In a world of geopolitical rivalry, supply-chain vulnerability and rising costs, competitiveness has become a strategic balancing act. Unsplash+
Competitiveness is not a new concept. It is likely embedded in our DNA, much like other fundamental instincts such as cooperation, survival, reproduction and mobility. What has changed over time is its geographical scope: once local, then national, competitiveness has now become global. That shift has fundamentally transformed how we understand prosperity, business, work and everyday life.
At its core, competitiveness is the ability to solve problems better than others. “Better” may mean cheaper, faster or, most importantly, with greater added value for the user. Competitiveness applies to everyone. A plumber is competitive if he fixes your sink quickly and reliably; a doctor if she cures you efficiently; a company if it consistently creates value and earns a profit. Historically, competitiveness was constrained by geography. A local plumber could not repair a sink in Beijing. But globalization has changed that equation. Today, even small, locally rooted companies may be tempted—or forced—to compete far beyond their original markets. Within a few decades, barriers to trade, communication and capital flows have fallen dramatically, opening global markets to firms of all sizes and origins.
The golden age of competitiveness
The era of openness can be dated quite precisely. It began on December 18, 1978, when Deng Xiaoping announced China’s open-door policy. That decision triggered a four-decade-long expansion of the global economy that lasted until the Covid-19 pandemic struck. During this period, unique in human history, it became possible to travel, communicate, invest and conduct business in virtually every country.
For companies, access to previously closed markets meant the possibility of supplementing an export strategy with direct investments. Such a change also implied greater knowledge of local markets, legislation, government policies, customers and value systems. Globalization rewarded scale, specialization and efficiency.
This period of openness also promoted multilateralism. Conflicts, at least in principle, were managed through international institutions rather than unilateral force. As President Reagan once observed, “Peace is not the absence of conflict, but the ability to cope with conflict by peaceful means.”
Vulnerability steps in
While this period delivered remarkable economic growth, it also produced structural vulnerabilities. Globalization encouraged specialization and, in turn, specialization created dependency. Certain nations came to dominate strategic minerals, key technologies or critical manufacturing capacities that could not easily be replaced.
China’s trade surplus has exceeded $1 trillion. This has been driven by expanding exports in critical minerals such as rare earths, renewable energy technologies like solar and wind, biotechnology and automobiles. For example, in 2001, China began investing in electric vehicle technologies, aiming to enhance competitiveness in an area where it struggled to match the U.S., Germany and Japan in traditional internal combustion engine and hybrid vehicle manufacturing. In 2009, with the support of financial subsidies from the Chinese government, fewer than 500 electric vehicles were sold. However, by 2022, following over $29 billion in tax breaks and subsidies since 2009, China sold more than 6 million EVs, accounting for over half of the global EV market. Projections suggest that by 2025, China will have sold well over 11 million electric vehicles.
With domestic consumption accounting for just 39 percent of China’s GDP, compared to roughly 70 percent in the U.S. and Europe, exports, in part, fill the production gap. The result is mounting international trade tension.
The empires strike back
Today, the U.S., China and Europe together account for over 60 percent of global GDP. What’s more, they are also political, technological and military powers. In 2025, the U.S. and China account for nearly half of global defense spending. Military procurement has become one of the fast-growing business sectors worldwide, rising by 9 percent to a total of $2.7 trillion in 2024.
Thus, the empires are back. As Henry Kissinger wrote in his book Diplomacy, “Empires are not interested in an international system; they want to be the international system.” Multilateralism is under strain, and geopolitical confrontation is increasingly replacing cooperative governance.
The politicization of conflict
The proliferation of tariffs and industrial policies is rightly alarming. However, these tools often mask another reality: access to markets is threatened. Or at least it is subject to political interference. “Geo-economy” is the new policy. It means transforming economic strength into political and diplomatic goals.
In the past, conflicts between nations largely centered around employment and economic fairness, and were resolved within multilateral frameworks such as the World Trade Organization. Today, international disputes increasingly invoke national security. The recent cases involving Huawei and TikTok in the U.S. illustrate this shift. When security is invoked, debate becomes more emotional, less evidence-based and firmly sovereign. Each nation claims the final say.
How does a fractured world economy function?
A fractured economy does not imply deglobalization. The world economy will remain interconnected, but its rules will no longer be universal. For example, transaction platforms such as SWIFT for payments or global credit card networks may no longer be universally accepted. Instead, countries will increasingly develop parallel institutions to retain control.
At the same time, multilateral institutions have not disappeared, and some will continue to operate to the greatest extent possible. According to the World Trade Organization, a majority of global trade still operates under multilateral agreements. Despite pressure from the U.S., non-American trade accounts for 86 percent of global commerce.
Alternatively, bilateral agreements continue to expand rapidly, either between economic blocs, such as the European Union and Mercosur, or between countries. China continues to forge bilateral agreements, notably with many nations in the Global South.
Between multilateralism and bilateralism lies a third model: ad hoc coalitions. These involve limited groups of countries aligning around defense policy, economic strategy or shared values. Examples include Europe’s SAFE program and the Coalition of the Willing, which bring together countries concerned about military security in Europe. Their aim is to make decisions and implement them quickly without being hampered by the need for broad consensus.
What strategies for companies in 2026?
Navigating this environment is extraordinarily complex. Companies must contend with several layers of political interference, market disruptions and profound technological change, from teh electrification of the economy to the rise of A.I. Nevertheless, four strategic axes are emerging for 2026.
Diversification. Companies are reducing excessive dependence on a limited number of suppliers, markets or customers. It is a quiet revolution taking place under the radar, but with a profound impact on nations and companies alike. China is redirecting its business towards Europe and the Global South while companies worldwide seek alternative energy and technology partners. Managing vulnerability has become a strategic imperative.
Resilience. The world will not stop interfering with corporate strategies. Thus, even if the future is more unpredictable, decisions must still be made, often under uncertainty and risk. Resilience is the capacity to adapt quickly as conditions change. As Carl von Clausewitz noted, “Strategy is the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances.”
Reliability. In a fractured economy, a company’s competitiveness also depends on strengthening confidence in its relationships with business partners. When the environment is in turmoil, a few things, precisely, should not change. Trust is one of them. Reliability implies transparency and efficiency. The ease of doing business is critical. As Peter Drucker said: “There is nothing so useless as doing efficiently something that nobody needs.”
Pricing power. In 2026, operating costs will inevitably rise. Political barriers and national priorities leave limited room for cost reduction. Price increases often become unavoidable. Competitiveness, then, depends on a firm’s ability to convince customers that value justifies price. Warren Buffett’s advice remains apt: “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.”
Optimism for 2026?
Business leaders must remain optimistic—whether by choice or necessity. Their primary role is to solve problems and motivate people toward success. Nostalgia, however comforting, is not a strategy. The world of 2026 will not return to a reassuring past. Nor does it have to be worse. It will simply be different. When Mark Twain was asked what he thought after listening to an opera by Richard Wagner, he replied: “It’s not as bad as it sounds.”
That, perhaps, is the most realistic mindset for planning 2026.
Stephane Garelli is Professor Emeritus at IMD and the University of Lausanne, the founder of the World Competitiveness Center, and a former managing director of the World Economic Forum and the Davos Annual Meetings. His latest book,World Competitiveness: Rewriting the Rules of Global Prosperity is published by Wiley.
Making fun of the headlines today, so you don’t have to
The news, even that about Southwest Airlines, doesn’t need to be complicated or confusing; that’s what any new release from Microsoft is for. And, as in the case with anything from Microsoft, to keep the news from worrying our pretty little heads over, remember something new and equally indecipherable will come out soon:
Really all you need to do is follow one simple rule: barely pay attention and jump to conclusions. So, here are some headlines today and my first thoughts:
A Southwest Airlines passenger climbed onto a wing.
Southwest Airlines passenger hospitalized after opening emergency exit and climbing onto wing, officials say
… Some people will do anything for extra leg room.
Moms for Liberty founder and her husband in 3-way and now battery is alleged
Oh, I’m guessing all kinds of batteries were involved.
Man who stripped naked on Disneyland ride was on drugs, police say
Ironically, he slipped himself a Mickey.
Century-overdue library book is finally returned in Minnesota
… No word if it was found with Joe Biden’s boxed papers.
Jared Leto becomes the first person to legally climb to the top of the Empire State Building
The last time he was that high, he agreed to do ‘Morbius.’
George Santos was expelled from Congress
… Saying that’s nothing compared to time he was suspended from baseball for using PEDs.
Darryl Hall broke up with John Oates
… look for a new group: John Oates and Pete Davidson!
Cyber Monday biggest on-line shopping event ever
And, now that Black Friday, Small Business Saturday and Cyber Monday are done, let’s make way for ‘Burglary Tuesday.’
Henry Kissinger dies at 100
It probably was the vaccine.
Huge crack opens up in Iceland, steam pouring forth
… So, just another vacation for Chris Christie.
‘Oppenheimer’ bests ‘Barbie’ in weekend premiere VOD viewership
… That would explain the giant pink mushroom cloud where Barbie’s dream house used to be.
Aaron Rodgers talks Jets return this season
And says he’ll stomp his leg once if yes, twice if no.Will Smith’s team responds to accusations that the actor bottoms
Will Smith’s team responds to accusations that the actor bottoms
Damn, a ‘race to the bottom’ is now a description of people rushing to Will Smith’s house!
The Las Vegas Sphere is already losing a 100 million dollars
… Look for Elon to pay billions for it …
Paul Lander is not sure which he is proudest of — winning the Noble Peace Prize or sending Congolese gynecologist Dr. Denis Mukwege to accept it on his behalf, bringing to light the plight of African women in war-torn countries. In his non-daydreaming hours, Paul has written for Weekly Humorist, National Lampoon, American Bystander, Huff Post Comedy, McSweeney’s, Bombeck Writers Workshop Blog and the Humor Times, written and/or produced for multiple TV shows and written standup material that’s been performed on Maher, The Daily Show, Colbert, Kimmel, etc. Now, on to Paul’s time-commanding Special Forces in Khandahar… (See all of Paul’s “Ripping the Headlines Today” columns here.)
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who rose to the heights of American government and helped steer U.S. foreign policy through two presidencies, has died at the age of 100. Presidential historian and author Doug Brinkley joins “CBS Mornings” to discuss his legacy.
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December 13, 2002 – Resigns as chairman of the 9-11 Commission, citing controversy over possible conflicts of interest with clients of his consulting firm.
Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, national security advisor, and lover of carpet bombing innocent civilians, passed away at the age of 100. The Onion asked Americans how they felt about his death, and this is what they said.
James Kessler, Psychologist
James Kessler, Psychologist
“Look, being nice in life won’t get you a Nobel Peace Prize.”
Sharon Thatcher, Teacher
“He wasn’t just a war criminal, he was our war criminal.”
Whitney Plainfield, Administrative Assistant
Whitney Plainfield, Administrative Assistant
“He would have hated to see anyone die painlessly and peacefully like this.”
Lisa Johnson, Dietician
“I don’t want to diminish his legacy by citing the Cambodian government’s official death toll because I know the real number was much, much worse.”
Gina Garroni, Delivery Driver
Gina Garroni, Delivery Driver
“Is that what I ran over last night?”
Christa Deacon, Guidance Counselor
Christa Deacon, Guidance Counselor
“May he be as bloodthirsty in death as he was in life.”
Melissa Stevens, Mortgage Banker
Melissa Stevens, Mortgage Banker
“Love him or hate him, he’ll always be remembered as the best goddamn contestant Rock Of Love ever saw.”
Dan Potter, Fireman
“I sprayed some agent orange on my kids today in his honor.”
Brook Pratt, Pest Control Worker
Brook Pratt, Pest Control Worker
“But he still had so many war crimes left in him.”
George W. Bush, Former President
George W. Bush, Former President
“I remember the first day of my presidency, he was nice enough to send me an unexploded IED.”
Greg Bentley, Graphic Artist
Greg Bentley, Graphic Artist
“But he looked so young in ‘Oppenheimer’?”
Al Preston, Copywriter
“If we all close our eyes and say a racial slur at the same time, maybe he’ll come back to life.”
Carter Jacobs, Electrician
Carter Jacobs, Electrician
“Say what you will about the guy.”
Barack Obama, Former President
Barack Obama, Former President
“He taught me that war didn’t have to be fair. The most important part was that it was pointless and bloody.”
