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Tag: hard time

  • Commentary: He’s loud. He’s obnoxious. And Kamala Harris can only envy JD Vance

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    JD Vance, it seems, is everywhere.

    Berating Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office. Eulogizing Charlie Kirk. Babysitting the Middle East peace accord. Profanely defending the aquatic obliteration of (possible) drug smugglers.

    He’s loud, he’s obnoxious and, in a very short time, he’s broken unprecedented ground with his smash-face, turn-it-to-11 approach to the vice presidency. Unlike most White House understudies, who effectively disappear like a protected witness, Vance has become the highest-profile, most pugnacious politician in America who is not named Donald J. Trump.

    It’s quite the contrast with his predecessor.

    Kamala Harris made her own kind of history, as the first woman, first Black person and first Asian American to serve as vice president. As such, she entered office bearing great — and vastly unrealistic — expectations about her prominence and the public role she would play in the Biden administration. When Harris acted the way that vice presidents normally do — subservient, self-effacing, careful never to poach the spotlight from the chief executive — it was seen as a failing.

    By the end of her first year in office, “whatever happened to Kamala Harris?” had become a political buzz phrase.

    No one’s asking that about JD Vance.

    Why is that? Because that’s how President Trump wants it.

    “Rule No.1 about the vice presidency is that vice presidents are only as active as their presidents want them to be,” said Jody Baumgartner, an East Carolina University expert on the office. “They themselves are irrelevant.”

    Consider Trump’s first vice president, Mike Pence, who had the presence and pizzazz of day-old mashed potatoes.

    “He was not a very powerful vice president, but that’s because Donald Trump didn’t want him to be,” said Christopher Devine, a University of Dayton professor who’s published four books on the vice presidency. “He wanted him to have very little influence and to be more of a background figure, to kind of reassure quietly the conservatives of the party that Trump was on the right track. With JD Vance, I think he wants him to be a very active, visible figure.”

    In fact, Trump seems to be grooming Vance as a successor in a way that Joe Biden never did with Harris. The 46th president practically had to be bludgeoned into standing aside after the Democratic freakout over his wretched, career-ending debate performance. (Things might be different with Vance if Trump could override the Constitution and fulfill his fantasy of seeking a third term in the White House.)

    There were other circumstances that kept Harris under wraps, particularly in the early part of Biden’s presidency.

    One was the COVID-19 lockdown. “It meant she wasn’t traveling. She wasn’t doing public events,” said Joel K. Goldstein, another author and expert on the vice presidency. “A lot of stuff was being done virtually and so that tended to be constraining.”

    The Democrats’ narrow control of the Senate also required Harris to stick close to Washington so she could cast a number of tie-breaking votes. (Under the Constitution, the vice president provides the deciding vote when the Senate is equally divided. Harris set a record in the third year of her vice presidency for casting the most tie-breakers in history.)

    The personality of their bosses also explains why Harris and Vance approached the vice presidency in different ways.

    Biden had spent nearly half a century in Washington, as a senator and vice president under Barack Obama. He was, foremost, a creature of the legislative process and saw Harris, who’d served nearly two decades in elected office, as a (junior) partner in governing.

    Trump came to politics through celebrity. He is, foremost, a pitchman and promoter. He saw Vance as a way to turn up the volume.

    Ohio’s senator had served barely 18 months in his one and only political position when Trump chose Vance as his running mate. He’d “really made his mark as a media and cultural figure,” Devine noted, with Vance’s memoir, “Hillbilly Elegy,” regarded as a kind of Rosetta Stone for the anger and resentment that fueled the MAGA movement.

    Trump “wanted someone who was going to be aggressive in advancing the MAGA narrative,” Devine said, “being very present in media, including in some newer media spaces, on podcasts, social media. Vance was someone who could hammer home Trump’s message every day.”

    The contrast continued once Harris and Vance took office.

