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  • Biden’s Hidden Economic Success

    Biden’s Hidden Economic Success

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    President Joe Biden’s economic agenda is achieving one of his principal goals: channeling more private investment into small communities that have been losing ground for years.

    That’s the conclusion of a new study released today, which found that economically strained counties are receiving an elevated share of the private investment in new manufacturing plants tied to three major bills that Biden passed early in his presidency. “After decades of economic divergence, strategic sector investment patterns are including more places that have historically been left out of economic growth,” concludes the new report from Brookings Metro and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT.

    The large manufacturing investments in economically stressed counties announced under Biden include steel plants in Mason County, West Virginia, and Mississippi County, Arkansas; an expansion of a semiconductor-manufacturing plant in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania; a plant to process the lithium used in electric vehicle (EV) batteries in Chester County, South Carolina; an electric-vehicle manufacturing plant in Haywood County, Tennessee; and plants to manufacture batteries for EVs in Montgomery County, Tennessee; Vigo County, Indiana; and Fayette County, Ohio.

    These are all some of the 1,071 counties—about a third of the U.S. total—that Brookings defines as economically distressed, based on high levels of unemployment and a relatively low median income. As of 2022, the report notes, these counties held 13 percent of the U.S. population but generated only 8 percent of the nation’s economic output.

    Since 2021, though, these distressed counties have received about $82 billion in private-sector investment from the industries targeted by the three major economic-development bills Biden signed. Those included the bipartisan infrastructure law and bills promoting more domestic manufacturing of semiconductors and clean energy, such as electric vehicles and equipment to generate solar and wind power.

    That $82 billion has been spread over 100 projects across 70 of the distressed counties, Brookings and MIT found. In all, since 2021 the distressed counties have received 16 percent of the total investments into the industrial sectors targeted by the Biden agenda. That’s double their share of national GDP. It’s also double the share of all private-sector investment they received from 2010 to 2020. Funneling more investment and jobs to these economically lagging communities “is really just at the core of what [Biden] is trying to accomplish,” Lael Brainard, the director of Biden’s National Economic Council, told me. “The president talks a lot about communities that have been left behind, and now he is talking a lot about communities that are coming back.”

    This surge of investment into smaller places is a huge change from previous patterns that have concentrated investment and employment in a handful of “superstar” metropolitan areas, Mark Muro, a senior fellow at Brookings Metro and one of the report’s authors, told me.

    “As the rich places have been getting richer, the social-media/tech economy was something that was happening somewhere else for most people,” Muro said. “Clearly, this is a different-looking recovery that is occurring in different places and has a tilt to distressed communities right now.”

    One of those places is Fayette County, in south-central Ohio, about equidistant from Dayton, Cincinnati, and Columbus. Fayette’s population of roughly 28,000 is predominantly white and rural with few college graduates. Its median income is about one-fourth lower than the national average, and its poverty rate is about one-fourth higher.

    Early in 2023, Honda and its partner LG Energy Solution broke ground on a massive new plant in Fayette to build batteries for Honda and Acura EVs. The Honda project has already generated large numbers of construction jobs, as has a massive Intel semiconductor-fabrication plant under construction about an hour away, outside Columbus, in Licking County. “The trade associations for electrical workers, plumbers, whatever it might be, they are going to have jobs in the state of Ohio for years,” Jeff Hoagland, the CEO of the Dayton Development Coalition, told me. “These are huge facilities. The Honda facility is the size of 78 football fields.”

    Honda is already advertising to fill some engineering jobs, and once the plant is operational in late 2024 or early 2025, it expects to hire some 2,200 people. Most of those jobs will not require college degrees, Hoagland said. Many more jobs, he added, will flow from the plant’s suppliers moving to establish facilities in the area. “There are companies already buying up land,” Hoagland told me.