Tom Buchner, Woodworker
“That’s what he gets for breaking into a house in a state with stand-your-ground laws.”
Alejandro Sotolongo, Art Director
Alejandro Sotolongo, Art Director
“Let he who has not carpet bombed Cambodia throw the first stone.”
Paul Flannery, Line Cook
“This is just like Paul Walker all over again.”
Lisa Hitchens, File Clerk
Lisa Hitchens, File Clerk
“He put Cambodia on the map and almost took it off.”
Dick Cheney, Retired
“Nobody’s perfect, but he came pretty close.”
Dean Verecci, Software Engineer
Dean Verecci, Software Engineer
“Oh thank god, the last war criminal in the American government is finally dead.”
Kevin Spell, Physical Trainer
Kevin Spell, Physical Trainer
“It brings a tear to my eye thinking of all the innocent people that will never get to die by his hand.”
Gene Schaefer, Bus Driver
Gene Schaefer, Bus Driver
“If you think that man was impressive, you should taste my wife Beth’s homemade potato salad. It’s out of this world!”
Irene Stobbs, Accountant
“Oh no, Paula and Louis’s kid?”
Nick Farrington, Dentist
“I just hope we don’t start tearing down all the Henry Kissinger monuments.”
Jessie Untermeyer, Music Teacher
Jessie Untermeyer, Music Teacher
“I hope he had just as much fun killing all those people as we had watching him kill them.”
George Huntington, Retired
George Huntington, Retired
“I’m not going to sugarcoat it—Henry had the mind of a supervillain, the heart of a serial killer, and the elegant gams of a va-va-voom showgirl.”
Condolences for former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger poured out on Chinese social media alongside official tributes after his death at the age of 100.
“Farewell, old friend of China,” posted one user on China’s social networking platform Weibo with the candle emoji.
Kissinger, serving as National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State under President Richard Nixon, played a pivotal role in reshaping U.S. foreign policy, particularly with the groundbreaking 1971 visit to the People’s Republic of China under then Chairman Mao Zedong.
This visit marked a significant shift in Cold War politics, effectively opening the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China, which had been estranged since Mao’s Communist takeover in 1949.
Kissinger’s strategic maneuvering laid the groundwork for Nixon’s historic visit in 1972, ultimately leading to the normalization of relations between the two nations.
Chairman Mao Zedong of the People’s Republic of China meets U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Beijing, Nov. 12., 1973. Tributes to Kissinger poured out in China after his death at the age of 100. Getty Images
Kissinger’s death was a leading topic of discussion on the Chinese social media platforms. The hashtag “Kissinger passes away” was the number one trend on Weibo. The hashtag was viewed 450 million times on Weibo. The hashtag “Kissinger dies at 100” was the number one trend on China’s do-everything-app WeChat.
The hashtag “Kissinger dies at 100” was the number one trend on the Chinese search engine Baidu. Another hashtag, “Kissinger visited China more than 100 times and just traveled to China this year,” trended heavily on Baidu.
In July, Kissinger visited China, where he met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing. Kissinger maintained his access to China’s top leadership as the relations between the U.S. and China witnessed a heightened phase of tensions.
China’s President Xi Jinping (R) meets former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on November 8, 2018. Kissinger died on Wednesday at the age of 100. Thomas Peter/AFP via Getty
Comments remembering Kissinger’s legacy continued to pour in on Thursday. He died on Wednesday.
“He is the promoter of the normalization of Sino-US relations, a true diplomatic pragmatist who will go well all the way,” wrote a Weibo user named ZhanLang34. “We will never forget this centenarian!” wrote another Weibo user.
On Thursday, People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party‘s official newspaper, described Kissinger as an “old friend of the Chinese people.”
“Among ordinary Chinese people, Kissinger is a highly recognized name for American politicians. This ‘China Connect’ who has been dealing with China for more than 40 years is known as ‘an old friend of the Chinese people,’” People’s Daily said, remembering Kissinger on his death.
People’s Daily added, “Kissinger occupies an important position in the history of American diplomacy, has an indelible position, and is also a historical witness of Sino-US relations.”
Kissinger’s tenure was also marked by controversial policies during the Vietnam War, including intensive bombing campaigns in Cambodia.
Despite these controversies, Kissinger’s legacy in the Nixon administration is primarily defined by his role in detente with the Soviet Union and the opening of China.
Xie Feng, China’s ambassador to the U.S., described Kissinger’s death as a loss to both countries – and the world.
“It is a tremendous loss for both our countries and the world. The history will remember what the centenarian had contributed to China-U.S. relations, and he will always remain alive in the hearts of the Chinese people as a most valued old friend,” Xie wrote on X, formerly Twitter.
Uncommon Knowledge
Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground.
Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground.
It is not unfair to say that Henry Kissinger, who died Wednesday, November 29, at age 100, owes his role in history to one man: Richard Nixon. It is also not unfair to say that their partnership ranks as one of the most productive, complicated, paranoid, and downright weird relationships this side of Martin and Lewis. At times, each man loathed the other, often for showing the exact same insecurities he himself possessed.
What would Kissinger have become if Nixon had not telephoned him shortly after winning the Republican presidential nomination in 1968, and asked him to be on his foreign policy advisory group? Here was Nixon reaching out to a man who not only had been a close adviser to Nelson Rockefeller, Nixon’s rival for the nomination, but who had made no secret of his antipathy for the nominee. And, in fact, Kissinger said no, preferring to advise him personally. How much of that he actually did during the campaign remains murky, since Kissinger also sent friendly signals to the camp of Hubert Humphrey during the general election.
Humphrey later would tell The New York Times that if he had been elected president, he would have made Kissinger his national security adviser, just as Nixon had. It never would have worked, of course. Humphrey was too happy a person to connect with Kissinger in the way Nixon did. As Walter Isaacson points out in Kissinger, his 1992 biography that remains the best and most definitive account of the man, Nixon himself saw even his own partnership with Kissinger as unlikely: “the grocer’s son from Whittier and the refugee from Hitler’s Germany, the politician and the academic.” But what the two had in common was a deep love of foreign policy, not just in the way it is discussed at the Council on Foreign Relations, but in the dark and complex ways that diplomacy and force are practiced, complete with stabbed backs and revenge served ice-cold. “My rule in international affairs,” Nixon once told Golda Meir in a meeting with Kissinger, “is, ‘Do unto others as they would do unto you.’” Added Kissinger, with impeccable timing, “Plus 10 percent.”
This made for a particularly activist presidency, as evidenced not just by the Vietnam War and the endless peace talks and the bombing campaigns (including the secret ones in Cambodia), but by genuine and dramatic outreach, most notably Nixon’s trip to China in 1972 and, to a lesser degree, détente with the Soviet Union. There is a much darker side, of course, perhaps best exemplified by the overthrow of Chile’s democratically-elected Socialist leader, Salvador Allende, in a 1973 coup engineered by the CIA. In Robert Dallek’s astute study, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, he describes the two men discussing the result, with Kissinger complaining about press coverage (as he often did) and Nixon proudly saying that “our hand doesn’t show on this one.”
We know about this conversation thanks to transcripts of Kissinger’s phone calls. As The New York Times pointed out in a 2007 profile of Dallek, “this most secretive of presidencies had gradually become the most transparent” thanks to the gradual release of tapes, transcripts of phone calls, and diaries kept by Nixon, Kissinger, and others. Little of this casts Kissinger in a kinder light, especially in his obeisance to Nixon in person and his mocking of him to others. Mr. “Meatball Mind” somehow does not have the same ring as “Mr. President.”
The struggle between these two men for credit may be best illustrated by the tussle over who would be Time’s Man of the Year in 1972: Nixon alone, as Nixon unsurprisingly preferred, or Nixon and Kissinger. As recounted in Isaacson’s book, Nixon got wind of talk that Kissinger might be Man of the Year and complimented Kissinger by note; behind the scenes, he felt otherwise, as John Ehrlichman’s notes from a Camp David meeting that fall make clear: “President’s genius needs to be recognized, vis-à-vis HAK.”
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger speaks to State Department employees on Sept. 28, 1973. Kissinger urged them to seize what he described as unparalleled opportunity to bring about a peaceful international structure. The speech came just two weeks after Kissinger and the U.S. backed a military coup in Chile that established a brutal dictatorship that is estimated to have left 3,000 people dead or tortured and 40,000 more missing.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger speaks to State Department employees on Sept. 28, 1973. Kissinger urged them to seize what he described as unparalleled opportunity to bring about a peaceful international structure. The speech came just two weeks after Kissinger and the U.S. backed a military coup in Chile that established a brutal dictatorship that is estimated to have left 3,000 people dead or tortured and 40,000 more missing.
Henry Kissinger — who as a top American foreign policy official oversaw, overlooked and at times actively perpetrated some of the most grotesque war crimes the United States and its allies have committed — died Wednesday at his home in Connecticut. He was 100 years old.
Kissinger’s death was announced by his consulting firm on Wednesday evening. No cause of death was immediately given.
Kissinger served as secretary of state and national security adviser under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, positions that allowed him to direct the Vietnam War and the broader Cold War with the Soviet Union, and to implement a stridently “realist” approach that prioritized U.S. interests and domestic political success over any potential atrocity that might occur.
The former led to perhaps the most infamous crime Kissinger committed: a secret four-year bombing campaign in Cambodia that killed an untold number of civilians, despite the fact that it was a neutral nation with which the United States was not at war.
During his time in charge of the American foreign policy machine, Kissinger also directed illegal arms sales to Pakistan as it carried out a brutal crackdown on its Bengali population in 1971. He supported the 1973 military coup that overthrew a democratically elected socialist government in Chile, gave the go-ahead to Indonesia’s 1975 invasion of East Timor, and backed Argentina’s repressive military dictatorship as it launched its “dirty war” against dissenters and leftists in 1976. His policies during the Ford administration also fueled civil wars in Africa, most notably in Angola.
Even the most generous calculations suggest that the murderous regimes Kissinger supported and the conflicts they waged were responsible for millions of deaths and millions of other human rights abuses, during and after the eight years he served in the American government.
Kissinger never showed remorse for those misdeeds. He never paid any real price for them either. He maintained a mocking tone toward critics of his human rights record throughout his life, and remained a member in good standing of elite Washington political society until his death.
In May 2016, for instance, President Barack Obama came as close as the United States ever does to apologizing for its role in a human rights atrocity during a visit to Argentina. The U.S. “has to examine its own policies as well, and its own past,” Obama said, in an expression of regret for the United States’ role in the “dirty war.” “We’ve been slow to speak out for human rights, and that was the case here.” He pledged to declassify thousands of documents related to the dictatorship’s reign of terror and U.S. support for it.
The examination must have been quick. Two months later, the Obama administration handed Kissinger, who those documents showed had cozied up to Argentine military dictator Jorge Rafael Videla in the 1970s, the Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest honor the Pentagon offers civilians.
Kissinger’s acolytes argue that honors like these are more than deserved. His accomplishments, including an opening of relations with China and detente with the Soviet Union, outweigh any abuses that helped make them possible. At the very least, they posit, the abuses were part of a cold calculation that “ensuring a nation’s survival sometimes leaves tragically little room for private morality,” as Robert D. Kaplan argued in 2013. Kissinger’s defenders suggest that even more death may have occurred if the U.S. had pursued a more morally grounded foreign policy instead.
His critics have made persuasive cases in numerous books, documentaries and publications that Kissinger was not just a war criminal but responsible for the creation of an imperial foreign policy that eventually embroiled the U.S. in a state of perpetual war and led it to commit and overlook numerous abuses of human rights in the decades after he left power.
Kissinger (center) remained a member in good standing of the Washington political, press and societal elite throughout his life, even among leaders like President Barack Obama (left), who criticized the human rights abuses that took place on his watch.
Kissinger (center) remained a member in good standing of the Washington political, press and societal elite throughout his life, even among leaders like President Barack Obama (left), who criticized the human rights abuses that took place on his watch.
Still others have argued that Kissinger was, in the words of New Yorker essayist Thomas Meaney, “a far less remarkable figure than his supporters, his critics — and he himself — believed.” Rather than an outlier, Meaney and others have suggested, Kissinger was a consummate political actor and a natural product of the American war machine, if one who had an outsize sense of self-importance even compared with many of the supposedly “great men” who’ve led the country before and after him.