    Biden handed his vice president a portfolio of tough and weighty issues, among them addressing the root causes of illegal migration from Central America. (They were “impossible, s— jobs,” in the blunt assessment that Harris’ husband, Doug Emhoff, offered in her recent campaign memoir.)

    Trump has treated Vance as a sort of heat-seeking rhetorical missile, turning him loose against his critics and acting as though the presidential campaign never ended.

    Vance seems gladly submissive. Harris, who was her own boss for nearly two decades, had a hard time adjusting as Biden’s No. 2.

    “Vance is very effective at playing the role of backup singer who gets to have a solo from time to time,” said Jamal Simmons, who spent a year as Harris’ vice presidential communications chief. “I don’t think Kamala Harris was ever as comfortable in the role as Vance has proven himself to be.”

    Will Vance’s pugilistic approach pay off in 2028? It’s way too soon to say. Turning the conventions of the vice presidency to a shambles, the way Trump did with the presidency, has delighted many in the Republican base. But polls show Vance, like Trump, is deeply unpopular with a great number of voters.

    As for Harris, all she can do is look on from her exile in Brentwood, pondering what might have been.

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    Mark Z. Barabak

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  • Florida’s Experiment With Measles

    Florida’s Experiment With Measles

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    The state of Florida is trying out a new approach to measles control: No one will be forced to not get sick.

    Joseph Ladapo, the state’s top health official, announced this week that the six cases of the disease reported among students at an elementary school in Weston, near Fort Lauderdale, do not merit emergency action to prevent unvaccinated students from attending class. Temporary exclusions of that kind while an outbreak is ongoing are part of the normal public-health response to measles clusters, as a means of both protecting susceptible children and preventing further viral spread. But Ladapo is going his own way. “Due to the high immunity rate in the community, as well as the burden on families and educational cost of healthy children missing school,” he said in a letter released on Tuesday, the state’s health department “is deferring to parents or guardians to make decisions about school attendance.”

    That decision came off as brazen, even for an administration that has made systematic efforts to lower vaccination rates among its constituents over the past two years. Ladapo’s letter acknowledges the benefits of vaccination, as well as the fact that vulnerable children are “normally recommended” to stay home. Still, it doesn’t bother giving local parents the bare-minimum advice that all kids who are able should get their MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) shots, Dorit Reiss, a professor and vaccine-policy expert at UC Law San Francisco, told me. “I wouldn’t have expected him, in the middle of a measles outbreak, to be willing to sacrifice children in this way.”

    The Florida Department of Health has not responded to a request for comment on Ladapo’s future plans, should this situation worsen. For the moment, though, he has chosen to lower the guardrails from their standard height. It’s an escalation of his, and Florida’s, broader push against established norms in public health, especially as they relate to vaccination. So what happens now?

    At least in any immediate sense, Ladapo’s decision may not do much harm. In fact, there’s good reason to believe that its effects will end up being minimal. Parents who have children at the school, Manatee Bay Elementary, have until today to decide whether to pull out those kids for the next three weeks. Many seem to have already done so: About 200 students, and six teachers, have been absent, according to local news reports. In the meantime, Broward County Public Schools’ superintendent said yesterday that just 33 students out of the school’s nearly 1,100 were still unvaccinated. Given those two facts—some degree of self-imposed isolation, and 97 percent of the community now having some level of immune protection—the virus will have a hard time spreading no matter what the rules for attendance might be.

    Disease modeling, too, suggests that the risk of a larger outbreak is low. For a study released in 2019, a team of researchers based at Newcastle University and the University of Pittsburgh simulated thousands of measles outbreaks at schools in Texas, the most populous state to allow nonmedical exemptions from routine vaccine requirements. The researchers looked at the extent to which a policy of sequestering unvaccinated kids would help to reduce the outbreaks’ size. In the median outcome, even without any school-wide interventions, they found that an initial case of measles spreads only to a small handful of people. Adding in the rule that unvaccinated kids must stay at home has no effect on transmission. When the school’s vaccination rates are assumed to be unusually low, the rule reduces the outbreak’s size by one case.

