BEDFORD (AP) — Roomba maker iRobot has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, but says it does not expect any disruptions to devices as the more than 30-year-old company is taken private under a restructuring process.
IRobot, which became well known for its robotic vacuums, has struggled of late, dealing with increased competition, layoffs and a declining stock price. In 2022, Amazon announced that it had agreed to buy iRobot for about $1.7 billion, but that deal was called off last year. Amazon blamed “undue and disproportionate regulatory hurdles” after the European Union signaled its objection to the transaction.
This page requires Javascript.
Javascript is required for you to be able to read premium content. Please enable it in your browser settings.
BOSTON — As state lawmakers were putting the final touches on legislation they hope will ease some of the state’s housing problems, home sales ticked up more than 8% in July and put 2024 sales just ahead of last year’s sluggish pace.
The Warren Group last week reported 4,427 single-family home sales in Massachusetts last month, representing an 8.2% increase over July 2023 sales.
The median sale price of $650,000 — a new record high for the month of July — was up 6.6% over July 2023’s $610,000 median price. But Warren Group Associate Publisher Cassidy Norton found a slight silver lining for prospective homebuyers.
“Yes, a median sale price of $650,000 was a new all-time high for the month of July, and month after month prices are setting new records, but price gains are smaller than they could be,” she said.
“Interest rates are more than double where they were two years ago, and I’m certain prices would be even higher without those changes. That does lead to a lack of inventory that may have abated price gains somewhat.”
That lack of inventory, a longstanding problem that makes it more expensive and more difficult to live in Massachusetts, “will continue to be the biggest factor driving prices for the foreseeable future,” Norton added.
Through seven months of 2024, single-family home sales are up just a hair over the same checkpoint in 2023, a year that ended with the lowest volume of sales in 12 years.
The 22,879 sales so far this year represent a 0.8 percent increase over the first seven months of 2023. The year-to-date single-family home sale price is up 9.5 percent to $618,500.
The story was similar for the condominium market in July. The month’s 1,947 condo sales were up 3.2 percent over last July’s 1,886 sales.
The median sale price climbed 1.8% over July 2023 to $565,000, also a new record for July. Year-to-date, there have been 10,901 condo sales — a 3.2 percent decrease compared to the first seven months of 2023 while the median sale price of $545,000 is up 4.8 percent over the same time.
“The median condo price also reached a new high for July, but prices were down moderately from the previous month,” Norton said. “This could be an early indicator that condo prices are starting to plateau.”
Gov. Maura Healey this month signed into law a policy-filled $5.16 billion housing bond package that lawmakers sent to her desk the morning of Aug. 1.
The law authorizes $5.16 billion in bonding, and implements 49 new housing policies, though advocates said its omissions made for an “underwhelming” final product.
HDFC Bank on Saturday reported a 2.11 per cent growth in consolidated net profit to ₹17,622.38 crore for the March 2024 quarter against ₹17,257.87 crore in the preceding December quarter.
On a standalone basis, the country’s largest private sector lender reported a net profit of ₹16,511.85 crore compared to ₹16,372.54 crore in the December quarter.
In July 2023, the bank merged its home loan-focused parent HDFC into itself.
Its core net interest income grew to ₹29,080 crore for the reporting quarter, while the other income grew to ₹18,170 crore.
The lender has reported its core net interest margin of 3.44 per cent on total assets.
The gross non-performing assets ratio came at 1.24 per cent.
Relatively speaking, 2023 has been the least dramatic year of COVID living to date. It kicked off with the mildest pandemic winter on record, followed by more than seven months of quietude. Before hospitalizations started to climb toward their September mini-spike, the country was in “the longest period we’ve had without a peak during the entire pandemic,” Shaun Truelove, an infectious-disease modeler at Johns Hopkins University, told me. So maybe it’s no surprise that, after a year of feeling normalish, most American adults simply aren’t that worried about getting seriously sick this coming winter.
They also are not particularly eager to get this year’s COVID shot. According to a recent CDC survey, just 7 percent of adults and 2 percent of kids have received the fall’s updated shot, as of October 14; at least another 25 percent intends to nab a shot for themselves or their children but haven’t yet. And even those lackluster stats could be an overestimate, because they’re drawn from the National Immunization Surveys, which is done by phone and so reflects the answers of people willing to take federal surveyors’ calls. Separate data collected by the CDC, current as of October 24, suggest that only 12 million Americans—less than 4 percent of the population—have gotten the new vaccine, according to Dave Daigle, the associate director for communications at the CDC’s Center for Global Health.
