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Tag: regime change

  • Who is Delcy Rodríguez? The woman who’s Venezuela’s interim president

    As uncertainty simmers in Venezuela, interim President Delcy Rodríguez has taken the place of her ally deposed President Nicolás Maduro, captured by the United States in a nighttime military operation, and offered “to collaborate” with the Trump administration in what could be a seismic shift in relations between the adversary governments.Rodríguez served as Maduro’s vice president since 2018, overseeing much of Venezuela’s oil-dependent economy and its feared intelligence service, and was next in the presidential line of succession.She’s part of a band of senior officials in Maduro’s administration that now appears to control Venezuela, even as U.S. President Donald Trump and other officials say they will pressure the government to fall in line with its vision for the oil-rich nation.On Saturday, Venezuela’s high court ordered her to assume the role of interim president, and the leader was backed by Venezuela’s military.Ally or adversaryRodríguez, a 56-year-old lawyer and politician has had a lengthy career representing the revolution started by the late Hugo Chávez on the world stage. It’s been unclear if the leader would warm up to the Trump administration or follow the same adversarial line as her predecessor.Her rise to become interim leader of the South American country came as a surprise on Saturday morning, when Trump announced that Secretary of State Marco Rubio had been in communication with Rodríguez and that the Venezuelan leader was “gracious” and would work with the American government. Rubio said Rodríguez was someone the administration could work with, unlike Maduro.But in a televised address, Rodríguez gave no indication that she would cooperate with Trump, referring to his government as “extremists” and maintaining that Maduro was Venezuela’s rightful leader.“What is being done to Venezuela is an atrocity that violates international law,” Rodríguez said, surrounded by high-ranking civilian officials and military leaders.Trump warned on Sunday, if Rodríguez didn’t fall in line, “she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.” He added that he wanted her to provide “total access,” from oil facilities to basic infrastructure like roads, so they can be rebuilt.Trump’s comments also followed Rubio having asserted in TV interviews on Sunday that he didn’t see Rodríguez and her government as “legitimate” because he said the country never held free and fair elections.On Sunday, in statements posted to her Instagram, she took a major shift in tone in a conciliatory message where she said she hoped to build “respectful relations” with Trump.“We invite the US government to collaborate with us on an agenda of cooperation oriented towards shared development within the framework of international law to strengthen lasting community coexistence,” she wrote.Rise to interim presidentA lawyer educated in Britain and France, the interim president and her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, head of the Maduro-controlled National Assembly, have sterling leftist credentials born from tragedy. Their father was a socialist leader who was arrested for his involvement in the kidnapping of American business owner William Niehous in 1976, and later died in police custody.Unlike many in Maduro’s inner circle, the Rodríguez siblings have avoided criminal indictment in the U.S., though the interim president did face U.S. sanctions during Trump’s first term for her role in undermining Venezuelan democracy.Rodríguez held a number of lower-level positions under Chávez’s government, but gained prominence working under Maduro to the point of being seen as his successor. She served the economic minister, foreign affairs minister, petroleum minister and others help stabilize Venezuela’s endemically crisis-stricken economy after years of rampant inflation and turmoil.Rodríguez developed strong ties with Republicans in the oil industry and on Wall Street who balked at the notion of U.S.-led regime change. The interim president also presided over an assembly promoted by Maduro in response to street protests in 2017 meant to neutralize the opposition-majority legislature.She enjoys a close relationship with the military, which has long acted as the arbiter of political disputes in Venezuela, said Ronal Rodríguez, a spokesperson for the Venezuela Observatory of Rosario University in Bogota, Colombia.“She has a very particular relationship with power,” he said. “She has developed very strong ties with elements of the armed forces and has managed to establish lines of dialogue with them, largely on a transactional basis.”Future in powerIt’s unclear how long Rodríguez will hold power, or how closely she will work with the Trump administration.Geoff Ramsey, a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, a Washington research institute, said Rodríguez’s initially firm tone with the Trump administration may have been an attempt to “save face.” Others have noted that Maduro’s capture required some level of collaboration within the Venezuelan government.“She can’t exactly expect to score points with her revolutionary peers if she presents herself as a patsy for U.S. interests,” Ramsey said.Venezuela’s constitution requires an election within 30 days whenever the president becomes “permanently unavailable” to serve. Reasons listed include death, resignation, removal from office or “abandonment” of duties as declared by the National Assembly.That electoral timeline was rigorously followed when Maduro’s predecessor, Chavez, died of cancer in 2013. However, the loyalist Supreme Court, in its decision Saturday, cited another provision of the charter in declaring Maduro’s absence a “temporary” one.In such a scenario, there is no election requirement. Instead, the vice president, an unelected position, takes over for up to 90 days — a period that can be extended to six months with a vote of the National Assembly.In handing temporary power to Rodríguez, the Supreme Court made no mention of the 180-day time limit, leading some to speculate she could try to remain in power even longer as she seeks to unite the disparate factions of the ruling socialist party while shielding it from what would certainly be a stiff electoral challenge.—Janetsky reported from Mexico City and Debre reported from Buenos Aires, Argentina. Associated Press writers Joshua Goodman in Miami, Darlene Superville aboard Air Force One and Jorge Rueda in Caracas, Venezuela, contributed to this report.