    Not all the modeling outcomes are so rosy. For the very worst-case scenarios, in which a case of measles emerges in a school where unvaccinated kids happen to be clustered, the study found that forced suspensions have dramatic benefits. A major outbreak in the Dallas–Fort Worth area, for example, might end up infecting 477 people in the absence of any interventions, according to the model. When unvaccinated kids are kept from going to school, that number drops by 95 percent.

    Hypothetical models can’t tell us what will happen in a real-life school with real-life kids, like the one in Weston, Florida. But given Manatee Bay Elementary’s reported vaccination rate, it’s fair to assume that Ladapo’s policy won’t be catastrophic. Indeed, it may well end up sparing a few dozen families from the fairly serious inconvenience of being out of school without having much effect at all on the outbreak’s final size.

    But is the sparing of that inconvenience worth the risks that still remain? (And how should one value the time of a parent who could have vaccinated their child but chose not to?) As Reiss points out, if this policy leads to even one more case in the current outbreak, it will have put one more kid at risk of hospitalization, long-term complications, or even death. Worst-case outbreak scenarios do occur from time to time, as we all know well by now; and the Weston outbreak getting much worse is certainly within the realm of possibility. Any public-health authority would have to weigh these odds in the face of a six-case cluster; and surely almost every statewide health authority would choose to err on the side of caution. In Florida, though, the scale appears to tip the other way. Ladapo has rolled the dice on doing less.

    That’s been his way since the very day he was appointed by Governor Ron DeSantis, in September 2021. Just hours after he was introduced, the state ended mandatory quarantines for low-risk students who had been exposed to COVID. The following March, just a few weeks after being confirmed into the job, Ladapo announced that Florida would be “the first state to officially recommend against the COVID-19 vaccines for healthy children.” He continued to scale up from there: That fall, he recommended against the use of mRNA vaccines by any men under the age of 40. A year later, in October 2023, his office warned everyone under the age of 65 about the risks of getting an mRNA-based COVID booster. And then, finally, just last month, Ladapo came out with a warning that mRNA-based COVID vaccines “are not appropriate for use in human beings.”

    The man’s commitment to undermining vaccination is truly unparalleled among leading public-health officials. “As a surgeon general he stands alone,” Reiss told me. Yet Ladapo’s policy activism, however grotesque it might seem, has been bizarrely ineffective in practice. Take his March 2022 move to lead the way on not vaccinating young people against COVID. Media coverage of that announcement dwelled on reasonable concerns that this policy would dampen immunization rates; vaccine experts said it was a dangerous and irresponsible move that would “cause more people to die.” In practice, though, it seems to have done almost nothing. At the time of Ladapo’s announcement, 24.2 percent of Florida’s kids and 66.3 percent of its teenagers had received at least one dose of a COVID vaccine. (The corresponding national numbers at the time were somewhat higher.) By the end of the year, and in spite of Ladapo’s contrarian guidance, Florida’s vaccination numbers for these age groups were up by about four and three points respectively—which is almost exactly the same amount, percentage-wise, as the increases in those numbers seen across the country.

    Or compare Florida’s experience to that of Nevada, a state which had very similar child and teen vaccination rates in March 2022: 23.1 percent and 64.0 percent. Through the end of 2022, while Ladapo was discouraging his constituents from getting shots, that state’s Democratic governor was engaged in a large-scale effort to do just the opposite. And yet the results were essentially the same: Nevada’s rates increased by pretty much the same amount as Florida’s.

    For all of Ladapo’s efforts to dampen his state’s enthusiasm for life-saving interventions, Florida’s age-adjusted rates of death from COVID do not appear to have increased relative to the rest of the country, at least according to reported numbers. In this way, one of the nation’s loudest and most powerful voices of vaccine skepticism seems to be shouting into the wind. His proclamations and decisions to this point have been exquisitely effective at producing outrage, but embarrassingly feeble when it comes to changing outcomes. Even taken on its own terms, as a means of changing public-health behavior, Ladapo’s anti-vaccine activism has been a demonstrable failure.