Settling on an ultimate legacy for Kissinger is an enticing task — one historians, foreign policy experts and journalists have sought to perfect for decades. It is a pertinent endeavor, too, for determining if Kissinger’s war crimes made him a particularly evil figure, or if they reveal that it is simply impossible to steer an empire the size of the United States for so long without doing some heinous things. Maybe both can be true.
What is undeniable, on the occasion of his death, is that millions of Argentinians, Bangladeshis, Cambodians, Chileans, East Timorese and others cannot offer their opinion on Henry Kissinger’s legacy or the world he helped create, because they died at the hands of the tyrants Kissinger enabled.
***
Born Heinz Alfred Kissinger in Bavaria in 1923, Kissinger and his family immigrated to the United States in 1938 to flee Nazi persecution of German Jews.
Kissinger forever downplayed the effect that had on his life, but historians have argued differently: Kissinger’s experience as a child likely shaped his “legendary insecurity, paranoia and extreme sensitivity to criticism” and planted the seeds of his “emphasis on stability and equilibrium, and his fears about revolution and disorder,” Thomas A. Schwartz, a Vanderbilt University historian, wrote in his biography of Kissinger in 2020. That Kissinger’s father, a teacher who was fired for being Jewish, lost everything, Schwartz continued, “contributed to Kissinger’s own sense that not only do the meek not inherit the earth, but that power is the ultimate arbiter in both life and international relations.”
Or, as a longtime Kissinger colleague put it in another quote Schwartz relayed: “Kissinger’s philosophy of life was that ‘good will won’t help you defend yourself on the docks of Marseilles.’”
Drafted into the U.S. Army in 1943, Kissinger served in Germany during World War II and became an accomplished intelligence agent. He earned a Bronze Star in part for his success in hunting down members of the Gestapo, the Nazis’ secret police force, in the immediate aftermath of the war.
After returning to the U.S. and graduating from Harvard, he fast-tracked his way to foreign policy influence, initially gaining fame within the establishment by arguing that President Dwight D. Eisenhower needed to accept that “limited nuclear war” in Europe might be necessary to protect the U.S. and its allies from the emerging power of the Soviet Union.
President Richard Nixon (left) and Kissinger, as national security adviser, talk together in Washington on Nov. 25, 1972.
President Richard Nixon (left) and Kissinger, as national security adviser, talk together in Washington on Nov. 25, 1972.
Kissinger’s rapid ascent up the foreign policy ladder was also possible because he was such a skilled political operator, Schwartz argued. He offered diplomatic and foreign policy advice to both Eisenhower, a Republican, and to President John F. Kennedy, a Democrat.
He advised former New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller in three separate bids for the presidency. But when Rockefeller failed to win the GOP nomination in 1968, Kissinger maintained positive relations with both Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate, and Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey throughout the general election. It was almost a given in Washington that Kissinger would assume a prominent role in the next administration, no matter the outcome.
Nixon prevailed and made Kissinger his first major foreign policy appointment, naming him White House national security adviser. Kissinger, like Nixon, was an ardent skeptic of bureaucrats he believed were too idealistic and moralistic in their approach to the Vietnam War and Soviet communism, and early in his tenure reshaped the White House National Security Council into its modern form in order to “tame the bureaucracy” and foster “a more centralized and secretive approach to foreign policy,” Schwartz wrote.
It would come in handy. Kissinger may have sought out the status he earned as a celebrity diplomat, and he sensed the importance of public opinion to an administration’s ability to exercise its foreign policy. But he preferred to do his dirtiest work in secret, away from the potentially scornful eyes of State Department diplomats, Congress, journalists or the public.
Kissinger personally ‘approved each of the 3,875 Cambodia bombing raids’ that occurred between 1969 and 1970.
In the spring of 1969, desperate to bring an end to the Vietnam War, Kissinger authorized one of its most horrific chapters: the secret carpet-bombing campaign in Cambodia. The theory was that it would force North Vietnam to accept improved U.S. conditions for ending the war, an early use of a “bombs as an instrument of diplomacy” approach, as Yale historian and fierce Kissinger critic Greg Grandin has described it, that has become a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy.
From 1969 to 1973, when a Congress that had been largely kept in the dark about the Cambodian campaign moved to halt it, the United States dropped a half-million tons of bombs on the neutral country. Kissinger personally “approved each of the 3,875 Cambodia bombing raids” that occurred between 1969 and 1970, according to a Pentagon report released later.
The bombing campaign ultimately killed between 150,000 and a half-million Cambodian civilians, various estimates suggest. It also helped unleash a civil war inside Cambodia that led to the rise of the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot, a dictator whose regime killed as many as 2 million Cambodians, according to modern appraisals.
The Cambodian landscape in 1968 shows the damage inflicted by B-52 bombing there.
The Cambodian landscape in 1968 shows the damage inflicted by B-52 bombing there.
Kissinger and the U.S. negotiated the Paris Peace Accords with North Vietnam in 1973, paving the way for the war’s end. It earned Kissinger a Nobel Peace Prize. Two prize committee members resigned in response.
That was the second of his major accomplishments. The year prior, he had helped Nixon reestablish diplomatic relations with China, which both Kissinger and Nixon saw as crucial to deepening a divide between it and the Soviet Union, the world’s two largest communist powers.
The two episodes define Kissinger’s career and how it has been interpreted. They made him a superstar within the Nixon administration and the American foreign policy establishment. The accomplishments they paved the way for — including major arms limitation treaties with the Soviet Union and the full restoration of diplomatic recognition with China — are still cited as lasting Kissinger victories.
They also came at an incredible human cost that was a direct result of Kissinger’s desperation to achieve them. Much like the end of the Vietnam War had been, the opening of relations with China was directly preceded by an atrocity the United States broadly ignored: the 1971 Pakistani killings of at least 500,00 people in present-day Bangladesh, then known as East Pakistan.
Focused on Beijing, Nixon and Kissinger did not merely look the other way when what was then known as West Pakistan launched an aggressive campaign against East Pakistan. Kissinger and Nixon saw West Pakistan as a crucial ally against the Soviets and a “gateway to open diplomatic relations with China.” In an effort to keep that door open, the Nixon administration largely refused to condemn West Pakistan’s efforts to repress Bengalis in the east, and even authorized potentially illegal arms shipments to West Pakistan.
Bengali forces, with support from India, eventually forced the Pakistanis to surrender,leading to the creation of independent Bangladesh — but not before Pakistani armed forces and other allied militant groups killed as many as 3 million people and raped some 400,000 women, according to modern estimates. The crisis forced millions of others to flee the country.
To Kissinger, it mattered little. In 1971, the Pakistanis helped shuttle him into China for a secret visit that helped pave the way for Nixon’s eventual trip to Shanghai.
“Not one has yet understood what we did in India-Pakistan and how we saved the China option which we need for the bloody Russians,” Kissinger said to Nixon in 1972, according to reports from the Press Trust of India based on memos that were declassified decades later. “Why should we give a damn about Bangladesh?”
***
Declassified memos and notes have made clear that Kissinger rarely missed a chance to take a similarly cavalier approach to human rights and democracy as his career progressed.
After Chileans elected socialist President Salvador Allende in 1970, Kissinger and Nixon almost immediately began plotting the overthrow of his government. The Chilean military carried out a coup in 1973, and Gen. Augusto Pinochet established a murderous dictatorship that killed an estimated 3,000 supposed dissidents and tortured as many as 40,000 more, according to a national truth commission established after Chile’s return to democracy in 1990.
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, an Army general, took power in a U.S.-supported coup in 1973 and embarked on a brutal reign of tyranny. Kissinger knew of the abuses and murders that took place on Pinochet’s watch but regarded him as a defense against communism even as his contemporaries in the State Department criticized his approach.
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, an Army general, took power in a U.S.-supported coup in 1973 and embarked on a brutal reign of tyranny. Kissinger knew of the abuses and murders that took place on Pinochet’s watch but regarded him as a defense against communism even as his contemporaries in the State Department criticized his approach.
Ever disdainful of what he saw as moralistic bureaucrats, Kissinger mocked the concerns State Department officials expressed about the dictatorship’s abuses.
“I read the briefing paper for this meeting and it was nothing but Human Rights,” he told a U.S. official about Chile in 1973, according to records obtained by the National Security Archive, a nonprofit library of public records and declassified documents. “The State Department is made up of people who have a vocation for the ministry. Because there are not enough churches for them, they went into the Department of State.”
Kissinger, who became secretary of state just a month after Pinochet’s coup, told State Department officials in October 1973 that the United States should not position itself as a defender of the military regime’s human rights abuses. But U.S. policy, he explained, was that “no matter how unpleasant they act, the [Pinochet] government is better for us than Allende was.”
Three years later, he told Pinochet in an official meeting that the Chilean dictatorship had become the victim of international propaganda efforts that had distorted its human rights record, according to declassified documents that notably were not shared with a U.S. Senate select committee that investigated covert American actions in the Chilean coup.
Top left: The Chilean presidential palace La Moneda under fire during the coup led by Pinochet in Santiago in 1973. Top right: Aides and others involved with the presidency of Salvador Allende are guarded by soldiers outside La Moneda. Bottom left: Chilean soldiers take cover behind a tank from fire by Allende’s bodyguards during the ground attack. Bottom right: Soldiers supporting the coup take cover as bombs are dropped on the presidential palace.
Top left: The Chilean presidential palace La Moneda under fire during the coup led by Pinochet in Santiago in 1973. Top right: Aides and others involved with the presidency of Salvador Allende are guarded by soldiers outside La Moneda. Bottom left: Chilean soldiers take cover behind a tank from fire by Allende’s bodyguards during the ground attack. Bottom right: Soldiers supporting the coup take cover as bombs are dropped on the presidential palace.
“My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government that was going Communist,” he told the Chilean.
In December 1975, Kissinger and Ford flew to Indonesia to meet with Suharto, a military dictator who took control of the country after the overthrow of Sukarno, an Indonesian nationalist, in 1967. At the time, Suharto was considering an invasion of neighboring East Timor, which was seeking independence.The U.S. and Suharto feared the independence effort could lead to an anti-colonialist government sympathetic to the Soviets.
Suharto launched the invasion not long after Kissinger and Ford returned to the United States, and declassified memos have shown that he did so “knowing that he had the full approval of the White House.”
“It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly,” Kissinger told Suharto, according to declassified memos obtained by the National Security Archive. “It would be better,” he continued, “if it occurred” after he and Ford had returned to the United States.
Indonesian forces proceeded to carry out what some historians now regard as a genocide of East Timorese populations — some estimates suggest they murdered 2,000 people in the initial days of the invasion alone. A truth and reconciliation committee later suggested that between 100,000 and 200,000 East Timorese people died throughout the conflict and the resulting Indonesian occupation of the island, which lasted until 1999.
Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities.Arthur Blood, then-U.S. consul general to East Pakistan, in a 1971 memo
Near the end of his time as secretary of state, Kissinger relayed similar messages to Argentina’s military dictatorship, which overthrew its government in 1976. In a meeting that year, Kissinger told the country’s foreign minister to “get the terrorist problem” — by which he meant dissenters against the new dictatorship — “over as quickly as possible,” according to memos declassified in 2002 and obtained by the National Security Archive. The Argentine left the meeting convinced the U.S. had greenlighted its “dirty war” and that Kissinger considered the elimination of dissenters far more important than human rights.
The same year, Kissinger visited Brazil and showered praise on the country’s military dictatorship, which had come to power in a coup in 1964, before Kissinger entered government. By then, though, it was well known that the regime was in the midst of its most brutal period of repression. In 2014, the country’s national truth commission found that the dictatorship killed at least 434 political dissidents and tortureding thousands more.
Kissinger’s sympathy for tyrants continued after he left the government in 1977. Kissinger attended the 1978 World Cup in Argentina as a special guest of Videla, the dictator, and lauded the regime for its success in “wiping out” its opponents, documents declassified in 2016 showed.
At the time, a State Department official expressed concern that the Argentines “may use Kissinger’s laudatory statements as justification for hardening their human rights stance.” Indeed, the dictatorship, which was fond of throwing dissenters out of helicopters and into the sea, eventually disappeared as many as 30,000 people.
After serving as national security adviser under Nixon, Kissinger became secretary of state under President Gerald Ford.
