensive States for First-Time Home Buyers | Entrepreneur

    The Least (and Most) Expensive States for First-Time Home Buyers | Entrepreneur

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    With interest rates soaring, finding a house is more complicated than ever for first-time buyers.

    But some states offer more realistic deals than others for those looking to invest in a little slice of the American Dream.

    Moneywise, a financial website, ranked all 50 states based on the median price for houses in each state as provided by Zillow and the average down payment percentage of 13% according to the National Association of Realtors.

    Their findings? For one, it might be called the Aloha State, but Hawaii is not very welcoming when it comes to buying a home.

    First-time home buyers in Hawaii must shell out an average down payment of $110,360.38 to secure a home, making it the most expensive state for first-home buyers. With limited land for development and burdensome regulations, Hawaii’s median home value is a tsunami of $848,926.

    If the surf and sand minus the tasty waves are what you’re looking for, you might want to consider a state like Mississippi, where the average home goes for $157,828 with a down payment of $20,517.64

    The number two most expensive state for first-time buyers in California. The Golden State lives up to its billing, with median home prices on Zillow ringing in at $760,800. The average downpayment on such a home is $98,904.

    Here’s a list of the priciest places to live.

    Courtesy: Moneywise

    Related: 9 Places in the U.S. With Small Town Charm and Affordable Home Prices

    Most affordable states for first-time home buyers

    So where should those looking to buy their first home look? According to this new survey, West Virginia is the best state to invest in, boasting the lowest average down payment requirement of $16,783.39. The median home price in West Virginia is $129,103, a steal compared to the national average of $428,700.

    The aforementioned Mississippi is the second cheapest place to buy a home. After that, first-home buyers should look at Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Iowa.

    “Armed with the knowledge from these findings, first-time home buyers can make informed decisions when it comes to choosing a state to buy their first home and work their way towards a brighter financial future,” said a spokesperson for Moneywise.

    Here is a list of the least expensive states to buy.

    Courtesy: Moneywise

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    Jonathan Small

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  • What Winning Did to the Anti-abortion Movement

    What Winning Did to the Anti-abortion Movement

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    In a normal year, the March for Life would begin somewhere along the National Mall. The cavalcade of anti-abortion activists in Washington, D.C., would wind around museums and past monuments, concluding at the foot of the Supreme Court, a physical representation of the movement’s objective: to overturn Roe v. Wade. The march happens in January of each year to coincide with the anniversary of the Roe decision.

    But this is not a normal year. Tomorrow’s march will be the first without Roe on the books.

    In recognition of that fact, the march has a new route. It will finish somewhere on First Street, between the Capitol and the Court building, an acknowledgment of the enormous and somewhat nebulous task ahead: banning or restricting abortion in all 50 states. That task will involve not only Congress, the courts, and the president but also 50 individual state legislatures, thousands of lawmakers, and all of the American communities they represent.

    At the march, activists and other attendees will be jubilant. Speakers will congratulate their fellow marchers on a job well done. Yet at the same time, a current of uncertainty ripples beneath the surface of the anti-abortion movement. Advocates are technically closer than ever to ending abortion in America, but in some ways, the path forward is more treacherous now than it was before. The movement is not in disarray, exactly, but its energy is newly decentralized, diffused throughout the country.

    “There’s a much more choose-your-own-adventure feel” to the movement now, Mary Ziegler, a University of California, Davis School of Law professor who has written about abortion for The Atlantic, told me.

    Overturning Roe was only the first step. The next isn’t exactly obvious.

    Since the 1980s, rescinding the Supreme Court’s 1973 ruling in Roe, which established a nationwide right to abortion, had been the movement’s top goal, because it was the key that unlocked everything else. There could be no real prohibitions on abortion as long as Roe was in effect. Charging into battle was easier under a single banner, with resources and energy directed toward a single national project: filling the Supreme Court with abortion foes.

    Now, though, across all 50 states, different leaders are pressing for abortion restrictions of varying types and degrees: heartbeat bans, gestational limits, restrictions on the abortion pill, or outright bans with few or no exceptions.

    America’s anti-abortion movement has always been a rich tapestry. Although its members share an overarching goal—ending abortion—they have disagreed on tactics and approach. Some groups—including Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life America, Americans United for Life (AUL), and the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC)—have prioritized legal and political strategies; others, including many Catholic organizations, have advocated more for funding the country’s 2,700 pregnancy centers or expanding the social safety net. But there was always a power hierarchy among these groups. “If you were wondering where the bills came from, the lawsuits, it was obvious: A handful of national groups dictated everything,” Ziegler said. The NRLC and AUL organized the troops and drafted model legislation. They planned judicial strategy and pushed court cases forward.

    In the post-Roe world, those groups are less powerful and less relevant. The central players now are the thousands of state-level politicians, local leaders, and grassroots activists who are writing and passing legislation, often independent of those once-dominant national groups.

    The influence of the national groups has been waning since even before the fall of Roe. A Texas pastor and a former state solicitor general, for example, came up with Texas’s 2021 S.B. 8, which banned abortion once a fetal heartbeat was detectable (typically after six weeks) and authorized private citizens to sue abortion providers. The two men did so without much input from any national group, according to the experts I spoke with. Abortion restrictions in Alabama and Georgia, which passed in 2019 and went into effect in 2022, were drafted by different state activists and leaders and contain starkly different language, showing little influence from national groups.

    The national anti-abortion movement clearly wasn’t ready for this flurry of activity. But it could have been better prepared, Daniel K. Williams, a history professor at the University of West Georgia, told me. When Amy Coney Barrett was nominated to the Court, or even as soon as Trump was elected president, national organizations could have put forward a single model law for lawmakers, and uniform guidance for health-care providers and hospitals. Instead, America ended up with a chaotic patchwork of abortion restrictions—a mixture of newly written trigger laws and dusty legislation from the late 19th century. Some of these new policies are vague or fail to address health complications such as miscarriage and ectopic pregnancy. They propose varying consequences for abortion providers and different mechanisms for enforcement.

    In November, the AUL released its American Life Initiative and its model legislation, the Ready for Life Act, which bans abortion after conception and includes a life-of-the-mother exception, as well as clarifications regarding miscarriage and ectopic pregnancy. But it came five months after the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision overturning Roe. That groups were drafting these guidelines “months after Dobbs and not experiencing any uniformity in state legislatures is a sign of how decentralized and swift-moving all of this has been,” Williams said.

    Clarke Forsythe, the senior counsel for AUL, defends his organization’s strategy: “We needed time to analyze Dobbs and its impact and implications and needed time to put the package together,” he told me. “It’s a long-term initiative and a long-term vision. There was no need to get it out before the election.”

    Abortion opponents insist that a state-level free-for-all could turn out to be helpful for the movement. With more people involved and working toward different initiatives, the argument goes, activists might come up with innovative ideas and policy proposals. Democracy, by nature, is messy. “It’s good for the country and good for our politics to decentralize the issue,” Forsythe told me. “The Court sent it back to the local level, where public policy can be better aligned with public opinion, where the people responsible for it are responsive to people at the local level.” Decentralization is the movement’s strength, Lila Rose, the president of the national anti-abortion group Live Action, told me. “It requires a diverse and multifaceted approach. It’s not strategic conflict so much as strategic differences.”

    This particular moment gives anti-abortion activists a chance to think creatively and to forge new alliances, some in the movement argue. Now that Roe is gone, do they need to keep up their ties with the GOP? “I would like to see the movement disentangle itself from particular political parties,” Erika Bachiochi, an anti-abortion writer and a fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, told me. Maybe, she added, there’s room for a return of the “old pro-life Democrat.”