    Hoagland said he has no doubt that the federal tax incentives in the big Biden bills for domestic production of clean energy and semiconductors were central to these decisions. The federal incentives have been “100 percent critical, and I know that firsthand from Intel and from Honda,” Hoagland said. “Those companies needed those [incentives] to get into the full implementation of their strategy to rebuild that manufacturing, that supply-chain base, in the United States. Now we are seeing all these companies come back to the heartland in Ohio to do manufacturing.” Yet another firm, Joby Aviation, announced in September that, with support from federal clean-energy loan guarantees, it plans to construct a factory near Dayton to build electric air taxis.

    Encouraging manufacturers to locate their facilities in the U.S. rather than abroad has been the central goal of the tax incentives, loan guarantees, and grants in the clean-energy, semiconductor, and infrastructure bills. But the Biden administration has also been using provisions in those bills, as well as other programs, to try to steer more of those domestic investments specifically into distressed communities.

    As the Brookings/MIT report notes, the Inflation Reduction Act’s clean-energy tax credits provide extra bonuses of 10 percent or more to companies that invest in low-income communities. An Energy Department loan-guarantee program favors companies that locate clean-energy investments in communities that lost jobs when fossil-fuel facilities shut down. In a speech last month, Brainard highlighted a $1 billion Transportation Department program that funds infrastructure improvements to “reconnect” neighborhoods that have been isolated from job opportunities by highways or other transportation infrastructure. (Many of those places are heavily minority communities.)

    Similarly, under the semiconductor bill, the administration is awarding substantial funds for “regional innovation engines” through the National Science Foundation, as well as “tech hubs” that require communities to organize businesses, schools, and government to develop coordinated plans for regional growth in high-tech industries. The winners of these grants include projects that are based in places far beyond the existing large metro centers of technological innovation, such as Louisiana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Oklahoma. “Those [programs] are spreading innovation investment to clusters all around the country rather than being concentrated just in a few huge metros,” Brainard told me.

    Joseph Parilla, the director of applied research at Brookings Metro, told me that the large manufacturing facilities being built in response to the new federal incentives naturally would flow toward the periphery of major metropolitan areas where many of these distressed counties are located. But Parilla believes the tax incentives and other programs that the Biden administration is implementing are also “having a pretty significant impact” in driving so many of these investments to smaller, economically strained places.

    Biden has made clear that he considers steering more investments to the places lagging economically both a political and policy priority. Even in forums as prominent as the State of the Union address, he often talks about the importance of creating jobs that will allow young people to stay in the communities where they were born. Biden has also, as I’ve written, rejected the belief of his two Democratic predecessors, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, that the most important step for expanding economic opportunity is to help more people obtain postsecondary education; instead, Biden conspicuously emphasizes how many jobs that do not require four-year college degrees are being created in the projects subsidized by his big-three bills. “What you’ll see in this field of dreams” are “Ph.D. engineers and scientists alongside community-college graduates,” he declared at the 2022 Ohio Intel plant ground-breaking.

    But it’s not clear that the economic benefits flowing into distressed communities will produce political gains for Biden. In 2020, despite his small-town, blue-collar “Scranton Joe” persona, Biden heavily depended on the big, well-educated metro areas thriving in the Information Age: Previous Brookings Metro research found that, although Biden won only about one-sixth of all U.S. counties, his counties generated nearly three-fourths of the nation’s total economic output.

    The outcome was very different in the economically distressed counties. Brookings found that in 2020, Trump won 54 of the 70 distressed counties where the new investments have been announced under Biden. Some Democratic operatives are dubious that these new jobs and opportunities will change that pattern much.

    Partly that’s because Democrats face so many headwinds in these places on issues relating to race and culture, such as immigration and LGBTQ rights. But it’s also because of the risk that without unions or many local Democratic officials to drive the message, workers simply won’t be aware that their new jobs are linked to programs that Biden created, as Michael Podhorzer, the former AFL-CIO political director, has argued to me.

    Jim Kessler, the executive vice president of Third Way, a centrist Democratic group that has studied the party’s problems in small-town and rural areas, agrees that even big job gains won’t flip small red places toward Biden. But even slightly reducing the GOP margin in those places could matter, he told me. “Some of these swing states have vast red areas, and he needs to do well enough in those areas,” Kessler said. Pointing to new jobs in previously declining places, Kessler said, could also provide Biden a symbol of economic recovery that resonates with voters far beyond those places.