After serving as national security adviser under Nixon, Kissinger became secretary of state under President Gerald Ford.
There is no doubt that Kissinger knew these many abuses were taking place throughout his career.
In 1971, Archer Blood, the U.S. consul general in East Pakistan, wrote a memo detailing Pakistani atrocities in Bangladesh, telling his superiors that Pakistan was “systematically eliminating” Bangladeshis “by seeking them out and shooting them down.” A month later, he authored another telegram accusing the U.S. of displaying “moral bankruptcy” for refusing to condemn or attempt to limit the violent crackdowns on East Pakistan. “Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities,” the telegram said.
Not long after Blood sent the memo about Pakistan, Kissinger and Nixon reassigned him to a diplomatic post in Washington.
As Kissinger plotted an overthrow of Allende’s government in Chile, a National Security Council official warned that it was “patently a violation of our own principles and policy tenets.” But the warnings did nothing to stop Kissinger from fomenting coups and singing the praises of those who committed atrocities.
Kissinger believed these atrocities were worth it, both to stop the spread of Soviet communism and to bolster American interests and credibility in the world.
Former President George H.W. Bush, who served as ambassador to the United Nations under Nixon, described Kissinger as paranoid, according to Princeton historian and Kissinger critic Greg Bass, and this paranoia about communism appeared repeatedly during his career.
Kissinger saw Allende’s election in Chile as evidence of the unstoppable march of Marxism that might overtake the world if the U.S. didn’t act to stop it, and the Pinochet regime’s abuses as merely a necessary price to pay to stop it.
In 1973, he asked a top Latin America official at the State Department whether Pinochet’s human rights violations were “that much worse than in other countries in Latin America.” When the official told him they were, he said only that cutting off military aid would have “very serious” consequences.
Kissinger did not believe that American foreign policy could be successful if it let morality overtake pragmatism and self-interest. Moral outcomes, he argued, came from the advance of human freedom, and he believed his actions achieved that.
“A country that demands moral perfection of itself as a test of its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security,” Kissinger wrote in his 1994 book, “Diplomacy.”
He also despised armchair quarterbacks. Governing, he posited, is difficult, and doesn’t allow for the luxury of hindsight that academics and his critics enjoy.
“The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise,” he wrote in “Diplomacy.” “The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes are irretrievable.”
Kissinger’s defenders argue that his critics now treat “the West’s victory” in the Cold War “as a foregone conclusion,” and that across the world, “revolutionary nihilists” were busy massacring people too. But these are convenient excuses for many of the atrocities Kissinger tolerated or authorized, and they ignore that many of Kissinger’s contemporaries often saw clear paranoia and fault in his actions well in advance.
“Is Allende a mortal threat to the U.S.?” Viron Vaky, the NSC official who criticized Kissinger’s efforts to foment a coup in Santiago, asked in a 1970 memo that was later obtained by the National Security Archive. “It is hard to argue this.”
***
In 2003, the film director Errol Morris released “The Fog of War,” a documentary featuring former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who oversaw much of the Vietnam War. The film centered McNamara detailing lessons he had learned from the experience as he sought to make peace with the “immense moral burden of his actions” in Vietnam, as The New Yorker’s Jon Lee Anderson wrote in 2016.
Kissinger never engaged in any such reflection. Instead, he continued to peddle lies about his actions, including an absurd suggestion, in 2014, that U.S. drone warfare had resulted in more deaths than the Cambodian bombing campaign.
“Unlike Robert McNamara, Kissinger has shown little in the way of a conscience,” Anderson wrote. (Kissinger, as Anderson noted, in fact mocked McNamara for espousing regret in the film.) “And because of that, it seems highly likely, history will not easily absolve him.”
Washington, however, spent the final decades of Kissinger’s life doing exactly that.
Kissinger served as an informal adviser to numerous presidents, secretaries of state and foreign policy heavyweights even after he left the government. He was welcome at Washington’s swankiest dinner parties, feted by leaders of both major political parties and large think tanks, and given generous platforms to offer his advice and perspective on American military crusades in the pages of the country’s most prominent newspapers and on the airwaves of its biggest TV and radio networks.
Kissinger with President George W. Bush, who leaned on the former official as an informal adviser throughout the administration’s global
Kissinger with President George W. Bush, who leaned on the former official as an informal adviser throughout the administration’s global “war on terror.” Kissinger was an ardent supporter of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
He used those platforms to, among other things, cheerlead for war in Iraq: In 2002, a year before the U.S. invaded, he called for regime change in Baghdad. Kissinger served as an “informal adviser,” as historian Grandin described it, to President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and top aide Karl Rove throughout that war, during which as many as 200,000 Iraqi civilians may have died, according to estimates, and the U.S. amassed a litany of new human rights abuses to add to its record.
Kissinger’s sense of bipartisanship never faltered. Hillary Clinton leaned on him for advice as secretary of state and called him a friend. Samantha Power, who served as Obama’s ambassador to the United Nations, often criticized Kissinger and argued that human rights should play a much more prominent role in American foreign policy. Yet in 2014, she attended a Yankees-Red Sox game with Kissinger, and two years later accepted an award named for him. The Obama administration leaned on the bombing of Cambodia as the legal justification for its drone wars, including the targeted killings of American citizens abroad.
That his influence never waned makes it easy to see Kissinger’s fingerprints on every ill — or accomplishment, as his acolytes would frame them — that followed. There’s probably some truth, too, to the idea that Kissinger maintained that influence in large part to help ensure his place in history as America’s most significant foreign policy mind, no matter who wrote it.
The United States, after all, overthrew numerous democratically elected governments, waged secret bombing campaigns, and committed and permitted human rights abuses well before Kissinger came to power. And the U.S. government has carried out decades of endless war that have resulted in significant civilian death tolls, the expanded use of torture, indefinite detention, illegal rendition and extrajudicial murder since Kissinger left government.
Much like Kissinger, the architects of those disasters faced few, if any, meaningful repercussions. A country that so often predicates its concern for human rights on the specific humans in question, and in which elite accountability for even the most blatant crimes and abuses is so rare, seems to have made up its mind about morality’s place in politics and public policy without much need for Kissinger’s help. He was just happier than most to provide it.
Perhaps, then, Kissinger’s life was most remarkable for how brightly it illuminated a simple and ugly truth about the nation he served.
“If all the sins of the U.S. security state can be loaded onto one man, all parties get what they need: Kissinger’s status as a world-historic figure is assured, and his critics can regard his foreign policy as the exception rather than the rule,” Meaney, the essayist, posited for The New Yorker in 2020. “It would be comforting to believe that American liberals are capable of seeing that politics is more than a matter of personal style, and that the record will prevail, but the enduring cult of Kissinger points to a less palatable possibility: Kissinger is us.”
Western governments are urging Israel to show restraint in its military campaign against Hamas in Gaza, as fears grow that the conflict could spiral out of control.
On Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and French President Emmanuel Macron combined their support for Israel’s right to retaliate with a warning: That response must be fair.
“Israel has the right to defend itself by eliminating terrorist groups such as Hamas through targeted action, but preserving civilian populations is the duty of democracies,” Macron said on Thursday night. “The only response to terrorism is always a strong and fair one. Strong because fair.”
On Thursday, for the first time the United States hinted at Israel’s responsibilities. Speaking alongside Benjamin Netanyahu at a press conference, Blinken said that while “Israel has the right to defend itself … how Israel does this matters.”
In a call with Netanyahu late Thursday evening, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak “reiterated that the UK stands side by side with Israel in fighting terror and agreed that Hamas can never again be able to perpetrate atrocities against the Israeli people,” according to a Downing Street readout. But the readout also added: “Noting that Hamas has enmeshed itself in the civilian population in Gaza, the Prime Minister said it was important to take all possible measures to protect ordinary Palestinians and facilitate humanitarian aid.”
These concerns were privately echoed by other Western officials, who warned that the world is facing a precarious moment.
As Israel scales up its powerful counteroffensive in Gaza, the fear in some European governments is that a full-blown regional war could erupt.
“Whatever Israel and the Palestinians do now risks contributing to the increasing bipolarization over the conflict,” one French diplomat said, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk publicly. “One big worry is the risk that the conflict spreads to the region.”
Gilad Erdan, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, already called the Hamas attacks and the subsequent kidnapping of civilians “Israel’s 9/11.”
But the 2001 attacks on the U.S. also led Washington to launch a global “War on Terror,” with American-led military involvement in Afghanistan and, two years later, Iraq, with the loss of many lives. The unified international support the U.S. enjoyed in the days and weeks immediately following 9/11 splintered over President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
“Israel clearly sees this as a casus belli [an act that provokes or justifies war],” one EU official said. “There is a real danger Israel simply uses this for a major ground offensive and wipes out the whole of Gaza.”
Shock and fury
Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis even publicly warned about making the same mistake.
“The shock and fury in Israel are reminiscent of the emotions in the US after 9/11,” he said on X. “That provoked a display of American unity and power. It also led to a misconceived and self-destructive war on terror. Israel may be heading down the same dangerous path.”
Hamas’ attacks against Israel last weekend, which left more than 1,200 dead, led to an incomparable wave of sympathy and outrage across the West. The Israeli flag was projected across the European Commission’s headquarters and Berlin’s Brandenburger Tor.
But already, Israel’s retribution against Hamas is being scrutinized. Its counteroffensive has killed more than 1, 500 Palestinians, according to Gaza’s health ministry, and put the coastal strip of land under “complete siege.”
The United Nations has already sounded the alarm. Just two days after the attacks, Secretary-General António Guterres said he was “deeply distressed” at Israel’s announcement of a siege on Gaza. He also warned Israel that “military operations must be conducted in strict accordance with international humanitarian law.” This was echoed by the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell.
NGOs and Western governments now fear a humanitarian crisis, with the Red Cross warning that Gaza hospitals could turn into “morgues” without electricity.
So far, Israel seems to be doubling down.
On Thursday, Israeli Energy Minister Israel Katz said there would be no humanitarian exception until all hostages were freed and that nobody should moralize.
Talking about Israel’s retaliatory measures in the Gaza Strip, Prosor said Israel decided to move “from containment to eradication” of Islamic jihadists. “This is civilization against barbarity. This is good against bad.”
Haim Regev, the Israeli ambassador to the EU, acknowledged on Tuesday that there were few critical voices so far. “But I feel the more we will go ahead with our response we might see more.”
Abdalrahim Alfarra, the head of the Palestinian Mission to the EU, told POLITICO on Thursday that a change in atmosphere is already underway. “It’s starting, since [Wednesday] there are several voices in the European Union itself that have started to ask Israel and Netanyahu’s government to at the least open up a passage for food aid to stop the Israeli aggression and war against the Gaza strip,” he said.
Gordian knot
Just like the U.S. response to 9/11, the escalation of the conflict risks destabilizing the entire region, Western diplomats fear.
“This whole conflict is a Gordian knot,” said one EU diplomat, describing the risk of escalation toward other countries in the region. The diplomat said the focus should now be on stabilizing the situation and to getting the parties back to the negotiating table.
“The Middle East conflict has the danger of escalating and bringing in other Arab countries under the pressure of their public opinion,” former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned, while pointing to the lessons learned from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, during which an Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria attacked Israel.
Despite the historical peace efforts of the U.S. in the region, Washington is far from a neutral broker, as it has been traditionally a strong supporter of Israel. In previous crises in the region, Washington appeared to give Israel carte blanche in its response, but over time ramped up pressure to compel the Israeli government to agree to a cease fire.
The EU official cited above doubted whether Washington will follow that playbook this time. “Biden has no more room for maneuvering domestically after the Hamas attacks,” the EU official said. “He has to support Netanyahu all the way.”
Eddy Wax, Suzanne Lynch, Sarah Wheaton, Elisa Braun, Jacopo Barigazzi and Laura Hülsemann contributed reporting.
This article has been updated with a readout from U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s call with BenjaminNetanyahu, and to reflect the Palestinian death toll.
Hamas’ attack against Israel being celebrated on the streets of Berlin indicates that Germany has let too many foreigners into the country, according to former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
“It was a grave mistake to let in so many people of totally different culture and religion and concepts, because it creates a pressure group inside each country that does that,” the 100-year-old ex-top American diplomat said in an interview with Axel Springer CEO Mathias Döpfner for Germany’s Welt TV.