    Perhaps this week’s decision to relax the rules on fighting measles will mark just one more step along that path: Once again, Florida’s surgeon general will have taken an appalling stance that ends up having no effect. But then again, now could be different. By the time Ladapo got around to undermining COVID shots, more than two-thirds of the state’s population, and 91 percent of its seniors, were already fully vaccinated. The damage he could have done was limited, by definition. But the measles outbreak in Weston is unfolding in real time. More such outbreaks are nearly guaranteed to occur in the U.S. in the months ahead. Reiss worries that Ladapo’s new idea, of choosing not to separate out unvaccinated kids during a school outbreak, could end up spreading into other jurisdictions. “If this becomes a precedent, that becomes a bigger problem,” she told me.

    For the first time since taking office, Ladapo may finally have a real opportunity to make a difference through his vaccination policy. That’s a problem.

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    Daniel Engber

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  • Millennials Have Lost Their Grip on Fashion

    Millennials Have Lost Their Grip on Fashion

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    Ballet flats are back. Everyone’s saying it—Vogue, the TikTok girlies, The New York Times, Instagram’s foremost fashion narcs, the whole gang. Shoes from trendsetting brands such as Alaïa and Miu Miu line store shelves, and hundreds of cheap alternatives are available online at fast-fashion juggernauts such as Shein and Temu. You can run from the return of the ballet flat, but you can’t hide. And, depending on how much time your feet spent in the shoes the last time they were trendy, maybe you can’t run either.

    The ballet flat—a slipperlike, largely unstructured shoe style meant to evoke a ballerina’s pointe shoes—never disappears from the fashion landscape entirely, but its previous period of decided coolness was during the mid-to-late 2000s. Back then, teens were swathing themselves in Juicy Couture and Abercrombie & Fitch, Lauren Conrad was ruining her life by turning down a trip to Paris on The Hills, and fashion magazines were full of Lanvin and Chloé and Tory Burch flats. The style was paired with every kind of outfit you could think of—the chunky white sneaker of its day, if you will.

    How you feel about the shoes’ revival likely has a lot to do with your age. If you’re young enough to be witnessing ballet flats’ popularity for the first time, then maybe they seem like a pleasantly retro and feminine departure from lug soles and sneakers. If, like me, you’ve made it past 30(ish), the whole thing might make you feel a little old. Physically, ballet flats are a nightmare for your back, your knees, your arches; when it comes to support, most offer little more than you’d get from a pair of socks. Spiritually, the injury might be even worse. Twenty years is a normal amount of time to have passed for a trend to be revived as retro, but it’s also a rude interval at which to contemplate being punted out of the zeitgeist in favor of those who see your youth as something to be mined for inspiration—and therefore as something definitively in the past.

    Trends are a funny thing. Especially in fashion, people see trends as the province of the very young, but tracing their paths is often less straightforward. Take normcore’s dad sneakers: In the mid-2010s, the shoes became popular among Millennials, who were then hitting their 30s, precisely because they were the sneakers of choice for retired Boomers. But in order for a trend to reach the rare heights of population-level relevance, very young people do eventually need to sign on. In the case of dad sneakers, it took years for Zoomers to come around en masse, but their seal of approval has helped keep bulky New Balances popular for nearly a decade—far past the point when most trends fizzle.

    The return of ballet flats is a signal of this new cohort of fashion consumers asserting itself even more widely in the marketplace. The trends young people endorse tend to swing between extremes. The durable popularity of dad shoes all but guaranteed that some young people would eventually start to look for something sleeker and less substantial. The ballet flat fits perfectly within the turn-of-the-millennium fashion tropes—overplucked eyebrows, low-rise jeans, tiny sunglasses—that Zoomers have been tinkering with for several years.

