This is an opinion editorial by Rikki, author and co-host of the “Bitcoin Italia,” and “Stupefatti” podcasts. He is one half of the Bitcoin Explorers, along with Laura, who chronicle Bitcoin adoption around the world, one country at a time.
On the road again. Direction: San Salvador. The Bitcoin community is about to gather here for Adopting Bitcoin, the final major Bitcoin conference of the year, but certainly not the least. Friends and Bitcoiners from around the world are flying into the country to work together and promote Bitcoin adoption. Who knows how many of them knew much about this country before the “Ley Bitcoin” was implemented?
Before returning to San Salvador, we made a pit stop in the village of Ataco — we were invited to participate in the handing out of a Bitcoin diploma, an actual qualification in Bitcoin and financial education that students in (currently) seven public schools in El Salvador receive after participating in a course offered by My First Bitcoin.
Less than a year ago, during our first trip to El Salvador living in Bitcoin only, we attended a meeting between the first principal to join the Bitcoin diploma project, government representatives and the project’s founders. It was a historic moment.
So, for us to see our first Bitcoin graduates in person was a special treat. It was a circle that closed. It is with mass education that our technological and nonviolent revolution will succeed. Certainly, not through the decree of law alone.
Visiting San Salvador
The next day, our awakening in San Salvador was quite traumatic — late, rushed, with the weekly vlog on our YouTube channel to edit and several pressing appointments to make. Because of this, we decided to do something we had not yet done here in El Salvador and we went to Starbucks. Last year, we saw dozens of videos on Twitter of bitcoin transactions at this chain in the country and felt confident this coffee shop would our sats.
“Two cappuccinos and two chocolate muffins please,” we said. “We will pay in bitcoin!”
Silence. The waitress’ lost look meant only one thing: she had never used Bitcoin before and had no idea how to do accept our proposed payment. Her colleague came to her aid but she could not remember the password to their Chivo wallet. No dice. So, we went to the McDonald’s next door, with the same intent.
That is where the real surprise took place: Not even the McDonald’s manager remembered the password for the Chivo app. Less than a year ago, the same establishment was studded with illuminated “pay for your burger in bitcoin!‘ signs. Unbelievable.
We remembered that the restaurant’s automated checkouts could create a bitcoin QR code without requiring any password and we asked the staff to try it. It worked! But what a struggle.
Education is everything.
The day before, we witnessed the final test of 16- and 17-year-olds who proved perfectly capable of creating and managing new, non-custodial bitcoin wallets, importing them into new devices, making on-chain transactions and monitoring them in a Bitcoin explorer. Less than 24 hours later, we found ourselves drinking watered-down coffee at a venue whose staff could not remember an application PIN.
Adopting Bitcoin
The conference was beautiful and very well organized. It is good to see so many friendly faces again, from all over the world. The content was of a high standard and audience participation was good.
I don’t like the term “orange pilling,” though I wish that teaching Bitcoin was as easy as swallowing a pill: You swallow it and boom, you’re a Bitcoiner. I consider it a misleading term. Studying and understanding Bitcoin is a long, time-consuming process.
Bitcoin is the greatest human rights tool ever invented. It was so long before “have fun staying poor,” and its price does not even matter to me. Price is just a consequence of its technology and the social revolution it is bringing. In El Salvador, where a person understands that bitcoin is also fundamental to their own survival, they understand everything. That, for me, is the “orange pilling” moment.
What wallet do I recommend downloading for orange pilling? It depends on who I’m talking to. If it’s someone completely new to the field, I go with Wallet Of Satoshi. The Lightning transactions there are amazing. True, it is completely custodial (not your keys, not your coin!), but the user experience is amazing. There are just two buttons and it’s instant. It works like a charm. But if I talk to someone who already knows something about the technology, I go with Blue Wallet. In this application, you have two different wallets: the non-custodial bitcoin wallet (of which you then own the private key) and one for using the Lightning Network. I think it’s very useful to make the difference between Layer 1 and Layer 2 clear. If you want to pay for a coffee with the Lightning Network, you literally have to move your bitcoin from Layer 1 to Layer 2.
In our work, we always have to keep in mind that it is really very early. As Bitcoiners, we would like to see this technology applied to the world as soon as possible. The truth is that history itself teaches us that this will not be possible. Think of credit cards: Frank McNamara invented the Diners Club, the world’s first credit card, in 1950. It took a notable amount of time after this for credit cards to become truly relevant. Bitcoin, in addition to being a disruptive technology, is a philosophical achievement. That’s why so many pre-coiners don’t think they need it and that it doesn’t solve any problems for them. We have to be patient and allow this creature more time to develop.
When will we reach hyperbitcoinization? I always wonder what is meant by this word. The diffusion of a technology to transmit value instantaneously and without boundaries? To me that is not hyperbitcoinization. Bitcoin will allow us to vote in a distributed network, to certify in a distributed network. It will enable us sooner or later to disintermediate any trust process. Trust is obsolete.
The notes worked and the panel went very well. There were roars of applause and lots of compliments.
Sunbathing In Bitcoin Beach
The third day of the conference was a chance to socialize as we sunbathed at Bitcoin Beach in El Zonte.
We are so immersed in Bitcoin that sometimes we forget to be analytical and really rationalize what is happening to us and to the world around us.
Let’s think about it: We were in Central America, the soundtrack of this day was the sound of the Pacific Ocean crashing on the black sand and volcanic rocks of the coastline. All around us were tropical vegetation, incredible sunsets and exotic animals. People from dozens of different countries have gathered here. To sharpen your hearing was to perceive a Babel of different languages and accents. All of this happened solely because of the intuition of a pseudonymous scientist — someone who dared to dream so big as to come up with something capable of changing the world.
If this thing, in itself, is not incredible, I really don’t know what is.
The truth is that Bitcoin has already changed our lives, irreversibly. And it has also already done so for so many people who are able to take this idea and embed it into their jobs or even to invent a new job from scratch. There are many such examples here. Sure, lots of technical people, like developers, journalists and entrepreneurs. But also many more creative people. The young man from India who decides to travel the world in Bitcoin, 40 countries in 400 days. The American couple who manages to teach while having fun. The journalist who, once he falls down the rabbit hole, devotes himself exclusively to Bitcoin. The driver who, thanks to Bitcoiners, sees his business scale like he never could have imagined. The small coffee producer who manages to export by getting paid in an instant and without onerous fees.
We could go on listing similar cases for hours. These are small things, let’s be clear. And perhaps they are isolated examples. And it may take resourcefulness and a touch of madness to make your dreams into realities with Bitcoin. But it is already possible. Bitcoin works. It changes the lives of those who can seize opportunities and all that it takes is having that spark.
The nights in El Zonte were hot and humid at this time. The sun set quickly behind the horizon. We all met at a hotel called Palo Verde for a conference party organized by IBEX. All of our friends were there, those we love. We had something to eat, chatted for a while, and then the music started. There is nothing more liberating than dancing on the beach, feet in the sand. It was super hot, but the dance floor was still crowded.
At the entrance we were given tickets for a raffle and prizes were to be drawn. Someone in our group won a very good bottle of whiskey. That’s the end. As the amber liquid trickled down our throats, we already anticipated the hangover headache. When the music ended, it was time for goodbyes.
The road home for us translates into a long walk on the shoreline, under an impressive starry sky, barefoot, with the waves placidly bathing our ankles.
Pura vida.
This is a guest post by Rikki. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
This is an opinion editorial by Ansel Lindner, a bitcoin and financial markets researcher and the host of the “Bitcoin & Markets” and “Fed Watch” podcasts.
Two forces have dominated the globe economically and politically for the last 75 years: globalization and trust-based money. However, the time for both of these forces has passed, and their waning will bring about a great reset of the global order.
But this is not the global, Marxist kind of Great Reset promoted by Klaus Schwab and those who attend Davos. This is an emergent, market-driven reset characterized by a multipolar world and a new monetary system.
Globalization Is Ending
The first reaction I usually get to my claim that the age of hyper-globalization is ending is flippant disbelief. People have so completely integrated the environment of the dying global order into their economic understanding that they cannot fathom a world where the cost-to-benefit analysis of globalization is different. Even after COVID-19 exposed the fragility of complex supply chains, like when the U.S. very nearly ran out of surgical masks and basic medications or when the world struggled to source semiconductors, people have yet to realize the shift that is happening.
Is it that hard to imagine that the businessmen who designed such fragile, overcomplicated production processes didn’t properly weigh the risks?
All that is needed to break globalization is for risk-adjusted costs to change a few percentage points and outweigh the benefits. The pennies saved by outsourcing numerous tasks to numerous jurisdictions will no longer outweigh the possibility of complete collapse of supply chains.
Gone is the time when complex supply chains were robust against typical risks. The risks today are much more systemic. Sure, there were skirmishes around the world and disagreements among parliaments, but great powers did not openly threaten one another’s spheres of influence. Risk-adjusted costs and benefits to globalization have radically changed.
Credit Doesn’t Like Conflict
Very closely related to deglobalization of supply chains is deglobalization of credit markets. The same factors that affect business peoples’ physical, risk-adjusted costs and benefits are also felt by bankers.
Banks don’t want to be exposed to the risk of war or sanctions wrecking their borrowers. In the current environment of deglobalization and rising risks to international trade, banks will naturally pull back on lending to those associated activities. Instead, banks will fund safer projects, likely fully-domestic or friend-shoring opportunities. The natural reaction by banks to this risky global environment will be credit contraction.
The deglobalization of supply chains and credit will be as closely linked on the way down as they were on the way up. It will start slowly, but pick up speed. A feedback loop of rising risk leading to shorter supply chains and less credit creation.
The Credit-Based U.S. Dollar
The prevailing form of money in the world is the credit-based U.S. dollar. Every dollar is created through debt, making every dollar someone else’s debt. Money is printed out of thin air in the process of making a loan.
This is different from pure fiat money. When fiat money is printed, the balance sheet of the printer adds assets alone. However, in a credit-based system, when money is printed in a loan, the printer creates an asset and a liability. The borrower’s balance sheet then has an offsetting liability and asset, respectively. Every dollar (or euro or yen, for that matter) is therefore an asset and a liability, and the loan that created that dollar is both an asset and a liability.
This system works extremely well if two factors are present. One, highly-productive uses of new credit are available, and two, a relative lack of exogenous shocks to the global economy. Change either of these things and a breakdown is bound to occur.
This dual nature of credit-based money is at the root of both the dollar’s spectacular rise in the 20th century, and the coming monetary reset. As global trust and supply chains break down, the comingling of assets in banks becomes more risky. Russia found this out the hard way when the West confiscated its reserves of dollars held in banks abroad. How is trust possible in that sort of environment? When credit-based money’s creation is based on trust… Houston, we have a problem.
Bitcoin’s Role In The Future
Luckily, we have experience with a world that doesn’t trust itself — i.e., the entire history of man prior to 1945. Back then, we were on a gold standard for reasons which included all those that bitcoiners are very familiar with (gold scores highly in the characteristics that make good money), but also because it minimized trust between great powers.
Gold lost its mantle for one reason — and you’ve probably never heard this anywhere before: because the global economic, political and innovation environment post-WWII created an extremely fertile soil for credit. Trust was easy, the major powers were humbled and all joined the new international institutions under the security umbrella of the U.S. The Iron Curtain provided a stark separation between zones of trust economically, but after it fell, there was a period of roughly 20 years where the world sang “kumbaya” because new credit was still extremely productive in the old Soviet block and China.
Today, we are facing the opposite sort of scenario: Global trust is eroding and credit has exploited all productive low-hanging fruit, forcing us into a period that demands neutral money.
The world will soon find itself split between regions/alliances of influence. A British bank will trust a U.S. bank, where a Chinese bank will not. To bridge this gap, we need money that everyone can hold and respect.
Gold Vs. Bitcoin
Gold would be the first choice here, if not for bitcoin. This is because gold has several drawbacks. First, gold is owned mainly by those groups who are losing trust in one another, namely the governments of the world. Much of the gold is held in the United States. Therefore, gold is unevenly distributed.
Second, gold’s physical nature, once a positive holding profligate governments in check, is now a weakness because it cannot be transported or assayed nearly as efficiently as bitcoin.
Lastly, gold is not programmable. Bitcoin is a neutral, decentralized protocol that can be tapped for any number of innovations. The Lightning Network and sidechains are just two examples of how Bitcoin can be programmed to increase its utility.
As globalization of both trade and credit is breaking down, the economic environment favors a return to a form of money that doesn’t depend on trust between major powers. Bitcoin is the modern answer.
This is a guest post by Ansel Lindner. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
Opinion by Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Hezri A Adnan (kuala lumpur, malaysia)
Inter Press Service
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Dec 06 (IPS) – Natural flows do not respect national boundaries. The atmosphere and oceans cross international borders with little difficulty, as greenhouse gases (GHGs) and other fluids, including pollutants, easily traverse frontiers.
Yet, in multilateral fora, strategies to address climate change and its effects remain largely national. GHG emissions – typically measured as carbon dioxide equivalents – are the main bases for assessing national climate action commitments.
Hezri A AdnanAssessing national responsibility
Jayati Ghosh, Shouvik Chakraborty and Debamanyu Das have critically considered how national climate responsibilities are assessed. The standard method – used by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – measures GHG emissions by activities within national boundaries.
This approach attributes GHG emissions to the country where goods are produced. Such carbon accounting focuses blame for global warming on newly industrializing economies. But it ignores who consumes the goods and where, besides diverting attention from those most responsible for historical emissions.
Thus, attention has focused on big national emitters. China, India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and other large developing economies – especially the ‘late industrializers’ – have become the new climate villains.
China, the United States and India are now the world’s three largest GHG emitters in absolute terms, accounting for over half the total. With more rapid growth in recent decades, China and India have greatly increased emissions.
Undoubtedly, some developing countries have seen rapid GHG emission increases, especially during high growth episodes. In the first two decades of this century, such emissions rose over 3-fold in China, 2.7 times in India, and 4.7-fold in Indonesia.
Meanwhile, most rich economies have seen smaller increases, even declines in emissions, as they ‘outsource’ labour- and energy-intensive activities to the global South. Thus, over the same period, production emissions fell by 12% in the US and Japan, and by nearly 22% in Germany.
Jomo Kwame SundaramObscuring inequalities
Only comparing total national emissions is not just one-sided, but also misleading, as countries have very different populations, economic outputs and structures.
But determining responsibility for global warming fairly is necessary to ensure equitable burden sharing for adequate climate action. Most climate change negotiations and discussions typically refer to aggregate national emissions and income measures, rather than per capita levels.
But such framing obscures the underlying inequalities involved. A per capita view comparing average GHG emissions offers a more nuanced, albeit understated perspective on the global disparities involved.
Thus, in spite of recent reductions, rich economies are still the greatest GHG emitters per capita. The US and Australia spew eight times more per head than developing countries like India, Indonesia and Brazil.
Despite its recent emission increases, even China emits less than half US per capita levels. Meanwhile, its annual emissions growth fell from 9.3% in 2002 to 0.6% in 2012. Even The Economist acknowledged China’s per capita emissions in 2019 were comparable to industrializing Western nations in 1885!
Several developments have contributed to recent reductions in rich nations’ emissions. Richer countries can better afford ‘climate-friendly’ improvements, by switching energy sources away from the most harmful fossil fuels to less GHG-emitting options such as natural gas, nuclear and renewables.
Changes in international trade and investment with ‘globalization’ have seen many rich countries shift GHG-intensive production to developing countries.
Thus, rich economies have ‘exported’ production of – and responsibility for – GHG emissions for what they consume. Instead, developed countries make more from ‘high value’ services, many related to finance, requiring far less energy.
Export emissions, shift blame
Thus, rich countries have effectively adopted then World Bank chief economist Larry Summers’ proposal to export toxic waste to the poorest countries where the ‘opportunity cost’ of human life was presumed to be lowest!
His original proposal has since become a development strategy for the age of globalization! Thus, polluting industries – including GHG-emitting production processes – have been relocated – together with labour-intensive industries – to the global South.
Although kept out of the final published version of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, over 40% of developing country GHG emissions were due to export production for developed countries.
Such ‘emission exports’ by rich OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries increased rapidly from 2002, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). These peaked at 2,278 million metric tonnes in 2006, i.e., 17% of emissions from production, before falling to 1,577 million metric tonnes.
For the OECD, the ‘carbon balance’ is determined by deducting the carbon dioxide equivalent of GHG emissions for imports from those for production, including exports. Annual growth of GHG discharges from making exports was 4.3% faster than for all production emissions.
Thus, the US had eight times more per capita GHG production emissions than India’s in 2019. US per capita emissions were more than thrice China’s, although the world’s most populous country still emits more than any other nation.
With high GHG-emitting products increasingly made in developing countries, rich countries have effectively ‘exported’ their emissions. Consuming such imports, rich economies are still responsible for related GHG emissions.
Change is in the air
Industries emitting carbon have been ‘exported’ – relocated abroad – for their products to be imported for consumption. But the UNFCCC approach to assigning GHG emissions responsibility focuses only on production, ignoring consumption of such imports.
Thus, if responsibility for GHG emissions is also due to consumption, per capita differences between the global North and South are even greater.
In contrast, the OECD wants to distribute international corporate income tax revenue according to consumption, not production. Thus, contradictory criteria are used, as convenient, to favour rich economies, shaping both tax and climate discourses and rules.
While domestic investments in China have become much ‘greener’, foreign direct investment by companies from there are developing coal mines and coal-fired powerplants abroad, e.g., in Indonesia and Vietnam.
If not checked, such FDI will put other developing countries on the worst fossil fuel energy pathway, historically emulating the rich economies of the global North. A Global Green New Deal would instead enable a ‘big push’ to ‘front-load’ investments in renewable energy.
This should enable adequate financing of much more equitable development while ensuring sustainability. Such an approach would not only address national-level inequalities, but also international disparities.
China now produces over 70% of photovoltaic solar panels annually, but is effectively blocked from exporting them abroad. In a more cooperative world, developing countries’ lower-cost – more affordable – production of the means to generate renewable energy would be encouraged.
Instead, higher energy costs now – due to supply disruptions following the Ukraine war and Western sanctions – are being used by rich countries to retreat further from their inadequate, modest commitments to decelerate global warming.
This retreat is putting the world at greater risk. Already, the international community is being urged to abandon the maximum allowable temperature increase above pre-industrial levels, thus further extending and deepening already unjust North-South relations.
But change is in the air. Investing in and subsidizing renewable energy technologies in developing countries wanting to electrify, can enable them to develop while mitigating global warming.
Hezri A Adnan is adjunct professor at the Faculty of Sciences, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.
This is an opinion editorial by David Seroy, Founder and President of Old North Capital Fund.
It is the author’s opinion that credit-based, bitcoin-backed dollars will act as the bridge connecting bitcoin, dollars, the Lightning Network, validity roll-ups, and elements of free banking in a hyperbitcoinized world.
Bitcoin and the dollar are symbiotic. Like yin and yang, bitcoin and dollars provide balance. On the one hand, bitcoin acts as a counterparty-free, decentralized, scarce, digital bearer asset to hedge against excessive credit creation. On the other hand, the free market has an insatiable desire for issuing credit-based dollars which fill the role of both a ‘stable” unit of account and an elastic monetary layer.
Thus the market has competing desires for both a fixed supply asset, as well as a monetary unit of account which is “stable” and can expand in response to economic demands. This reality leads us to believe the path to hyperbitcoinization will naturally be paved with an array of credit-based, bitcoin-backed dollars underpinned by bitcoin collateral. Nik Bhatia describes a similar vision in his book, “Layered Money.” Put simply, credit money will exist because the market demands it, but it will be backed by and therefore limited by bitcoin’s fixed supply also because the market demands it. The net result is a synergistic fly-wheel will begin to form between the demand for bitcoin and bitcoin-backed dollars.
In 2010, Hal Finney described such a vision where bitcoin-backed banks could “issue their own digital cash currency, redeemable for bitcoins.” This idea was based on George Selgin’s Free Banking research. Eric Yakes summarizes Free Banking in his article “Bitcoin Banking Systems“:
“Imagine a world in which banks were allowed to competitively issue their own private monies and markets were allowed to sort out whether these monies were valuable. This system is built on the assumptions that (1) information transparency is high; (2) it exists within a competitive market environment; and (3) it is subject to minimal regulations. If such a system emerged and was predicated upon voluntary agreement and exchange amongst market actors, who’s to say that it would not be just?”
Unfortunately, none of the three criteria can be met in the existing legacy system, and therefore we are unlikely to ever see a true bitcoin “free banking” revolution via the legacy system. Specifically:
Information Transparency: Large financial institutions can and already do issue their own private dollars, but they exist on shadow ledgers outside the purview of regulators. The inability to regulate these shadow ledgers prevents any sort of broad information transparency from ever existing in the legacy banking system.
Competitiveness: Getting approval for a banking license is a tedious, lengthy, and highly costly endeavor. It is very much restricted to a select few and is therefore not competitive.
Regulation: Banks have never been more highly regulated, as a result of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis (“GFC”). There is no reason to believe this will change. Even if it does, there is no assurance it would last.
However, Decentralized Finance (“DeFi”) could circumvent these issues in a “sly round-about way” à la Friedrich Hayek. While much of DeFi is riddled with grift and gambling, a small subset of it is equipped to usher in the bitcoin free banking movement.
The exact mechanics could vary by protocol and would be defined by smart contracts. However, functionally it would operate as Finney originally described. Consider this excerpt from Finney’s original forum post and swap in “protocol,” “smart contract,” and “stablecoin”:
“Different banks (protocols) can have different policies (smart contracts), some more aggressive, some more conservative. Some would be fractional reserve, while others may be 100% Bitcoin-backed. Interest rates may vary. Cash (Stablecoins) from some banks (protocols) may trade at a discount to that from others.”
Advantages Of DeFi Over Legacy Free Banking
There are many advantages to building these “bitcoin free banks” aka protocols on DeFi over the legacy system:
Transparent: Stablecoins issued via DeFi would exist on-chain, meaning on a transparent immutable ledger. Specifically, outstanding claims and underlying collateral would always be public and cryptographically auditable. Building on-chain is a superior form of proof of reserves.
Permissionless: DeFi removes gatekeepers just as free banking envisioned. For builders, anyone technically can create and launch a new protocol. Thus we could see a Cambrian explosion of bitcoin-backed credit experiments. For individual users no inherent restrictions such as KYC would prevent anyone around the world from interacting with the protocol.
Non-Custodial: With DeFi, users can maintain control of their own keys (subject to the terms of the smart contract) instead of entrusting them to centralized entities who may rehypothecate the assets—or even honest actors exposed to regulatory capture who may be coerced into giving up the keys.
Better Terms: By dis-intermediating banks, users can create superior terms for themselves. One such example is “Zero” (described below), which allows users to borrow stablecoins at a 0% interest rate against bitcoin collateral, with no set loan term and strong capital efficiency.
Examples In The Wild
Active examples of bitcoin free banking would be Fuji built on the Liquid sidechain and Sovryn’s Zero protocol built on the RSK sidechain, both of which function as a quasi-decentralized borrowing and stablecoin services. Zero specifically allows users to provide collateral in the form of RBTC (a pegged version of bitcoin on the Rootstock “RSK” sidechain) into a smart contract and subsequently issue dollar-denominated stablecoins to themselves.
The stablecoins technically has]ve no cost to issue (Specifically, the protocol has no cost to mint tokens, but users are charged an origination fee to borrow, which normally sits at 0.5%), and thus zero interest, because the stablecoins are minted rather than diverted from another use. This is similar to the way free banks functioned when issuing private bank notes against their collateral, except the newly issued tokens have a value pegged to the dollar. Instead of banks issuing private money notes in the legacy system, protocols issue bitcoin-backed stablecoins. Instead of free banks controlling the collateral and allocation of credit, users individually interacting with the protocol control their own credit creation system.
The use of a permissionless, distributed credit creation system disempowers singular central entities from reaping privileged benefits from the Cantillon effect and controlling the allocation of new credit money.
The Importance Of Bitcoin-Backed Credit And Stablecoins
Outside of Bitcoin itself, stablecoins are unequivocally the “killer app” in crypto. Alex Gladstein argues that the importance of stablecoins as a humanitarian tool “is impossible to deny.” The market capitalization of stablecoins strongly affirms the crucial place of stablecoins.
Some Bitcoiners struggle to acknowledge the importance of dollars, as it can seem antithetical to the Bitcoin ethos. However, bitcoin-backed credit makes these ideas compatible. When stablecoins are minted as claims against bitcoin collateral, this process is effectively a short against the dollar. Over a long time frame, we would expect the value of bitcoin to increase as the dollar decreases in purchasing power, thus making it easier to pay back the debt. This is the premise of Pierre Rochard’s article “speculative Attack.”
The key component of bitcoin-backed credit is the ability to create a synergy and fly-wheel between dollars and bitcoin. Specifically, as the market demand for censorship-resistant dollars increases, it consequently drives demand for more bitcoin collateral to be purchased and locked in smart contracts to mint stablecoins and meet that demand. Separately, as organic demand for issuing bitcoin backed increases (such as borrowing against it at 0% interest rate), it leads to the creation of more liquidity of censorship-resistant stablecoins. Both censorship-resistant stablecoins and loans against bitcoin collateral have proven to have significant demand. Tying these two high-demand products together creates a synergy between dollar and bitcoin advocates that mutually perpetuate growth of the other.
The Tech Stack And The Circular Economy
Due to Bitcoin’s limited scripting capabilities, projects such as Zero and Fuji currently must be built on Bitcoin sidechains that provide for smart contract functionality. The tradeoff is that users must lock their bitcoin in a federated multisignature address and receive a bitcoin derivative known as RBTC or L-BTC.
In the interim, this is a trust limitation that is not perfectly aligned with the Bitcoin ethos. However, we can use these federated models to prove product-market fit while exploring research around trustless options such as drivechains and validity rollups (aka “zk rollups”). Validity rollups are particularly interesting as a way to create a trustless two-way peg that could one day replace the functionality of federations and circumvent the current trust assumptions of sidechains without altering the core tenets of the Bitcoin base layer. A detailed analysis of validity rollups on Bitcoin can be found here. Alternatively, video’s discussing ZK Roll-ups on Bitcoin here and here:
An eventual future could include creating a trust-minimized bridge between stablecoins minted on a validity Rollup that are then subsequently used for payments on the Lightning Network. This could be enabled by the developments of Taro and RGB, which allow the issuance of tokens (but have limited smart contracting functionality in part due to having no global state) onto the Lightning Network. Currently the vision for Taro and RGB is to bring well-established stablecoins like USDT and USDC onto Lightning. However, the ability to send bitcoin-backed stablecoins which are more censorship resistant, and drive demand to the underlying bitcoin collateral, instead of centralized fiat stablecoins across the Lightning Network is more consistent with the Bitcoin ethos and would be the next evolution of creating a more decentralized circular bitcoin economy.
The advent of bitcoin-backed stablecoins bridges these technologies together in a world which allows HODLing bitcoin forever, while getting the short- to medium-term benefit of a bitcoin backed dollar unit of account, with the superior payment rails of Lightning. Rather than working against the dollar and its ubiquitous acceptance as a unit of account, decentralized bitcoin-backed credit works with it to build a superior system with Bitcoin at its base.
Implications Of Bitcoin-Backed Credit
On the surface, bitcoin-backed credit using DeFi allows Bitcoiners to get dollar denominated loans without having to sell their bitcoin, in a KYC-free and non-custodial manner. However, that would be hugely understating its importance.
On a deeper level, bitcoin-backed credit will be the incentivized bridge to hyperbitcoinization. It will facilitate a transition from dollars to bitcoin-backed dollars, to eventually completely new bitcoin-backed credit instruments, as the dollar fades into irrelevance.
By breaking down the barriers and opacity to credit creation using DeFi, we will disempower centralized authorities’ monopoly on money creation. Simply being able to have and to transfer bitcoin, the asset, is not sufficient. We must also decentralize the financial services and money-creation layers. If we ignore these monetary layers, then we relegate Bitcoin to a life of gold 2.0 in truly all the worst ways — a world in which central authorities use the ever-present demand for credit to hijack our monetary sovereignty through custody.
The transition to Bitcoin DeFi will shift the paradigm from top-down centralized money creation to distributed bottom-up. Specifically, individuals will have the option to become their own credit creators. The banks and central authorities will no longer be able to unilaterally dictate how credit is created and where it is allocated. This will create a distributed model of capital allocation with an infinite number of isolated experiments as opposed to a few centralized allocators, which more properly reflects the desires of the market.
The importance of decentralized bitcoin-backed stablecoin loans via DeFi cannot be understated. It is the bridge that will link disparate parts of the ecosystem (store of value, credit, smart contracts, and payments) together with Bitcoin as the singularity.
