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Tag: Olaf Scholz

  • Bank fears will likely lead to even more market volatility in the week ahead

    Bank fears will likely lead to even more market volatility in the week ahead

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  • German Christian Democrats rewrite Merkel’s China playbook

    German Christian Democrats rewrite Merkel’s China playbook

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    BERLIN — Germany’s Christian Democrats, the country’s largest opposition group, are planning to shift away from the pragmatic stance toward China that characterized Angela Merkel’s 16 years as chancellor, claiming that maintaining peace through trade has failed.

    It’s a remarkable course change for the conservative party that pursued a strategy of rapprochement and economic interdependence toward China and Russia during Merkel’s decade and a half in power. The volte-face has been spurred by Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and Beijing’s increasingly aggressive stance — both economically and politically — in the Asian region and beyond.

    According to a draft position paper seen by POLITICO, the conservatives say the idea of keeping peace through economic cooperation “has failed with regard to Russia, but increasingly also China.” The 22-page paper, which is to be adopted by the center-right Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary group in the Bundestag around Easter, outlines key points for a new China policy.

    In a world order that is changing after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz last year announced a Zeitenwende, or major turning point, in German security policy. Economy Minister Robert Habeck and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, in particular, have stressed the necessity of a comprehensive China strategy, an idea already mentioned in the coalition agreement to form Scholz’s government. Their ministries have elaborated two different drafts, but a comprehensive strategy is not yet in sight.

    “We realize at this point in time, with some surprise, which is why we prepared and presented this paper, that the German government is significantly behind schedule on key foreign and security policy documents,” said CDU foreign policy lawmaker Johann Wadephul.

    The foreword to the position paper states that “the rise of communist China is the central, epochal challenge of the 21st century for all states seeking to preserve, strengthen, and sustain the rules-based international order.” The CDU/CSU parliamentary group is open to working out a “national consensus” with Scholz’s government. That consensus, the group says, must be embedded in the national security strategy and in a European China strategy.

    The relationship with China is described in the same triad fashion that was formulated by the European Commission in 2019 and is in the coalition agreement of the current German government. Under this strategy, the Asian country is seen as a partner, economic competitor and systemic rival.

    But the CDU/CSU group’s paper says policy should move away from a Beijing-friendly, pragmatic stance toward China, especially on trade. “We should not close our eyes to the fact that China has shifted the balance on its own initiative and clearly pushed the core of the relationship toward systemic rivalry,” the text states.

    Such an emphasis from the conservative group is remarkable given its long-held preference for economic cooperation and political rapprochement toward both China and Russia under Merkel. Before leaving office, for example, Merkel pushed a major EU-China investment deal over the line, though it was later essentially frozen by the European Parliament due to Beijing’s sanctions against MEPs.

    “I say to this also self-critically [that] this means for the CDU/CSU a certain new approach in China policy after a 16-year government period,” Wadephul said.

    The paper calls for a “Zeitenwende in China policy,” too, concluding that Germany should respond “with the ability and its own strength to compete” wherever China seeks and forces competition; should build up its resilience and defensive capability and form as well as expand alliances and partnerships with interest and value partners; and demonstrate a willingness to partner where it is openly, transparently and reliably embraced by China.

    The CDU/CSU paper calls for a European China strategy and a “European China Council” with EU neighbors for better cooperation. A central point is also strengthening reciprocity and European as well as German sovereignty.

    “Decoupling from China is neither realistic nor desirable from a German and European perspective,” according to the text.

    To better monitor dependencies, the paper proposes an expert commission in the Bundestag that would present an annual “China check” on dependencies in trade, technology, raw materials and foreign trade, with the overall aim of developing a “de-risking” strategy.

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    Gabriel Rinaldi

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  • Toxic Germanity and the battle for ‘das Auto’

    Toxic Germanity and the battle for ‘das Auto’

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    BERLIN — Europe’s worst-kept secret is that the Germans ultimately decide everything.

    “I’ll never forget how all the other member states held back in anticipation, waiting to see what the Germans would do,” a senior U.K. official, recalling his time in Brussels, recently told a private dinner of MPs and other German officials in Berlin.

    The recollection was meant as a compliment, one the official hoped would ingratiate him with the Germans around the table.

    Sad thing is it worked.

    The second worst-kept secret in Brussels is that for all the “peace project” kumbaya, the Germans actually enjoy dominating the place. That said, even stalwart veterans of the EU bubble were hard-pressed in recent days to cite a more blatant example of toxic Germanity than Berlin’s last-minute intervention to save the internal combustion engine.

    To recap: Last week, EU countries were expected to rubber-stamp a package of measures aimed at ridding Europe’s roads of fuel-burning autos. Under the plan, the EU would prohibit new registrations of cars powered by internal combustion engines beginning in 2035. The sweeping deal, the culmination of years of painstaking negotiations in Brussels and European capitals, is a pillar of the EU’s ambitious goal to become carbon neutral by 2050.

    Berlin’s 11th-hour intervention on a deal everyone believed was done and dusted not only left the EU’s environmental policy in limbo, it also laid bare the bloc’s power vertical in all its dubious Teutonic glory. The message: Germany is no longer even trying to hide its power.

    Enter France.

    “For the French, the situation also represents an opportunity and they are never ones to waste a good crisis,” an EU diplomat said. “The more they can contribute to the idea that Germany goes it alone, the more it strengthens the view that the Germans are an unreliable partner in Europe.”

    Germany’s unprecedented move has given rise to fears that other countries will try to follow its example and hold EU reforms hostage by threatening a last-minute veto to win concessions, in effect rewriting the rules of engagement.

    Germans may not be known for their finesse, but even so, Berlin’s bare-knuckle tactics to save the engine have not just shocked Brussels veterans, it’s angered them.  

    That’s why the real significance of the standoff has less to do with CO2 emissions than how Brussels works. One big concern among EU insiders is that the coalition Germany has assembled to save the car, which includes the likes of Poland, Austria, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, will go rogue as a bloc on other fronts, with or without German support.

    Berlin’s views on “the future of mobility” were so clear that Mercedes, VW and BMW pledged to shift to all-electric by 2035 | Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images

    It’s easy to mock the circuitous nature of EU decision-making, the push and pull between the European Commission, Parliament and Council, communicated in the opaque dialect of Brussels’ earnest eurocrats.

    Boring as it may be, the alchemy produces bona fide results that legitimize and sustain the EU.  

    That Germany is willing to tinker with this delicate balance betrays either ignorance in the current regime of how the EU works, ambivalence, or both.

    One could argue with justification that Germany was never going to kill the golden goose. Invented and perfected in Germany over more than a century by the likes of Mercedes, BMW and Audi, the internal combustion engine has been the wellspring of German pride and prosperity for generations.

    The image of a piston-fired Porsche 911 zooming down the autobahn is as core to German identity as sex is to the French.

    Take that away, what’s left (aside from beer and bratwurst)?

    Indeed, considering that the country’s automakers haven’t proved particularly adept at manufacturing electric cars (or more specifically the batteries at the heart of the vehicles), there was a strong case for Germany to develop low-emission synthetic fuels that would keep the internal combustion engine alive.  

    Berlin had at least a decade to do so.

    Thing is, it didn’t, choosing instead to pour billions into subsidizing the purchase of electric vehicles and the infrastructure to recharge them (full disclosure: the author is a beneficiary of such a subsidy).  

    What’s more, Germany also encouraged other European countries to follow suit. In fact, Berlin’s views on “the future of mobility” were so clear that Mercedes, VW and BMW pledged to shift to all-electric by 2035. The cluster of countries that have served as the workbench for those companies, from Slovakia to Hungary and Austria, all agreed to go along.

    That’s why the German insistence this month that the EU carve out an exception to the engine ban for cars powered by synthetic, so-called e-fuels has caught the rest of Europe flat-footed.

    Why now? In a word, politics.

    Germans may not be known for their finesse, but even so, Berlin’s bare-knuckle tactics to save the engine have not just shocked Brussels veterans, it’s angered them | John Thys/AFP

    Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats have dropped below 20 percent in a number of recent polls, putting them more than 10 percentage points behind the first-place Christian Democrats.

    Scholz’s smallest coalition partner, the business-oriented Free Democrats (FDP), are in even worse shape. The party fared miserably in a string of recent regional elections and in national polls, it is teetering perilously close to the 5 percent threshold parties need to surpass for entry into parliament.

    Party leader Christian Lindner, who used to drive souped-up Porsches around the storied Nürburgring race track, has vowed to save the engine from the clutches of the Green lobby.

    Scholz, keenly aware that his party’s base also remains attached to “das Auto,” has been happy to let him try and has so far not stepped in to intervene.

    About 1 million Germans work in the auto industry and many of those jobs — especially at suppliers — would be lost if the engine is killed for the simple reason that electric cars have far fewer (and different) parts than traditional automobiles.

    The real mystery is why the Greens, the other party in Germany’s governing triumvirate, have not done more to resolve the crisis. Not only has the environmental party championed the engine ban for years, but it is also the most pro-European party in the government and would normally be at pains to keep Berlin from even appearing to undermine Brussels.    

    Yet Green Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck has largely been silent on the issue. Far from the fray in Europe, he was last spotted in the Amazon having his face painted by an indigenous girl during a swing through the region.

    In a bid to defuse the standoff ahead of next week’s EU leaders’ summit, the German government sent a letter to the Commission on Wednesday, spelling out what it wants in return for lifting its blockade. Its chief demand — a broad exception for e-fuels — was already rejected by the Parliament and other institutions during the original negotiations over the package.

    Reversing that would require the deal to be reopened.

    The French are sure to cry foul.

    And then Germany will push ahead anyway.

    Joshua Posaner contributed reporting.

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    Matthew Karnitschnig

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  • Germany, Japan pledge to boost cooperation on economic security

    Germany, Japan pledge to boost cooperation on economic security

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    Germany and Japan agreed on Saturday to strengthen cooperation on economic security in the aftermath of tensions over global supply chains and the economic impact of the war in Ukraine.

    In the first high-ministerial government consultations held between the two countries, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reached out to Tokyo to seek to reduce Germany’s dependence on China for imports of raw materials.

    “The current challenges of our time make it clear: It is important to expand cooperation with close partners and acquire new partners. We want to reduce dependencies and increase the resilience of our economies.” the German chancellor said in a tweet.

    Scholz and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said they believe the agreement will allow both countries to diversify value chains in order to be able to reduce economic risks.

    In a joint statement, the two countries said they will work on establishing “a legal framework for bilateral defense and security cooperation activities,” including ways to protect critical infrastructures, trade routes and to secure future supply of sustainable energy.

    Germany’s decision to prioritize consultations with Japan came after the Asian country put forward an economic security bill last year aimed at securing the uptake of technology and bolstering critical supply chains. 

    Japan is Germany’s second-largest trading partner in Asia after China, with a bilateral trade volume of €45.7 billion mainly based on the import and export of machinery, vehicles, electronics and chemical products.

    The two leaders also exchanged views on the situation in Ukraine, cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and the G7 meeting in Hiroshima scheduled for May.

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    POLITICO Staff

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  • Shock, anger, betrayal: Inside the Qatargate-hit Socialist group

    Shock, anger, betrayal: Inside the Qatargate-hit Socialist group

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    BRUSSELS — The European Parliament’s Socialists are warily eyeing their colleagues and assistants, wondering which putative ally might turn out to be a liar as new details emerge in a growing cash-for-favors scandal.

    Long-simmering geographic divisions within the group, Parliament’s second largest, are fueling mistrust and discord. Members are at odds over how forcefully to defend their implicated colleagues. Others are nursing grievances over how the group’s leadership handled months of concerns about their lawmaker, Eva Kaili, who’s now detained pending trial.

    Publicly, the group has shown remarkable solidarity during the so-called Qatargate scandal, which involves allegations that foreign countries bribed EU lawmakers. Socialists and Democrats (S&D) chief Iratxe García has mustered a unified response, producing an ambitious ethics reform proposal and launching an internal investigation without drawing an open challenge to her leadership. Yet as the Parliament’s center left ponders how to win back the public’s trust ahead of next year’s EU election, the trust among the members themselves is fraying.

    “I feel betrayed by these people that are colleagues of our political group,” said Mohammed Chahim, a Dutch S&D MEP. “As far as I am concerned, we are all political victims, and I hope we can get the truth out in the open.”

