Ukraine continues to press attacks, particularly on the Tokmak, Velyka Novosilka, and Bakhmut fronts. Ukraine controls a foothold on the east side of the Dnipro River near the remains of the Antonivka Road Bridge, despite Russian artillery and missile attacks. Russia continues to make ineffective attacks on the Lyman and Donetsk (Avdiivka/Marinka) fronts, but has made no measurable progress.
Russian Private Military Companies and Wagner Update
In Saturday’s Ukraine Update, I noted that Russia had brought forward several PMCs (Private Military Companies) as reinforcements to the Bakhmut area. The PMCs deployed included PMC Patriot, Veterans, Potok, and Fakel.
Professor Mark Galeotti, former NYU Professor of Political Science and presently a senior associate research fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), is a world renowned expert in transnational criminal organizations and Russian security affairs.
Prof. Galeotti provided a summary of the current state of PMCs in Russia.
To paraphrase, Prof. Gaelotti notes there are broadly two types of organizations that term themselves “PMCs” in Russia. What he calls simply “PMCs,” are “reputable international businesses involved in mine-clearing, maritime security, training, and VIP protection. Not front-line fighting.”
By contrast, Russia also has self-styled PMCs that are actually groups of mercenaries, or mercs. PMC Wagner would have been among the most famous and largest of such organizations.
Prof. Gaelotti notes that the merc organizations that remain can be grouped into several buckets.
- Ministry of Defense PMCs that are not truly independent, like Patriot, Shchit, and Redut. These are only a few hundred soldiers, usually better paid and experienced than the average Russian soldier.
- FGUP Okharana, which is the corporate arm of Russia’s National Guard—again a state military institution’s offshoot masquerading as a private corporation, but firmly under Ministry of Defense control.
- Newly formed organizations like Potok, Plamya, Fakel, or Uran. Major corporations like Gazprom or Roscosmos were essentially forced by the Ministry of Defense to bankroll additional units. Prof. Gaelotti considers them indistinguishable from ordinary Russian Army units and are not real mercenary companies, at least not yet. They number in the hundreds, not the thousands.
- Small ideologically based mercenary companies like ultra-nationalist ENOT Corps that are not numerous and are now under close watch.
- Territorial PMCs like the Chechen Kadyrovites, are smaller localized units whose ideas may not align with the Ministry of Defense or take orders.
(Full thread can be read on threadreaderapp.com here)
In short, none of these units seem likely to step in to take on the role Wagner did in recruiting and fielding division or larger-sized soldiers. Most of these units are essentially extensions of the Ministry of Defense, formed for political expedience.
There is no “second Wagner” waiting to step in to take on the void left by the group’s de facto decapitation.
Meanwhile, BBC reported that satellite photos from Belarus indicated that they are constructing a camp for Wagner large enough to house between 6,000-8,000 troops.
Wagner essentially had two categories of soldiers: barely trained convict units of “disposable” infantry, who were used in small squads to run high-risk, near-suicidal reconnaissance missions to identify weak spots in Ukrainian defenses. When Wagnerites are mentioned, many people imagine these soldiers, who composed a significant majority of Wagner troops in Ukraine by June 2023.
However, Wagner started as an organization that hired ex-Spetnaz and VDV (Russian paratroopers), to form a small but elite mercenary troop, with perhaps 6,000-8,000 members by 2022. Equipped with heavy weaponry and carefully maintained, these elite troops were used to exploit the weakness identified by the convict suicide runs.
Perhaps not coincidentally, the numbers of Wagnerites that appear to have gone to Belarus matches approximately the number of highly experienced “elite” Wagner troops that Prigozhin reportedly had remaining. With no further cash forthcoming from Russia’s Ministry of Defense, the Wagnerites may be shedding their convict troops to return to their core veterans that terrorized African battlefields in the days before Wagner became largely committed to the Ukrainian battlefield.
The Ministry of Defense of Russia has already announced that Wagner’s heavy weapons and equipment will be transferred to the Russian Army, and it does not appear that there has been any major movement of heavy arms and equipment to Belarus to indicate the contrary.