German-born Holocaust survivor Kissinger — who went on to become the architect of American foreign policy during the Vietnam War — said that it was “painful,” in response to a question about seeing Arabs in Berlin celebrating last weekend’s assault on Israel.
In a surprise attack that started on Saturday morning, Hamas militants stormed out of the Gaza Strip, killing more than 1,200 Israelis and abducting dozens more, while firing rockets at cities including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Israel has since hit back by commencing a siege of Gaza and firing its own barrage of retaliatory missiles, killing hundreds of Palestinians.
Hamas’ “open act of aggression” must be met with “some penalty,” Kissinger said — while warning about the potential for dangerous escalation in the region.
“The Middle East conflict has the danger of escalating and bringing in other Arab countries under the pressure of their public opinion,” Kissinger warned, while pointing to the lessons learned from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, during which an Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria attacked Israel.
The real goal of Hamas and its supporters “can only be to mobilize the Arab world against Israel and to get off the track of peaceful negotiations,” Kissinger said.
It is also “possible” that Israel could take action against Iran, if it considers Tehran to have had a hand in perpetrating the attack, the former top diplomat added.
More broadly, Kissinger said, Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine coupled with Hamas’ attack on Israel represent a “fundamental attack on the international system.”
At least Europe no longer has to endure that hackneyed Henry Kissinger quip about whom to call if you want “to call Europe.”
No one’s calling anyway.
Of the myriad geostrategic illusions that have been destroyed in recent days, the most sobering realization for anyone residing on the Continent should be this: No one cares what Europe thinks. Across an array of global flashpoints, from Nagorno-Karabakh to Kosovo to Israel, Europe has been relegated to the role of a well-meaning NGO, whose humanitarian contributions are welcomed, but is otherwise ignored.
The 27-member bloc has always struggled to articulate a coherent foreign policy, given the diverse national interests at play. Even so, it still mattered, mainly due to the size of its market. The EU’s global influence is waning, however, amid the secular decline of its economy and its inability to project military might at a time of growing global instability.
Instead of the “geopolitical” powerhouse Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised when she took office in 2019, the EU has devolved into a pan-Europeanminnow, offering a degree of bemusement to the real players at the top table, while mostly just embarrassing itself amid its cacophony of contradictions.
If that sounds harsh, consider the past 72 hours: In the wake of Hamas’ massacre of hundreds of Israeli civilians over the weekend, European Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi announced on Monday that the bloc would “immediately” suspend €691 million in aid to the Palestinian Authority. A few hours later, Slovenian Commissioner Janez Lenarčič contradicted his Hungarian colleague, insisting the aid “will continue as long as needed.”
The Commission’s press operation followed up with a statement that the EU would conduct an “urgent review” of some aid programs to ensure that funds not be funneled into terrorism, implying such safeguards were not already in place.
As far as the EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell was concerned, the outcome of any review of assistance for the Palestinians was a foregone conclusion: “We will have to support more, not less,” he said on Tuesday.
To sum up: Over the course of just 24 hours, the Commission went from announcing it would suspend all aid to the Palestinians to signaling it would increase the flow of funds.
The EU’s response to the events on the ground in Israel was no less confused. Even as Israel was still counting the bodies from the most horrific massacre in the Jewish state’s history, Borrell, a longtime critic of the country who has effectively been declared persona non grata there, resorted to bothsidesing.
Borrell, a Spanish socialist, condemned Hamas’ “barbaric and terrorist attack,” while also chiding Israel for its blockade of Gaza and highlighting the “suffering” of the Palestinians who voted Hamas into power.
The Spaniard’s approach stood in sharp contrast to that of von der Leyen, who unequivocally condemned the attacks (albeit in a series of tweets) and had the Israeli flag projected onto the façade of her office.
Borrell organized an emergency meeting of EU foreign ministers in Oman to discuss the situation in Israel, but Israel’s foreign minister declined to participate, even remotely | AFP via Getty Images
Those moves immediately drew protest from other corners of the EU, however, with Clare Daly, a firebrand leftist MEP from Ireland, questioning von der Leyen’s legitimacy and telling her to “shut up.”
By mid-week, ascertaining Europe’s position on the crisis was like throwing darts — blindfolded.
Bloody hands
Compare that with the messaging from Washington.
“In this moment, we must be crystal clear,” U.S. President Joe Biden said in a special White House address Tuesday. “We stand with Israel. We stand with Israel. And we will make sure Israel has what it needs to take care of its citizens, defend itself, and respond to this attack.”
Biden noted that he’d called France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom to discuss the crisis. Notably not on the list: any of the EU’s “leaders.”
On Tuesday, Borrell organized an emergency meeting of EU foreign ministers in Oman, where they were already gathering, to discuss the situation in Israel. Israel’s foreign minister, Eli Cohen, declined to participate, even remotely.
That’s not too surprising, considering Europe’s record on Iran, which has supported Hamas for decades and whose leadership celebrated the weekend attacks. Though Iran denies direct involvement, many analysts say Hamas’ carefully planned assault would not have been possible without training and logistical support from Tehran.
“Hamas would not exist if not for Iran’s support,” U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, a Democrat on the Senate foreign relations committee, said on Wednesday. “And so it is a bit of splitting hairs as to whether they were intimately involved in the planning of these attacks, or simply funded Hamas for decades to give them the ability to plan these attacks. There’s no doubt that Iran has blood on its hands.”
Despite persistent signs of Tehran’s malevolent activities across the region, including the detention of a European diplomat vacationing in Iran, Borrell has repeatedly sought to engage with the country’s hard-line regime in the hope of reigniting the so-called nuclear deal with global powers that then-U.S. President Donald Trump exited in 2018.
Last year, Borrell even traveled to Iran in a bid to restart talks, despite the loud objections of Israel’s then-foreign minister, Yair Lapid.
If nothing else, Borrell is consistent.
“Iran wants to wipe out Israel? Nothing new about that,” he told POLITICO in 2019 when he was still Spanish foreign minister. “You have to live with it.”
European Council President Charles Michel mounted an ambitious diplomatic effort earlier this year amid a resurgence in tensions | Jorge Guererro/AFP via Getty Images
Now Europe has to live with the consequences of that misguided policy and its loss of credibility in Israel, the region’s only democracy.
The Charles Michel Show
Another glaring example of Europe’s geopolitical impotence is Nagorno-Karabakh, the disputed, predominantly Armenian, region in Azerbaijan.
The long-simmering conflict there was all but forgotten by most of the world, but not by European Council President Charles Michel, who mounted an ambitious diplomatic effort earlier this year amid a resurgence in tensions.
In July, Michel hosted leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Brussels, the sixth such meeting. He described the discussions as “frank, honest and substantive.” He even invited the leaders to a special summit in October for a “pentalateral meeting” with Germany and France in Granada.
It wasn’t meant to be. By then, Azerbaijan had seized the region, sending more than 100,000 refugees fleeing to Armenia. Europe, in dire need of natural gas from Azerbaijan, was powerless to do anything but watch.
Earlier this month, Michel blamed Russia, traditionally Armenia’s protector in the region, for the fiasco.
“It is clear for everyone to see that Russia has betrayed the Armenian people,” Michel told Euronews.
A similar pattern has played out in Kosovo, where the Europeans have been trying for years to broker a lasting peace between its Albanian and Serbian populations. The main sticking point there is the status of the northern part of Kosovo, bordering Serbia, where Serbs comprise a majority of the roughly 40,000 residents.
Borrell even appointed a “Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan Regional Issues.”
The incumbent in the post, Miroslav Lajčák, Slovakia’s former foreign minister, hasn’t had much luck. Though Lajčák was awarded the grandiose title more than three years ago, the parties are, if anything, further apart today than ever.
The EU has spent untold millions trying to stabilize the region, funding civil society organizations, schools and even a police force.
When tensions threatened to devolve into all-out combat following an incursion into northern Kosovo by Serbian militiamen last month, however, the EU was forced to resort to its tried-and-true crisis resolution mechanism: Uncle Sam.
”We get criticized for too little leadership in Europe and then for too much,” U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke said in 1998, after Washington dragged its reluctant European allies into an effort to halt the “ethnic cleansing” campaign unleashed by Yugoslavian leader Slobodan Milošević in Kosovo.
”The fact is the Europeans are not going to have a common security policy for the foreseeable future,” Holbrooke added. “We have done our best to keep them involved. But you can imagine how far I would have got with Mr. Milošević if I’d said, ‘Excuse me, Mr. President, I’ll be back in 24 hours after I’ve talked to the Europeans.”’
Risky business
One needn’t look further than Ukraine for proof that his point is no less valid today. Though the EU has done what it can, providing tens of billions in financial, humanitarian and military aid, it’s not nearly enough to help Ukraine keep the Russians at bay. If it weren’t for American support, Russian troops would be stationed all along the EU’s eastern flank, from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Ukraine’s plight highlights the divide between Europe’s geostrategic aspirations and reality. Even though Europe didn’t anticipate Russia’s full-scale invasion, it had been talking for years about the need to improve its defense capabilities.
“We must fight for our future ourselves, as Europeans, for our destiny,” then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared in 2017.
And then nothing happened.
The reality is that it will always be easier to lean on Washington than to achieve European consensus around foreign policy and military capabilities.
That’s why Europe’s discussions about security sound more like fantasy football than Risk.
After Biden decided to send a U.S. aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean in response to the Hamas attack this week, Thierry Breton, France’s EU commissioner, said Europe needed to think about building its own aircraft carrier. Even in Brussels, the comment generated little more than comic relief.
Despite all the rhetoric about the necessity for Europe to play a more global role, not even the leaders of the EU’s biggest members, France and Germany, seem to be serious about it.
As Biden hunkered down in the White House Situation Room to discuss the crisis in Israel, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz were busy conferring in Hamburg.
After agreeing to redouble their efforts to cut red tape in the EU, they took a harbor cruise with their partners.
The leaders celebrated their successful deliberations on a local wharf with beer and Fischbrötchen, a Hamburg fish sandwich. The sun even came out.
Call it coincidence, serendipity, an aligning of the planets—whatever the term, the moment was creepy and amusing all at once. I was beavering away in the basement research room at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, in Yorba Linda, a suburb of Los Angeles, when Henry Kissinger twice came into view—in the flat, cursive form of Nixon’s scrawl in the margins of the book I was reading, and then in the rounder corporeal form of the man himself, in the hallway outside the door.
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Kissinger, the last surviving member of Nixon’s Cabinet, was in Yorba Linda last fall for two reasons: to speak at a fundraising gala for the Richard Nixon Foundation and to promote a book he had published earlier in the year, at the improbable age of 99. The book, Leadership, contains an entire chapter in praise of Nixon, the man who had made Kissinger the 20th century’s only celebrity diplomat.
I was there to gather material for a Nixon book of my own. I had been nosing around in a cache of volumes from Nixon’s personal library. I was particularly interested in any marks he may have left in the books he’d owned. From what I could tell, no one had yet mined this remarkably varied collection, more than 2,000 books filling roughly 160 boxes stored in a vault beneath the presidential museum. Taken together, they reflect the broad range of Nixon’s intellectual curiosity—an underappreciated quality of his highly active mind. To give an idea: One heavily underlined book in the collection is a lengthy biography of Tolstoy; another is a book on statesmanship by Charles de Gaulle; another is a deep dive into the historiography of Japanese art. Several fat volumes of The Story of Civilization, Will and Ariel Durant’s mid-century monument to middlebrow history, display evidence of attentive reading and rereading.
Every morning a friendly factotum would wheel out a gray metal cart stacked with dusty boxes from Nixon’s personal library. On the afternoon Kissinger arrived, I had worked my way down to an obscure book published in 1984, a decade after Nixon left the White House. A significant portion of Bad News: The Foreign Policy of The New York Times, by a foreign correspondent for the New York Daily News named Russ Braley, is a blistering indictment of the Times’ coverage of the Nixon administration. In Braley’s telling, the Times’ treatment swung between the unfair and the uncomprehending, for reasons ranging from negligence to malice.
The book had found its ideal reader in Richard Nixon. The pages of his copy were cluttered with underlining from his thick ballpoint pen. It occurred to me, as I followed along, that Nixon was being brought up short by his reading: Much of the material in Bad News was apparently news to him.