I do not believe Bitcoin will reach maximum success without this realization.
This is a guest post by David Seroy. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc. or Bitcoin Magazine.
Are you less happy at work since you befriended that new recruit? Have they told you stories about how colleagues have constantly undermined them? Or do you have a boss who excludes you from key meetings — and then asks why you did not attend a meeting even though you are pretty sure you were not invited to begin with? If so, you may be working with a gaslighter.
Gaslighters, as the name suggests, cast themselves in a positive light — friend or confidante who is here to help — but actually operate much more effectively in the shadows. Merriam-Webster named “gaslighting” the word of the year. Searches for the word on merriam-webster.com surged 1,740% in 2022 over the prior year year, despite there not being an event that the publisher — known for its dictionaries — could point to as a cause of the spike.
It defines gaslighting as “psychological manipulation of a person usually over an extended period of time that causes the victim to question the validity of their own thoughts, perception of reality, or memories and typically leads to confusion, loss of confidence and self-esteem, uncertainty of one’s emotional or mental stability, and a dependency on the perpetrator.”
Perhaps the reasons were more personal — or professional — than political. My social media feed is now full of thought pieces on how to spot one of these saboteurs. The comments sections read like the show notes of a True Crime podcast — gruesome yet hard to turn away from.
The term was coined in a 1938 play, “Gas Light,” a psychological thriller set in Victorian London and written by Patrick Hamilton.
The term was further popularized after George Cukor’s 1944 film, “Gaslight,” based on the play, in which Gregory (Charles Boyer) tries to convince his wife Paula (Ingrid Bergman) that she has lost her reason. While he turns on the lights in the attic while searching for hidden jewels, the gaslight flickers in the rest of the house. He tells Paula that she is merely imagining the dimming of the lights.
The workplace is fertile ground for such behavior, given what’s at stake: money, power, status, promotion, rivalry and the intrigue that often comes with office politics.
I’m in the business of helping people work out their conflicts at work. None of this surprises me. In fact, I dedicated a whole chapter in my book, “Jerks at Work,” to gaslighters.
“‘For gaslighters, slow and steady wins the race, and the best ones make friends with their victims first.’”
What has surprised me is how wide-ranging the definition of “gaslighting” has become. Everything from “not respecting personal boundaries” to “talking so much shit about me I couldn’t get hired for two years” seems to fall under the umbrella.
What I’ve learned from my doom scrolling is that the word “gaslighter” — probably the worst name to bestow on a colleague or boss — seems to refer to anyone who’s done a whole bunch of bad things to us at work, especially things that involve humiliation.
So what really is a gaslighter, and why is it important to distinguish one from, say, a demeaning boss with a chip on their shoulder and a penchant for public shaming?
If we stick to the clinical definition, gaslighters have two signature moves: They lie with the intent of creating a false reality, and they cut off their victims socially.
They position themselves as both savior and underminer, creating a negative and fearful atmosphere, spreading gossip and taking credit for other people’s work. They are often jealous and resentful, and aim to undercut others in order to further their own position.
You may also be an unwitting pawn in the gaslighting of another colleague. The gaslighter might try to convince you that Johnny is trying to steal your leadership role on a project, and encourage you to freeze him out in the cafeteria at lunch time, or simply be extra wary about sharing important information.
For gaslighters, slow and steady wins the race, and the best ones make friends with their victims first. For this reason, it could also be considered a form of workplace harassment.
They often flatter them, make them feel special. Others create a fear of speaking up in their victims by making their position at work seem more precarious than it is. And the lies are complex, coming at you in layers. It takes a long time to realize your status as a victim of gaslighting, and social isolation is a necessary part of this process.
“‘It takes a long time to realize your status as a victim of gaslighting, and social isolation is a necessary part of this process.’”
But there’s a difference between an annoying coworker or micromanaging boss, and a gaslighter, who lies and conspires to undermine your position. “The gaslighter doesn’t want you to improve or succeed — they’re out to sabotage you,” according to the careers website Monster.com. “They will accuse you of being confused or mistaken, or that you took something they said the wrong way because you are insecure. They might even manipulate paper trails to “prove” they are right.”
Examples cited by Monster.com: “You know you turned in a project, but the gaslighter insists you never gave it to them. You can tell someone has been in your space, moving things around, or even on your computer, but you don’t have proof. You are the only one not included in a team email or meeting invite, or intentionally kept out of the loop. Then when you don’t respond or show up, you are reprimanded.”
Knowing this, what can you do to prevent yourself from becoming a target? First, recognize that gaslighters don’t wear their strategy on their sleeve. Flattery, making you feel like you’re a part of a special club, or questioning your expertise are not things that raise gaslighting alarm bells.
Rather than looking out for mean behavior by a boss or coworker, look out for signs of social isolation. A boss who wants to cut you off from coworkers and other leaders should raise red flags, even if the reason is that “you’re better than them.”
Second, recognize that lie detection is a precarious — and from a scientific perspective, almost impossible — business. Don’t try to become a lie detector, instead take notes, so you can put your “gaslighter” on notice that you are wise to their tactics. You can also use the notes as evidence if you decide to later raise the situation with Human Resources.
Here are some ways to beat the gaslighter: Send emails with “a summary of today’s meeting” so you can document the origin of ideas and make sure they don’t steal credit from you. Furthermore, document things that happened in person, and share it with your would-be gaslighter. And speak up at meetings. Don’t allow yourself to be browbeaten into submission.
The more you document, the more difficult it will be to be victimized. But a word of warning: Don’t try to confront gaslighters — instead, go to your social network to build your reality back up. Trying to beat these folks at their own game is a losing strategy. But these small things, done early in a working relationship, can work wonders.
We want to hear from readers who have stories to share about the effects of increasing costs and a changing economy. If you’d like to share your experience, write to readerstories@marketwatch.com. Please include your name and the best way to reach you. A reporter may be in touch.
This is an opinion editorial by Zack Voell, a bitcoin mining and markets researcher.
Bitcoin miners often suffer the brunt of bear market woes thanks to some of the industry’s highest capital expenditures, smallest margins and most unreliable infrastructure. Although the current bearish phase has been one of Bitcoin’s shallowest drawdowns, miners have suffered more than ever.
Layoffs, bankruptcies, lawsuits and other negative press have battered one of Bitcoin’s most prominent sectors. But every bear market eventually finds a bottom — the pain climaxes and things slowly begin to recover. A variety of data suggest mining has reached this point of its market cycle, which could offer a bit of optimism going into the new year.
This article is not intended to offer financial or investment advice of any kind. On the contrary, its intended purpose is data-driven analysis of the current state of the bitcoin mining sector in context of some exogenous and endogenous influences that could shape its near-term future.
Understanding Capitulation
Before diving into the data, it might help to understand what “capitulation” is. The term is commonly used in financial markets to reference an acute and often dramatic crescendo of fear or widespread surrender by investors or businesses during the throes of depressed market conditions. Basically, everyone says, “It’s over. We can’t take this anymore.” For mining, capitulation basically means the economics became so bad and operating margins are so thin that miners chose to quit or simply cannot operate anymore and are squeezed out of the market.
Wall Street Analysts Turn Bearish
One of the hallmark signs of miner capitulation (in this author’s opinion) at the current stage of the ongoing bear market is the full pivot from financial analysts who report on publicly-traded mining companies. For the past 12 months, these analysts have preached about the upside potential of bitcoin mining stocks. But now they are “pulling the plug.” This language was used by Chris Brendler of DA Davidson to describe his outlook on the mining sector. Since July, Brendler has said that the current market conditions were a good time to buy mining stocks, as reported by CoinDesk.
In December 2021, JPMorgan’s analyst Reginald Smith also wrote a memo that said one particular mining company — Iris Energy — has “more than 100% upside.” He also suggested the current stock price was at a “deep discount.” Shares of the company were trading around $14 at the time of the memo. No they’re trading below $2… an even deeper discount!
If Wall Street giving up on mining isn’t capitulation, then what is?
Bitcoin Hash Rate Starts Dropping
For the entirety of the bear market to date, the Bitcoin hash rate has steadily grown larger, forcing difficulty increase after increase on struggling miners. But that trend might be changing. In early December, the next adjustment is set to drop by almost 11% at the time of writing. This drop will be caused by hash rate falling, which is notably off its recent all-time highs and currently sitting near 240 exahashes per second (EH/s).
Normally a dip in hash rate and difficulty would not be too significant. But seven of the past nine difficulty adjustments have been positive. And in context of the incessant hash rate growth and subsequent hash price collapse, the apparent trend reversal for hash rate is notable. Some miners appear to be throwing in the metaphorical towel and taking their machines offline. Discussing the hash rate and difficulty on Twitter in context of whether miners were capitulating, Foundry Senior Vice President Kevin Zhang simply replied, “Yes.”
Bitcoin Miners Are Re-Accumulating
Generating fear, uncertainty and doubt (FUD) around on-chain movements of bitcoin from miner addresses is a popular pastime for Twitter influencers. And observing miner balances can be helpful. Current data shows notably larger balances compared to just a month ago. In short, net selling activity by miners appears to have subsided and their stockpiles of bitcoin are on the rise again.
Bitcoin mining address balances have seen small reductions over the past year. But the line chart below shows data that indicate a trend reversal is beginning. One-hop miner balances have increased by over 3%, or roughly 85,000 BTC since early October. Perhaps miners decided it’s time to HODL again.
Bitcoin miners may have decided it’s time to HODL again.
Miner Outflows Spiked And Fell
One other piece of on-chain data that fuels mining FUD is outflows — the activity of miner addresses moving coins from those addresses to some other location. In mid-November, these outflows spiked to their highest level since June, which could indicate that fear and panic in the market has affected at least a few miners. Not surprisingly, the spike in outflows occurred at the same time as the collapse of FTX and its subsequent fallout were making headlines.
It should be noted that any inferences from on-chain data like outflows are informed guesstimates at best. Bitcoin network data is a useful tool for contextualizing certain market events, but it is far from infallible or un-manipulatable. But miners are notoriously bad at timing markets, and the timing of this sudden spike in coin movements could reasonably suggest some panicking miners. In the following week, however, outflows fell back to normal levels and have remained there as of the time of this writing.
Did miners panic near the market bottom? Very possibly.
Bitcoin Mining In 2023
Assuming the above analysis is correct and capitulation has occurred, the market will not immediately recover. As the dust settles and survivors emerge, the process of building and scaling more mining infrastructure will be as slow, expensive and tedious as ever. Winners are built in the bear market, and after some of the largest mining companies have sold bitcoin balances down to nearly zero and even sold significant amounts of mining hardware in desperate attempts to stay operational, all that’s left is survival or bankruptcy.
Of course, things could always get worse overnight. But this article suggests the weak and panicked have been squeezed out, and the time for recovery is here. Now is the time to be optimistic, not bearish.
This is a guest post by Zack Voell. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
This is an opinion editorial by Pierre Gildenhuys, the co-founder of a Hong Kong-based social environment tech startup.
Proof-of-work is the consensus mechanism that the Bitcoin protocol uses. On a fundamental level, this means that work has to be done to prove the transactions that have transpired on the network are valid.
Proof-of-work functions with specialized “computers” known as application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), which input transaction data, information from the previous block hearer and a nonce (random number) to guess the result of hash functions. Hash functions are one-directional mathematical equations, so it is impossible to figure out a resulting output from a publicly visible input other than through rapid guessing as these ASICs do. “Miners” are the people who operate these machines, and they want to increase the number of hashes (or guesses) per second that their devices can produce, and they want to find the cheapest and most reliable source of energy so that this mining becomes profitable for them to pay off the cost of their machines and to make an income to cover their other expenses. Despite this, it is an incredibly competitive industry as a result of Bitcoin’s difficulty adjustment: depending on how many hashes per second are mining on the network, the complexity and difficulty of the hash function will increase or decrease accordingly so that it takes an average of 10 minutes for each new block to be found across the global network.
Blocks are a collection of the transactional data that has to be transmitted and are added to a chain of all of the previous blocks on the network and will only be transmitted and added to this “blockchain” when the answer to the hash function is found. Miners are rewarded for doing this by receiving transaction fees that are paid by users as well as earning a block subsidy which began as 50 bitcoin, but halves every 210,000 blocks — approximately every four years. (The current block subsidy is 6.25 bitcoin per block.) The Bitcoin protocol has a maximum issuance of 21 million bitcoin, meaning the block subsidy will run out around the year 2140, and all mining rewards will be paid by transaction fees.
The fundamental importance of proof-of-work:
There is a real-world cost to producing bitcoin.
There is a real-world cost to defending the integrity and accuracy of Bitcoin.
Bitcoin has “unforgeable costliness,” meaning that it would only be possible to make fake bitcoin or fraudulent bitcoin transactions through redoing all of the costly proof-of-work that came before it, at a rate that outpaces all of the ongoing proof-of-work on the network.
It has already become too costly and unfeasible to gain the 51% needed for any individuals, nation-states or organizations to take control of the network for their benefit and maliciously change the transaction history.
This is contrasted by proof-of-stake which serves as the consensus mechanism for many altcoins, digital penny stocks and the other Ponzi schemes being marketed as alternatives to bitcoin.
Proof-of-stake works through “staking” or more simply put, locking the tokens of that protocol so that they cannot be spent. The number of tokens staked represents your chance of validating a block of transactions. The more tokens staked, the higher the chances of validating a transaction and thus the more frequently you would be rewarded.
Bearing this in mind, most altcoins were issued to insiders and the development teams before they became publicly available — so major quantities of those tokens were already owned before outsiders could even start acquiring or staking them.
According to a study by Sam Callahan, Ethereum had an officially admitted premine of around 20% — which is among the lowest of all altcoins — meaning that those insiders only had to acquire an additional 31% since public launch in order to change the protocol in whichever way that benefited them. While Bitcoin has a provable 0% premine, the number of bitcoin owned by any individual or group cannot change the protocol in any way, again unlike altcoins. The only way to change the Bitcoin protocol is through true consensus of 51% of work done for the network, which has historically proved incredibly difficult to achieve and thus leaves the virtues of Bitcoin untouched, unless changes prove beneficial for everyone in the network. Research into the “Blocksize War” is a good way to understand this.
The implications of proof-of-stake:
Proof-of-stake has no real-world cost of production.
A majority 51% stake is easily acquired by wealthy individuals, nations and organizations so they can change the rules of the protocol to benefit themselves.
The defense of proof-of-stake tokens relies purely on the trust in everyone with enough capital or enough tokens to not change the protocol.
Proof-of-work is a good use of energy as it secures a global monetary network in a way where no one can change the rules or produce more tokens to inflate the supply, meaning that it becomes a financially suitable money to hold for a long period of time. Proof-of-stake is not an adequate replacement to proof-of-work because it doesn’t solve the issue of intervention from malicious parties anywhere in the world at any time.
Blockchain is not a new development, and financial payment rails can be developed which are much faster than any platform that uses a blockchain. Blockchains distribute total information about transactions to thousands of computers globally, thus making it slower than simply distributing balances from a centralized system. The only reason Bitcoin makes use of a blockchain is because it needs to be truly decentralized. And with the help of proof-of-work, it is provably decentralized, however, since the decentralization of proof-of-stake chains cannot be ensured, using proof-of-stake altcoins essentially places your trust in a centralized platform which could have malicious intents and thus making it irrelevant to use a proof-of-stake system, when more efficient centralized systems such as PayPal, Cash App or other digital payments platforms exist.
If you are comfortable with the risk that your funds can be stopped, censored or confiscated from you at any time for any reason — or more pertinently, that the platform can be revealed to be fraudulent or insolvent — then make use of centralized systems such as the legacy financial system or digital payments applications. However, using proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies, which are most often centralized Ponzi schemes that enrich its founders, is wasteful as they are pointless and simply take up storage space that could be used for more important data storage for the future.
I will stick to Bitcoin which is secure, immutable, unseizable and decentralized with no single point of failure. Bitcoin is money with a finite issuance, so the value of a bitcoin cannot be stolen through the unnecessary inflation of the supply — as has happened to every fiat currency and to most altcoins.
This is a guest post by Pierre Gildenhuys. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
This is an opinion editorial by Bernardo Filipe, a life-long thinker, philosopher and author of “The Straight Science.”
“Earnings-free assets with no residual value are problematic.
The implication is that, owing to the absence of any explicit yield benefitting the holder of bitcoin, if we expect that at any point in the future the value will be zero when miners are extinct, the technology becomes obsolete, or future generations get into other such ‘assets’ and bitcoin loses its appeal for them, then the value must be zero now.” — Nassim Taleb
If bitcoin’s general adoption succeeds, it will be automating most of our financial structure with the aid of power plants, energy and computers. At the very least, it will create a system that is parallel to the current banking one and that would therefore be protected from the latter’s crashes (see 2007-2008 financial crisis). Of course it is taking years for this new system to fully mature. Taleb says this mission is worth exactly zero because he lacks the vision.
Is it a good time to invest in bitcoin? I believe it is. Besides proper philosophers, who are thinking in terms of centuries, not many can build such a belief, with the exception of the best wealth managers, who think in terms of decades.
So philosophers, who historically never cared about wealth, and wealth managers, who naturally enough only care about wealth, are uniting here in an interesting turn of events. Philosophers see that the inevitable fate of mankind is to evolve into a cybernetic organism, and they see that any technology that facilitates this process is bound to come to dominate. Wealth managers, on the other hand, realize that an alternative financial system that is thermodynamically closed can be useful to their activities.
That’s all there is to say about it. But I can say more.
Because there are indeed other opinions in the marketplace, which are however mostly inconsequential. There’s, for example, the confused Nassim Taleb, who writes 300-page books about trivial ideas that can be summarized in a single paragraph. He talks about “black swans” as if we didn’t already know that a scientific model is merely a rough sketch and not the freaking gospel. He literally wrote 300 pages about this — that you can’t accurately predict any event with 100% certainty and that accidents and disasters happen. Only instead of calling these events accidents or disasters, which is what they are, he called them “black swans.” In an utterly exasperating prose riddled with italics, moreover, literally italicizing at least a word in every single paragraph, if not sentence. And also gratuitously quoting and name-dropping intellectuals for absolutely no reason. So why did people pay attention to him again? Because he made a fortune trading options. Nassim Taleb believes bitcoin is worth exactly zero and that bitcoin’s price drop in March 2020 “proves” that it can’t be used to hedge against risk (as if all risks were equal, and as if diversification wasn’t the best general hedge against risk to begin with), showing once and for all that he not understand his own book. You cannot “prove” anything from a single data point, my dear Taleb. The March 2020 lockdown was a freak event — an exception — a “black swan,” to adopt your terminology. If you had paid attention, you’d have also seen that the entire market also collapsed, and you’d have maybe realized that you cannot extrapolate anything worthwhile about bitcoin at this stage from this freak event. But Taleb says that bitcoin collapsed more than the stock market did — therefore, he thinks, “bitcoin is worthless”. We’re moving now, then, from childish terminology to childish logic.
But what exactly is his mistake here? The problem is that he has failed to realize that bitcoin is still in development, it is still growing and evolving. The mistake he’s making is equivalent to watching a healthy cat kill a newborn lion, and then concluding from that freak observation that cats are stronger than lions. He seems to think that bitcoin’s future behavior will mirror its current behavior, but how could that be the case when we are this early? So early in fact that no regulation exists for it and most people are still trying to define what exactly bitcoin is. Meaning, practically nobody has a clue about what bitcoin is. Taleb, then, is not considering in his analysis the idea that bitcoin’s maximum utility hinges on a future widespread adoption. He’s analyzing bitcoin at this point in time, myopically, with a total disregard for the effect of future favorable conditions in his analysis, as if bitcoin today was already a finished product and process. But it isn’t — because bitcoin is designed to bind itself cyber-symbiotically to mankind, and right now the portion of mankind to which it has bound itself is not significant enough, in terms of raw wealth and investment power.
To Nassim Taleb, bitcoin seems to function like a Ponzi scheme, but I say it will resemble a Ponzi only if it fails to develop into maturity. Otherwise, it will be nothing like a Ponzi and very much like an extremely awesome asset with great utility. I could also say that most life on planet Earth is a “Ponzi,” because a few billion years down the line the Sun will expand and destroy the entire planet, destroying with it, for example, all the real estate contained in it. At that time, the real estate bag-holders might perhaps say that real estate investment was always a Ponzi to begin with, especially after they see every bitcoin holder safely move their bitcoin out of the planet. In this scenario, what exactly is the Ponzi? So we see that Taleb’s quote above is meaningless: in a sufficiently advanced future, everything is fated to go to zero, but of course that doesn’t mean there’s no value to anything.
Right now we are, then, entering bitcoin’s “development into maturity” phase (having already gone through ten years of its infancy) which is the final and protracted phase that will reduce price volatility and effectively bring to the table its store of value capabilities. Can this phase fail to be completed? Sure. In nature, lifeforms occasionally fail to develop into maturity. That doesn’t stop me or any other person from trying to imagine what a particular lifeform can look and behave like if favorable conditions emerge that guarantee its prosperous development. This is, of course, a basic idea from biology. In the technological realm, however, the same principles from biological and evolutionary thought can be applied because tools are created, they grow, they mutate, they clash with each other, and eventually evolve or become obsolete in a manner that resembles that of lifeforms in nature; only in the technological realm it is mankind which dictates the fate of the tool, while in the biological realm, it is nature. The point is that this “development into maturity” phase that I’m referring to is of course in the case of bitcoin the “widespread adoption of bitcoin” phase: the phase in which all worthwhile wealth managers agree that bitcoin’s rules are great and decide to play by them—allocating a small portion of their capital to it, initially—and gradually but steadily adding some more whenever they see fit. For it will be this phase that will put the cybernetic symbiosis between bitcoin and mankind in full swing.
As of right now, bitcoin is useful for wealth transfers and that’s about it. However, bitcoin can potentially, i.e., in theory, under favorable conditions, be much more useful than it currently is. For we are envisioning, after all, a radical optimization of the entire financial structure with the aid of automation. It’s on this coming, higher utility that we are betting, dear Taleb — and this is why we couldn’t care less now about volatility or fragility or your “convex curve responses to stressors.” I know you wrote an entire book about randomness, and even tried to create a theory on how to utilize randomness to our benefit. But at the end of the day this entire theoretical endeavor is pointless because the purpose of theory is to predict the future, while randomness is defined precisely as that which cannot be predicted. Sure, yes, of course we want to minimize the harmful effects of randomness (=chance,=accidents, =disasters). It’s called risk management. But until the non-predictable accident (see the pleonasm?) actually happens nobody knows how fragile our process-activity-asset stands relative to said accident—otherwise the event wouldn’t be by definition an accident and we’d have been able to factor it in our theories and models! But not only do you fail to see this triviality, you even give lectures about it, as if randomness could be in anyway intelligible, as if we hadn’t already defined it as unintelligible! And as if the book’s message was something profound instead of obvious, as obvious as saying the sky is blue or that birds fly.
If you think I am being too tough on Taleb, dear reader, I’ll just say that he was asking to get such a reply when he started gratuitously quoting philosophers for no reason, hundreds of pages in a row. He invoked the spirit of philosophy—so here it is now biting him back—a proper case of a wizard’s spell turning against the caster. Hope you like it, Taleb!
So that’s that. Philosophers, wealth managers and a few visionaries agree that bitcoin is awesome. Then, there’s the rest of humanity who simply doesn’t care about this stuff. Finally, there are thinkers like Nassim Taleb who aren’t thinking straight. In short: the potential gains far over-shadow the, in my view, laughably low risk of bitcoin going to zero.
This is a guest post by Bernardo Filipe. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Dec 02 (IPS) – As 2022 draws to a close, we are confronted with an unprecedented collision of global risks, interacting and reinforcing each other in dangerous new ways.
The impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are still rippling outwards, colliding and combining like waves on a sea. The heightened threat of nuclear conflict, the global energy crisis, the rising cost of food, deepening poverty and inequality: these consequences are interacting with the ongoing impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects of climate change.
This confluence of global risks has led to unwelcome new terms entering the dictionary, such as ‘polycrisis’ and ‘multicrisis.’
In the face of such complex challenges, it’s easy to feel helpless and paralyzed. And yet, if this year has shown us anything, it’s that we need an urgent upgrade of our systems of cooperation to tackle them.
It starts with making sure we have the right knowledge. Climate scientist Johan Rockström, a board member of our foundation, has written powerfully on the need for an international consortium of scientists to provide shared insights on the emerging interactions between risks.
At the Global Challenges Foundation, we’ve just released our annual review of global catastrophic risks, risks that threaten the survival of more than ten per cent of humanity. This year’s report shows how, more than ever, our systems and structures for preventing and managing these risks are both outdated and inadequate.
Whether it’s climate change, environmental breakdown, nuclear conflict, pandemics or artificial intelligence, we have a systemic problem with processing and acting on the complex challenges that lie in the intersections.
Of course, there is no one magic solution, given the multilateral system that we inhabit. However, there are many existing proposals to improve the mechanics of global governance that could be immediately fast tracked.
For example, there are several important proposals in the United Nations Secretary-General’s 2021 report, Our Common Agenda. These include the idea for an Emergency Platform that would be triggered by a major crisis such as the use of a nuclear weapon and coordinate the global response.
The report also proposes reviving the UN’s Trusteeship Council, inactive for many years, as a multi-stakeholder body to tackle emerging challenges and to act to preserve the global commons on behalf of future generations.
The failure of the COP27 climate talks in Egypt to agree strong measures to curb fossil fuel production has demonstrated how intergovernmental negotiations are not producing rapid enough action on climate change.
On top of this, the global energy crisis has led to some countries slowing or shelving their green agendas, in a year of extreme temperatures and climate-related crises.
We urgently need to find alternative ways of collaborating to prevent catastrophic climate change. One key proposal is a carbon tax – administered at both global and national levels – with the proceeds going to the communities who are most affected.
The International Monetary Fund concluded that, of all the various recognised strategies to reduce fossil fuel emissions, implementing a carbon tax would be the most powerful and efficient.
Of course, this may not be the easiest ‘sell’ politically during a cost-of-living crisis but evidence from countries like Canada shows that it can be done gradually and sensitively.
The spread of COVID-19 around the world since 2020 has highlighted the linkages between environmental destruction and pandemics. COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic that humanity faces.
As renowned epidemiologist and public health expert Professor David Heymann writes in his pandemics chapter in our report, as well as tackling the root causes of new pathogens coming into contact with humans, we need to upgrade the international frameworks that govern how countries report on new disease outbreaks.
This means enacting a stronger enforcement mechanism to the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations, and a Pandemic Treaty.
When it comes to nuclear risk, looming ever larger over Ukraine, it’s now more likely than ever that nuclear weapons will be used in either military actions, miscalculation or by accident than at any time since the beginning of the nuclear age.
The international community must treat all threats to use nuclear weapons very seriously. Even ‘small’ or ‘tactical’ weapons can cause terrible damage and their use would undermine the nuclear taboo in place since their use at the end of the Second World War.
Nuclear expert, and contributor to our report, Kennette Benedict says there is still much more we can do to prevent a nuclear disaster. IAEA Director General Raffael Grossi and his colleagues are doing heroic work to prevent nuclear plant disasters in Ukraine.
The international community must continue to support the agency and provide more funding for IAEA’s work. Explicit protection of nuclear plants in violent conflicts and war should be codified in international law.
Only with a clear understanding of each of the greatest risks facing humanity can we move forward to rethink how we could better manage them. And only with new kinds of global cooperation can we deal with today’s complex web of interlocking and reinforcing global risks to ensure a habitable, safe and peaceful future.
As we say goodbye to this year of global risks, this should be top of our ‘to do’ list for 2023.
This is an opinion editorial by Federico Rivi, an independent journalist and author of the Bitcoin Train newsletter.
We are raising interest rates “because we are fighting inflation. Inflation has come out of practically nothing.” So said European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, host of the Irish talk show Late Late Show on Friday, October 28, 2022. Words apparently contradicting a statement that came shortly afterwards in the same interview. Inflation, she said, is caused “by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. […] This energy crisis is causing massive inflation that we have to defeat.”
The Rate Hike
The day before the interview the European Central Bank had raised interest rates by a further 75 basis points, bringing the total growth applied in the last three meetings to 2%: the highest level since 2009. In all likelihood it will not end there, as the Governing Council plans to “raise rates further to ensure a timely return of inflation to its medium-term objective of 2 per cent.”
According to the latest data, the rise in prices in the euro area has actually reached levels never seen in the last 20 years: +9.9% in September compared to the same month last year. Countries like Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are seeing price increases of 22%, 22.5% and 24.1% respectively.