CDC Director Mandy Cohen still seems optimistic that the country will come close to the uptake rates of last autumn, when 17 percent of Americans received the updated bivalent vaccine. But for that to happen, Americans would have to maintain or exceed their current immunization clip—which Gregory Poland, a vaccine expert at Mayo Clinic, told me he isn’t betting on. (Already, he’s worried about the possible dampening effect of new data suggesting that getting flu and COVID shots simultaneously might slightly elevate the risk of stroke for older people.) As things stand, the United States could be heading into the winter with the fewest people recently vaccinated against COVID-19 since the end of 2020, when most people didn’t yet have the option to sign up at all.
This winter is highly unlikely to reprise that first one, when most of the population had no immunity, tests and good antivirals were scarce, and hospitals were overrun. It’s more likely to be an encore of this most recent winter, with its relative calm. But that’s not necessarily a comfort. If that winter was a kind of uncontrolled experiment in the damage COVID could do when unchecked, this one could codify that experiment into a too-complacent routine that cements our tolerance for suffering—and leaves us vulnerable to more.
To be fair, this year’s COVID vaccines have much been harder to get. With the end of the public-health emergency, the private sector is handling most distribution—a transition that’s made for a more uneven, chaotic rollout. In the weeks after the updated shot was cleared for use, many pharmacies were forced to cancel vaccination appointments or turn people away because of inadequate supply. At one point, Jacinda Abdul-Mutakabbir, an infectious-disease pharmacist at UC San Diego, who’s been running COVID and flu vaccination in her local community, was emailing her county’s office three times a week, trying to get vaccine vials. Even when vaccines have been available, many people have been dismayed to find they need to pay out of pocket for the cost. (Most people, regardless of insurance status, are supposed to be able to receive a free COVID-19 vaccine.)
The vaccine is now easier to find, in many places; insurance companies, too, seem to be fixing the kinks in compensation. But Abdul-Mutakabbir told me she worries that many of the people who were initially turned away may simply never come back. “You lose that window of opportunity,” she told me. Even people who haven’t gotten their autumn shot may be hesitating to try if they expect access to be difficult, as the emergency physician Jeremy Faust points out in his Inside Medicine newsletter.
Plus, because the rollout started later this year than in 2022, many people ended up infected before they could get vaccinated and may now be holding off on the shot—or skipping it entirely. And some Americans have simply decided against getting the shot. The CDC reported that 38 percent don’t plan to vaccinate themselves or their children; earlier this fall, more than half of respondents in a Kaiser Family Foundation poll said they probably or definitely wouldn’t be signing up themselves or their kids. More than 40 percent of those polled by KFF remain doubtful, too, that COVID shots are safe—dwarfing the numbers of people worried about flu shots, and even about RSV shots, which are newer than their COVID counterparts.
The consequences of low COVID-vaccine uptake are hard to parse. This year, like last year, most Americans have been vaccinated, infected, or both, many of them quite recently. COVID’s average severity has, for many months, been at a relatively consistent low. The last catastrophic SARS-CoV-2 variant—one immune-evasive enough to spark a massive wave of sickness, death, and long COVID—arrived two years ago. Barring another feat of viral evolution, perhaps these dynamics have reached something like a stable state, Justin Lessler, an infectious-disease modeler at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, told me. So maybe the most likely scenario is a close repeat of last winter: a rise in hospitalizations and deaths that’s ultimately far more muted than any earlier in the outbreak. And the COVID-19 Scenario Modeling Hub, which Lessler co-leads alongside Truelove and a large cohort of other researchers, projects that “next year will look a lot like this year, whatever this year ends up looking like,” Lessler said.
But predictability is distinct from peace. COVID has still been producing roughly twice the annual mortality that flu does; roughly 17,000 people are being hospitalized for the disease each week. SARS-CoV-2 infections also still carry a risk, far higher than flu’s, of debilitating some people for years. “And I do think we’re going to experience a winter increase,” Truelove told me. Even if this year’s COVID-vaccine uptake were to climb above 30 percent, models suggest that January hospitalizations could rival numbers from early 2023. Go much lower than that, and several scenarios point to outcomes being worse.
Based on the limited data available, at least one trend is mildly encouraging: Adults 75 and older, the age demographic most vulnerable to COVID and that stands to benefit most from annual shots, also have the highest vaccine uptake so far, at about 20 percent. At the same time, Katelyn Jetelina, the epidemiologist who writes the popular Your Local Epidemiologist newsletter, points out that CDC data suggest that only 8 percent of nursing-home residents are up to date on their COVID shots. “That is what keeps me up at night,” Jetelina told me. Early National Immunization Surveys data also suggest that uptake is lagging among other groups that might fare less well against COVID—among them, rural populations, Hispanic people, American Indians and Alaskan Natives, the uninsured, and people living below the poverty line.
Last winter was widely considered to be a bullet dodged, and the reactions to the coming months may be similar: At least it’s no longer that bad. Since the winter of Omicron, the country has been living with lower vaccine uptake while experiencing lower COVID peaks. But those lower peaks shouldn’t undermine the importance of vaccines. Infection-induced immunity, past vaccinations, improvements in treatments, and other factors have combined to make COVID look like a gentler disease. Add more recent vaccination to that mix, and many of those gains would likely be enhanced, keeping immunity levels up without the risks of illness or passing the virus to someone else.
As relatively “okay” as this past year-plus has been, it could have been better. Missed vaccinations still translate into more days spent suffering, more chronic illnesses, more total lives lost—an enormous burden to put on an already stressed health-care system, Jetelina told me. For the flu, more Americans act as if they understand this relationship: This year, as of November 1, nearly 25 percent of American adults, and more than 20 percent of American kids, have gotten their fall flu shot. Most of the experts I spoke with would be surprised to see such rates for COVID vaccines even at the end of this rollout.
If last winter was a preview of future COVID winters, our behaviors, too, could predict the patterns we’ll follow going forward. We may not be slammed with the next terrible variant this year, or the next, or the next. When one does arrive, though, as chances are it will, the precedent we’re setting now may leave us particularly unprepared. At that point, people may be years out from their most recent COVID shot; whole swaths of babies and toddlers may have yet to receive their first dose. Some of us may still have some immunity from recent infections, sure—but it won’t be the same as dosing up right before respiratory-virus season with protection that’s both reliable and safe. Systems once poised to deliver COVID vaccines en masse may struggle to meet demand. Or maybe the public will be slow to react to the new emergency at all. Our choices now “will be self-reinforcing,” Poland told me. We still won’t be doomed to repeat our first full COVID winter. But we may get closer than anyone cares to endure.
Diana Henriques was first stricken in late 1996. A business reporter for The New York Times, she was in the midst of a punishing effort to bring a reporting project to fruition. Then one morning she awoke to find herself incapable of pinching her contact lens between her thumb and forefinger.
Henriques’s hands were soon cursed with numbness, frailty, and a gnawing ache she found similar to menstrual cramps. These maladies destroyed her ability to type—the lifeblood of her profession—without experiencing debilitating pain.
“It was terrifying,” she recalls.
Henriques would join the legions of Americans considered to have a repetitive strain injury (RSI), which from the late 1980s through the 1990s seized the popular imagination as the plague of the modern American workplace. Characterized at the time as a source of sudden, widespread suffering and disability, the RSI crisis reportedly began in slaughterhouses, auto plants, and other venues for repetitive manual labor, before spreading to work environments where people hammered keyboards and clicked computer mice. Pain in the shoulders, neck, arms, and hands, office drones would learn, was the collateral damage of the desktop-computer revolution. As Representative Tom Lantos of California put it at a congressional hearing in 1989, these were symptoms of what could be “the industrial disease of the information age.”
By 1993, the Bureau of Labor Statistics was reporting that the number of RSI cases had increased more than tenfold over the previous decade. Henriques believed her workplace injury might have had a more specific diagnosis, though: carpal tunnel syndrome. Characterized by pain, tingling, and numbness that results from nerve compression at the wrist, this was just one of many conditions (including tendonitis and tennis elbow) that were included in the government’s tally, but it came to stand in for the larger threat. Everyone who worked in front of a monitor was suddenly at risk, it seemed, of coming down with carpal tunnel. “There was this ghost of a destroyed career wandering through the newsroom,” Henriques told me. “You never knew whose shoulder was going to feel the dead hand next.”
But the epidemic waned in the years that followed. The number of workplace-related RSIs recorded per year had already started on a long decline, and in the early 2000s, news reports on the modern plague all but disappeared. Two decades later, professionals are ensconced more deeply in the trappings of the information age than they’ve ever been before, and post-COVID, computer use has spread from offices to living rooms and kitchens. Yet if this work is causing widespread injury, the evidence remains obscure. The whole carpal tunnel crisis, and the millions it affected, now reads like a strange and temporary problem of the ancient past.
So what happened? Was the plague defeated by an ergonomic revolution, with white-collar workers’ bodies saved by thinner, light-touch keyboards, adjustable-height desks and monitors, and Aeron chairs? Or could it be that the office-dweller spike in RSIs was never quite as bad as it seemed, and that the hype around the numbers might have even served to make a modest problem worse, by spreading fear and faulty diagnoses?
Or maybe there’s another, more disturbing possibility. What if the scourge of RSIs receded, but only for a time? Could these injuries have resurged in the age of home-office work, at a time when their prevalence might be concealed in part by indifference and neglect? If that’s the case—if a real and pervasive epidemic that once dominated headlines never really went away—then the central story of this crisis has less to do with occupational health than with how we come to understand it. It’s a story of how statistics and reality twist around and change each other’s shape. At times they even separate.
The workplace epidemic was visible only after specific actions by government agencies, employers, and others set the stage for its illumination. This happened first in settings far removed from office life. In response to labor groups’ complaints, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration began to look for evidence of RSIs within the strike-prone meatpacking industry—and found that they were rampant.
Surveillance efforts spread from there, and so did the known scope of the problem. By 1988, OSHA had proposed multimillion-dollar fines against large auto manufacturers and meatpacking plants for underreporting employees’ RSIs; other businesses, perhaps spooked by the enforcement, started documenting such injuries more assiduously. Newspaper reporters (and their unions) took up the story, too, noting that similar maladies could now be produced by endless hours spent typing at the by-then ubiquitous computer keyboard. In that way, what had started playing out in government enforcement actions and statistics morphed into a full-blown news event. The white-collar carpal tunnel crisis had arrived.
In the late 1980s, David Rempel, an expert in occupational medicine and ergonomics at UC San Francisco, conducted an investigation on behalf of California’s OSHA in the newsroom of The Fresno Bee. Its union had complained that more than a quarter of the paper’s staff was afflicted with RSIs, and Rempel was there to find out what was wrong.
The problem, he discovered, was that employees had been given new, poorly designed computer workstations, and were suddenly compelled to spend a lot of time in front of them. In the citation that he wrote up for the state, Rempel ordered the Bee to install adjustable office furniture and provide workers with hourly breaks from their consoles.
A computer workstation at The Fresno Bee in 1989 (Courtesy of David Rempel)
Similar injury clusters were occurring at many other publications, too, and reporters cranked out stories on the chronic pain within their ranks. More than 200 editorial employees of the Los Angeles Times sought medical help for RSIs over a four-year stretch, according to a 1989 article in that newspaper. In 1990, The New YorkTimes published a major RSI story—“Hazards at the Keyboard: A Special Report”—on its front page; in 1992, Time magazine ran a major story claiming that professionals were being “Crippled by Computers.”
But ergonomics researchers like Rempel would later form some doubts about the nature of this epidemic. Research showed that people whose work involves repetitive and forceful hand exertions for long periods are more prone to developing carpal tunnel syndrome, Rempel told me—but that association is not as strong for computer-based jobs. “If there is an elevated risk to white-collar workers, it’s not large,” he said.
Computer use is clearly linked to RSIs in general, however. A 2019 meta-analysis in Occupational & Environmental Medicine found an increased risk of musculoskeletal symptoms with more screen work (though it does acknowledge that the evidence is “heterogeneous” and doesn’t account for screen use after 2005). Ergonomics experts and occupational-health specialists told me they are certain that many journalists and other professionals did sustain serious RSIs while using 1980s-to-mid-’90s computer workstations, with their fixed desks and chunky keyboards. But the total number of such injuries may have been distorted at the time, and many computer-related “carpal tunnel” cases in particular were spurious, with misdiagnoses caused in part by an unreliable but widely used nerve-conduction test. “It seems pretty clear that there wasn’t a sudden explosion of carpal tunnel cases when the reported numbers started to go up,” Leslie Boden, an environmental-health professor at the Boston University School of Public Health, told me.
Such mistakes were probably driven by the “crippled by computers” narrative. White-collar workers with hand pain and numbness might have naturally presumed they had carpal tunnel, thanks to news reports and the chatter at the water cooler; then, as they told their colleagues—and reporters—about their disabilities, they helped fuel a false-diagnosis feedback loop.
It’s possible that well-intentioned shifts in workplace culture further exaggerated the scale of the epidemic. According to Fredric Gerr, a professor emeritus of occupational and environmental health at the University of Iowa, white-collar employees were encouraged during the 1990s to report even minor aches and pains, so they could be diagnosed—and treated—earlier. But Gerr told me that such awareness-raising efforts may have backfired, causing workers to view those minor aches as harbingers of a disabling, chronic disease. Clinicians and ergonomists, too, he said, began to lump any pain-addled worker into the same bin, regardless of their symptoms’ severity—a practice that may have artificially inflated the reported rates of RSIs and caused unnecessary anxiety.
Henriques, whose symptoms were consistent and severe, underwent a nerve-conduction test not long after her pain and disability began; the result was inconclusive. She continues to believe that she came down with carpal tunnel syndrome as opposed to another form of RSI, but chose not to receive surgery given the diagnostic uncertainty. New YorkTimes reporters with RSIs were not at risk of getting fired, as she saw it, but of ending up in different roles. She didn’t want that for herself, so she adapted to her physical limitations, mastering the voice-to-text software that she has since used to dictate four books. The most recent came out in September.
As it happens, a very similar story had played out on the other side of the world more than a decade earlier.
Reporters in Australia began sounding the alarm about the booming rates of RSIs among computer users in 1983, right at the advent of the computer revolution. Some academic observers dismissed the epidemic as the product of a mass hysteria. Other experts figured that Australian offices might be more damaging to people’s bodies than those in other nations, with some colorfully dubbing the symptoms “kangaroo paw.” Andrew Hopkins, a sociologist at the Australian National University, backed a third hypothesis: that his nation’s institutions had merely facilitated acknowledgement—or stopped suppressing evidence—of what was a genuine and widespread crisis.
“It is well known to sociologists that statistics often tell us more about collection procedures than they do about the phenomenon they are supposed to reflect,” Hopkins wrote in a 1990 paper that compared the raging RSI epidemic in Australia to the relative quiet in the United States. He doubted that any meaningful differences in work conditions between the two nations could explain the staggered timing of the outbreaks. Rather, he suspected that different worker-compensation systems made ongoing epidemics more visible, or less, to public-health authorities. In Australia, the approach was far more labor-friendly on the whole, with fewer administrative hurdles for claimants to overcome, and better payouts to those who were successful. Provided with this greater incentive to report their RSIs, Hopkins argued, Australian workers began doing so in greater numbers than before.
Then conditions changed. In 1987, Australia’s High Court decided a landmark worker-compensation case involving an RSI in favor of the employer. By the late 1980s, the government had discontinued its quarterly surveillance report of such cases, and worker-comp systems became more hostile to them, Hopkins said. With fewer workers speaking out about their chronic ailments, and Australian journalists bereft of data to illustrate the problem’s scope, a continuing pain crisis might very well have been pushed into the shadows.
Now it was the United States’ turn. Here, too, attention to a workplace-injury epidemic swelled in response to institutional behaviors and incentives. And then here, too, that attention ebbed for multiple reasons. Improvements in workplace ergonomics and computer design may indeed have lessened the actual injury rate among desk workers during the 1990s. At the same time, the growing availability of high-quality scanners reduced the need for injury-prone data-entry typists, and improved diagnostic practices by physicians reduced the rate of false carpal tunnel diagnoses. In the blue-collar sector, tapering union membership and the expansion of the immigrant workforce may have pushed down the national number of recorded injuries, by making employees less inclined to file complaints and advocate for their own well-being.
But America’s legal and political climate was shifting too. Thousands of workers would file lawsuits against computer manufacturers during this period, claiming that their products had caused injury and disability. More than 20 major cases went to jury trials—and all of them failed. In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled against an employee of Toyota who said she’d become disabled by carpal tunnel as a result of working on the assembly line. (The car company was represented by John Roberts, then in private appellate-law practice.) Meanwhile, Republicans in Congress managed to jettison a new set of OSHA ergonomics standards before they could go into effect, and the George W. Bush administration ended the requirement that employers separate out RSI-like conditions in their workplace-injury reports to the government. Unsurprisingly, recorded cases dropped off even more sharply in the years that followed.
Blue-collar workers in particular would be left in the lurch. According to M. K. Fletcher, a safety and health specialist at the AFL-CIO, many laborers, in particular those in food processing, health care, warehousing, and construction, continue to suffer substantial rates of musculoskeletal disorders, the term that’s now preferred over RSIs. Nationally, such conditions account for an estimated one-fifth to one-third of the estimated 8.4 million annual workplace injuries across the private sector, according to the union’s analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics reports.
From what experts can determine, carpal tunnel syndrome in particular remains prevalent, affecting 1 to 5 percent of the overall population. The condition is associated with multiple health conditions unrelated to the workplace, including diabetes, age, hypothyroidism, obesity, arthritis, and pregnancy. In general, keyboards are no longer thought to be a major threat, but the hazards of repetitive work were always very real. In the end, the “crippled by computers” panic among white-collar workers of the 1980s and ’90s would reap outsize attention and perhaps distract from the far more serious concerns of other workers. “We engage in a disease-du-jour mentality that is based on idiosyncratic factors, such as journalists being worried about computer users, rather than prioritization by the actual rate and the impact on employment and life quality,” Gerr, the occupational- and environmental-health expert at the University of Iowa, told me.
As for today’s potential “hazards at the keyboard,” we know precious little. Almost all of the research described above was done prior to 2006, before tablets and smartphones were invented. Workplace ergonomics used to be a thriving academic field, but its ranks have dwindled. The majority of the academic experts I spoke with for this story are either in the twilight of their careers or they’ve already retired. A number of the researchers whose scholarship I’ve reviewed are dead. “The public and also scientists have lost interest in the topic,” Pieter Coenen, an assistant professor at Amsterdam UMC and the lead author of the meta–analysis from 2019, told me. “I don’t think the problem has actually resolved.”
So is there substantial risk to workers in the 2020s from using Slack all day, or checking email on their iPhones, or spending countless hours hunched at their kitchen tables, typing while they talk on Zoom? Few are trying to find out. Professionals in the post-COVID, work-from-home era may be experiencing a persistent or resurgent rash of pain and injury. “The industrial disease of the information age” could still be raging.
This fall, unlike the one before it, and the one before that, America looks almost like its old self. Schools and universities are in session; malls, airports, and gyms are bustling with the pre-holiday rush; handwashing is passé, handshakes are back, and strangers are packed together on public transport, nary a mask to be seen. On its surface, the country seems ready to enjoy what some might say is our first post-pandemic winter.
Americans are certainly acting as if the crisis has abated, and so in that way, at least, you could argue that it has. “If you notice, no one’s wearing masks,” President Joe Biden told60 Minutes in September, after proclaiming the pandemic “over.” Almost no emergency protections against the virus are left standing; we’re dismantling the few that are. At the same time, COVID is undeniably, as Biden says, “a problem.” Each passing day still brings hundreds of deaths and thousands of hospitalizations; untold numbers of people continue to deal with long COVID, as more join them. In several parts of the country, health-care systems are struggling to stay afloat. Local public-health departments, underfunded and understaffed, are hanging by a thread. And a double surge of COVID and flu may finally be brewing.
So we can call this winter “post-pandemic” if we want. But given the policy failures and institutional dysfunctions that have accumulated over the past three years, it won’t be anything like a pre-pandemic winter, either. The more we resist that reality, the worse it will become. If we treat this winter as normal, it will be anything but.
By now, we’ve grown acquainted with the variables that dictate how a season with SARS-CoV-2 will go. In our first COVID winter, the vaccines had only just begun their trickle out into the public, while most Americans hadn’t yet been infected by the virus. In our second COVID winter, the country’s collective immunity was higher, but Omicron sneaked past some of those defenses. On the cusp of our third COVID winter, it may seem that SARS-CoV-2 has few plot twists left to toss us.
But the way in which we respond to COVID could still sprinkle in some chaos. During those first two winters, at least a few virus-mitigating policies and precautions remained in place—nearly all of which have since come down, lowering the hurdles the virus must clear, at a time when America’s health infrastructure is facing new and serious threats.
The nation is still fighting to contain a months-long monkeypox outbreak; polio continues to plague unvaccinated sectors of New York. A riot of respiratory viruses, too, may spread as temperatures cool and people flock indoors. Rates of RSV are rising; flu returned early in the season from a nearly three-year sabbatical to clobber Australia, boding poorly for us in the north. Should flu show up here ahead of schedule, Americans, too, could be pummeled as we were around the start of 2018, “one of the worst seasons in the recent past,” says Srinivasan Venkatramanan, an infectious-disease modeler at the University of Virginia and a member of the COVID-19 Scenario Modeling Hub.
The consequences of this infectious churn are already starting to play out. In Jackson, Mississippi, health workers are watching SARS-CoV-2 and other respiratory viruses tear through children “like nothing we’ve ever seen before,” says Charlotte Hobbs, a pediatric-infectious-disease specialist at the University of Mississippi Medical Center. Flu season has yet to go into full swing, and Hobbs is already experiencing one of the roughest stretches she’s had in her nearly two decades of practicing. Some kids are being slammed with one virus after the other, their sicknesses separated by just a couple of weeks—an especially dangerous prospect for the very youngest among them, few of whom have received COVID shots.
The toll of doctor visits missed during the pandemic has ballooned as well. Left untreated, many people’s chronic conditions have worsened, and some specialists’ schedules remain booked out for months. Add to this the cases of long COVID that pile on with each passing surge of infections, and there are “more sick people than there used to be, period,” says Emily Landon, an infectious-disease physician at the University of Chicago. That’s with COVID case counts at a relative low, amid a massive undercount. Even if a new, antibody-dodging variant doesn’t come banging on the nation’s door, “the models predict an increase in infections,” Venkatramanan told me. (In parts of Europe, hospitalizations are already making a foreboding climb.)
And where the demand for care increases, supply does not always follow suit. Health workers continue to evacuate their posts. Some have taken early retirement, worried that COVID could exacerbate their chronic conditions, or vice versa; others have sought employment with better hours and pay, or left the profession entirely to salvage their mental health. A wave of illness this winter will pare down forces further, especially as the CDC backs off its recommendations for health-care workers to mask. At UAB Hospital, in Birmingham, Alabama, “we’ve struggled to have enough people to work,” says Sarah Nafziger, an emergency physician and the medical director for employee health. “And once we get them here, we have a hard time getting them to stay.”