My reading was interrupted by a commotion outside the research room. I stuck my head out in time to see Kissinger and his entourage settling into the room across the hall. A group of donors and Nixonophiles had gathered to hear heroic tales of Nixon’s statecraft.
I dutifully returned to Braley. When I got to a chapter on Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers, I found an unmistakable pattern: Most of Nixon’s markings involved the man holding court across the hall. And Nixon wasn’t happy with him. Kissinger, Braley wrote, had actually invited Ellsberg to Nixon’s transition office in late 1968 to explicate his dovish views on Vietnam, more than two years before the Papers were released. Nixon’s pen came down: exclamation point! Kissinger gave Ellsberg an office in the White House complex anyway, for a month in 1969—a stone’s throw from the Oval Office. Slash mark! Kissinger spent his evenings “ridicul[ing]” Nixon “in private conversations with liberal friends.” This last treachery summoned the full battery of Nixon’s marginalia: a slash running alongside the paragraph, a check mark for emphasis, and a plump, emphatic line under “liberal friends.”
Page 551 from Bad News: The Foreign Policy of The New York Times, by Russ Braley (Photograph by Joel Barhamand for The Atlantic)
Still, Braley went on, when the Pentagon Papers were leaked, their publication alarmed Kissinger, because they posed a “double threat” to national security and to the conduct of foreign policy. “And to K!” Nixon wrote in the margin.
The contrast between Nixon’s bitter hash marks about Kissinger from the 1980s and Kissinger’s present-day celebration of his old boss offered a lesson in the evolving calculation of self-interest. It also conjured the image of a solitary old man in semiretirement, learning things about a now-vanished world he’d once thought he presided over. It happened often in the reading room in Yorba Linda: With unexpected immediacy, the gray metal cart carried the past into the present, in small but tangible fragments of Nixon himself.
The task of a marginalia maven is at right angles to the task of reading a book: It is an attempt to read the reader rather than to read the writer. For several decades now, scholars have been swarming the margins of books in dead people’s libraries. Those margins are among the most promising sites of “textual activity,” to use the scholar’s clinical phrase—a place to explore, analyze, and, it is hoped, find new raw material for the writing of dissertations. Famous readers whose libraries have fallen under such scrutiny include Melville and Montaigne, Machiavelli and Mark Twain.
A book invites various kinds of engagement, depending on the reader. Voltaire (whom Nixon admired, to judge by his extravagant underlining in the Durants’ The Age of Voltaire) scribbled commentary so incessantly that his marginalia have been published in volumes of their own. Voltaire liked to argue with a book. Nixon did not. He had a lively mind but not, when reading, a disputatious one; he restricted his marginalia almost exclusively to underlining sentences or making other subverbal marks on the page—boxes and brackets and circles. You get the idea that he knew what he wanted from a book and went searching for it, and when he found what he wanted, he pinned it to the page with his pen (seldom, from what I’ve seen, a pencil).
In his method, Nixon resembled the English writer Paul Johnson. I once asked Johnson how, given his prolific journalistic career—several columns and reviews a week in British and American publications—he managed to read all the books he cited in his own very long and very readable histories, which embraced such expansive subjects as Christianity, ancient Egypt, and the British empire. His reaction bordered on revulsion at my naivete. “Read them?!” he spat out. “Read them?! I don’t read them! I fillet them!” As it happens, Nixon was an avid reader of Johnson, whose books he often handed out to friends and staff at Christmastime.
John Adams, another busy producer of marginalia, liked to quote a Latin epigram: Studium sine calamo somnium. Adams translated this as: “Study without a pen in your hand is but a dream.” Nixon acquired the pen-in-hand habit early, as his surviving college and high-school textbooks show, and he kept at it throughout his life. For Nixon, as for the rest of us, marking up books was also a way of slowing himself down and attending to what he read. He was not a notably fast reader, by his own account, but his powers of concentration and memorization were considerable. Going at a book physically was a way of absorbing it mentally.
One of the most heavily represented authors in Nixon’s personal library is Churchill, whom Nixon revered not only as a statesman but also as a historian and an essayist. Nixon’s shelves sagged with Churchill’s multivolume histories and biographies: The World Crisis, Marlborough: His Life and Times, The Second World War, A History of the English Speaking Peoples. Churchill’s Great Contemporaries, a series of sketches he wrote in the 1920s and ’30s sizing up roughly two dozen friends and colleagues, was clearly a favorite. When I retrieved Nixon’s copy from a box, I found it dog-eared throughout.
Nixon’s tastes ran heavily toward history, but he could be tempted away from the past to a book of present-day punditry, if the writer and point of view were agreeable. According to a report in Time magazine, when half a million citizens descended on Washington, D.C., in November 1969 to protest the Vietnam War, Nixon holed up in his private quarters with a book called The Decline of Radicalism: Reflections on America Today. The book, slim and elegant, had been sent to Nixon by its author, the historian Daniel Boorstin.
Judging by his notations, Nixon was interested less in Boorstin’s turgid cultural analysis of “consumption communities” and more in his thesis that the ragged protesters gathering outside the White House fence constituted something new in American history: They were not radicals at all but nihilists. Nixon brought out the pen, and in Yorba Linda, a continent and decades away from his White House hideaway, I could still feel the insistent furrow of his underlining on the page. He marked several consecutive paragraphs in a section called “The New Barbarians,” in which Boorstin criticized protesters for their “indolence of mind” and “mindless, obsessive quest for power.”
People read books for lots of reasons: instruction, pleasure, uplift. This was Nixon reading for self-defense.
The book I most wanted to see in Yorba Linda was Nixon’s copy of Robert Blake’s biography Disraeli(1966). A re-creation of Nixon’s favorite room in the White House was one of the Nixon museum’s prime exhibits when it opened, in 1990, a few years before Nixon’s death. (It has since been redesigned.) Nixon himself chose Disraeli to rest on his desk for the public to see. The book was given to him during his first year in the White House, in 1969, by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Harvard professor, prominent Democrat, and future U.S. senator from New York. To the surprise of just about everybody, the year he took office, Nixon made Moynihan his chief domestic-policy counselor, a counterpart in those early days to Kissinger as head of the National Security Council. Despite Nixon’s enduring image as a black-eyed right-winger, his political ideology was always flexible, if not flatly self-contradictory.
Moynihan the liberal hoped to persuade Nixon the hybrid to take Benjamin Disraeli, the great prime minister of Victorian Britain, as his model. Disraeli was a Tory and an imperialist, and at the same time a social reformer of vision and courage. According to Moynihan, Nixon read the book within days of receiving it. Soon enough, the president was calling himself a “Disraeli conservative.” The precise meaning of the tag was clear to Nixon alone, but we can assume it underwent a great deal of improvisation and revision as his presidency wore on.
Disraeli’s appeal to Nixon went beyond his light-footed ideology. Speaking to his Cabinet at a dinner one evening in early 1972, Nixon called Disraeli a “magnificent” politician. Now, he went on, the “fashionable set today would immediately say, ‘Ah, politicians. Bad.’ ” As he saw it, the “fashionable set”—the epithet, suffused with reverse snobbery and class resentment, is pure Nixon—believed that politicians disdain idealism and think nothing of principle. “But,” Nixon said, “the pages of history are full of idealists who never accomplished anything.” It was “pragmatic men” like Disraeli “who had the ability to do things that other people only talked about.” Nixon, who had never shied away from calling himself a politician, wanted to see himself in Disraeli, or at least in Blake’s Disraeli—this “classic biography,” to which, he told his Cabinet, he often turned for inspiration on sleepless nights. And here the book was, Nixon’s own copy, at the top of my growing stack in Yorba Linda.
Disraeli is packed with observations about political tradecraft. They are penetrating, specific, and cold-blooded. The little dicta come from both the biographer and his subject. “He was a master at disguising retreat as advance,” Blake wrote approvingly. Nixon underlined that sentence, and then this one from Disraeli’s contemporary Lord Salisbury: “The commonest error in politics is sticking to the carcasses of dead policies.”
A line, a check mark, a circle—why Nixon deployed one notation and not another for any given passage is a question as unanswerable as “Why didn’t he burn the tapes?” But it was politics that always caught his eye, and activated his pen. Disraeli, Blake wrote, “suffered from a defect, endemic among politicians, the greatest reluctance to admit publicly that he had been in the wrong, even when the fault lay with his subordinates.” Another from Blake: Successful politicians “realize that a large part of political life in a parliamentary democracy consists not so much in doing things yourself as in imparting the right tone to things that others do for you or to things that are going to happen anyway.”
Should we take marked passages like these, with their ironic acceptance of the fudging and misdirection called for in the political arts, as a gesture toward self-criticism on Nixon’s part? Probably not: Nixon knew himself better than psycho-biographers give him credit for, but self-awareness is not self-criticism. In his chosen profession, he took the bad with the good, and his casual, creeping concessions to the seamier requirements of politics are what eventually did him in.
If you go looking for them, you can see reflections of Blake’s Disraeli throughout Nixon’s presidency, encapsulated in enduring phrases here and there. It was in Blake that Nixon came across Disraeli’s famous description of “exhausted volcanoes.” Disraeli coined it to disparage the feckless time-servers in William Ewart Gladstone’s cabinet after they had been in office a few years. Nixon underscored not only “exhausted volcanoes” but the rest of the passage from Blake’s text: The phrase, Blake writes, “was no mere gibe … For the past year, the Government had been vexed by that combination of accidents, scandals and blunders which so often for no apparent reason seem to beset an energetic administration in its later stages.”
Nixon feared the same fate for his second term—a loss of energy and direction. The day after his landslide reelection, in 1972, he called together his Cabinet and senior staff. He told them of Disraeli’s warning about “exhausted volcanoes.” And then, with his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, serving as the lord high executioner, he demanded their resignations en masse.
Not everything inBlake’s Disraeli caught Nixon’s interest; certainly not everything was useful to him. As I paged through, I saw there were many longueurs, stretches of several dozen pages, sometimes more, where no filleting of any kind happened. And then—inevitably, suddenly—Nixon the reader is seized by passages of sometimes thunderous resonance, and the pen is again called into play.
“Disraeli,” Blake writes, “really was regarded as an outsider by the Victorian governing class.” One can almost see Nixon sit bolt upright and pick up his pen. This is the same ostracism that Nixon himself felt keenly throughout his personal and professional life, in fact and in imagination. The following page and a half, discussing the disdain of the “élite” for Disraeli, is bracketed nearly in its entirety. Some sentences are boxed. Some passages, like this one, are underlined as well as bracketed:
Men of genius operating in a parliamentary democracy … inspired a great deal of dislike and no small degree of distrust among the bustling mediocrities who form the majority of mankind.
The antagonism of the elites was not the determining fact of Disraeli’s career, but both biographer and subject perceived its profound effects, and so did the man reading about it 90 years after Disraeli’s death. As president, Nixon felt himself similarly situated: the political leader of an imperial nation, highly skilled, aching for greatness, yet in permanent estrangement from the most powerful figures of the politics and culture that surrounded him, nearly all of whom he judged, as Disraeli had, “bustling mediocrities.”
When reading about the elites, Nixon pressed the ballpoint deep into the page. We marginalia mavens, tracing our fingers across the lines today, can only guess, of course. But it may be that in 1969, sitting in the reading chair in his White House hideaway, he already sensed that this was not bound to end well.
This article appears in the October 2023 print edition with the headline “Nixon Between the Lines.” When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.
BRATISLAVA — French President Emmanuel Macron sought to mend fences with Eastern Europeans at a conference in Slovakia, telling an audience largely from the region that he wants a more collaborative relationship with ex-Soviet states.
“We didn’t listen enough to you, and your calls for your history and painful memories to be acknowledged,” he told an audience at the GLOBSEC security forum in the Slovak capital.
“Some said you missed opportunities to stay silent; I say we sometimes missed opportunities to listen to you. That time is over,” he said, referring to a swipe by former French President Jacques Chirac in 2003 that offended Eastern Europeans.
“I don’t think there is a western and an eastern Europe, an old Europe and a new one; there is only one Europe … with a will to build unity,” he said.
Policy notes that played well with Eastern Europeans included saluting the strength of NATO, acknowledging the experience of many countries formerly under Soviet rule, and supporting a pathway for Ukraine toward NATO membership.