    But an unintended consequence of overturning Roe could be that the movement has inadvertently pushed its highest objective—ending legal abortion—further out of reach. “On the one hand, when there’s a free-for-all, ideas that may never have been given the time of day can emerge and work,” Ziegler said. “On the other, you can have bills that are damaging nationally get passed.” Texas’s S.B. 8—the Texas Heartbeat Act—frustrated some movement leaders because it empowered individual citizens to sue, which meant that those individuals would control the narrative, Ziegler said. Others worry about the vocal “abortion abolition” groups, which have been calling for women who obtain abortions to be punished.

    These days, Ziegler says, “there’s no single voice in the movement to say, ‘No, that’s not what we stand for.’” A few extremists, in other words, could damage the movement’s reputation—and interfere with its ultimate goal.

    Before Dobbs, anti-abortion advocates seemed confident that once a handful of states banned abortion, many more would follow—that they could build a “culture of life” in America that would put the country on a righteous path. In some ways, the opposite has occurred. As a few states put limits on abortion rights, others, such as Vermont, California, and Michigan, have reacted by enshrining those rights into state law. Meanwhile, voters in red states including Kansas, Montana, and Kentucky rejected attempts to restrict abortion. Former President Donald Trump—the man whose nomination of three Supreme Court justices led directly to the overturning of Roe—has gone so far as to blame Republicans’ disappointing midterm performance on the anti-abortion movement. (In response, Rose called his comments “sniveling cowardice.”)

    Nationally, the movement’s relationship with the Republican Party is troubled. Last fall, when Senator Lindsey Graham proposed legislation restricting abortions after 15 weeks, only a handful of his Republican colleagues were publicly supportive. “Most of the members of my conference prefer that this be dealt with at the state level,” Minority Leader Mitch McConnell told reporters at the time.

    Even in the new Congress, where Republicans have a House majority, one of the first pieces of legislation passed in the lower chamber was the so-called Born Alive bill, which would require health-care providers to treat babies in the vanishingly rare cases of failed abortions. Here was a chance for Republicans to pass a bill restricting abortion after 15 weeks or even six, in a show of support to the movement that they purport to champion. But they didn’t. Republicans in Congress are “afraid to do anything on this issue that’s meaningful” for fear of the political consequences, Ziegler says.

    Anti-abortion leaders like Rose believe that they’re being unfairly blamed for these recent Republican losses and missed opportunities. They argue that in the midterms the GOP chose candidates who were insufficiently anti-abortion, or simply problematic, such as Mehmet Oz and Herschel Walker. But there was also a communication issue, they say. Candidates weren’t outspoken enough about abortion; they should have talked more about the Democrats’ support for abortion at late gestational ages, and their plan to codify abortion rights into law. “That’s where the real problem was” in the midterms, Marilyn Musgrave, the vice president of government affairs for Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life America, told me. “Republicans weren’t pointing out the extremism on the other side.”

    It’s true that some Republicans campaigned successfully on abortion restrictions last year, including GOP Governors Ron DeSantis of Florida, Kay Ivey of Alabama, Brian Kemp of Georgia, and Greg Abbott of Texas, each of whom won reelection by a substantial margin. Still, the recent state referenda and post-Dobbs polling suggest that the anti-abortion movement is too optimistic about the level of support for their goals.

    “We’ve clearly lost the narrative,” Charlie Camosy, an ethics professor at Creighton University School of Medicine and a columnist for the Religion News Service, told me. Activists like Camosy hope that the movement’s new emphasis will be a grassroots effort to educate Americans and persuade them to oppose abortion. Camosy isn’t attending the March for Life tomorrow; instead, he’s giving a speech at a Catholic seminar in Freehold, New Jersey, where he lives. “Something is wrong in our ability to communicate what’s at stake,” he said of the broader movement. “Focusing on the national level distracts from getting Michigan or Montana or Kentucky or Kansas right.”

    But eventually, Camosy’s movement will have to face the reality of abortion in America: Some states just aren’t going to budge. “Fewer than 50 percent of states are likely to meaningfully curtail abortion,” Williams estimates. Even if the movement gains ground in some states, “that’s likely only to harden the resistance in more strongly pro-choice states.” Which means that, rather than a growing national consensus on abortion, Americans probably can expect more polarization—a cultural standoff.

    Tomorrow’s March for Life will be the first time activists have held a major national gathering since Roe was overturned in June. But it will probably be a much smaller event than before. Some activists have wondered whether it should happen at all. More states and cities will be hosting their own rallies, because that’s where the next round of work needs to be done. And many people will be at those local marches instead—to start, or maybe to double down, on their difficult project of creating a “culture of life.”

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    Elaine Godfrey

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  • How Many Republicans Died Because the GOP Turned Against Vaccines?

    How Many Republicans Died Because the GOP Turned Against Vaccines?

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    No country has a perfect COVID vaccination rate, even this far into the pandemic, but America’s record is particularly dismal. About a third of Americans—more than a hundred million people—have yet to get their initial shots. You can find anti-vaxxers in every corner of the country. But by far the single group of adults most likely to be unvaccinated is Republicans: 37 percent of Republicans are still unvaccinated or only partially vaccinated, compared with 9 percent of Democrats. Fourteen of the 15 states with the lowest vaccination rates voted for Donald Trump in 2020. (The other is Georgia.)

    We know that unvaccinated Americans are more likely to be Republican, that Republicans in positions of power led the movement against COVID vaccination, and that hundreds of thousands of unvaccinated Americans have died preventable deaths from the disease. The Republican Party is unquestionably complicit in the premature deaths of many of its own supporters, a phenomenon that may be without precedent in the history of both American democracy and virology.

    Obviously, nothing about being a Republican makes someone inherently anti-vaccine. Many Republicans—in fact, most of them—have gotten their first two shots. But the wildly disproportionate presence of Republicans among the unvaccinated reveals an ugly and counterintuitive aspect of the GOP campaign against vaccination: At every turn, top figures in the party have directly endangered their own constituents. Trump disparaged vaccines while president, even after orchestrating Operation Warp Speed. Other politicians, such as Texas Governor Greg Abbott, made all COVID-vaccine mandates illegal in their state. More recently, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis called for a grand jury to investigate the safety of COVID vaccines. The right-wing media have leaned even harder into vaccine skepticism. On his prime-time Fox News show, Tucker Carlson has regularly questioned the safety of vaccines, inviting guests who have called for the shots to be “withdrawn from the market.”

    Breaking down the cost of vaccine hesitancy would be simple if we could draw a causal relationship between Republican leaders’ anti-vaccine messaging and the adoption of those ideas by Americans, and then from those ideas to deaths due to non-vaccination. Unfortunately, we don’t have the data to do so. Individual vaccine skepticism cannot be traced back to a single source, and even if it could, we don’t know exactly who is unvaccinated and what their political affiliations are.

    What we do have is a patchwork of estimations and correlations that, taken together, paint a blurry but nevertheless grim picture of how Republican leaders spread the vaccine hesitancy that has killed so many people. We know that as of April 2022, about 318,000 people had died from COVID because they were unvaccinated, according to research from Brown University. And the close association between Republican vaccine hesitancy and higher death rates has been documented. One study estimated that by the fall of 2021, vaccine uptake accounted for 10 percent of the total difference between Republican and Democratic deaths. But that estimate has changed—and even likely grown—over time.