    S&D MEPs are grappling not only with a sense of personal betrayal but also a fear that the links to corruption could squash otherwise promising electoral prospects. 

    Social democrats were looking forward to running in 2024 on the bread-and-butter issues at the top of minds around the bloc amid persistent inflation, buoyed by Olaf Scholz’s rise in Germany and the Continent-wide popularity of Finland’s Sanna Marin. Now, the group’s appeal to voters’ pocketbooks could be overshadowed by suitcases filled with cash.

    “We were completely unaware of what was going on,” said García, vowing that the group’s internal inquiry will figure out what went wrong. “We have to let the people responsible [for the investigation] work.”

    The ‘darkest plenary’

    Shock, anger and betrayal reverberated through the 145-strong caucus in early December last year when Belgian police began arresting senior S&D figures, chief among them a former Italian MEP Pier Antonio Panzeri and Eva Kaili, a rising star from Greece who had barely completed a year as one of Parliament’s 14 vice presidents.

    “The Qatargate revelations came as a terrible shock to S&D staff and MEPs,” an S&D spokesperson said. “Many felt betrayed, their trust abused and broken. Anyone who has ever become a victim of criminals will understand it takes time to heal from such an experience.”

    When the S&D gathered for a Parliament session in Strasbourg days after the first arrests, few members took it harder than the group’s president, García, who at one point broke down in tears, according to three people present.

    “We are all not just political machines, but also human beings,” said German MEP Gabriele Bischoff, an S&D vice chair in her first term. “To adapt to such a crisis, and to deal with it, it’s not easy.”

    “I mean, also, you trusted some of these people,” she said.

    An Italian court ruled that the daughter of former MEP Pier Antonio Panzeri can be extradited to Belgium | European Union

    In Strasbourg the group showed zero appetite to watch the judicial process play out, backing a move to remove Kaili from her vice presidency role. (She has, through a lawyer, consistently maintained her innocence.) 

    The group’s leadership also pressured MEPs who in any way were connected to the issues or people in the scandal to step back from legislative work, even if they faced no charges.

    “It was of course the darkest plenary we’ve had,” said Andreas Schieder, an Austrian S&D MEP who holds a top role on the committee charged with battling foreign interference post Qatargate. “But we took the right decisions quickly.”

    The S&D hierarchy swiftly suspended Kaili from the group in December and meted out the same treatment to two other MEPs who would later be drawn into the probe.

    But now many S&D MEPs are asking themselves how it was possible that a cluster of people exerted such influence across the Socialist group, how Kaili rose so quickly to the vice presidency and how so much allegedly corrupt behavior went apparently unnoticed for years.

    Like family

    The deep interpersonal connections between those accused and the rest of the group were part of what made it all so searing for the S&D tribe. 

    Belgian authorities’ initial sweep nabbed not only Panzeri and Kaili but also Kaili’s partner, a longtime parliamentary assistant named Francesco Giorgi, who had spent years working for Panzeri. Suddenly every former Panzeri assistant still in Parliament was under suspicion. Panzeri later struck a plea deal, offering to dish on whom he claims to have bribed in exchange for a reduced sentence.

    Maria Arena, who succeeded Panzeri as head of the Parliament’s human rights panel in 2019, also found herself under heavy scrutiny: Her friendship with her predecessor was so close that she’d been spotted as his plus-one at his assistant’s wedding. Alessandra Moretti, another S&D MEP, has also been linked to the probe, according to legal documents seen by POLITICO.

    The appearance of Laura Ballarin, García’s Cabinet chief, raising a glass with Giorgi and vacationing on a Mediterranean sailboat with Kaili, offered a tabloid-friendly illustration of just how enmeshed the accused were with the group’s top brass.

    “I was the first one to feel shocked, hurt and deeply betrayed when the news came out,” Ballarin told POLITICO. “Yet, evidently, my personal relations did never interfere with my professional role.”

    Making matters worse, some three months later, the scandal has largely remained limited to the S&D. Two more of its members have been swallowed up since the initial round of arrests: Italy’s Andrea Cozzolino and Belgium’s Marc Tarabella — a well-liked figure known for handing out Christmas gifts to Parliament staff as part of a St. Nicholas act. Both were excluded, like Kaili, from the S&D group. They maintain their innocence.

    Whiter than white

    That’s putting pressure on García, who is seen in Brussels as an extension of the power of her close ally, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. 

    Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is one of S&D chief Iratxe García most important allies | Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images

    However, she has not always been able to leverage that alliance in Brussels. A prime example is the backroom deal the political groups made to appoint the Parliament’s new secretary-general, Alessandro Chiocchetti, who hails from the center-right European People’s Party. García emerged mostly empty-handed from the negotiations, with the EPP maneuvering around her and The Left group securing an entirely new directorate general.

    Kaili, from a tiny two-person Greek Socialist delegation, would also have never gotten the nod to become vice president in 2022 without García and the Spanish Socialists’ backing.

    Yet when it comes to trying to clean house and reclaim the moral high ground, the Socialist chief has brought people together. “She deserves to be trusted to do this correctly,” said René Repasi, a German S&D lawmaker.

    In the new year, the S&D successfully pushed through the affable, progressive Luxembourgish Marc Angel to replace Kaili, fending off efforts by other left-leaning and far-right groups to take one of the S&D’s seats in the Parliament’s rule-making bureau. In another move designed to steady the ship, the Socialists in February drafted Udo Bullmann, an experienced German MEP who previously led the S&D group, as a safe pair of hands to replace Arena on the human rights subcommittee.

    And in a bid to go on the offensive, the Socialists published a 15-point ethics plan (one-upping the center-right Parliament president’s secret 14-point plan). It requires all S&D MEPs — and their assistants — to disclose their meetings online and pushes for whistleblower protections in the Parliament. Where legally possible, the group pledges to hold its own members to these standards — for example by banning MEPs from paid-for foreign trips — even if the rest of the body doesn’t go as far.

    Those results were hard won, group officials recounted. With members from 26 EU countries, the group had to navigate cultural and geographic divisions on how to handle corruption, exposing north-south fault lines.

    “To do an internal inquiry was not supported in the beginning by all, but we debated it,” said Bischoff, describing daily meetings that stretched all the way to Christmas Eve. 

    The idea of recruiting outside players to conduct an internal investigation was also controversial, she added. Yet in the end, the group announced in mid-January that former MEP Richard Corbett and Silvina Bacigalupo, a law professor and board member of Transparency International Spain, would lead a group-backed inquiry, which has now begun.

    The moves appear to have staved off a challenge to García’s leadership, and so far, attacks from the Socialists’ main rival, the EPP, have been limited. But S&D MEPs say there’s still an air of unease, with some concerned the cleanup hasn’t gone deep enough — while others itch to defend the accused.

    Some party activists quietly question if the response was too fast and furious.

    Arena’s political future is in doubt, for example, even though she’s faced no criminal charges. Following mounting pressure about her ties to Panzeri, culminating with a POLITICO report on her undeclared travel to Qatar, Arena formally resigned from the human rights subcommittee. The group is not defending her, even as some activists mourn the downfall of someone they see as a sincere champion for human rights causes.

    Vocal advocacy for Kaili has also fueled controversy: Italian S&D MEPs drew groans from colleagues when they hawked around a letter about the treatment of Kaili and her daughter, which only garnered 10 signatures.

    “I do not believe it was necessary,” García said of the letter. “[If] I worry about the situation in jails, it has to be for everyone, not for a specific MEP.”

    The letter also did nothing to warm relations between the S&D’s Spanish and Italian delegations, which have been frosty since before the scandal. The S&D spokesperson in a statement rejected the notion that there are tensions along geographical lines: “There’s no divide between North and South, nor East and West, and there’s no tension between the Italian and Spanish delegations.”

    In another camp are MEPs who are looking somewhat suspiciously at their colleagues.

    Repasi, the German S&D member, said he is weary of “colleagues that are seemingly lying into your face” — a specific reference to Tarabella, who vocally denied wrongdoing for weeks, only to have allegations surface that he took around €140,000 in bribes from Panzeri, the detained ex-lawmaker.

    Repasi added: “It makes you more and more wonder if there is anyone else betting on the fact that he or she might not be caught.”

    Jakob Hanke Vela, Karl Mathiesen and Aitor Hernández-Morales contributed reporting.

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  • ‘Oh my God, it’s really happening’

    ‘Oh my God, it’s really happening’

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    Kaja Kallas had been dreading the call.

    “I woke at 5 o’clock,” the Estonian prime minister recalled recently. The phone was ringing. Her Lithuanian counterpart was on the line. 

    “Oh my God, it’s really happening,” came the ominous words, according to Kallas. Another call came in. This time it was the Latvian prime minister. 

    It was February 24, 2022. War had begun on the European continent. 

    The night before, Kallas had told her Cabinet members to keep their phones on overnight in anticipation of just this moment: Russia was blitzing Ukraine in an attempt to decapitate the government and seize the country. For those in Estonia and its Baltic neighbors, where memories of Soviet occupation linger, the first images of war tapped into a national terror. 

    “I went to bed hoping that I was not right,” Kallas said.

    Across Europe, similar wakeup calls rolled in, as Russian tanks barrelled into Ukraine and missiles pierced the early morning sky. In recent weeks, POLITICO spoke with prime ministers, high-ranking EU and NATO officials, foreign ministers and diplomats — nearly 20 in total — to reflect on the war’s early days as it reaches its ruinous one-year mark on Friday. All described a similar foreboding that morning, a sense that the world had irrevocably changed.

    Within a year, the Russian invasion would profoundly reshape Europe, upending traditional foreign policy presumptions, cleaving it from Russian energy and reawakening long-dormant arguments about extending the EU eastward.

    But for those centrally involved in the war’s buildup, the events of February 24 are still seared in their memories. 

    In an interview with POLITICO, Charles Michel — head of the European Council, the EU body comprising all 27 national leaders — recalled how he received a call directly from Kyiv as the attacks began. 

    “I was woken up by Zelenskyy,” Michel recounted. It was around 3 a.m. The Ukrainian president told Michel: “The aggression had started and that it was a full-scale invasion.” 

    Michel hit the phones, speaking to prime ministers across the EU throughout the night.

    Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell speak to the press on February 24, 2022 | Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty Images

    By 5 a.m., EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell was in his office. Three hours later, he was standing next to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as the duo made the EU’s first major public statement about the dawning war. Von der Leyen then convened the 27 commissioners overseeing EU policy for an emergency meeting. 

    Elsewhere in Brussels, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg was on the phone with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who were six hours behind in Washington, D.C. He then raced over to NATO headquarters, where he urgently gathered the military alliance’s decision-making body. 

    The mood that morning, Stoltenberg recalled in a recent conversation with reporters, was “serious” but “measured and well-organized.”

    In Ukraine, missiles had begun raining down in Kyiv, Odesa and Mariupol. Volodymyr Zelenskyy took to social media, confirming in a video that war had begun. He urged Ukrainians to stay calm. 

    These video updates would soon become a regular feature of Zelenskyy’s wartime leadership. But this first one was especially jarring — a message from a president whose life, whose country, was now at risk. 

    It would be one of the last times the Ukrainian president, dressed in a dove-gray suit jacket and crisp white shirt, appeared in civilian clothes.

    Europe’s 21st-century Munich moment

    February 24, 2022 is an indelible memory for those who lived through it. For many, however, it felt inevitable. 

    Five days before the invasion, Zelenskyy traveled to the Munich Security Conference, an annual powwow of defense and security experts frequented by senior politicians. 

    It was here that the Ukrainian leader made one final, desperate plea for more weapons and more sanctions, hitting out at Germany for promising helmets and chiding NATO countries for not doing enough. 

    “What are you waiting for?” he implored in the highly charged atmosphere in the Bayerischer Hof hotel. “We don’t need sanctions after bombardment happens, after we have no borders, no economy. Why would we need those sanctions then?”

    The symbolism was rife — Munich, a city forever associated with appeasement following Neville Chamberlain’s ill-fated attempt to swap land for peace with Adolf Hitler in 1938, was now the setting for Zelenskyy’s last appeal to the West.

    Zelenskyy, never missing a moment, seized the historical analogy. 