    The Brookings and MIT authors expect that Biden will have many more such examples to cite as further investments in industries including clean energy and semiconductors roll out. “The map is not yet finished,” the report concludes. “There are hundreds of distressed counties with assets similar to those that have attracted investment and have not yet been targeted.” One of the most tangible legacies of Biden’s presidency may be a steady procession of new plants rising through the coming years in communities previously left for scrap. Whether voters in these places give him credit for that will help determine if he’s still in the White House to see it.

    Ronald Brownstein

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  • The Real Issue in the UAW Strike

    The Real Issue in the UAW Strike

    The United Automobile Workers’ strike against the Big Three manufacturers that began earlier today is exacerbating the most significant political vulnerability of President Joe Biden’s drive to build a clean-energy economy.

    A trio of bills Biden passed through Congress during his first two years in the Oval Office has generated a torrent of private-sector investment into clean-energy projects. But so far most of that green investment and the jobs it will create are flowing into red-leaning communities that are generally hostile to both the Democratic Party and labor unions.

    Congressional Democrats provided all the votes for the legislation that is catalyzing the rapid growth of the new green economy. But with so many of the new energy projects benefiting red places, many people in progressive circles worry that this historic transformation will fail to generate either sufficient political rewards for the president and congressional Democrats, or as many good-paying, blue-collar jobs as Biden has repeatedly promised.

    Fear that the shift to electric vehicles will reduce the number of quality jobs in the auto industry is the backdrop for the strike the UAW launched at midnight today. In both public and private, union officials have made clear their belief that the auto industry is using the technological transition to mask a second, economic, transition. They worry that the companies are using the shift from internal-combustion engines to carbon-free electric vehicles to simultaneously shift more of their operations from high-paying union jobs mostly in northern states to lower-paying, nonunion jobs mostly in southern states.

    Moreover, the union and its allies worry that the massive federal subsidies Biden’s agenda is providing the companies for the EV transition is inadvertently underwriting that transition toward lower-wage and nonunion plants. As Shawn Fain, the UAW’s new president, put it earlier this week: “There’s a lot with the EV transition that has to happen, and there’s … hundreds of billions of our taxpayer dollars that are helping fund this, and workers cannot continue to be left behind in that equation.”

    As the strike approached, the Biden administration took conspicuous steps to respond to those concerns by announcing a suite of multibillion-dollar Department of Energy loans and grants designed to  incentivize the auto companies to convert existing, unionized plants to EV production.

    “The president’s policy position is absolutely clear: He’s pro-union,” one senior White House official, who asked not to be identified while describing internal discussions, told me. “He thinks that companies that are receiving the benefits should respect the right to organize, should not interfere with workers’ ability to exercise that right, and he wants to see these jobs be good union jobs. From a policy perspective there is no daylight between the president’s policy preferences and where the UAW is, or the other unions are.”

    The challenge for the Biden administration in delivering on that pledge is the decisions that the auto companies and other industries are making in response to the bills he signed to promote more domestic investment: the bipartisan infrastructure law, a measure to encourage more U.S. production of semiconductors, and the Inflation Reduction Act, which contains federal assistance for the domestic manufacture and deployment of low-carbon energy sources.

    The tax subsidies and federal grants and loans in those bills have triggered a towering wave of new domestic investments across a broad range of industries producing clean energy. The big auto manufacturers alone have announced nearly $90 billion in spending on manufacturing facilities to produce EVs in just the past two years, according to the Center for Automotive Research, a nonpartisan Michigan-based think tank. Suppliers to the companies, including firms producing semiconductors for automotive use, are investing billions more in the EV transition. Brookings Metro, a nonpartisan think tank, calculated that total private-sector investment in EV manufacturing under Biden has reached nearly $140 billion. This building surge dwarfs the typical amount of annual investment in the auto industry over the past quarter century, but still likely represents only a down payment on what’s ahead. “There’s a lot of innovation that is going to happen over the next 20 years, in terms of product, process, technology,” Alan Amici, the center’s president and CEO, told me.