    Partisanship affected outcomes in the pandemic even before we had vaccines. A recent study found that from October 2020 to February 2021, the death rate in Republican-leaning counties was up to three times higher than that of Democratic-leaning counties, likely because of differences in masking and social distancing. Even when vaccines came around, these differences continued, Mauricio Santillana, an epidemiology expert at Northeastern University and a co-author of the study, told me. Follow-up research published in Lancet Regional Health Americas in October looked at deaths from April 2021 to March 2022 and found a 26 percent higher death rate in areas where voters leaned Republican. “There are subsequent and very serious [partisan] patterns with the Delta and Omicron waves, some of which can be explained by vaccination,” Bill Hanage, a co-author of the paper and an epidemiologist at Harvard, told me in an email.

    But to understand why Republicans have died at higher rates, you can’t look at vaccine status alone. Congressional districts controlled by a trifecta of Republican leaders—state governor, Senate, and House—had an 11 percent higher death rate, according to the Lancet study. A likely explanation, the authors write, could be that in the post-vaccine era, those leaders chose policies and conveyed public-health messages that made their constituents more likely to die. Although we still can’t say these decisions led to higher death rates, the association alone is jarring.

    One of the most compelling studies comes from researchers at Yale, who published their findings as a working paper in November. They link political party and excess-death rate—the percent increase in deaths above pre-COVID levels—among those registered as either Democrats or Republicans, providing a more granular view. They chose to analyze data from Florida and Ohio from before and after vaccines were available. Looking at the period before the vaccine,  researchers found a 1.6 percentage-point difference in excess death rate among Republicans and Democrats, with a higher rate among Republicans. But after vaccines became available, that gap widened dramatically to 10.4 percentage points, again with a higher Republican excess death rate. “When we compare individuals who are of the same age, who live in the same county in the same month of the pandemic, there are differences correlated with your political-party affiliation that emerge after vaccines are available,” Jacob Wallace, an assistant professor of public health at Yale who co-authored the paper, told me. “That’s a statement we can confidently make based on the study and we couldn’t before.”

    Even with this new research, it is difficult to determine just how many people died as a result of their political views. In the “excess death” study, researchers dealt only with rates of excess death, not actual death-toll numbers. Overall, excess deaths represent a small share of deaths. “On the scale of national registration for both parties,” Wallace said, “we’re talking about relatively small numbers and differences in deaths” when you look at excess death rates alone.

    The absolute number of Republican deaths is less important than the fact that they happened needlessly. Vaccines could have saved lives. And yet, the party that describes itself as pro-life campaigned against them. Democrats are not without fault, though. The Biden administration’s COVID blunders are no doubt to blame for some of the nation’s deaths. But on the whole, Democratic leaders have mostly not promoted ideas or enforced policies around COVID that actively chip away at life expectancy. It is a tragedy that the Republican push against basic lifesaving science has cut lives short and continues to do so. The partisan divide in COVID deaths, Hanage said, is just “another example of how the partisan politics of the U.S. has poisoned the well of public health.”

    What’s most concerning about all of this is that partisan disparities in death rates were also apparent before COVID. People living in Republican jurisdictions have been at a health disadvantage for more than 20 years. From 2001 to 2019, the death rate in Democratic counties decreased by 22 percent, according to a recent study; in Republican counties, it declined by only 11 percent. In the same time period, the political gap in death rates increased sixfold.

    Health outcomes have been diverging at the state level since the ’90s, Steven Woolf, an epidemiologist at Virginia Commonwealth University, told me. Woolf’s work suggests that over the decades, state policy decisions on health issues such as Medicaid, gun legislation, tobacco taxes, and, indeed, vaccines have likely had a stronger impact on state health trajectories than other factors. COVID’s high Republican death rates are not an isolated phenomenon but a continuation of this trend. As Republican-led states pushed back on lockdowns, the impact on population death rates was observed within weeks, Woolf said.

    If the issue is indeed systemic, that doesn’t bode well for the future. Other factors could explain the higher death rate in Republican-leaning places—more poverty, less education, worse socioeconomic conditions—, though Woolf said isn’t convinced that those factors aren’t related to bad state health policy too. In any case, the long-term decline of health in red states indicates that there is an ongoing problem at a high level in Republican-led places, and that something has gone awry. “If you happen to live in certain states, your chances for living a long life are going to be much higher than if you’re an American living in a different state,” Woolf said.

    Unfortunately, this trend shows no signs of breaking. The anti-science messaging that fuels such a divide is popular with Republican leaders because it plays so well with their constituents. Far-right crowds cheer for missed vaccine targets and jokes about executing scientific leaders. In an environment where partisanship trumps all—including trying to save people’s lives—such messaging is both politically effective and morally abhorrent. The data, however imperfect, demand a reckoning with the consequences of such a strategy not only during the pandemic but over the past few decades, and in the years to come. But to acknowledge how many Republicans didn’t have to die would mean giving credence to scientific and medical expertise. So long as America remains locked in a poisonous partisan battle in which science is wrongly dismissed as being associated with the left, the death toll will only rise.

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    Yasmin Tayag

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  • Letting Go of the Iowa Caucus

    Letting Go of the Iowa Caucus

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    My father was a registered independent for most of my childhood because he resented having to choose. But choosing was not hard for my mother. She was an MSNBC devotee, a liberal Pennsylvania transplant who took her adopted role as an Iowa Democrat seriously. She wanted me to take politics seriously, too.

    Which is why, on a freezing January night in 2000, Mom zipped up our coats, buckled 7-year-old me into our white Toyota Previa, and drove us along five miles of gravel to the nearest town: Danville, population 919. It would be my very first Iowa caucus, with New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley and Vice President Al Gore vying for the Democratic nomination. Mom thought Bradley had more personality, so she stood, with me at her side, in his corner of the Danville Elementary School gymnasium. When Bradley was considered not “viable,” per caucus rules, Mom walked us over to Gore’s group, and he was soon declared the winner. Mom recounted all of this recently; I remember little from that night, except the outlines of bulky puffer jackets and a general tingliness at being the only kid in a room full of adults doing something that seemed important.

    Accuse me of harboring a pro-caucus bias and you’d be right; I love them and I always have. A caucus is like a primary, but not: There’s no secret ballot. You demonstrate your preference for a candidate by physically moving your body to a different chair or another corner of the gym. Only a few states do it this way, and “this way” looks different everywhere.

    After that night in 2000, Mom took me with her at each opportunity. Every four or eight years, we held hands and navigated icy sidewalks after dark. We explored student-less school hallways and cozy church luncheon rooms. We stood under basketball hoops and listened to neighbors argue about candidates as though their opinions really mattered, because that night they actually did.

    Over the past half century, Iowa’s prominence in politics became part of its identity—something the state was known for besides its acres of corn and millions of hogs. Iowa doesn’t have any major-league teams to root for, or the kind of glittering cities that draw visitors from all corners of the world. But the caucuses helped make Iowa special—and on the national political stage, they made it relevant.

    Still, it’s possible to hold two truths in tension. The caucus is part of Iowa’s identity, and deeply rooted in my own, yet the process has never really been fair—not to many Iowans, and not to other Americans. So, even though I felt a sharp pang of sorrow earlier this month when President Joe Biden suggested that my home state should give up its spot on the early-voting roster, I wasn’t surprised. Most Iowans have seen this day coming. Some are more prepared than others.

    Thanks to the caucus, I never thought it was strange that I’d met Barack Obama twice before I turned 20. Nothing seemed shocking about Newt Gingrich showing up to speak at the restaurant where my parents have happy hour on Fridays. I was only slightly unsettled to discover that my high-school friend was having a summertime fling with a political reporter I knew from D.C.