    Ballet flats are an all-the-more-appropriate sign of a generational shift, in fact, because they are the folly of youth made manifest. Wearing them is an act of violence against podiatry, yes, but their drawbacks go further. Many ballet flats are so flimsy that they look trashed after only a few wears. They’re difficult to pair with socks, so they stink like feet almost as quickly. Ballet flats are impractical shoes that sneak into closets under the guise of practicality—hey, they’re not high heels!—and prey on people who do not yet know better.

    What does that mean, then, for the people who do know better? For one, it means that the extended adolescence that some Millennials experienced following the Great Recession is finally, inarguably over. We’re old, at least relatively speaking. Every generation eventually ages out of the particular cultural power of youth and then watches as younger people make mistakes that seem obvious in hindsight, and the ballet flat is a reminder that people my age are no longer the default main characters in culture that we once were. When I was a middle schooler begging for a pair of wooden-soled Candie’s platform sandals in the mid-’90s, I remember my mother, in a fit of exasperation, telling me that I couldn’t have them because she saw too many people fall off their platforms in the ’70s. This is the first time I remember contemplating my mom as a human being who existed long before I was conscious of her: someone who bought cool but ill-advised clothes and uncomfortable shoes, who went to parties where people sometimes had a hard time remaining upright.

    Even the cool girls with the coolest shoes at some point grow to regard parts of their past selves as a bit silly, and they become the people trying to save the kids from their own fashion hubris. This sensation is undoubtedly acute for Millennials, because this hubris is displayed most prominently in an arena they used to rule: the internet. On TikTok, the world’s hottest trend machine, the over-30 crowd is more onlooker than participant, and the youth are using the platform to encourage one another to dress like they’re going to a party at the Delt house in 2007. Someone has to warn them.

    If you’re realizing that this someone is you, my advice would be to not let the generational responsibilities of aging weigh too heavily on you. The upside of losing your spot at culture’s center stage, after all, is freedom. You can look around at what’s fashionable, pick the things that work for you, and write off the rest as the folly of youth. (The Zoomers are right: The lug-soled combat boots that I wore in high school actually are very cool.) In place of chasing trends, you can cultivate taste. When you fail at taste, at least you can be aware of your own questionable decisions. In the process of writing this article, I realized that French Sole still makes the exact same prim little flats that I must have bought three or four times over during the course of my first post-college job, in the late 2000s. They’re as flimsy as ever, but whatever made me love them 15 years ago is still there, buried under all of my better judgment. I haven’t closed the tab quite yet.

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    Amanda Mull

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  • Adult ADHD Is the Wild West of Psychiatry

    Adult ADHD Is the Wild West of Psychiatry

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    In October, when the FDA first announced a shortage of Adderall in America, the agency expected it to resolve quickly. But five months in, the effects of the shortage are still making life tough for people with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder who rely on the drug. Stories abound of frustrated people going to dozens of pharmacies in search of medication each month, only to come up short every time. Without treatment, students have had a hard time in school, and adults have struggled to keep up at work and maintain relationships. The Adderall shortage has ended, but the widely used generic versions of the drug, known as amphetamine mixed salts, are still scarce.

    A “perfect storm” of factors—manufacturing delays, labor shortages, tight regulations—is to blame for the shortage, David Goodman, an ADHD expert and a psychiatry professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, told me. And they have all been compounded by the fact that the pandemic produced a surge in Americans who want Adderall. The most dramatic changes occurred among adults, according to a recent CDC report on stimulant prescriptions, with increases in some age groups of more than 10 percent in just a single year, from 2020 to 2021. It’s the nature of the spike in demand for Adderall—among adults—that has some ADHD experts worried about “whether the demand is legitimate,” Goodman said. It’s possible that at least some of these new Adderall patients, he said, are getting prescriptions they do not need.