While speculation has abounded about the possibility that Wagner is being placed in Belarus to launch a new front to advance on Kyiv from the north, I assess this possibility to be quite remote. Belarussian President Lukashenko has called on Wagner to help train the Belarussian military.
It doesn’t appear that Wagner took the greater bulk of its troops with them to Belarus, but I would be surprised if what was left behind was not the masses of untrained convict troops. it’s unclear what has happened to these troops—they were supposedly given a choice to go to Belarus, join the Russian military, or go home. It’s also unclear if the remaining troops even have much combat value when separated from the Wagner elite.
As to Prigozhin himself, he has not been photographed since departing Rostov-on-Don. Belarus claims he is now in the country, but Prigozhin’s whereabouts are unknown. Russian television producers consider Prigozhin persona-non-grata and consider his name too risky to even mention.
Ukraine Advances North of Robotyne
Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops are extending their control over the area north of the first of four Russian main defense lines north of Tokmak.
Prominent pro-Russian blogger War Gonzo reports a general Ukrainian advance 1.5km deep that ran across a wide 6.5km front north of Robotyne. It’s not clear exactly to where he refers, but Ukraine has been gradually expanding their mine-cleared routes leading up near the Russian defense line around Robotyne. Ukraine appears to be being cautious and giving itself multiple vectors of approach when it moves to strike the Russian main defense line.
CNN and numerous other outlets report that the Biden administration is giving serious consideration to sending cluster munitions to Ukraine. Administration officials suggest a decision could be forthcoming in time to include the controversial munitions in the July, 2023 aid package.
Cluster munitions, or submunition weapons, are a class of artillery shells and rocket/missile warheads that contain large numbers of smaller bombs, called bomblets.
The shell or missile is designed to deploy the bomblets above the target, raining the surrounding area with hundreds of small bombs that are intended to explode on impact.
The idea is instead of one concentrated explosion, the area is blanketed with numerous small explosives.
When destroying a warehouse or a fortified bunker, it is often preferable to have one large “unitary” warhead explode to cause the most concentrated damage in one area.
But particularly when aiming to destroy entrenched enemy infantry, cluster munitions are unparalleled in their effectiveness.
For example, one primary weapon that is being considered for deployment is the M483 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM).
It can be a 155mm artillery shell or on a GMLRS rocket deployed from a HIMARS system. Instead of a single explosive charge, the DPICM deploys 88 smaller bomblets. In field tests, it has been found to have the same effect as 5-15 conventional munitions when striking soft (i.e. unarmored) targets that are distributed broadly. It has been pointed out the DPICM is essentially designed to take on infantry in fixed fortified positions.
For example, given enough tries to strike a position, Ukrainian gunners can obtain the right range and angle of fire to hit Russian trenches head-on for devastating results.
But a DPICM shell would remove much of this trial and error, as the first round fire would spray the area with bomblets, and as long as the weapon was fired in the vicinity of the trench, some of the bomblets will land inside, killing or injuring any defenders.
This is what allows a single DPICM shell to take the place of as many as a dozen conventional artillery shells or more when attacking entrenched and widely distributed infantry.
The DPICM GMLRS variant is arguably even more terrifying. Like other GMRLS missiles, the DPICM warhead GMRLS has a range of about 70km and a high level of precision accuracy. But instead of a unitary warhead, it has a DPICM warhead, containing 404 submunitions.
Fired from a HIMARS system, the rocket can have its trajectory angled to plunge into even deep entrenchments. it can deploy the bomblets at different altitudes to vary the concentration and spread of the destructive effects.
The US has large stockpiles of DPICM ammunition, and permitting Ukraine to access these stocks would significantly increase the available firepower for the ammunition-hungry Ukrainian offensive, particularly given their economies in eliminating targets compared to unitary munitions.
There are two potential issues with the use of cluster munitions. First, the weapons are considered highly controversial and dangerous to civilians. Second, to export these weapons to Ukraine the Biden Administration would likely need Congress to pass legislation permitting their export.
Before we get into the legal issues, people must understand why cluster munitions are considered problematic. It is frequently misunderstood that certain weapons of war that have been made illegal by international treaties, such as chemical weapons, were banned out of concern for troops. This is untrue.