    For 50 years, these meet-cutes and history-making appearances have been normal, tradition. Iowans heard Howard Dean make the animalistic roar that supposedly ended his campaign. They sheltered in place with Elizabeth Warren during a tornado. They watched Fred Thompson rolling around the state fair in style, and bore witness to John Delaney’s sad ride down the Giant Slide.

    Iowa’s prominence in the process dates back to the 1970s, when the caucuses helped put George McGovern, and later Jimmy Carter, on the proverbial map. State law requires that Iowa holds its caucuses eight days before the first primary happens, hence the quadrennial Iowa–New Hampshire pairing. Most people know this by now; it’s the process they don’t get—the appeal of the thing. The magic.

    That’s how many Iowans see the caucus: a messy, intimate project that represents politics in its most sublime form—a dose of pure democracy smack-dab in the middle of Iowa’s fields and farms. I’m not sure about all that. But the caucuses are intimate. You discuss electability with your legs wedged beneath a lunch table designed for children. You look your neighbor in the eye and tell him why he’s wrong. On a school night! During one of his first-ever caucuses, my father, sitting at Senator Bernie Sanders’s table, was approached by a neighbor from Hillary Clinton’s. “Didn’t you hear that Sanders was a conscientious objector?” the man asked. Dad replied that he didn’t realize it was a liability for a presidential candidate to have a conscience. I remember thinking that this was a good comeback.

    As a sophomore in college, I viewed the caucus as a noble process, probably because I was reading a lot of Hannah Arendt for class. The German philosopher wrote often about the polis—from which politics is derived—and in The Human Condition she defined it as “the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together.” The caucus, I thought. How romantic. But at the time, I was unaware—being young and able-bodied and generally self-absorbed—that caucuses don’t allow all people to act and speak together.

    Mailing in your candidate preferences has never been an option in the caucuses. And many Iowans are not free at seven on a weeknight in January or February. That includes people working shift jobs, people working late, people with little kids, people with relatives to take care of, people with disabilities, people who don’t drive at night, people who have important plans, people who are simply out of town. Over the summer, state Democratic officials, in a bid to keep their place, finally did propose an absentee option. The DNC was apparently unimpressed.

    The other most common criticism of the caucus is that Iowa is too white to make a decision that sets the political tempo for the rest of the country. Iowans would counter that their state proved to be the launching pad for America’s first Black president, but the point is well taken. In 2020, Biden finished fourth in mostly white Iowa, and it took the Black voters of South Carolina to push him to the front of the pack.

    Iowa’s critics were vindicated that year, when the caucus became synonymous with chaos. The actual process went relatively smoothly, but a faulty new app and jammed phone lines disrupted the reporting of the results. That year, I’d invited my boyfriend to come to my hometown while I covered the caucuses. I’d wanted him to be charmed by the quaint small-town-ness of it all; instead, I was embarrassed. The entire state was. That was the final straw. This summer, a Democratic National Committee panel required every state to make the case for going early in the primary season. Earlier this month, with Biden’s support, the committee passed a proposal that would reorder which states vote first: South Carolina would start, and Michigan and Georgia would be part of the first five. Iowa was not on the list.

    Long-time party activists are suffering varying degrees of disappointment at the news. Some lean more toward acceptance. “We’ve taken our role seriously. I think that it was probably time to move on,” Kurt Meyer, a retiree who’s led caucuses for years in northeast Mitchell County, told me. “As an Iowan who cares about such things, I’m sorry to see it go … but it’s okay.” Then he chuckled: “It’s like an aging ball player saying, It was a good run and I enjoyed those World Series games, but now I’m ready to watch from the comfort of the den with a drink in my hand.”

    Others are left with a bitter taste. They have some arguments in their favor, after all: Candidates with no money can travel across Iowa easily and purchase ads cheaply. The caucus process itself allows people to rank their preferences and enables coalition-building among supporters of different candidates. “I don’t think people understood the nuance that was there, and that might be the party’s biggest failure,” Sandy Dockendorff, a longtime caucus leader in the southeast, told me. The result, she said, is that people in flyover country will feel even more neglected than they already do.

    “That’s telling a lot of rural folks—a lot of the breadbasket—that we don’t matter,” Dockendorff said. “That’ll be felt for generations.”

    Three years ago, I wrote a story about the Iowa Democratic Party’s plan to offer “satellite” caucuses that would let some people with work commitments or disabilities participate remotely. I was critical of the proposal because it wouldn’t solve all of the caucus’s inclusivity problems. After my article ran, a well-known Iowa labor leader emailed me. “I can tell you really dislike Iowa!” he wrote. The note was short, and I was crushed. My chest hurt. Had I betrayed my state with a single, 1,300-word article? But I think I understand how he was feeling. I get it now.

    Americans outside the Midwest may soon forget about the Butter Cow. Iowa will take an economic hit if the state doesn’t go first in the Democrats’ nominating process. The restaurants serving tenderloins and chicken lips to eager-to-please politicians won’t make as much; the hotels and bars frequented by the national press corps will suffer. But the real reason these changes will be hard for many Iowans to accept is that a whole lot of pride is tied up in this thing. I hear it when I’m talking on the phone with my parents, and when I’m listening to people like Dockendorff and Meyer reminisce. Caucus advocates claim that Iowans are perfectly suited for the part because they are a particularly discerning people. I don’t think that’s true. But Iowans do take the role seriously—at least the ones who participate.

    Iowa Democrats have invested decades of effort into hosting bright-eyed, young campaign staffers from California and Massachusetts in their homes. They’ve given rookie candidates with few resources the space to make a case and a name for themselves. That all of this might soon be ripped away by a faceless group of people in D.C.—who seem to harbor, if not ill will, then at least a light disdain toward Iowa—is hard to swallow. Identity is a tricky thing.

    No one is totally sure what happens next. The DNC will vote on the new order in February, and this summer, states will submit plans for the upcoming election. Iowa will have to decide how to play it. If state Democrats agree to move the caucus, in theory that breaks state law; the state attorney general could sue them. Some party leaders seem eager to say “Screw it!” and hold a first-in-the-nation caucus anyway, which could mean that Iowa’s delegates aren’t counted at the national convention. Candidates who campaign for such an unsanctioned event could face repercussions. But whatever happens, after committee members vote and state leaders draw their line in the sand, the Iowa caucus probably won’t look the same.

    I don’t get to decide what the best outcome would be, for the state or for the process itself. But for all of my life and 20 years before that, Iowa has enjoyed a very particular feeling—a heady mix of relevance and attention—that has become enmeshed, irrevocably, into Iowans’ sense of their home and themselves. I learned to cherish that feeling as a 7-year-old. Maybe it’s time for other people, in some other state, to feel it, too. It will be hard to let go.

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    Elaine Godfrey

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  • What the Georgia Runoff Revealed

    What the Georgia Runoff Revealed

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    Senator Raphael Warnock’s win in yesterday’s Georgia Senate runoff capped a commanding show of strength by Democrats in the states that decided the 2020 race for the White House—and will likely pick the winner again in 2024.

    With Warnock’s victory over Republican Herschel Walker, Democrats have defeated every GOP Senate and gubernatorial candidate endorsed by Donald Trump this year in the five states that flipped from supporting him in 2016 to backing Joe Biden in 2020: Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Georgia, and Arizona.