    The problem is that America has no standard clinical guidelines for how doctors should diagnose and treat adults with ADHD—a gap the CDC has called a “public health concern.” When people come in wanting help for ADHD, providers have “a lot of choices about what to use and when to use it, and those parameters have implications for good care or bad care,” Craig Surman, a psychiatry professor and an ADHD expert at Harvard and the scientific coordinator of adult-ADHD research at Massachusetts General Hospital, told me. The stimulant shortage will end, but even then, adults with ADHD may not get the care they need.

    For more than 200 years, symptoms related to ADHD—such as difficulty focusing, inability to sit still, and fidgeting—have largely been associated with children and teenagers. Doctors widely assumed that kids would grow out of it eventually. Although symptoms become “evident at a very early period of life,” one Scottish physician wrote in 1798, “what is very fortunate [is that] it is generally diminished with age.” For some people, ADHD symptoms really do get better as they enter adulthood, but for most, symptoms continue. The focus on children persists today in part because of parental pressure. Pediatricians have had to build a child-focused ADHD model, Surman said, because parents come in and say, “What are we going to do with our kid?” As a result, treating children ages 4 to 18 for ADHD is relatively straightforward: Clear-cut clinical guidelines from the American Academy of Pediatrics specify the need for rigorous psychiatric testing that rules out other causes and includes reports about the patient from parents and teachers. Treatment usually involves behavior management and, if necessary, medication.

    But there is no equivalent playbook for adults with ADHD in the U.S.—unlike in other developed nations, including the U.K. and Canada. In fact, the disorder was only recently acknowledged within the field of adult psychiatry. One reason it went overlooked for so long is because ADHD can sometimes look different in kids compared with adults: Physical hyperactivity tends to decrease with age as opposed to, say, emotional or organizational problems. “The recognition that ADHD is a life-span disorder that persists into adulthood in most people has really only happened in the last 20 years,” Margaret Sibley, a psychiatry professor at the University of Washington School of Medicine, told me. And the field of adult psychiatry has been slow to catch up. Adult ADHD was directly addressed for the first time in DSM-5—the American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic bible—in 2013, but the criteria described there still haven’t been translated into practical instructions for clinicians.

    Addressing adult ADHD isn’t as simple as adapting children’s standards for grown-ups. A key distinction is that the disorder impairs different aspects of an adult’s life: Whereas a pediatrician would investigate ADHD’s impact at school or at home, a provider evaluating an adult might delve into its effects at work or in romantic relationships. Sources of information differ too: Parents and teachers can shed light on a child’s situation, but “you wouldn’t call the parent of a 40-year-old to get their take on whether the person has ADHD,” Sibley said. Providers usually rely instead on self-reporting—which isn’t always accurate. Complicating matters, the symptoms of ADHD tend to be masked by other cognitive issues that arise in adulthood, such as those caused by depression, drug use, thyroid problems, or hormonal shifts, Sibley said: “It’s a tough disorder to diagnose, because there’s no objective test.” The best option is to perform a lengthy psychiatric evaluation, which usually involves reviewing symptoms, performing a medical exam, taking the patient’s history, and assessing the patient using rating scales or checklists, according to the APA.

    Without clinical guidelines or an organizational body to enforce them, there is no pressure to uphold that standard. Virtual forms of ADHD care that proliferated during the pandemic, for example, were rarely conducive to lengthy evaluations. A major telehealth platform that dispensed ADHD prescriptions, Cerebral, has been investigated for sacrificing medical rigor for speedy treatment and customer satisfaction, potentially letting people without ADHD get Adderall for recreational use. In one survey, 97 percent of Cerebral users said they’d received a prescription of some kind. Initial consultations with providers lasted just half an hour, reported The Wall Street Journal; former employees feared that the company’s rampant stimulant-prescribing was fueling an addiction crisis. “It’s impossible to do a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation in 30 minutes,” Goodman said. (Cerebral previously denied wrongdoing and no longer prescribes Adderall or other stimulants.)