    For Democrats, the rub is how much of this capital is flowing into red places hostile to unions and represented by House and Senate Republicans who voted against the legislation that triggered the investments. (Every House Republican this spring also voted to repeal all of the Inflation Reduction Act’s incentives for clean-energy production.) The biggest recipients of the new investments include more red states than blue ones, Brookings has determined.

    Red states are receiving so many of the new projects partly because they have lower tax rates and electricity costs. But most analysts agree that companies have also channeled so much of their new investments toward red states because most of them have “right to work” laws that make it more difficult for unions to organize.

    In the auto industry, this preference for states resistant to unions has translated into a surge of investment in the South. Brookings Metro calculated that the South has attracted 55 percent of the total private investment in electric vehicles and batteries under Biden. That’s more than double the portion of the new clean-vehicle investment that has flowed into the Midwest, whose existing auto plants are largely unionized. That torrent of new money includes plans to build EVs or their batteries by Hyundai and Rivian in Georgia, Toyota in North Carolina, Tesla in Texas, BMW in South Carolina, Mercedes-Benz in Alabama, General Motors in Tennessee, and Ford in Tennessee and Kentucky.

    The EV investments announced so far are projected to generate at least 65,000 jobs across the region, Stan Cross, the electric-transportation-policy director for the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, told me. Far more job growth is virtually certain in the years ahead, Cross said, largely because such investment patterns are self-reinforcing: Companies that provide parts for the big manufacturers are already locating around their new southern plants, such as the $1 billion in investment announced by suppliers near Hyundai’s Georgia facility.

    This southern EV boom is reinforcing a long-term shift in the auto industry’s center of gravity that has weakened the UAW’s position. Heavily unionized, Democratic-leaning Michigan still employs many more people in the industry than any other state. But starting in the mid-1990s in plants by Mercedes in Alabama and BMW in South Carolina, the industry’s employment has steadily shifted to the South. Since the early ’90s, the South’s share of total auto-industry employment has roughly doubled from 15 to about 30 percent, while the Midwest’s share has fallen, from 60 to about 45 percent, Karl Kuykendall, a regional economist at S&P Global Market Intelligence, told me. Kuykendall said he “would not be surprised” if the pace of this regional transition accelerates as the companies move deeper into the technological transition to electric vehicles.

    Hardly any of the auto plants in the South are unionized. And wages even for manufacturing workers are much lower in the region and in other red states than in the Midwest, as Michael Podhorzer, a former political director for the AFL-CIO, has calculated. The disparity between largely union and nonunion regions across the U.S. creates an enormous challenge for the UAW. In the strike that began this morning, it is seeking a raise of about 40 percent over the next four years, and the restoration of automatic pay increases for inflation, as well as health and retirement benefits that it surrendered when the companies faced bankruptcy amid the 2008 financial crisis. But even if the union succeeds at winning a favorable contract, that could just increase the incentive for the auto industry to shift more jobs to nonunion plants across the South.

    While foreign automakers have invested heavily in the South, the fabled Big Three domestic auto manufacturers (General Motors, Ford, and Stellantis) still mostly rely on facilities across the industrial Midwest. But the announcements by Ford and GM that they plan to build battery plants in Kentucky and Tennessee may signal a shift in that strategy. As important to the UAW, Ford, GM, and Stellantis are structuring their EV-battery plants, in the North and the South, as joint ventures with foreign partners that are not subject to the national labor agreement the companies are now negotiating. The union has to negotiate separate contracts with those plants—where the companies are offering much lower wages than in their unionized facilities.

    “From all evidence, automakers appear to be utilizing the shift to electric vehicles to do everything in their power to lower job quality for the very workers they are relying on to make this transition happen,” Jason Walsh, an executive director of the BlueGreen Alliance, a coalition of labor unions and environmentalists, told me. Those concerns have prompted the UAW to demand in the contract talks that the auto companies guarantee that workers now building internal-combustion-engine vehicles will be assured jobs as the companies switch toward manufacturing more EVs.

