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  • A Major Breed of Flu Has Gone Missing

    A Major Breed of Flu Has Gone Missing

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    In March 2020, Yamagata’s trail went cold.

    The pathogen, one of the four main groups of flu viruses targeted by seasonal vaccines, had spent the first part of the year flitting across the Northern Hemisphere, as it typically did. As the seasons turned, scientists were preparing, as they typically did, for the virus to make its annual trek across the equator and seed new outbreaks in the globe’s southern half.

    That migration never came to pass. As the new coronavirus spread, pandemic-mitigation measures started to squash flu-transmission rates to record lows. The drop-off was so sharp that several flu lineages may have gone extinct, among them Yamagata, which hasn’t been definitively detected in more than three years despite virologists’ best efforts to root it out.

    Yamagata’s disappearance could still be temporary. “Right now, we’re all just kind of holding our breath,” says Adam Lauring, a virologist at the University of Michigan Medical School. The virus might be biding its time in an isolated population, escaping the notice of tests. But the search has stretched on so fruitlessly that some experts are ready to declare it officially done. “It’s been missing for this long,” says Vijaykrishna Dhanasekaran, a virologist at Hong Kong University. “At this point, I would really think it’s gone.”

    If Yamagata remains AWOL indefinitely, its absence would have at least one relatively straightforward consequence: Researchers might no longer need to account for the lineage in annual vaccines. But its vanishing act could have a more head-spinning implication. Flu viruses, which have been plaguing human populations for centuries, are some of the most well-known and well-studied threats to our health. They have prompted the creation of annual shots, potent antivirals, and internationally funded surveillance programs. And yet, scientists still have some basic questions about why they behave as they do—especially about Yamagata and its closest kin.


    Yamagata, in many ways, has long been an underdog among underdogs. The lineage is one of two in a group called influenza B viruses, and it’s slower to evolve and transmit, and is thus sometimes considered less troublesome, than its close cousin Victoria. As a pair, the B’s are also commonly regarded as the wimpier versions of flu.

    To be fair, the competition is stiff. Flu B’s are constantly being compared with influenza A viruses—the group that contains every flu subtype that has caused a pandemic in our recent past, including the extraordinarily deadly outbreak of 1918. Seasonal flu epidemics, too, tend to be heavily dominated by flu A’s, especially H3N2 and H1N1, two notably tough-to-target strains that feature prominently in each year’s vaccine. Even H5N1, the flavor of avian influenza that’s been devastating North America’s wildlife, is a member of the pathogen’s A team.

    B viruses, meanwhile, don’t have a particularly daunting résumé. “To our knowledge, there has never been a B pandemic,” says John Paget, an infectious-disease epidemiologist at the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research. Only once every seven seasons or so does a B virus dominate. And although A and B viruses sometimes tag-team the winter, causing twin outbreaks spaced out by a few weeks, these seasons often open with a major flu A banger and then close out with a more muted B coda.

    The reasons underlying these differences are still pretty murky, though scientists do have some hints. Whereas flu A viruses are known as especially speedy shape-shifters, constantly spawning genetic offshoots that vie to outcompete one another, flu B’s evolve at oddly plodding rates. Their sluggish approach makes it easier for our immune system to recognize the viruses when they reappear, resulting in longer-lasting protection, more effective vaccines, and fewer reinfections than are typical with the A’s. Those molecular differences also seem to drive differences in how and when the viruses spread. The A’s tend to trouble people repeatedly from birth to death, and are great at globe-trotting. But B’s, perhaps because immunity against them is easier to come by, more often concentrate among kids, many of whom have never encountered the viruses before—and who are usually more resilient to respiratory viruses and travel less than adults, keeping outbreaks mostly regional. That might also help explain why B epidemics so frequently lag behind A’s: Slower pathogen evolution facing off with more durable host immunity add up to less rapid B spread, while their A colleagues rush ahead. Our bodies also seem to mount rather fiery defenses against A viruses, steeling them against other infections in the weeks that follow and deepening the disadvantage against any B’s trailing behind. All of that means flu B has a hard time catching humans off guard.

    The virus’s host preferences, too, make flu A viruses more dangerous. Those lineages are great at hopscotching among a whole menagerie of species—most infamously, pigs and wild, water-loving birds—sometimes undergoing rapid bursts of evolution as they go. But flu B’s seem to almost exclusively infect humans, igniting only the rare and fast-resolving outbreak in a limited number of other species—a few seals here, a handful of pigs there. Spillovers from wild creatures into humans are the roots of global outbreaks. And so, with its zoonotic bent, “influenza A will always be the main focus” of concern, says Carolien van de Sandt, a virologist at the Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, in Melbourne. Even among some scientists, Yamagata and Victoria register as little more than literal B-list blips.