The background to the 1928 Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons and subsequent related treaties, the primary focus in the restriction of the weapons was based on the collateral effects of the weapons on civilians. During World War One when chemical warfare was used on an industrial scale, poison gasses affecting civilian populations was not uncommon.
Similarly, when an international discussion of a ban on cluster weapons began, proponents focused on the effects of cluster weapons on civilians, primarily from unexploded munitions. Not out of some idea of the weapons being cruel to the soldiers upon which they were used.
For example, the USAF made heavy use of cluster munitions in trying to strike the transit routes of North Vietnamese guerillas in Vietnam and Laos. Out of 260M bomblets dropped on Xieng Khouang province from 1964 to 1973, an estimated 80M failed to explode (a 30.7% failure rate). Five decades later, unexploded cluster bomb ordinances continue to claim Laotian lives and limbs—children are particularly affected as the bomb casing is so ubiquitous, they have lost any sense of danger when seeing signs of the bomblets.
It is difficult to overstate how terrible the aftereffects of these weapons have been for civilians in Vietnam and Laos. In Laos alone, an estimated 20,000 people have been killed or injured by cluster bombs since the end of the Vietnam War. 40% of the victims have been children.
In 2016, President Obama launched a 3-year $90M initiative to clean up cluster bomb munitions in Laos, but victims continue to be claimed. This underscores how difficult cluster munitions are to remove once they are scattered in a wide area.
Aside from humanitarian concerns, an additional hurdle to sending them to Ukraine is that President Biden will likely need legislative action to make it happen. President Obama signed into law a near-total ban on U.S. exports of cluster munitions on March 11, 2009, as part of the omnibus budget bill.
The law requires that only cluster munitions with a demonstrated dud rate of 1% or less can be exported. DCISM, for example, is considered to have a very low dud rate, but it’s estimated in the 3-4% range. Cold War era US cluster munitions had a dud rate of around 30%, and Russian cluster munitions currently in use are believed to have a dud rate of between 20%~40%.
Unless there is some kind of loophole of which I am unaware, President Biden cannot legally export almost any American cluster munitions.
The Case for Cluster Munitions
Having described how terrible cluster munitions are, I would like to make clear that I am a reluctant but firm supporter of the idea of sending them to Ukraine as soon as possible for the following reasons.
- The use of cluster munitions by Ukraine is legal under international law, as they are for the United States and Russia as non-signatories to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.
- Cluster munitions are uniquely well suited for the types of threats Ukraine is facing in abundance. it also addresses Ukraine’s munition shortage, which represents one of the biggest threats of failure for their counteroffensive.
- Cluster munitions are already in ubiquitous use by Russian forces in Ukraine. Defeating Russia faster will reduce attacks on Ukraine generally, and cluster munition duds’ distribution in Ukraine. Unilateral restraint by Ukraine is unhelpful.
- The humanitarian costs of deploying cluster munitions are borne exclusively by the people of Ukraine, thus they (through their government) should be the ones who decide for themselves how to balance military value with post-war ill effects.
There is nothing illegal about Ukraine or Russia using cluster munitions provided they follow other rules of war in their deployment. In 2008, the Convention on Cluster Munitions went into force, making it illegal to use or stockpile cluster munitions for signatories. 111 nation-states have put the treaty into effect, in addition to 13 that have signed the treaty but have not.
Signatories include the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and Australia, including a majority of NATO nations. A majority of the world’s nations are now signatories. Non-signatories include the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Israel, India, Pakistan, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia.
With the extremely narrow exception of international laws that are considered to have universal jurisdiction, international laws are based on treaties and agreements. They are not applied to any nation that has not signed onto these agreements.
The main reason to provide cluster munitions to Ukraine is that the weapons are nearly uniquely suited to the battlefield conditions Ukraine now faces. Cluster munitions are not particularly effective in fluid and widely dispersed combat situations—they have a demonstrated ineffectiveness at suppressing guerillas. By contrast, they are perfect for taking on entrenched conventional military forces. That is compact defensive formations of heavily entrenched infantry that require enormous amounts of conventional munitions to dislodge.
