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  • President Trump orders divestment in $2.9 million chips deal to protect US security interests

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    President Donald Trump on Friday ordered the unraveling of a $2.9 million computer chips deal that he concluded threatened U.S. security interests if the current owner, HieFo Corp., remained in control of the technology.The executive order cast a spotlight on a business deal that drew scant attention when it was announced in May 2024 during President Joe Biden’s administration. The deal involved aerospace and defense specialist Emcore Corp. selling its computer chips and wafer fabrication operations to HieFo for $2.92 million — a price that included the assumption of about $1 million in liabilities.But Trump is now demanding that HieFo divest that technology within 180 days, citing “credible evidence” that the current owner is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China.HieFo was founded by Dr. Genzao Zhang and Harry Moore. According to a press release that came out after the deal closed, plans for the technology acquired from Emcore were to be overseen by largely the same team of employees in Alhambra, California.Zhang, who was a vice president of engineering at Emcore before becoming HieFo’s CEO, pledged to “continue the pursuit of the most innovative and disruptive solutions” with technology designed for purposes that would include artificial intelligence.HieFo didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment about Trump’s order.Emcore was a publicly traded company at the time of the HieFo deal, but was taken private last year by the investment firm Charlesbank Capital Partner.

    President Donald Trump on Friday ordered the unraveling of a $2.9 million computer chips deal that he concluded threatened U.S. security interests if the current owner, HieFo Corp., remained in control of the technology.

    The executive order cast a spotlight on a business deal that drew scant attention when it was announced in May 2024 during President Joe Biden’s administration. The deal involved aerospace and defense specialist Emcore Corp. selling its computer chips and wafer fabrication operations to HieFo for $2.92 million — a price that included the assumption of about $1 million in liabilities.

    But Trump is now demanding that HieFo divest that technology within 180 days, citing “credible evidence” that the current owner is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China.

    HieFo was founded by Dr. Genzao Zhang and Harry Moore. According to a press release that came out after the deal closed, plans for the technology acquired from Emcore were to be overseen by largely the same team of employees in Alhambra, California.

    Zhang, who was a vice president of engineering at Emcore before becoming HieFo’s CEO, pledged to “continue the pursuit of the most innovative and disruptive solutions” with technology designed for purposes that would include artificial intelligence.

    HieFo didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment about Trump’s order.

    Emcore was a publicly traded company at the time of the HieFo deal, but was taken private last year by the investment firm Charlesbank Capital Partner.

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  • Trump announces 130% tariffs on China. The global trade war just came roaring back

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    (CNN) — President Donald Trump announced he will impose an additional 100% tariff on goods from China, on top of the 30% tariffs already in effect, starting November 1 or sooner. The threat is a massive escalation after months of a trade truce between the two nations.

    “The United States of America will impose a Tariff of 100% on China, over and above any Tariff that they are currently paying,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social Friday afternoon. “Also on November 1st, we will impose Export Controls on any and all critical software.”

    Trump’s announcement is tied to Beijing ramping up export controls on its critical rare earths, which are needed to produce many electronics. As a result, Trump appeared to call off a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping that was scheduled for later this month in South Korea.

    Trump’s initial message Friday, delivered via a Truth Social post, in which he threatened “massive” new tariffs, was ill received by investors on Friday as fears of a spring déjà vu, when tariffs on Chinese goods soared to a stunning 145%, set in. Markets closed sharply lower on Friday after Trump’s initial comments, with the Dow falling by 878 points, or 1.9%. The S&P 500 was down 2.7%, and the tech-heavy Nasdaq tumbled 3.5%.

    While Trump doesn’t always act on his threats, investors, consumers and businesses still have reason to worry.

    President Donald Trump is threatening to raise tariffs on Chinese goods shipped to the United States. Credit: Jessica Koscielniak / Reuters via CNN Newsource

    The two largest economies depend on each other

    The United States and China are the world’s two largest economies. Although Mexico has recently replaced China as the top source of foreign goods shipped to the United States, America depends on China for hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of goods. Meanwhile, China is one of the top export markets for America.

    In particular, electronics, apparel and furniture are among the top goods the United States receives from China. Trump has pushed CEOs, especially in tech, to move production to the United States, but he’s softened his approach in recent months as business leaders have satisfied the president with announcements of hundreds of billions of dollars in investments in US manufacturing — even if they continue to make the bulk of their products overseas.