    Plenty of other experts, though, think flu B’s relative obscurity is misguided—perhaps even a bit dangerous. Flu B’s account for roughly a quarter of annual flu cases, many of which lead to hospitalization and death; they seem hardier than their A cousins against certain antiviral drugs. And scientists simply know a lot less about flu B’s: how, precisely, they interact with the immune system; what factors influence their sluggish evolutionary rate; the nuances of their person-to-person spread; their oddball animal-host range. And that lack of intel on what has for decades been a formidable infectious foe creates a risk all on its own.


    Flu lineages have dipped into relative obscurity before only to come roaring back. After the end of the H2N2 pandemic of the late 1950s, H1N1 appeared to flame out—only to reemerge nearly two decades later to greet a population full of young people whose immune systems hadn’t glimpsed it before. And as recently as the 1990s, the B lineage Victoria underwent a years-long ebb in most parts of the world, before ricocheting back to prominence in the early 2000s.

    As far as researchers can tell, Victoria is alive and well; during the globe’s most recent winter seasons, the lineage appears to have ignited late-arriving outbreaks in several countries, including in South Africa, Malaysia, and various parts of Europe. But based on the viral sequences that researchers have isolated from people sick with flu, Yamagata is still nowhere to be found, says Saverio Caini, a virologist at the cancer research center ISPRO, in Italy.

    The lineage was already teetering on a precipice before the pandemic began, van de Sandt told me. Yamagata and Victoria, which splintered apart in the early 1980s, are still closely related enough that they often compete for the same hosts. And just prior to 2020, Victoria, the more diverse and fleet-footed of the two B lineages, had been reliably edging out its cousin, pushing Yamagata’s prevalence down, down, down. That trend, coupled with several years of use of a well-matched Yamagata strain in the seasonal flu vaccine, meant that Yamagata “had already decreased in incidence and circulation,” van de Sandt said. With the odds so steeply stacked, the addition of pandemic mitigations may have been the final factor that snuffed the lineage out.

    Recently, a few countries—including China, Pakistan, and Belize—have tentatively reported possible Yamagata infections. But there’s been no conclusive genetic proof, several experts told me. Several parts of the world, including the United States, regularly use flu vaccines containing active flu viruses that can trip the same viral tests that the wild, disease-causing pathogens do. “So the reports could be contaminations,” van de Sandt said. Scientists would need to scour the virus’s genetic sequences to distinguish infection from injection; those data, however, haven’t emerged.

    Should the Yamagata dry spell continue, researchers may want to start considering snipping the lineage out of vaccines altogether, perhaps as early as the middle or end of this year. Doing so would punt the world back to the early 2010s, when flu shots were trivalent—designed to protect people against two A viruses, H3N2 and H1N1, plus either Victoria or Yamagata, depending on which lineage researchers forecasted would surge more. (They were often wrong.) Or maybe the space once used for Yamagata could feasibly be filled with another flavor of H3N2, the fastest mutator of the bunch.

    But purging Yamagata from the vaccine would be a gamble. If Yamagata is not gone for good, van de Sandt worries that booting it from the vaccine would leave the world vulnerable to a massive and deadly outbreak. Even Dhanasekaran, who is among the researchers who are fairly confident that we’ve seen the last of Yamagata, told me he doesn’t want to rule out the possibility that the virus is cloistering in an immunocompromised person with a chronic infection, and it’s unclear if it could reemerge from such a hiding place. The only thing scientists can do for now is be patient, says Jayna Raghwani, a computational biologist at the University of Oxford. “If we don’t see it in successive seasons for another two to three years, that will be more convincing,” she told me.

    If Yamagata’s death knell has actually rung, though, it will have reverberating effects. There’s no telling, for instance, how other flu lineages might be affected by their colleague’s supposed retirement. Perhaps Victoria, which can swap genetic material with Yamagata, will evolve more slowly without its partner. At the same time, Victoria may have an easier time infecting people now that it no longer needs to compete as often for hosts.

    If Yamagata has gone to pasture, “there won’t be a ceremony declaring the world Yamagata free,” Lauring told me. And it’s easy, he points out, to forget things we don’t see. But even if Yamagata seems gone for now, the effects of its demise will be significant enough that it can’t be forgotten—not just yet.

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    Katherine J. Wu

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  • The Age of Vaccine Pessimism

    The Age of Vaccine Pessimism

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    The world has just seen the largest vaccination campaign in history. At least 13 billion COVID shots have been administered—more injections, by a sweeping margin, than there are human beings on the Earth. In the U.S. alone, millions of lives have been saved by a rollout of extraordinary scope. More than three-fifths of the population elected to receive the medicine even before it got its full approval from the FDA.