    Five days before the invasion, Zelenskyy traveled to the Munich Security Conference, where he made one final, desperate plea for more weapons and more sanctions | Pool photo by Ronald Wittek/Getty Images

    “Has our world completely forgotten the mistakes of the 20th century?” he asked. “Where does appeasement policy usually lead to?”

    But his calls for more arms were ignored, even as countries began ordering their citizens to evacuate and airlines began canceling flights in and out of the country. 

    A few days later, Zelenskyy’s warnings were coming true. On February 22, Vladimir Putin inched closer to war, recognizing the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine. It was a decisive moment for the Russian president, paving the way for his all-out assault less than 48 hours later.  

    The EU responded the next day — its first major action against Moscow’s activities in Ukraine since the escalation of tensions in 2021. Officials unveiled the first in what would be nine sanction packages against Russia (and counting). 

    In an equally significant move, a reluctant Germany finally pulled the plug on Nord Stream 2, the yet unopened gas pipeline linking Russia to northern Germany — the decision, made after months of pressure, presaged how the Russian invasion would soon upend the way Europeans powered their lives and heated their homes.

    Summit showdown

    As it happened, EU leaders were already scheduled to meet in Brussels on February 24, the day the invasion began. Charles Michel had summoned the leaders earlier that week to deal with the escalating crisis, and to sign off on the sanctions.  

    Throughout the afternoon, Brussels was abuzz — TV cameras from around the world had descended on the European quarter. Helicopters circled overhead.

    European leaders gathered in Brussels following the invasion | Pool photo by Olivier Hoslet/AFP via Getty Images

    Suddenly, the regular European Council meeting of EU leaders, often a forum for technical document drafting as much as political decision-making, had become hugely consequential. With war unfolding, the world was looking at the EU to respond — and lead.

    The meeting was scheduled to begin at 8 p.m. As leaders were gathering, news came that Russia had seized the Chernobyl nuclear plant, Moldova had declared a state of emergency and thousands of people were pouring out of Ukraine. Later that night, Zelenskyy announced a general mobilization: every man between the ages of 18 and 60 was being asked to fight.

    Many leaders were wearing facemasks, a reminder that another crisis, which now seemed to pale in comparison, was still ever-present.

    Just before joining colleagues at the Europa building in Brussels, Emmanuel Macron phoned Putin — the French president’s latest effort to mediate with the Russian leader. Macron had visited Moscow on February 7 but left empty-handed after five hours of discussions. He later said he made the call at Zelenskyy’s request, to ask Putin to stop the war.

    “It did not produce any results,” Macron said of the call. “The Russian president has chosen war.”

    Arriving at the summit, Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš captured the gravity of the moment. “Europe is experiencing the biggest military invasion since the Second World War,” he said. “Our response has to be united.”

    But inside the room, divisions were on full display. How far, leaders wondered, could Europe go in sanctioning Russia, given the potential economic blowback? Countries dug in along fault lines that would become familiar in the succeeding months. 

    The realities of war soon pierced the academic debates. Zelenskyy’s team had set up a video link as missile strikes encircled the capital city, wanting to get the president talking to his EU counterparts.

    One person present in the room recalled the percolating anxiety as the video feed beamed through — the image out of focus, the camera shaky. Then the picture sharpened and Zelenskyy appeared, dressed in a khaki shirt and looking deathly pale. His surroundings were faceless, an unknown room somewhere in Kyiv. 

    “Everyone was silent, the atmosphere was completely tense,” said the official who requested anonymity to speak freely.  

    Zelenskyy, shaken and utterly focused, told leaders that they may not see him again — the Kremlin wanted him dead.

    Black smoke rises from a military airport in Chuguyev near Kharkiv on February 24, 2022 | Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images

    “If you, EU leaders and leaders of the free world, do not really help Ukraine today, tomorrow the war will also knock at your door,” he warned, invoking an argument he would return to again and again: that this wasn’t just Ukraine’s war — it was Europe’s war. 

    Within hours, EU leaders had signed off on their second package of pre-prepared sanctions hitting Russia. But a fractious debate had already begun about what should come next. 

    The Baltic nations and Poland wanted more — more penalties, more economic punishments. Others were holding back. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi aired their reluctance about expelling Russian banks from the global SWIFT payment system. It was needed to pay for Russian gas, after all. 

    How quickly that would change. 

    Sanctions were not the only pressing matter. There was a humanitarian crisis unfolding on Europe’s doorstep. The EU had to both get aid into a war zone and prepare for a mass exodus of people fleeing it. 

    Janez Lenarčič, the EU’s crisis management commissioner, landed in Paris on the day of the invasion, returning from Niger. Officials started making plans to get ambulances, generators and medicine into Ukraine — ultimately comprising 85,000 tons of aid. 

    “The most complex, biggest and longest-ever operation” of its kind for the EU, he said. 

    By that weekend, there was also a plan for the refugees escaping Russian bombs. At a rare Sunday meeting, ministers agreed to welcome and distribute the escaping Ukrainians — a feat that has long eluded the EU for other migrants. Days later, they would grant Ukrainians the instant right to live and work in the EU — another first in an extraordinary time. Decisions that normally took years were now flying through in hours.

    Looming over everything were Ukraine’s repeated — and increasingly dire — entreaties for more weapons. Europe’s military investments had lapsed in recent decades, and World War II still cast a dark shadow over countries like Germany, where the idea of sending arms to a warzone still felt verboten.

    There were also quiet doubts (not to mention intelligence assessments). Would Ukraine even have its own government next week? Why risk war with Russia if it was days away from toppling Kyiv?

    “What we didn’t know at that point was that the Ukrainian resistance would be so successful,” a senior NATO diplomat told POLITICO on condition of anonymity. “We were thinking there would be a change of regime [in Kyiv], what do we do?” 

    That, too, was all about to change. 

    German Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed Germany on the night of Russia’s invasion | Pool photo by Hannibal Hanschke/Getty Images

    By the weekend, Germany had sloughed off its reluctance, slowly warming to its role as a key military player. The EU, too, dipped its toe into historic waters that weekend, agreeing to help reimburse countries sending weapons to Ukraine — another startling first for a self-proclaimed peace project.

    “I remember, saying, ‘OK, now we go for it,’” said Stefano Sannino, secretary-general of the EU’s diplomatic arm. 

    Ironically, the EU would refund countries using the so-called European Peace Facility — a little-known fund that was suddenly the EU’s main vehicle to support lethal arms going to a warzone. 

    Over at NATO, the alliance activated its defense plans and sent extra forces to the alliance’s eastern flank. The mission had two tracks, Stoltenberg recounted — “to support Ukraine, but also prevent escalation beyond Ukraine.” 

    Treading that fine line would become the defining balancing act over the coming year for the Western allies as they blew through one taboo after another.

    Who knew what, when

    As those dramatic, heady early days fade into history, Europeans are now grappling with what the war means — for their identity, for their sense of security and for the European Union that binds them together. 

    The invasion has rattled the core tenets underlying the European project, said Ivan Krastev, a prominent political scientist who has long studied Europe’s place in the world.

    “For different reasons, many Europeans believed that this is a post-war Continent,” he said. 

    Post-World War II Europe was built on the assumption that open economic policies, trade between neighbors and mild military power would preserve peace. 

    “For the Europeans to accept the possibility of the war was basically to accept the limits of our own model,” Krastev argued. 

    The disbelief has bred self-reflection: Has the war permanently changed the EU? Will a generation that had confined memories of World War II and the Cold War to the past view the next conflict differently?

    And, perhaps most acutely, did Europe miss the signs? 

    Ukrainian refugees gather and rest upon their arrival at the main railway station in Berlin | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images

    “The start of that war has changed our lives, that’s for sure,” said Romanian Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu. It wasn’t, however, unexpected, he argued. “We are very attentive to what happens in our region,” he said. “The signs were quite clear.”

    Aurescu pointed back to April 2021 as the moment he knew: “It was quite clear that Russia was preparing an aggression against Ukraine.”

    Not everyone in Europe shared that assessment, though — to the degree that U.S. officials became worried. They started a public and private campaign in 2021 to warn Europe of an imminent invasion as Russia massed its troops on the Ukrainian border. 

    In November 2021, von der Leyen made her first trip to the White House. She sat down with Joe Biden in the Oval Office, surrounded by a coterie of national security and intelligence officials. Biden had just received a briefing before the gathering on the Russia battalion buildup and wanted to sound the alarm. 

    “The president was very concerned,” said one European official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive conversations. “This was a time when no one in Europe was paying any attention, even the intelligence services.”

    But others disputed the narrative that Europe was unprepared as America sounded the alarm. 

    “It’s a question of perspective. You can see the same information, but come to a different conclusion,” said one senior EU official involved in discussions in the runup to the war, while conceding that the U.S. and U.K. — both members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance — did have better information.

    Even if those sounding the alarm proved right, said Pierre Vimont, a former secretary-general of the EU’s diplomatic wing and Macron’s Russia envoy until the war broke out, it was hard to know in advance what, exactly, to plan for. 

    “What type of military operation would it be?” he recalled people debating. A limited operation in the east? A full occupation? A surgical strike on Kyiv?

    Here’s where most landed: Russia’s onslaught was horrifying — its brutality staggering. But the signs had been there. Something was going to happen.

    “We knew that the invasion is going to happen, and we had shared intelligence,” Stoltenberg stressed. “Of course, until the planes are flying and the battle tanks are rolling, and the soldiers are marching, you can always change your plans. But the more we approached the 24th of February last year, the more obvious it was.”

    Then on the day, he recounted, it was a matter of dutifully enacting the plan: “We were prepared, we knew exactly what to do.”

    “You may be shocked by this invasion,” he added, “but you cannot be surprised.” 

    Clea Caulcutt and Cristina Gallardo contributed reporting.

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  • It’s the end of the world as we know it — and Munich feels nervous

    It’s the end of the world as we know it — and Munich feels nervous

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    MUNICH — Cut through the haze of hoary proclamations emanating from the main stage of the Munich Security Conference about Western solidarity and common purpose this weekend, and one can’t help but notice more than a hint of foreboding just beneath the surface.

    Even as Western leaders congratulate themselves for their generosity toward Ukraine, the country’s armed forces are running low on ammunition, equipment and even men. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who opened the conference from Kyiv on Friday, urged the free world to send more help — and fast. “We need speed,” he said.

    U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris turned the heat up on Russia on another front, accusing the country of “crimes against humanity.” “Let us all agree. On behalf of all the victims, both known and unknown: justice must be served,” she said.

    In other words, Russian leaders could be looking at Nuremberg 2.0. That’s bound to make a few people in Moscow nervous, especially those old enough to remember what happened to Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milošević and his entourage.

    The outlook in Asia is no less fraught. Taiwan remains on edge, as the country tries to guess China’s next move. Here too, the news from Munich wasn’t reassuring.

    “What is happening in Europe today could happen in Asia tomorrow,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said.   

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi did nothing to contradict that narrative. “Let me assure the audience that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory,” Wang told the conference when asked about Beijing’s designs on the self-governed island. Taiwan “has never been a country and it will never be a country in the future.”

    For some attendees, the vibe in the crowded Bayerischer Hof hotel where the gathering takes place carried echoes of 1938. That year, the Bavarian capital hosted a conference that resulted in the infamous Munich Agreement, in which European powers ceded the Sudetenland to Germany in a misguided effort they believed could preserve peace.

    “We all know that there is a storm brewing outside, but here inside the Bayerischer Hof all seems normal,” wrote Andrew Michta, dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the Germany-based Marshall Center. “It all seems so routine, and yet it all changes suddenly when a Ukrainian parliamentarian pointedly tells the audience we are failing to act fast enough.”

    The only people smiling at this year’s security conference are the defense contractors. Arms sales are booming by all accounts.

    Even Germany, which in recent years perfected the art of explaining away its failure to meet its NATO defense spending commitment, promised to reverse course. Indeed, German officials appeared to be trying to outdo one another to prove just how hawkish they’ve become.

    Chancellor Olaf Scholz vowed to “permanently” meet NATO’s defense spending goal for individual members of two percent of GDP.

    Chancellor Olaf Scholz vowed to “permanently” meet NATO’s defense spending goal for individual members | Johannes Simon/Getty Images

    Germany’s new defense minister, Boris Pistorius, a Social Democrat like Scholz, called for even more, saying that “it will not be possible to fulfill the tasks that lie ahead of us with barely two percent.”