In the widespread consensus on the meaning of the term inflation, however, there is a major inconsistency. A distortion of the real concept that leads leaders, experts – and consequently the media – to attribute different causes to the word, depending on the convenience of the moment. When the cause, in reality, is always and only one.
Inflation And Price Increases Are Different
For many, inflation is now synonymous with rising prices. This is not just a widespread belief but a meaning that has also been adopted by economics textbooks and the official language. According to Cambridge Dictionary inflation is “a general, continuous increase in prices.”
But is this really the case? Bitcoin teaches one thing: Don’t trust, verify. And by verifying, a problem emerges: the reversal of cause and effect.
Inflation is treated as the effect of a certain event: an energy crisis, a chip shortage, a drought can all lead to higher prices for goods and services in certain sectors. But in reality inflation, in its original meaning, does not mean the rise in prices, it indicates its cause.
The clue comes directly from etymology: inflation comes from the Latin word inflatio, itself a derivative of inflare, i.e. toinflate. Think about inflating a balloon: the act of inflare (inflating) is when air is blown from the mouth into the balloon: the cause. The immediate consequence is the expansion of the volume of the balloon that is taking in air: the effect.
Pumping new air into the balloon is the action that leads to its expansion. The same reasoning applies to money: the very act of printing money is inflation and its consequence is an increase in prices. This reversal of cause and effect was already referred to in the late 1950s as semantic confusion by one of the most prominent economists of the Austrian school, Ludwig von Mises:
“There is nowadays a very reprehensible, even dangerous, semantic confusion that makes it extremely difficult for the non-expert to grasp the true state of affairs. Inflation, as this term was always used everywhere and especially in this country, means increasing the quantity of money and bank notes in circulation and the quantity of bank deposits subject to check. But people today use the term “inflation” to refer to the phenomenon that is an inevitable consequence of inflation, that is the tendency of all prices and wage rates to rise. The result of this deplorable confusion is that there is no term left to signify the cause of this rise in prices and wages.”
If, therefore, there can be many causes of price increases, there cannot be as many causes of inflation because it is itself an origin of price increases. It would be much more adequate and intellectually honest to say that the decrease in purchasing power can result from several factors including inflation, i.e. the printing of money.
Money Flooding
So how has the European Central Bank behaved in terms of monetary issuance in recent years? The most effective figure to understand this is the ECB balance sheet, which shows the countervalue of assets held: those assets for which the Eurotower does not pay but acquires by creating new currency. As of October 2022, the ECB held almost EUR 9 trillion. Before the pandemic, at the beginning of 2019, it had around 4,75 trillion. Frankfurt has almost doubled its money supply in three and a half years.
If we measure the amount of euros circulating in the form of banknotes and deposits – the figure defined as M1 – the number is slightly more reassuring, but not much: at the beginning of 2019 there were almost EUR 8.5 trillion in circulation, today there are 11.7 trillion. A growth of 37.6%.
Are we really sure, then, that this price growth – or as it is wrongly called by everyone, inflation – comes from nowhere? Or that it is just a consequence of the war in Ukraine? Given the amount of money supply injected into the market in the last three years, we should count ourselves lucky that the average price growth of goods and services is still stuck at 10%, due to the restrictions of the pandemic and the subsequent economic crisis we are entering.
What does Bitcoin have to do with all this? Bitcoin has everything to do with it because it was born as an alternative to the economic catastrophes for which central banks continue to make themselves responsible. An alternative to the bubbles of unsustainable growth alternating with ruinous crises caused by the market manipulation of the interventionist utopia. Bitcoin cannot tell the world that “inflation came from nowhere,” because its code is public and everyone can check its monetary policy. A policy that does not change and cannot be manipulated. It is fixed and will remain so. 2.1 quadrillion satoshis. Not one more.
This is a guest post by Federico Rivi. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
PORTLAND, USA, Dec 01 (IPS) – Illegal immigration has evolved into a mounting crisis for a growing number of countries worldwide and governments appear to be at a loss on how to deal with the crisis.
Migrant destination countries are facing record high numbers of unlawful border crossings and unauthorized arrivals at their shores, thousands of visa overstayers, and millions of men, women and children residing unlawfully within their countries.
In many of those countries illegal migration is viewed as a threat to national sovereignty. It is seen as undermining cultural integrity. Illegal migration is also creating financial drains on public funds.
In addition, illegal immigration is also undermining the rule of law, threatening regional cooperation, challenging law enforcement agencies, eroding public support for legal migration, altering political equilibrium and adding to nativism and xenophobia. In addition, the public’s concerns about immigration are reflected in the growing influence of far-right political parties in such countries as Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Sweden and the United States.
Multinational migrant-smuggling networks are also contributing to the mounting illegal immigration crisis as well as generating substantial profits for criminal organizations. Those networks exploit migrants seeking to leave their countries, offering various services, including transportation, accommodations and critical information.
Government programs and plans to counter migrant smuggling networks have achieved limited success. Also, international attempts to address illegal immigration, such as the Global Compact on International Migration of 2018, have not diminished illegal immigration nor the activities of smuggling networks.
A major factor behind the rise of illegal immigration is the large and growing supply of men, women and children in sending countries who want to migrate to another country and by any means possible, including illegal immigration. The number of people in the world wanting to migrate to another country is estimated at nearly 1.2 billion.
The billion plus people wanting to migrate represents about 15 percent of the world’s population. That number of people wanting to migrate is also more than four times the size of the estimated total number immigrants worldwide in 2020, which was 281 million (Figure 1).
Source: United Nations and Gallup Polls.
The country with the largest number of immigrants is the United States with almost 48 million foreign-born residents in 2022, or approximately 14 percent of its population. About one quarter of those immigrants, or approximately 11.4 million, are estimated to be illegal immigrants.
While an estimate of the total number of immigrants in the world is readily available, the number of illegal immigrants is a very different matter with few reliable estimates available on a global scale.
Nearly two decades ago it was estimated that perhaps 20 percent of the immigrants were unauthorized migrants. Applying that proportion to the current total number of immigrants of 281 million yields an estimate of about 56 million unauthorized migrants. If the U.S. proportion of illegal immigrants is applied to the total global immigrant population, the resulting estimated number of illegal immigrants in the world is approximately 70 million.
The widely recognized human rights regarding international migration are relatively straightforward. Articles 13 and 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights respectively state, “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”, and “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”.
Importantly, however, everyone does not have the right to enter nor remain in another country. The unlawful entry into a country and overstaying a temporary visit are clearly not recognized human rights. Moreover, to be granted asylum, an individual needs to meet the internationally recognized definition of a refugee.
According to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, a refugee is a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country due to past persecution or a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the future “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
Difficult living conditions, such as unemployment, poverty, inadequate housing, lack of health care, marital discord and political unrest, do not qualify an individual for the internationally recognized refugee status nor to a legitimate claim for asylum.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a right to migrate to another country, people wanting to do so are increasingly turning to illegal immigration. And upon arriving at the destination country, many are claiming the right to seek asylum.
Once inside the country, the legal determination of an asylum claim often takes years, permitting claimants time to establish households, find employment and integrate into accepting communities, such as sanctuary cities. Also, many of the unauthorized migrants believe, based on the experiences of millions before them, that government authorities will not repatriate them even if their asylum claim is rejected, which is typically the case.
The mounting illegal immigration crisis is complicated by 103 million people who are estimated to have been forcibly displaced worldwide by mid-2022. That number is a record high for forcibly displaced people and is expected to grow in the coming years.
Approximately 50 percent of those forcibly displaced were displaced internally and 5 percent were people in need of international protection. In addition, the number of refugees has reached a record high of nearly 33 million worldwide and the estimate for asylum seekers is close to 5 million (Figure 2).
Source: UNHCR.
The worldwide numbers of forcibly displaced people, internally displaced people and refugees have increased substantially since the start of the 21st century. For example, over the past two decades the numbers of displaced people increased from 38 million to nearly 86 million (Figure 3).
Source: UNHCR.
Many of those people have been displaced by weather-related events. UNHCR estimates that an annual average of nearly 22 million people have been forcibly displaced by events related to weather, such as wildfires, floods, and extreme heat temperatures.
Moreover, the numbers of displaced people are expected to increase substantially over the coming decades. Some estimate that by midcentury more than one billion people, largely from less developed countries, could be displaced due to climate and environmental changes and civil unrest.
By third decade of the 21st century, the following major trends contributing to the mounting global illegal migration crisis have become abundantly clear:
Powerful forces worldwide are fueling illegal immigration, including demographics, poverty, smuggling networks, civil unrest and increasingly climate change, which is creating “climate refugees”.
Those potent forces are resulting in large and increasing numbers of men, women and even unaccompanied children arriving at borders and landing on shores of destination countries without authorization.
Unauthorized migrants, as well as visa overstayers, seek to settle in those destination countries by any means available and are not prepared to return to their countries of origin.
Most of the large and growing numbers of unauthorized migrants now residing unlawfully within countries are not likely to be repatriated.
Finally, it is also clear that neither governments nor international agencies have yet been able to come up with effective policies and programs to address the mounting global illegal immigration crisis.
Joseph Chamie is an independent consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division and author of numerous publications on population issues, including his recent book, “Births, Deaths, Migrations and Other Important Population Matters.”
HAMILTON, Canada, Dec 01 (IPS) – Last year’s climate COP 26 in Glasgow, Scotland, was billed as the most important conference in the history of humanity. But it failed to deliver. If anything, that failure added urgency for global climate action at COP 27 in Egypt last month.
Now that it this year’s COP is over, it is useful to reflect on a few excerpts from UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s opening day remarks:
• “These climate conferences remind us that the answer is in our hands and the clock is ticking.”
• “We are in the fight of our lives, and we are losing.”
• “Greenhouse gas emissions keep growing, global temperatures keep rising…and our planet is fast approaching tipping points that will make climate chaos irreversible.”
• “We are getting dangerously close to the point of no return. And to avoid that dire fate all countries must accelerate their transition now, in this decade.”
• “Humanity has a choice: cooperate or perish.”
• “It is either a climate solidarity pact, or it is a collective suicide pact.”
Credit: UN Photo/Albert González Farran
Sadly, COP27’s outcomes make very clear that the world signed on to the one the global fossil fuel sector wanted: the suicide pact.
COP 27 did not deliver. In fact, it has been labelled by many as the worst COP ever.
What happened in Egypt puts a whole new spin on the term COP-out. But how could it have been otherwise?
COP 27 was held in a country aligned with surrounding petrostates ruled by a ruthless dictatorship and was sponsored by one of the world’s largest plastic polluters: Coca-Cola.
It did not seem to register with organizers that the company’s relentless bottled water production is widely held in the global water science and policy community as a triumph of marketing over common sense.
Did the organizers not see that Coca-Cola’s sponsorship of COP 27 was an open invitation to blatant global greenwashing?
The obvious should not be missed here: Capitalism is not out of control, capitalism is in control – and COP 27 offers clear proof of that truth.
As society’s reliance on petroleum grew and our energy demands expanded, the global fossil fuel cartel quietly evolved into a superpower unto itself. There were more than 600 fossil fuel lobbyists at COP 27. What, one might reasonably ask, could possibly go wrong? Lots, evidently.
The oil and gas lobby completely corrupted the COP process. The proceedings and outcomes of COP 27 make it clear that the fossil fuel sector now owns the COP agenda. The sole aim of their presence there was to prevent, not promote, progress on dealing with the global climate threat. And they succeeded.
None of the agreements negotiated in Egypt are binding. Like the national emissions reductions target put forward by UN Member States under the Paris Climate Accord, the commitments made at COP 27 are all merely aspirational.
There is no penalty for failing to achieve them. There have been 27 COPs since 1995 and still no formal binding agreement on cutting fossil fuel burning.
Except for a small blip during the pandemic, fossil fuel burning globally continues to rise, not fall.
As one participant pointed out, the aspirational scheme agreed upon in Sharm el Sheikh is a down payment on disaster. No one expects anyone to actually compensate developing countries that contribute little to the climate threat for the catastrophic impacts climate breakdown is now having on them.
With COP 28 scheduled to be held next year in the United Arab Emirates – one of the most notorious petrostates of them all – the only thing COP 27 accomplished was to expose what the COP summit process has become – a pointless travelling circus set up once a year out of which little but platitudes emerge.
The entire COP process is no longer fit for purpose. It is a bloated, corrupted process too moribund to come up with any measures effective enough, and binding enough, to bring about the changes we need to make to avoid climate catastrophe.
Voices calling for change get louder and louder. The COP process must be replaced with something more efficient that does its work largely hidden from the glare of the media.
It can no longer be allowed to be contaminated by corporate sponsorship. The process can no longer be allowed to be owned and corrupted by the global fossil fuel cartel and oil and gas sector lobbyists.
One suggested way of doing this is to establish an IPCC-like structure of smaller bodies, each addressing key issues, notably energy transition, restorative agriculture, transportation and issues related to damage and loss.
Each such body would be made up of representatives of majority-world countries empowered to negotiate legally binding agreements that are workable and achievable, whether it be halting and reversing deforestation, cutting carbon dioxide and methane emissions, drawing down coal use and addressing other threats to our future such as ocean acidification and deoxygenation.
These agreements can then be signed off by world leaders without the need for the hype, grandstanding and false hope now associated with COP process pronouncements.
We are witnessing a great bonfire of our heritage. Things are being lost that have not yet been found. We need to find them before they, and we, are gone.
Robert Sandford holds the Global Water Futures Chair in Water and Climate Security at the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health, based at McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
The United Nations Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disability (UNCRPD) require the governments to remove all barriers to information access – including those faced by Deaf persons. Credit: UNCRPD
Opinion by Timothy Egwelu (kampala)
Inter Press Service
KAMPALA, Nov 30 (IPS) – Since the onset of the Covid19 pandemic, at least two deaf people were shot and killed in Uganda by state law enforcement officers. Their ‘crime’ was being deaf and uneducated. Their inability to hear or comprehend Covid19 containment measures communicated in English led to their death.
This is despite the United Nations Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disability (UNCRPD) and its reporting mechanisms requiring the governments to remove all barriers to information access – including those faced by Deaf persons. Deaf people are a linguistic minority – with sign language being their primary language of communication. In Uganda, 1 in 30 people are deaf.
Kenya and Uganda have both taken initial steps to legally recognize sign language in the Constitution and have begun to include sign language in official communications. Kenya, for example, has expanded healthcare services by providing interpreters in hospitals. But the fact that deaf people and their issues are still regarded a minority and neglected is all the proof we need to show that we have a long way to go.
Countries in the East African community must redouble their efforts to implement their inclusion laws, and legally recognize their sign languages in all sectors. Additionally, they must take on the costs of sign language interpretation in public sectors. This will be a big step towards building the inclusive East African community that we all seek. Until then, we in the Deaf community, continue to suffer discrimination.
As a first step, we must ensure that sign language interpreters play an essential part in economic, social and political events, so that deaf persons can actively and meaningfully participate public life. Many people assume that all deaf persons understand advanced written grammar. This is not the case, as English (or any other language) and Sign Language grammar are distinct.
To aid deaf persons in deciphering spoken and written language, sign language interpreters are needed. Nonetheless, their services are expensive, costing an average of $40 daily for these services. Consider this alongside the fact that 41% of Ugandans live on less than $1.90 a day. These services are indeed out of reach for majority of the deaf and hard of hearing community in the country.
We’re seeing some progress. In Uganda, there have been sustained television campaigns on the need to expand access to information and services through sign language. It is envisaged that through this campaign, more Ugandans will be aware of their rights and that it will in turn move political decision makers to speed up the approval of the Draft Guidelines to Television Access by the Ministry of ICT and National Guidance. These will provide structures towards implementation.
The other EAC countries are yet to officially recognize their sign languages. This results in the perpetuation of human rights exclusions and abuses of deaf persons. These countries must therefore fulfill their obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which promotes the full integration of persons with disabilities in societies.
While it could be argued that there are indeed legal and policy frameworks in Uganda and the EAC countries that ensure access to information; this largely remains on paper and is not in practice, particularly for deaf persons. Consider that healthcare facilities, educational institutions and government offices have inaccessible formats of information and a lack of sign language interpreters. Additionally, television – both for information and entertainment purposes, is largely exclusive to the hearing world.
Additionally, consider the value and importance of Sign language interpretation of court proceedings to an accused Deaf person. Certainly, interpretation is the only means of ensuring proper understanding and participation in the trial, yet it is not always readily available. Access to justice has been denied to many deaf persons in many unreported cases. Deaf persons are therefore largely sidelined and suffer widespread injustices.
Countries in the EAC should therefore urgently shift towards implementation of their national and international laws on inclusion. They must legally recognize their sign languages and mainstream them into all sectors. Additionally, they must take on the costs of sign language interpretation in public sectors. This will be a big step towards building the inclusive East African community that we all seek. Until then, we in the Deaf community, continue to suffer discrimination.
Timothy is a Deaf lawyer and a disability inclusion specialist in Uganda. He is an Aspen New Voices 2022 Fellow and founder of Stein Law and Advocacy for the Deaf.
This is an opinion editorial by Roy Sheinfeld, the cofounder and CEO of Breez, a Lightning Network mobile app. A version of this article was originally published on Medium.
It’s almost tautologically true that specialization within a social system increases with sophistication. In fact, increasing specialization could be one way to define social sophistication.
Example One:
Our global society is pretty sophisticated. I know how to create products, ace a trivia contest about “The Wire” and find the best shawarma joints in Tel-Aviv, but I have no idea how to knit, design an efficient photovoltaic cell or where to go rock climbing around Maputo. We’re all experts at something, learning more and more about less and less.
Compare that with hunter-gatherer societies, where everyone can basically do everything. Everyone can weave a basket, catch a fish, light a fire, sing a song, recite the rules of the tribe, make a shelter, etc. Though their worlds are complex, their societies are simple, with very little internal differentiation or specialization.
Example Two:
In the early days of the web, companies like CompuServe and AOL were basically one-stop online shops. They were ISPs providing basic connectivity: email; social media (i.e., chat rooms); content in the form of news, weather and so on; and search, often in the form of an actual curated directory.
As the web has become so much more complex, we engage with multiple companies for each of those functions. Including all the writing, editing, commenting, revising and so on — even a simple post like this one will involve the services of a few ISPs, a few email providers, a few cloud storage platforms, a few cloud text editors, a few image repositories and who knows how many background services.
And now it’s happening to the Lightning Network. Like any social system, our network is constantly evolving, and it looks very different now compared to how it looked in the beginning. Activity related to Lightning is becoming more specialized, and that specialization is both a symptom of and catalyst for the growth of the network.
What the invention of the first net must have looked like. How far we’ve come… (Image: Hans Splinter).
And Then There Was Lightning, And It Was Good
Back in the early days of Lightning (we’re talking, like, 2018), there were basically only two kinds of company. First were the infrastructure companies that built the early implementations of the network. Lightning Labs got started early with lnd. Further north on the same coast, Blockstream was working on c-lightning, which it has since rebranded as Core Lightning. Half a world and a hop or two away, Eclair was emerging in France.
Then there were the “wallets,” which came in roughly three flavors. The early custodial wallets, like Wallet of Satoshi and BlueWallet, offered relatively-simple UXs, but they took custody of users’ funds. The early non-custodial wallets, like Eclair, Zap and SBW, presented the opposite tradeoff: full user custody with a sometimes rocky UX.
Fortunately, the second-generation wallets, like Phoenix and Breez followed close behind, and they started treating the user experience holistically, considering both users’ desire to self-custody their bitcoin and to move it without manually opening, funding and balancing channels.
This was Lightning’s proof-of-concept phase. We proponents of Lightning were claiming that it was peer-to-peer money — bitcoin for everyday purchases — and these were the basic technologies needed to transfer bitcoin from one peer to another over the network. If the wallets and protocol implementations had proved unfeasible, there would have been little point in continuing.
In effect, it was a community of dozens, maybe hundreds of people, everyone knew everyone else, and we were all working on the same, relatively fundamental problems. It was a simple social system, and there was little internal differentiation. We hunted. We gathered.
Domesticating The Nodes
Around 10,000 years ago, our hunter-gatherer ancestors got sick of chasing the animals and plants they needed to survive. And who could blame them? Talk about exhausting. So they switched tack and started domesticating plants and animals to have them closer to home. It must have been a great idea because it happened independently in several locations around the world. And this change had momentous consequences: the steepest growth in population ever, the advent of civilization (in the sense of a city-based society) and an explosion of technologies from the wheel and architecture to centralized political systems and writing.
The basic idea is that when people tame their environments, they have more time to work on complicated things like tax codes, fad diets and open protocols.
Lightning users’ environment consists of nodes because nodes mediate all the inter/transactions on the network. Domesticating them was the next step in Lightning’s evolution.
Once you start domesticating, it’s hard to stop — incidentally another case of vertical specialization. (Image: Cinty Ionescu).
Just as those early wallets were picking up steam, node-management tech for full nodes started to appear. Some, like ThunderHub and Ride The Lightning, among others, were effectively second-layer, node-management tech, helping users execute operations and adjust the configuration of their nodes. Others, like RaspiBlitz and Umbrel, were designed to help users install and configure nodes.
Such node-management tech is easy to overlook in the evolution of Lightning, but it’s important because it fosters decentralization, which is a value in itself and a vital means of maintaining the network’s robustness.
And the next phase of that evolution has already emerged. Voltage, for example, offers scalable, enterprise-grade cloud nodes. Instead of a handy tool to run a node, companies can now rent a fully operational node with the capacity and connectivity they need on demand.
Note that the benefits of node-management tech are largely unintended. Just like whoever invented the wheel did not have high-speed rails and Swiss watches in mind, those who started working on node-management tech probably just wanted more features for their own use. However, they’re facilitating new network features that are vital to Lightning’s robustness and growth (liquidity triangles, LSPs), not to mention how they flatten the learning curve for incoming users.
Just like hunter-gatherers achieved a quantitative and qualitative leap in the complexity of their societies when they tamed the things their societies depended on (plants and animals), the second phase in the evolution of Lightning was a process of domesticating the nodes upon which our network depends.
Going Vertical
Early in the agrarian revolution, and in many places in the world today, farmers actually refine their own products. That is, a shepherd family might make and sell yarn, leather, milk, cheese, meat, sausages and so on that they make themselves. Generally though, the best sausage maker and the best cheese maker specialized to better serve their respective markets. After a few generations, neither can shear a sheep, but together they can compose a charcuterie board that would have shocked their ancestors with its decadence and refinement.
The fruits (and meats! and cheeses!) of vertical differentiation and specialization. (Image: Shelby L. Bell).
After a few more generations, we have the current scenario where I cannot make cheese or sausage, but I can debug in seven different languages.
Just as civilization inevitably underwent (and is always undergoing) a process of vertical differentiation and specialization, which makes it more sophisticated, the current, expected and vital trend in Lightning is that companies are specializing in ever-smaller niches to provide ever-better user experiences. These niches are both functional and geographical.
After a little more sophistication, the second phase of building infrastructure began, and ever-more infrastructure companies arose in ever-more vertical niches. For example, some offer PoS with fiat on-ramps (e.g., Strike) and fiat off-ramps (e.g., CryptoConvert, IBEX, etc.). There are also self-hosted, bitcoin-only, PoS solutions operated locally (e.g., lnbits, BTCPay, LNPay, etc.).
To serve the variable amounts of liquidity that merchants and users might need (think Spirit Halloween in April versus in September), liquidity marketplaces have opened up. Bitrefill’s Thor began selling channels quite early on. Now, liquidity management and channel funding have become a cottage industry in their own right, counting such participants as lightning network+, Magma from Amboss and Lightning Pool. Synonym’s Blocktank is on track to become a multi-purpose Lightning service provider (LSP) with a broad palette of services. And bolt.observer is a service tailored to LSPs that helps them to monitor the state of their nodes.
Beyond the functional differentiation, there is also geographical specialization, which makes sense given regulatory differences and localization needs. Bitcoin Beach, though not exactly a company, famously helped to foster the adoption of bitcoin as legal tender in El Salvador by priming the local circular economy in El Zonte. Bitnob is helping Africans stack sats and accept remittances. Vietnam is leading the world in bitcoin adoption for the second year in a row, and one reason is that Neutronpay has been feeding the market with Lightning-based solutions. Also in South East Asia, Pouch.ph has been bringing Lightning to the Filipino masses.
So where is this trend of increasing specialization leading?
It’s no exaggeration to say that there are now more vertical markets, each containing several companies, in the Lightning ecosystem than there were Lightning companies only five years ago. As a social system — a technology and organizational structure through which we interact with each other — Lightning is becoming far more sophisticated.
The Future Of Functional Differentiation
Specialization is so widespread in social structures because it increases efficiency and productivity, which in turn fosters growth. Although the web of 1995 was structurally far simpler than the web of 2005 or 2015, it became easier to use with each passing decade. As a result, the pool of 16 million early adopters grew by an even billion in a decade, and now nearly 70% of the world’s population use it regularly.
It might sound counterintuitive, but greater specialization and sophistication feeds growth.
Proliferating verticals and functional differentiation are necessary because her problems are not my problems, but we both need Lightning. (Image: Arian Zwegers).
And it’s how Lightning will grow too. As more and more experts from more and more different fields of activity discover Lightning and integrate it into the solutions they’re providing anyway, more and more users will be onboarded — often without even knowing about it.
Take Synota for example. They connect Lightning payment apps to smart meters to help make energy payments instantaneous, final and based on real-time prices. Gas and electricity flow in one direction, sats flow in the other. It’s a great idea, whatever means of exchange it uses, and it just happens to make more sense with Lightning. If they can deliver efficiency gains to their users, then they’ll be onboarding people onto the network who may have never heard of Lightning and not care in the least about multipath payments or anchor channels.
For us on the Lightning side, the challenge is going to be making adoption easy without sacrificing the technological integrity of our solutions and to keep the barriers as low as possible for all incoming users, be they LSPs, merchants, consumers, Lightning wizards or complete n00bs. Of course, one way to meet this challenge is with more specialization — different offerings for different user groups. If we get this right, growth will come organically, naturally and inevitably.
This is a guest post by Roy Sheinfeld. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
This is an opinion editorial by Alex Gladstein, chief strategy officer of the Human Rights Foundation and author of “Check Your Financial Privilege.”
I. The Shrimp Fields
“Everything is gone.”
–Kolyani Mondal
Fifty-two years ago, Cyclone Bhola killed an estimated 1 million people in coastal Bangladesh. It is, to this day, the deadliest tropical cyclone in recorded history. Local and international authorities knew well the catastrophic risks of such storms: in the 1960s, regional officials had built a massive array of dikes to protect the coastline and open up more territory for farming. But in the 1980s after the assassination of independence leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, foreign influence pushed a new autocratic Bangladeshi regime to change course. Concern for human life was dismissed and the public’s protection against storms was weakened, all in order to boost exports to repay debt.
Instead of reinforcing the local mangrove forests which naturally protected the one-third of the population that lived near the coast, and instead of investing in growing food to feed the quickly growing nation, the government took out loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in order to expand shrimp farming. The aquaculture process — controlled by a network of wealthy elites linked to the regime — involved pushing farmers to take out loans to “upgrade” their operations by drilling holes in the dikes that protected their land from the ocean, filling their once-fertile fields with saltwater. Then, they would work back-breaking hours to hand-harvest young shrimp from the ocean, drag them back to their stagnant ponds, and sell the mature ones to the local shrimp lords.
With financing from the World Bank and IMF, countless farms and their surrounding wetlands and mangrove forests were engineered into shrimp ponds known as ghers. The area’s Ganges river delta is an incredibly fertile place, home to the Sundarbans, the world’s biggest stretch of mangrove forest. But as a result of commercial shrimp farming becoming the region’s main economic activity, 45% of the mangroves have been cut away, leaving millions of people exposed to the 10-meter waves that can crash against the coast during major cyclones. Arable land and river life has been slowly destroyed by excess salinity leaking in from the sea. Entire forests have vanished as shrimp farming has killed much of the area’s vegetation, “rendering this once bountiful land into a watery desert,” according to Coastal Development Partnership.
A farm in Khuna province, flooded to make shrimp fields
The shrimp lords, however, have made a fortune, and shrimp (known as “white gold”) has become the country’s second-largest export. As of 2014, more than 1.2 million Bangladeshis worked in the shrimp industry, with 4.8 million people indirectly dependent on it, roughly half of the coastal poor. The shrimp collectors, who have the toughest job, make up 50% of the labor force but only see 6% of the profit. Thirty percent of them are girls and boys engaged in child labor, who work as much as nine hours a day in the salt water, for less than $1 per day, with many giving up school and remaining illiterate to do so. Protests against the expansion of shrimp farming have happened, only to be put down violently. In one prominent case, a march was attacked with explosives from shrimp lords and their thugs, and a woman named Kuranamoyee Sardar was decapitated.