    Yet the legacy of this achievement appears to be in doubt. Just look at where the country is right now. In Florida, the governor—a likely Republican presidential candidate—openly pursues the politics of vaccine resistance and denial. In Ohio, kids are getting measles. In New York, polio is back. A football player nearly died on national TV, and fears about vaccines fanned across the internet. Vaccinologists, pediatricians, and public-health experts routinely warn that confidence is wavering for every kind of immunization, and worry that it may collapse in years to come.

    In other words, America is mired in a paradoxical and pessimistic moment. “We’ve just had a national vaccination campaign that has exceeded almost all previous efforts in a dramatic fashion,” says Noel Brewer, a psychologist at the University of North Carolina who has been studying decision making about vaccines for more than 20 years, “and people are talking about vaccination as if there’s something fundamentally wrong.”

    It’s more than talk. Americans are arguing, Americans are worrying, Americans are obsessing over vaccines; and that fixation has produced its own, pathological anxiety. To fret about the state of public trust is rational: When vaccine adherence wobbles, lives are put in peril; in the midst of a pandemic, the mortal risk is even greater. More than 60 million Americans haven’t gotten a single COVID shot, and a few thousand deaths are attributed to the disease every week. But the scale of this concern—the measure of our instability—may be distorted by the heights to which we’ve climbed. Evidence that the nation has arrived at the brink of collapse does not hold up to scrutiny. No one knows where vaccination rates are really heading, and the coming crash is more an idea—a projection, even—than a certainty. The future of vaccination in America may be no worse than its recent past. In the end, it might be better.

    The first alarms about a widespread vaccination crisis—the first suggestions that a leeriness of COVID shots had “spread its tentacles into other diseases”—were raised by clinicians. Megha Shah, a pediatrician with the Los Angeles public-health department, told me that she began to worry in the spring of 2021, while volunteering at a medical center. Two years earlier, she recalled, working there had been uneventful. She’d meet with parents—mostly from low-income Latino families—to discuss the standard vaccination schedule: Okay, here’s what we’re recommending for your child. This protects against this; that protects against that. The parents would ask a couple of questions, and she’d answer them. The child would be immunized, almost every time.

    But in the middle of the COVID-vaccine rollout, she found that those conversations were playing out differently. “Oh, I’m just not sure,” she said some parents told her. Or, “I need to talk this over with my partner.” She saw families refuse, flat-out, to give their infants routine shots. “It just was very, very surprising,” Shah said. “I mean, questions are good. We want parents to be engaged and informed decision makers.” But it seemed to her—and her colleagues too—that healthy “engagement” had gone sour.

    Last year, she and her colleagues took a closer look. For a study published in Pediatrics, they drew on national survey data collected from April 2020 through early 2022, of parents’ attitudes toward standard childhood vaccines. In some respects, the results looked good: Parents endorsed the importance and effectiveness of these vaccines at a high and stable rate throughout the pandemic—in the vicinity of 91 percent. But over the same period, concerns about potential harms marched upward. In April 2020, about 25 percent of those surveyed agreed that vaccines “have many known harmful side effects” and “may lead to illness or death”; by the end of the year, that number had increased to 30 percent, and then to nearly 35 percent the following June. “Parents still seemed very confident overall in the benefits of vaccinations,” Shah told me, “but there was a huge jump over the course of the pandemic about the safety.”

    Those results jibed with a theory that has now been invoked so many times, it reads as common knowledge: “Perhaps this was a spillover effect,” Shah said, “from all of the vaccine misinformation that was circling during the pandemic.” That effect—the spreading tentacles of doubt—can be seen around the world, says Heidi Larson, a professor at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine who has studied attitudes toward vaccination across Europe since the start of the coronavirus pandemic. “The public-health community was assuming that COVID would be a great boon to public confidence in vaccines, but it hasn’t worked out that way. The trend has been actually a negative knock-on effect,” Larson told me. In a troubling alignment, even anti-vaccine activists now endorse the notion of hesitancy spillover, calling it a “wonderful silver lining” to the pandemic.

    But hold on a minute. Here in the U.S., it’s certainly true that vaccine worries have been broadcast and rebroadcast, at ever greater volumes, through a clamorous network of influencers and politicians. This campaign of hesitancy is growing more open and insistent by the day, and the consequences can be atrocious: Americans with false beliefs about vaccines are falling sick and dying stubborn and alone. But even as these anecdotes accrue, misinformation’s greater sway—the extent to which it shapes Americans’ behavior toward vaccines for COVID, measles, or the flu—remains murky, if not altogether undetectable. The best numbers to go on in this country, drawn from polls of people’s attitudes about vaccines and official vaccination surveys from the CDC, don’t hint at any comprehensive change. When concerning blips and mini-trends arise—shifts in parents’ attitudes, as seen in Shah’s research, or drops in local rates of children getting immunized—they’re set against a landscape with a flat horizon.