    Keep in mind that at the beginning of last year, leading Social Democrats were still calling on the U.S. to remove all of its nuclear warheads from German soil.

    In other words, if even the Germans have woken up to the perils of the world’s current geopolitical state, this could well be the moment to really start worrying.

    CORRECTION: Jens Stoltenberg’s reference to Asia has been updated.

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    Matthew Karnitschnig

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  • China talks ‘peace,’ woos Europe and trashes Biden in Munich

    China talks ‘peace,’ woos Europe and trashes Biden in Munich

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    MUNICH — China is trying to drive a fresh wedge between Europe and the United States as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine trudges past its one-year mark.

    Such was the motif of China’s newly promoted foreign policy chief Wang Yi when he broke the news at the Munich Security Conference on Saturday that President Xi Jinping would soon present a “peace proposal” to resolve what Beijing calls a conflict — not a war — between Moscow and Kyiv. And he pointedly urged his European audience to get on board and shun the Americans.

    In a major speech, Wang appealed specifically to the European leaders gathered in the room.

    “We need to think calmly, especially our friends in Europe, about what efforts should be made to stop the warfare; what framework should there be to bring lasting peace to Europe; what role should Europe play to manifest its strategic autonomy,” said Wang, who will continue his Europe tour with a stop in Moscow.

    In contrast, Wang launched a vociferous attack on “weak” Washington’s “near-hysterical” reaction to Chinese balloons over U.S. airspace, portraying the country as warmongering.

    “Some forces might not want to see peace talks to materialize,” he said, widely interpreted as a reference to the U.S. “They don’t care about the life and death of Ukrainians, [nor] the harms on Europe. They might have strategic goals larger than Ukraine itself. This warfare must not continue.”

    Yet at the conference, Europe showed no signs of distancing itself from the U.S. nor pulling back on military support for Ukraine. The once-hesitant German Chancellor Olaf Scholz urged Europe to give Ukraine even more modern tanks. And French President Emmanuel Macron shot down the idea of immediate peace talks with the Kremlin.

    And, predictably, there was widespread skepticism that China’s idea of “peace” will match that of Europe.

    “China has not been able to condemn the invasion,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told a group of reporters. Beijing’s peace plan, he added, “is quite vague.” Peace, the NATO chief emphasized, is only possible if Russia respects Ukraine’s sovereignty.

    Europe watches with caution

    Wang’s overtures illustrate the delicate dance China has been trying to pull off since the war began.

    Keen to ensure Russia is not weakened in the long run, Beijing has offered Vladimir Putin much-needed diplomatic support, while steering clear of any direct military assistance that would attract Western sanctions against its economic and trade relations with the world.

    Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitro Kuleba is expected to hold a bilateral meeting with Wang while in Munich | Johannes Simon/Getty Images

    “We will put forward China’s position on the political settlement on the Ukraine crisis, and stay firm on the side of peace and dialogue,” Wang said. “We do not add fuel to the fire, and we are against reaping benefit from this crisis.”

    According to Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, who met Wang earlier this week, Xi will make his “peace proposal” on the first anniversary of the war, which is Friday.

    Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitro Kuleba is expected to hold a bilateral meeting with Wang while in Munich. He said he hoped to have a “frank” conversation with the Beijing envoy.

    “We believe that compliance with the principle of territorial integrity is China’s fundamental interest in the international arena,” Kuleba told journalists in Munich. “And that commitment to the observance and protection of this principle is a driving force for China, greater than other arguments offered by Ukraine, the United States, or any other country.”

    EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell met Wang later on Saturday and called on him to “use [China’s] closeness to convince Russia to engage in real peace efforts. Borrell expressed hope that Wang’s visit to Moscow could be used to convince Russia to stop its brutal war,” according to an EU official familiar with the talks, adding the EU chief told Wang Russia conducted “gross violation of the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter.”

    Many in Munich were wary of the upcoming Chinese plan.

    German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock welcomed China’s effort to use its influence to foster peace but told reporters she had “talked intensively” with Wang during a bilateral meeting on Friday about “what a just peace means: not rewarding the attacker, the aggressor, but standing up for international law and for those who have been attacked.”

    “A just peace,” she added, “presupposes that the party that has violated territorial integrity — meaning Russia — withdraws its troops from the occupied country.”

    One reason for Europe’s concerns is the Chinese peace plan could undermine an effort at the United Nations to rally support for a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which will be on the U.N.’s General Assembly agenda next week, according to three European officials and diplomats.

    Taiwan issue stokes up US-China tension

    If China was keen to talk about peace in Ukraine, it’s more reluctant to do so in a case closer to home.

    When Wolfgang Ischinger, the veteran German diplomat behind the conference, asked Wang if he could reassure the audience Beijing was not planning an imminent military escalation against Taiwan, the Chinese envoy was non-committal.

    Nato Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said “what is happening in Europe today could happen in east Asia tomorrow” | Johannes Simon/Getty Images

    “Let me assure the audience that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory. It has never been a country and it will never be a country in the future,” Wang said.

    The worry over Taiwan resonated in a speech from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who said “what is happening in Europe today could happen in Asia tomorrow.” Reminding the audience of the painful experience of relying on Russia’s energy supply, he said: “We should not make the same mistakes with China and other authoritarian regimes.”

    But China’s most forceful attack was reserved for the U.S. Calling its decision to shoot down Chinese and other balloons “absurd” and “near-hysterical,” Wang said: “It does not show the U.S. is strong; on the contrary, it shows it is weak.

    Wang also amplified the message in other bilateral meetings, including one with Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. “U.S. bias and ignorance against China has reached a ridiculous level,” he said. “The U.S. … has to stop this kind of absurd nonsense out of domestic political needs.”

    It remains unclear if Wang will hold a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken while in Germany, as has been discussed.

    Hans von der Burchard and Lili Bayer reported from Munich, and Stuart Lau reported from Brussels.

    This article was updated to include details of the meeting between Wang and Borrell.

    CORRECTION: Jens Stoltenberg’s reference to Asia has been updated.

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  • West struggles to deliver on Zelenskyy’s defense wish list

    West struggles to deliver on Zelenskyy’s defense wish list

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    BRUSSELS — With Ukraine’s partners racing to send more weapons to Kyiv amid an emerging Russian offensive, fulfilling Ukrainian requests is becoming trickier.

    Ukraine is still waiting for promised deliveries of modern tanks. Combat jets, though much discussed, are mired in the throes of government hesitation.

    On top of that, Kyiv is using thousands of rounds of ammunition per day — and Western production simply can’t keep up.

    As members of the U.S.-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group gather in Brussels on Tuesday to coordinate arms assistance to Ukraine, they face pressure to expedite delivery and provide even more advanced capabilities to Ukrainian forces. 

    “We have received good signals,” Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a video address following visits to London, Paris and Brussels. 

    “This applies both to long-range missiles and tanks, and to the next level of our cooperation — combat aircraft,” he said, however adding, “We still need to work on this.”

    And while most of Ukraine’s partners are committed to responding to Zelenskyy’s stump tour with expanded support as the conflict threatens to escalate, Western governments will have to overcome political and practical hurdles. 

    “It is clear that we are in a race of logistics,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters on Monday. “Key capabilities like ammunition, fuel, and spare parts must reach Ukraine before Russia can seize the initiative on the battlefield.”

    Existing and future supply of weapons to Ukraine will both be on the table when the defense group — made up of about 50 countries and popularly known at the Ramstein format — meets at NATO headquarters.

    NATO allies will also hold a meeting of defense ministers directly afterward to hear the latest assessment from Ukrainian counterparts and discuss the alliance’s future defense challenges. 

    Ukrainian officials will use the session, which would typically be held at the U.S. base in Ramstein, Germany, to share their latest needs with Western officials — from air defense to ground logistics — while it will also be a venue for Kyiv’s supporters to check in on implementation of earlier pledges and availabilities in the near future.

    The aim of the session, said a senior European diplomat, is “to step up military support as much as needed — not only commitments, but actual speedy deliverables is of particular significance.”

    “Tanks are needed not on paper but in the battlefield,” said the diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of discussions.

    Ammo, ammo, ammo 

    One of the most pressing issues on the table in Brussels this week is how to keep the weapons already sent to Ukraine firing. 

    “Of course it is important to discuss new systems, but the most urgent need is to ensure that all the systems which are already there, or have been pledged, are delivered and work as they should,” Stoltenberg said.

    During meetings with EU heads on Thursday, Zelenskyy and his team provided each leader with an individualized list requesting weapons and equipment based on the country’s known stocks and capabilities. 

    But there was one common theme. 

    “The first thing on the list was, everywhere, the ammunition,” Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said.

    “If you have the equipment and you don’t have the ammunition, then it’s no use,” the Estonian leader told reporters on Friday. 

    And while Ukraine is in dire need of vast amounts of ammo to keep fighting, Western countries’ own stocks are running low. 

    “It’s a very real concern,” said Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. Army Europe. “None of us, including the United States, is producing enough ammunition right now,” he said in a phone interview on Sunday.

    Munitions will also be top of mind at the session of NATO defense ministers on Wednesday, who will discuss boosting production of weapons, ammunition and equipment, along with future defense spending targets for alliance members.

    Boosting stockpiles and production, Stoltenberg emphasized on Monday, “requires more defense expenditure by NATO allies.” 

    Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas | Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty images

    And while the NATO chief said some progress has been made on work with industry on plans to boost stockpile targets, some current and former officials have expressed frustration about the pace of work. 

    Kallas last week raised the idea of joint EU purchases to help spur production and hasten deliveries of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, although it’s not clear whether this plan would enjoy sufficient support within the bloc — and how fast it could have an impact.

    Hodges thinks companies need a clearer demand signal from governments. “We need industry to do more,” he said. 

    But he noted, “These are not charities … they are commercial businesses, and so you have to have an order with money before they start making it.”

    Jets fight fails to take off (for now

    Fighter jets are a priority ask for Ukrainian officials, although Western governments seem not yet ready to make concrete commitments. 

    Numerous countries have expressed openness to eventually providing Ukraine with jets, indicating that the matter is no longer a red line. Regardless, hesitation remains. 

    NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg | Valeria Mongelli/AFP via Getty Images

    The U.K. has gone the furthest so far, announcing that it will train Ukrainian pilots on fighter jets. But when it comes to actually providing aircraft, British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace cautioned that “this is not a simple case of towing an aircraft to the border.”

    Polish President Andrzej Duda, meanwhile, said sending F-16 aircraft would be a “very serious decision” which is “not easy to take,” arguing that his country does not have enough jets itself.

    For some potential donors, the jets debate revolves around both timing and utility. 

    “The essential question is: What do they want to do with planes? It’s not clear,” said one French diplomat, who was unauthorized to speak publicly. “Do they think that with 50 or 100 fighter jets, they can retake the Donbas?” the diplomat said.

    The diplomat said there is no point in training Ukrainians on Western jets now. “It’ll take over six months to train them, so it doesn’t respond to their immediate imperatives.”

    But, the diplomat added, “maybe some countries should give them MiGs, planes that they can actually fly.”

    Slovakia is in fact moving closer to sending MiG-29 jets to Ukraine. 

    “We want to do it,” said a Slovak official who was not at liberty to disclose their identity. “But we must work out the details on how,” the official said, adding that a domestic process and talks with Ukraine still need to take place. 

    No big jet announcements are expected at the Tuesday meeting, though the issue is likely to be discussed. 

    Where are the tanks?

    And while Western governments have already — with great fanfare — struck a deal to provide Ukraine with modern tanks, questions over actual deliveries will also likely come up at Tuesday’s meeting.

    Germany’s leadership in particular has stressed it’s time for countries that supported the idea of sending tanks to live up to their rhetoric. 

    “Germany is making a very central contribution to ensuring that we provide rapid support, as we have done in the past,” German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said last week. 

    German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is shown an anti-aircraft gun tank Gepard | Morris MacMatzen/Getty Images

    “We are striving to ensure that many others who have come forward in the past now follow up on this finger-pointing with practical action,” he went on. Germany’s goal is for Ukraine to receive tanks by the end of March, and training has already begun. 

    Along with tanks, another pending request that Ukrainian officials will likely bring up this week is long-range missiles. 

    Hodges, who has been advocating for the West to give Ukraine the weapons it would need to retake Crimea, said he believes long-range precision weapons are the key. “That’s how you defeat mass with precision.” 