    As uncertainty simmers in Venezuela, interim President Delcy Rodríguez has taken the place of her ally deposed President Nicolás Maduro, captured by the United States in a nighttime military operation, and offered “to collaborate” with the Trump administration in what could be a seismic shift in relations between the adversary governments.

    Rodríguez served as Maduro’s vice president since 2018, overseeing much of Venezuela’s oil-dependent economy and its feared intelligence service, and was next in the presidential line of succession.

    She’s part of a band of senior officials in Maduro’s administration that now appears to control Venezuela, even as U.S. President Donald Trump and other officials say they will pressure the government to fall in line with its vision for the oil-rich nation.

    On Saturday, Venezuela’s high court ordered her to assume the role of interim president, and the leader was backed by Venezuela’s military.

    Ally or adversary

    Rodríguez, a 56-year-old lawyer and politician has had a lengthy career representing the revolution started by the late Hugo Chávez on the world stage. It’s been unclear if the leader would warm up to the Trump administration or follow the same adversarial line as her predecessor.

    Her rise to become interim leader of the South American country came as a surprise on Saturday morning, when Trump announced that Secretary of State Marco Rubio had been in communication with Rodríguez and that the Venezuelan leader was “gracious” and would work with the American government. Rubio said Rodríguez was someone the administration could work with, unlike Maduro.

    But in a televised address, Rodríguez gave no indication that she would cooperate with Trump, referring to his government as “extremists” and maintaining that Maduro was Venezuela’s rightful leader.

    “What is being done to Venezuela is an atrocity that violates international law,” Rodríguez said, surrounded by high-ranking civilian officials and military leaders.

    Trump warned on Sunday, if Rodríguez didn’t fall in line, “she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.” He added that he wanted her to provide “total access,” from oil facilities to basic infrastructure like roads, so they can be rebuilt.

    Trump’s comments also followed Rubio having asserted in TV interviews on Sunday that he didn’t see Rodríguez and her government as “legitimate” because he said the country never held free and fair elections.

    On Sunday, in statements posted to her Instagram, she took a major shift in tone in a conciliatory message where she said she hoped to build “respectful relations” with Trump.

    “We invite the US government to collaborate with us on an agenda of cooperation oriented towards shared development within the framework of international law to strengthen lasting community coexistence,” she wrote.

    Rise to interim president

    A lawyer educated in Britain and France, the interim president and her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, head of the Maduro-controlled National Assembly, have sterling leftist credentials born from tragedy. Their father was a socialist leader who was arrested for his involvement in the kidnapping of American business owner William Niehous in 1976, and later died in police custody.

    Unlike many in Maduro’s inner circle, the Rodríguez siblings have avoided criminal indictment in the U.S., though the interim president did face U.S. sanctions during Trump’s first term for her role in undermining Venezuelan democracy.

    Rodríguez held a number of lower-level positions under Chávez’s government, but gained prominence working under Maduro to the point of being seen as his successor. She served the economic minister, foreign affairs minister, petroleum minister and others help stabilize Venezuela’s endemically crisis-stricken economy after years of rampant inflation and turmoil.

    Rodríguez developed strong ties with Republicans in the oil industry and on Wall Street who balked at the notion of U.S.-led regime change. The interim president also presided over an assembly promoted by Maduro in response to street protests in 2017 meant to neutralize the opposition-majority legislature.

    She enjoys a close relationship with the military, which has long acted as the arbiter of political disputes in Venezuela, said Ronal Rodríguez, a spokesperson for the Venezuela Observatory of Rosario University in Bogota, Colombia.

    “She has a very particular relationship with power,” he said. “She has developed very strong ties with elements of the armed forces and has managed to establish lines of dialogue with them, largely on a transactional basis.”

    Future in power

    It’s unclear how long Rodríguez will hold power, or how closely she will work with the Trump administration.

    Geoff Ramsey, a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, a Washington research institute, said Rodríguez’s initially firm tone with the Trump administration may have been an attempt to “save face.” Others have noted that Maduro’s capture required some level of collaboration within the Venezuelan government.

    “She can’t exactly expect to score points with her revolutionary peers if she presents herself as a patsy for U.S. interests,” Ramsey said.

    Venezuela’s constitution requires an election within 30 days whenever the president becomes “permanently unavailable” to serve. Reasons listed include death, resignation, removal from office or “abandonment” of duties as declared by the National Assembly.

    That electoral timeline was rigorously followed when Maduro’s predecessor, Chavez, died of cancer in 2013. However, the loyalist Supreme Court, in its decision Saturday, cited another provision of the charter in declaring Maduro’s absence a “temporary” one.

    In such a scenario, there is no election requirement. Instead, the vice president, an unelected position, takes over for up to 90 days — a period that can be extended to six months with a vote of the National Assembly.

    In handing temporary power to Rodríguez, the Supreme Court made no mention of the 180-day time limit, leading some to speculate she could try to remain in power even longer as she seeks to unite the disparate factions of the ruling socialist party while shielding it from what would certainly be a stiff electoral challenge.

    Janetsky reported from Mexico City and Debre reported from Buenos Aires, Argentina. Associated Press writers Joshua Goodman in Miami, Darlene Superville aboard Air Force One and Jorge Rueda in Caracas, Venezuela, contributed to this report.

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  • What Britain’s silence on Iran’s protests says about its foreign policy priorities

    Why is there no statement about supporting regime change in Iran? And why are there no comments about the international law violations by the Iranian regime as it cracks down on protesters?

    “Starmer’s silence on Iran is shocking,” the UK’s Shadow Foreign Secretary Priti Patel opined on Saturday, referring to a dramatic absence of commentary from British politicians and British media regarding the weeklong anti-regime protests in Iran.

    “With Iran’s cruel authoritarian regime emboldened by its brutal crackdown of freedom and democracy advocates within the country, Britain stands in silence as we see the chilling images of protesters being silenced and young activists being detained,” she added.

    “All this is not happening in secret but in plain sight, which is why the lack of robust action and condemnation by Starmer’s feeble government is shocking. Senior figures in the Labour Government seem unwilling and incapable of stepping up.”

    Mass demonstrations broke out across Iran on December 28, with citizens protesting over the collapse of the rial and soaring inflation, as well as dissatisfaction with the Islamic regime.
    These are the largest anti-regime protests since 2022’s Mahsa Amini protests. And yet there have been no tweets from Prime Minister Keir Starmer nor Yvette Cooper showing solidarity with the Iranian people or condemning the brutal Islamic regime’s crackdown on protests.

    The BBC – the country’s state broadcaster – has only published four articles. If one were relying on the BBC for coverage, one could be forgiven for not knowing anything was happening in Iran at all. A large group of Iranian and Jewish protesters actually gathered outside the BBC HQ on Sunday, chanting, “Ayatollah BBC, shame on you.”
    Yet when there is any development in Israel or Palestine, Cooper, David Lammy, and Starmer – and of course the BBC – scramble to chime in.

    And it’s not just the BBC. The Guardian, which has dedicated itself to the noble task of Israel-bashing, focused its coverage on an op-ed by Iran’s foreign ministerAbbas Araghchi about how “Israel’s recklessness is a threat to all.”
    The Jerusalem Post has seen countless images on Iranian citizen Telegram channels and X/Twitter accounts showing horrific injuries, including an X-ray of a woman with hundreds of metal bearings in her skull. Yet, according to The Guardian, Israel is the greatest threat.

    People stand outside the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) headquarters in London, (credit: REUTERS/HENRY NICHOLLS)

    So why the silence?
    One reason could be that British politicians and British media view Iran’s internal issues abstractly, whereas the Israel-Palestine conflict is seen as somewhat symbiotic with British history and policy and therefore of domestic importance. The last two years have shown that Israel-Palestine developments have a strong impact on British domestic policy and are treated as a Westminster issue.

    Iranian internal struggles, on the other hand, are regarded at a distance. The UK sometimes takes the side of quiet diplomacy, fearing that any public condemnation of internal Iranian affairs may jeopardize any future negotiations.
    Some have said that British politicians are playing a waiting game, fearful to chip in before more is clear. Others argued that they do not want to comment on foreign regime changes. However, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny.

    After the US’s capture and indictment of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on Saturday, Starmer and Cooper both immediately came out with statements about endorsing “transition of power” in Venezuela, so long as it is with respect to international law. Why is there no statement about supporting regime change in Iran? And why are there no comments about the international law violations by the Iranian regime as it cracks down on protesters?

    The BBC has given some dubious reasons for its lack of coverage. BBC World Affairs reporter John Simpson responded to queries by saying it is “very difficult for news organizations to get correspondents in [Iran]. The BBC is banned, and so are most others. It’s a bit like Gaza.”

    Not being able to enter Gaza has not stopped the BBC from writing incessantly about it over the last two years, so why this would be a barrier to covering Iran is unclear.

    “Understood, but BBC can report on the tide of social media posts, many of which are obviously authentic – but the total blackout on the story is absolutely astounding and irresponsible,” retorted historian Simon Schama, highlighting the double standards.

    The National Union for Democracy in Iran – which delivered a groundbreaking report on Iran’s web of influence in the UK last year – magnanimously offered to help the BBC with its coverage. “We are analyzing, monitoring, verifying, and translating protest videos and slogans on a daily basis. We are happy to help.”If the Islamic Republic falls, it will change the future of not just the Iranian people but the entire world. Regardless of the outcome, the UK will be directly affected. Surely the BBC wants to be leading the tide of reporting on this? Surely Britain’s government wants to preemptively assure the Iranian people of its support, should the regime fall.
    The Iranian people are asking to be heard. The question remains of why key British establishments are choosing not to give them a voice.

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  • With CIA strike, signs Trump is ‘shaping the battlespace’ in Venezuela

    The day after Christmas is typically quiet in the nation’s capital. But President Trump’s decision to acknowledge a covert U.S. strike on Venezuelan territory, in an interview with an obscure local news outlet on Friday, set off a scramble in a drowsy Washington that has become a hallmark of the president.

    Officials working on Latin America policy for the administration that had been closely tracking reports of refinery fires and other curious events throughout Venezuela couldn’t immediately figure out which target the president was talking about, three sources familiar with the matter told The Times.

    Trump would later detail that the strike targeted a “dock area where they load the boats up with drugs.” But initial confusion from within his own government signaled just how tight a circle within the West Wing is determining whether to climb the escalation ladder toward war with Caracas.

    Trump initially confirmed he had authorized CIA actions in Venezuela in an exchange with reporters on October. While the administration is obligated to report covert CIA operations to Congress, more robust congressional authorization is required for the use of military force.

    “I authorized for two reasons, really. No. 1, they have emptied their prisons into the United States of America,” Trump said at the time. “And the other thing, the drugs, we have a lot of drugs coming in from Venezuela, and a lot of the Venezuelan drugs come in through the sea.”