    It’s not a pretty view, for that: The U.S. lags five points behind the average wealthy country in its rate of people fully vaccinated against COVID, and two points behind in its vaccination rate for measles. And even blips can translate into many thousands of at-risk kids, Shah pointed out. Yet one might still be grateful for the sameness overall. A seedbed of resistance to the COVID shots, disproportionately Republican, was already present near the start of the pandemic, and hasn’t seemed to thrive despite two years’ worth of fertilizer runoff from Fox News and other outlets spewing doubt. In August 2020, the Harris Poll’s weekly COVID-19 tracker found that 15 percent of American adults said they were “not at all likely” to get the vaccine when it finally became available. In August 2022, Harris reported that 17 percent weren’t planning to be immunized. Other long-running surveys have found similar results. In September 2020, Kaiser Family Foundation’s vaccine monitor pegged the rate of refusal at 20 percent. In December 2022, it was … still 20 percent.

    The most recent uptake numbers from the CDC suggest that children born in 2018 and 2019 (who would have been babies or toddlers when COVID first appeared) had higher vaccination rates by age 2 than children born in 2016 and 2017. Some of these kids did miss out on shots amid the pandemic’s early lapses in routine medical care, but they quickly caught up. Another, more alarming batch of data from the CDC shows that measles-mumps-rubella coverage among the nation’s kindergartners has dropped for two years in a row, down from 95.2 to 93.5 percent, and is now lower than it’s been since at least 2013. Still, the proportion of kids who get exempted from school vaccine requirements for medical or philosophical reasons has hardly changed at all, and the headline-grabbing “slide” in rates appears instead to be at least in part a product of “provisional enrollments”—i.e., children who missed some vaccinations (perhaps in early 2020) and were allowed to enter school while they caught up. If there really is a wave of newly red-pilled, anti-vaxxer parents, then going by these data, they’re nowhere to be seen.

    Some public-health disasters hit like hurricanes; others spread like rust. “We may not have a full picture yet,” Shah told me, referring to the latest evidence from the CDC on where vaccination rates are heading. “My gut and my clinical experience tell me that it’s too soon to say.”

    Other experts share that view. Robert Bednarczyk, an epidemiologist at Emory University, has been estimating the susceptibility of U.S. children to measles outbreaks since 2016. National immunization surveys have not shown substantial drops in coverage for 2020 and 2021, he told me, “but there is a large caveat to this. These surveys have a lag time.” Any children from the CDC’s data set who were born in 2018, he noted, would have gotten most of their vaccines before the pandemic started, during their first year of life. The same problem applies to teens. The government’s latest stats for adolescents—which looked as good as ever in 2021—capture many who would have gotten all their shots pre-COVID. Until more data are released, researchers still won’t know whether or how far kids’ vaccination rates have really dipped during the 2020s.

    The time delay is just one potential problem. Parents who are suspicious of vaccines, and angry at the government for encouraging their use, may be less willing to participate in CDC surveys, Daniel Salmon, the director of the Institute for Vaccine Safety at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, told me. “Having studied this for 25 years, I would be surprised if we don’t see a substantial COVID effect on childhood vaccines,” he said. “These data are a little bit reassuring, that it’s not, like, an oh-my-god huge effect. But we need more time and more data to really know the answer.”

    Uncertainty doesn’t have to be a source of terror, though. Early uptake data already provide some signs of a “vaccine-hesitancy spillover effect” happening in reverse, UNC’s Brewer told me, driving more enthusiasm, not less, for getting different kinds of shots. Just look at how the push to dose the nation with half a billion COVID shots goosed the rates of grown-ups getting flu shots: For decades now, our public-health establishment has pushed for better influenza coverage, even as the rate for older Americans was stuck at roughly 65 percent. Then COVID came along and, voilà, senior citizens’ flu-shot coverage jumped to 75 percent—higher than it ever was before. This all fits with a familiar idea in the field, Brewer said, that going in for any one vaccine makes you much more likely to get another in the future. “There does seem to be a sort of positive spillover,” he said, “probably because the forces that led to previous vaccinations are still mostly in place.”