In a 2007 research paper, 102 Bangladeshi shrimp farms were surveyed, revealing that, out of a cost of production of $1,084 per hectare, the net income was $689. The nation’s export-driven profits came at the expense of the shrimp laborers, whose wages were deflated and whose environment was destroyed.
In a report by the Environmental Justice Foundation, a coastal farmer named Kolyani Mondal said that she “used to farm rice and keep livestock and poultry,” but after shrimp harvesting was imposed, “her cattle and goats developed diarrhea-type disease and together with her hens and ducks, all died.”
Now her fields are flooded with salt water, and what remains is barely productive: years ago her family could generate “18-19 mon of rice per hectare,” but now they can only generate one. She remembers shrimp farming in her area beginning in the 1980s, when villagers were promised more income as well as lots of food and crops, but now “everything is gone.” The shrimp farmers who use her land promised to pay her $140 per year, but she says the best she gets are “occasional installments of $8 here or there.” In the past, she says, “the family got most of the things they needed from the land, but now there are no alternatives but going to the market to buy food.”
In Bangladesh, billions of dollars of World Bank and IMF “structural adjustment” loans — named for the way they force borrowing nations to modify their economies to favor exports at the expense of consumption — grew national shrimp profits from $2.9 million in 1973 to $90 million in 1986 to $590 million in 2012. As in most cases with developing countries, the revenue was used to service foreign debt, develop military assets, and line the pockets of government officials. As for the shrimp serfs, they have been impoverished: less free, more dependent and less able to feed themselves than before. To make matters worse, studies show that “villages shielded from the storm surge by mangrove forests experience significantly fewer deaths” than villages which had their protections removed or damaged.
Under public pressure in 2013 the World Bank loaned Bangladesh $400 million to try and reverse the ecological damage. In other words, the World Bank will be paid a fee in the form of interest to try and fix the problem it created in the first place. Meanwhile, the World Bank has loaned billions to countries everywhere from Ecuador to Morocco to India to replace traditional farming with shrimp production.
The World Bank claims that Bangladesh is “a remarkable story of poverty reduction and development.” On paper, victory is declared: countries like Bangladesh tend to show economic growth over time as their exports rise to meet their imports. But exports earnings flow mostly to the ruling elite and international creditors. After 10 structural adjustments, Bangladesh’s debt pile has grown exponentially from $145 million in 1972 to an all-time high of $95.9 billion in 2022. The country is currently facing yet another balance of payments crisis, and just this month agreed to take its 11th loan from the IMF, this time a $4.5 billion bailout, in exchange for more adjustment. The Bank and the Fund claim to want to help poor countries, but the clear outcome after more than 50 years of their policies is that nations like Bangladesh are more dependent and indebted than ever before.
During the 1990s in the wake of the Third World Debt Crisis, there was a swell of global public scrutiny on the Bank and Fund: critical studies, street protests, and a widespread, bipartisan belief (even in the halls of the U.S. Congress) that these institutions ranged from wasteful to destructive. But this sentiment and focus has largely faded. Today, the Bank and the Fund manage to keep a low profile in the press. When they do come up, they tend to be written off as increasingly irrelevant, accepted as problematic yet necessary, or even welcomed as helpful.
The reality is that these organizations have impoverished and endangered millions of people; enriched dictators and kleptocrats; and cast human rights aside to generate a multi-trillion-dollar flow of food, natural resources and cheap labor from poor countries to rich ones. Their behavior in countries like Bangladesh is no mistake or exception: it is their preferred way of doing business.
II. Inside The World Bank And IMF
“Let us remember that the main purpose of aid is not to help other nations but to help ourselves.”
The IMF is the world’s international lender of last resort, and the World Bank is the world’s largest development bank. Their work is carried out on behalf of their major creditors, which historically have been the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan.
The sister organizations — physically joined together at their headquarters in Washington, DC — were created at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944 as two pillars of the new U.S.-led global monetary order. Per tradition, the World Bank is headed by an American, and the IMF by a European.
Their initial purpose was to help rebuild war-torn Europe and Japan, with the Bank to focus on specific loans for development projects, and the Fund to address balance-of-payment issues via “bailouts” to keep trade flowing even if countries couldn’t afford more imports.
Nations are required to join the IMF in order to get access to the “perks” of the World Bank. Today, there are 190 member states: each one deposited a mix of their own currency plus “harder currency” (typically dollars, European currencies or gold) when they joined, creating a pool of reserves.
When members encounter chronic balance-of-payments issues, and cannot make loan repayments, the Fund offers them credit from the pool at varying multiples of what they initially deposited, on increasingly expensive terms.
The Fund is technically a supranational central bank, as since 1969 it has minted its own currency: the special drawing rights (SDR), whose value is based on a basket of the world’s top currencies. Today, the SDR is backed by 45% dollars, 29% euros, 12% yuan, 7% yen and 7% pounds. The total lending capacity of the IMF today stands at $1 trillion.
Between 1960 and 2008, the Fund largely focused on assisting developing countries with short-term, high-interest-rate loans. Because the currencies issued by developing countries are not freely convertible, they usually cannot be redeemed for goods or services abroad. Developing states must instead earn hard currency through exports. Unlike the U.S., which can simply issue the global reserve currency, countries like Sri Lanka and Mozambique often run out of money. At that point, most governments — especially authoritarian ones — prefer the quick fix of borrowing against their country’s future from the Fund.
As for the Bank, it states that its job is to provide credit to developing countries to “reduce poverty, increase shared prosperity, and promote sustainable development.” The Bank itself is split up into five parts, ranging from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which focuses on more traditional “hard” loans to the larger developing countries (think Brazil or India) to the International Development Association (IDA), which focuses on “soft” interest-free loans with long grace periods for the poorest countries. The IBRD makes money in part through the Cantillon effect: by borrowing on favorable terms from its creditors and private market participants who have more direct access to cheaper capital and then loaning out those funds at higher terms to poor countries who lack that access.
World Bank loans traditionally are project- or sector-specific, and have focused on facilitating the raw export of commodities (for example: financing the roads, tunnels, dams, and ports needed to get minerals out of the ground and into international markets) and on transforming traditional consumption agriculture into industrial agriculture or aquaculture so that countries could export more food and goods to the West.
Bank and Fund member states do not have voting power based on their population. Rather, influence was crafted seven decades ago to favor the U.S., Europe and Japan over the rest of the world. That dominance has only weakened mildly in recent years.
Today the U.S. still owns far and away the largest vote share, at 15.6% of the Bank and 16.5% of the Fund, enough to single-handedly veto any major decision, which requires 85% of votes at either institution. Japan owns 7.35% of the votes at the Bank and 6.14% at the Fund; Germany 4.21% and 5.31%; France and the U.K. 3.87% and 4.03% each; and Italy 2.49% and 3.02%.
By contrast, India with its 1.4 billion people only has 3.04% of the Bank’s vote and just 2.63% at the Fund: less power than its former colonial master despite having a population 20 times bigger. China’s 1.4 billion people get 5.7% at the Bank and 6.08% at the fund, roughly the same share as the Netherlands plus Canada and Australia. Brazil and Nigeria, the largest countries in Latin America and Africa, have about the same amount of sway as Italy, a former imperial power in full decline.
Tiny Switzerland with just 8.6 million people has 1.47% of votes at the World Bank, and 1.17% of votes at the IMF: roughly the same share as Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia combined, despite having 90 times fewer people.
Population vs. IMF voting rights
These voting shares are supposed to approximate each country’s share of the world economy, but their imperial-era structure helps color how decisions are made. Sixty-five years after decolonization, the industrial powers led by the U.S. continue to have more or less total control over global trade and lending, while the poorest countries have in effect no voice at all.
The G-5 (the U.S., Japan, Germany, the U.K. and France) dominate the IMF executive board, even though they make up a relatively small percent of the world’s population. The G-10 plus Ireland, Australia, and Korea make up more than 50% of the votes, meaning that with a little pressure on its allies, the U.S. can make determinations even on specific loan decisions, which require a majority.
To complement the IMF’s trillion-dollar lending power, the World Bank group claims more than $350 billion in outstanding loans across more than 150 countries. This credit has spiked over the past two years, as the sister organizations have lent hundreds of billions of dollars to governments who locked down their economies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Over the past few months, the Bank and Fund began orchestrating billion-dollar deals to “save” governments endangered by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s aggressive interest rate hikes. These clients are often human rights violators who borrow without permission from their citizens, who will ultimately be the ones responsible for paying back principal plus interest on the loans. The IMF is currently bailing out Egyptian dictator Abdel Fattah El-Sisi — responsible for the largest massacre of protestors since Tiananmen Square — for example, with $3 billion. Meanwhile, the World Bank was, during the past year, disbursing a $300 million loan to an Ethiopian government that was committing genocide in Tigray.
The cumulative effect of Bank and Fund policies is much larger than the paper amount of their loans, as their lending drives bilateral assistance. It is estimated that “every dollar provided to the Third World by the IMF unlocks a further four to seven dollars of new loans and refinancing from commercial banks and rich-country governments.” Similarly, if the Bank and Fund refuse to lend to a particular country, the rest of the world typically follows suit.
It is hard to overstate the vast impact the Bank and Fund have had across developing nations, especially in their formative decades after World War II. By 1990 and the end of the Cold War, the IMF had extended credit to 41 countries in Africa, 28 countries in Latin America, 20 countries in Asia, eight countries in the Middle East and five countries in Europe, affecting 3 billion people, or what was then two-thirds of the global population. The World Bank has extended loans to more than 160 countries. They remain the most important international financial institutions on the planet.
Today, financial headlines are filled with stories about IMF visits to countries like Sri Lanka and Ghana. The outcome is that the Fund loans billions of dollars to countries in crisis in exchange for what is known as structural adjustment.
In a structural-adjustment loan, borrowers not only have to pay back principal plus interest: they also have to agree to change their economies according to Bank and Fund demands. These requirements almost always stipulate that clients maximize exports at the expense of domestic consumption.
During research for this essay, the author learned much from the work of the development scholar Cheryl Payer, who wrote landmark books and papers on the influence of the Bank and Fund in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. This author may disagree with Payer’s “solutions” — which, like those of most critics of the Bank and Fund, tend to be socialist — but many observations she makes about the global economy hold true regardless of ideology.
“It is an explicit and basic aim of IMF programs,” she wrote, “to discourage local consumption in order to free resources for export.”
This point cannot be stressed enough.
The official narrative is that the Bank and Fund were designed to “foster sustainable economic growth, promote higher standards of living, and reduce poverty.” But the roads and dams the Bank builds are not designed to help improve transport and electricity for locals, but rather to make it easy for multinational corporations to extract wealth. And the bailouts the IMF provides aren’t to “save” a country from bankruptcy — which would probably be the best thing for it in many cases — but rather to allow it to pay its debt with even more debt, so that the original loan doesn’t turn into a hole on a Western bank’s balance sheet.
In her books on the Bank and Fund, Payer describes how the institutions claim that their loan conditionality enables borrowing countries “to achieve a healthier balance of trade and payments.” But the real purpose, she says, is “to bribe the governments to prevent them from making the economic changes which would make them more independent and self-supporting.” When countries pay back their structural adjustment loans, debt service is prioritized, and domestic spending is to be “adjusted” downwards.
IMF loans were often allocated through a mechanism called the “stand-by agreement,” a line of credit that released funds only as the borrowing government claimed to achieve certain objectives. From Jakarta to Lagos to Buenos Aires, IMF staff would fly in (always first or business class) to meet undemocratic rulers and offer them millions or billions of dollars in exchange for following their economic playbook.
Abolition or reduction of foreign exchange and import controls
Shrinking of domestic bank credit
Higher interest rates
Increased taxes
An end to consumer subsidies on food and energy
Wage ceilings
Restrictions on government spending, especially in healthcare and education
Favorable legal conditions and incentives for multinational corporations
Selling off state enterprises and claims on natural resources at fire sale prices
The World Bank had its own playbook, too. Payer gives examples:
The opening up of previously remote regions through transportation and telecommunications investments
Aiding multinational corporations in the mining sector
Insisting on production for export
Pressuring borrowers to improve legal privileges for the tax liabilities of foreign investment
Opposing minimum wage laws and trade union activity
Ending protections for locally-owned businesses
Financing projects that appropriate land, water and forests from poor people and hand them to multinational corporations
Shrinking manufacturing and food production at the expense of the export of natural resources and raw goods
Third World governments have historically been forced to agree to a mix of these policies — sometimes known as the “Washington Consensus” — in order to trigger the ongoing release of Bank and Fund loans.
The former colonial powers tend to focus their “development” lending on former colonies or areas of influence: France in West Africa, Japan in Indonesia, Britain in East Africa and South Asia and the U.S. in Latin America. A notable example is the CFA zone, where 180 million people in 15 African countries are still forced to use a French colonial currency. At the suggestion of the IMF, in 1994 France devalued the CFA by 50%, devastating the savings and purchasing power of tens of millions of people living in countries ranging from Senegal to Ivory Coast to Gabon, all to make raw goods exports more competitive.
The outcome of Bank and Fund policies on the Third World has been remarkably similar to what was experienced under traditional imperialism: wage deflation, a loss of autonomy and agricultural dependency. The big difference is that in the new system, the sword and the gun have been replaced by weaponized debt.
Over the last 30 years, structural adjustment has intensified with regard to the average number of conditions in loans extended by the Bank and Fund. Before 1980, the Bank did not generally make structural adjustment loans, most everything was project- or sector-specific. But since then, “spend this however you want” bailout loans with economic quid pro quos have become a growing part of Bank policy. For the IMF, they are its lifeblood.
For example, when the IMF bailed out South Korea and Indonesia with $57 billion and $43 billion packages during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, it imposed heavy conditionality. Borrowers had to sign agreements that “looked more like Christmas trees than contracts, with anywhere from 50 to 80 detailed conditions covering everything from the deregulation of garlic monopolies to taxes on cattle feed and new environmental laws,” according to political scientist Mark S. Copelvitch.
A 2014 analysis showed that the IMF had attached, on average, 20 conditions to each loan it gave out in the previous two years, a historic increase. Countries like Jamaica, Greece and Cyprus have borrowed in recent years with an average of 35 conditions each. It is worth noting that Bank and Fund conditions have never included protections on free speech or human rights, or restrictions on military spending or police violence.
An added twist of Bank and Fund policy is what is known as the “double loan”: money is lent to build, for example, a hydroelectric dam, but most if not all of the money gets paid to Western companies. So, the Third World taxpayer is saddled with principal and interest, and the North gets paid back double.
The context for the double loan is that dominant states extend credit through the Bank and Fund to former colonies, where local rulers often spend the new cash directly back to multinational companies who profit from advising, construction or import services. The ensuing and required currency devaluation, wage controls and bank credit tightening imposed by Bank and Fund structural adjustment disadvantage local entrepreneurs who are stuck in a collapsing and isolated fiat system, and benefit multinationals who are dollar, euro or yen native.
Another key source for this author has been the masterful book “The Lords of Poverty” by historian Graham Hancock, written to reflect on the first five decades of Bank and Fund policy and foreign assistance in general.
“The World Bank,” Hancock writes, “is the first to admit that out of every $10 that it receives, around $7 are in fact spent on goods and services from the rich industrialized countries.”
In the 1980s, when Bank funding was expanding rapidly around the world, he noted that “for every US tax dollar contributed, 82 cents are immediately returned to American businesses in the form of purchase orders.” This dynamic applies not just to loans but also to aid. For example, when the U.S. or Germany sends a rescue plane to a country in crisis, the cost of transport, food, medicine and staff salaries are added to what is known as ODA, or “official development assistance.” On the books, it looks like aid and assistance. But most of the money is paid right back to Western companies and not invested locally.
Reflecting on the Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980s, Hancock noted that “70 cents out of every dollar of American assistance never actually left the United States.” The U.K., for its part, spent a whopping 80% of its aid during that time directly on British goods and services.
“One year,” Hancock writes, “British tax-payers provided multilateral aid agencies with 495 million pounds; in the same year, however, British firms received contracts worth 616 million pounds.” Hancock said that multilateral agencies could be “relied upon to purchase British goods and services with a value equivalent to 120% of Britain’s total multilateral contribution.”
One starts to see how the “aid and assistance” we tend to think of as charitable is really quite the opposite.
And as Hancock points out, foreign-aid budgets always increase no matter the outcome. Just as progress is evidence that the aid is working, a “lack of progress is evidence that the dosage has been insufficient and must be increased.”
Some development advocates, he writes, “argue that it would be inexpedient to deny aid to the speedy (those who advance); others, that it would be cruel to deny it to the needy (those who stagnate). Aid is thus like champagne: in success you deserve it, in failure you need it.”
IV. The Debt Trap
“The concept of the Third World or the South and the policy of official aid are inseparable. They are two sides of the same coin. The Third World is the creation of the foreign aid: without foreign aid there is no Third World.”
According to the World Bank, its objective is “to help raise living standards in developing countries by channeling financial resources from developed countries to the developing world.”
But what if the reality is the opposite?
At first, beginning in the 1960s, there was an enormous flow of resources from rich countries to poor ones. This was ostensibly done to help them develop. Payer writes that it was long considered “natural” for capital to “flow in one direction only from the developed industrial economies to the Third World.”
The life cycle of a World Bank loan: positive, then deeply negative cash flows for the borrower country
But, as she reminds us, “at some point the borrower has to pay more to his creditor than he has received from the creditor and over the life of the loan this excess is much higher than the amount that was originally borrowed.”
In global economics, this point happened in 1982, when the flow of resources permanently reversed. Ever since, there has been an annual net flow of funds from poor countries to rich ones. This began as an average of $30 billion per year flowing from South to North in the mid-to-late 1980s, and is today in the range of trillions of dollars per year. Between 1970 and 2007 — from the end of the gold standard to the Great Financial Crisis — the total debt service paid by poor countries to rich ones was $7.15 trillion.
Net resource transfers from developing countries: increasingly negative since 1982
To give an example of what this might look like in a given year, in 2012 developing countries received $1.3 trillion, including all income, aid and investment. But that same year, more than $3.3 trillion flowed out. In other words, according to anthropologist Jason Hickel, “developing countries sent $2 trillion more to the rest of the world than they received.”
When all the flows were added up from 1960 to 2017, a grim truth emerged: $62 trillion was drained out of the developing world, the equivalent of 620 Marshall Plans in today’s dollars.
The IMF and World Bank were supposed to fix balance of payments issues, and help poor countries grow stronger and more sustainable. The evidence has been the direct opposite.
“For every $1 of aid that developing countries receive,” Hickel writes, “they lose $24 in net outflows.” Instead of ending exploitation and unequal exchange, studies show that structural adjustment policies grew them in a massive way.
Since 1970, the external public debt of developing countries has increased from $46 billion to $8.7 trillion. In the past 50 years, countries like India and the Philippines and the Congo now owe their former colonial masters 189 times the amount they owed in 1970. They have paid $4.2 trillion on interest payments alone since 1980.
The exponential rise in developing country debt
Even Payer — whose 1974 book “The Debt Trap” used economic flow data to show how the IMF ensnared poor countries by encouraging them to borrow more than they could possibly pay back — would be shocked at the size of today’s debt trap.
Her observation that “the average citizen of the US or Europe may not be aware of this enormous drain in capital from parts of the world they think of as being pitifully poor” still rings true today. To this author’s own shame, he did not know about the true nature of the global flow of funds and simply assumed that rich countries subsidized poor ones before embarking on the research for this project. The end result is a literal Ponzi scheme, where by the 1970s, Third World debt was so big that it was only possible to service with new debt. It has been the same ever since.
Many critics of the Bank and Fund assume that these institutions are working with their heart in the right place, and when they do fail, it is because of mistakes, waste or mismanagement.
It is the thesis of this essay that this is not true, and that the foundational goals of the Fund and Bank are not to fix poverty but rather to enrich creditor nations at the expense of poor ones.
This author is simply not willing to believe that a permanent flow of funds from poor countries to rich ones since 1982 is a “mistake.” The reader may dispute that the arrangement is intentional, and rather may believe it is an unconscious structural outcome. The difference hardly matters to the billions of people the Bank and Fund have impoverished.
V. Replacing the Colonial Resource Drain
“I am so tired of waiting. Aren’t you, for the world to become good and beautiful and kind? Let us take a knife and cut the world in two — and see what worms are eating at the rind.”
By the end of the 1950s, Europe and Japan had largely recovered from war and resumed significant industrial growth, while Third World countries ran out of funds. Despite having healthy balance sheets in the 1940s and early 1950s, poor, raw-material-exporting countries ran into balance-of-payments issues as the value of their commodities tanked in the wake of the Korean War. This is when the debt trap began, and when the Bank and Fund started the floodgates of what would end up becoming trillions of dollars of lending.
This era also marked the official end of colonialism, as European empires drew back from their imperial possessions. The establishment assumption in international development is that the economic success of nations is due “primarily to their internal, domestic conditions. High-income countries have achieved economic success,” the theory goes, “because of good governance, strong institutions and free markets. Lower-income countries have failed to develop because they lack these things, or because they suffer from corruption, red tape and inefficiency.”
This is certainly true. But another major reason why rich countries are rich and poor countries are poor is that the former looted the latter for hundreds of years during the colonial period.
“Britain’s industrial revolution,” Jason Hickel writes, “depended in large part on cotton, which was grown on land forcibly appropriated from Indigenous Americans, with labor appropriated from enslaved Africans. Other crucial inputs required by British manufacturers — hemp, timber, iron, grain — were produced using forced labor on serf estates in Russia and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, British extraction from India and other colonies funded more than half the country’s domestic budget, paying for roads, public buildings, the welfare state — all the markets of modern development — while enabling the purchase of material inputs necessary for industrialization.”
The theft dynamic was described by Utsa and Prabhat Patnaik in their book “Capital And Imperialism”: colonial powers like the British empire would use violence to extract raw materials from weak countries, creating a “colonial drain” of capital that boosted and subsidized life in London, Paris and Berlin. Industrial nations would transform these raw materials into manufactured goods, and sell them back to weaker nations, profiting massively while also crowding out local production. And — critically — they would keep inflation at home down by suppressing wages in the colonial territories. Either through outright slavery or through paying well below the global market rate.
As the colonial system began to falter, the Western financial world faced a crisis. The Patnaiks argue that the Great Depression was a result not simply of changes in Western monetary policy, but also of the colonial drain slowing down. The reasoning is simple: rich countries had built a conveyor belt of resources flowing from poor countries, and when the belt broke, so did everything else. Between the 1920s and 1960s, political colonialism became virtually extinct. Britain, the U.S., Germany, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium and other empires were forced to give up control over more than half of the world’s territory and resources.
As the Patnaiks write, imperialism is “an arrangement for imposing income deflation on the Third World population in order to get their primary commodities without running into the problem of increasing supply price.”
Post 1960, this became the new function for the World Bank and IMF: recreating the colonial drain from poor countries to rich countries that was once maintained by straightforward imperialism.
Post-colonial drain from the Global South to the Global North
Officials in the U.S., Europe and Japan wanted to achieve “internal equilibrium” — in other words, full employment. But they realized they could not do this via subsidy inside an isolated system, or else inflation would run rampant. To achieve their goal would require external input from poorer countries. The extra surplus value extracted by the core from workers in the periphery is known as “imperialist rent.” If industrial countries could get cheaper materials and labor, and then sell the finished goods back at a profit, they could inch closer to the technocrat dream economy. And they got their wish: as of 2019, wages paid to workers in the developing world were 20% the level of wages paid to workers in the developed world.
As an example of how the Bank recreated the colonial drain dynamic, Payer gives the classic case of 1960s Mauritania in northwest Africa. A mining project called MIFERMA was signed by French occupiers before the colony became independent. The deal eventually became “just an old-fashioned enclave project: a city in a desert and a railroad leading to the ocean,” as the infrastructure was solely focused on spiriting minerals away to international markets. In 1969, when the mine accounted for 30% of Mauritania’s GDP and 75% of its exports, 72% of the income was sent abroad, and “practically all the income distributed locally to employees evaporated in imports.” When the miners protested against the neocolonial arrangement, security forces savagely put them down.
Geography of the drain from the Global South from 1960 to 2017
MIFERMA is a stereotypical example of the kind of “development” that would be imposed on the Third World everywhere from the Dominican Republic to Madagascar to Cambodia. And of these projects rapidly expanded in the 1970s, thanks to the petrodollar system.
Post-1973, Arab OPEC countries with enormous surpluses from skyrocketing oil prices sank their profits into deposits and treasuries in Western banks, which needed a place to lend out their growing resources. Military dictators across Latin America, Africa and Asia made great targets: they had high time preferences and were happy to borrow against future generations.
Helping expedite loan growth was the “IMF put”: private banks started to believe (correctly) that the IMF would bail out countries if they defaulted, protecting their investments. Moreover, interest rates in the mid-1970s were often in negative real territory, further encouraging borrowers. This — combined with World Bank president Robert McNamara’s insistence that assistance expand dramatically — resulted in a debt frenzy. U.S. banks, for example, increased their Third World loan portfolio by 300% to $450 billion between 1978 and 1982.
The problem was that these loans were in large part floating interest rate agreements, and a few years later, those rates exploded as the U.S. Federal Reserve raised the global cost of capital close to 20%. The growing debt burden combined with the 1979 oil price shock and the ensuing global collapse in the price of commodities that power the value of developing country exports paved the way for the Third World Debt Crisis. To make matters worse, very little of the money borrowed by governments during the debt frenzy was actually invested in the average citizen.
Third World debt service over time
In their aptly named book “Debt Squads,” investigative journalists Sue Branford and Bernardo Kucinski explain that between 1976 and 1981, Latin governments (of which 18 of 21 were dictatorships) borrowed $272.9 billion. Out of that, 91.6% was spent on debt servicing, capital flight and building up regime reserves. Only 8.4% was used on domestic investment, and even out of that, much was wasted.
Brazilian civil society advocate Carlos Ayuda vividly described the effect of the petrodollar-fueled drain on his own country:
“The military dictatorship used the loans to invest in huge infrastructure projects — particularly energy projects… the idea behind creating an enormous hydroelectric dam and plant in the middle of the Amazon, for example, was to produce aluminum for export to the North… the government took out huge loans and invested billions of dollars in building the Tucuruí dam in the late 1970s, destroying native forests and removing massive numbers of native peoples and poor rural people that had lived there for generations. The government would have razed the forests, but the deadlines were so short they used Agent Orange to defoliate the region and then submerged the leafless tree trunks underwater… the hydroelectric plant’s energy [was then] sold at $13-20 per megawatt when the actual price of production was $48. So the taxpayers provided subsidies, financing cheap energy for transnational corporations to sell our aluminum in the international market.”
In other words, the Brazilian people paid foreign creditors for the service of destroying their environment, displacing the masses and selling their resources.
Today the drain from low- and middle-income countries is staggering. In 2015, it totaled 10.1 billion tons of raw materials and 182 million person-years of labor: 50% of all goods and 28% of all labor used that year by high-income countries.
VI. A Dance With Dictators
“He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”
Of course, it takes two sides to finalize a loan from the Bank or Fund. The problem is that the borrower is typically an unelected or unaccountable leader, who makes the decision without consulting with and without a popular mandate from their citizens.
As Payer writes in “The Debt Trap,” “IMF programs are politically unpopular, for the very good concrete reasons that they hurt local business and depress the real income of the electorate. A government which attempts to carry out the conditions in its Letter of Intent to the IMF is likely to find itself voted out of office.”
Hence, the IMF prefers to work with undemocratic clients who can more easily dismiss troublesome judges and put down street protests. According to Payer, the military coups in Brazil in 1964, Turkey in 1960, Indonesia in 1966, Argentina in 1966 and the Philippines in 1972 were examples of IMF-opposed leaders being forcibly replaced by IMF-friendly ones. Even if the Fund wasn’t directly involved in the coup, in each of these cases, it arrived enthusiastically a few days, weeks or months later to help the new regime implement structural adjustment.
The Bank and Fund share a willingness to support abusive governments. Perhaps surprisingly, it was the Bank that started the tradition. According to development researcher Kevin Danaher, “the Bank’s sad record of supporting military regimes and governments that openly violated human rights began on August 7, 1947, with a $195 million reconstruction loan to the Netherlands. Seventeen days before the Bank approved the loan, the Netherlands had unleashed a war against anti-colonialist nationalist in its huge overseas empire in the East Indies, which had already declared its independence as the Republic of Indonesia.”
“The Dutch,” Danaher writes, “sent 145,000 troops (from a nation with only 10 million inhabitants at the time, economically struggling at 90% of 1939 production) and launched a total economic blockade of nationalist-held areas, causing considerable hunger and health problems among Indonesia’s 70 million inhabitants.”