    Any such weapon, he argued, “has got to be at the top of the list.” 

    Clea Caulcutt contributed reporting from Paris and Hans von der Buchard contributed from Berlin.


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    Lili Bayer

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  • Theater or Zelenskyy? How Macron keeps failing to lead European response to Ukraine war

    Theater or Zelenskyy? How Macron keeps failing to lead European response to Ukraine war

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    When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled to Western Europe last week to drum up support for his country’s fight against Russia, he made a last-minute stopover in Paris.

    French President Emmanuel Macron was lucky to get the nod.

    Macron’s attitude toward Ukraine’s war effort has frequently proved inscrutable to allies who wonder why France seemed to be hedging its bets by pursuing dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin and touting the need for “security guarantees” for Moscow.

    While German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has suffered bruising criticism over the slow pace of his decision to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, Paris’ contribution to the overall war effort has been substantially smaller, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of gross domestic product, than Berlin’s, according to a ranking from the Kiel Institute for World Economy updated at the end of last year.

    Even accounting for Macron’s more recent pledge to deliver Caesar howitzers and, jointly with Italy, a MAMBA air defense system, France’s overall support effort is likely to remain well below that of the biggest helpers in 2023. As of November, Poland had pledged more than €3 billion in aid, while the United Kingdom has offered more than €7 billion. France, by contrast, offered €1.4 billion — placing the country well below Western allies in terms of a percentage of GDP.

    When Zelenskyy left Ukraine to visit Western leaders last week, Paris didn’t issue a formal invitation — and the meeting with Macron nearly didn’t happen. The French president had originally planned to spend the evening at the theater with his wife. It was only when aides saw footage of Zelenskyy’s solemn address at Westminster Hall in London that they rushed out an invitation and arranged for the late-evening visit in Paris, according to an Elysée official.

    No wonder Zelenskyy nearly missed Paris.

    When asked why France has sometimes pursued a divergent path on Ukraine compared with other Western allies, French officials defend Macron. In an interview with POLITICO, former French President François Hollande said it made sense to speak to Putin before the invasion to “deprive him of any arguments or pretexts.” A French diplomat added: “It was either that or do nothing. He [Macron] decided to try diplomacy — I don’t think we can blame him for that.”

    As for France’s tepid contribution to the war effort, officials argue that, as continental Europe’s premier military power, Paris has other security responsibilities, namely defending Europe’s southern flank, and must retain some capacity. Sending France’s Leclerc tanks, they say, doesn’t make sense because they are no longer in production and couldn’t easily be replaced.

    But when asked if France is leading on Ukraine, the same officials tend to shrug.

    For François Heisbourg, senior adviser to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Macron’s zig-zagging approach to the Ukraine war effort represents a missed opportunity not just in terms of hard power — but in terms of Macron’s larger ambition, spelled out in his 2017 Sorbonne speech, to position himself as a European leader in the lineage of former President François Mitterrand, former Prime Minister Michel Rocard or former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

    “2022 was a year of missed chances,” said Heisbourg. Macron “spent 15 days going around telling everyone who would listen that Russia required security guarantees, as if Russia wasn’t grown-up enough to request them itself.”

    Macron “can still make up the lost time, but the precondition for that is to be extremely clear on Ukraine, and from there to recover legitimacy among the central European states.”

    France’s ‘open road’

    The irony is that in geopolitical terms, Paris has rarely had a better chance to lead Europe.

    Britain has left the European Union, removing a major liberal counterweight to France’s statism. Germany’s Olaf Scholz has been tied down by coalition politics and the impact of Berlin’s failed bet on Russian energy. France, by contrast, enjoyed stable government and the benefits of relative energy independence thanks to its early embrace of nuclear power. As far as Paris’ position in Europe was concerned, “the road was open,” said Heisbourg.

    In some ways, Macron has exploited this opportunity. Paris has been by far the most vocal advocate for a robust EU response to U.S. President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, a bumper package of subsidies for green business. When he traveled to Washington in November, the French president very much looked like a European leader delivering grievances to a trade rival — and bringing home results for all of the EU.

    Yet France’s attempts at economic leadership within the EU haven’t translated into a wider bid to become Europe’s security guarantor and consensus builder. “No one has replaced Angela Merkel at the Council table,” argued one Eastern European diplomat when asked who was currently “leading” the EU. Hollande and several diplomats lamented the deterioration of Franco-German ties under Macron, saying that it undermined the bloc’s coherence and any hope of a more integrated approach to defense.

    As the war in Ukraine nears its first anniversary, Macron has pivoted toward much more full-throated support for Kyiv. In his New Year’s address to the French, he promised Ukrainians to “help you until victory” — making the rhetorical switch from “Russia can’t win the war.” He’s left a door open to training Ukrainian pilots on Western fighter jets and made a significant contribution to the MAMBA missile defense system. “Toward victory, toward peace, toward Europe,” he tweeted during Zelenskyy’s visit to Paris.

    Yet France also remains one of the most skeptical countries in the EU when it comes to accepting Ukraine into the bloc, and its overall contribution still pales in comparison to other countries.

    Macron still has three years in office, plenty of time to double down on his newfound interest in Ukrainian “victory.”

    But with street protests over planned pension reforms now dogging his presidency at home, the golden opportunity is fading.

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    Nicholas Vinocur

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  • Putin has never threatened me, Germany’s Scholz says

    Putin has never threatened me, Germany’s Scholz says

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    German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Russian President Vladimir Putin has never threatened him or Germany, following claims by Boris Johnson that Putin threatened the former U.K. prime minister with a missile strike.

    “Putin didn’t threaten me or Germany” in the phone conversations the chancellor has had with the Russian leader, Scholz told German newspaper Bild in an interview published Sunday.

    In a British documentary that aired last week, Johnson revealed that Putin threatened him in a long phone call in February 2022 just before Russia invaded Ukraine. “He said ‘Boris, I don’t want to hurt you but, with a missile, it would only take a minute’ — something like that,” Boris said in the documentary, referring to Putin.

    Johnson said he took the Russian leader’s threat to be “playing along” with attempts to get him to negotiate over Ukraine. The Kremlin has denied any threat.

    Pushed in the Bild interview on whether Scholz had also received similar threats during phone calls with the Russian leader, the chancellor said “no.”

    In his phone calls with Putin, “I make it very clear to Putin that Russia has sole responsibility for the war,” Scholz said. “In our telephone conversations, our very different positions on the war in Ukraine become very clear,” he said.

    The chancellor also denied that Germany’s decision to deliver Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine was a threat to Russia.

    He said that Germany is delivering battle tanks to Ukraine, along with other allies including the U.S., so that Kyiv “can defend itself.”

    “This joint approach prevents an escalation of the war,” Scholz said.

    Scholz’s comments come as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned that “the situation is getting tougher” on the front lines of the war in the east of the country. Moscow is throwing in “more and more of its forces to break our defenses. Now, it is very difficult in Bakhmut, Vuhledar, near Lyman, and other directions,” Zelenskyy said in his nightly address late Saturday.

    As battles rage around these towns, an early mediator between Russia and Ukraine at the start of the war — former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett who served for just six months last year — revealed that Putin early in the invasion had promised not to kill Zelenskyy. In an interview with the Associated Press published Sunday, Bennett said that during a visit to Moscow in March 2022 he asked Putin if the Kremlin was planning to try to kill the Ukrainian leader.

    “He said ‘I won’t kill Zelenskyy.’ I then said to him ‘I have to understand that you’re giving me your word that you won’t kill Zelenskyy.’ He said ‘I’m not going to kill Zelenskyy,’” Bennett told the AP. Bennett said that after his meeting, he called Zelenskyy to inform him of Putin’s comments.

    The Kremlin has previously denied Ukrainian claims that Russia intended to assassinate Zelenskyy.

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  • Germany moves to send battle tanks to Ukraine

    Germany moves to send battle tanks to Ukraine

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    BERLIN — German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is expected to announce the delivery of German Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine on Wednesday, an official with knowledge of the matter told POLITICO.

    That decision is a significant U-turn and potentially a decisive moment in the war as it should pave the way for a broader coalition of countries to send battle tanks to the fronts against the Russian invaders. As Leopard 2 tanks are made in Germany, Berlin has to give its permission for their re-export.

    Berlin has long resisted sending the Leopard 2s, wanting Washington to take the first step in sending heavy armor. That kind of joint action finally appeared to be imminent on Tuesday, with two U.S. officials saying the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden was leaning toward sending “a significant number” of M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. An announcement on the U.S. tanks could come as early as this week.

    Scholz’s expected announcement — which has not yet been officially confirmed — comes as the chancellor is scheduled to address the German parliament on Wednesday at 1 p.m. According to the official, Germany will also confirm that it will allow other countries such as Poland to send their Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Warsaw said on Tuesday that it had sent its formal request for those re-exports.

    German magazine Spiegel also reported Tuesday evening that the chancellor had decided to supply Ukraine with Leopard tanks, saying that Germany would send “at least one company of Leopard 2A6s” as part of a broader coalition of countries that would also send the German-made vehicle.

    A German government spokesperson could not be reached for comment.

    Ukraine had pressed hard for Germany to agree to send tanks at a meeting of defense ministers at the U.S. Ramstein air base in Germany in Friday, but German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius dashed Kyiv’s hope, saying no decision had been made.

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  • European allies will send about 80 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, Germany says

    European allies will send about 80 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, Germany says

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    BERLIN — Germany and its European partners plan to “quickly” send two Leopard 2 tank battalions to Ukraine — suggesting about 80 vehicles — the government in Berlin announced Wednesday, adding that Germany would provide one company of 14 Leopard 2 A6 tanks “as a first step.”

    Other countries likely to send Leopards to the war against Russia include Poland, Spain, Norway and Finland.

    The decision by Chancellor Olaf Scholz — which emerged on Tuesday evening — marks a decisive moment in Western support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression, which entered its 12th month this week and could soon heat up further as Moscow is expected to launch a new offensive.

    German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius told reporters that the training of Ukrainian crews on the tanks will begin “very soon,” and that the Leopards will be arriving in Ukraine in about two months.

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he was “very happy” with the promise of tanks from the U.S., Germany and Britain. “But speaking frankly, the number of tanks and the delivery time to Ukraine is critical,” he said, in an interview with Sky News.

    Andriy Yermak, the head of Zelenskyy’s office, welcomed the German announcement as a “first step.”

    “Leopards are very much needed,” he said on Telegram.

    Zelenskyy himself also welcomed the move on Twitter. “Sincerely grateful to the Chancellor and all our friends in” Germany, he said.

    Russia’s Ambassador to Germany Sergei Nechaev said in a statement the decision was “extremely dangerous,” and took the conflict “to a new level of confrontation.”

    Kyiv had long urged Germany and other partners to supply its army with the powerful German-built Leopard 2 tank, but Scholz hesitated to take the decision, partly out of concern that it could drag Germany or NATO into the conflict. He remained adamant that such a move had to be closely coordinated and replicated by Western allies, most notably the United States.

    During a speech in Germany’s parliament on Wednesday, Scholz sought to defend his long hesitations on tank deliveries, saying that it “was right and it is right that we did not allow ourselves to be rushed” into taking a decision but insisted “on this close cooperation” with allies, notably the United States. 

    Scholz also stressed that Germany would not actively engage in the war but would continue to seek to “prevent an escalation between Russia and NATO.” He also launched a direct appeal to German citizens who might be skeptical: “Trust me, trust the German government: We will continue to ensure … that this support is provided without the risks for our country rising in the wrong direction.”

    The news of an imminent announcement by U.S. President Joe Biden to send “a significant number” of American M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine facilitated the chancellor’s decision. Scholz had come under huge pressure from European partners like Poland, as well as his own coalition partners in government, to no longer block the delivery of the German tank. Since they are German-made, their re-export needed the approval of the German government.

    NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg tweeted that he “strongly welcomes” Berlin’s decision | Dirk Waem /Belga Mag/AFP via Getty Images)

    “The goal is to quickly form two tank battalions with Leopard 2 tanks for Ukraine,” a German government spokesperson said.

    “As a first step, Germany will provide a company of 14 Leopard-2 A6 tanks from Bundeswehr stocks. Other European partners will also hand over Leopard-2 tanks,” the spokesperson added.