    Even some of the scariest signals we’ve seen so far—reports that anti-vaccine sentiment is clearly on the rise—can seem ambiguous, depending on one’s breadth of view. Consider the finding from Heidi Larson’s group, that vaccine confidence has declined across the whole of the European Union throughout the pandemic, according to surveys taken in 2020 and 2022. The same report says that attitudes have now returned to where they were in 2018 and that confidence in the MMR vaccine, in particular, remains higher than it was four years ago. Given that the 2020 surveys were conducted mostly in March, at the very onset of the first pandemic lockdowns, they might have captured a temporary spike of interest in vaccines. After all, vaccines can seem more useful when you’re terrified of death.

    In other words, America may truly have experienced a recent drop in vaccine confidence—but from an inflated and unsustainable high. That could help explain other recent findings too, including Shah’s. “You need to take the long view,” says Douglas Opel, a pediatric bioethicist at Seattle Children’s Hospital who has been studying the ups and downs of vaccine hesitancy for more than a decade. For a paper published last July, he and colleagues looked at vaccine attitudes among 4,562 parents from late 2019 to the end of 2020. They found that the parents grew more enthusiastic about childhood immunizations when the pandemic started, but their feelings later returned to baseline.

    Larson told me that a “transient COVID effect” may well explain some of what her team has found, but said it was very unlikely to account in full for the worrying trend. In any case, she told me, “we shouldn’t assume this and should instead make an extra effort to continue to build confidence.”

    No crunching of the numbers can excuse the spread of vaccine misinformation, or suggest that those who peddle it are anything but a hateful scourge on individuals and a threat to public health. But you can’t simply ignore the fact that, as far as we can see, all the gnashing about vaccines’ supposed risks simply hasn’t changed a lot of people’s minds. It certainly hasn’t caused a steep and sudden rise in vaccine refusal. The idea that we’re in the midst of some new vaccine-hesitancy contagion is based as much on vibes as proven fact.

    The problem is, bad vibes can leave us prone to misinterpretation. Take the recent measles outbreak in Ohio: It’s alarming, but not so relevant to recent trends in vaccination, despite many claims to that effect. More than one-quarter of the affected children were too young to have been eligible for the MMR vaccine, while others were old enough to have missed their first shot by 2020, before any hesitancy “spillover” could have taken place. And at least a meaningful proportion of the affected families, from the state’s Democratic-leaning Somali American community, wouldn’t seem to represent the GOP’s white, unvaccinated constituency.

    The stark politicization of the COVID shots can be misread too. Despite the 30-point gap between Democrats and Republicans in COVID vaccination rates, those rates are much, much higher—for members of both parties—than they’ve ever been for flu shots. And interparty differences in flu-shot uptake seem to be long-standing. A preprint study from Minttu Rönn, a researcher at the Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, and colleagues found a broadening divide in coverage between Democratic- and Republican-voting states, based on data going back to 2010. But this may not be a bad thing. Rönn doesn’t think the change arises from a loss of trust among Republicans; rather, she told me, it looks to be related to rising flu-shot coverage overall, with proportionally greater gains in Democratic-leaning areas. (That difference could be the result of local attitudes, ease of access, or insurance coverage, she said.) In other words, red states aren’t necessarily falling behind on vaccination. Blue states are surging forward.

    Optimism here may seem perverse. COVID booster uptake is absurdly low right now, even for the elderly. The politicization of vaccines (whenever it began) certainly isn’t letting up. Given what would happen if trust in vaccination really did collapse, perhaps it makes more sense to err on the side of freaking out. As Larson said, every effort should be taken to build confidence, no matter what.

    But the truth of what we know right now ought to be important too. Maybe it’s okay to feel okay. Maybe there’s value in maintaining calm and taking stock of what we’ve accomplished or what we’ve maintained in the face of all these efforts to confuse us. At the risk of trying way too hard to find some solace in disturbing facts, here’s another case in point. Remember Shah’s results, that parents’ concerns about the health effects of childhood vaccines have steadily gone up throughout the pandemic, even as their belief in vaccines’ benefits stayed high? That increase wasn’t clearly more pronounced in any specific group. Belief that vaccination can result in illness or death went up across the board for men and women in the survey, for young and old, for Black and white alike. It rose among Republicans and also Democrats—in just about the same proportions. If America’s parents have been getting more attuned to potential risks from vaccination, we’re doing it together.

    I’m in that number too. As a scientist by training and a science journalist by trade, I’ve been reporting and editing stories about vaccination for years. Still, I’ve never thought so hard about the topic, and in such critical detail, as I have since 2021. At no point in my life has vaccination been this pervasive, perplexing, and important. When it came time to get my children COVID shots, I learned everything I could about potential risks and benefits. I looked at data on the incidence of myocarditis, I considered very rare but deadly outcomes, and I weighed the efficacy of different shots against their measured side effects. These investigations did not arise from distrust of authority, podcast propaganda, or a belief in microchips so small they fit inside of a syringe. I wasn’t fearful; I was curious. I had questions, and I got answers—and now every member of my family has gotten their shots.