In its first few decades the Bank funded many such colonial schemes, including $28 million for apartheid Rhodesia in 1952, as well as loans to Australia, the United Kingdom, and Belgium to “develop” colonial possessions in Papua New Guinea, Kenya and the Belgian Congo.
In 1966, the Bank directly defied the United Nations, “continuing to lend money to South Africa and Portugal despite resolutions of the General Assembly calling on all UN-affiliated agencies to cease financial support for both countries,” according to Danaher.
Danaher writes that “Portugal’s colonial domination of Angola and Mozambique and South Africa’s apartheid were flagrant violations of the UN charter. But the Bank argued that Article IV, Section 10 of its Charter which prohibits interference in the political affairs of any member, legally obliged it to disregard the UN resolutions. As a result the Bank approved loans of $10 million to Portugal and $20 million to South Africa after the UN resolution was passed.”
Sometimes, the Bank’s preference for tyranny was stark: it cut off lending to the democratically-elected Allende government in Chile in the early 1970s, but shortly after began to lend huge quantities of cash to Ceausescu’s Romania, one of the world’s worst police states. This is also an example of how the Bank and Fund, contrary to popular belief, didn’t simply lend along Cold War ideological lines: for every right-wing Augusto Pinochet Ugarte or Jorge Rafael Videla client, there was a left-wing Josip Broz Tito or Julius Nyerere.
In 1979, Danaher notes, 15 of the world’s most repressive governments would receive a full third of all Bank loans. This even after the U.S. Congress and the Carter administration had stopped aid to four of the 15 — Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Ethiopia — for “flagrant human rights violations.” Just a few years later, in El Salvador, the IMF made a $43 million loan to the military dictatorship, just a few months after its forces committed the largest massacre in Cold War-era Latin America by annihilating the village of El Mozote.
There were several books written about the Bank and the Fund in 1994, timed as 50-year retrospectives on the Bretton Woods institutions. “Perpetuating Poverty” by Ian Vàsquez and Doug Bandow is one of those studies, and is a particularly valuable one as it provides a Libertarian analysis. Most critical studies of the Bank and Fund are from the left: but the Cato Institute’s Vásquez and Bandow saw many of the same problems.
“The Fund underwrites any government,” they write, “however venal and brutal… China owed the Fund $600 million as of the end of 1989; in January 1990, just a few months after the blood had dried in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, the IMF held a seminar on monetary policy in the city.”
Vásquez and Bandow mention other tyrannical clients ranging from military Burma, to Pinochet’s Chile, Laos, Nicaragua under Anastasio Somoza Debayle and the Sandinistas, Syria, and Vietnam.
“The IMF,” they say, “has rarely met a dictatorship that it did not like.”
Vásquez and Bandow detail the Bank’s relationship with the Marxist-Leninist Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in Ethiopia, where it provided for as much as 16% of the government’s annual budget while it had one of the worst human rights records in the world. The Bank’s credit arrived just as Mengistu’s forces were “herding people into concentration camps and collective farms.” They also point out how the Bank gave the Sudanese regime $16 million while it was driving 750,000 refugees out of Khartoum into the desert, and how it gave hundreds of millions of dollars to Iran — a brutal theocratic dictatorship — and Mozambique, whose security forces were infamous for torture, rape and summary executions.
In his 2011 book “Defeating Dictators,” the celebrated Ghanaian development economist George Ayittey detailed a long list of “aid-receiving autocrats”: Paul Biya, Idriss Déby, Lansana Conté, Paul Kagame, Yoweri Museveni, Hun Sen, Islam Karimov, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Emomali Rahmon. He pointed out that the Fund had dispensed $75 billion to these nine tyrants alone.
In 2014, a report was released by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, alleging that the Ethiopian government had used part of a $2 billion Bank loan to forcibly relocate 37,883 indigenous Anuak families. This was 60% of the country’s entire Gambella province. Soldiers “beat, raped, and killed” Anuak who refused to leave their homes. Atrocities were so bad that South Sudan granted refugee status to Anuaks streaming in from neighboring Ethiopia. A Human Rights Watch report said that the stolen land was then “leased by the government to investors” and that the Bank’s money was “used to pay the salaries of government officials who helped carry out the evictions.” The Bank approved new funding for this “villagization” program even after allegations of mass human rights violations emerged.
Mobutu Sese Soko and Richard Nixon at the White House in 1973
It would be a mistake to leave Mobutu Sese Soko’s Zaire out of this essay. The recipient of billions of dollars of Bank and Fund credit during his bloody 32-year reign, Mobutu pocketed 30% of incoming aid and assistance and let his people starve. He complied with 11 IMF structural adjustments: during one in 1984, 46,000 public school teachers were fired and the national currency was devalued by 80%. Mobutu called this austerity “a bitter pill which we have no alternative but to swallow,” but didn’t sell any of his 51 Mercedes, any of his 11 chateaus in Belgium or France, or even his Boeing 747 or 16th century Spanish castle.
Per capita income declined in each year of his rule on average by 2.2%, leaving more than 80% of the population in absolute poverty. Children routinely died before the age of five, and swollen-belly syndrome was rampant. It is estimated that Mobutu personally stole $5 billion, and presided over another $12 billion in capital flight, which together would have been more than enough to wipe the country’s $14 billion debt clean at the time of his ouster. He looted and terrorized his people, and could not have done it without the Bank and Fund, which continued to bail him out even though it was clear he would never repay his debts.
That all said, the true poster boy for the Bank and Fund’s affection for dictators might be Ferdinand Marcos. In 1966, when Marcos came to power, the Philippines was the second-most prosperous country in Asia, and the country’s foreign debt stood at roughly $500 million. By the time Marcos was removed in 1986, the debt stood at $28.1 billion.
As Graham Hancock writes in “Lords Of Poverty,” most of these loans “had been contracted to pay for extravagant development schemes which, although irrelevant to the poor, had pandered to the enormous ego of the head of state… a painstaking two-year investigation established beyond serious dispute that he had personally expropriated and sent out of the Philippines more than $10 billion. Much of this money — which of course, should have been at the disposal of the Philippine state and people — had disappeared forever in Swiss bank accounts.”
“$100 million,” Hancock writes, “was paid for the art collection for Imelda Marcos… her tastes were eclectic and included six Old Masters purchased from the Knodeler Gallery in New York for $5 million, a Francis Bacon canvas supplied by the Marlborough Gallery in London, and a Michelangelo, ‘Madonna and Child’ bought from Mario Bellini in Florence for $3.5 million.”
“During the last decade of the Marcos regime,” he says, “while valuable art treasuries were being hung on penthouse walls in Manhattan and Paris, the Philippines had lower nutritional standards than any other nation in Asia with the exception of war-torn Cambodia.”
To contain popular unrest, Hancock writes that Marcos banned strikes and “union organizing was outlawed in all key industries and in agriculture. Thousands of Filipinos were imprisoned for opposing the dictatorship and many were tortured and killed. Meanwhile the country remained consistently listed among the top recipients of both US and World Bank development assistance.”
After the Filipino people pushed Marcos out, they still had to pay an annual sum of anywhere between 40% and 50% of the entire value of their exports “just to cover the interest on the foreign debts that Marcos incurred.”
One would think that after ousting Marcos, the Filipino people would not have to owe the debt he incurred on their behalf without consulting them. But that is not how it has worked in practice. In theory, this concept is called “odious debt” and was invented by the U.S. in 1898 when it repudiated Cuba’s debt after Spanish forces were ousted from the island.
American leaders determined that debts “incurred to subjugate a people or to colonize them” were not legitimate. But the Bank and Fund have never followed this precedent during their 75 years of operations. Ironically, the IMF has an article on its website suggesting that Somoza, Marcos, Apartheid South Africa, Haiti’s “Baby Doc” and Nigeria’s Sani Abacha all borrowed billions illegitimately, and that the debt should be written off for their victims, but this remains a suggestion unfollowed.
Technically and morally speaking, a large percentage of Third World debt should be considered “odious” and not owed anymore by the population should their dictator be forced out. After all, in most cases, the citizens paying back the loans didn’t elect their leader and didn’t choose to borrow the loans that they took out against their future.
In July 1987, the revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara gave a speech to the Organistion of African Unity (OAU) in Ethiopia, where he refused to pay the colonial debt of Burkina Faso, and encouraged other African nations to join him.
“We cannot pay,” he said, “because we are not responsible for this debt.”
Sankara famously boycotted the IMF and refused structural adjustment. Three months after his OAU speech, he was assassinated by Blaise Compaoré, who would install his own 27-year military regime that would receive four structural adjustment loans from the IMF and borrow dozens of times from the World Bank for various infrastructure and agriculture projects. Since Sankara’s death, few heads of state have been willing to take a stand to repudiate their debts.
Burkinese dictator Blaise Compaoré and IMF managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Compaoré seized power after assassinating Thomas Sankara (who tried to refuse Western debt) and he went on to borrow billions from the Bank and Fund.
One big exception was Iraq: after the U.S. invasion and ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, American authorities managed to get some of the debt incurred by Hussein to be considered “odious” and forgiven. But this was a unique case: for the billions of people who suffered under colonialists or dictators, and have since been forced to pay their debts plus interest, they have not gotten this special treatment.
In recent years, the IMF has even acted as a counter-revolutionary force against democratic movements. In the 1990s, the Fund was widely criticized on the left and the right for helping to destabilize the former Soviet Union as it descended into economic chaos and congealed into Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship. In 2011, as the Arab Spring protests emerged across the Middle East, the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition was formed and met in Paris.
Through this mechanism, the Bank and Fund led massive loan offers to Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan — “Arab countries in transition” — in exchange for structural adjustment. As a result, Tunisia’s foreign debt skyrocketed, triggering two new IMF loans, marking the first time that the country had borrowed from the Fund since 1988. The austerity measures paired with these loans forced the devaluation of the Tunisian dinar, which spiked prices. National protests broke out as the government continued to follow the Fund playbook with wage freezes, new taxes and “early retirement” in the public sector.
Twenty-nine-year-old protestor Warda Atig summed up the situation: “As long as Tunisia continues these deals with the IMF, we will continue our struggle,” she said. “We believe that the IMF and the interests of people are contradictory. An escape from submission to the IMF, which has brought Tunisia to its knees and strangled the economy, is a prerequisite to bring about any real change.”
VII. Creating Agricultural Dependence
“The idea that developing countries should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better ensure their food security by relying on the U.S. agricultural products, which are available in most cases at lower cost.”
As a result of Bank and Fund policy, all across Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South and East Asia, countries which once grew their own food now import it from rich countries. Growing one’s own food is important, in retrospect, because in the post-1944 financial system, commodities are not priced with one’s local fiat currency: they are priced in the dollar.
Consider the price of wheat, which ranged between $200 and $300 between 1996 and 2006. It has since skyrocketed, peaking at nearly $1,100 in 2021. If your country grew its own wheat, it could weather the storm. If your country had to import wheat, your population risked starvation. This is one reason why countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Ghana and Bangladesh are all currently turning to the IMF for emergency loans.
Historically, where the Bank did give loans, they were mostly for “modern,” large-scale, mono-crop agriculture and for resource extraction: not for the development of local industry, manufacturing or consumption farming. Borrowers were encouraged to focus on raw materials exports (oil, minerals, coffee, cocoa, palm oil, tea, rubber, cotton, etc.), and then pushed to import finished goods, foodstuffs and the ingredients for modern agriculture like fertilizer, pesticides, tractors and irrigation machinery. The result is that societies like Morocco end up importing wheat and soybean oil instead of thriving on native couscous and olive oil, “fixed” to become dependent. Earnings were typically used not to benefit farmers, but to service foreign debt, purchase weapons, import luxury goods, fill Swiss bank accounts and put down dissent.
Consider some of the world’s poorest countries. As of 2020, after 50 years of Bank and Fund policy, Niger’s exports were 75% uranium; Mali’s 72% gold; Zambia’s 70% copper; Burundi’s 69% coffee; Malawi’s 55% tobacco; Togo’s 50% cotton; and on it goes. At times in past decades, these single exports supported virtually all of these countries’ hard currency earnings. This is not a natural state of affairs. These items are not mined or produced for local consumption, but for French nuclear plants, Chinese electronics, German supermarkets, British cigarette makers, and American clothing companies. In other words, the energy of the labor force of these nations has been engineered toward feeding and powering other civilizations, instead of nourishing and advancing their own.
Researcher Alicia Koren wrote about the typical agricultural impact of Bank policy in Costa Rica, where the country’s “structural adjustment called for earning more hard currency to pay off foreign debt; forcing farmers who traditionally grew beans, rice, and corn for domestic consumption to plant non-traditional agricultural exports such as ornamental plants, flowers, melons, strawberries, and red peppers… industries that exported their products were eligible for tariff and tax exemptions not available to domestic producers.”
“Meanwhile,” Koren wrote, “structural adjustment agreements removed support for domestic production… while the North pressured Southern nations to eliminate subsidies and ‘barriers to trade,’ Northern governments pumped billions of dollars into their own agricultural sectors, making it impossible for basic grains growers in the South to compete with the North’s highly subsidized agricultural industry.”
Koren extrapolated her Costa Rica analysis to make a broader point: “Structural adjustment agreements shift public spending subsidies from basic supplies, consumed mainly by the poor and middle classes, to luxury export crops produced for affluent foreigners.” Third World countries were not seen as body politics but as companies that needed to increase revenues and decrease expenditures.
The testimony of a former Jamaican official is especially telling: “We told the World Bank team that farmers could hardly afford credit, and that higher rates would put them out of business. The Bank told us in response that this means ‘The market is telling you that agriculture is not the way to go for Jamaica’ — they are saying we should give up farming altogether.”
“The World Bank and IMF,” the official said, “don’t have to worry about the farmers and local companies going out of business, or starvation wages or the social upheaval that will result. They simply assume that it is our job to keep our national security forces strong enough to suppress any uprising.”
Developing governments are stuck: faced with insurmountable debt, the only factor they really control in terms of increasing revenue is deflating wages. If they do this, they must provide basic food subsidies, or else they will be overthrown. And so the debt grows.
Even when developing countries try to produce their own food, they are crowded out by a centrally-planned global trade market. For example, one would think that the cheap labor in a place like West Africa would make it a better exporter of peanuts than the United States. But since Northern countries pay an estimated $1 billion in subsidies to their agriculture industries every single day, Southern countries often struggle to be competitive. What’s worse, 50 or 60 countries are often directed to focus on the very same crops, crowding each other out in the global marketplace. Rubber, palm oil, coffee, tea and cotton are Bank favorites, as the poor masses can’t eat them.
It is true that the Green Revolution has created more food for the planet, especially in China and East Asia. But despite advances in agricultural technology, much of these new yields go to exports, and vast swathes of the world remain chronically malnourished and dependent. To this day, for example, African nations import about 85% of their food. They pay more than $40 billion per year — a number estimated to reach $110 billion per year by 2025 — to buy from other parts of the world what they could grow themselves. Bank and Fund policy helped transform a continent of incredible agricultural riches into one reliant on the outside world to feed its people.
Reflecting on the results of this policy of dependency, Hancock challenges the widespread belief that the people of the Third World are “fundamentally helpless.”
“Victims of nameless crises, disasters, and catastrophes,” he writes, suffer from a perception that “they can do nothing unless we, the rich and powerful, intervene to save them from themselves.” But as evidenced by the fact that our “assistance” has only made them more dependent on us, Hancock rightfully unmasks the notion that “only we can save them” as “patronizing and profoundly fallacious.”
Far from playing the role of good samaritan, the Fund does not even follow the timeless human tradition, established more than 4,000 years ago by Hammurabi in ancient Babylon, of forgiving interest after natural disasters. In 1985, a devastating earthquake hit Mexico City, killing more than 5,000 people and causing $5 billion of damage. Fund staff — who claim to be saviors, helping to end poverty and save countries in crisis — arrived a few days later, demanding to be repaid.
VIII. You Can’t Eat Cotton
“Development prefers crops that can’t be eaten so the loans can be collected.”
The Togolese democracy advocate Farida Nabourema’s own personal and family experience tragically matches the big picture of the Bank and Fund laid out thus far.
The way she puts it, after the 1970s oil boom, loans were poured into developing nations like Togo, whose unaccountable rulers didn’t think twice about how they would repay the debt. Much of the money went into giant infrastructure projects that didn’t help the majority of the people. Much was embezzled and spent on pharaonic estates. Most of these countries, she says, were ruled by single party-states or families. Once interest rates started to hike, these governments could no longer pay their debts: the IMF started “taking over” by imposing austerity measures.
“These were new states that were very fragile,” Nabourema says in an interview for this article. “They needed to invest strongly in social infrastructure, just as the European states were allowed to do after World War II. But instead, we went from free healthcare and education one day, to situations the next where it became too costly for the average person to get even basic medicine.”
Regardless of what one thinks about state-subsidized medicine and schooling, eliminating it overnight was traumatic for poor countries. Bank and Fund officials, of course, have their own private healthcare solutions for their visits and their own private schools for their children whenever they have to live “in the field.”
Because of the forced cuts in public spending, Nabourema says, the state hospitals in Togo remain to this day in “complete decay.” Unlike the state-run, taxpayer-financed public hospitals in the capitals of former colonial powers in London and Paris, things are so bad in Togo’s capital Lomé that even water has to be prescribed.
“There was also,” Nabourema said, “reckless privatization of our public companies.” She explained how her father used to work at the Togolese steel agency. During privatization, the company was sold off to foreign actors for less than half of what the state built it for.
“It was basically a garage sale,” she said.
Nabourema says that a free market system and liberal reforms work well when all participants are on an equal playing field. But that is not the case in Togo, which is forced to play by different rules. No matter how much it opens up, it can’t change the strict policies of the U.S. and Europe, who aggressively subsidize their own industries and agriculture. Nabourema mentions how a subsidized influx of cheap used clothes from America, for example, ruined Togo’s local textile industry.
“These clothes from the West,” she said, “put entrepreneurs out of business and littered our beaches.”
The most horrible aspect, she said, is that the farmers — who made up 60% of the population in Togo in the 1980s — had their livelihoods turned upside down. The dictatorship needed hard currency to pay its debts, and could only do this by selling exports, so they began a massive campaign to sell cash crops. With the World Bank’s help, the regime invested heavily in cotton, so much so that it now dominates 50% of the country’s exports, destroying national food security.
In the formative years for countries like Togo, the Bank was the “largest single lender for agriculture.” Its strategy for fighting poverty was agricultural modernization: “massive transfers of capital, in the form of fertilizers, pesticides, earth-moving equipment, and expensive foreign consultants.”
Nabourema’s father was the one who revealed to her how imported fertilizers and tractors were diverted away from farmers growing consumption food, to farmers growing cash crops like cotton, coffee, cocoa and cashews. If someone was growing corn, sorghum or millet — the basic foodstuffs of the population — they didn’t get access.
“You can’t eat cotton,” Nabourema reminds us.
Over time, the political elite in countries like Togo and Benin (where the dictator was literally a cotton mogul) became the buyer of all the cash crops from all of the farms. They’d have a monopoly on purchases, Nabourema says, and would buy the crops for prices so low that the peasants would barely make any money. This entire system — called “sotoco” in Togo — was based on funding provided by the World Bank.
When farmers would protest, she said, they would get beaten or their farms would get burned to rubble. They could have just grown normal food and fed their families, like they had done for generations. But now they could not even afford the land: the political elite has been acquiring land at an outrageous rate, often through illegal means, jacking up the price.
As an example, Nabourema explains how the Togolese regime might seize 2,000 acres of land: unlike in a liberal democracy (like the one in France, which has built its civilization off the backs of countries like Togo), the judicial system is owned by the government, so there is no way to push back. So farmers, who used to be self-sovereign, are now forced to work as laborers on someone else’s land to provide cotton to rich countries far away. The most tragic irony, Nabourema says, is that cotton is overwhelmingly grown in the north of Togo, in the poorest part of the country.
“But when you go there,” she says, “you see it has made no one rich.”
Women bear the brunt of structural adjustment. The misogyny of the policy is “quite clear in Africa, where women are the major farmers and providers of fuel, wood, and water,” Danaher writes. And yet, a recent retrospective says, “the World Bank prefers to blame them for having too many children rather than reexamining its own policies.”
As Payer writes, for many of the world’s poor, they are poor “not because they have been left behind or ignored by their country’s progress, but because they are the victims of modernisation. Most have been crowded off the good farmland, or deprived of land altogether, by rich elites and local or foreign agribusiness. Their destitution has not ‘ruled them out’ of the development process; the development process has been the cause of their destitution.”
“Yet the Bank,” Payer says, “is still determined to transform the agricultural practices of small farmers. Bank policy statements make it clear that the real aim is integration of peasant land into the commercial sector through the production of a ‘marketable surplus’ of cash crops.”
Payer observed how, in the 1970s and 1980s, many small plotters still grew the bulk of their own food needs, and were not “dependent on the market for the near-totality of their sustenance, as ‘modern’ people were.” These people, however, were the target of the Bank’s policies, which transformed them into surplus producers, and “often enforced this transformation with authoritarian methods.”
In a testimony in front of U.S. Congress in the 1990s, George Ayittey remarked that “if Africa were able to feed itself, it could save nearly $15 billion it wastes on food imports. This figure may be compared with the $17 billion Africa received in foreign aid from all sources in 1997.”
In other words, if Africa grew its own food, it wouldn’t need foreign aid. But if that were to happen, then poor countries wouldn’t be buying billions of dollars of food per year from rich countries, whose economies would shrink as a result. So the West strongly resists any change.
IX. The Development Set
Excuse me, friends, I must catch my jet
I’m off to join the Development Set
My bags are packed, and I’ve had all my shots
I have traveller’s checks and pills for the trots!
The Development Set is bright and noble
Our thoughts are deep and our vision global
Although we move with the better classes
Our thoughts are always with the masses
In Sheraton Hotels in scattered nations
We damn multinational corporations
Injustice seems easy to protest
In such seething hotbeds of social rest.
We discuss malnutrition over steaks
And plan hunger talks during coffee breaks.
Whether Asian floods or African drought
We face each issue with open mouth.
And so begins “The Development Set,” a 1976 poem by Ross Coggins that hits at the heart of the paternalistic and unaccountable nature of the Bank and the Fund.
The World Bank pays high, tax-free salaries, with very generous benefits. IMF staff are paid even better, and traditionally were flown first or business class (depending on the distance), never economy. They stayed in five-star hotels, and even had a perk to get free upgrades onto the supersonic Concorde. Their salaries, unlike wages made by people living under structural adjustment, were not capped and always rose faster than the inflation rate.
Until the mid-1990s the janitors cleaning the World Bank headquarters in Washington — mostly immigrants who fled from countries that the Bank and Fund had “adjusted” — were not even allowed to unionize. In contrast, Christine Lagarde’s tax-free salary as head of the IMF was $467,940, plus an additional $83,760 allowance. Of course, during her term from 2011 to 2019, she oversaw a variety of structural adjustments on poor countries, where taxes on the most vulnerable were almost always raised.
Graham Hancock notes that redundancy payments at the World Bank in the 1980s “averaged a quarter of a million dollars per person.” When 700 executives lost their jobs in 1987, the money spent on their golden parachutes — $175 million — would have been enough, he notes, “to pay for a complete elementary school education for 63,000 children from poor families in Latin America or Africa.”
According to former World Bank head James Wolfensohn, from 1995 to 2005 there were more than 63,000 Bank projects in developing countries: the costs of “feasibility studies” and travel and lodging for experts from industrialized countries alone absorbed as much as 25% of the total aid.
Fifty years after the creation of the Bank and Fund, “90% of the $12 billion per year in technical assistance was still spent on foreign expertise.” That year, in 1994, George Ayittey noted that 80,000 Bank consultants worked on Africa alone, but that “less than .01%” were Africans.
Hancock writes that “the Bank, which puts more money into more schemes in more developing countries than any other institution, claims that ‘it seeks to meet the needs of the poorest people;’ but at no stage in what it refers to as the ‘project cycle’ does it actually take the time to ask the poor themselves how they perceive their needs… the poor are entirely left out of the decision-making progress — almost as if they don’t exist.”
Bank and Fund policy is forged in meetings in lavish hotels between people who will never have to live a day in poverty in their lives. As Joseph Stiglitz argues in his own criticism of the Bank and Fund, “modern high-tech warfare is designed to remove physical contact: dropping bombs from 50,000 feet ensures that one does not ‘feel’ what one does. Modern economic management is similar: from one’s luxury hotel, one can callously impose policies about which one would think twice if one knew the people whose lives one was destroying.”
Strikingly, Bank and Fund leaders are sometimes the very same people who drop the bombs. For example, Robert McNamara — probably the most transformative person in Bank history, famous for massively expanding its lending and sinking poor countries into inescapable debt — was first the CEO of the Ford corporation, before becoming U.S. defense secretary, where he sent 500,000 American troops to fight in Vietnam. After leaving the Bank, he went straight to the board of Royal Dutch Shell. A more recent World Bank head was Paul Wolfowitz, one of the key architects of the Iraq War.
The development set makes its decisions far away from the populations who end up feeling the impact, and they hide the details behind mountains of paperwork, reports and euphemistic jargon. Like the old British Colonial Office, the set conceals itself “like a cuttlefish, in a cloud of ink.”
The prolific and exhausting histories written by the set are hagiographies: the human experience is airbrushed out. A good example is a study called “Balance of Payments Adjustment, 1945 to 1986: The IMF Experience.” This author had the tedious experience of reading the entire tome. Benefits from colonialism are entirely ignored. The personal stories and human experiences of the people who suffered under Bank and Fund policy are elided. Hardship is buried under countless charts and statistics. These studies, which dominate the discourse, read as if their main priority is to avoid offending Bank or Fund staff. Sure, the tone implies that perhaps mistakes were made here or there, but the intentions of the Bank and Fund are good. They are here to help.
In one example from the aforementioned study, structural adjustment in Argentina in 1959 and 1960 is described as such: “While the measures had initially reduced the standard of living of a vast sector of the Argentine population, in relatively short time these measures had resulted in a favorable trade balance and balance of payments, an increase in foreign exchange reserves, a sharp reduction in the rate of increases in the cost of living, a stable exchange rate, and increased domestic and foreign investment.”
In layman’s terms: Sure, there was enormous impoverishment of the entire population, but hey, we got a better balance sheet, more savings for the regime, and more deals with multinational corporations.
The euphemisms keep coming. Poor countries are consistently described as “test cases.” The lexicon and jargon and language of development economics is designed to hide what is actually happening, to mask the cruel reality with terms and process and theory, and to avoid stating the underlying mechanism: rich countries siphoning resources from poor countries and enjoying double standards that enrich their populations while impoverishing people elsewhere.
The apotheosis of the Bank and Fund’s relationship with the developing world is their annual meeting in Washington, D.C.: a grand festival on poverty in the richest country on earth.
“Over mountainous piles of beautifully prepared food,” Hancock writes, “huge volumes of business get done; meanwhile staggering displays of dominance and ostentation get smoothly blended with empty and meaningless rhetoric about the predicament of the poor.”
“The 10,000 men and women attending,” he writes, “look extraordinarily unlikely to achieve [their] noble objectives; when not yawning or asleep at the plenary sessions they are to be found enjoying a series of cocktail parties, lunches, afternoon teas, dinners, and midnight snacks lavish enough to surfeit the greenest gourmand. The total cost of the 700 social events laid on for delegates during a single week [in 1989] was estimated at $10 million — a sum of money that might, perhaps, have better ‘served the needs of the poor’ had it been spent in some other way.”
This was 33 years ago: one can only imagine the cost of these parties in today’s dollars.
In his book “The Fiat Standard,” Saifedean Ammous has a different name for the development set: the misery industry. His description is worth quoting at length:
“When World Bank planning inevitably fails and the debts cannot be repaid, the IMF comes in to shake down the deadbeat countries, pillage their resources, and take control of political institutions. It is a symbiotic relationship between the two parasitic organizations that generates a lot of work, income and travel for the misery industry’s workers — at the expense of the poor countries that have to pay for it all in loans.”
“The more one reads about it,” Ammous writes, “the more one realizes how catastrophic it has been to hand this class of powerful yet unaccountable bureaucrats an endless line of fiat credit and unleash them on the world’s poor. This arrangement allows unelected foreigners with nothing at stake to control and centrally plan entire nations’ economies…. Indigenous populations are removed from their lands, private businesses are closed to protect monopoly rights, taxes are raised, and property is confiscated… tax-free deals are provided to international corporations under the auspices of the International Financial Institutions, while local producers pay ever-higher taxes and suffer from inflation to accommodate their governments’ fiscal incontinence.”