    The spokesperson also said the training of Ukrainian crews on the tanks “is to begin rapidly in Germany.” Berlin would also provide “logistics, ammunition and maintenance of the systems.”

    In addition to the 14 Leopard 2A6 tanks, Germany will also send two tank recovery vehicles, Deputy Defense Minister Siemtje Möller said in a letter to defense policy lawmakers, seen by POLITICO.

    Möller wrote that Ukrainian tank crews will undergo a six-week-training on the Leopards, in Germany which is supposed to start in early February. “This procedure should enable the Leopard 2 A6 to be taken over by Ukraine by the end of the first quarter of 2023.”

    Germany will provide partner countries like Spain, Poland, Finland and Norway, which “want to quickly deliver Leopard-2 tanks from their stocks,” the necessary re-export permission, the spokesperson said.

    The decision by Chancellor Olaf Scholz marks a decisive moment of Western support for Ukraine | David Hecker/Getty Images

    NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg tweeted that he “strongly welcomes” Berlin’s decision. “At a critical moment in Russia’s war, these can help Ukraine to defend itself, win & prevail as an independent nation.”

    Spain, which owns one of the largest fleets of Leopards in the EU, with 347 tanks, has previously said it would send tanks to Kyiv as part of a European coalition, according to El País.

    The Norwegian government is considering sending eight of its 36 Leopard tanks to Ukraine, but no decision has been made yet, Norwegian daily DN reported late Tuesday after a meeting of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs and defense, quoting sources close to the deliberation.

    Portugal, which has 37 Leopards, could provide four tanks to the assembling European coalition, a source close to the government told Correio da Manhã late on Tuesday.

    The Netherlands, which is leasing 18 Leopards from Germany, is also weighing supplying some of their armored vehicles, Dutch newswire ANP reported, quoting a government spokesperson. On Tuesday, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said he was “willing to consider” buying the tanks from Germany and shipping them to Ukraine, but that no decision had been made.

    On Wednesday, the Swedish defense minister said that Sweden did not exclude sending some of its own tanks at a later stage, according to Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet.

    Wilhelmine Preussen and Zoya Sheftalovich contributed reporting.

    This article was updated.

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  • Germany ready to let Poland send Leopard tanks to Ukraine: foreign minister

    Germany ready to let Poland send Leopard tanks to Ukraine: foreign minister

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    PARIS — Germany “would not stand in the way” if Poland or other allies asked for permission to send their German-built Leopard tanks to Ukraine, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said on Sunday.

    The remarks by the Green politician, who was interviewed by French TV LCI on the sidelines of a Franco-German summit in Paris, came in response to comments by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who has raised pressure on Berlin in recent days by saying that Poland is willing to supply Kyiv with Leopard tanks, which would require German approval.

    Morawiecki even suggested that Warsaw was ready to send those tanks without Berlin’s consent.

    Baerbock, however, stressed that “we have not been asked so far” by Poland for such permission. “If we were asked, we would not stand in the way,” she added.

    German officials have gotten increasingly frustrated in recent days by what they perceive as a “media blame-game” by Poland, as Warsaw has repeatedly suggested that Germany was hampering plans to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine, although it appears that the necessary request for export permission has not been made yet.

    Germany is, however, still dragging its feet when it comes to the bigger question of whether it would be willing to send its own Leopard tanks to Ukraine, for example as part of a broader coalition with Poland and other countries like Finland and Denmark.

    Pressed on that point during a press conference in Paris on Sunday, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz avoided giving a clear answer, stressing instead that Berlin had never ceased supporting Ukraine with weapons deliveries and took its decisions in cooperation with its allies.

    Poland’s Morawiecki said on Sunday that his country was ready to build a “smaller coalition” for sending tanks to Ukraine without Germany.

    Baerbock’s comments are therefore also raising the pressure on Scholz to take a clearer position on the tank issue — at least when it comes to granting export permissions to other countries.

    After Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, also from the Greens, said earlier that Germany “should not stand in the way” of permitting such deliveries, the foreign minister’s even more definitive statement makes it even harder for Scholz to take a different position.

    Ukraine has been appealing to Germany and other Western nations to supply modern Western-made battle tanks in order to fend off an expected Russian spring offensive.

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  • Scholz upbeat about trade truce with US in ‘first quarter of this year’

    Scholz upbeat about trade truce with US in ‘first quarter of this year’

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    PARIS — German Chancellor Olaf Scholz raised optimism on Sunday that the EU and the U.S. can reach a trade truce in the coming months to prevent discrimination against European companies due to American subsidies.

    Speaking at a press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron following a joint Franco-German Cabinet meeting in Paris, Scholz said he was “confident” that the EU and the U.S. could reach an agreement “within the first quarter of this year” to address measures under the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act that Europe fears would siphon investments in key technologies away the Continent.

    “My impression is that there is a great understanding in the U.S. [of the concerns raised in the EU],” the chancellor said.

    Macron told reporters that he and Scholz supported attempts by the European Commission to negotiate exemptions from the U.S. law to avoid discrimination against EU companies.

    The fresh optimism came as both leaders adopted a joint statement in which they called for loosening EU state aid rules to boost home-grown green industries — in a response to the U.S. law. The text said the EU needed “ambitious” measures to increase the bloc’s economic competitiveness, such as “simplified and streamlined procedures for state aid” that would allow pumping more money into strategic industries. 

    The joint statement also stressed the need to create “sufficient funding.” But in a win for Berlin, which has been reluctant to talk about new EU debt, the text says that the bloc should first make “full use of the available funding and financial instruments.” The statement also includes an unspecific reference about the need to create “solidarity measures.” 

    EU leaders will meet early next month to discuss Europe’s response to the Inflation Reduction Act, including the Franco-German proposal to soften state aid rules.

    The relationship between Scholz and Macron hit a low in recent months when the French president canceled a planned joint Cabinet meeting in October over disagreements on energy, finance and defense. But the two leaders have since found common ground over responding to the green subsidies in Washington’s Inflation Reduction Act. Macron said that Paris and Berlin had worked in recent weeks to “synchronize” their visions for Europe. 

    “We need the greatest convergence possible to help Europe to move forward,” he said.

    But there was little convergence on how to respond to Ukraine’s repeated requests for Germany and France to deliver battle tanks amid fears there could be a renewed Russian offensive in the spring. 

    Asked whether France would send Leclerc tanks to Ukraine, Macron said the request was being considered and there was work to be done on this issue in the “days and weeks to come.”

    Scholz evaded a question on whether Germany would send Leopard 2 tanks, stressing that Berlin had never ceased supporting Ukraine with weapons deliveries and took its decisions in cooperation with its allies.

    “We have to fear that this war will go on for a very long time,” the chancellor said.

    Reconciliation, for past and present

    The German chancellor and his Cabinet were in Paris on Sunday to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Elysée treaty, which marked a reconciliation between France and Germany after World War II. The celebrations, first at the Sorbonne University and later at the Elysée Palace, were also a moment for the two leaders to put their recent disagreements aside.

    Paris and Berlin have been at odds in recent months not only over defense, energy and finance policy, but also Scholz’s controversial €200 billion package for energy price relief, which was announced last fall without previously involving the French government. These tensions culminated in Macron snubbing Scholz by canceling, in an unprecedented manner, a planned press conference with the German leader in October.

    At the Sorbonne, Scholz admitted relations between the two countries were often turbulent. 

    “The Franco-German engine isn’t always an engine that purrs softly; it’s also a well-oiled machine that can be noisy when it is looking for compromises,” he said.  

    Macron said France and Germany needed to show “fresh ambition” at a time when “history is becoming unhinged again,” in a reference to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 

    “Because we have cleared a path towards reconciliation, France and Germany must become pioneers for the relaunch of Europe” in areas such as energy, innovation, technology, artificial intelligence and diplomacy, he said. 

    On defense, Paris and Berlin announced that Franco-German battalions would be deployed to Romania and Lithuania to reinforce NATO’s eastern front.

    The leaders also welcomed “with satisfaction” recent progress on their joint fighter jet project, FCAS, and said they wanted to progress on their Franco-German tank project, according to the joint statement. 

    The joint declaration also said that both countries are open to the long-term project of EU treaty changes, and that in the shorter term they want to overcome “deadlocks” in the Council of the EU by switching to qualified majority voting on foreign policy and taxation.

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  • Why Germany is struggling to stomach the idea of sending tanks to Ukraine | CNN

    Why Germany is struggling to stomach the idea of sending tanks to Ukraine | CNN

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    CNN
     — 

    The past 12 months has forced European leaders to seriously rethink their approach to national security.

    If Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has confirmed one thing, it’s that peace on the continent cannot be taken for granted. The status quo – decades of low spending and defense not being a policy priority – cannot continue.

    This is especially true in Germany, which has for years has spent far less on its military than many of its Western allies but is now reconsidering its approach to defense at home and abroad.

    Days after the invasion began last February, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivered a head-turning speech to parliament in which he committed to spending €100 billion ($108 billion) to modernize Germany’s military capacity.

    He also vowed that Germany would lift its defense spending to 2% of GDP – meeting a target set by NATO that it had missed for years – and end its deep reliance on Russian energy, particularly gas.

    However, nearly a year on, critics say Scholz’s vision has failed to become reality. And Germany has been accused of dragging its feet when it comes to sending its more powerful weapons to Ukraine.

    The criticism has grown in recent days as US and European leaders have piled pressure on Berlin to send German-made Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, or at least allow other countries to do so.

    Experts estimate there are around 2,000 Leopard tanks in use by 13 countries across Europe, and they are increasingly being seen as vital to Ukraine’s war effort as the conflict grinds into a second year. But Berlin must grant these nations approval to re-export German-made tanks to Ukraine, and it has so far resisted calls to do so.

    Scholz has insisted that any such plan would need to be fully coordinated with the whole of the Western alliance, and German officials have indicated they won’t approve the transfer of Leopards unless the US also agrees to send some of its tanks to Kyiv.

    On Friday, a key meeting of Western allies in Germany broke up without a wider agreement on sending tanks to Ukraine, after the country’s new defense minister Boris Pistorius said no decision had yet been made by his government.

    Pistorius rebuffed claims that Germany has been “standing in the way” of a “united coalition” of countries in favor of the plan. “There are good reasons for the delivery and there are good reasons against it … all the pros and cons have to be weighed very carefully, and that assessment is explicitly shared by many allies,” he added.

    Germany’s decision to dig in on sending tanks will likely go down badly with its allies, both in the immediate and long-term.

    “It’s like acid eroding through layer after layer of trust,” a senior NATO diplomat told CNN on Friday. The diplomat added that Germany’s hesitance could also have a lasting impact on the rest of Europe and potentially push other members of the alliance closer towards the US, even if Germany is reluctant to do so.

    And the divisions in the alliance have only grown more public in recent days – earlier in the week, Poland’s prime minister described Germany as “the least proactive country out of the group, to put it mildly,” and suggested his country might send Leopards to Ukraine without Berlin’s approval.

    For all of the criticism of Germany’s hesitance on tanks, Berlin has played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine over the past year. The US and the UK are the only two countries to have delivered more military aid to Kyiv than Germany since the invasion began, according to the Kiel Institute.

    Germany’s military support for Ukraine has evolved over time. It ditched its longstanding policy of not delivering lethal weapons to conflict zones and recently has stepped up deliveries of heavier equipment to Ukraine, including armored infantry fighting vehicles and Patriot missile defense systems.

    The government, however, sees tanks as a massive step up from the weaponry it’s delivered to Ukraine so far, and fears that authorizing German tanks to be used against Russia would be seen by Moscow as a significant escalation.

    Experts say the reticence is partly borne of Berlin’s pragmatic approach to conflict in general, and a relatively timid military posture going back decades, informed by what Scholz himself has described as “the dramatic consequences of two world wars that originated in Germany.”

    “Germany has been on a peace-time footing for years. We don’t have the expertise in procedure or procurement to do anything at speed right now. The truth is that for decades, we have seen our defense budget as a gift to our allies because they thought it was important,” said Christian Mölling, deputy director at the German Council on Foreign Relations.

    Whatever happens in Ukraine, Germany will have to ask itself some big questions about security in the coming years. The appetite to improve Germany’s armed forces has grown significantly since the start of the war.

    Last week, Christine Lambrecht resigned as defense minister amid criticism of her efforts to modernize the military. Lambrecht had struggled to do anything of note with the €100bn that Scholz made available to her last year. The head of the Christian Democrats, the main opposition party in Germany, has accused the Chancellor of not taking his own speech last year seriously.