    We’ve all been forced by circumstance to think in different ways about our health. Before the pandemic, Larson told me, most people simply didn’t have to pay attention to vaccines. Parents with young children, sure, but everybody else? “I think they probably said, Yeah, vaccines are important. Yeah, they’re safe enough,” she said. But now the stakes are raised across the population. “I mean, there are these groups around the world where you’re like, ‘why do they care about vaccines?’ And it’s because of COVID.”

    The emergence of so many groups with newfound interest in vaccines could end up being dangerous, of course—in the same way that newly minted drivers are a menace on the road. “A lot of people went online asking questions about vaccines,” Larson told me, in a tone that made it sound as though online were a synonym for “straight to hell.” But sometimes asking questions gets you useful information, and sometimes useful information leads to wise decisions. Debates about vaccines may be louder than they’ve ever been before, but that doesn’t mean that vaccination rates are bound to fall.

    Even if the situation isn’t getting that much worse, the country might still be left to wallow in its status quo. Yes, more than 200 million Americans have been fully immunized against COVID—and more than 100 million haven’t. “This has been a problem for a long time,” Daniel Salmon told me. “It was already ‘a crisis in confidence’ a dozen years ago. We don’t see a free fall—that’s somewhat reassuring—but that’s very different from saying that we’re good to go.”

    The fact of this crisis, however long it’s been around, will never matter more than its effects. After all, “confidence” itself is not the only factor, or even the most important one, that determines who gets shots. “Generally speaking, access to vaccination is a much bigger driver than what people think and feel,” Noel Brewer told me. Early in the pandemic, lots of parents wanted to vaccinate their kids and simply couldn’t. Now many of them can. But obstacles persist, and their effects aren’t evenly distributed. According to the CDC, toddlers’ vaccination rates are somewhat lower among those who live in poverty, or reside in rural areas, or don’t identify as white or Asian. Since the pandemic started, these gaps in opportunity appear to have increased. A grand and tragic spillover of people’s vaccination doubts—the anti-vaxxers’ hoped-for “silver lining” to the pandemic—may or may not come. In the meantime, though, there are other problems to address.

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    Daniel Engber

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  • Warning Signs About the First Post-pandemic Winter

    Warning Signs About the First Post-pandemic Winter

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    This fall, unlike the one before it, and the one before that, America looks almost like its old self. Schools and universities are in session; malls, airports, and gyms are bustling with the pre-holiday rush; handwashing is passé, handshakes are back, and strangers are packed together on public transport, nary a mask to be seen. On its surface, the country seems ready to enjoy what some might say is our first post-pandemic winter.

    Americans are certainly acting as if the crisis has abated, and so in that way, at least, you could argue that it has. “If you notice, no one’s wearing masks,” President Joe Biden told 60 Minutes in September, after proclaiming the pandemic “over.” Almost no emergency protections against the virus are left standing; we’re dismantling the few that are. At the same time, COVID is undeniably, as Biden says, “a problem.” Each passing day still brings hundreds of deaths and thousands of hospitalizations; untold numbers of people continue to deal with long COVID, as more join them. In several parts of the country, health-care systems are struggling to stay afloat. Local public-health departments, underfunded and understaffed, are hanging by a thread. And a double surge of COVID and flu may finally be brewing.

    So we can call this winter “post-pandemic” if we want. But given the policy failures and institutional dysfunctions that have accumulated over the past three years, it won’t be anything like a pre-pandemic winter, either. The more we resist that reality, the worse it will become. If we treat this winter as normal, it will be anything but.


    By now, we’ve grown acquainted with the variables that dictate how a season with SARS-CoV-2 will go. In our first COVID winter, the vaccines had only just begun their trickle out into the public, while most Americans hadn’t yet been infected by the virus. In our second COVID winter, the country’s collective immunity was higher, but Omicron sneaked past some of those defenses. On the cusp of our third COVID winter, it may seem that SARS-CoV-2 has few plot twists left to toss us.

    But the way in which we respond to COVID could still sprinkle in some chaos. During those first two winters, at least a few virus-mitigating policies and precautions remained in place—nearly all of which have since come down, lowering the hurdles the virus must clear, at a time when America’s health infrastructure is facing new and serious threats.

    The nation is still fighting to contain a months-long monkeypox outbreak; polio continues to plague unvaccinated sectors of New York. A riot of respiratory viruses, too, may spread as temperatures cool and people flock indoors. Rates of RSV are rising; flu returned early in the season from a nearly three-year sabbatical to clobber Australia, boding poorly for us in the north. Should flu show up here ahead of schedule, Americans, too, could be pummeled as we were around the start of 2018, “one of the worst seasons in the recent past,” says Srinivasan Venkatramanan, an infectious-disease modeler at the University of Virginia and a member of the COVID-19 Scenario Modeling Hub.