“As part of the debt relief deals signed with the misery industry,” he continues, “governments were asked to sell off some of their most prized assets. This included government enterprises, but also national resources and entire swaths of land. The IMF would usually auction these to multinational corporations and negotiate with governments for them to be exempt from local taxes and laws. After decades of saturating the world with easy credit, the IFIs spent the 1980s acting as repo men. They went through the wreckage of third-world countries devastated by their policies and sold whatever was valuable to multinational corporations, giving them protection from the law in the scrap heaps in which they operated. This reverse Robin Hood redistribution was the inevitable consequence of the dynamics created when these organizations were endowed with easy money.”
“By ensuring the whole world stays on the U.S. dollar standard,” Ammous concludes, “the IMF guarantees the US can continue to operate its inflationary monetary policy and export its inflation globally. Only when one understands the grand larceny at the heart of the global monetary system can one understand the plight of developing countries.”
X. White Elephants
“What Africa needs to do is grow, grow out of debt.”
–George Ayittey
By the mid-1970s, it was clear to Western policymakers, and especially to Bank president Robert McNamara, that the only way poor countries would be able to pay back their debt was with more debt.
The IMF had always paired its lending with structural adjustment, but for its first few decades, the Bank would give project-specific or sector-specific loans with no additional conditions attached. This changed during McNamara’s tenure, as less specific structural adjustment loans became popular and then even dominant at the Bank during the 1980s.
The reason was simple enough: Bank workers had a lot more money to lend out, and it was easier to give away large sums if the money was not tied to specific projects. As Payer notes, “twice as many dollars per staff week of work” could be disbursed through structural adjustment loans.
The borrowers, Hancock says, couldn’t be happier: “Corrupt ministers of finance and dictatorial presidents from Asia, Africa and Latin America tripped over their own expensive footwear in their unseemly haste to get adjusted. For such people money was probably never easier to obtain: with no complicated projects to administer and no messy accounts to keep, the venal, the cruel and the ugly laughed literally all the way to the bank. For them structural adjustment was like a dream come true. No sacrifices were demanded of them personally. All they had to do — amazing but true — was screw the poor.”
Beyond “general use” structural adjustment loans, the other way to spend large amounts of money was to finance massive, individual projects. These would become known as “white elephants,” and their carcasses still dot the deserts, mountains and forests of the developing world. These behemoths were notorious for their human and environmental devastation.
A good example would be the billion-dollar Inga dams, built in Zaire in 1972, whose Bank-funded architects electrified the exploitation of the mineral-rich Katanga province, without installing any transformers along the way to help the vast numbers of villagers who were still using oil lamps. Or the Chad-Cameroon pipeline in the 1990s: this $3.7 billion, Bank-funded project was built entirely to siphon resources out of the ground to enrich the Deby dictatorship and its foreign collaborators, without any benefits for the people. Between 1979 and 1983, Bank-financed hydroelectric projects “resulted in the involuntary resettlement of at least 400,000 to 450,000 people on four continents.”
Hancock details many such white elephants in “Lords Of Poverty.” One example is the Singrauli Power and Coal Mining Complex in India’s Uttar Pradesh state, which received nearly a billion dollars in Bank funding.
“Here,” Hancock writes, “because of ‘development,’ 300,000 poor rural people were subjected to frequent forced relocations as new mines and power stations opened… the land was totally destroyed and resembled scenes out of the lower circles of Dante’s inferno. Enormous amounts of dust and air and water pollution of every conceivable sort created tremendous public health problems. Tuberculosis was rampant, potable water supplies destroyed, and chloroquine-resistant malaria afflicted the area. Once prosperous villages and hamlets were replaced by unspeakable hovels and shacks on the edges of huge infrastructure projects… some people were living inside the open pit mines. Over 70,000 previously self-sufficient peasant farmers — deprived of all over possible sources of income — had no choice but to accept the indignity of intermittent employment at Singrauli for salaries of around 70 cents a day: below survival level even in India.”
In Guatemala, Hancock describes a giant hydroelectric dam called the Chixoy, built with World Bank support in the Mayan highlands.
“Originally budgeted at $340 million,” he writes, “the construction costs had risen to $1 billion by the time the dam was opened in 1985… the money was lent to the Guatemalan government by a consortium [led] by the World Bank… General Romero Lucas Arica’s military government, in power during the bulk of the construction phase and which signed the contract with the World Bank, was recognized by political analysts as having been the most corrupt administration in the history of a Central American country in a region that has been afflicted by more than its fair share of venal and dishonest regimes… members of the junta pocketed about $350 million out of the $1 billion provided for Chixoy.”
And finally in Brazil, Hancock details one of the Bank’s most harmful projects, a “massive colonization and resettlement scheme” known as Polonoroeste. By 1985, the Bank had committed $434.3 million to the initiative, which ended up transforming “poor people into refugees in their own land.”
The scheme “persuaded hundreds of thousands of needy people to migrate from Brazil’s central and southern provinces and relocate themselves as farmers in the Amazon basin” to generate cash crops. “The Bank’s money,” Hancock wrote, “paid for the speedy paving of Highway BR-364 which runs into the heart of the north-western province of Rondonia. All the settlers traveled along this road on their way to farms that they slashed and burned out of the jungle… Already 4% deforested in 1982, Rondonia was 11% deforested by 1985. NASA space surveys showed that the area of deforestation was doubled approximately every two years.”
As a result of the project, in 1988 “tropical forests covering an area larger than Belgium were burnt by settlers.” Hancock also notes that “more than 200,000 settlers were estimated to have contracted a particularly virulent strain of malaria, endemic in the north-west, to which they had no resistance.”
Such grotesque projects were the result of the massive growth of lending institutions, a detachment of the creditors from the actual places they were lending to, and management by unaccountable local autocrats who pocketed billions along the way. They were the outcome of policies that tried to lend as much money as possible to Third World countries to keep the debt Ponzi going and to keep the flow of resources from south to north moving. The grimmest example of all might be found in Indonesia.
XI. A Real-Life Pandora: The Exploitation Of West Papua
“You want a fair deal, you’re on the wrong planet.”
The island of New Guinea is resource-rich beyond imagination. It contains, just for starters: the third-largest expanse of tropical rainforest in the world, after the Amazon and the Congo; the world’s largest gold and copper mine at Grasberg, in the shadow of the 4,800 meter “Seven Summit” peak of Puncak Jaya; and, offshore, the Coral Triangle, a tropical sea known for its “unparalleled” reef diversity.
And yet, the people of the island, especially those living in the California-sized Western half under Indonesian control, are some of the poorest in the world. Resource colonialism has long been a curse for the residents of this territory, known as West Papua. Whether the pillage was committed by the Dutch, or, in more recent decades, the Indonesian government, imperialists have found generous support from the Bank and the Fund.
This essay already mentioned how one of the World Bank’s first loans was to the Dutch, which it used to try and sustain its colonial empire in Indonesia. In 1962, Imperial Holland was finally defeated, and gave up control over West Papua to the Sukarno government as Indonesia became independent. However, the Papuans (also known as the Irianese) wanted their own freedom.
In the course of that decade — as the IMF credited the Indonesian government with more than $100 million — Papuans were purged from positions of leadership. In 1969, in an event that would make Geroge Orwell’s Oceania blush, Jakarta held the “Act of Free Choice,” a poll where 1,025 people were rounded up and forced to vote in front of armed soldiers. The results to join Indonesia were unanimous, and the vote was ratified by the UN General Assembly. After that, locals had no say in what “development” projects would proceed. Oil, copper and timber were all harvested and removed from the island in the following decades, with no involvement by Papuans, except as forced labor.
The mines, highways and ports in West Papua were not built with the wellbeing of the population in mind, but rather were built to loot the island as efficiently as possible. As Payer was able to observe even in 1974, the IMF helped transform Indonesia’s vast natural resources into “mortgages for an indefinite future to subsidize an oppressive military dictatorship and to pay for imports which supported the lavish lifestyle of the generals in Jakarta.”
A 1959 article on the discovery of gold in the area is the beginning of the story of what would later become the Grasberg mine, the world’s lowest-cost and largest producer of copper and gold. In 1972, the Phoenix-based Freeport signed a deal with Indonesian dictator Suharto to extract gold and copper from West Papua, without any consent from the indigenous population. Until 2017, Freeport controlled 90% of the project’s shares, with 10% in the hands of the Indonesian government and 0% for the Amungme and Kamoro tribes who actually inhabit the area.
By the time Grasberg’s treasures are fully depleted by the Freeport corporation, the project will have generated some six billion tons of waste: more than twice as much rock as was excavated to dig the Panama Canal.
The ecosystems downstream from the mine have since been devastated and stripped of life as more than a billion tons of waste have been dumped “directly into a jungle river of what had been one of the world’s last untouched landscapes.” Satellite reports show the devastation wrought by the ongoing dumping of more than 200,000 of toxic tailings per day into an area that contains the Lorentz National Park, a world heritage site. Freeport remains the largest foreign taxpayer in Indonesia and the biggest employer in West Papua: it plans to stay until 2040, when the gold will run out.
As the World Bank writes candidly in its very own report on the region, “international business interests want better infrastructure in order to extract and export the non-renewable mineral and forest assets.”
By far the most shocking program that the Bank financed in West Papua was “transmigration,” a euphemism for settler colonialism. For more than a century, the powers in control of Java (home to most of Indonesia’s population) dreamed of moving large chunks of Javanese to farther-flung islands in the archipelago. Not just to spread things out, but also to ideologically “unify” the territory. In a 1985 speech, the Minister of Transmigration said that “by way of transmigration, we will try to … integrate all the ethnic groups into one nation, the Indonesian nation… The different ethnic groups will in the long run disappear because of integration … there will be one kind of man.”
These efforts to resettle Javanese — known as “Transmigrasi” — began during colonial times, but in the 1970s and 1980s the World Bank began financing these activities in an aggressive way. The Bank allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to the Suharto dictatorship to allow it to “transmigrate” what were hoped to be millions of people to places like East Timor and West Papua in what was “the world’s largest-ever exercise in human resettlement.” By 1986, the Bank had committed no less than $600 million directly to support transmigration, which entailed “a breathtaking combination of human rights abuses and environmental destruction.”
Consider the story of the Sago palm, one of the main traditional foodstuffs of Papuans. One tree alone was able to supply food for a family for six to 12 months. But the Indonesian government, at the encouragement of the Bank, came and said no, this is not working: you need to eat rice. And so the Sago gardens were cut down to grow rice for export. And the locals were forced to buy rice in the market, which simply made them more dependent on Jakarta.
Any resistance was met with brutality. Especially under Suharto — who held as many as 100,000 political prisoners — but even today in 2022, West Papua is a police state almost without rival. Foreign journalists are virtually banned; free speech does not exist; the military operates without any accountability. NGOs like Tapol document a legion of human rights violations ranging from mass surveillance of personal devices, restrictions on when and for what reason people can leave their homes and even rules on how Papuans can wear their hair.
Between 1979 and 1984, some 59,700 transmigrants were taken to West Papua, with “large scale” support from the World Bank. More than 20,000 Papuans fled the violence into neighboring Papua New Guinea. Refugees reported to international media that “their villages were bombed, their settlements burned, women raped, livestock killed, and numbers of people indiscriminately shot while others were imprisoned and tortured.”
A subsequent project backed by a $160 million Bank loan in 1985 was called “Transmigration V”: the seventh Bank-funded project in support of settler colonialism, it aimed to finance the relocation of 300,000 families between 1986 and 1992. The regime’s governor of West Papua at the time described the indigenous people as “living in a stone-age era” and called for a further two million Javanese migrants to be sent to the islands so that “backwards local people could intermarry with the newcomers thus giving birth to a new generation of people without curly hair.”
The original and final versions of the Transmigration V loan agreement were leaked to Survival International: the original version made “extensive reference to the bank’s policies on tribal peoples and provides a list of measures that would be required to comply with these,” but the final version made “no reference to the bank’s policies.”
Cultural genocide in West Papua
Transmigration V ran into budget issues, and was cut short, but ultimately 161,600 families were moved, at a cost of 14,146 Bank staff months. The Bank was clearly financing cultural genocide: today, Ethnic Papuans make up no more than 30% of the territory’s population. But social engineering wasn’t the only goal of taking money from the Bank: 17% of funds for transmigration projects were estimated to have been stolen by government officials.
Fifteen years later on December 11, 2001, the World Bank approved a $200 million loan to “improve road conditions” in West Papua and other parts of Eastern Indonesia. The project, known as EIRTP, aimed to “improve the condition of national and other strategic arterial roads in order to reduce transport costs and provide more reliable access among provincial centers, regional development and production areas, and other key transport facilities. Reducing road transport costs,” the Bank said, “will help to lower input prices, raise output prices and increase the competitiveness of local products from the affected areas.” In other words: the Bank was helping to extract resources as efficiently as possible.
The Bank and Fund’s history in Indonesia is so outrageous that it seems like it must be from another time, ages ago. But that’s simply not true. Between 2003 and 2008, the Bank funded palm oil development in Indonesia to the tune of nearly $200 million and hired private companies who were alleged to have “used fire to clear primary forests and seize lands belonging to indigenous people without due process.”
Today, the Indonesian government remains on the hook for the EIRTP loan. In the past five years, the Bank has collected $70 million in interest payments from the Indonesian government and taxpayer, all for its efforts to accelerate the extraction of resources from islands like West Papua.
One might consider bankruptcy an important and even essential part of capitalism. But the IMF basically exists to prevent the free market from working as it normally would: it bails out countries that normally would go bankrupt, forcing them instead deeper into debt.
The Fund makes the impossible possible: small, poor countries hold so much debt that they could never pay it all off. These bailouts corrupt the incentives of the global financial system. In a true free market, there would be serious consequences for risky lending: the creditor bank could lose its money.
The exponential rise of Third World debt
When the U.S., Europe or Japan made their deposits at the Bank and Fund, it was similar to purchasing insurance on their ability to extract wealth from developing nations. Their private banks and multinational corporations are protected by the bailout scheme, and on top of it, they earn handsome, steady interest (paid for by poor countries) on what is widely perceived to be humanitarian assistance.
As David Graeber writes in “Debt,” when banks “lent money to dictators in Bolivia and Gabon in the late ’70s: [they made] utterly irresponsible loans with the full knowledge that, once it became known they had done so, politicians and bureaucrats would scramble to ensure that they’d still be reimbursed anyway, no matter how many lives had to be devastated and destroyed in order to do it.”
Kevin Danaher describes the tension that began to emerge in the 1960s: “Borrowers began to pay back more annually to the Bank than it disbursed in new loans. In 1963, 1964, and 1969 India transferred more money to the World Bank than the Bank disbursed to it.” Technically, India was paying off its debts plus interest, but the Bank’s leadership saw a crisis.
“To solve the problem,” Danaher continues, Bank president Robert McNamara increased lending “at a phenomenal rate, from $953 million in 1968 to $12.4 billion in 1981.” The number of IMF lending programs also “more than doubled” from 1976 to 1983, mostly to poor countries. The Bank and the Fund’s assurances led the world’s titanic money center banks as well as hundreds of regional and local banks in the U.S. and Europe — “most of them with little or no previous history of foreign lending” — to go on an unprecedented lending spree.
The Third World debt bubble finally burst in 1982, when Mexico announced a default. According to official IMF history, “private bankers envisaged the dreaded possibility of a widespread repudiation of debts, such as had occurred in the 1930s: at that time the debt owed by debtor countries to industrial counties was mostly in the form of securities issued by debtor countries in the US and in the form of bonds sold abroad; in the 1980s the debt was almost entirely in the form of short and medium term loans from commercial banks in the industrial members. Monetary authorities of industrial members instantly realized the urgency of the problem posed for the world’s banking system.”
In other words: the threat that the banks of the West might have holes on their balance sheet was the danger: not that millions would die of austerity programs in poor countries. In her book “A Fate Worse Than Debt,” the development critic Susan George charts how the top-nine largest U.S. banks all had placed more than 100% of their shareholders’ equity in “loans to Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela alone.” The crisis was averted, however, as the IMF helped credit flow to Third World countries, even though they should have gone bankrupt.
“Simply put,” according to a technical analysis of the Fund, its programs “provide bailouts for private lenders to emerging markets, thereby allowing international creditors to benefit from foreign lending without bearing the full risks involved: the banks reap significant profits if borrowers repay their debts and avoid losses if financial crisis occur”
Latin American citizens suffered under structural adjustment, but between 1982 and 1985. George reported that “in spite of over-exposure to Latin America, dividends declared by the big nine banks increased by more than a third during the same period.” Profits in that time rose by 84% at Chase Manhattan and 66% at Banker’s Trust, and stock value rose by 86% at Chase and 83% at Citicorp.
“Clearly,” she wrote, “austerity is not the term to describe the experiences since 1982 of either the Third World elite or the international banks: the parties that contracted the loans in the first place.”
The “generosity” of the West enabled unaccountable leaders to plunge their nations into debt deeper than ever before. The system was, as Payer writes in “Lent And Lost,” a straightforward Ponzi scheme: the new loans went straight to paying for the old loans. The system needed to grow to avoid collapse.
“By keeping financing going,” an IMF managing director said, according to Payer, structural adjustment loans “permitted trade that might otherwise not have been possible.”
Given that the Bank and Fund will prevent even the most comically corrupt and wasteful governments from going bankrupt, private banks adapted their behavior accordingly. A good example would be Argentina, which has received 22 IMF loans since 1959, even trying to default in 2001. One would think that creditors would stop lending to such a profligate borrower. But in fact, just four years ago, Argentina received the largest IMF loan of all time, a staggering $57.1 billion.
Payer summed up “The Debt Trap” by stating that the moral of her work was “both simple and old-fashioned: that nations, like individuals, cannot spend more than they earn without falling into debt, and a heavy debt burden bars the way to autonomous action.”
But the system makes the deal too sweet for the creditors: profits are monopolized while losses are socialized.
Payer realized this even 50 years ago in 1974, and hence concluded that “in the long run it is more realistic to withdraw from an exploitative system and suffer the dislocation of readjustment than it is to petition the exploiters for a degree of relief.”
In a true global free market, the policies that the Bank and Fund impose on poor countries might make sense. After all, the record of socialism and large-scale nationalization of industry is disastrous. The problem is, the world is not a free market, and double standards are everywhere.
Subsidies — for example, free rice in Sri Lanka or discounted fuel in Nigeria — are ended by the IMF, yet creditor nations like the U.K. and U.S. extend state-funded healthcare and crop subsidies to their own populations.
One can take a Libertarian or Marxist view and arrive at the same conclusion: this is a double standard which enriches some countries at the expense of others, with most citizens of rich countries blissfully unaware.
To help build out from the rubble of World War II, IMF creditors relied heavily on central planning and anti-free market policy for the first few decades after Bretton Woods: for example, import restrictions, capital outflow limits, foreign exchange caps and crop subsidies. These measures protected industrial economies when they were most vulnerable.
In the U.S., for example, the Interest Equalization Act was passed by John F. Kennedy to stop Americans from buying foreign securities and instead focus them on domestic investing. This was one of many measures to tighten capital controls. But the Bank and Fund have historically prevented poor countries from using the same tactics to defend themselves.
As Payer observes, “The IMF has never played a deciding role in the adjustment of exchange rates and trade practices among the wealthy developed nations… It is the weaker nations which are subjected to the full force of the IMF principles… the inequality of power relationships meant that the Fund could do nothing about market ‘distortions’ (such as trade protection) which were practiced by the rich countries.”
Cato’s Vásquez and Bandow came to a similar conclusion, noting that “most industrialized nations have maintained a patronizing attitude towards underdeveloped nations, hypocritically shutting out their exports.”
In the early 1990s, while the U.S. stressed the importance of free trade, it “erected a virtual iron curtain against [Eastern Europe’s] exports, including textiles, steel, and agricultural products.” Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan were all targeted. The U.S. prevented Eastern European nations from selling “a single pound of butter, dry milk, or ice cream in America” and both the Bush and Clinton administrations imposed stiff chemical and pharmaceutical import restrictions on the region.
It is estimated that protectionism by industrial countries “reduces developing countries’ national income by roughly twice as much as provided by development assistance.” In other words, if Western nations simply opened their economies, they wouldn’t have to provide any development assistance at all.
There is a sinister twist to the arrangement: when a Western country (i.e., the U.S.) runs into an inflationary crisis — like today’s — and is forced to tighten its monetary policy, it actually gains more control over developing countries and their resources, whose dollar debt becomes much more difficult to pay back, and who fall deeper into the debt trap, and deeper into Bank and Fund conditionality.
In 2008, during the Great Financial Crisis, American and European authorities lowered interest rates and juiced up banks with extra cash. During the Third World Debt Crisis and the Asian Financial Crisis, the Bank and Fund refused to permit this kind of behavior. Instead, the recommendation to afflicted economies was to tighten at home and borrow more from abroad.
In September 2022, newspaper headlines stated that the IMF was “worried” about inflation in the United Kingdom, as its bond market teetered on the brink of collapse. This is of course another hypocrisy, given that the IMF did not seem worried about inflation when it imposed currency devaluation on billions of people for decades. Creditor nations play by different rules.
In a final case of “do as I say, not as I do,” the IMF still holds a whopping 90.5 million ounces — or 2,814 metric tons — of gold. Most of this was accumulated in the 1940s, when members were forced to pay 25% of their original quotas in gold. In fact, until the 1970s, members “normally paid all interest owed on IMF credit in gold.”
When Richard Nixon formally ended the gold standard in 1971, the IMF did not sell its gold reserves. And yet, attempts by any member countries to fix their currency to gold are forbidden.
XIV. Green Colonialism
“If you turned the electricity off for a few months in any developed Western society, 500 years of supposed philosophical progress about human rights and individualism would quickly evaporate like they never happened.”
In the past few decades, a new double standard has emerged: green colonialism. This, at least, is what the Senegalese entrepreneur Magatte Wade calls the West’s hypocrisy over energy use in an interview for this article.
Wade reminds us that industrial countries developed their civilizations by utilizing hydrocarbons (in large part stolen or bought on the cheap from poor countries or colonies), but today the Bank and Fund try to push policies which prohibit the developing world from doing the same.
Where the U.S. and U.K. were able to use coal and the Third World’s oil, the Bank and Fund want African countries to use solar and wind manufactured and financed by the West.
This hypocrisy was on display a few weeks ago in Egypt, where world leaders gathered at COP 27 (the Sharm el-Sheikh Climate Change Conference) to discuss how to reduce energy use. The location on the African continent was intentional. Western leaders — currently scrambling to import more fossil fuels after their access to Russian hydrocarbons was curtailed — flew in on gas-guzzling private jets to plead with poor countries to reduce their carbon footprint. In typical Bank and Fund tradition, the ceremonies were hosted by the resident military dictator. During the festivities, Alaa Abd Al Fattah, a prominent Egyptian human rights activist, languished nearby on hunger strike in prison.
British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak arrives at COP 27 on a private jet
“Just like back in the day when we were colonized and the colonizers set the rules to how our societies would work,” Wade said, “this green agenda is a new form of governing us. This is master now dictating to us what our relationship with energy should be, telling us what kind of energy we should use, and when we can use it. The oil is in our soil, it is part of our sovereignty: but now they are saying we cannot use it? Even after they looted incalculable amounts for themselves?”
Wade points out that as soon as the core countries have an economic crisis (as they now face heading into the winter of 2022), they go right back to using fossil fuels. She observes that poor countries aren’t allowed to develop nuclear energy, and notes that when Third World leaders tried to push in this direction in the past, some of them — notably in Pakistan and Brazil — were assassinated.
Wade says her life’s work is prosperity building in Africa. She was born in Senegal, and moved to Germany at age seven. She still remembers her first day in Europe. She was used to a shower being a 30-minute affair: get the coal stove going, boil the water, put some cold water in it to cool it down, and drag the water to the shower area. But in Germany, all she had to do was turn a handle.
“I was shocked,” she says. “This question defined the rest of my life: How come they have this here but we don’t over there?”
Wade learned over time that reasons for Western success included the rule of law, clear and transferable property rights, and stable currencies. But, also, critically, reliable energy access.
“We can’t have limitations on our energy use imposed on us by others,” Wade said. And yet, the Bank and Fund continue to put pressure on energy policy in poor countries. Last month, Haiti followed pressure from the Bank and Fund to end its fuel subsidies. “The result,” wrote energy reporter Michael Schellenberger, “has been riots, looting, and chaos.”
“In 2018,” Schellenberger says, “the Haitian government agreed to IMF demands that it cut fuel subsidies as a prerequisite for receiving $96 million from the World Bank, European Union, and Inter-American Development bank, triggering protests that resulted in the resignation of the prime minister.”
“In over 40 nations since 2005,” he says, “riots have been triggered after cutting fuel subsidies or otherwise raising energy prices.”
It is the height of hypocrisy for the West to achieve success based on robust energy consumption and on energy subsidies, and then try to limit the type and amount of energy used by poor countries and then raise the price that their citizens pay. This amounts to a Malthusian scheme in line with former Bank chief Robert McNamara’s well-documented belief that population growth was a threat to humanity. The solution, of course, was always to try and reduce the population of poor countries, not rich ones.
“They treat us like little experiments,” Wade says, “where the West says: we might lose some people along the way, but let’s see if poor countries can develop without the energy types we used.”
“Well,” she says,” “we are not an experiment.”
XV. The Human Toll Of Structural Adjustment
“To the World Bank, development means growth… But … unrestrained growth is the ideology of the cancer cell.”
The social impact of structural adjustment is immense, and barely ever gets mentioned in traditional analysis of the Bank and Fund’s policy. There have been plenty of exhaustive studies done on their economic impact, but very little comparatively on their global health impact.
Researchers like Ayittey, Hancock and Payer give a few jarring examples from the 1970s and 1980s:
Between 1977 and 1985, Peru undertook IMF structural adjustment: the average per capita income of Peruvians fell 20%, and inflation soared from 30% to 160%. By 1985, a worker’s pay was only worth 64% of what it had been worth in 1979 and 44% of what it had been in 1973. Child malnutrition rose from 42% to 68% of the population.
In 1984 and 1985 the Philippines under Marcos implemented yet another round of IMF structural reform: after one year, GNP per capita regressed to 1975 levels. Real earnings fell by 46% among urban wage earners.
In Sri Lanka, the poorest 30% suffered an uninterrupted decline in calorie consumption after more than a decade of structural adjustment.
In Brazil, the number of citizens suffering from malnutrition jumped from 27 million (one third of the population) in 1961 to 86 million (two thirds of the population) in 1985 after 10 doses of structural adjustment.
Between 1975 and 1984 in IMF-guided Bolivia, the number of hours the average citizen had to work to purchase 1,000 calories of bread, beans, corn, wheat, sugar, potatoes, milk or quinoa increased on average by five times.
After structural adjustment in Jamaica in 1984, the nutritional purchasing power of one Jamaican dollar plummeted in 14 months from being able to buy 2,232 calories of flour to just 1,443; from 1,649 calories of rice to 905; from 1,037 calories of condensed milk to 508; and from 220 calories of chicken to 174.
As a result of structural adjustment, Mexican real wages declined in the 1980s by more than 75%. In 1986, about 70% of lower-income Mexicans had “virtually stopped eating rice, eggs, fruit, vegetables, and milk (never mind meat or fish)” at a time when their government was paying $27 million per day — $18,750 per minute — in interest to its creditors. By the 1990s, “a family of four on the minimum wage (which made up 60% of the employed labor force) could only buy 25% of its basic needs.
In sub-Saharan Africa, GNP per capita “dropped steadily from $624 in 1980 to $513 in 1998… food production per capita in Africa was 105 in 1980 but 92 for 1997… and food imports rose an astonishing 65% between 1988 and 1997.”
These examples, though tragic, only give a small and patchwork picture of the deleterious impact that Bank and Fund policies have had on the health of the world’s poor.
On average, every year from 1980 to 1985, there were 47 countries in the Third World pursuing IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programs, and 21 developing countries pursuing structural or sector adjustment loans from the World Bank. During this same period, 75% of all countries in Latin America and Africa experienced declines in per capita income and child welfare.
The decline in living standards make sense when one considers that Bank and Fund policies sculpted societies to focus on exports at the expense of consumption while gutting food security and healthcare services.
During IMF structural adjustment, real wages in countries like Kenya declined by more than 40%. After billions in Bank and Fund credit, per capita food production in Africa fell by nearly 20% between 1960 and 1994. Meanwhile, health expenditures in “IMF-World Bank programmed countries” declined by 50% during the 1980s.
When food security and healthcare collapse, people die.
Papers from 2011 and 2013 showed that countries that took a structural adjustment loan had higher levels of child mortality than those that did not. A 2017 analysis was “virtually unanimous in finding a detrimental association between structural adjustment and child and maternal health outcomes.” A 2020 study reviewed data from 137 developing countries between 1980 and 2014 and found that “structural adjustment reforms lower health system access and increase neonatal mortality.” A paper from 2021 concluded that structural adjustment plays “a significant role in perpetuating preventable disability and death.”