    The person who now gets to spend that money is Pistorius, who German officials see as a safe pair of hands and up to the job. The question that he and Scholz must answer is how far Germany is willing to go in being a serious military presence in Europe.

    In December, Germany admitted that it would not meet Scholz’s pledge to meet the NATO requirement on defense spending in 2022, and said it would likely miss the target again in 2023.

    And its military’s combat readiness is inferior to that of some other European powers. According to the Rand cooperation, it would take Germany roughly a month to mobilise a fully-armored brigade, whereas the British army “should be able to sustain at least one armored brigade indefinitely.”

    Defense experts say Germany will find it hard to move very far or very fast in its efforts to bolster its military.

    “Yes, we have committed to spending more on our security, but without any clear idea of exactly what it should be spent on or how it fits into a broader security strategy,” Mölling said.

    Mölling also believes that German’s defense ambitions could be hamstrung by political will: “Careers have been built on the narrative that Germany is a peace-loving nation. The public mood is shifting and possibly at a tipping point, but it would be very hard to be the leader that drove to make Germany a leading player in European security.”

    European officials and diplomats are pessimistic and think that the reality of German politics means it will ultimately continue resisting serious reform on defense.

    It is often said in diplomatic circles that Germany’s 21st century model for success has been built on three pillars: cheap Chinese labor, cheap Russian energy, and American guarantees of security.

    Many believe this well-known preference for diplomatic pragmatism and subsequent reluctance to pick sides will mean any defense reforms will be severely limited.

    One German official told CNN that it will be hard for mainstream politicians to break free from old habits: “They have an inherent skepticism against siding overtly with the USA and a subtle hope that the relationship with Russia can be fixed.”

    Berlin has also lent its support to Ukraine in other ways, taking action to wean itself off of Russian gas and setting an example for rest of Europe, which has seen its overall consumption of gas go down since the the start of the war. Europe’s relatively warm winter has of course helped, but stopping Putin from weaponizing energy has been an important factor in the Western pushback on Moscow.

    But the security map of Europe has been redrawn, as have the dividing lines in the international diplomacy. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of another country has demonstrated more clearly than ever that moral values are not universal.

    Germany, Europe’s wealthiest country, has undeniably benefited enormously from its policy of keeping feet in two camps. It is protected by NATO membership while maintaining economic relations with undesirable partners.

    That policy has been called out and Germany must now decide exactly what kind of voice it wants to have in the current conversation taking place about global security. The decisions it takes in the next few years could play a crucial role defining the security of the entire European continent for decades to come.

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  • Germany’s strategic timidity

    Germany’s strategic timidity

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    BERLIN — News this month that the number of German soldiers declaring themselves conscientious objectors rose fivefold in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created little more than a ripple in Germany.

    For many Germans it’s perfectly natural for members of the Bundeswehr, the army, to renege on the pledge they made to defend their country; if Germans themselves don’t want to fight, why should their troops?

    Indeed, in Germany, a soldier isn’t a soldier but a “citizen in uniform.” It’s an apposite euphemism for a populace that has lived comfortably under the U.S. security umbrella for more than seven decades and goes a long way toward explaining how Germany became NATO’s problem child since the war in Ukraine began, delaying and frustrating the Western effort to get Ukraine the weaponry it needs to defend itself against an unprovoked Russian onslaught.

    The latest installment in this saga (it began just hours after the February invasion when Germany’s finance minister told Ukraine’s ambassador there was no point in sending aid because his country would only survive for a few hours anyway) concerns the question of delivering main battle tanks to Ukraine. Germany, one of the largest producers of such tanks alongside the U.S., has steadfastly refused to do so for months, arguing that providing Ukraine with Western tanks could trigger a broader war.

    Chancellor Olaf Scholz has also tried to hide behind the U.S., noting that Washington has also not sent any tanks. (Scholz has conveniently ignored the detail that the U.S. has provided Ukraine with $25 billion in military aid so far, more than 10 times what Germany has.)

    Germany’s allies, including Washington, often ascribe German recalcitrance to a knee-jerk pacifism born of the lessons learned from its “dark past.”

    In other words, the German strategy — do nothing, blame the Nazis — is working.

    Of course, Germany’s conscience doesn’t really drive its foreign policy, its corporations do. While it hangs back from supporting Ukraine in a fight to defend its democracy from invasion by a tyrant, it has no qualms about selling to authoritarian regimes, like those in the Middle East, where it does brisk business selling weapons to countries such as Egypt and Qatar.

    Despite everything that’s happened over the past year, Berlin is still holding out hope that Ukraine can somehow patch things up with Russia so that Germany can resume business as usual and switch the gas back on. Even if Germany ends up sending tanks to Ukraine — as many now anticipate — it will deliver as few as it can get away with and only after exhausting every possible option to delay.  

    Much attention in recent years has focused on Nord Stream 2, the ill-fated Russo-German natural gas project. Yet tensions between the U.S. and Germany over the latter’s entanglement with Russian energy interests date back to the late 1950s, when it first began supplying the Soviet Union with large-diameter piping.

    Throughout the Cold War, Germany’s involvement with NATO was driven by a strategy to take advantage of the protection the alliance afforded, delivering no more than the absolute minimum, while also expanding commercial relations with the Soviets.

    In 1955, the weekly Die Zeit described what it called the “fireside fantasy of West German industry” to normalize trade relations with the Soviet Union. Within years, that dream became a reality, driven in large measure by Chancellor Willy Brandt’s détente policies, known as Ostpolitik.

    Joe Biden, eager to reverse the diplomatic damage inflicted during the Trump years, reversed course and has gone out of his way to show his appreciation for all things German | Thomas Lohnes/Getty Images

    That’s one reason the Germans so feared U.S. President Ronald Reagan and his hard line against the Soviets. Far from welcoming his “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall” demand, both the German public and industry were terrified by it, worried that Reagan would upset the apple cart and destroy their business in the east.  

    By the time the Berlin Wall fell a couple of years later, West German exports to the Soviet Union had reached nearly 12 billion deutsche mark, a record.

    That’s why Germany’s handling of Ukraine isn’t a departure from the norm; it is the norm.

    Germany’s dithering over aid to Ukraine is a logical extension of a strategy that has served its economy well from the Cold War to the decision to block Ukraine’s NATO accession in 2008 to Nord Stream.

    Just last week, as the Russians were raining terror on Dnipro, the minister president of Saxony, Michael Kretschmer, called for the repair of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which was blown up by unknown saboteurs last year, so that Germany “keeps the option” to purchase Russian gas after war ends.

    One can’t blame him for trying. If one accepts that German policy is driven by economic logic rather than moral imperative, the fickleness of its political leaders makes complete sense — all the more so considering how well it has worked.

    The money Germany has saved on defense has enabled it to finance one of the world’s most generous welfare states. When Germany was under pressure from allies a few years ago to finally meet NATO’s 2 percent of GDP spending target, then-Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel called the goal “absurd.” And from a German perspective, he was right; why buy the cow when you can get the milk for free?

    Of course, the Germans have had a lot of help milking, especially from the U.S.

    American presidents have been chastising Germany over its lackluster contribution to the Western alliance going as far back as Dwight D. Eisenhower, only to do nothing about it.

    The exception that proves the rule is Donald Trump, whose plan to withdraw most U.S. troops from Germany was thwarted by his election loss.

    Joe Biden, eager to reverse the diplomatic damage inflicted during the Trump years, reversed course and has gone out of his way to show his appreciation for all things German.

    Biden’s decision to court the Germans instead of castigating them for failing to meet their commitments taught Berlin that it merely needs to wait out crises in the transatlantic relationship and the problems will fix themselves. Under pressure from Trump to buy American liquefied natural gas, then-Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed in 2018 to support the construction of the necessary infrastructure. After Trump, those plans were put on ice, only to revive them amid the current energy crisis.

    By virtue of its size and geographical position at the center of Europe, Germany will always be important for the U.S., if not as a true ally, at least as an erstwhile partner and staging ground for the American military.

    Who cares that the Bundeswehr has become a punchline or that Germany remains years away from meeting its NATO spending targets?

    In Washington’s view, Germany might be a bad ally, but at least it’s America’s bad ally.

    And no one understands the benefits of that status better than the Germans themselves.

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  • Germany’s Scholz changes defense ministers — but not his reluctance on tanks (yet)

    Germany’s Scholz changes defense ministers — but not his reluctance on tanks (yet)

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    BERLIN — Olaf Scholz has once again rebooted his security policy, nominating a new defense minister to take the reins. But when it comes to his reluctance to send battle tanks to Ukraine, the German chancellor is still waiting for the U.S. to take the lead.

    Tuesday’s nomination of Boris Pistorius puts an end to a growing government crisis that had left Europe’s biggest economy for several days effectively without clear military leadership. But Pistorius — whom Scholz hailed as having “the strength and calmness that is needed in view of the Zeitenwende,” Germany’s historic military revamp — will have little time to get adjusted to the new role.

    Pressure is mounting on Germany to participate in a broader alliance of countries that would supply Ukraine’s army with modern Leopard 2 battle tanks. And moments after being sworn in on Thursday, the new defense minister is scheduled to meet U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who is coming to Berlin before a key meeting Friday in Germany where allies will discuss tank deliveries for Ukraine.

    Pistorius is replacing Christine Lambrecht, a loyal defender of Scholz’s cautious tank stance who resigned on Monday after a series of gaffes and missteps that weighed on Berlin’s reputation.

    That means expectations are high for the 62-year-old Pistorius, who is from Scholz’s center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Yet Social Democratic lawmakers say the appointment by itself won’t tilt the scales on supplying Ukraine with tanks.

    “I don’t think one has anything to do with the other,” Wolfgang Hellmich, the SPD’s defense policy spokesperson, told POLITICO.

    Kristian Klinck, an SPD member of the Bundestag’s defense committee and an army reserve officer, also said he didn’t see “any significant change in this regard because of the personnel change in the defense ministry.”

    While stressing that Pistorius will play a role in deciding on further military aid for Ukraine, Klinck said “this very important question of the delivery of battle tanks” would be decided “primarily in the chancellor’s office” and in coordination with other allies.

    Scholz himself reiterated his reluctant position during an interview with Bloomberg on Tuesday, saying that any decisions on further weapon supplies could only be taken in close coordination with allies.

    That argument for holding back tank deliveries has started to sound less convincing, however, given the calls from allies like Poland to jointly send Leopards, and after the U.K. announced it would supply Ukraine with its own Challenger 2 battle tanks.

    German officials have indicated, though, that Scholz would likely move if he received backing from the U.S., especially if Washington also agreed to send battle tanks.

    During a call between Scholz and U.S. President Joe Biden on Tuesday, both leaders discussed “effective, sustainable and closely coordinated” military support for Ukraine, according to a German spokesperson. This has raised expectations that a breakthrough on tanks could still be feasible.

    Pressure on Scholz

    Green MP Anton Hofreiter, chair of the Bundestag’s European affairs committee and a long-standing critic of Scholz’s cautious position, said it was time for the chancellor to act.

    “The decision to supply tanks ultimately rests with the chancellor. Behind him is his Social Democratic Party, which unfortunately is still often under the illusion that relations with Russia can be normalized again and that Moscow should therefore not be provoked too much,” Hofreiter told POLITICO.

    Anton Hofreiter, co-head of the German Green Party Bundestag faction | Sean Gallup/Getty Images

    Hofreiter, whose Green party is part of Germany’s government coalition alongside Scholz’s SPD and the pro-business Free Democratic Party, argued Germany was presenting “an unclear, wavering and hesitant picture” of its military support for Ukraine.

    “Allies are now watching Berlin very closely: If we continue to close our minds on the Leopard issue, Germany would be increasingly isolated in Europe,” he said.

    Scholz’s vice chancellor, Robert Habeck, also from the Greens, upped the pressure on the chancellor last week, saying Berlin should not stand in the way if allies like Poland, Finland or Spain want to send their own Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine — an important demand because Berlin must authorize any re-export of the German-made battle tanks.

    The government’s deputy spokesperson later clarified that there were “no differences” on the issue between Habeck and Scholz, suggesting the chancellor would support his deputy’s line.