    The consequences of this infectious churn are already starting to play out. In Jackson, Mississippi, health workers are watching SARS-CoV-2 and other respiratory viruses tear through children “like nothing we’ve ever seen before,” says Charlotte Hobbs, a pediatric-infectious-disease specialist at the University of Mississippi Medical Center. Flu season has yet to go into full swing, and Hobbs is already experiencing one of the roughest stretches she’s had in her nearly two decades of practicing. Some kids are being slammed with one virus after the other, their sicknesses separated by just a couple of weeks—an especially dangerous prospect for the very youngest among them, few of whom have received COVID shots.

    The toll of doctor visits missed during the pandemic has ballooned as well. Left untreated, many people’s chronic conditions have worsened, and some specialists’ schedules remain booked out for months. Add to this the cases of long COVID that pile on with each passing surge of infections, and there are “more sick people than there used to be, period,” says Emily Landon, an infectious-disease physician at the University of Chicago. That’s with COVID case counts at a relative low, amid a massive undercount. Even if a new, antibody-dodging variant doesn’t come banging on the nation’s door, “the models predict an increase in infections,” Venkatramanan told me. (In parts of Europe, hospitalizations are already making a foreboding climb.)

    And where the demand for care increases, supply does not always follow suit. Health workers continue to evacuate their posts. Some have taken early retirement, worried that COVID could exacerbate their chronic conditions, or vice versa; others have sought employment with better hours and pay, or left the profession entirely to salvage their mental health. A wave of illness this winter will pare down forces further, especially as the CDC backs off its recommendations for health-care workers to mask. At UAB Hospital, in Birmingham, Alabama, “we’ve struggled to have enough people to work,” says Sarah Nafziger, an emergency physician and the medical director for employee health. “And once we get them here, we have a hard time getting them to stay.”

    Clinical-laboratory staff at Deaconess Hospital, in Indiana, who are responsible for testing patient samples, are feeling similar strain, says April Abbott, the institution’s microbiology director. Abbott’s team has spent most of the past month below usual minimum-staffing levels, and has had to cut some duties and services to compensate, even after calling in reinforcements from other, already shorthanded parts of the lab. “We’re already at this threshold of barely making it,” Abbott told me. Symptoms of burnout have surged as well, while health workers continue to clock long hours, sometimes amid verbal abuse, physical attacks, and death threats. Infrastructure is especially fragile in America’s rural regions, which have suffered hospital closures and an especially large exodus of health workers. In Madison County, Montana, where real-estate values have risen, “the average nurse cannot afford a house,” says Margaret Bortko, a nurse practitioner and the region’s health officer and medical director. When help and facilities aren’t available, the outcome is straightforward, says Janice Probst, a rural-health researcher at the University of South Carolina: “You will have more deaths.”

    In health departments, too, the workforce is threadbare. As local leaders tackle multiple infectious diseases at once, “it’s becoming a zero-sum game,” says Maria Sundaram, an epidemiologist at the Marshfield Clinic Research Institute. “With limited resources, do they go to monkeypox? To polio? To COVID-19? To influenza? We have to choose.” Mati Hlatshwayo Davis, the director of health in St. Louis, told me that her department has shrunk to a quarter of the size it was five years ago. “I have staff doing the jobs of three to five people,” she said. “We are in absolute crisis.” Staff have left to take positions as Amazon drivers, who “make so much more per hour.” Looking across her state, Hlatshwayo Davis keeps watching health directors “resign, resign, resign.” Despite all that she has poured into her job, or perhaps because of it, “I can’t guarantee I won’t be one of those losses too.”


    This winter is unlikely to be an encore of the pandemic’s worst days. Thanks to the growing roster of tools we now have to combat the coronavirus—among them, effective vaccines and antivirals—infected people are less often getting seriously sick; even long COVID seems to be at least a bit scarcer among people who are up-to-date on their shots. But considering how well our shots and treatments work, the plateau of suffering at which we’ve arrived is bizarrely, unacceptably high. More than a year has passed since the daily COVID death toll was around 200; nearly twice that number—roughly three times the daily toll during a moderate flu season—now seems to be a norm.

    Part of the problem remains the nation’s failed approach to vaccines, says Avnika Amin, a vaccine epidemiologist at Emory University: The government has repeatedly championed shots as a “be-all and end-all” strategy, while failing to rally sufficient uptake. Boosting is one of the few anti-COVID measures still promoted, yet the U.S. remains among the least-vaccinated high-income countries; interest in every dose that’s followed the primary series has been paltry at best. Even with the allure of the newly reformulated COVID shot, “I’m not really getting a good sense that people are busting down the doors,” says Michael Dulitz, a health worker in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Nor can vaccines hold the line against the virus alone. Even if everyone got every shot they were eligible for, Amin told me, “it wouldn’t make COVID go away.”