    Coming even amid widespread discontent over the economy, this year’s Democratic sweep against the Trump-backed candidates underscores the continuing resistance to the former president’s influence. In particular, Warnock’s decisive margins in Atlanta and its suburbs yesterday extended the Democratic dominance of white-collar (and usually racially diverse) metropolitan areas, as varied as the suburbs of Detroit and Philadelphia and the booming hot spots of Phoenix and Madison.

    “The huge question after the election of 2020 was whether the suburbs would snap back to the GOP column after Trump was no longer on the ballot,” Ben Wikler, the Democratic Party chair in Wisconsin, told me. “What we saw in 2022 was suburbs continuing to trend toward Democrats.”

    Apart from perhaps Michigan, none of these states appears entirely out of reach for the GOP in 2024. Whit Ayres, a longtime GOP pollster, told me that although suburban voters recoiled against “delusional candidates” who “parroted” Trump’s lies about the 2020 election, Republicans “could very well come back and win the suburbs” with “non-delusional candidates.”

    Of the five pivotal states from the last presidential election, Republicans this year actually performed best in Georgia, where the party swept the other statewide offices. Even Walker remained stubbornly close to Warnock in the final results, despite an avalanche of damaging personal revelations and gaffes. Across these states, Republican dominance in rural areas that the GOP consolidated under Trump continued through this year’s midterm and allowed several of his endorsed candidates, like Walker, to remain competitive despite big deficits in the largest population centers.

    But in the end, the Democratic strength in the largest metropolitan areas proved insurmountable for the seven Trump-backed candidates in governor or Senate races across these five states. The only Republicans who won such contests in these states were Georgia Governor Brian Kemp, who sharpened an image of independence by standing up to Trump’s efforts to overturn his 2020 loss in the state, and Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, who echoes many of Trump’s themes but has an established political identity apart from him. (Johnson barely held off his Democratic challenger, Mandela Barnes.)

    “You have a large percentage of Americans who are wary of MAGA and have now voted against MAGA three times,” Simon Rosenberg, the president of NDN, a Democratic research and advocacy group, told me. Rosenberg was the most forceful public skeptic of the “red wave” theory. “They are now going to have to take all those people and turn them into Republican voters in 2024. It’s certainly not impossible, but I’d much rather be us than them going into the 2024 election”

    In many ways, yesterday’s Georgia result underscored the partisan chasm that has left the country closely divided for at least the past decade. Walker was, by any objective measure, among the weakest general-election candidates for a major office either party has produced in modern memory. Tarred by an endless procession of scandals, prone to nonsensical statements on the campaign trail (as when he mused on the relative merits of vampires and werewolves), and unwilling or unable to articulate positions on many major issues, he nonetheless drew unflagging support from national Republican leaders and held the large majority of the state’s Republican votes.

    That Walker came as close as he did to winning underscores the growing parliamentary nature of House and Senate elections, in which fewer voters are casting their ballots based on personal assessments of the two candidates and more are deciding based on which party they want to control the national agenda.

    Yet all of that still left Walker, like the other Trump-backed candidates, short in the face of solid margins for Democrats in and around these states’ major population centers. Exit polls showed Democrats posting big advantages among all the demographic groups that tend to congregate in large metropolitan areas: young people, people of color, college-educated voters, secular voters, and LGBTQ adults.

    Thriving Cobb and Gwinnett Counties outside Atlanta, with a combined population of 1.7 million people, encapsulate the suburban evolution that has tilted the balance of power. For years, these counties were Republican redoubts: George W. Bush won them by roughly a combined 150,000 votes in the 2004 presidential race, and even as late as the hard-fought 2014 Georgia Senate race, the winning GOP nominee, David Perdue, carried each of them by double-digit margins.

    But both counties have grown more diverse. White people now make up only about three-fifths of the population in Cobb and a little more than half in Gwinnett, and nearly half of Cobb adults hold at least a four-year college degree. This has alienated them from a GOP that Trump has reshaped to reflect the cultural priorities and grievances of culturally conservative white voters, particularly those without college degrees or who live outside urban areas. Hillary Clinton narrowly carried both counties in 2016, Biden won just under 60 percent of the vote in each in 2020, and Warnock in November roughly matched Biden’s performance. As of the latest count, Warnock yesterday again carried about three-fifths of the vote in both Cobb and Gwinnett. He also ran up big margins in the suburban counties just south of Atlanta.

    The same patterns were evident in the large white-collar suburbs of the other states that Republicans must win back to recapture the White House in 2024. In Michigan, Governor Gretchen Whitmer, in crushing her Trump-backed opponent, Tudor Dixon, won a higher share of the vote in Oakland and Kent Counties than she managed in 2018 or than Biden did in 2020. In Pennsylvania, Senator-elect John Fetterman matched Biden in exceeding three-fifths of the vote in both Delaware and Montgomery Counties, outside Philadelphia. In Arizona, Senator Mark Kelly carried Maricopa County, centered on Phoenix, by almost 100,000 votes—more than doubling Biden’s margin in 2020, when he became the first Democratic presidential nominee to win the county since Harry Truman in 1948. In Wisconsin, Governor Tony Evers won booming Dane County, centered on Madison, by 25,000 more votes than he had in 2018, and an analysis of the statewide results showed him improving the most over his first election in the counties with the highest levels of educational attainment.

    After this year’s defeats, many analysts in both parties are dubious that Trump can recapture enough (and maybe any) of these five states in 2024. The bigger question facing Republicans is whether another candidate, one who does not have Trump’s personal baggage but who shares most of his culture-war views, such as Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, could perform much better.

    Republicans are generally optimistic that DeSantis could regain ground Trump has lost among suburban voters who leaned Republican not too long ago. They point to Georgia Republican Governor Kemp performing better than Walker did in the Atlanta suburbs as evidence that a more mainstream Republican can slice the Democratic advantage in such places. DeSantis, Ayres said, “has got a lot of things he can sell to suburban Republican voters that Trump just can’t sell.”

    Almost universally, Democrats believe that Republicans are underestimating how hard it will be to reel back in college-educated suburban voters who have now mobilized against Trump’s vision for America in three consecutive elections, especially in these battleground states. Although DeSantis is less belligerent than Trump, and not associated with the violence and subversion of the January 6 insurrection, so far he has emphasized a similar style of politics focused on conservative grievance against “woke” cultural liberalism. “Ron DeSantis is every bit as MAGA as Donald Trump,” Rosenberg said. “This idea that he is some more moderate version of Trump is just farcical.”

    The fact that even a candidate as weak as Walker remained as competitive as he did underscores how difficult it may be for either side to establish a comfortable advantage in these states in 2024. (The exceptions could be Michigan, which even many Republicans agree looks daunting for them, and maybe Pennsylvania, which also tilted blue last month.)

    These states provided Democrats with their own warning signs this year. Exit polls last month showed that most voters in these states disapproved of Biden’s job performance and that big majorities in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, the states where the question was asked, did not want him to run again. Democrats also faced a worrying trend of lagging Black turnout in many urban centers this year, though Black voters came out in big numbers in Georgia’s early voting, and activists in the state are confident they will remain highly engaged through 2024. “Our goal was to build a culture of voting, and that’s what we have done in Georgia over the past five years,” Amari Fennoy, the state coordinator for the NAACP Georgia State Conference, told me.

    Yet the consistency of the results this year, both demographically and geographically, signal that the re-sorting of the parties in the Trump era has left Democrats with a narrow, but potentially durable, advantage in these five crucial states. That doesn’t mean Democrats are guaranteed to win them in the 2024 presidential race, but it does suggest an important takeaway from the 2022 election that finally ended last night: As long as voters still perceive Republicans to be operating in Trump’s shadow (much less if they again nominate Trump himself), Democrats will begin with an advantage in the states most likely to pick the next president.