    The bigger problem is that too few providers are equipped to do those evaluations in the first place. Because adult ADHD was only recently recognized, most psychiatrists working today received no formal training in treating the disorder. “There’s a shortage of expertise,” Surman said. “It’s a confusing space where, at this point, consumers often are educating providers.” The dearth of trained professionals means that many adults seeking help for ADHD are seen by providers, including primary-care doctors, social workers, and nurse practitioners, who lack the experience to offer it. “It’s a systemic issue,” Sibley said, “not that they’re being negligent.”

    The lack of trained providers opens up the potential for inadequate or even dangerous care. Adderall is just one of many stimulants used to treat ADHD, and choosing the right one for a patient can be challenging—and not all people with ADHD need or want to take them. But even the most well-intentioned health-care professionals may be unprepared to evaluate patients properly. The federal government considers Adderall a highly addictive Schedule II drug, like oxycodone and fentanyl, and the risks of prescribing it unnecessarily are high: Apart from dependency, it can also cause issues such as heart problems, mood changes, anxiety, and depression. Some people with ADHD might be better off with behavioral therapy or drugs that aren’t stimulants. Unfortunately, it can be all too easy for inexperienced providers to start a patient on these drugs and continue treatment. “If I give stimulants to the average person, they’ll say their mood, their thinking, and their energy are better,” Goodman said. “It’s very important not to make a diagnosis based on the response to stimulant medication.” But the uptick in adults receiving prescriptions for those drugs since at least 2016 is a sign that this might be happening.

    The fact that adult ADHD is surging may soon lead to change. Last year, the American Professional Society of ADHD and Related Disorders began drafting the long-needed guidelines. The organization’s goal is to standardize care and treatment for adult ADHD across the country, said Goodman, who is APSARD’s treasurer. Establishing standards could have “broad, sweeping implications” beyond patient care, he added: Their existence could compel more medical schools to teach about adult ADHD, persuade insurance companies to cover treatment, and pressure lawmakers to include it in workplace policies.

    A way out of this mess, however long overdue, is only going to become even more necessary. Nearly 5 percent of adults are thought to have the disorder, but less than 20 percent of them have been diagnosed or have received treatment (compared with about 77 percent of children). “You have a much larger market of recognized and untreated adults, and that will continue to increase,” Goodman said. Women—who, like girls, are historically underdiagnosed—will likely make up a substantial share. Adults with ADHD may have suffered in silence in the past, but a growing awareness of the disorder, made possible by ongoing destigmatization, will continue to boost the ranks of people who want help. On social media, ADHD influencers abound, as do dedicated podcasts on Spotify.

    Until guidelines are published—and embedded into medical practice—the adult-ADHD landscape will remain chaotic. Some people will continue to get Adderall prescriptions they don’t need, and others may be unable to get an Adderall prescription they do need. Rules alone couldn’t have prevented the shortage, and they won’t stop it now. But in more ways than one, their absence means that many people who need help for ADHD are unable to receive it.

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    Yasmin Tayag

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  • A Major Breed of Flu Has Gone Missing

    A Major Breed of Flu Has Gone Missing

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    In March 2020, Yamagata’s trail went cold.

    The pathogen, one of the four main groups of flu viruses targeted by seasonal vaccines, had spent the first part of the year flitting across the Northern Hemisphere, as it typically did. As the seasons turned, scientists were preparing, as they typically did, for the virus to make its annual trek across the equator and seed new outbreaks in the globe’s southern half.

    That migration never came to pass. As the new coronavirus spread, pandemic-mitigation measures started to squash flu-transmission rates to record lows. The drop-off was so sharp that several flu lineages may have gone extinct, among them Yamagata, which hasn’t been definitively detected in more than three years despite virologists’ best efforts to root it out.

