Tag: Ukrainian

Back in July we reported that Russia urgently needed more loitering munitions for battlefield use. While the larger Shahed-136 kamikaze drones supplied by Iran are mainly targeting the Ukrainian power grid, Russia now appears deploying significant numbers of the smaller, more accurate Lancet-3. A series of videos released by the Russian Ministry of Defense reveal some interesting features of this new and dangerous weapon.

“Lancets may not have been employed in large numbers earlier because Russia’s initial invasion plans and the opening weeks and months of the war did not anticipate massive Ukrainian resistance and therefore the MOD may not have placed enough orders for these to be manufactured in large numbers,” Samuel Bendett, an expert on the Russian defense scene and adviser to the CNA and CNAS think tanks, told Forbes.

That now seems to have changed, though as we will see the are questions about the actual numbers.

Made by a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov concern, the Lancet 3 weighs about thirty pounds, and has a distinctive profile thanks to its X-shaped wings. The weapon used is claimed to be the a new, upgraded version of the Lancet-3 with an eleven-pound warhead compared to the original seven-pound one, and is distinguished by the larger wingspan.

The videos show Lancet strikes on a variety of targets, including S-300 air defense systems, tanks, artillery, trucks, self-propelled howitzers and radar systems, even a gunboat. The volume of such videos released in a few days suggests a propaganda push to persuade people that Russia has at least one weapon that works.

One of the most obvious features of these strikes is that the Lancet has a shaped-charge warhead, a type that focuses its energy into a narrow, armor-piercing jet, which is highly visible in many of the strikes, passing right through the target and out the other side. This enables it to attack even heavily-armored targets like tanks. However, it is not powerful enough to go through a tank’s frontal armor, but can maneuver to attack whether there is less protection.

“You can go around the same tank to hit it not in the most powerful armor on the “forehead”, but in the vulnerable rear,” according to Russian military expert Anton Lavrov in an October 21 piece on the Lancet in Izvestia.

Lancet does not appear to have a top-attack mode, as used by the Javelin, the most reliable way of striking where the armor is thinnest. One video shows a Lancet hitting the side of a Ukrainian T-64 tank, but it is not clear whether the resulting explosion does any real damage – “canceled by active armor” was the opinion of one commenter.

A second feature of the videos is that while many of them show the first-person view from the Lancet’s nose camera as it approaches impact, they also the scene from overhead: a second drone is watching from high altitude. This suggests that the Russians do not launch a Lancet until a target is identified, reducing the risk that it will be wasted. However, this adds delay and removes the element of surprise.

This leads on to a third feature – in several of the videos, soldiers on the ground scatter in the seconds before the Lancet strikes. This suggests that it is highly audible or visible or both, and alert troops can get out of the way. They might also shoot it down – the Ukrainians claim to have brought down a number of Lancets with just small arms fire.

While the Lancet is claimed to be able to hit moving and even evading targets, in every instance seen the target appears to be stationary. This may reflect a sensor-to-shooter delay in the command chain: it takes so long get an Lancet in the air and to a target (cruising speed is only 70 mph) that it is only used on essentially static targets.

While the Lancet is clearly an effective weapon, the videos reveal limitations. Some appear to show misses. And in one of the more embarrassing incidents, in a Lancet strike which is claimed to show the weapon destroying a Ukrainian Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile launcher, the target looks more like a wooden dummy. (This is apparent from lack of secondary explosions, and the way the target collapses after being it). As with other weapons, the Lancet is only as good as the person identifying the target.

Some of the targets selected seem like odd choices. It makes perfect sense to use the Lancet with its 25-mile long range against a high-value target like an S-300 surface-to-air missile complex, but Lancets are shown hitting low-value targets including trucks and a parked, empty Hummer. Again, the weapon is only as good as the intelligence behind targeting. It also raises the question of how many Lancets Russia has to use.

Bendett notes there have been conflicting messages from different sources in Russia about whether they are available in sufficient numbers.

“First we get the official statements that several hundred loitering drones were used in the war in total, then we get Kalashnikov/Rostec stating that they will deliver if there are orders, then we get official Russian media posting Lancet attacks more and more often, and then we get these reports that 1500 are delivered somewhere to the front,” says Bendett.

It is possible that the flood of videos does not represent an increase in supply, especially as they cannot be dated, more a desire to make a good impression.

“The increase in Lancet’s public exposure may be directly related to Ukrainian advances and Russian retreats at several major fronts over the past several months, as a way to affirm that the Russian defense to the warfighters’ needs,” says Bendett.

Bendett notes also that this exposure for Lancet may be a way of balancing Russia’s obvious dependence on Iranian loitering drones. The longer-range Shahed-136 is a different type of weapon with a bigger warhead but apparently lacking the precision guidance of the Lancet, and Russia does not make anything in this class.

“This is not the only ‘missing’ elements in this war,” says Bendett. “Russia still does not have enough actual combat UAVs, despite months of combat and years of development.”

The nearest equivalent to the Lancet-3 on the Ukrainian side are probably the Phoenix Ghost provided by the U.S. along with the Warmate supplied by Poland; the smaller Switchblade-300 is mainly an antipersonnel weapon and the Switchblade-600 is yet to arrive. However, there are very few videos of these weapons in action, as Ukraine is maintaining tight operational security.

The new videos are a good advert for the power of loitering munitions and the need for better defenses to stop them. The number and quality fielded by the two sides could become increasingly important factor in the progress of the war.