    The remarks raised expectations that Berlin may use Friday’s meeting to at least give its allies the green light on sending Leopard tanks. But it remains uncertain whether Scholz will join the coalition and offer Germany’s own tanks, either from the German army or defense industry stocks.

    Scholz said Tuesday that he would not debate these questions in public.

    There are also questions in Germany about whether the recent political crisis within the defense ministry has left Scholz weakened. Scholz personally chose Lambrecht and defended her until the end, despite concerns she had failed to properly spend a reject influx of defense funds and let Germany’s ammunition stockpiles run low (in addition to her gaffes and waning standing among the military).

    The SPD’s Hellmich, however, expressed optimism that these shortcomings would now improve with the newly appointed minister.

    “Boris Pistorius has been in the political business for a long time and is knowledgeable on the subject. He sits on the defense committee of the Bundesrat [Germany’s upper house of parliament] and is a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly,” Hellmich said.

    “That’s why the troops are in good hands with him.”

    This article was updated to include details of a call between Olaf Scholz and Joe Biden.

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    Hans von der Burchard and Gabriel Rinaldi

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  • Thierry Breton: Brussels’ bulldozer digs in against US

    Thierry Breton: Brussels’ bulldozer digs in against US

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    Thierry Breton is winning the war of ideas in Brussels.

    The ex-CEO is a political whirlwind with a gigantic portfolio as internal market chief, the backing of French President Emmanuel Macron and lots of proposals. He’s been touring European Union capitals to win support for plans to shield Europe’s industry from crippling energy prices, American subsidies and “naive” EU free traders.

    France’s decades-long push for more state intervention is finally finding some echo in Berlin and the 13th floor of the Berlaymont building, occupied by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who largely owes her job to Macron.

    Omnipresent and ebullient, Breton is playing a key role in marshaling industry and political support for sweeping but so far vague plans to boost clean tech, secure key raw materials and overhaul EU checks on government support that he blasts as too slow to help companies.

    “Of course there is resistance; my job is precisely to manage and align everyone,” he told French TV this week of his January meetings with Spanish, Polish and Belgian leaders to flog a forthcoming industrial policy push that could be a turning point in how far European governments will finance companies.

    Time is short. Von der Leyen wants to line up proposals for a February summit. European industry is complaining that it can’t swallow far higher energy prices and tighter regulation for much longer, with at least one announcing a European shutdown and an Asian expansion.

    Breton said governments don’t need convincing on the need for rapid action. But he’s running up against one of Europe’s sacred cows — EU state aid rules run by Executive Vice President Margrethe Vestager that curb government support with lengthy checks to make sure companies don’t get unfair help. She’s also under intense pressure to preserve a “level playing field” as smaller countries worry about German and French financial firepower.

    The French internal market commissioner’s bullish style often sees him act as if he’s got a role in subsidies. In the fall, he sent a letter to EU countries asking them to send views on emergency state aid rules to the internal market department, which is under his supervision, two EU officials recalled. 

    In a meeting with European diplomats, a Commission representative had to correct it, the EU officials said, asking capitals to make sure the input goes instead to the competition department overseen by Vestager. 

    Europe First

    While Breton doesn’t like to be called a protectionist, his latest mission has been to protect Europe from its transatlantic friend.

    As early as September, one Commission official said, the Frenchman was mandated by Europe’s industry to speak out against U.S. President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, which provides tax credits for U.S.-made electric cars and support to American battery supply chains.

    U.S President Joe Biden gives remarks during an event celebrating the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act on September 13, 2022 | Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

    His Paris-backed campaign charged ahead while EU officials and diplomats tiptoed around the subject. Some within the Commission headquarters found his bad cop routine helpful in keeping pressure on the U.S. 

    “He’s been constructive, though clearly disruptive,” said Tyson Barker, head of the technology and global affairs program at the German Council of Foreign Relations.

    The Frenchman has even pitched himself as the bloc’s “sheriff” against Silicon Valley giants, warning billionaire Elon Musk that an overhaul of the Twitter social network can only go so far since “in Europe, the bird will fly by our rules.”

    “Big Tech companies only understand balances of power,” said Cédric O, a former French digital minister who worked with Breton during the French EU Council presidency. “When [Breton and Musk] see each other, it necessarily remains cordial, but Breton shows his teeth and rightly so. It’s his job.”

    Breton can even surprise his own services, according to two EU officials. In May, the Commission’s department responsible for digital policy — DG CONNECT — was caught off guard when Breton announced in the press that he would unveil plans by year-end to make sure that technology giants forked out for telecoms networks. 

    In so doing, Breton — who was CEO of France Télécom in the early 2000s — resurrected a long-dormant and fractious policy debate that had been put to rest almost a decade ago, when erstwhile Digital Commissioner Neelie Kroes ordered Europe’s telecoms operators to “adapt or die” rather than seek money from content providers.

    After Breton’s commitments, the Commission’s services were soon scrambling to develop some sort of a coherent policy program to deliver on the Frenchman’s comments. A consultation is scheduled for early this year. 

    Carte blanche

    Breton is a rare creature in the halls of the Berlaymont, where policy is hatched slowly after extensive consultation. To a former CEO with a broad remit — his portfolio runs from the expanse of space to the tiniest of microchips — rapid reaction matters more than treading on toes or singing from the hymn sheet. This often sees him floating ideas and then pulling back.

    Last year he alarmed environmentalists by raising the prospect of a U-turn on the EU’s polluting car ban. He wagged his finger at German Chancellor Olaf Scholz for a solo trip to China. He called for nuclear energy to be considered green. He has pushed out grand projects — such as industrial alliances on batteries and cloud, or a cyber shield — that he doesn’t always follow up on.

    He’s even pushed forward a multibillion-euro EU communication satellite program dubbed Iris², a favorite of French aerospace companies, that will see the bloc build a rival to Musk’s space-based Starlink broadband constellation.

    “It’s clear that he’s been given more free rein than others,” said one EU official. “He has von der Leyen’s ear,” the official added, noting that Breton enjoys “privileged access” to the Commission president — who may be mindful that she’ll need French support for a second term.

    According to an official, Breton “has von der Leyen’s ear” and enjoys “privileged access” to the Commission president | Valeria Mongeli/AFP via Getty Images

    Indeed, Breton’s massive role was partly designed as a counterweight to a German president.

    “There is a criticism of von der Leyen for being too German,” explained Sébastien Maillard, director of the Jacques Delors Institute think tank. “There may inevitably be a division of roles between them — [where Breton is] a counterbalance.”

    He’s been called an “unguided missile,” but more often than not, the Frenchman has Paris’ backing when going off script. His October op-ed with Italian colleague Paolo Gentiloni, which called for greater European financial solidarity, was part of France’s agenda, according to one high-ranking Commission official.

    “When he went out in the press with Gentiloni against Scholz’s €200 billion, he was clearly doing the job for Macron,” the official said. 

    His November call for a rethink on the 2035 car engine ban came just after a week after critical green legislation had been finalized by Commission Executive Vice President Frans Timmermans and jarred with the EU’s own position at the COP 27 climate summit in Indonesia. But it aped the position of French auto industry captains, such as Stellantis CEO Carlos Tavares and Renault’s Luca de Meo, who wanted Brussels to slam the brakes on the climate drive.

    Breton had not coordinated his car comments with colleagues in advance, according to two Commission officials.

    Less than 10 days later, French Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne echoed caution about the “extremely ambitious” engine ban and warned that pivoting to electric car manufacturing was daunting.

    Going A-list

    Breton acknowledged himself that he wasn’t Macron’s first choice for the critical EU post, telling POLITICO at a live event that he was a “plan B commissioner.”

    Asked if he was targeting an A-list job for the new Commission mandate in 2024, he said he “may be able to consider a new plan B assignment — if it is a plan B.”

    “He is thinking about the future,” said one EU official. “Look at his LinkedIn posts. He is thinking past the next European elections. He definitely wants to convince Macron to get an expanded portfolio.” 

    Grabbing the Commission’s top job may be tricky, relying on how EU leaders will line up, according to multiple EU and French officials. 

    There are other jobs, including overturning the unwritten law that no French or German candidate can hold the economically powerful competition portfolio. Another option could be becoming Europe’s official digital czar, combining the enforcement powers of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act into a supranational digital enforcement agency, one EU official said.

    Breton has shrugged off speculation on his long-term plans.

    “All my life, I have been informed of my next potential job 15 minutes before,” he said last month.

    Jakob Hanke Vela, Stuart Lau, Barbara Moens, Camille Gijs and Mark Scott contributed reporting.

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    Laura Kayali, Samuel Stolton and Joshua Posaner

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  • Who’s not coming to Davos

    Who’s not coming to Davos

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    DAVOS, Switzerland — The World Economic Forum’s annual conclave in the Swiss Alps is the greatest intersection of wealth and political power on the global calendar, but this year the balance is shifting. 

    Each January, forum organizers became used to announcing another record-setting list of national leaders, global officials and royalty making their way to the exclusive gathering.

    WEF would attract even globalization’s strongest skeptics: from U.S. President Donald Trump to former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and climate campaigner Greta Thunberg.

    While there are 52 heads of state of government heading to Davos this year, top-tier leaders are missing. U.S. President Joe Biden and his Chinese and Russian counterparts Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are all giving it a miss. 

    French President Emmanuel Macron, who promised to Make the Planet Great Again, is also skipping the talkfest, along with new British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and re-elected Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

    Instead, it’s a European-heavy guest list: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is the only leader from a G7 country, sharing top billing with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, another German.

    Even within European royal ranks, the forum this year is attracting the likes of Queen Maxima of the Netherlands — a U.N. financial inclusion envoy — rather than environmental campaigners such as King Charles and Prince William.

    Some of the most prominent tech companies are dialing back their participation amid rounds of heavy layoffs. 

    And the biggest party hosts in town — Russian oligarchs — remain forced out by sanctions levied since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has unrivaled star wattage among the Davos crowd — but even a video appearance from him this year will be treated as below par, given how many of them he now does.

    It’s the C-Suite, stupid!

    With the global political elite mostly absent, WEF is this year choosing to focus on rising CEO numbers. 

    Among 2,700 participants in official WEF sessions, “we’re likely to surpass the old record from 2020 with 600 global CEOs — including 1,500 C-suite level overall,” said WEF’s head of digital and marketing George Schmitt, who added that 80 of the CEOs are first-timers in Davos.

    Those who claim Davos is dead are yet to be proven right, but WEF’s critics now spread beyond the activist world who have long disparaged the juxtaposition of private jet opulence with hand-wringing panels about global poverty.

    WEF would attract even globalization’s strongest skeptics: from U.S. President Donald Trump to former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and climate campaigner Greta Thunberg | Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images

    The U.S. delegation includes cabinet members such as climate envoy John Kerry, who will camp out in Davos for most of the week, but others such as Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen are skipping. 

    It’s not that Yellen has better things to do at home: She’s embarking on an 11-day trip with stops in Senegal, Zambia and South Africa, with no time for Davos. 

    Nobel Peace Prize winner Beatrice Fihn, who campaigns to eliminate nuclear weapons, said she “genuinely had forgotten that Davos is still happening.” 

    “The format seems slightly dated now. The private jets and oligarch parties are no longer in step with modern biz [business] life,” said Scott Colvin, a Davos veteran who is now public affairs director at Aviva. “The events around COP [the U.N.’s annual climate summit] now feel a bigger deal, given their focus on a specific global policy objective,” he added.

    WEF is a victim of its own success and stuck in a demographic bind.

    The forum’s operating model requires it to provide a place for the world’s most powerful and influential people to talk. 

    In 2020 Bloomberg calculated 119 billionaires joined the party, with a combined net worth of more than $500 billion. 

    WEF’s efforts to bring the uber-elite together is a stark annual reminder that they don’t look like the rest of us. 

    The best ratio of female participants in WEF’s 52-year history of in-person gatherings was 24 percent, in 2020. 

    Despite years of exhortations and incentives for members to bring more female colleagues, the number often hovers in the range of 18 percent to 20 percent. A WEF spokesperson said that 42 percent of speakers this year will be women.

    WEF aims for global reach — but often lands in the middle of the Atlantic instead. 

    This year Europe is supplying the most political leaders, while the U.S. corporate delegation will once again massively outweigh the others. The 700 Americans participating this year outnumber the Chinese delegation roughly 20 to 1.

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    Ryan Heath

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