It is impossible to do a full accounting of just how many women, men and children were killed as a result of Bank and Fund austerity policies.
Food security advocate Davidson Budhoo claimed that six million children died each year in Africa, Asia and Latin America between 1982 and 1994 as a result of structural adjustment. This would put the Bank and Fund’s death toll in the same ballpark as the deaths caused by Stalin and Mao.
Is this remotely possible? No one will ever know. But by looking at the data, we can begin to get a sense.
Research from Mexico — a typical country in terms of consistent involvement historically from the Bank and Fund — shows that for every 2% decrease in GDP, the mortality rate increased by 1%.
Now consider that as a result of structural adjustment, the GDP of dozens of countries in the Third World between the 1960s and 1990s suffered double-digit contractions. Despite massive population growth, many of these economies stagnated or shrank over 15-25 year periods. Meaning: the Bank and the Fund’s policies likely killed tens of millions of people.
Whatever the final death toll, there are two certainties: one, these are crimes against humanity, and two, no Bank or Fund officials will ever go to prison. There will never be any accountability or justice.
The inescapable reality is that millions died too young in order to extend and improve the lives of millions elsewhere. It is of course true that much of the success of the West is because of enlightenment values like rule of law, free speech, liberal democracy and domestic respect for human rights. But the unspoken truth is that much of the West’s success is also the result of resource and time theft from poor countries.
The stolen wealth and labor of the Third World will go unpunished but remains visible today, forever encrusted in the developed world’s architecture, culture, science, technology and quality of life. The next time one visits London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, Amsterdam or Berlin, this author suggests going for a walk and pausing at a particularly impressive or scenic view of the city to reflect on this. As the old saying goes, “We must pass through the darkness to reach the light.”
XVI. A Trillion Dollars: The Bank And Fund In The Post-COVID World
Bank and Fund policy towards developing countries has not changed much over the past few decades. Sure, there have been a few superficial tweaks, like the “Highly-Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC) initiative, where some governments can qualify for debt relief. But underneath the new language, even these poorest of the poor countries still need to do structural adjustment. It’s just been rebranded to “Poverty Reduction Strategy.”
The same rules still apply: in Guyana, for example, “the government decided in early 2000 to increase the salaries of civil servants by 3.5%, after a fall in purchasing power of 30% over the previous five years.” The IMF immediately threatened to remove Guyana from the new list of HIPCs. “After a few months, the government had to backpedal.”
The same large-scale devastation still occurs. In a 2015 International Consortium Of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) report, for instance, it was estimated that 3.4 million people were displaced in the previous decade by Bank-funded projects. The old accounting games, meant to exaggerate the good done by assistance, are joined by new ones.
The U.S. government applies a 92% discount to the debt of Highly-Indebted Poor Countries, and yet U.S. authorities include the nominal value of the debt relief in their “ODA” (official development assistance) numbers. Meaning: they significantly exaggerate the volume of their aid. The Financial Times has argued that it is “the aid that isn’t” and has argued that “writing off official commercial debt should not count as aid.”
While it’s true that there have actually been large transformations at the Bank and Fund in recent years, those changes have not been in the way that the institutions try to shape the economies of borrowing countries, but rather in that they have focused their efforts on nations closer to the world’s economic core.
“By practically any metric,” a NBER study observes, “the post-2008 IMF programs to several European economies are the largest in the IMF’s 70-year history.”
The largest IMF bailouts in history
“IMF commitments as a share of world GDP,” the study explains, “hit an all-time high as the European Debt Crisis began to unravel.” Iceland began an IMF program in 2008, followed by Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
The IMF-led bailout of Greece was a staggering $375 billion. In July 2015, “popular discontent led to a ‘no’ vote in a referendum on whether to accept the IMF’s loan conditions, which included raising taxes, lowering pensions and other spending, and privatizing industries.”
In the end, however, the Greek people’s voice wasn’t heard since “the government subsequently ignored the results and accepted the loans.”
The Fund used the same playbook in Greece and other lower-income European countries as it has used all over the developing world for decades: breaking democratic norms to provide billions to the elites, with austerity for the masses.
In the past two years, the Bank and Fund have pumped hundreds of billions of dollars into countries following government lockdowns and COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. More loans were given out in a shorter time than ever before.
Even in late 2022 as interest rates continue to rise, the debt of poor countries keeps rising, and the amount they owe to rich countries keeps growing. History rhymes, and IMF visits to dozens of countries remind us of the early 1980s, when a massive debt bubble was popped by Federal Reserve policies. What followed was the worst depression in the Third World since the 1930s.
We can hope that this does not happen again, but given the Bank and the Fund’s efforts to load up poor countries with more debt than ever before, and given that the cost of borrowing is going up in a historic way, we can predict that it will happen again.
And even where the Bank and Fund’s influence shrinks, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is beginning to step in. In the past decade, China has tried to emulate the dynamics of the IMF and World Bank through its own development institutions and through its “Belt and Road” initiative.
As the Indian geostrategist Brahma Chellaney writes, “Through its $1 trillion ‘one belt, one road’ initiative, China is supporting infrastructure projects in strategically located developing countries, often by extending huge loans to their governments. As a result, countries are becoming ensnared in a debt trap that leaves them vulnerable to China’s influence… the projects that China is supporting are often intended not to support the local economy, but to facilitate Chinese access to natural resources, or to open the market for its low-cost and shoddy export goods. In many cases, China even sends its own construction workers, minimizing the number of local jobs that are created.”
The last thing the world needs is another Bank and Fund drain dynamic, only pulling resources from poor countries to go to the genocidal dictatorship in Beijing. So it is good to see the CCP having trouble in this area. It is trying to grow its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank by more than $10 billion per year, but it is encountering a variety of issues with projects that it financed across the developing world. Some governments, like in Sri Lanka, simply cannot pay back. Since the CCP cannot mint the world reserve currency, it actually has to eat the loss. Because of this, it won’t likely be able to come anywhere close to approximating the lending volume of the U.S.-Europe-Japan-led system.
Which is certainly a good thing: CCP loans may not come with onerous structural adjustment conditions, but they certainly don’t have any considerations for human rights. In fact, the CCP helped shield one belt and road client — Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa — from war crimes allegations at the UN. Looking at its projects in Southeast Asia (where it is depleting Burmese minerals and timber and eroding Pakistani sovereignty) and sub-Saharan Africa (where it is extracting an enormous amount of rare earths), it largely amounts to the same kind of resource theft and geopolitical control tactics practiced by colonial powers for centuries, just dressed up in a new kind of clothing.
It’s not clear that the Bank and Fund even view the CCP as a bad actor. After all, Wall Street and Silicon Valley tend to be quite friendly with the world’s worst dictators. China remains a creditor at the Bank and Fund: its membership has never been in question, despite the genocide of the Uyghur people. As long as the CCP does not get in the way of the big picture goals, the Bank and Fund probably don’t mind. There’s enough loot to go around.
In 1979, developing nations gathered in the Tanzanian city of Arusha to devise an alternative plan to the IMF- and World Bank-led structural adjustment that had left them with mountains of debt and very little say as to the future of the world economy.
“Those who wield power control money,” the delegates wrote: “Those who manage and control money wield power. An international monetary system is both a function and an instrument of prevailing power structures.”
As Stefan Eich writes in “The Currency Of Politics,” “the Arusha Initiative’s emphasis on the international monetary system’s burden of hierarchical imbalances was a powerful attempt to insist on money’s political nature by countering claims to neutral technical expertise asserted by the Fund’s money doctors.”
“The IMF may have claimed a neutral, objective, scientific stance,” Eich writes, “but all scholarly evidence, including the Fund’s internal documentation, pointed the other way. The Fund was, in fact, deeply ideological in the way it framed underdevelopment as a lack of private markets but systematically applied double standards in ignoring similar market controls in ‘developed’ countries.”
This resonates with what Cheryl Payer observed, that Bank and Fund economists “erected a mystique around their subject which intimidated even other economists.”
“They represent themselves,” she said, “as highly trained technicians who determine the ‘correct’ exchange rate and ‘proper’ amount of money creation on the basis of complex formulas. They deny the political significance of their work.”
Like most of the leftist discourse on the Bank and Fund, the criticisms made at Arusha were mostly on target: the institutions were exploitative, and enriched their creditors at the expense of poor countries. But Arusha’s solutions missed the mark: central planning, social engineering and nationalization.
The Arusha delegates advocated for the Bank and Fund to be abolished, and for odious debts to be canceled: perhaps noble but entirely unrealistic goals. Beyond that, their best plan of action was “shift power into the hands of local governments” — a poor solution given that the vast majority of Third World countries were dictatorships.
For decades, the public in developing countries suffered as their leaders wavered between selling out their country to multinational corporations and socialist authoritarianism. Both options were destructive.
This is the trap that Ghana has found itself in since independence from the British Empire. More often than not, the Ghanaian authorities, regardless of ideology, chose the option of borrowing from abroad.
Ghana has a stereotypical history with the Bank and Fund: military leaders seizing power by coup only to impose IMF structural adjustment; real wages dropping between 1971 and 1982 by 82%, with public health spending shrinking 90% and meat prices up 400% during the same time; borrowing to build enormous white elephant projects like the Akosombo Dam, which powered a U.S.-owned aluminum plant at the expense of more than 150,000 people who contracted river blindness and paralysis from the creation of the world’s largest manmade lake; and a depletion of 75% of the country’s rainforests as timber, cocoa and minerals industries boomed while domestic food production cratered. $2.2 billion of assistance flowed into Ghana in 2022, but the debt stands at an all-time high of $31 billion, up from $750 million 50 years ago.
Since 1982, under IMF “guidance,” the Ghanaian cedi was devalued by 38,000%. One of the biggest outcomes of structural adjustment has been, like elsewhere around the world, expedition of the extraction of Ghana’s natural resources. Between 1990 and 2002, for example, the government only received $87.3 million from the $5.2 billion worth of gold mined out of Ghanaian soil: in other words, 98.4% of the profits from gold mining in Ghana went to foreigners.
As Ghanaian protestor Lyle Pratt says, “The IMF is not here to bring down prices, they are not here to ensure that we construct roads — it is not their business and they simply don’t care… The IMF’s primary concern is to make sure that we build the capacity to pay our loans, not to develop.”
2022 feels like a rerun. The Ghanaian cedi has been one of the world’s worst-performing currencies this year, losing 48.5% of its value since January. The country is facing a debt crisis, and, like in decades past, is forced to prioritize paying back its creditors over investing in its own people.
In October, just a few weeks ago, the country received its latest IMF visit. If a loan is finalized, it would be the 17th IMF loan for Ghana since the CIA-backed military coup of 1966. That is 17 layers of structural adjustment.
A visit from the IMF is a bit like a visit from the Grim Reaper — it can only mean one thing: more austerity, pain, and — without exaggeration — death. Perhaps the wealthy and well-connected can escape unscathed or even enriched, but for the poor and working classes, the currency devaluation, rising interest rates and disappearance of bank credit is devastating. This is not the Ghana of 1973 that Cheryl Payer first wrote about in “The Debt Trap”: it is 50 years later, and the trap is 40 times deeper.
But perhaps there is a glimmer of hope.
On December 5 to 7, 2022 in the Ghanaian capital of Accra, there will be a different kind of visit. Instead of creditors looking to charge interest on the people of Ghana and dictate their industries, the speakers and organizers of the Africa Bitcoin Conference are gathering to share information, open-source tools and decentralizing tactics on how to build economic activity beyond the control of corrupt governments and foreign multinational corporations.
Farida Nabourema is the lead organizer. She is pro-democracy; pro-poor; anti-Bank and Fund; anti-authoritarian; and pro-Bitcoin.
“The real issue,” Cheryl Payer once wrote, “is who controls the capital and technology that is exported to the poorer countries.”
One can argue that Bitcoin as capital and as technology is being exported to Ghana and Togo: it certainly didn’t arise there. But it’s not clear where it arose. No one knows who created it. And no government or corporation can control it.
Bitcoin and cryptocurrency ownership per capita: countries with a history of IMF structural adjustments tend to rank very high
During the gold standard, the violence of colonialism corrupted a neutral monetary standard. In the post-colonial world, a fiat monetary standard — upheld by the Bank and Fund — corrupted a post-colonial power structure. For the Third World, perhaps a post-colonial, post-fiat world will be the right mix.
Proponents of dependency theory like Samir Amin gathered at conferences like Arusha and called for a “delinking” of poor countries from rich ones. The idea was: the wealth of rich countries was not just attributable to their liberal democracies, property rights and entrepreneurial environments, but also to their resource and labor theft from poor countries. Sever that drain, and poor countries could get a leg up. Amin predicted that “the construction of a system beyond capitalism will have to begin in the peripheral areas.” If we agree with Allen Farrington that today’s fiat system is not capitalism, and that the current dollar system is deeply flawed, then perhaps Amin was right. A new system is more likely to emerge in Accra, not Washington or London.
As Saifedean Ammous writes, “The developing world consists of countries that had not yet adopted modern industrial technologies by the time an inflationary global monetary system began replacing a relatively sound one in 1914. This dysfunctional global monetary system continuously compromised these countries’ development by enabling local and foreign governments to expropriate the wealth produced by their people.”
In other words: rich countries got industrialized before they got fiat: poor countries got fiat before they got industrialized. The only way to break the cycle of dependency, according to Nabourema and other organizers of the Africa Bitcoin Conference, might be to transcend fiat.
XVIII. A Glimmer of Hope
“The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust that’s required to make it work. The central bank must be trusted not to debase the currency, but the history of fiat currencies is full of breaches of that trust.”
Whatever the answer is to poverty in the Third World, we know it is not more debt. “The poor of the world,” Cheryl Payer concludes, “don’t need another ‘bank,’ however benign. They need decently paid work, responsive government, civil rights, and national autonomy.”
For seven decades, the World Bank and IMF have been enemies of all four.
Looking forward, says Payer, “the most important task for those in the wealthy countries who are concerned with international solidarity is to actively fight to end the flow of foreign aid.” The problem is that the current system is designed and incentivized to keep this flow going. The only way to make a change is through a total paradigm shift.
We already know that Bitcoin can help individuals inside developing countries gain personal financial freedom and escape the broken systems imposed on them by their corrupt rulers and international financial institutions. This is what will be accelerated in Accra next month, contra the designs of the Bank and Fund. But can Bitcoin actually change the core-periphery dynamics of the world’s power and resource structure?
Nabourema is hopeful, and doesn’t understand why leftists in general condemn or ignore Bitcoin.
“A tool that is capable of allowing people to build and access wealth independent from institutions of control can be seen as a leftist project,” she says. “As an activist that believes that citizens should be paid in currencies that actually value their life and sacrifices, Bitcoin is a people’s revolution.”
“I find it painful,” she says, “that a farmer in sub-Saharan Africa only earns 1% of the price of coffee on the global market. If we can get to a stage where farmers can sell their coffee without so many middle institutions more directly to the buyers, and get paid in bitcoin, you could imagine how much of a difference that would make in their lives.”
“Today,” she says, “our countries in the Global South still borrow money in U.S. dollars, but over time our currencies depreciate and lose value and we end up having to make twice or three times the payment we initially promised in order to reimburse our creditors.”
“Now imagine,” she says, “if we get to a stage in 10 or 20 years where bitcoin is the global money that is accepted for business worldwide, where every nation has to borrow in bitcoin and spend bitcoin and every nation has to pay their debts in bitcoin. In that world, then foreign governments cannot demand that we repay them in currencies that we need to earn but they can simply print; and just because they decide to increase their interest rates, it won’t automatically jeopardize the lives of millions or billions of people in our countries.”
“Of course,” Nabourema says, “Bitcoin is going to come with issues like any innovation. But the beauty is that those issues can be improved with peaceful, global collaboration. No one knew 20 years ago what amazing things the internet allows us to do today. No one can tell what amazing things Bitcoin will allow us to do in 20 years.”
“The way forward,” she says, “is an awakening of the masses: for them to understand the ins and outs of how the system works and to understand that there are alternatives. We have to be in a position where people can reclaim their liberty, where their lives aren’t controlled by authorities that can confiscate their freedom at any time without consequences. Gradually we are getting closer to this goal with Bitcoin.”
“Since money is the center of everything in our world,” Nabourema says, “the fact that we are now able to obtain financial independence is so important for people in our countries, as we seek to reclaim our rights in every field and sector.”
In an interview for this article, deflation advocate Jeff Booth explains that as the world approaches a bitcoin standard, the Bank and the Fund will be less likely to be creditors, and more likely to be co-investors, partners, or simply grantors. As prices fall over time, this means debt gets more expensive and more difficult to repay. And with the U.S. money printer turned off, there would be no more bailouts. At first, he suggests, the Bank and Fund will try to continue to lend, but for the first time they’ll actually lose big chunks of money as countries freely default as they move onto a bitcoin standard. So they may consider co-investing instead, where they might become more interested in the real success and sustainability of the projects they support as the risk is more equally shared.
Bitcoin mining is an additional area of potential change. If poor countries can exchange their natural resources for money without dealing with foreign powers, then maybe their sovereignty can strengthen, instead of erode. Through mining, the vast amounts of river power, hydrocarbons, sun, wind, ground warmth, and offshore OTEC in emerging markets could be converted directly to the world reserve currency without permission. This has never before been possible. The debt trap seems truly inescapable for most poor countries, continuing to grow every year. Maybe investing in anti-fiat Bitcoin reserves, services and infrastructure is a way out and a path to striking back.
Bitcoin, Booth says, can short-circuit the old system that has subsidized wealthy countries at the expense of wages in poor countries. In that old system, the periphery had to be sacrificed to protect the core. In the new system, the periphery and core can work together. Right now, he says, the U.S. dollar system keeps people poor through wage deflation in the periphery. But by equalizing the money and creating a neutral standard for everyone, a different dynamic is created. With one monetary standard, labor rates would be necessarily pulled closer together, instead of kept apart. We don’t have words for such a dynamic, Booth says, because it has never existed: he suggests “forced cooperation.”
Booth describes the U.S. ability to instantly issue any amount of more debt as “theft in base money.” Readers may be familiar with the Cantillon effect, where those who are closest to the money printer benefit from fresh cash while those farthest away suffer. Well, it turns out there is a global Cantillon effect, too, where the U.S. benefits from issuing the global reserve currency, and poor countries suffer.
“A bitcoin standard,” Booth says, “ends this.”
How much of the world’s debt is odious? There are trillions of dollars of loans created at the whim of dictators and unelected supranational financial institutions, with zero consent from the people on the borrowing side of the deal. The moral thing to do would be to cancel this debt, but of course, that will never happen because the loans exist ultimately as assets on the balance sheets of the creditors of the Bank and Fund. They will always prefer to keep the assets and simply create new debt to pay the old.
The IMF “put” on sovereign debt creates the biggest bubble of all: bigger than the dot-com bubble, bigger than the subprime mortgage bubble, and bigger even than the stimulus-powered COVID bubble. Unwinding this system will be extremely painful, but it’s the right thing to do. If debt is the drug, and the Bank and Fund are the dealers, and the developing country governments are the addicts, then it’s unlikely either party will want to stop. But to heal, the addicts need to go to rehab. The fiat system makes this basically impossible. In the Bitcoin system, it may get to the point where the patient has no other choice.
As Saifedean Ammous says in an interview for this article, today, if Brazil’s rulers want to borrow $30 billion and the U.S. Congress agrees, America can snap its fingers and allocate the funds through the IMF. It’s a political decision. But, he says, if we get rid of the money printer, then these decisions become less political and start to resemble the more prudent decision-making of a bank that knows no bailout will come.
In the last 60 years of Bank and Fund dominance, countless tyrants and kleptocrats were bailed out — against any financial common sense — so that their nations’ natural resources and labor could continue to be exploited by core countries. This was possible because the government at the very heart of the system could print the reserve currency.
But in a bitcoin standard, Ammous wonders, who is going to make these high risk, billion-dollar loans in exchange for structural adjustment?
“You,” he asks, “and whose bitcoins?”
This is a guest post by Alex Gladstein. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
This is an opinion editorial by Arman The Parman, a Bitcoin educator passionate about privacy.
Over many years, I have tinkered with various Bitcoin wallets and mentored many people to hold their private keys securely. I settled on “Electrum Desktop Wallet” as my favorite and most versatile software wallet.
In this essay, I will outline some of Electrum’s features, and my likes and dislikes. This is not a detailed guide on how to use it and get the most out of it. I also won’t be going into why you should hold your own Bitcoin keys; it’s assumed you know and desire to do this, but if you need to know why it’s essential, please take a look at “Six Reasons To Withdraw Your Bitcoin From Exchanges.”
I have experienced first-hand Electrum’s idiosyncrasies and worked out solutions to overcome them – if used correctly, it is the most powerful wallet I have come across.
Electrum is for the person who is, or aspires to be, a “power” user. Because it allows so much control, and because of my familiarity with the software, I choose to teach this wallet to most of the students as part of my Bitcoin privacy/security mentorship course (although some people need something simpler to use). The experience of teaching how to use it has certainly helped me understand what people find intuitive and what they find tricky.
For the new Bitcoiner going at it alone, Electrum would be totally safe to use, provided they take their time and use it in a testing environment with only a small number of sats at first.
Operating System
Electrum can be installed on a Windows PC, Mac computer, or a Linux PC, and importantly for some, on ARM chip computers (i.e. Raspberry Pi’s).
It can also be installed on a phone, but the mobile version’s functionality is poor, and its connection to nodes has been erratic, so I don’t recommend that version. BlueWallet is a good alternative for a phone wallet.
Downloading And Verifying
Downloading and installing the program is straightforward for Windows and Mac, and a little tricky for Linux users, particularly those who are still learning to use Linux.
For those just testing the program out, simply downloading and using it without verifying the software is fine – I just wouldn’t do that for large amounts, or if privacy is a big concern (i.e. if you have KYC free bitcoin, you need to practice good privacy to keep the coins unidentifiable).
If you are in fact going to end up using this wallet for a significant sum, then you should learn to verify the software with gpg. You can build your skills around this here. You can do that while waiting for my guide on how to use Electrum safely/privately.
The Environment
One problem with Electrum is that if you run the program in the most intuitive way (i.e. just double click the icon) rather than the command line (with certain flags), you will almost certainly connect to a random Bitcoin node which will expose your wallet and all its potential 8.6 billion addresses to the owner of the random node – the owner could be a surveillance company, and there goes your privacy (they will get all your used and unused addresses, and your IP address).
To overcome this, I will teach you, in the next installment, how to load up a disposable wallet first, optimise your network settings (connect to your own node, or one you trust), and only then load your real wallet into Electrum.
Some people may be lost on what I mean by network settings or nodes. You can learn more about that here if you feel like going on a very important tangent.
The Electrum Wallet has a very clean layout displaying your addresses, although you have to know to go to the menu and select “show addresses” to see it. Then you’ll get a list of your first 20 receiving addresses highlighted green (you have 4.6 billion of these but obviously not all shown), and a list of your first 10 receiving addresses highlighted yellow (again, you have 4.6 billion of this type).
Many other software wallets don’t show you a list of addresses and only provide an address when requested to send coins to the wallet. This hides information from the user to keep things simple, but the user tends to remain ignorant, as the opportunity to learn is not presented. I have met many people who use Ledger Live or the Trezor suite, or Blue Wallet on their phone, and don’t realize they have limitless addresses, let alone something called “change” addresses.
Electrum also shows you a list of all your UTXOs (but you have to select “show coins”) to enable that.
Electrum Server Is Necessary
Electrum Wallet can not connect to your Bitcoin Core node directly. This is annoying, but it does make electrum run faster. Much faster. You still need Bitcoin Core, but you will also need software called Electrum Server (of which there are different varieties each with their advantages and disadvantages, which I won’t go into here). Installing Bitcoin Core is hard enough for some people. Installing Electrum Server is MUCH harder, you really need to be fairly techy.
For ease and positive reinforcement, I recommend people install, for their first node, a node-package like MyNode (see my guide) or Raspiblitz (see my guide), before moving on to installing a node and associated software on a regular PC.
These packages have some weaknesses but are excellent to begin with because with a single installation process on a Raspberry Pi 4, you get many applications (like Electrum Server, Lightning, BTCPay Server, Mempool viewer – which you’d otherwise have to install one by one, and potentially verify) and the cost is only about $300 for all the equipment (the software is free). As your skills and interest progresses, then I recommend people look into more advanced node setups (none of which get expensive). In case you’re wondering why you should run a node at all, here are six excellent reasons.
Wallet Creation
I think it’s useful to define the two types of wallets before going much further:
Software wallet – this is the program that manages your Bitcoin private keys and addresses. Eg Electrum, Sparrow, Blue Wallet.
Bitcoin wallet – by this, I mean the collection of unique addresses that are created deterministically (and reproducibly) from your mnemonic seed phrase (usually 12 or 24 words) – each seed phrase has 8.6 billion unique addresses that it can access/create.
Electrum, by default, creates wallets that are not standard which is very annoying. The most common protocol is called BIP39 (Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 39) that nearly all wallets will use.
That means that the 12 or 24 words that your BIP39 wallet created will be compatible with other BIP39 wallets, such that if you lose your software (or hardware) wallet, then you can get it back by entering your seed words into any compatible BIP39 wallet – it doesn’t have to be the same brand.
The Electrum developer, however, has his own plans and thinks the industry standard is unsafe (he has an outrageously unrealistic concern about BIP39). Instead of BIP39, Electrum creates wallets based on its own protocol – which no other wallet uses by default. Unfortunately, if you create an Electrum seed phrase, you can only use that seed phrase with Electrum.
Importantly, Electrum will allow you to restore a BIP39 wallet into it, but you have to know how. It will not, however, create a BIP39 wallet for you. But there are ways around this.
You can also simply load a single address into Electrum to observe its balance – it doesn’t even have to be yours (although, don’t get ideas about spending the balance, that’s not possible unless you load in the private key, in which case the address would be yours).
When creating or restoring a Bitcoin wallet with Electrum, you can choose what address type to have:
Legacy – these addresses start with 1 – the original Bitcoin addresses.
Pay-to-Script-Hash – these addresses all start with ‘3’.
Segwit – From 2017 after the Segwit soft fork, you could create “Pay-to-witness-public-key-hash” (also called “Native Segwit”, or “Bech32”). These are the most commonly used now. They all start with “bc1q.”
Taproot. This is new and not yet supported by Electrum. Taproot was a soft fork in 2021. Addresses start with “bc1p.”
The first three address types listed have extended public keys that look a little different from each others’. They start with xPub, yPub, and zPub, respectively. I believe taproot is tPub but I’m still getting familiar with that. For more education material about Bitcoin public and private keys, you can read here.
Labels
This feature is not unique, but very important to have if you want to maintain privacy through good coin control. By labeling your UTXOs, you’ll know which ones you might want to avoid spending together with others. For example, if you have a KYC-free or mixed coin, and you select it together with a KYC coin and send the combined total somewhere, then the private coin can be identified as belonging to whoever owns the KYC coin (since someone had the ability to spend both together). Don’t do that. The labels can be saved to a file so they can be uploaded to a different computer should you have duplicate wallets.
Coin Selection
Coin selection is a great feature. You can go to your address windows, and pick the coin you want to spend – or group several of them for spending. If you don’t select which coin you want to spend, like any other software, Electrum will choose the “best” coin to spend for you – but the software doesn’t always know what’s best. It doesn’t know which coins not to merge, which ones are dust attacks, and which ones are mixed. You know this, because you’ve labeled them, and then you can decide how to manage it.
Sending/Receiving
The process of sending bitcoin payments is very “fine tunable.” You can keep it simple, but there’s also an advanced button which I encourage people to always use – at least learn to get familiar. Here you can see exactly the important elements of the Bitcoin transaction – the inputs (with Tx IDs and addresses), the outputs, whether any listed addresses are found in your own wallet or not (through colour-coding), the mining fee and an ability to fine-tune it, the size of the transaction (in bytes), if there is a lock time, and if replace-by-fee is enabled. You don’t need to know right away what all these things mean, but at least they are there and as you get experienced, you’ll know what things to learn about.
When receiving, you can go to the receiving tab and the next unused address will be provided – with that you can copy/paste as needed or generate a QR code. Alternatively, you can go to the address window and select any address you see to create an invoice. You can right-click, select details, and you’ll see a button to create a QR code of the address or you can just copy the address text.
As soon as a payment is made to an address, and is waiting in the mempool, Electrum will show you the payment sitting with the address, which is handy – you don’t need to wait for a miner to mine the coin for you to know the payment is coming. Electrum also allows you to spend such an unconfirmed coin.