The only weapons that are capable of replacing cluster munitions are available in sharply limited quantities. For example, the M30A1 GMLRS rocket, which deploys over 100,000 tungsten balls over a wide area was intended to replicate the effects of a cluster munition, but without the harmful effects of leaving duds that impact civilians post-war. But these weapons are not available in bulk, nor can production be ramped up to meet Ukrainian needs in any reasonable timeframe.
These weapons are likely to be crucial to Ukraine’s success on the battlefield in the near term. The single greatest shortage that Ukraine is likely to face in an extended counteroffensive is not military forces. I previously discussed how Ukraine’s available reserves likely dwarf that of Russia’s, and they has only committed a fraction of its available military power. Instead, it is a lack of ammunition that might force Ukraine to slow the pace of its attacks or to hold it all together.
During any offensive, the rate of consumption of munitions, particularly artillery shells, and missiles, goes up dramatically It is clear that Ukraine has been judicious particularly in its use of guided munitions in the past seven months, and has hoarded a considerable supply, as they have devastated Russia’s artillery arm over the past month with precision counter-battery fire.
Sustaining forward momentum and pressuring Russian positions as Russia runs out of reserves and artillery is critical, as Ukraine tries to push Russia to a breaking point. I used the analogy of the Battle of Normandy (1944) to explain how historical battles indicate how a well-entrenched adversary can be pushed into a compromised position, and once that happens, the real and rapid progression of an offensive can proceed like a dam-bursting.
But this is dependent on available ammunition.
Cluster munitions can significantly ameliorate Ukrainian ammunition shortages. Cluster munitions have a demonstrated ability in the right circumstances to reduce ammunition consumption by an order of five to 15 times. Ukraine is facing precisely those conditions.
The United States military has a major stockpile of cluster munitions it has been reluctant to make use of for many years. The last time the United States used cluster munitions in any quantity was in 2003, during the battles against Iraq’s conventional armies. Since that time, only a single use of an anti-tank cluster munition in Yemen in 2008 has been noted.
The US has a cluster munition stockpile of 5.5 million shells and missiles, composed predominantly of 155mm DPICM artillery shells. This represents arguably one of the largest untapped sources of badly needed munitions,
Furthermore, cluster munitions are in frequent use by Russian forces in Ukraine. Russian forces have not only made frequent use of them in field combat, but it has also deployed them in indiscriminate bombardments of Ukrainian cities including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and numerous other smaller towns and villages. Russian forces particularly target areas of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, and electrical infrastructure. Over 50 Ukrainian hospitals have been damaged by Russian cluster munitions.
The longer the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues to be fought on Ukrainian soil, the more Russian cluster bomb munitions will be deployed against Ukrainian civilians—and leave more Russian duds behind.
And it should be noted that the humanitarian costs of the use of cluster munitions will be uniquely borne by Ukrainians. Russian partisan raids into Belgorod notwithstanding, Ukraine will undoubtedly be strongly warned against deploying them against targets in Russia. Given strong opposition to cluster munitions among her mutual allies (UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Denmark, etc.) Ukraine is highly likely to strictly comply with such a request.
I do not ascribe to the idea that a government, even a democratically elected government, is free to impose humanitarian costs on its citizenry. However, there is a complex moral calculus that is present on the Ukrainian battlefield.
Russian forces have slaughtered Ukrainian civilians, such as the ethnic cleansing operation run by Russian forces in Bucha. Russian torture facilities have been discovered in Izium and Kherson, with survivors telling harrowing tales of abductions and electrocutions. Russia has engaged in cultural genocide, abducting thousands of children and engaging in illegal forced relocation programs to drive Ukrainian populations inside Russian-occupied territories. Russia’s extended bombardment campaign of Ukrainian civilians needs no introduction.
These humanitarian costs are also being borne by Ukrainian citizens, and the longer the Russo-Ukrainian War lasts, the higher those costs will become.
Thus, the decision of whether to use a weapon that carries a humanitarian cost is a complex one, that asks for the balancing of present humanitarian costs, with the potential future harm that the weapon may cause.
I do not believe that question has any clear answer, and I think the decision should be made by the representatives of the Ukrainian people.
In this, the Ukrainian government has been unambiguous—give us cluster munitions. I think the United States should do so.
RO37
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