    “I think that the coalition that turned out to stop Trump is going to be the starting point for the next presidential race,” Wikler said. “There are new threats and new opportunities, but this was not a one-off coalition that came together for a special occasion and went home.” Georgia, again, made that very clear last night.

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    Ronald Brownstein

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  • How Abortion Defined the 2022 Midterms

    How Abortion Defined the 2022 Midterms

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    Ask anyone what Mehmet Oz said about reproductive rights during last month’s Pennsylvania Senate debate, and they’ll probably tell you that the TV doctor believes an abortion should be between “a woman, her doctor, and local political leaders.” The truth is, that dystopian Handmaid’s Tale–esque statement did not come verbatim from the Republican’s mouth. But it may have cost him the election anyway.

    Instead, that catchphrase entered Pennsylvania voters’ consciousness—and ricocheted across social media—via a tweet by Pat Dennis, a Democratic opposition researcher. Dennis’s megaviral post included a clip purporting to show Oz pitching something akin to a pregnancy tribunal. But the clip was, well, clipped: In the 10-second video, Oz does not even say the word abortion. Did it matter? Not in the least. Here was Oz’s fuller, unedited response to the question:

    There should not be involvement from the federal government in how states decide their abortion decisions. As a physician, I’ve been in the room when there’s some difficult conversations happening. I don’t want the federal government involved with that at all. I want women, doctors, local political leaders, letting the democracy that’s always allowed our nation to thrive to put the best ideas forward so states can decide for themselves.

    Although that by no means utterly rebuts Dennis’s three-clause summary, it is different. Of course, voters zeroed in on—and recoiled from—the pithier version. Oz failed to shake his association with the thorny abortion hypothetical, much as he failed to shake the long-running joke that he actually lives in New Jersey. Abortion decided this race, and Oz was on the wrong side of history.

    In red and blue states alike, reproductive autonomy proved a defining issue of the 2022 midterms. Although much pre-election punditry predicted that Pennsylvania Democratic nominee John Fetterman’s post-stroke verbal disfluency was poised to “blow up” the pivotal Senate race on Election Day, the exit polls suggest that abortion seismically affected contests up and down the ballot.

    Concerns over the future of reproductive rights unequivocally drove Democratic turnout and will now lead to the rewriting of state laws around the country. In deep-red Kentucky, voters rejected an amendment that read, “Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to secure or protect a right to abortion or require the funding of abortion.” In blue havens such as California and Vermont, voters approved ballot initiatives enshrining abortion rights into their state constitutions.

    In Michigan, a traditionally blue state that in recent years has turned more purple, voters likewise enshrined reproductive protections into law, with 45 percent of exit-poll respondents calling abortion the most important issue on the ballot. In the race for the Michigan statehouse, the incumbent Democratic governor, Gretchen Whitmer, trounced her Republican challenger, Tudor Dixon, who had said that she supports abortion only in instances that would save the life of the woman, and never in the case of rape or incest. Dixon lost by more than 10 percentage points and almost half a million votes.

    After the Supreme Court’s Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision ended the federal right to abortion in June, many observers wondered whether pro-abortion-rights Democrats would remain paralyzed with despair or whether their anger would become a galvanizing force going into the election season. The answer is now clear—though, in fact, it has been for some time.

    In August, just six weeks after Dobbs, Kansas voters rejected an amendment to the state constitution that could have ushered in a ban on abortion. That grassroots-movement defeat of the ballot initiative was a genuine shocker—and it showed voters in other states what was possible at the local level.

    Nowhere in the midterms voting did abortion seem to matter more than in Pennsylvania. Oz, like his endorser, former President Donald Trump, spent years as a Northeast cosmopolitan before he tried, and failed, to remake himself as a paint-by-numbers conservative. That meant preaching a party-line stance during the most contentious national conversation about abortion in half a century. It came back to haunt him.

    At the October debate, Fetterman was mocked for (among other things) his simplistic, repetitive invocation of supporting Roe v. Wade. Even when asked by moderators to answer an abortion question in more detail, he simply kept coming back to the phrase. Whatever it lacked in nuance, Fetterman’s allegiance to his pro-abortion-rights position was impossible to misconstrue. This was an abortion election, and voters knew exactly where he stood.

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    John Hendrickson

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  • Why Politics Has Become So Stressful

    Why Politics Has Become So Stressful

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    No matter which party wins control of the House and Senate next month, the results are virtually certain to reinforce the paradox powering the nation’s steadily mounting political tension.

    American politics today may be both more rigid and more unstable than at any other time since at least the Civil War. A politics that is rigid and unstable sounds like a contradiction in terms. But the system’s instability is a direct result of its rigidity. Because so many voters—and so many states—are reliably locked down for one side or the other, even the slightest shifts among the few voters and few states that are truly up for grabs can tilt the balance of power. The consequence is a politics in which neither party can sustain a durable advantage over the other, and political direction for a country of 330 million people is decided by a tiny sliver of voters in about half a dozen states—maybe a few hundred thousand people in all.

    These twin forces largely explain why so many Americans now find politics so stressful. People across the country nervously parse the choices of distant voters in a handful of states to see which party will control the federal government. The balance always remains so wobbly that a momentary mood swing in just a few subdivisions outside Atlanta, Phoenix, or Philadelphia can determine whether Democrats are empowered to pass a new law codifying a national right to abortion, or Republicans are positioned to impose a national ban. Everything is always at stake—and nothing seems to break the deadlock.

    Just how few states determine which side prevails? Probably no more than eight, and arguably as few as six. The list of genuine swing states extends no further than Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, with New Hampshire and North Carolina plausibly added to that roster, though at the federal level the former measurably leans toward Democrats and the latter toward Republicans. The parties still dream of occasional statewide wins in other places—say, Colorado or Minnesota for Republicans and Ohio or Florida for Democrats—but they know that such victories will require unusual circumstances and candidates.

    This small band of true swing states holds the balance of power between the massive red and blue blocks that are, as I’ve written, behaving as if they constitute different nations. Five states in this small group effectively decided the last presidential election by shifting from Donald Trump in 2016 to Joe Biden in 2020: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Almost all of the highly competitive Senate races that will determine control of the chamber this year are unfolding in one of those eight most competitive states, too. Partisans who obsessively checked the poll results from those few states in 2020 have found themselves in a political Groundhog Day, scanning the FiveThirtyEight election-outcome probabilities on pretty much the same places two years later. Two years from now, in the 2024 presidential contest, they are almost guaranteed to be fixated on the same states again.

    What’s more, the balance of power within those few swing states is also precarious; the outcome of elections teeters on microscopic shifts in turnout and/or voter preferences. Biden won the five states he flipped from 2016 by only a combined 279,265 votes, and more than half of that total came in Michigan alone. Few observers would be surprised if almost all of this year’s major Senate contests across the swing states come down to photo finishes.

    In a new book on the 2020 election, The Bitter End, three prominent political scientists describe modern American politics as “calcified,” meaning that the majority of voters are firmly locked into support for one party based primarily on their views about cultural and demographic change. But the UCLA political scientist Lynn Vavreck, one of the co-authors, says that equating “calcification” with “stability” is a mistake. “Being stuck, or calcified, doesn’t mean we are stuck with one outcome,” she told me. “It means that because of that rough partisan parity, we are stuck on the knife’s edge. Anything is tipping these outcomes.”