The French president also said that although France had been criticized as being “arrogant,” “faraway” and “not interested” in the region, he has tried to engage more. His comments appeared to hit a chord among the delegates, who applauded him heartily during opening remarks.
The speech represents a shift in tone for the French president, who previously distanced himself from a more hard-line approach against Russia taken by ex-Soviet states. In the past, Macron had warned against aligning with more hawkish countries, thus risking extending the conflict in Ukraine.
And in the east, there is little love lost for the French president. Since the start of the war, Macron came under fire from Eastern European leaders for pursuing dialogue with Russia and clocking hours of calls with Vladimir Putin.
“It was logical to me that with a strong U.S.-German relation nowadays, Russia out of the picture, France should look for improving its relations with” Central and Eastern Europe, said a senior Central European diplomat who complimented the speech.
Previously, Macron’s statements that Russia should not be humiliated or that it should be given security guarantees have contributed to the perception that he has an ambiguous attitude toward Russia’s aggression.
But in Bratislava, the French president hammered home his commitment to supporting Ukraine “in the long-term.”
“We need to help Ukraine lead an efficient counter-offensive. What is at stake is lasting peace. We must be clear: A ceasefire is not enough, we will recreate a frozen conflict that will be another war for tomorrow,” he said.
Support for Ukraine
At GLOBSEC, Macron also called for “strong and tangible” security guarantees for Ukraine ahead of a key NATO summit in Vilnius in July. In recent weeks, Ukrainians have renewed their lobbying push for a concrete path toward membership, working hard to sway wary members of the alliance.
The French president said Ukraine should be given security guarantees — not only because it is “protecting Europe,” but also because it is “so well-equipped.”
“If we want a sustainable peace and want to be credible toward Ukraine, we must include it in an architecture of security,” he told delegates at the forum.
While there is a broad understanding Ukraine will not be able to join the alliance while it is still at war with Russia, NATO members are divided on how they should respond to Ukraine’s current push for membership.
Macron’s comments are likely to be read as a gesture toward many Eastern Europeans that think Ukraine’s allies should send positive signals on its NATO membership bid.
In Bratislava, while Macron said it was unlikely there would be consensus on full membership for Ukraine, he did give a sense of what option he might back for Ukraine.
“We have to build something between Israel-style security guarantees and fully-fledged membership,” he said.
Former diplomat and presidential adviser Henry Kissinger marks his 100th birthday on Saturday, outlasting many of his political contemporaries who guided the United States through one of its most tumultuous periods including the presidency of Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War.
Born in Germany on May 27, 1923, Kissinger remains known for his key role in American foreign policy of the 1960s and 1970s including eventual attempts to pull the U.S. out of Vietnam, but not before he became inextricably linked to many of the conflict’s most disputed actions.
David Kissinger, writing in The Washington Post on Thursday, said his father’s centenary “might have an air of inevitability for anyone familiar with his force of character and love of historical symbolism. Not only has he outlived most of his peers, eminent detractors and students, but he has also remained indefatigably active throughout his 90s.”
The elder Kissinger will celebrate this week with visits to New York, London and his hometown of Fürth, Germany, David Kissinger wrote.
In recent years Kissinger has continued to hold sway over Washington’s power brokers as an elder statesman. He has provided advice to Republican and Democratic presidents, including the White House during the Trump administration, while maintaining an international consulting business through which he delivers speeches in the German accent he has not lost since fleeing the Nazi regime with his family when he was a teenager.
As recently as this month, Kissinger opined that the war in Ukraine is reaching a turning point with China entering negotiations. He told CBS News that he expects negotiations to come to a head “by the end of the year.” He has called for peace through negotiation to end the conflict.
Kissinger also coauthored a book about artificial intelligence in 2021 called “The Age of AI: And Our Human Future.” He has warned that governments should prepare for the potential risks associated with the technology.
During eight years as a national security adviser and secretary of state, Kissinger was involved in major foreign policy events including the first example of “shuttle diplomacy” seeking Middle East peace, secret negotiations with China to defrost relations between the burgeoning superpowers and the instigation of the Paris peace talks seeking an end to the Vietnam conflict and the U.S. military’s presence there.
Kissinger, along with Nixon, also bore the brunt of criticism from American allies when North Vietnamese communist forces took Saigon in 1975 as the remaining U.S. personnel fled what is now known as Ho Chi Minh City.
Kissinger additionally was accused of orchestrating the expansion of the conflict into Laos and Cambodia, enabling the rise of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime that killed an estimated 2 million Cambodians.
Among his endorsements, Kissinger was recognized as a central driver in the period of detente, a diplomatic effort between the U.S. and the Soviet Union beginning in 1967 through 1979 to reduce Cold War tensions with trade and arms negotiations including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaties.
Kissinger remained one of Nixon’s most trusted advisers through his administration from 1969 to 1974, his power only growing through the Watergate affair that brought down the 37th president.
Gerald Ford, who as vice president ascended to the Oval Office following his predecessor’s resignation, awarded Kissinger the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977, saying Kissinger “wielded America’s great power with wisdom and compassion in the service of peace.”
Others have accused Kissinger of more concern with power than harmony during his tenure in Washington, enacting realpolitik policies favoring American interests while assisting or emboldening repressive regimes in Pakistan, Chile and Indonesia.
___
Associated Press writer Patrick Whittle contributed to this report.
Former diplomat and presidential adviser Henry Kissinger marks his 100th birthday on Saturday, outlasting many of his political contemporaries who guided the United States through one of its most tumultuous periods including the presidency of Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War.
Kissinger has been at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy for longer than most Americans have been alive. Born in Germany on May 27, 1923, Kissinger remains known for his key role in American foreign policy of the 1960s and 1970s, including eventual attempts to pull the U.S. out of Vietnam, but not before he became inextricably linked to many of the conflict’s most disputed actions.
In recent years, Kissinger has continued to hold sway over Washington’s power brokers as an elder statesman. He has provided advice to Republican and Democratic presidents, including the White House during the Trump administration while maintaining an international consulting business through which he delivers speeches in the German accent he has not lost since fleeing the Nazi regime with his family when he was a teenager.
Kissinger collaborated with two co-authors on a 2021 book, “The Age of AI and Our Human Future,” well beyond an age at which most people are unwilling or unable to learn about the latest technology.
During eight years as a national security adviser and secretary of state, Kissinger was involved in major foreign policy events including the first example of “shuttle diplomacy” seeking Middle East peace, secret negotiations with China to defrost relations between the burgeoning superpowers and the instigation of the Paris peace talks seeking an end to the Vietnam conflict and the U.S. military’s presence there.
Kissinger, along with Nixon, also bore the brunt of criticism from American allies when North Vietnamese communist forces took Saigon in 1975 as the remaining U.S. personnel fled what is now known as Ho Chi Minh City.
Kissinger additionally was accused of orchestrating the expansion of the conflict into Laos and Cambodia, enabling the rise of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime that killed an estimated 2 million Cambodians.
Among his endorsements, Kissinger was recognized as a central driver in the period of detente, a diplomatic effort between the U.S. and the Soviet Union beginning in 1967 through 1979 to reduce Cold War tensions with trade and arms negotiations including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaties.
Kissinger remained one of Nixon’s most trusted advisers through his administration from 1969 to 1974, his power only growing through the Watergate affair that brought down the 37th president.
Gerald Ford, who as vice president ascended to the Oval Office following his predecessor’s resignation, awarded Kissinger the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977, saying Kissinger “wielded America’s great power with wisdom and compassion in the service of peace.”
Others have accused Kissinger of more concern with power than harmony during his tenure in Washington, enacting realpolitik policies favoring American interests while assisting or emboldening repressive regimes in Pakistan, Chile and Indonesia.
The former Secretary of State, long an adviser to presidents and architect of U.S. foreign policy positions, is reaching a milestone birthday this month. Henry Kissinger talks with “Sunday Morning” senior contributor Ted Koppel about today’s global tensions; the hazards that artificial intelligence poses in crisis situations; and his response to critics about his record on war and peace.
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Bernard Kalb, veteran correspondent and former CBS News journalist, died Sunday, his daughter confirmed to CBS News. He was 100.
A statement from Kalb’s family called him the “ultimate reporter” who had “boundless curiosity and an unquenchable thirst for knowledge.”
Bernard Kalb in CBS Newsroom. Image dated June 15, 1972.
CBS News Archive / Getty Images
“Above all, he was a person of impeccable integrity who embraced peoples and cultures all over the world and loved his family deeply,” the statement continued. “We have lost a journalistic giant. We will miss him enormously.”
Kalb’s younger brother, Marvin Kalb, another former CBS News reporter, told The Washington Post that Kalb died at his home in the Washington suburbs following complications from a fall.
Over the course of his journalistic career, which spanned over six decades, Kalb worked at CBS News from 1962 to 1980, and accompanied former President Richard Nixon to China during his historic trip in 1972. Kalb was also responsible for the opening CBS News’ Hong Kong bureau in 1972, was a Washington anchorman on “CBS Morning News” and was well-regarded for his reporting on Southeast Asian affairs.
Portrait of American journalists and brothers Bernard Kalb (left) and Marvin Kalb as they pose before a wall of electronic equipment, November 5, 1969.
CBS News Archive / Getty Images
Kalb also co-authored two books with his brother — one a biography on Henry Kissinger, and another a novel about the fall of Saigon.
In addition to his prolific news career, Kalb is also known for a short employment stint at the U.S. State Department. In the announcement of his new role at the State Department in 1984, the New York Times called him “a widely traveled foreign correspondent,” who covered the office for eight years — through five secretaries of state — before being named as their spokesman.
“This is the first time that a journalist who covered the State Department has been named as its spokesman,” the Times wrote.
Kalb resigned publicly in 1986, after a misinformation campaign following U.S. airstrikes that had hit Moammar Gadhafi’s compound earlier in the year. The Washington Post exposed the campaign, reporting that the U.S. had leaked false information to reporters, which Kalb knew nothing about, according to The Associated Press.
State dept. spokeman Bernard Kalb RE: Haiti elections in 1986.
Cynthia Johnson / Getty Images
“I am concerned about the impact of any such program on the credibility of the United States,” Kalb said, adding, “Anything that hurts America’s credibility, hurts America.”
He later returned to journalism, becoming the first host of CNN’s “Reliable Sources” in 1992.
He is survived by his wife, Phyllis, and his four daughters, Tanah, Marina, Claudia, and Sarinah, according to The Associated Press.
LIVERPOOL, England — On the long picket line outside the gates of Liverpool’s Peel Port, rain-soaked dock workers warm themselves with cups of tea as they listen to 1980s pop.
Dozens of buses, cars and trucks honk in solidarity as they pass.
Dockers’ strikes are not new to Liverpool, nor is depravation. But this latest walk-out at Britain’s fourth-largest port is part of something much bigger, a great wave of public and private sector strikes taking place across the U.K. Railways, postal services, law courts and garbage collections are among the many public services grinding to a halt.
The immediate cause of the discontent, as elsewhere, is the rising cost of living. Inflation in the United Kingdom breached the 10 percent mark this year, with wages failing to keep pace.
But the U.K.’s economic woes long predate the current crisis. For more than a decade, Britain has been beset by weak economic growth, anaemic productivity, and stagnant private and public sector investment. Since 2016, its political leadership has been in a state of Brexit-induced flux.
Half a century after U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger looked at the U.K.’s 1970s economic malaise and declared that “Britain is a tragedy,” the United Kingdom is heading to be the sick man of Europe once again.
The immediate cause of Liverpool dockers’ discontent that brought them to strike is the rising cost of living. | Christopher Furlong/Getty Images
Here in Liverpool, the “scars run very deep,” said Paul Turking, a dock worker in his late 30s. British voters, he added, have “been misled” by politicians’ promises to “level up” the country by investing heavily in regional economies. Conservatives “will promise you the world and then pull the carpet out from under your feet,” he complained.
“There’s no middle class no more,” said John Delij, a Peel Port veteran of 15 years. He sees the cost-of-living crisis and economic stagnation whittling away the middle rung of the economic ladder.
“How many billionaires do we have?” Delij asked, wondering how Britain could be the sixth-largest economy in the world with a record number of billionaires when food bank use is 35 percent above its pre-pandemic level. “The workers put money back into the economy,” he said.
What would they do if they were in charge? “Invest in affordable housing,” said Turking. “Housing and jobs.”