    Shortly after imposing minimum 145% tariffs on Chinese goods — an effective embargo on trade, Trump issued an exemption for electronics, making them subject to 20% tariffs instead. The move was, in many ways, an acknowledgment that the Trump administration understood the pain he was inflicting on the US economy through his sky-high tariffs.

    Then, in May, US and Chinese officials further established the interdependence of trade by agreeing to lower tariffs on one another. China brought levies on American exports down to 10% from 125%, and the United States brought rates down to 30% from 145%.

    Both countries’ stock markets rallied as a result.

    It was only a matter of time

    Trump on Friday claimed trade hostility from China “came out of nowhere.” But in reality, it’s been bubbling up for months.

    For the United States, a critical part of trade agreements has been to ensure China will increase its supply of rare earth magnets. Yet despite several apparent breakthroughs, Trump has in recent months repeatedly accused China of violating the terms.

    Trump first responded by putting restrictions on sales of American technologies to China, including a key Nvidia AI chip. Many of these restrictions were later lifted.

    Then came the Trump administration’s announcement that it would soon impose fees on goods transported on Chinese-owned or -operated ships. China countered with a similar plan on American ships that took effect Friday.

    In short: Trump has already demonstrated there’s no limit to how high he’ll go with tariffs on China, and Xi has shown no mercy in how he chooses to retaliate.

    But Trump’s ability to continue to impose tariffs on a whim could soon end, pending the verdict in a landmark case kicking off in the Supreme Court next month. Xi, however, faces no such constraints.

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    Elisabeth Buchwald and CNN

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  • U.S. Confirms China Has Had A Spy Base In Cuba Since At Least 2019

    U.S. Confirms China Has Had A Spy Base In Cuba Since At Least 2019

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    WASHINGTON (AP) — China has been operating a spy base in Cuba since at least 2019, part of a global effort by Beijing to upgrade its intelligence-gathering capabilities, according to a Biden administration official.

    The official, who was not authorized to comment publicly and spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the U.S. intelligence community has been aware of China’s spying from Cuba and a larger effort to set up intelligence-gathering operations around the globe for some time.

    The Biden administration has stepped up efforts to thwart the Chinese push to expand its spying operations and believes it has made some progress through diplomacy and other unspecified action, according to the official, who was familiar with U.S. intelligence on the matter.

    The existence of the Chinese spy base was confirmed after The Wall Street Journal reported on Thursday that China and Cuba had reached an agreement in principle to build an electronic eavesdropping station on the island. The Journal reported China planned to pay a cash-strapped Cuba billions of dollars as part of the negotiations.

    The White House called the report inaccurate.

    “I’ve seen that press report, it’s not accurate,” White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said in an MSNBC interview Thursday. “What I can tell you is that we have been concerned since day one of this administration about China’s influence activities around the world; certainly in this hemisphere and in this region, we’re watching this very, very closely.”

    The U.S. intelligence community had determined Chinese spying from Cuba has been an “ongoing” matter and is “not a new development,” the administration official said.

    Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío also refuted the report in a Twitter post Saturday.

    “The slanderous speculation continues, evidently promoted by certain media to cause harm and alarm without observing minimum patterns of communication and without providing data or evidence to support what they disseminate,” he wrote.

    President Joe Biden’s national security team was briefed by the intelligence community soon after he took office in January 2021 about a number of sensitive Chinese efforts around the globe where Beijing was weighing expanding logistics, basing and collection infrastructure as part of the People’s Liberation Army’s attempt to further its influence, the official said.

    Chinese officials looked at sites spanning the Atlantic Ocean, Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and the Indo-Pacific. The effort included looking at existing collection facilities in Cuba, and China conducted an upgrade of its spying operation on the island in 2019, the official said.

    Tensions between the U.S. and China have been fraught throughout Biden’s term.

    The relationship may have hit a nadir last year after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to democratically governed Taiwan. That visit, the first by a sitting House speaker since Newt Gingrich in 1997, led China, which claims the island as its territory, to launch military exercises around Taiwan.

    U.S.-China relations became further strained early this year after the U.S. shot down a Chinese spy balloon that had crossed the United States.