If a sender has set a very low fee and confirmation is taking a while, you can hurry up the payment by spending the unconfirmed transaction to another one of your addresses. In that second (downstream) transaction, you could add a high mining fee. To collect the fee, a miner would have to include the first transaction (not lucrative) and the downstream transaction you created (lucrative) – why? Because the second transaction is invalid until the first transaction is valid (as you can’t spend coins that theoretically don’t exist). This technique is called “child pays for parent.”
Another technique possible with Electrum, to speed up payments, is called RBF (replace by fee). This is not possible for the receiver to do as described above with “child pays for parent.” Instead, an impatient receiver must ask the sender to perform a RBF. The sender will resend the original UTXO which has been “spent” but not yet mined to the blockchain. That UTXO can be put in an alternative transaction (spending to the same address as the first transaction, or another), and with a higher mining fee. Whichever of the two transactions gets mined first will be valid and the other becomes invalid.
As a side note, RBF allows the potential for fraud. If a receiver (merchant) accepts an unconfirmed transaction as “payment received” and delivers the goods to the sender of the payment, the sender has an opportunity to perform a RBF transaction before the original payment gets mined. They would use their own address as the recipient of the payment, and add a high fee. When that gets mined, the original transaction becomes invalid, is dropped by all the nodes from the mempool, and the balance from the merchant’s wallet disappears. This is why you’ll notice that Bitcoin exchanges, when you deposit bitcoin, will wait for confirmation on the blockchain before crediting your account.
Multisignature wallets
Electrum manages multisignature wallets really well, and for a time I believe it was the only software wallet you could use. You can have cosigners with hot keys (software wallets) or cold keys (connect hardware wallets). The multisignature public keys can be made one at a time, on different days, in different places on different computers (or hardware wallets) – spreading it out reduces the risk of a single point of failure/attack. How far you take the precautions is up to you.
Extra details about multisig wallets and keys can be found here, and I’ll have a guide on making these wallets in the future. The wallet creation process is excellent but with some quirks which become irrelevant once you know about them.
I really like how Electrum handles partially signed Bitcoin transactions (PSBTs), an important feature of multisig wallets, discussed next.
PSBTs
An Electrum bitcoin transaction is represented by just a bunch of text (which themselves represent binary numbers, as all computer data is). You have the ability to save that text to a file, a QR code, or to the clipboard (as text, for copy/paste into an email for example). That text can be sent anywhere, and however you want. If you are so inclined, you can extract the text and send it by email, a physical letter, Morse code, smoke signals, gravitational waves back in time via a black hole, or interpretive dance – that’s up to you.
Electrum gives you the ability to extract that text and save it, before it’s signed, after it’s signed, or in a multisignature setting when it’s partially signed.
Multisignature is particularly interesting. If there are for example 3 key holders around the world, you can sign a transaction on your computer, extract the partially signed Bitcoin transaction, email it (or QR code over a video call) to another participant overseas, they can import it, sign it, then send it to the 3rd person for signing and broadcasting. No, this is not unique to Electrum, I just like how Electrum handles it. The workflow is not intuitive though, and takes practice.
Pay To Many (PayJoin And CoinJoin)
There is a hidden feature (search the menus) where you can choose multiple destinations (multiple outputs) when spending. For example you can take 6.15 bitcoin, and send 0.01 bitcoin to 615 different employees, all in one transaction. This feature allows you to create PayJoins manually – something only a minority of people would do, or even understand, but it’s cool nonetheless.
Pay to Many also allows you to create your own manual CoinJoins. For more information on what that is and how to do it, see this guide.
Gap Limit
An important feature that not all wallets have is the ability to set the gap limit. As I mentioned earlier, every wallet is a collection of 8.6 billion addresses. The software wallet must connect to a node and ask if an address has bitcoin associated with it. It’s not going to check all 8.6 billion of them. Electrum asks for the first 20 addresses. If they are uded, it will ask for another 20, and so on. It will keep this up until the node returns 20 unused addresses in a row.
This is a way to explain that the default gap limit is 20, but you can change that. Why would you? Because sometimes merchants allow customers to produce bitcoin addresses themselves through a payment app (like my donation page, hint-hint). If the first 20 customers make invoices (one address each, sequentially given by the app), and then the 21st customer generates an invoice and pays, then the Electrum wallet will appear empty. This happens because the first 20 addresses will be queried, found to be unused, and then Electrum will stop searching. Electrum allows you to change the gap limit, eg to 500 but there are no instructions, you’d have to research online, or find it right here:
You’ll have to first go to the menu: view→show console, and then type this command in the console (of course the “500” can be changed to another number):
wallet.change_gap_limit(500)
With this command, you’ll see 500 new addresses in the address window.
Watching Wallets
These are wallets without private keys, necessary for hardware wallets to connect to. Most people with a hardware wallet use the software on the computer that “came with” the device, but they are not usually open source. Electrum is an alternative that can be used with any hardware device.
Air-Gapped Computers
It’s possible to install Electrum on a computer that can’t ever connect to the internet (Air-gapped computer). That computer can be used to check that the seed phrase a hardware wallet gives, created the correct addresses from the seed.
For example, you might buy a BitBox02 hardware wallet, and it creates a 24 word seed for you, and from that, create addresses (with associated private keys hidden from view). Depending on the level of paranoia you have (and the amount of bitcoin you are storing), you might choose not to trust the embedded software, and assume at first that the addresses it creates belong to the CEO to start with.
To check the addresses are genuine, you need to put the seed words into (restore) a different wallet – eg Electrum; and make sure Electrum generates identical addresses. That’s easy enough, but you can’t just type seeds into any old computer with Electrum on it. Well, you can but you really really shouldn’t – malware can potentially extract your keystrokes and steal your bitcoin.
One solution is to enter the seeds into Electrum on a clean and secure air-gapped computer (or a different brand hardware wallet).
The cheapest way is with a Raspberry Pi Zero – They used to cost about $10 before pandemic-induced shortages. The ARM chip on these devices means not all software wallets are compatible. Electrum is and works magnificently.
A Bitcoin transaction is a payment that contains a coin that was previously “locked” by an address. To unlock the coin (with respect to the rules of Bitcoin) and be allowed to spend it, using public/private key cryptography, one must prove they own the private key to the address contained within. That is done with a signature (using the private key, but not revealing it).
The signed transaction is itself a message; a bit of computer data, although following a strict protocol.
Using public/private key cryptography, outside of Bitcoin, you can actually sign ANY message. For example, here is a message I signed after I selected an address (and therefore its private key). Below is the message, the address and the signature (nonsense-looking text), which was produced after I clicked “sign.”
Now you or anyone can take the address, the message, and the signature, put it in Electrum (or other software), and verify that it really was the correct private key (matching the address) that produced that message (this is actually the same type of verification that Bitcoin nodes do for any Bitcoin transaction). I’ll open another wallet that hasn’t got the relevant private key, to demonstrate verification. I went into the “verify message” window, then entered all the details as you see above, and then clicked Verify:
Encrypt/Decrypt A Message
Instead of signing a message with public/private key cryptography, the output can be an encrypted version of the message (i.e. jumbled up and unreadable) using someone else’s public key/address. The encrypted version can then be sent to anyone who has the corresponding private key, because the text can only be read when the private key is used to reverse the process.
For example, you could have been given my bitcoin public key, encrypted this message as above, emailed me the cyphertext (the random-looking text in the bottom field), and because I have the private key to the public key, I can reverse the encrypted message to the original form and read your wrong-think message. In this way, you can send text to me across an insecure communication channel, and only I can read it.
This is the magic of public/private key cryptography, and one of the main components that made Bitcoin possible. We should all be thankful that the cypherpunks fought hard, and won, against the US government who tried to ban it in the 1990s.
Summary
This was a long review of the Electrum Desktop Wallet. Hopefully, that has piqued your interest to learn how to use it – I will release a guide on this very soon. In the meantime, it may be worth practicing very basic Bitcoin transactions by following this exercise.
This is a guest post by Arman The Parman. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
This is an opinion editorial by Shinobi, a self-taught educator in the Bitcoin space and tech-oriented Bitcoin podcast host.
I recently spent a week in El Salvador to attend Adopting Bitcoin and decided it might be worthwhile to summarize my perception of things having actually had the chance to visit the country myself.
Since the announcement of the Bitcoin legal tender law in 2021, the topic of El Salvador has been a deeply divisive one in this space. On one hand, you have people blindly cheering on President Nayib Bukele and treating all criticism as FUD and misinformation generated simply to attack Bitcoin and the use of it. On the other hand, you have people blindly decrying him as a dictator and violator of human rights and treating anything positive he is accomplishing for his country as irrelevant in the face of his disregard for law.
Obviously, I am not a Salvadoran. I have never lived in the country and the short amount of time I have now spent there is by no means enough to truly acquire a deep insight into what life is like in El Salvador, or to really appreciate the nature of the problems people face there. Nevertheless, seeing things for that short time in person has given me a very different perspective than the one I had purely informed by reading things over the internet.
Adoption Has Been Slow, But The Seed Is Planted
I was very skeptical of the Bitcoin law when it was first proposed. My first article for Bitcoin Magazine was actually about my worries over ways the law could cause negative consequences and effectively implode on itself if adoption of Bitcoin took off too fast early on. I saw the promise of conversion to USD by the government of El Salvador as something that could fail catastrophically if Bitcoin became a major vehicle for remittance payments, effectively bankrupting the trust established for conversion on the dollar side. Thankfully, that did not happen.
Adoption seems to be a very slow-moving wave in the country, and according to many people I talked to when I was there, many businesses that used to accept bitcoin have actually stopped accepting it over the last year or so. Chivo is still dealing with problems, to the point that even today there are still issues with the ATMs during attempts to sell, and horrible UX flows make paying at the few businesses that accept BTC an annoying experience. It is by no means “Bitcoin country,” as people constantly call it, in the sense of being able to use Bitcoin everywhere. But the opportunities to use it in El Salvador do far exceed those of any other physical locality I have ever traveled to myself. The plant hasn’t quite sprouted yet, but the seed is clearly in the ground.
Bukele Is Going Beyond Bitcoin
Beyond the debates over Bitcoin use and adoption though, Bukele has done quite a lot in the last year. I feel like people in this space pontificating on the internet lose sight of this in arguing over the adoption of Bitcoin in El Salvador, but what is being done in the country goes beyond just Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a part of the plan, yes, but this is a nation of more than six million people for whom President Bukele is responsible. His concern isn’t, and should not be, purely to benefit Bitcoin with his actions in office. He has the citizens of El Salvador and their wellbeing to concern himself with. That is his primary concern.
When I was in El Salvador for Adopting Bitcoin, I met someone who has been living in the country for the last 10 years who only recently got into Bitcoin because of the Bitcoin Law passed by Bukele a year ago. He had almost a decade of experience living in El Salvador as it was before Bukele, and the reality of it as he described was much more brutal than any statistics could paint: street merchants being murdered over not being able to afford 16 cents of protection money, widespread racketeering and robbery, corruption all across the government. Gang members would commit a murder, get arrested, and be out on the street within a few months due to how easy it was to bribe officials. He would regularly go to sleep listening to gunshots from rival gangs fighting over territory the block over from his house. It was completely unbridled anarchy.
I cannot even truly imagine living in such an environment, and I have lived my entire life in one of the most dangerous cities in the United States. All of that changed this year with President Bukele’s declaration of martial law and an all-out war on the gangs of the country. Almost 60,000 gang members have been arrested during the course of the year, and the results have been pronounced.
The murder rate has plummeted, people are going out at night where before most people would not consider that a risk worth taking and tourism is growing. I am no stranger to living places where you have to keep your head on a swivel and pay attention to your surroundings, but not even for an instant in my week there did I feel like there was even a slight chance of something bad happening. As an outsider, it felt perfectly safe to me, and the man I met who has lived there for a decade described the El Salvador of today as an entirely different country compared to the one he moved to 10 years ago.
Have there been cases of false arrests? Yes. Is there an existential issue in sweeping aside due process to deal with the problem of violence in the country? Yes. But what would be the alternative solution anyone else would offer?
It was a common occurrence for people to be murdered over sums of money so small that here in the United States, many would just tell a cashier to keep it because they don’t want to carry that small amount of change in their pockets. Yes, due process is a core tenant of a stable society, but isn’t the ability to live without worry over being murdered for pocket change more important? I think it is very easy for people far removed from a situation to lecture those who aren’t about how to handle them, to treat the situation as some intellectual exercise that should be approached with the goal of a perfect solution. But the real world doesn’t work like that. Life is messy, and perfect solutions are almost never attainable.
Removing the massive gang presence in the country is a prerequisite to actually enabling economic growth. You can’t have a growing economy if gangs are going to swoop in and extort money from people every day. No one from outside of the country is rationally going to want to take their money and invest it in such an environment. However imperfect the solution being implemented is right now, it is a solution, and it is showing results. NOTUS Energy from Germany stated its intent to invest $100 million in energy infrastructure in the country, specifically citing improvements in security in recent years as a factor. If Bukele and the current government continue the path they are on, it is very likely interest in similar investments will continue to grow.
Not An Intellectual Exercise
The Bitcoin Law has not led to instant prosperity in El Salvador, but it is laying the foundations of that to come. Chivo still has its issues, but given time, those can be improved and private solutions can be built and tailored to meet the needs of people in El Salvador. The use of Bitcoin hasn’t exploded through the entire country, but the seeds of it have been planted. Similarly, the crackdown on gangs this year has not magically turned the economy and country around, but it has planted the seeds of something. Removing the gangs from the street has created room for that economic growth to happen where it otherwise would not have had the space. Things are moving in the right direction.
People looking in from the outside have tried to paint Bukele and his efforts as either unspeakable totalitarianism or an already-complete process of sculpting a utopian dream. In my opinion, they are neither. He is a man laying the foundations to allow Salvadorans the room and freedom to create their own economic prosperity.
Will it happen overnight? No. Is it guaranteed to have a positive outcome? No. But he is trying as best he can to clean up the mess left over from 30 years of corruption and violence after a brutal civil war. Bitcoiners need to step back and realize that this is a real country with real people and not some intellectual exercise to argue about on the internet.
Things seem to me to be moving in a positive direction, and I hope they continue to do so.
This is a guest post by Shinobi. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
Income-seeking investors are looking at an opportunity to scoop up shares of real estate investment trusts. Stocks in that asset class have become more attractive as prices have fallen and cash flow is improving.
Below is a broad screen of REITs that have high dividend yields and are also expected to generate enough excess cash in 2023 to enable increases in dividend payouts.
REIT prices may turn a corner in 2023
REITs distribute most of their income to shareholders to maintain their tax-advantaged status. But the group is cyclical, with pressure on share prices when interest rates rise, as they have this year at an unprecedented scale. A slowing growth rate for the group may have also placed a drag on the stocks.
And now, with talk that the Federal Reserve may begin to temper its cycle of interest-rate increases, we may be nearing the time when REIT prices rise in anticipation of an eventual decline in interest rates. The market always looks ahead, which means long-term investors who have been waiting on the sidelines to buy higher-yielding income-oriented investments may have to make a move soon.
During an interview on Nov 28, James Bullard, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and a member of the Federal Open Market Committee, discussed the central bank’s cycle of interest-rate increases meant to reduce inflation.
When asked about the potential timing of the Fed’s “terminal rate” (the peak federal funds rate for this cycle), Bullard said: “Generally speaking, I have advocated that sooner is better, that you do want to get to the right level of the policy rate for the current data and the current situation.”
Fed’s Bullard says in MarketWatch interview that markets are underpricing the chance of still-higher rates
In August we published this guide to investing in REITs for income. Since the data for that article was pulled on Aug. 24, the S&P 500 SPX, -0.29%
has declined 4% (despite a 10% rally from its 2022 closing low on Oct. 12), but the benchmark index’s real estate sector has declined 13%.
REITs can be placed broadly into two categories. Mortgage REITs lend money to commercial or residential borrowers and/or invest in mortgage-backed securities, while equity REITs own property and lease it out.
The pressure on share prices can be greater for mortgage REITs, because the mortgage-lending business slows as interest rates rise. In this article we are focusing on equity REITs.
Industry numbers
The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (Nareit) reported that third-quarter funds from operations (FFO) for U.S.-listed equity REITs were up 14% from a year earlier. To put that number in context, the year-over-year growth rate of quarterly FFO has been slowing — it was 35% a year ago. And the third-quarter FFO increase compares to a 23% increase in earnings per share for the S&P 500 from a year earlier, according to FactSet.
The NAREIT report breaks out numbers for 12 categories of equity REITs, and there is great variance in the growth numbers, as you can see here.
FFO is a non-GAAP measure that is commonly used to gauge REITs’ capacity for paying dividends. It adds amortization and depreciation (noncash items) back to earnings, while excluding gains on the sale of property. Adjusted funds from operations (AFFO) goes further, netting out expected capital expenditures to maintain the quality of property investments.
The slowing FFO growth numbers point to the importance of looking at REITs individually, to see if expected cash flow is sufficient to cover dividend payments.
Screen of high-yielding equity REITs
For 2022 through Nov. 28, the S&P 500 has declined 17%, while the real estate sector has fallen 27%, excluding dividends.
Over the very long term, through interest-rate cycles and the liquidity-driven bull market that ended this year, equity REITs have fared well, with an average annual return of 9.3% for 20 years, compared to an average return of 9.6% for the S&P 500, both with dividends reinvested, according to FactSet.
This performance might surprise some investors, when considering the REITs’ income focus and the S&P 500’s heavy weighting for rapidly growing technology companies.
For a broad screen of equity REITs, we began with the Russell 3000 Index RUA, -0.04%,
which represents 98% of U.S. companies by market capitalization.
We then narrowed the list to 119 equity REITs that are followed by at least five analysts covered by FactSet for which AFFO estimates are available.
If we divide the expected 2023 AFFO by the current share price, we have an estimated AFFO yield, which can be compared with the current dividend yield to see if there is expected “headroom” for dividend increases.
For example, if we look at Vornado Realty Trust VNO, +1.03%,
the current dividend yield is 8.56%. Based on the consensus 2023 AFFO estimate among analysts polled by FactSet, the expected AFFO yield is only 7.25%. This doesn’t mean that Vornado will cut its dividend and it doesn’t even mean the company won’t raise its payout next year. But it might make it less likely to do so.
Among the 119 equity REITs, 104 have expected 2023 AFFO headroom of at least 1.00%.
Here are the 20 equity REITs from our screen with the highest current dividend yields that have at least 1% expected AFFO headroom:
Click on the tickers for more about each company. You should read Tomi Kilgore’s detailed guide to the wealth of information for free on the MarketWatch quote page.
The list includes each REIT’s main property investment type. However, many REITs are highly diversified. The simplified categories on the table may not cover all of their investment properties.
Knowing what a REIT invests in is part of the research you should do on your own before buying any individual stock. For arbitrary examples, some investors may wish to steer clear of exposure to certain areas of retail or hotels, or they may favor health-care properties.
Largest REITs
Several of the REITs that passed the screen have relatively small market capitalizations. You might be curious to see how the most widely held REITs fared in the screen. So here’s another list of the 20 largest U.S. REITs among the 119 that passed the first cut, sorted by market cap as of Nov. 28:
Opinion by Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana (bangkok, thailand)
Inter Press Service
BANGKOK, Thailand, Nov 29 (IPS) – The recent climate talks in Egypt have left us with a sobering reality: The window for maintaining global warming to 1.5 degrees is closing fast and what is on the table currently is insufficient to avert some of the worst potential effects of climate change. The Nationally Determined Contribution targets of Asian and Pacific countries will result in a 16 per centincrease in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 from the 2010 levels.
Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana
The Sharm-el Sheikh Implementation Plan and the package of decisions taken at COP27 are a reaffirmation of actions that could deliver the net-zero resilient world our countries aspire to. The historic decision to establish a Loss and Damage Fund is an important step towards climate justice and building trust among countries.
But they are not enough to help us arrive at a better future without, what the UN Secretary General calls, a “giant leap on climate ambition”. Carbon neutrality needs to at the heart of national development strategies and reflected in public and private investment decisions. And it needs to cascade down to the sustainable pathways in each sector of the economy.
Accelerate energy transition
At the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), we are working with regional and national stakeholders on these transformational pathways. Moving away from the brown economy is imperative, not only because emissions are rising but also because dependence on fossil fuels has left economies struggling with price volatility and energy insecurity.
A clear road map is the needed springboard for an inclusive and just energy transition. We have been working with countries to develop scenarios for such a shift through National Roadmaps, demonstrating that a different energy future is possible and viable with the political will and sincere commitment to action of the public and private sectors.
The changeover to renewables also requires concurrent improvements in grid infrastructure, especially cross-border grids. The Regional Road Map on Power System Connectivity provides us the platform to work with member States toward an interconnected grid, including through the development of the necessary regulatory frameworks for to integrate power systems and mobilize investments in grid infrastructure. The future of energy security will be determined by the ability to develop green grids and trade renewable-generated electricity across our borders.
Green the rides
The move to net-zero carbon will not be complete without greening the transport sector. In Asia and the Pacific transport is primarily powered by fossil fuels and as a result accounted for 24 per cent of total carbon emissions by 2018.
Energy efficiency improvements and using more electric vehicles are the most effective measures to reduce carbon emissions by as much as 60 per cent in 2050 compared to 2005 levels. The Regional Action Programme for Sustainable Transport Development allows us to work with countries to implement and cooperate on priorities for low-carbon transport, including electric mobility. Our work with the Framework Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-border Paperless Trade also is helping to make commerce more efficient and climate-smart, a critical element for the transition in the energy and transport sectors.
Adapting to a riskier future
Even with mitigation measures in place, our economy and people will not be safe without a holistic risk management system. And it needs to be one that prevents communities from being blindsided by cascading climate disasters.
We are working with partners to deepen the understanding of such cascading risks and to help develop preparedness strategies for this new reality, such as the implementation of the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action for Adaptation to Drought.
Make finance available where it matters the most
Finance and investment are uniquely placed to propel the transitions needed. The past five years have seen thematic bonds in our region grow tenfold. Private finance is slowly aligning with climate needs. The new Loss and Damage Fund and its operation present new hopes for financing the most vulnerable. However, climate finance is not happening at the speed and scale needed. It needs to be accessible to developing economies in times of need.
Innovative financing instruments need to be developed and scaled up, from debt-for-climate swaps to SDG bonds, some of which ESCAP is helping to develop in the Pacific and in Cambodia. Growing momentum in the business sector will need to be sustained. The Asia-Pacific Green Deal for Business by the ESCAP Sustainable Business Network (ESBN) is important progress. We are also working with the High-level Climate Champions to bring climate-aligned investment opportunities closer to private financiers.
Lock in higher ambition and accelerate implementation
Climate actions in Asia and the Pacific matter for global success and well-being. The past two years has been a grim reminder that conflicts in one continent create hunger in another, and that emissions somewhere push sea levels higher everywhere. Never has our prosperity been more dependent on collective actions and cooperation.
Our countries are taking note. Member States meeting at the seventh session of the Committee on Environment and Development, which opens today (29 November) are seeking consensus on the regional cooperation needed and priorities for climate action such as oceans, ecosystem and air pollution. We hope that the momentum begun at COP27 and the Committee will be continued at the seventy-ninth session of the Commission as it will hone in on the accelerators for climate action.
In this era of heightened risks and shared prosperity, only regional, multilateral solidarity and genuine ambition that match with the new climate reality unfolding around us — along with bold climate action — are the only way to secure a future where the countries of Asia and the Pacific can prosper.
Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana is an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)
After days of intense negotiations in Sharm el-Sheikh, countries at the latest UN Climate Change Conference, COP27, reached agreement on an outcome that established a funding mechanism to compensate vulnerable nations for ‘loss and damage’ from climate-induced disasters. 20 November 2022 Credit: United Nations
Opinion by Inge Kaul (berlin)
Inter Press Service
BERLIN, Nov 29 (IPS) – For decades, there have been non-conclusive deliberations regarding how the international community could support poor and vulnerable countries in their efforts to cope with and recover from the havoc wreaked on their territory by the ill-effects of global warming such as severe droughts, floods, storms, or rising sea levels.
At the COP27 climate summit, this issue figured for the first time as a separate item on the agenda; and, as one of their very last-minute decisions, delegations even agreed to establish a dedicated loss and damage fund (LDF). However, the question of how to operationalize, notably resource the fund was left open.
A “transitional committee” is to be created to examine possible funding options and report to COP28, which could then, eventually, decide on the LDF’s operationalization.
Remembering the many press photos showing the despair written into the faces of people, whose houses and fields were destroyed by floods, or the blank stares of those sitting next to the cadavers of their cattle killed by severe drought conditions,
I feel that business as usual—namely, taking it easy in delivering on funding promises (as we have seen it in the case of the $ 100 billion annual climate-finance promise) — would be an extremely immoral and unethical behavior in the present case.
Therefore, let’s waste no time and start to explore where one could find money fit for the purpose of loss and damage support.
In the following, I argue that only one – still to be established – source will generate on a relatively reliable and predictable manner the longer-term stream of public finance required, as a minimum, for creating a solid basis of LDF core funding.
The funding source to be agreed and established as a matter of highest urgency are UN assessed contributions for climate security.
Money fit for the purpose of loss and damage support
However, at the outset, it is perhaps important to clarify that support for loss and damage should not be confounded with humanitarian assistance delivered as a prompt crisis-response measure.
Disaster may strike countries haphazardly, irrespective of whether they are poor or rich, vulnerable or not. All countries may need or, at least, somehow benefit from immediate and fast-disbursing, short-term humanitarian assistance in cash or kind.
How best to organize such short-term humanitarian assistance is also an important issue that deserves more attention. However, it is an issue beyond the scope of this article.
Therefore, let’s now turn to the specific issue of what type of external support could be most useful for “climate victims”, notably poor and vulnerable countries struggling to rebuild their communities and economies.
An entity such as the newly established LDF and the money that, one day, it might have at its disposal, are governance tools. Like any other tools they should be fit for the purpose at hand.
Considering for now mainly the core funding that the LDF needs to have, it should perhaps have three key characteristics, namely be: (1) public finance; (2) patient, that is, designed for the longer-term; and (3) relatively predictable in its availability.
The reasons are that, typically, a country’s vulnerability to severe climate events is a complex multi-dimensional phenomenon to which both structural factors (e.g., the countries geographic position and size) and non-structural factors (such as its development level) contribute.
Thus, by implication, meaningful loss-and-damage support is likely to be required for several years, maybe, even for a decade or more. This should not come as a surprise, because even in developed countries rebuilding efforts have often been a lengthy process.
Moreover, in the case of small-island developing countries, it could even be that parts of the population need to be resettled to start their life anew.
Initially, patient, predictable public finance may constitute the most important source of funding. As the rebuilding process advances, the public funds could also play an important role in helping to mobilize other resource inflows, including private investments.
Or, they could be twinned with adaptation finance and other types of climate finance, as well as official development assistance.
Making the case for UN assessed contributions for climate-security, including loss and damage support
By now, there exists broad-based agreement that our security today depends on more than the security of our countries’ external borders and on more than the control of within-country conflicts and violence.
As US President Joe Biden, noted in his statement to COP27, military security today is only one dimension of our security, next to climate and food security; and, as COVID-19 taught us, next to global health security.
The security threats we are facing are global in their reach; they tie us together in a web of manifold interdependencies. They require all hands-on deck, or no one will be secure. The United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) is, therefore, correct in pushing for a “Climate Solidarity Pact.”
Thus, it is timely to ask: Why do we have, within the UN, only an established system of assessed contributions to support efforts aimed at keeping and restoring military security? Why not also assessed contributions – a solidarity-based pact – to climate security?
Among the reasons that strongly speak for this financing option are several. First, such contributions could be introduced for, say, an initial period of 20 years, subject, of course, to regular monitoring of their functioning and impact.
Evidently, they would provide the type of reliable and predictable long-term public finance that the LDF needs.
Second, agreement on a UN funding scale for climate security would help end the present continuous tussle among countries over who should contribute how much. The UN assessment scale for determining individual countries’ contributions to climate security would be based on a joint decision by member states.
Besides income (capacity to pay) one would, in the present case, certainly also consider past and current per-capita emission levels and other relevant factors.
Many aspects of the proposed funding source still need further élaboration and consultations. However, let’s start at the beginning and encourage a world-wide dialogue on the pros and cons of the following issues.
Should we: (1) consider climate security, notably that of vulnerable countries, as a global security issue; and (2) grant climate security the same financing privilege that military security enjoys, namely, to benefit from assessed contributions paid by all UN member states according to a formula that aims at promoting climate security and justice?
Why not ?
Inge Kaul is a fellow at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany.