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Tag: Robert H. Smith School of Business

  • Fed-Predicted Recession More Likely Severe than Mild

    Fed-Predicted Recession More Likely Severe than Mild

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    Newswise — As recent survey results from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago reinforce Fed economists predicting a mild recession from the recent banking crisis, finance professor Albert “Pete” Kyle at the University of Maryland agrees a recession looms –- but more likely as severe. 

    The crisis, fueled by SVB’s fast collapse, indicates a costly failure – “likely to show up as a recession which is severe, not mild,” says Kyle, Charles E Smith Chair in Finance and Distinguished University Professor for UMD’s Robert H. Smith School of Business.

    Regulatory Failure

    Kyle says SVB’s failure resulted from bank supervision. “The Dodd-Frank Act focused more on heavy-handed regulation than on higher capital requirements to make banks financially healthy. Bank regulators must have known about the unrealized losses on mortgage and Treasury securities which crippled SVB’s balance sheet. These are transparently obvious from cursory oversight. They apparently did not do enough to force SVB to recapitalize until it was too late. As a result of this regulatory forbearance, the FDIC, which ultimately uses the money of taxpayers to take over failed banks, faces billions of dollars in losses.

    The regulatory failure was not the result of exempting banks like SVB from stress tests. Ordinary bank regulatory oversight, operating independently from stress tests, certainly picked up the problems at SVB well before it collapsed.

    The idea that uninsured depositors will monitor banks adequately is known not to work well. Its mechanism of enforcement is bank runs, which—once started—spread to the entire banking system and rapidly send an economy into a recession. The government knows that steep recessions are an absurdly high price to pay for bank monitoring. The entire purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act was to provide a regulatory system which would prevent bank failures without causing recessions. Therefore, it is surprising that the government even thought about wiping out uninsured depositors of SVB as a mechanism of maintaining financial discipline in the banking sector.

    Commercial Real Estate Disaster

    The commercial real estate sector of the U.S. economy is facing a disaster, Kyle says, as office space lease rates are falling, commercial real estate debt is coming due, and many commercial real estate ventures will likely be insolvent when loans fall due. “This disaster is unfolding slowly because leases and loans typically last five to 10 years,” he explains. “It becomes apparent when leases do not roll over and loans cannot be repaid.”

    Much of the risk has probably found its way into the banking system, especially into the portfolios of medium-sized banks, he says. “Since regulators failed to force SVB to fix obvious problems with SVB’s balance sheet, investors and bankers alike are likely to infer that regulators will also fail to force banks burdened with less obvious bad commercial real estate debt to recapitalize promptly.”

    Perspective from Previous Crises

    As the 2008 financial crisis was largely triggered by bad residential mortgage loans, the bad commercial real estate loans will potentially drive another crisis, Kyle says. “I expect a recession to unfold if and when it becomes apparent that banks are too undercapitalized to function properly. This recession might resemble the recession in the early 90s, which was a delayed response to banking problems within the savings and loan industry.”

    Whether this recession unfolds sooner or later depends on the speed with which the government acts to force banks to recapitalize, he adds. “The Fed’s prediction of a mild recession this year suggests they will do too little, too late. Immediate action might trigger a more severe recession now, which would be a small price to pay for a healthy economy a few years later.”

    Why ‘Sooner Rather Than Later’

    In addition to weakly capitalized banks, the Fed’s commitment to bring the inflation rate down to two percent annually “will exacerbate the debt burden of commercial real estate borrowers because the value of their collateral will fall faster with a lower rate of inflation and high interest rates needed to bring inflation down will make rolling over debt more costly,” Kyle says. However, the Fed’s action is inevitable because (unlike government regulators’ commitments to require banks to be well-capitalized) “if the Fed is unable to rid the economy of inflation, the Fed itself will become obviously insolvent and lose so much credibility that the independence of the Fed will be threatened.”

    Underlying Problem

    Heavy-handed government regulation leading to regulatory capture represents the underlying problem, Kyle says. “The more that is at stake, the more resources regulated entities devote to influencing government policy. The Dodd-Frank Act, rather than creating a healthy banking industry, has created a noncompetitive, undercapitalized banking system, which has captured its regulators and is prone to collapse.” If governments subsidize risk-taking by allowing banks or other companies to function as if things are normal when they are inadequately capitalized, he adds, “the banks or other companies will embrace poor capitalization because they believe they can keep their gains but dump their losses on taxpayers.”

    Warnings from History

    Ultimately, many banks and other companies will fail because their bets did not work out, Kyle says, and these failed companies will be nationalized by the FDIC or other government agencies. “During the past financial crisis, the government quickly sold off nationalized companies like General Motors and AIG. It gave banks generous bailouts to avoid formally nationalizing them. When banks and other firms start failing again, we do not know whether the government will hold the failed firms as nationalized companies or let them go public again.”

    He adds: “In my opinion, the government allowed banks to remain in the private sector last time because bailing out banks (with cheap equity from the TARP program) did not cost taxpayers too much out of pocket: Bank stocks rebounded quickly from their depressed prices. By contrast, in the savings and loan debacle, getting out from under government ownership took more than a decade because the industry did not rebound as a whole. If regulators allow the banking system to become too undercapitalized, the hole to dig out of will become so big that nationalization may not be followed by quick privatization. The road to socialism is paved with debt.”

    Finally, Kyle warns that the collapse of the commercial real estate sector may be accompanied by the collapse of the finances of some big cities. “As the politics of many cities–such as Chicago, San Francisco, and New York–moves to the left, many high-income taxpayers are migrating from these cities to other cities with lower taxes and more business-friendly environments. Some of these cities may face major financial stress in coming years, and this will exacerbate their commercial real estate problems.”

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    University of Maryland, Robert H. Smith School of Business

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  • FHFA’s Changes to Mortgage Fees Increases Risk in the Housing Finance System

    FHFA’s Changes to Mortgage Fees Increases Risk in the Housing Finance System

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    BYLINE: Clifford Rossi

    By Clifford Rossi

    On May 1, 2023, a set of new, loan-level price adjustment (LLPA) grids for mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mandated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) will go into effect. FHFA’s director stated that the rationale for these changes is “to increase pricing support for purchase borrowers limited by income or by wealth.​”  

    Unfortunately, the FHFA has subverted the economically sound practice of risk-based pricing and in the process has undermined incentives for borrowers to improve their credit.  

    Imagine that as a safe driver over the years, you’ve enjoyed lower auto insurance premiums than riskier drivers. Then one day, you receive a notice that your premiums, with never having had an accident or moving violation, are going up 300%. Further, you find out that your new premiums are going to subsidize drivers with riskier driving habits and records. Essentially that’s what the FHFA is doing for mortgage borrowers.

    Differential or risk-based pricing of key attributes describing the degree of credit risk in a mortgage has been in place for years. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge ongoing guarantee fees to compensate the agencies for credit risk on mortgage loans purchased from lenders. Those guarantee fees are based on the risk attributes of those loans and are embedded in a borrower’s mortgage rate. In addition, upfront delivery fees, or LLPAs, are imposed on selected risk attributes such as credit score, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and loan purpose (e.g., purchase of a home or refinance). 

    The new LLPA grids differentiate risk via a fee based on whether the borrower is purchasing the home, refinancing the mortgage with limited cash taken back out, or a cash-out refinance. The current LLPA grids are risk-based in the sense that higher fees are assigned to riskier FICO and LTV cells. However, the new grids will increase the cost of borrowing for a sizable borrowing cohort that presents very low credit risk while greatly lowering the cost of borrowing for borrowers that pose significant credit risk to Fannie and Freddie.

    The changes between the current and new LLPA grid for purchase mortgages are shown in Table 1 below. The cells shaded in red depict increases in LLPAs while cells shaded green represent decreases.  Borrowers with credit scores between 720-759 with LTVs between 80.01- 85% will go up by .75% from .25% to 1%, or a 300% increase on May 1, for example, while borrowers with credit scores less than 620 with LTVs above 95% will drop by 2%.  

    To put this in perspective, according to Fannie Mae historical credit performance data, borrowers in the low-risk group had a net loss rate of .29% while the high-risk group’s net loss rate was 2.09%, or more than seven times the low-risk cohort. Similarly, the high-risk group has a historical late-stage (i.e., more than 180 days past due ever) that is 6.5 times the rate of the low-risk group on loans originated between 1999-2022. Credit risk clearly does not increase in a linear fashion with credit score and LTV but rather results in a sharp acceleration when lower credit scores are combined with higher LTVs.  Lowering fees invites more high-risk borrowers into the credit portfolios of both GSEs though they represent a very small portion of new GSE-eligible mortgages.  More than 25% of prospective borrowers will face an increase in LLPAs while borrowers with credit scores less than 660 make up about 2% of new originations.  

     

    Figure 1: Changes (in percent) in LLPAs Between Current and New Grids

    Note: numbers in red represent high risk credit scores or LTVs and blue represents high risk combinations of credit score and LTV.

    Table 2 provides a sense of the impact of these changes on borrowers taking out a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage assuming a loan size of $300,000 and a mortgage rate of 6.4%. Borrowers with FICOs between 720-759 with LTVs of 80.01-85% would see an annual increase of about $360 or about a 1.6 percent increase in their payment overall.  While this does not seem to be a substantial increase, on top of higher mortgage rates and inflation already embedded in the economy, it creates an additional financial headwind for these borrowers.  

    A countervailing argument can be made that higher risk borrowers will see significant reductions in their mortgage payments and that the risks to the GSEs from attracting more of these borrowers into their credit portfolios are offset by higher fees on the low credit risk borrowers.  Still, such a policy puts many high-risk borrowers at risk given their risk profile at the wrong time of the economic cycle.

     

    Table 2: Change in Monthly Mortgage Payment Under new LLPAs

    The FHFA forced both GSEs to essentially flatten the actuarially fair pricing relationships of credit score and LTV to credit risk for the sake of improving housing affordability of borrowers with poor credit characteristics. However, that policy does nothing for higher credit risk borrowers to improve the long-term sustainability of retaining their home once the loan is made. We found out during the years leading up to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that policies intended to help marginal borrowers become homeowners ultimately resulted in many heartbreaking stories of foreclosure. While supporting homeownership across all communities and incomes is a laudable objective, imposing affordable housing policy on risk-based pricing is ultimately an ineffective policy mechanism that comes at the expense of burdening a large segment of borrowers including those intended to fare better after May 1.  

    Clifford Rossi is a Professor of the Practice and Executive-in-Residence for the University of Maryland’s Robert H. Smith School of Business. He has nearly 25 years of experience in the financial services industry where he held senior risk management positions at several of the largest financial institutions including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

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    University of Maryland, Robert H. Smith School of Business

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  • UMD Smith to Add MS Climate Finance Track

    UMD Smith to Add MS Climate Finance Track

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    Newswise — The University of Maryland’s Robert H. Smith School of Business will offer a new track in climate finance to students in the Master of Finance and Master of Quantitative Finance degree programs, starting in spring 2024. 

    Climate Finance Track Informational Webinar, 9-10 a.m. Tuesday Feb. 21, 2023, will preview the track, which adds four new elective courses to Smith’s current MS curriculum.

    These courses will teach students how to use climate modeling and analytics tools to assess climate change financial risks, how to navigate accounting rules around climate and carbon disclosures, and techniques used by asset and fund managers for valuing companies and assets based on their exposure to climate-related risks.

    The track also will incorporate an experiential learning project engaging small groups of students with a corporate or government sponsor on a consulting project related to climate finance and risk management.

    Financing projects to mitigate climate risk for companies and individuals and finding mechanisms to incent the transition from a fossil fuels-based economy to a green economy requires direct engagement with the financial services industry, says Professor of the Practice and Executive-in-Residence Clifford Rossi, one of the faculty members who will teach courses in the track. 

    “Asset management, banking, insurance, and other nonbank financial companies are critical stakeholders in these efforts,” he says. “The Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory agencies are developing rules and requirements for financial disclosures of climate-related risks for publicly traded corporations and scenario analysis for banking institutions.”

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  • Student Loan Forgiveness on Ice: Insights for Borrowers

    Student Loan Forgiveness on Ice: Insights for Borrowers

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    Newswise — With the proposed student debt relief program mired and stalled in legal battles, it’s now revealed that erroneous notices of student debt forgiveness application approvals were emailed to about 9 million Americans. At this point, says UMD Smith’s Samuel Handwerger, “the Biden administration might be asking themselves ‘Is the road to hell really paved with good intentions?’”