    The best evidence is that the modern Democratic electoral coalition is at least somewhat larger than the GOP’s. Democrats have won the popular vote in seven of the past eight presidential elections, something no party has done since the formation of the modern party system in 1828. But the Democratic edge hasn’t been decisive enough to overcome the party’s inability to compete in large swaths of the country. Nor can Democrats overcome the structural advantages provided to the GOP by its dominance of smaller, preponderantly white and mostly Christian interior states, whose influence is magnified in the Electoral College and the Senate.

    Barring a major surprise, next month’s election seems guaranteed to extend the longest period in American history when neither party has been able to establish a lasting advantage over the other.

    If Democrats lose the House or Senate, or both, it will mark the fifth consecutive time that a president went into a midterm with unified control of Congress and the White House and then lost it. (That happened to Bill Clinton in 1994, George W. Bush in 2006, Barack Obama in 2010, and Trump in 2018.) No president since Jimmy Carter in 1978 has successfully defended unified control of government through a midterm election. Since 1968, in fact, either party has held unified control in Washington for just 16 of 54 years. In the 72 years before that (from 1896 to 1968), one party or the other held unified control for 58 years.

    This isn’t the first extended period of political instability for the U.S. One party or the other managed just eight years of unified control in the tumultuous two decades before the Civil War. The era from 1877 to 1896 may have been the period most like today: The two sides managed just six years of unified control over those two decades, and never for more than two years at a time. Divided government was also the rule through the 1950s. But none of these earlier periods of instability persisted remotely as long as today’s.

    All of the earlier periods without a dominant party were notable for the lack of clear differentiation between the sides. In the decades before the Civil War, for instance, the need to mollify northern and southern wings prevented either the Whigs or the Democrats from taking a clear position in opposition to the spread of slavery.

    Now it’s the gulf between the parties that largely explains their standoff. In their current ideological configurations, neither side can consistently win enough states to sustain an advantage. Democrats dominate the coastal states most integrated into the 21st-century Information Age economy; the heartland states centered on the 20th-century powerhouse industries of manufacturing, energy extraction, and agriculture are a sea of Republican red. Neither side has managed more than idiosyncratic incursions into the other’s terrain (like Republican Glenn Youngkin’s 2021 gubernatorial win in Virginia and Democrat Joe Manchin’s three Senate wins in West Virginia).

    Generational and demographic change may strengthen Democrats over time, but as long as attitudes about American identity remain the principal dividing line in our politics, Vavreck, like many others, doesn’t see either side breaking out of today’s trench warfare. And she expects that identity-centered division—what I’ve called the collision between the Republican “coalition of restoration” and the Democratic “coalition of transformation”—to remain the central focus of our politics for years. “This is the dimension of conflict we are fighting on for the foreseeable future,” she said. “COVID didn’t dislodge it; the murder of George Floyd didn’t dislodge it; the Capitol insurrection didn’t dislodge it.”

    One way to measure how dug in we’ve become is to look at the consistency of presidential-election results over time. Forty states, or four-fifths of the total, have voted the same way in each of the four presidential elections since 2008: 20 for the Democratic nominees, 20 for the Republicans. That’s a modern peak for consistency. Thirty-four states voted the same way in the four presidential elections from 1992 through 2004. In the four elections from 1976 through 1988, only 25 did. Even in the four consecutive elections won by Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1932 through 1944, only about two-thirds of the states voted the same way each time.

    What’s especially relevant for next month’s election is a corollary trend. Not only are more states reliably voting the same way for president; they are also, to a greater extent than earlier, aligning their votes in congressional elections with their preferences for the White House. Republicans hold just one of the 40 Senate seats in the 20 states that have voted Democratic in at least the past four presidential elections (Susan Collins in Maine), and Democrats hold just two of 40 in the four-time Republican states (Manchin in West Virginia and Jon Tester in Montana). Republicans this year might capture a Senate seat in Nevada—a state on the Democratic list—and solidly Republican Utah, of all places, looks reasonably competitive, but otherwise the November results are unlikely to change those numbers.

    With each side realistically contesting Senate seats in so few states, it’s no wonder, as I’ve written, that the parties are much less likely than in the past to accumulate comfortable Senate majorities—and thus much more likely to quickly lose control of the upper chamber after winning it. Neither side has held the Senate majority for more than eight consecutive years since 1980, a span unprecedented in American history.

    The fact that control of Congress appears within reach for both sides in virtually every election, as it does again this year, heightens the sense of urgency and intensity around each campaign. So does the awareness that, because the parties have become so polarized in their goals, each shift in control can produce enormous changes in policy, no matter how wispy the change in voter attitudes that precipitated it. “The difference in policy now between the group that has 51 percent and the group that has 49 percent is so enormous because of the polarization and divergence of the two parties,” the longtime GOP pollster Whit Ayres told me. Such big change resting on such small shifts, Ayres added, “is not healthy for democracy.”

    Trump’s emergence has further raised the stakes over control of Congress and the White House. Many independent students of democracy and authoritarianism believe that if restored to unified control over government, Trump—and the many Republicans embracing his discredited fraud claims—will seek to tilt the electoral rules in a way that makes it more difficult to again remove him from power. A similar dynamic is already evident in the 21 red states that responded to Trump’s 2020 defeat by passing laws making voting more difficult. “If the Republican Party manages to get control one way or another, including both legal and illegal things, and rig the system a little bit more, we could have a period of more continuity [in unified control of Washington] but it would be minority government,” the political scientist Thomas Mann, a co-author of a seminal 2012 book on congressional polarization, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, told me.

    Which is to say that you can likely add the future of American democracy to the list of issues that will soon be decided by a relative handful of voters in the handful of states at the tipping point of our internal cold war.

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    Ronald Brownstein

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  • The Great Senate Stalemate

    The Great Senate Stalemate

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    The map of competitive Senate elections is shrinking—and not just for November.

    Though Republicans began the year expecting sweeping Senate gains, the party’s top-grade opportunities to capture seats now held by Democrats have dwindled to just two—Nevada and Georgia—and both are, at best, toss-ups for the GOP. And while Democrats, somewhat astoundingly, have emerged from the primaries with at least as many plausible flipping chances as Republicans, Pennsylvania is the only GOP-held seat clearly favored to go blue, and even that isn’t guaranteed. It remains entirely possible that November’s results will leave the Senate divided again at 50–50, something that has not happened in consecutive elections since the Seventeenth Amendment established the direct election of senators more than a century ago.

    This standoff partly reflects the volatile dynamics of the 2022 election, in which Republican advantages on the economy have been largely neutralized by public unease over gun violence, the Supreme Court’s abortion ruling, the resurgent visibility of former President Donald Trump, and the GOP’s nomination of weak, Trump-aligned candidates. Yet the possibility of a virtual draw—after a campaign season in which the two sides have already poured more than $850 million into just the 10 most expensive Senate races—reflects larger changes in the electoral competition.

    One of the most powerful trends in modern politics has been for each party to consolidate control of the Senate seats in the states it usually captures in the presidential election. That’s lowered the ceiling on the number of Senate seats each party can win. And that lowered ceiling, in turn, has diminished each side’s ability to maintain control of the Senate majority for any extended period.

    The Senate is therefore frozen in the sense that neither side, in normal times, can seriously contest more than a handful of the seats held by the other party. Paradoxically, it’s unstable in the sense that the shrunken playing field leaves each side clinging to tiny majorities that are vulnerable to small shifts in voter attitudes in the very few states that remain consistently competitive.