Clinical-laboratory staff at Deaconess Hospital, in Indiana, who are responsible for testing patient samples, are feeling similar strain, says April Abbott, the institution’s microbiology director. Abbott’s team has spent most of the past month below usual minimum-staffing levels, and has had to cut some duties and services to compensate, even after calling in reinforcements from other, already shorthanded parts of the lab. “We’re already at this threshold of barely making it,” Abbott told me. Symptoms of burnout have surged as well, while health workers continue to clock long hours, sometimes amid verbal abuse, physical attacks, and death threats. Infrastructure is especially fragile in America’s rural regions, which have suffered hospital closures and an especially large exodus of health workers. In Madison County, Montana, where real-estate values have risen, “the average nurse cannot afford a house,” says Margaret Bortko, a nurse practitioner and the region’s health officer and medical director. When help and facilities aren’t available, the outcome is straightforward, says Janice Probst, a rural-health researcher at the University of South Carolina: “You will have more deaths.”
In health departments, too, the workforce is threadbare. As local leaders tackle multiple infectious diseases at once, “it’s becoming a zero-sum game,” says Maria Sundaram, an epidemiologist at the Marshfield Clinic Research Institute. “With limited resources, do they go to monkeypox? To polio? To COVID-19? To influenza? We have to choose.” Mati Hlatshwayo Davis, the director of health in St. Louis, told me that her department has shrunk to a quarter of the size it was five years ago. “I have staff doing the jobs of three to five people,” she said. “We are in absolute crisis.” Staff have left to take positions as Amazon drivers, who “make so much more per hour.” Looking across her state, Hlatshwayo Davis keeps watching health directors “resign, resign, resign.” Despite all that she has poured into her job, or perhaps because of it, “I can’t guarantee I won’t be one of those losses too.”
This winter is unlikely to be an encore of the pandemic’s worst days. Thanks to the growing roster of tools we now have to combat the coronavirus—among them, effective vaccines and antivirals—infected people are less often getting seriously sick; even long COVID seems to beat least a bitscarcer among people who are up-to-date on their shots. But considering how well our shots and treatments work, the plateau of suffering at which we’ve arrived is bizarrely, unacceptably high. More than a year has passed since the daily COVID death toll was around 200; nearly twice that number—roughly three times the daily toll during a moderate flu season—now seems to be a norm.
Part of the problem remains the nation’s failed approach to vaccines, says Avnika Amin, a vaccine epidemiologist at Emory University: The government has repeatedly championed shots as a “be-all and end-all” strategy, while failing to rally sufficient uptake. Boosting is one of the few anti-COVID measures still promoted, yet the U.S. remains among the least-vaccinated high-income countries; interest in every dose that’s followed the primary series has been paltry at best. Even with the allure of the newly reformulated COVID shot, “I’m not really getting a good sense that people are busting down the doors,” says Michael Dulitz, a health worker in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Nor can vaccines hold the line against the virus alone. Even if everyone got every shot they were eligible for, Amin told me, “it wouldn’t make COVID go away.”
The ongoing dry-up of emergency funds has also made the many tools of disease prevention and monitoring more difficult to access. Free at-home tests are no longer being shipped out en masse; asymptomatic testing is becoming less available; and vaccines and treatments are shifting to the private sector, putting them out of reach for many who live in poor regions or who are uninsured and can least afford to fall ill.
It doesn’t help, either, that the country’s level of preparedness lays out as a patchwork. People who vaccinate and mask tend to cluster, Amin told me, which means that not all American experiences of winter will be the same. Less prominent, less privileged parts of the country will quietly bear the brunt of outbreaks. “The biggest worry is the burden becoming unnoticed,” Venkatramanan told me. Without data, policies can’t change; the nation can’t react. “It’s like flying without altitude or speed sensors. You’re looking out the window and trying to guess.”
There’s an alternative winter the country might envision—one unencumbered by the policy backslides the U.S. has made in recent months, and one in which Americans acknowledge that COVID remains not just “a problem” but a crisis worth responding to.
In that version of reality, far more people would be up-to-date on their vaccines. The most vulnerable in society would be the most protected. Ventilation systems would hum in buildings across the country. Workers would have access to ample sick leave. Health-care systems would have excesses of protective gear, and local health departments wouldn’t want for funds. Masks would come out in times of high transmission, especially in schools, pharmacies, government buildings, and essential businesses; free tests, boosters, and treatments would be available to all. No one would be asked to return to work while sick—not just with COVID but with any transmissible disease. SARS-CoV-2 infections would not disappear, but they would remain at more manageable levels; cases of flu and other cold-weather sicknesses that travel through the air would follow suit. Surveillance systems would whir in every state and territory, ready to detect the next threat. Leaders might even set policies that choreograph, rather than simply capitulate to, how Americans behave.
We won’t be getting that winter this year, or likely any year soon. Many policies have already reverted to their 2019 status quo; by other metrics, the nation’s well-being even seems to have regressed. Life expectancyin the U.S.hasfallen, especially among Native Americans and Alaskan Natives. Institutions of health are beleaguered; community-outreach efforts have been pruned.
The pandemic has also prompted a deterioration of trust in several mainstays of public health. In many parts of the country, there’s worry that the vaccine hesitancy around COVID has “spread its tentacles into other diseases,” Hobbs told me, keeping parents from bringing their kids in for flu shots and other routine vaccines. Mississippi, once known for its stellarrate of immunizing children, now consistently ranks among those with the fewest young people vaccinated against COVID. “The one thing we do well is vaccinate children,” Hobbs said. That the coronavirus has reversed the trend “has astounded me.” In Montana, sweeping political changes, including legislation that bans employers from requiring vaccines of any kind, have made health-care settings less safe. Fewer than half of Madison County’s residents have received even their primary series of COVID shots, and “now a nurse can turn down the Hepatitis B series,” Bortko told me. Health workers, too, feel more imperiled than before. Since the start of the pandemic, Bortko’s own patients of 30 years, “who trusted me with their lives,” have pivoted to “yelling at us about vaccination concerns and mask mandates and quarantining and their freedoms,” she told me. “We have become public enemy No. 1.”
At the same time, many people with chronic and debilitating conditions are more vulnerable than they were before the pandemic began. The policies that protected them during the pandemic’s height are gone—and yet SARS-CoV-2 is still here, adding to the dangers they face. The losses have been written off, Bortko told me: Cases of long COVID in Madison County have been dismissed as products of “risk factors” that don’t apply to others; deaths, too, have been met with a shrug of “Oh, they were old; they were unhealthy.” If, this winter, COVID sickens or kills more people who are older, more people who are immunocompromised, more people of color, more essential and low-income workers, more people in rural communities, “there will be no press coverage,” Hlatshwayo Davis said. Americans already expect that members of these groups will die.
It’s not too late to change course. The winter’s path has not been set: Many Americans are still signing up for fall flu and COVID shots; we may luck out on the viral evolution front, too, and still be dealing largely with members of the Omicron clan for the next few months. But neither immunity nor a slowdown in variant emergence is a guarantee. What we can count on is the malleability of human behavior—what will help set the trajectory of this winter, and others to come. The U.S. botched the pandemic’s beginning, and its middle. That doesn’t mean we have to bungle its end, whenever that truly, finally arrives.
Program brings together more than 100 global experts to promote excellence practices in federal government entities
Press Release –
updated: Mar 29, 2021
TORONTO and DUBAI, United Emirates, March 29, 2021 (Newswire.com)
– Ryelle Strategy Group, an industry-leading excellence assessment and strategy execution firm, has announced a strategic partnership with the Sheikh Khalifa Government Excellence Program of the federal government of the United Arab Emirates to deliver its first-ever virtual government excellence program.
Ryelle will recruit and deliver more than 100 subject matter experts from around the world with expertise in strategy, innovation, education, finance, infrastructure, energy, climate, healthcare, among other disciplines, to deliver this mandate. This group will assess the operations of more than 30 government entities to establish excellence standards, promote knowledge sharing and capacity building and integrate industry-leading best practices with the ultimate objective of helping the government improve their efficiency and shape the future of their entities.
“It is an honour to have been chosen as the partner by the federal government of the UAE in moving this established government excellence platform to a digital context,” said Carol Kotacka, Managing Director of Ryelle Strategy Group. “Running the program virtually for the first time ever allows us to maximize all facets of international best practices and take full advantage of a global network of subject matter experts like never before. We will be drawing on our extensive network to add to our globally recognized team of experts to ensure that we will be able to choose from the best and brightest from around the world.”
About Ryelle Strategy Group Ryelle Strategy Group is a boutique consulting firm that specializes in excellence assessment and strategy execution across private, public and non-profit sectors both in the field and via virtual platforms. From client/patient/customer experience mapping, knowledge mobilization and market intelligence to stakeholder engagement, brand management and the creation of new platforms, Ryelle Strategy Group’s mission is to enable connection, collaboration and co-creation within organizations to achieve outcomes. Learn more at www.ryellegroup.com
About the Sheikh Khalifa Government Excellence Program Sheikh Khalifa Government Excellence Program aims to develop excellence practices of the federal government through the adoption of the modern fundamentals and principles of excellence and raise awareness about excellence in government work, guiding and developing government entities capabilities through sharing of knowledge and best practices that encourage disruptive innovation and consolidate quality concepts and leadership excellence. Learn more at https://www.skgep.gov.ae/en/programme
Contact Carol Kotacka, Managing Partner International Recruitment Ryelle Strategy Group contractor@ryellegroup.com