    Handwerger adds: “Whether the intent has been solely to boost the economy and promote higher educational achievement amongst Americans or a veiled political ad for Democratic votes in the latest election, find me an economist that believes an educated population is not good for the economy and I will show you that Joseph Stalin’s many 5-year plans really did succeed.”

    Handwerger, CPA and accounting lecturer for the University of Maryland’s Robert H. Smith School of Business, gives more insights – especially for borrowers – in this Q&A:

    What are the essentials to know concerning the legal challenges?

    Handwerger: This boils down to two cases. First, in Texas, two individuals — backed by the conservative organization Job Creators Network Foundation — allege the forgiveness plan unfairly excludes them and shouldn’t be allowed. The other suit, “ Nebraska v. Biden,” comes from a group of states — Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas and South Carolina — claiming that the forgiveness would hurt them in the form of lost tax revenue. Normally, loan forgiveness results in taxable income for the individual whose loan has been forgiven. But based on the 2017 Trump Administration tax law, student loan forgiveness is not considered taxable income during the years 2018 thru 2025, after which that particular provision sunsets. Talk about a perfect storm of Republican and Democratic agendas.

    With another pause on repayments, is there anything different this time?

    Handwerger: Starting in 2020 under Trump, repayments for federal student loans have been in a state of suspended animation — no payments and no interest accruing. President Biden now has extended this original pause seven times with this latest move. But unlike previous extensions which expired by easily decipherable due dates, this latest extension almost requires a college degree to fully follow. But to put it as simple as possible, payments restart 60 days after whichever of the following scenarios happens first:

    • The lawsuits that have blocked the debt relief are resolved
    • Debt relief is implemented
    • The date is June 30, 2023

    In other words, if the debt relief is not implemented or the lawsuits are not resolved prior to June 30, 2023, then 60 days after this date, payments start to become due again and interest accrual resumes.

    Should borrowers make voluntary payments?

    Handwerger: Regarding this freeze-of-interest tolling, making voluntary payments in the interim is not an economically smart move, as normally one would be better served to earn some short-term interest on the funds. Even with a moving-target restart date making such financial planning tricky, the smart money move still is not to make payments while the freeze remains on. Adding to the efficacy of this argument is that the months during the pause still count as months with proper payment for many federal loan programs, where unpaid principal after a series of years is ultimately forgiven.

    How long before a resolution? What if Biden wins?

    Handwerger: It will be interesting to see how Biden will handle the applications for debt forgiveness if it legally can be resumed. Currently, loan forgiveness applications are suspended, and the government is not accepting any more applications. Originally the end date for applying was scheduled to be December 31, 2023. But the wheels on the legal process could go very slowly if the Supreme Court enters the picture. All of this makes for a lot of uncertainty for the 43 million-plus Americans holding unpaid student loan debt. The loan relief, in its original form, did not apply to loans originating after July 1, 2022. So, taking on more student debt needs to be carefully considered, as it always should be. My query: Would a win allowing for the loan forgiveness after a protracted legal battle entice Biden to expand the loans available for relief? I can’t wait for further developments to find out.

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  • US Housing: Smith Expert Breaks Down the Gloomy Forecast

    US Housing: Smith Expert Breaks Down the Gloomy Forecast

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    Newswise — Inflation, soaring interest rates and massive financial market volatility have dampened end-of-year projections for the U.S. economy. But housing, in a historically low mortgage-rate environment, has been an outlier amid the disorder – until recently. Now, clouds are on the horizon, says UMD Smith’s Clifford Rossi, and rumblings suggest all may not be well with U.S. housing. So, “to determine whether we’re looking at a Cat 5 hurricane or merely a steady rain, we need to scrutinize the host of variables affecting this market.”

    First, significantly, there really is no such thing as a national housing market but rather “thousands of local housing markets that are driven by a combination of market fundamentals that push-and-pull on markets over economic cycles. This means some markets will hold up better than others over time because of these forces,” says Rossi, professor of the practice and executive-in-residence for the University of Maryland’s Robert H. Smith School of Business.