    Beijing also was angered by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s stopover in the U.S. last month that included an encounter with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy. The speaker hosted the Taiwanese leader at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in southern California.

    Still, the White House has been eager to resume high-level communications between the two sides.

    Secretary of State Antony Blinken is planning to travel to China next week, a trip that was canceled as the balloon was flying over the U.S. Blinken expects to be in Beijing on June 18 for meetings with senior Chinese officials, according to U.S. officials, who spoke Friday on condition of anonymity because neither the State Department nor the Chinese foreign ministry has yet confirmed the trip.

    CIA Director William Burns met in Beijing with his counterpart last month. White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with his Chinese counterpart in Vienna over two days in May and made clear that the administration wanted to improve high-level communications with the Chinese side.

    Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin recently spoke briefly with Li Shangfu, China’s minister of national defense, at the opening dinner of a security forum in Singapore. China had earlier rejected Austin’s request for a meeting on the sidelines of the forum.

    AP Diplomatic Writer Matthew Lee contributed to this report.

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  • To reinvent globalization, companies and countries should think ‘diversifying,’ not ‘decoupling,’ according to McKinksey Global Institute’s research

    To reinvent globalization, companies and countries should think ‘diversifying,’ not ‘decoupling,’ according to McKinksey Global Institute’s research

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    The pandemic, Ukraine, geopolitical stress, climate change, and macroeconomic uncertainty: These are turbulent times. No wonder business leaders and policymakers are re-examining everything from their supply chains to their trading patterns. The overarching question, as we see it, is what this means for globalization.

    The simple fact is that globalization is not going away. No nation can stand alone. The world is and will continue to be a dense web of interconnections. McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) research found that every major region relies on others for important manufactured goods or resources. More than half of Europe’s energy, a quarter of China’s minerals, and the majority of electronics for Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa are imported. Even the United States, which is less dependent on trade than most countries, relies on imports for more than 30% of the value embedded in the goods it consumes.

    These connections have brought broad benefits, such as fostering economic growth, improving efficiency, reducing prices, and increasing the availability of goods.  At the same time, the economic logic of scale and specialization has created vulnerabilities. About 40% of global product trade is concentrated in its origins–meaning that the importing economies rely on three or fewer nations for things they need, like laptops, mobile phones, cobalt, and palm oil.  

    Concentration sometimes arises because a product is only produced in a few places. For example, Brazil and the U.S.  supply more than 90% of soybeans. However, three-quarters of concentrated trade–or 30% of all global trade–is a matter of choice, with individual countries sourcing from only a few places, even though there are other options.

    Such “economy-specific concentration” can be observed widely, from natural resources (iron ore and wheat) to intermediate products (televisions and memory chips) to final goods (vaccines and aircraft). There are many reasons for this, including geographic proximity, consumer choice, comfort with established trading partners, market structure, and trade barriers and preferential arrangements.

    While such concentration can be efficient, it can also bring troubling side effects. If concentrated trade flows are disrupted, products are harder to replace on short notice.

    When the pandemic and stressed supply chains cut semiconductor chip production in Asia, for example, that affected automakers in Europe and the U.S., too.  In sensitive sectors associated with national strategic interests, concentrated trade relationships can result in uncomfortable levels of risk.

    In response to these concerns, some have called for “decoupling” to reduce dependence on certain foreign countries. However, in practical terms, severing connections costs time and money. Plus, reducing sources of supply tends to increase concentration.

    Instead, we would argue for increasing diversification. It just makes sense not to have all the important eggs in two or three baskets. Companies and countries that thoughtfully manage their concentrated exposures are likely to be more resilient–not only able to absorb a supply disruption but to bounce back better. Singapore, for example, realized that it was depending on a handful of pipelines for its critical imports of natural gas. Over the last decade, it has systematically diversified its supply, building a liquefied natural gas terminal to access the seaborne market.

    Greater diversification could also promote a more inclusive trading system and economy. The connection between trade and wealth creation is strong: diversification could enable more countries to participate more fully. Picture a world in which countries ranging from Vietnam to Poland, India to Mexico, and Venezuela to Egypt play a larger role in global trade.

    Is diversification happening? It’s complicated. An MGI analysis of a range of large economies found that their concentration patterns across sectors hadn’t changed much from 2016 to 2021.

    In April 2022, though, 81% of global supply-chain leaders surveyed said they had initiated dual sourcing of raw materials, up 26 percentage points from the previous year. So, change could be in the making.                                        

    Globalization has played a significant role in the sharp decline in extreme poverty–from 36% of the world’s population in 1990 to less than 10% in 2017. However, the benefits have not accrued everywhere or nearly enough. There have certainly been losers.

    By focusing on resilience and diversifying sources of supply, we believe it is possible to re-imagine globalization and build the foundation for sustainable and inclusive growth.

    Bob Sternfels is the managing partner of McKinsey & Company. Olivia White is a director of the McKinsey Global Institute.

    The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.

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    Bob Sternfels, Olivia White

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  • The last American venture capitalist in Beijing: Here are the strategic miscalculations undermining America’s technology competition with China

    The last American venture capitalist in Beijing: Here are the strategic miscalculations undermining America’s technology competition with China

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    On Oct. 10, the Biden administration announced a series of sanctions aimed at cutting off the flow of American talent and equipment to the Chinese semiconductor industry. The policy marked a significant departure from the administration’s initial forays which targeted extending American leadership in the industry via funding grants, such as the $100 billion CHIPS and Science Act.

    The latest actions make clear that the U.S. feels it must couple defensive and offensive action to “maintain as large of a lead as possible” over China, as National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan described. What is becoming clear, however, is that the Americans have already lost the initiative in many core technology-enabled areas.

    Since 2017, the U.S. government has pursued a strategic “decoupling” whereby American economic and technological systems were to be disentangled from China. Many of the resulting sanctions, especially on the Chinese tech industry, foreshadowed those now being taken against Russia.

    Putin’s descent into global pariah status has been a long time coming–yet the effectiveness of these sanctions has revealed the unintended consequences of sanctions against China. As one of the last American VCs in China and the son of the U.S. Air Force pilot who flew Henry Kissinger to Beijing, I have seen firsthand the nuance of our relationship.

    To be clear, the U.S.-China relationship has significant tensions. Nevertheless, China is not Russia.

    To start, decoupling pushed China further towards technological self-sufficiency, illuminating China’s technological vulnerabilities and providing a window to bridge these gaps. The effectiveness of future sanctions will be muted compared to those now being taken against Russia. This divergence will not only be a result of the size and sophistication of the Chinese economy–but also because America gave China years of lead time to prepare.

    Sanctions on Russia were significantly strengthened precisely because America still controls Russia’s digital rails (operating systems and app stores). America’s decoupling policy needlessly made China fully aware of these vulnerabilities, spurring the Chinese to protect themselves and ultimately extend their commercial and political influence. 

    In the field of semiconductors, human talent, private and public capital, and regulatory support mobilized en masse are enabling China to leap rungs on the evolutionary ladder of chip development. A recent report claims SMIC took just two years to leap from 14 nm to 7 nm–faster than TSMC and Samsung, without the most advanced production equipment.

    The history of U.S. unilateral hardware sanctions against the Chinese is not pretty. In the 1990s, we decided to cut China’s access to US-built satellites. Other nations rushed to fill the market gap. Today, China consumes roughly 40% of the world’s chips. The Dutch, Koreans, and others will loathe abandoning this market to align with US sanctions. A former senior National Security Council official recently told me that even typical China hawks such as Japan and India were questioning the logic of the recent American action, which could actually trigger a rush from other nations to design-out U.S. products as quickly as possible, so as to not fall within the sanctions guidelines. The net effect here is clear “self-harm,” as a senior former NSC official told me this week.

    Sanctions on China have also impacted America’s ability to win hearts, minds, and wallets globally. Decoupling actually encouraged Chinese dominance in other battleground markets by forcing Chinese tech to take ownership over app stores, hardware, and operating systems that were historicaly ceded to the Americans.

    In 2019, Google forcibly removed its operating system and app store from Huawei phones after the United States Department of Commerce added the Chinese company to its trade restriction list. By 2020, Huawei announced it would use its internally built HarmonyOS on all of its hardware and would look to replace Google Play Store with its own AppGallery.