    Throughout the 20th century, it was common for one side to build a comfortable majority in which it held at least 55 percent of the Senate’s seats. Republicans hit that level of dominance in 10 of the 15 Congresses from 1901 through 1930. Then, from 1932 to 1980, Democrats regularly reached the 55 percent threshold. (The big exception to this pattern came in the 1950s, when the ideological lines between the parties blurred and neither won more than a two-seat Senate majority through four consecutive Congresses.) Even from 1980 to 2000, one side or the other reached 55 seats seven times. Since 2000, though, the parties have controlled at least 55 seats only three times: Republicans immediately after George W. Bush’s reelection in 2004 and Democrats immediately after Barack Obama’s presidential victories in 2008 and 2012.

    Smaller margins have reduced both parties’ ability to defend their majorities for any extended period. Since 1980, neither party has controlled the Senate for more than eight consecutive years. That’s unprecedented: The U.S. has never gone four decades without a Senate majority that survived for more than eight years.

    Both the thin margins and frequent turnover are rooted in a third trend: the growing alignment between states’ votes for president and Senate.

    Especially through the second half of the 20th century, states routinely supported presidential candidates from one party and Senate candidates from the other. After the landslide reelections of Richard Nixon in 1972 and Ronald Reagan in 1984, for instance, Democrats still controlled about half of the Senate seats in the states that voted for them both times.

    But as American politics has grown more partisan and parliamentary, those split-ticket senators have virtually gone extinct, which has reduced the number of states each side can realistically contest.

    After the 2020 election, the GOP held 94 percent of the Senate seats in the 25 states that voted for Trump both times while Democrats held 98 percent of the seats in the 20 states that twice voted against him. Democrats have squeezed out their current 50–50 Senate majority by winning eight of the 10 Senate seats in the remaining five swing states that switched from Trump to Joe Biden.

    Last spring, Republicans anticipated a midterm red wave that would break this stalemate, followed by a push toward a filibuster-proof 60-seat Senate majority in 2024.

    Both parties identified Catherine Cortez Masto in Nevada, Raphael Warnock in Georgia, Mark Kelly in Arizona, and Maggie Hassan in New Hampshire as the most vulnerable Democratic senators. Beyond that, Republicans hoped to seriously challenge Michael Bennet in Colorado and Patty Murray in Washington. The 2022 electoral environment remains unsettled, and it’s possible that continuing discontent over the economy could improve GOP prospects before election day. But for now, with Colorado, Washington, Arizona, and New Hampshire all moving toward the Democrats, it appears that the list of fully plausible GOP Senate targets has fallen to just two: Nevada and Georgia.

    All polls in Georgia show a tight race between Warnock and the Republican nominee, Herschel Walker, the former University of Georgia football star. And with Republican Governor Brian Kemp holding a steady lead over Democrat Stacey Abrams, it remains possible that a Georgia crimson tide (pun intended) might carry Walker to victory. But Walker may be the most obviously unqualified Senate nominee in recent memory, and he’s facing a seemingly endless procession of personal scandals. Walker’s vulnerabilities might allow Warnock to survive even a strong Republican current; indeed all but one of the five most recent public polls have shown Warnock in the lead.

    That leaves Nevada as the best chance for Republicans to capture a seat Democrats hold now. A state with legions of low-wage workers, Nevada has heavily felt the effects of coronavirus shutdowns and inflation. The state also lacks the large pool of college graduates and white-collar professionals heavily motivated by abortion and other social issues lifting Democrats elsewhere. But even with all that boosting them, Republicans can hardly be confident about Nevada: For longer than the past decade, Nevada Democrats, operating the political machine assembled by the late former Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, have shown a knack for turning out just enough of their voters to win very close races.

    Democrats, unexpectedly, have kept a larger roster of GOP Senate seats in play. The Senate race most likely to change hands between the parties remains Pennsylvania, where Republican Pat Toomey is retiring. Democratic Lieutenant Governor John Fetterman, although some polls show his margin narrowing, remains favored over Mehmet Oz, the Republican nominee. Oz is laboring under strong unfavorable ratings and will likely face an undertow from the governor’s race, where Doug Mastriano, among the most extreme GOP nominees anywhere this year, could face a crushing defeat.

    Polls also show Democrats Mandela Barnes and Tim Ryan locked in margin-of-error races in Wisconsin and Ohio. Barnes and Ryan have given themselves a realistic chance to win against GOP opponents who are also laboring under high unfavorable ratings, Senator Ron Johnson in Wisconsin and J. D. Vance in Ohio. But those are both states where Democrats often struggle to find the last few percentage points of support they need, and this will especially be the case while Biden’s approval rating is depressed among the white non-college voters so plentiful in each.

    In North Carolina, Democrat Cheri Beasley is likewise step for step in polls with Republican Ted Budd—though, since 2008, that state has functioned as a kind of heartbreak hill for Democrats, who have suffered a succession of narrow defeats there. Florida has become an even tougher state for Democrats, but polls have consistently shown Democratic Representative Val Demings remaining closer to Republican Senator Marco Rubio than most analysts initially expected.

    This playing field still leaves Republicans a path to a majority, but one much narrower than they anticipated. If the GOP loses Pennsylvania, which remains likely, its most plausible path to retake the Senate is to win both Nevada and Georgia, while simultaneously holding off the Democrats in both Wisconsin and Ohio, not to mention North Carolina and Florida. Republican upsets in Arizona or New Hampshire, or Oz surging past Fetterman during the final weeks in Pennsylvania, would ease that pressure. But today, none of those outcomes look probable.

    Yet even if Democrats hold the Senate, it will likely be with a very narrow majority, and perhaps with nothing more than another 50–50 tie that Vice President Kamala Harris will step in to break. Democrats would still remain at substantial risk of surrendering their majority in 2024, largely because they will be defending all three of the seats they hold in the states that twice voted for Trump—Joe Manchin in West Virginia, Jon Tester in Montana, and Sherrod Brown in Ohio. That won’t be easy in a presidential-election year.

    Early in Biden’s presidency, some Democratic strategists, such as the data analyst David Shor, ominously warned that the party could face an extended period of Republican dominance in the Senate, largely because of the GOP’s hardening advantage in heavily white interior states. The GOP probably does hold an edge in the long-term battle for Senate control because it is regularly winning slightly more states than Democrats in presidential contests. But the fizzling of the GOP’s Senate opportunities this year shows how difficult it may be for either side to secure a sizable, much less durable, majority.

    Political scientists and strategists alike usually find far more meaning in elections that deliver resounding change than those that reconfirm the status quo. Yet it will send a powerful message if neither party in November can break through the forces that have left the Senate so precariously balanced. It will show that the two sides remain locked in a grinding trench warfare where neither can overwhelm the other’s defenses and the handful of states in the no-man’s-land between them hold decisive power to tilt the national direction. That’s a recipe for more years of bitter but inconclusive conflict between two political coalitions that are now almost identical in size—but utterly antithetical in their vision for America’s future.

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    Ronald Brownstein

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  • Yogonet | Gambling & Sports Betting News. US, UK and Global

    Yogonet | Gambling & Sports Betting News. US, UK and Global

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    After the publication of the Provisional Measure that seeks to regulate sports betting, the Brazilian federal government is moving forward with the creation of the National Secretariat for Prizes and Bets. The new body will report to the Ministry of Finance.
    In order to achieve its goal of monitoring the sports betting system, the secretariat will be staffed by agents from the Federal Police and the…

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