Falling behind
The British economy has been struck by particular turbulence over recent weeks. The cost of government borrowing soared in the wake of former PM Liz Truss’ disastrous mini-budget on September 23, with the U.K.’s central bank forced to step in and steady the bond markets.
But while the swift installation of Rishi Sunak, the former chancellor, as prime minister seems to have restored a modicum of calm, the economic backdrop remains bleak. Spending and welfare cuts are coming. Taxes are certain to rise. And the underlying problems cut deep.
U.K. productivity growth since the financial crisis has trailed that of comparator nations such as the U.S., France and Germany. As such, people’s median incomes also lag behind neighboring countries over the same period. Only Russia is forecast to have worse economic growth among the G20 nations in 2023.
In 1976, the U.K. — facing stagflation, a global energy crisis, a current account deficit and labor unrest — had to be bailed out by the International Monetary Fund. It feels far-fetched, but today some are warning it could happen again.
The U.K. is spluttering its way through an illness brought about in part through a series of self-inflicted wounds that have undermined the basic pillars of any economy: confidence and stability.
The political and economic malaise is such that it has prompted unwanted comparisons with countries whose misfortunes Britain once watched amusedly from afar.
“The existential risk to the U.K. … is not that we’re suddenly going to go off an economic cliff, or that the country’s going to descend into civil war or whatever,” said Jonathan Portes, professor of economics at King’s College London. “It’s that we will become like Italy.”
Portes, of course, does not mean a country blessed with good weather and fine food — but an economy hobbled by persistently low growth, caught in a dysfunctional political loop that lurches between “corrupt and incompetent right-wing populists” and “well-intentioned technocrats who can’t actually seem to turn the ship around.”
“That’s not the future that we want in the U.K,” he said.
Reviving the U.K.’s flatlining economy will not happen overnight. As Italy’s experience demonstrates, it’s one thing to diagnose an illness — another to cure it.
Experts speak of an unbalanced model heavily reliant upon Britain’s services sector and beset with low productivity, a result of years of underinvestment and a flexible labor market which delivers low unemployment but often insecure and low-paid work.
“We’re not investing in skills; businesses aren’t investing,” said Xiaowei Xu, senior research economist at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. “It’s not that surprising that we’re not getting productivity growth.”
But any attempt to address the country’s ailments will require its economic stewards to understand their underlying causes — and those stretch back at least to the first truly global crisis of the 21st century.
Crash and burn
The 2008 financial crisis hammered economies around the world, and the U.K. was no exception. Its economy shrunk by more than 6 percent between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009. Five years passed before it returned to its pre-recession size.
For Britain, the crisis in fact began in September 2007, a year before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when wobbles in the U.S. subprime mortgage market sparked a run on the British bank Northern Rock.
The U.K. discovered it was particularly vulnerable to such a shock. Over the second half of the 20th century, its manufacturing base had largely eroded as its services sector expanded, with financial and professional services and real estate among the key drivers. As the Bank of England put it: “The interconnectedness of global finance meant that the U.K. financial system had become dangerously exposed to the fall-out from the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market.”
The crisis was a “big shock to the U.K.’s broad economic model,” said John Springford, from the Centre for European Reform. Productivity took an immediate hit as exports of financial services plunged. It never fully recovered.
“Productivity before the crash was basically, ‘Can we create lots and lots of debt and generate lots and lots of income on the back of this? Can we invent collateralized debt obligations and trade them in vast volumes?’” said James Meadway, director of the Progressive Economy Forum and a former adviser to Labour’s left-wing former shadow chancellor, John McDonnell.
A post-crash clampdown on City practises had an obvious impact.
“This is a major part of the British economy, so if it’s suddenly not performing the way it used to — for good reasons — things overall are going to look a bit shaky,” Meadway added.
The shock did not contain itself to the economy. In a pattern that would be repeated, and accentuated, in the coming years, it sent shuddering waves through the country’s political system, too.
The 2010 election was fought on how to best repair Britain’s broken economy. In 2009, the U.K. had the second-highest budget deficit in the G7, trailing only the U.S., according to the U.K. government’s own fiscal watchdog, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).
The Conservative manifesto declared “our economy is overwhelmed by debt,” and promised to close the U.K.’s mounting budget deficit in five years with sharp public sector cuts. The incumbent Labour government responded by pledging to halve the deficit by 2014 with “deeper and tougher” cuts in public spending than the significant reductions overseen by former Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.
The election returned a hung parliament, with the Conservatives entering into a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. The age of austerity was ushered in.
Austerity nation
Defenders of then-Chancellor George Osborne’s austerity program insist it saved Britain from the sort of market-led calamity witnessed this fall, and put the U.K. economy in a condition to weather subsequent global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the fallout from the war in Ukraine.
“That hard work made policies like furlough and the energy price cap possible,” said Rupert Harrison, one of Osborne’s closest Treasury advisers.
Pointing to the brutal market response to Truss’ freewheeling economic plans, Harrison praised the “wisdom” of the coalition in prioritizing tackling the U.K.’s debt-GDP ratio. “You never know when you will be vulnerable to a loss of credibility,” he noted.
But Osborne’s detractors argue austerity — which saw deep cuts to community services such as libraries and adult social care; courts and prisons services; road maintenance; the police and so much more — also stripped away much of the U.K.’s social fabric, causing lasting and profound economic damage. A recent study claimed austerity was responsible for hundreds of thousands of excess deaths.
Under Osborne’s plan, three-quarters of the fiscal consolidation was to be delivered by spending cuts. With the exception of the National Health Service, schools and aid spending, all government budgets were slashed; public sector pay was frozen; taxes (mainly VAT) rose.
But while the government came close to delivering its fiscal tightening target for 2014-15, “the persistent underperformance of productivity and real GDP over that period meant the deficit remained higher than initially expected,” the OBR said. By his own measure, Osborne had failed, and was forced to push back his deficit-elimination target further. Austerity would have to continue into the second half of the 2010s.
Many economists contend that the fiscal belt-tightening sucked demand out of the economy and worsened Britain’s productivity crisis by stifling investment. “That certainly did hit U.K. growth and did some permanent damage,” said King’s College London’s Portes.
“If that investment isn’t there, other people start to find it less attractive to open businesses,” former Labour aide Meadway added. “If your railways aren’t actually very good … it does add up to a problem for businesses.”
A 2015 study found U.K. productivity, as measured by GDP per hour worked, was now lower than in the rest of the G7 by a whopping 18 percentage points.
“Frankly, nobody knows the whole answer,” Osborne said of Britain’s productivity conundrum in May 2015. “But what I do know is that I’d much rather have the productivity challenge than the challenge of mass unemployment.”
‘Jobs miracle’
Rising employment was indeed a signature achievement of the coalition years. Unemployment dropped below 6 percent across the U.K. by the end of the parliament in 2015, with just Germany and Austria achieving a lower rate of joblessness among the then-28 EU states. Real-term wages, however, took nearly a decade to recover to pre-crisis levels.
Economists like Meadway contend that the rise in employment came with a price, courtesy of Britain’s famously flexible labor market. He points to a Sports Direct warehouse in the East Midlands, where a 2015 Guardian investigation revealed the predominantly immigrant workforce was paid illegally low wages, while the working conditions were such that the facility was nicknamed “the gulag.”
The warehouse, it emerged, was built on a former coal mine, and for Meadway the symbolism neatly charts the U.K.’s move away from traditional heavy industry toward more precarious service sector employment. “It’s not a secure job anymore,” he said. “Once you have a very flexible labor market, the pressure on employers to pay more and the capacity for workers to bargain for more is very much reduced.”
Throughout the period, the Bank of England — the U.K.’s central bank — kept interest rates low and pursued a policy of quantitative easing. “That tends to distort what happens in the economy,” argued Meadway. QE, he said, is a “good [way of] getting money into the hands of people who already have quite a lot” and “doesn’t do much for people who depend on wage income.”
Meanwhile — whether necessary or not — the U.K.’s austerity policies undoubtedly worsened a decades-long trend of underinvestment in skills and research and development (Britain lags only Italy in the G7 on R&D spending). At British schools, there was a 9 percent real terms fall in per-pupil spending between 2009 and 2019, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ Xu. “As countries get richer, usually you start spending more on education,” Xu noted.
Two senior ministers in the coalition government — David Gauke, who served in the Treasury throughout Osborne’s tenure, and ex-Lib Dem Business Secretary Vince Cable — have both accepted that the government might have focused more on higher taxation and less on cuts to public spending. But both also insisted the U.K had ultimately been correct to prioritize putting its public finances on a sounder footing.
It was February 2018 before Britain finally achieved Osborne’s goal of eliminating the deficit on its day-to-day budget.
Austerity was coming to an end, at last. But Osborne had already left the Treasury, 18 months earlier — swept away along with Cameron in the wake of a seismic national uprising.
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David Cameron had won the 2015 election outright, despite — or perhaps because of — the stringent spending cuts his coalition government had overseen, more of which had been pledged in his 2015 manifesto. Also promised, of course, was a public vote on Britain’s EU membership.
The reasons for the leave vote that followed were many and complex — but few doubt that years of underinvestment in poorer parts of the U.K. were among them.
Regardless, the 2016 EU referendum triggered a period of political acrimony and turbulence not seen in Westminster for generations. With no pre-agreed model of what Brexit should actually entail, the U.K.’s future relationship with the EU became the subject of heated and protracted debate. After years of wrangling, Britain finally left the bloc at the end of January 2020, severing ties in a more profound way than many had envisaged.
While the twin crises of COVID and Ukraine have muddled the picture, most economists agree Brexit has already had a significant impact on the U.K. economy. The size of Britain’s trade flows relative to GDP has fallen further than other G7 countries, business investment growth trails the likes of Japan, South Korea and Italy, and the OBR has stuck by its March 2020 prediction that Brexit would reduce productivity and U.K. GDP by 4 percent.
Perhaps more significantly, Brexit has ushered in a period of political instability. As prime ministers come and go (the U.K. is now on its fifth since 2016), economic programs get neglected, or overturned. Overseas investors look on with trepidation.
“The evidence that the referendum outcome, and the kind of uncertainty and change in policy that it created, have led to low investment and low growth in the U.K. is fairly compelling,” said professor Stephen Millard, deputy director at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
Beyond the instability, the broader impact of the vote to leave remains contentious.
Portes argued — as many Remain supporters also do — that much harm was done by the decision to leave the EU’s single market. “It’s the facts, not the uncertainty that in my view is responsible for most of the damage,” he said.
Brexit supporters dismiss such claims.
“It’s difficult statistically to find much significant effect of Brexit on anything,” said professor Patrick Minford, founder member of Economists for Brexit. “There’s so much else going on, so much volatility.”
Minford, an economist favored by ex-PM Truss, acknowledged that “Brexit is disruptive in the short run, so it’s perfectly possible that you would get some short-run disruption.” But he added: “It was a long-term policy decision.”
Where next?
Plenty of economists can rattle off possible solutions, although actually delivering them has thus far evaded Britain’s political class. “It’s increasing investment, having more of a focus on the long-term, it’s having economic strategies that you set out and actually commit to over time,” says the IFS’ Xu. “As far as possible, it’s creating more certainty over economic policy.”
But in seeking to bring stability after the brief but chaotic Truss era, new U.K. Chancellor Jeremy Hunt has signaled a fresh period of austerity is on the way to plug the latest hole in the nation’s finances. Leveling Up Secretary Michael Gove told Times Radio that while, ideally, you wouldn’t want to reduce long-term capital investments, he was sure some spending on big projects “will be cut.”
This could be bad news for many of the U.K.’s long-awaited infrastructure schemes such as the HS2 high-speed rail line, which has been in the works for almost 15 years and already faces a familiar mix of local resistance, vested interests, and a sclerotic planning system.
“We have a real problem in the sense that the only way to really durably raise productivity growth for this country is for investments to pick up,” said Springford, from the Centre for European Reform. “And the headwinds to that are quite significant.”
For dock workers at Liverpool’s Peel Port, the prospect of a fresh round of austerity amid a cost-of-living crisis is too much to bear. “Workers all over this country need to stand up for themselves and join a union,” insisted Delij.
For him, it’s all about priorities — and the arguments still echo back to the great crash of 15 years ago. “They bailed the bankers out in 2007,” he said, “and can’t bail hungry people out now.”