    Early on, the Biden administration appeared somewhat obtuse to these concerns, even though Biden has sympathized more overtly with organized labor than any other Democratic president in decades. Speaking before a Silicon Valley industry group in early June, Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm turned heads among labor leaders when she said the administration was “agnostic” about where companies choose to site their clean-energy investments.

    Her department, perhaps reflecting that perspective, a few weeks later approved more than $9 billion in federal loan guarantees to Ford and a Korean partner to build their EV-battery plants in Kentucky and Tennessee, two right-to-work states. Fain, the union president, immediately issued a statement condemning the loan guarantees and declaring that the administration was “actively funding” a “race to the bottom” in wages and benefits “with billions in public money.”

    Fain’s message appears to have been received. The administration’s tone was different in late August, when the Energy Department announced that it was making available $2 billion in grants and $10 billion in loan guarantees under the Inflation Reduction Act (as well as another $3.5 billion in grants under the infrastructure bill) to subsidize the conversion of existing plants to make electric vehicles and their batteries. “We are going to focus on financing projects that are in long-standing automaking communities, that keep folks already working on the payroll, projects that advance collective bargaining agreements, that create high-paying, long-lasting jobs,” Granholm told reporters at the time.

    That message reflected Biden’s own priorities, the senior White House official told me this week: “All I would say is, the president is not ‘agnostic’” about where the clean-energy investments are flowing. “He’s the president for all of America. But all of America ought to respect the right to organize. He is trying to move the system toward good-paying jobs and more union density.”

    Labor allies agree the administration is now focusing more on the potential challenges for workers in the EV transition than it did earlier in Biden’s presidency. The late-August Energy Department announcement “is a very clear indication that the Biden administration is hearing what union workers are saying and is trying their best to be responsive to that,” Walsh said.

    The problem for the administration is that it has limited tools to shape how the auto companies make their investments. Generally, under the kind of federal loan and grant programs that Granholm made available in August, the administration can encourage companies to preserve existing plants and also to remain neutral in labor organizing campaigns when the firms open new clean-vehicle facilities. All indications point to Biden using that leverage more aggressively than he did earlier in his presidency. Over time, the senior White House official said, the administration “has strengthened its negotiating posture” to demand “stronger community benefits” from companies seeking the loans or grants.

    But the Inflation Reduction Act’s biggest incentives for building electric vehicles are generous tax credits for both producers and consumers. And those credits are available to companies that build and source a specified share of their materials for EVs domestically whether or not they use union labor. When the House passed its version of the Inflation Reduction Act in 2021, it included another $4,500 tax credit to consumers for EVs built largely with union labor, but Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia, a Democrat, insisted on the removal of that provision as one price for his vote that allowed the overall package to pass the Senate.

    That now looks like an extraordinarily consequential concession. “This is happening because Joe Manchin pulled the union requirements out of the IRA and that really opened the door to this perverse situation where, by law, the administration has constraints about how far it can push to ensure that there are going to be good quality jobs in this transition,” says Adam Hersh, a senior economist at the Economist Policy Institute, a left-leaning think tank.

    Looming over all these maneuvers is former President Donald Trump’s relentless attack on Biden’s clean-energy agenda. In speeches, Trump has repeatedly declared that Biden’s intertwined proposals to promote EVs will “kill countless union autoworker jobs forever, especially in Michigan and the Midwest.” Trump, and some of the other 2024 GOP candidates, have pledged to repeal the IRA’s clean-energy incentives as well as Biden’s proposed fuel-economy standards for cars and light trucks, which would require the companies to massively shift their sales toward EVs over the next decade. In effect, Trump is presenting the transition to EVs as another example in his broader claim that the left is seeking to uproot and transform America as his supporters know and understand it.

    While many labor leaders have endorsed Biden for a second term, Fain has pointedly withheld the UAW’s endorsement. And Fain has publicly warned that Trump’s denunciation of the EV transition could find a receptive audience among his members if the union can’t win a generous contract and strong guarantees of job security. Given the importance of the industrial Midwest to the president’s reelection hopes, Biden may have nearly as much at stake as Fain in the outcome of this strike.

    Ronald Brownstein

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