    The ongoing dry-up of emergency funds has also made the many tools of disease prevention and monitoring more difficult to access. Free at-home tests are no longer being shipped out en masse; asymptomatic testing is becoming less available; and vaccines and treatments are shifting to the private sector, putting them out of reach for many who live in poor regions or who are uninsured and can least afford to fall ill.

    It doesn’t help, either, that the country’s level of preparedness lays out as a patchwork. People who vaccinate and mask tend to cluster, Amin told me, which means that not all American experiences of winter will be the same. Less prominent, less privileged parts of the country will quietly bear the brunt of outbreaks. “The biggest worry is the burden becoming unnoticed,” Venkatramanan told me. Without data, policies can’t change; the nation can’t react. “It’s like flying without altitude or speed sensors. You’re looking out the window and trying to guess.”


    There’s an alternative winter the country might envision—one unencumbered by the policy backslides the U.S. has made in recent months, and one in which Americans acknowledge that COVID remains not just “a problem” but a crisis worth responding to.

    In that version of reality, far more people would be up-to-date on their vaccines. The most vulnerable in society would be the most protected. Ventilation systems would hum in buildings across the country. Workers would have access to ample sick leave. Health-care systems would have excesses of protective gear, and local health departments wouldn’t want for funds. Masks would come out in times of high transmission, especially in schools, pharmacies, government buildings, and essential businesses; free tests, boosters, and treatments would be available to all. No one would be asked to return to work while sick—not just with COVID but with any transmissible disease. SARS-CoV-2 infections would not disappear, but they would remain at more manageable levels; cases of flu and other cold-weather sicknesses that travel through the air would follow suit. Surveillance systems would whir in every state and territory, ready to detect the next threat. Leaders might even set policies that choreograph, rather than simply capitulate to, how Americans behave.

    We won’t be getting that winter this year, or likely any year soon. Many policies have already reverted to their 2019 status quo; by other metrics, the nation’s well-being even seems to have regressed. Life expectancy in the U.S. has fallen, especially among Native Americans and Alaskan Natives. Institutions of health are beleaguered; community-outreach efforts have been pruned.

    The pandemic has also prompted a deterioration of trust in several mainstays of public health. In many parts of the country, there’s worry that the vaccine hesitancy around COVID has “spread its tentacles into other diseases,” Hobbs told me, keeping parents from bringing their kids in for flu shots and other routine vaccines. Mississippi, once known for its stellar rate of immunizing children, now consistently ranks among those with the fewest young people vaccinated against COVID. “The one thing we do well is vaccinate children,” Hobbs said. That the coronavirus has reversed the trend “has astounded me.” In Montana, sweeping political changes, including legislation that bans employers from requiring vaccines of any kind, have made health-care settings less safe. Fewer than half of Madison County’s residents have received even their primary series of COVID shots, and “now a nurse can turn down the Hepatitis B series,” Bortko told me. Health workers, too, feel more imperiled than before. Since the start of the pandemic, Bortko’s own patients of 30 years, “who trusted me with their lives,” have pivoted to “yelling at us about vaccination concerns and mask mandates and quarantining and their freedoms,” she told me. “We have become public enemy No. 1.”

    At the same time, many people with chronic and debilitating conditions are more vulnerable than they were before the pandemic began. The policies that protected them during the pandemic’s height are gone—and yet SARS-CoV-2 is still here, adding to the dangers they face. The losses have been written off, Bortko told me: Cases of long COVID in Madison County have been dismissed as products of “risk factors” that don’t apply to others; deaths, too, have been met with a shrug of “Oh, they were old; they were unhealthy.” If, this winter, COVID sickens or kills more people who are older, more people who are immunocompromised, more people of color, more essential and low-income workers, more people in rural communities, “there will be no press coverage,” Hlatshwayo Davis said. Americans already expect that members of these groups will die.

    It’s not too late to change course. The winter’s path has not been set: Many Americans are still signing up for fall flu and COVID shots; we may luck out on the viral evolution front, too, and still be dealing largely with members of the Omicron clan for the next few months. But neither immunity nor a slowdown in variant emergence is a guarantee. What we can count on is the malleability of human behavior—what will help set the trajectory of this winter, and others to come. The U.S. botched the pandemic’s beginning, and its middle. That doesn’t mean we have to bungle its end, whenever that truly, finally arrives.

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    Katherine J. Wu

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