    The strike comes as Venezuelan authorities have increased the number of U.S. citizens detained in their custody, the New York Times first reported on Friday. Caracas had freed 17 Americans and permanent residents held in notorious Venezuelan prisons at the start of the Trump administration.

    Evan Ellis, who served in Trump’s first term planning State Department policy on Latin America, the Caribbean and international narcotics, said it was “unclear whether the initial plan was for this operation to be publicly announced in an interview by the president.” Venezuela’s dictatorial president, Nicolás Maduro, “was certainly confused about it,” he said.

    “It would make sense for them to do something like that, rather then a military strike, especially right now when there’s a delicate line between military operations and other things,” Ellis added. “My sense is — to the extent the president has acknowledged it — that this was them carrying out their mission to shape the battlespace in support of broader national objectives.”

    But Trump has yet to articulate the full scope of those objectives, leaving observers to wonder whether regime change in Venezuela is his true, ultimate aim.

    Trump has repeatedly told the media that Maduro’s days in power are numbered. The administration refers to him and his regime as an illegitimate narco-state terrorizing American communities. On a bipartisan basis, going back to Trump’s first term and throughout the Biden administration, the United States has recognized a democratic opposition in Venezuela as its rightful government.

    But a military war on the drug trade would make little sense targeting Venezuela, where only a fraction of illicit narcotics smuggled into the United States originate. Trump has hinted in recent weeks at other motives driving his calculus.

    Over the last four months, the Trump administration slowly ramped up its pressure campaign on Maduro, first by targeting boats allegedly carrying narcotics and drug smugglers in international waters before announcing a blockade of Venezuelan oil tankers. Venezuela’s oil exports have consequently plummeted by half over the course of the last month.

    On Wednesday, the Treasury Department also issued sanctions against four companies that it said were either operating in Venezuela’s oil sector or as accompanying oil tankers.

    “Maduro’s regime increasingly depends on a shadow fleet of worldwide vessels to facilitate sanctionable activity, including sanctions evasion, and to generate revenue for its destabilizing operations,” the department said in a statement. “Today’s action further signals that those involved in the Venezuelan oil trade continue to face significant sanctions risks.”

    The Pentagon, meanwhile, has stationed nearly a quarter of the U.S. naval fleet in the Caribbean since the summer, in what Trump has referred to as a “massive armada” without precedent in the region.

    While Venezuela’s current oil output is modest, the nation sits on the world’s largest known oil reserves, offering significant potential access to any future strategic partners. China is currently the largest importer of Venezuelan oil, and at least one tanker subjected to the U.S. blockade has sought protection from Moscow, Maduro’s chief military ally.

    Addressing the blockade in an exchange with reporters, Trump said he had spoken with top U.S. oil executives about what the Venezuelan market would look like with Maduro no longer in power. And he suggested the U.S. government would keep whatever barrels are seized, hearkening back to Trump’s campaign, throughout the 2010s, for the United States to control the oil fields of Iraq as the spoils of its war there.

    We’re going to keep it,” Trump said last week, of the 1.9 million barrels of Venezuelan oil on the first tanker seized. “Maybe we’ll sell it. Maybe we’ll keep it. Maybe we’ll use it in the strategic reserves. We’re keeping it.”

    “We’re keeping the ships, also,” he added.

    Michael Wilner

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  • Contributor: Don’t count on regime change to stabilize Venezuela

    As the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier sails to the Caribbean, the U.S. military continues striking drug-carrying boats off the Venezuelan coast and the Trump administration debates what to do about Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, one thing seems certain: Venezuela and the western hemisphere would all be better off if Maduro packed his bags and spent his remaining years in exile.

    This is certainly what Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado is working toward. This year’s Nobel Prize laureate has spent much of her time recently in the U.S. lobbying policymakers to squeeze Maduro into vacating power. Constantly at risk of detention in her own country, Machado is granting interviews and dialing into conferences to advocate for regime change. Her talking points are clearly tailored for the Trump administration: Maduro is the head of a drug cartel that is poisoning Americans; his dictatorship rests on weak pillars; and the forces of democracy inside Venezuela are fully prepared to seize the mantle once Maduro is gone. “We are ready to take over government,” Machado told Bloomberg News in an October interview.

    But as the old saying goes, if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. While there’s no disputing that Maduro is a despot and a fraud who steals elections, U.S. policymakers can’t simply take what Machado is saying for granted. Washington learned this the hard way in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, when an opposition leader named Ahmed Chalabi sold U.S. policymakers a bill of goods about how painless rebuilding a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would be. We all know how the story turned out — the United States stumbled into an occupation that sucked up U.S. resources, unleashed unpredicted regional consequences and proved more difficult than its proponents originally claimed.

    To be fair, Machado is no Chalabi. The latter was a fraudster; the former is the head of an opposition movement whose candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, won two-thirds of the vote during the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election (Maduro claimed victory anyway and forced González into exile). But just because her motives are good doesn’t mean we shouldn’t question her assertions.

    Would regime change in Caracas produce the Western-style democracy Machado and her supporters anticipate? None of us can rule it out. But the Trump administration can’t bank on this as the outcome of a post-Maduro future. Other scenarios are just as likely, if not more so — and some of them could lead to greater violence for Venezuelans and more problems for U.S. policy in Latin America.

    The big problem with regime change is you can never be entirely sure what will happen after the incumbent leader is removed. Such operations are by their very nature dangerous and destabilizing; political orders are deliberately shattered, the haves become have-nots, and constituencies used to holding the reins of power suddenly find themselves as outsiders. When Hussein was deposed in Iraq, the military officers, Ba’ath Party loyalists and regime-tied sycophants who ruled the roost for nearly a quarter-century were forced to make do with an entirely new situation. The Sunni-dominated structure was overturned, and members of the Shia majority, previously oppressed, were now eagerly taking their place at the top of the system. This, combined with the U.S. decision to bar anyone associated with the old regime from serving in state positions, fed the ingredients for a large-scale insurgency that challenged the new government, precipitated a civil war and killed tens of thousands of Iraqis.

    Regime change can also create total absences of authority, as it did in Libya after the 2011 U.S.-NATO intervention there. Much like Maduro today, Moammar Kadafi was a reviled figure whose demise was supposed to pave the way for a democratic utopia in North Africa. The reality was anything but. Instead, Kadafi’s removal sparked conflict between Libya’s major tribal alliances, competing governments and the proliferation of terrorist groups in a country just south of the European Union. Fifteen years later, Libya remains a basket case of militias, warlords and weak institutions.

    Unlike Iraq and Libya, Venezuela has experience in democratic governance. It held relatively free and fair elections in the past and doesn’t suffer from the types of sectarian rifts associated with states in the Middle East.

    Still, this is cold comfort for those expecting a democratic transition. Indeed, for such a transition to be successful, the Venezuelan army would have to be on board with it, either by sitting on the sidelines as Maduro’s regime collapses, actively arresting Maduro and his top associates, or agreeing to switch its support to the new authorities. But again, this is a tall order, particularly for an army whose leadership is a core facet of the Maduro regime’s survival, has grown used to making obscene amounts of money from illegal activity under the table and whose members are implicated in human rights abuses. The very same elites who profited handsomely from the old system would have to cooperate with the new one. This doesn’t appear likely, especially if their piece of the pie will shrink the moment Maduro leaves.

    Finally, while regime change might sound like a good remedy to the problem that is Venezuela, it might just compound the difficulties over time. Although Maduro’s regime’s remit is already limited, its complete dissolution could usher in a free-for-all between elements of the former government, drug trafficking organizations and established armed groups like the Colombian National Liberation Army, which have long treated Venezuela as a base of operations. Any post-Maduro government would have difficulty managing all of this at the same time it attempts to restructure the Venezuelan economy and rebuild its institutions. The Trump administration would then be facing the prospect of Venezuela serving as an even bigger source of drugs and migration, the very outcome the White House is working to prevent.

    In the end, María Corina Machado could prove to be right. But she is selling a best-case assumption. The U.S. shouldn’t buy it. Democracy after Maduro is possible but is hardly the only possible result — and it’s certainly not the most likely.

    Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities.

    Daniel R. DePetris

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