    However, with the Federal Reserve in a real fight to combat inflation, the mortgage market is entering a cold winter. Rossi adds, “with rates on fixed-rate 30-year mortgages above 7% for the first time in many years, mortgage demand has been crushed.”

    A countervailing effect, though, is that the housing market has experienced an abnormally low level of supply. In other words, “months of housing inventory – usually around five-to-six months or so for a ‘normal’ market has been hovering around two months for most of 2022,” Rossi says. “This should hold back markets from experiencing a serious decline in home prices over the next year.”

    Rossi says housing prices will continue to decelerate as mortgage rates continue to climb with further Fed rate hikes. Should a recession materialize in 2023, this would further drive down home prices, but a fair amount of uncertainty persists about the timing and depth of such a downturn.

    The effect on lenders and servicers is a wildcard here. “Expect a significant amount of consolidation in the industry most notably among non-bank originators and servicers,” he says. “These institutions swept into the mortgage market in the years following the 2008 crisis and now dominate originations and servicing in the mortgage market for all investor types.”

    These firms are only regulated at the state level from a safety and soundness perspective and tend to have less capital and liquidity on hand in the event of a significant downturn. This makes them significantly riskier than federally regulated depositories such as commercial banks.

    Originators are struggling to make money in a purchase money environment where borrower refinances have dried up as rates have risen. “Many people who refinanced their mortgage at 3% are in the catbird seat now and will not be as motivated to sell their home as a result,” Rossi says. “This phenomenon will also hold housing inventory levels down.”

    The Projection

    “Generally, we are in for a bumpy ride in housing for the next 12 months, but we shouldn’t expect it to look anything like 2008-2009,” Rossi says. “This looks to be more of a reversion to the mean from a period of lofty house-price appreciation.”

    Rossi says, “if pressed, I could see “a 3-8% decline in home prices with 5% down being my expected level over the next 12 months. This would be conditional on a Fed terminal rate of 4.75% by the first part of 2023, a mild recession sometime in the mid-to-late part of the year, and unemployment rates no more than 5-6%.” But he adds, these, among other factors, obviously hang in the balance.

    Variables and Wildcards

    Deviations from these assumptions on either side would affect these home price projections, Rossi says. One of the trickier issues is figuring out what the Fed will do if the economy does enter a recession. “Would they start lowering rates or hold the line to finish the job on inflation? Right now, the Fed seems poised to fight inflation first and then deal with the aftermath. That strategy coupled with the long lags in monetary policy have me leaning more to a higher likelihood of recession.”

    Another wildcard is job openings as described in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) report. “Should job numbers remain at elevated levels, the Fed might feel more emboldened to hold the line against lowering rates in the face of a recession.”

    Advice for Prospective Buyers

    Typically, during a recession when unemployment rates rise, mortgage delinquencies follow. “Expect any recession in 2023 to lead to those same outcomes, but I do not expect any crash in housing as a result.”

    Rossi concludes: “In this environment and if you have a low mortgage rate — unless some life change dictates otherwise, I would stay put as this period of market uncertainty unfolds, I would bolster my short-term finances for repairs and other unexpected expenses including much higher maintenance costs (e.g., utility bills) during this winter of housing discontent.”

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    University of Maryland, Robert H. Smith School of Business

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  • UMD Smith Expert Weighs in on Market and Financial Implications of an Elon Musk Buyout of Twitter

    UMD Smith Expert Weighs in on Market and Financial Implications of an Elon Musk Buyout of Twitter

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    With Elon Musk’s offer to proceed with a $44 billion acquisition of Twitter, Clinical Professor of Finance and stock market expert David Kass at the University of Maryland’s Robert H. Smith School of Business says:

    “It now appears that Musk will acquire Twitter for $54.20 per share as he originally agreed.  The shares will then cease to trade publicly but could be reissued as an IPO in the future. I would expect Musk to use his innate creativity and genius to turn the company around and greatly expand its services in the years ahead.”

    Kass has served as an economist in senior positions with the Federal Trade Commission, General Accounting Office, Department of Defense, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 

    He also is active on Twitter (@DrDavidKass) and blogs about Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway and the stock market. 

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