    Once American-controlled app stores are removed from emerging market phones, Chinese companies can pre-load or provide exclusive access to Chinese applications, rather than their American competitors. Imagine a Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, Vivo, or Techno user in Africa only able to access Didi ride-hailing affiliates instead of Uber, Alipay mobile payment partners instead of PayPal, Shein affiliated e-commerce platforms instead of Amazon, TikTok instead of Facebook, Youku instead of YouTube, iQiyi instead of Netflix, etc. Chinese companies control 78% of the African feature phone market and provide almost 70% of Africa’s 4G networks. A significant segment of the African market now uses mobile interfaces that could potentially box out American-built applications. Aside from Samsung, there is no global handset (be it a smartphone or feature phone) alternative to the Chinese-built hardware.

    Growing Chinese tech independence has also transformed U.S.-China competition across the globe. In an era where goodwill and economic ties scale exponentially through digital connectivity, decoupling hinders America’s strategic relationship with countries and global consumers, as it forces them into a binary decision on technology partnerships. Goaded by America to choose sides, many key emerging markets may elect to work with China.

    To understand the growing power of Chinese competition, look no further than TikTok. Since it entered the American market, TikTok has exploded as the dominant both social and entertainment platform. In 2021, Americans spent an average of 25.6 hours a month on TikTok. This dwarfs the average time spent by Americans on TikTok’s competitors: Facebook (16.1 hours) and Instagram (7.7 hours). Only YouTube came close at 22.6 hours a month. Who has Netflix cited as amongst their most formidable competition in a letter to shareholders? TikTok. While TikTok and Netflix deliver different products, they are competing for the same thing: your attention. Time (or to be more specific, screen time) is finite. Netflix has a $10 billion production budget. TikTok’s users generate its content for free. The more time users spend on TikTok, the less there is available for other forms of socializing or entertainment.

    TikTok isn’t just a threat to traditional American social media, entertainment, and news platforms. Google’s two-decade unchallenged dominance as a search engine is eroding, as TikTok’s native search capabilities become the go-to hub for GenZ. The company is now expanding into e-commerce and logistics, threatening American giants like Amazon. 

    The real cost of miscalculating

    TikTok’s growing dominance is emblematic of the advantage that Chinese tech has over its American counterparts in the global competition for users. The dominance of Chinese models isn’t driven just by rock-bottom production costs. Core technology innovation is what drives it, particularly as it relates to TikTok’s highly addictive algorithmic recommendation engine.

    In 2018, I hosted a dinner party between Peter Thiel and Zhang Yiming, the Founder of Tiktok’s parent company Bytedance. When our Chinese interlocutors questioned Thiel about Facebook’s lack of recent innovation, he pointed to a content partnership with Major League Baseball. Zhang laughed. After years of being told Chinese tech was only capable of copying American giants, this moment must have felt vindicating. It was probably as gratifying for Zhang as when Facebook’s TikTok knock-off called Lasso (where Thiel was previously a board member) sputtered and crashed in just under two years.

    American tech giants have effectively been walled off from competition since the mid-2000s. Their near-monopoly position–and the rent-seeking it once enabled–has made them complacent.

    Chinese tech can now challenge Silicon Valley in an increasing number of areas. Models popularized in the Chinese market are a challenge for U.S. tech, particularly in emerging markets. There are hundreds of other Chinese-built, funded, or inspired applications that share TikTok’s voracious ability to latch onto the minds and wallets of consumers. In addition to TikTok, e-commerce platforms such as Shein and AliExpress, short-form video app Kuaishou, and various gaming companies owned by Tencent (like Fortnite) have a combined global customer base on a scale of billions.

    American policy towards China shouldn’t turn into a self-defeating prophecy. We are not locked in a zero-sum dynamic. As the two largest economies and strategic powers in the world, America and China still have much to gain through cooperation.

    There is no path to solving the great global challenges of our time (reversing climate change, pandemic management, nuclear disarmament, avoiding global financial crisis) without China’s direct collaboration. If Russia was to resort to using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, no other nation could play a more pivotal role in staving off World War III than China. Decoupling is a poor policy choice for addressing these myriad and complex tensions.

    Worst of all, the loss of China as a market and increased zero-sum competition with China will reduce economic opportunities for American companies and dim American growth prospects. We will miss globalization when it’s gone.

    Ben Harburg is the managing partner of the global investment firm MSA Capital.

    The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.

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    Ben Harburg

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