    Yamagata’s disappearance could still be temporary. “Right now, we’re all just kind of holding our breath,” says Adam Lauring, a virologist at the University of Michigan Medical School. The virus might be biding its time in an isolated population, escaping the notice of tests. But the search has stretched on so fruitlessly that some experts are ready to declare it officially done. “It’s been missing for this long,” says Vijaykrishna Dhanasekaran, a virologist at Hong Kong University. “At this point, I would really think it’s gone.”

    If Yamagata remains AWOL indefinitely, its absence would have at least one relatively straightforward consequence: Researchers might no longer need to account for the lineage in annual vaccines. But its vanishing act could have a more head-spinning implication. Flu viruses, which have been plaguing human populations for centuries, are some of the most well-known and well-studied threats to our health. They have prompted the creation of annual shots, potent antivirals, and internationally funded surveillance programs. And yet, scientists still have some basic questions about why they behave as they do—especially about Yamagata and its closest kin.


    Yamagata, in many ways, has long been an underdog among underdogs. The lineage is one of two in a group called influenza B viruses, and it’s slower to evolve and transmit, and is thus sometimes considered less troublesome, than its close cousin Victoria. As a pair, the B’s are also commonly regarded as the wimpier versions of flu.

    To be fair, the competition is stiff. Flu B’s are constantly being compared with influenza A viruses—the group that contains every flu subtype that has caused a pandemic in our recent past, including the extraordinarily deadly outbreak of 1918. Seasonal flu epidemics, too, tend to be heavily dominated by flu A’s, especially H3N2 and H1N1, two notably tough-to-target strains that feature prominently in each year’s vaccine. Even H5N1, the flavor of avian influenza that’s been devastating North America’s wildlife, is a member of the pathogen’s A team.

    B viruses, meanwhile, don’t have a particularly daunting résumé. “To our knowledge, there has never been a B pandemic,” says John Paget, an infectious-disease epidemiologist at the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research. Only once every seven seasons or so does a B virus dominate. And although A and B viruses sometimes tag-team the winter, causing twin outbreaks spaced out by a few weeks, these seasons often open with a major flu A banger and then close out with a more muted B coda.

    The reasons underlying these differences are still pretty murky, though scientists do have some hints. Whereas flu A viruses are known as especially speedy shape-shifters, constantly spawning genetic offshoots that vie to outcompete one another, flu B’s evolve at oddly plodding rates. Their sluggish approach makes it easier for our immune system to recognize the viruses when they reappear, resulting in longer-lasting protection, more effective vaccines, and fewer reinfections than are typical with the A’s. Those molecular differences also seem to drive differences in how and when the viruses spread. The A’s tend to trouble people repeatedly from birth to death, and are great at globe-trotting. But B’s, perhaps because immunity against them is easier to come by, more often concentrate among kids, many of whom have never encountered the viruses before—and who are usually more resilient to respiratory viruses and travel less than adults, keeping outbreaks mostly regional. That might also help explain why B epidemics so frequently lag behind A’s: Slower pathogen evolution facing off with more durable host immunity add up to less rapid B spread, while their A colleagues rush ahead. Our bodies also seem to mount rather fiery defenses against A viruses, steeling them against other infections in the weeks that follow and deepening the disadvantage against any B’s trailing behind. All of that means flu B has a hard time catching humans off guard.

    The virus’s host preferences, too, make flu A viruses more dangerous. Those lineages are great at hopscotching among a whole menagerie of species—most infamously, pigs and wild, water-loving birds—sometimes undergoing rapid bursts of evolution as they go. But flu B’s seem to almost exclusively infect humans, igniting only the rare and fast-resolving outbreak in a limited number of other species—a few seals here, a handful of pigs there. Spillovers from wild creatures into humans are the roots of global outbreaks. And so, with its zoonotic bent, “influenza A will always be the main focus” of concern, says Carolien van de Sandt, a virologist at the Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, in Melbourne. Even among some scientists, Yamagata and Victoria register as little more than literal B-list blips.

    Plenty of other experts, though, think flu B’s relative obscurity is misguided—perhaps even a bit dangerous. Flu B’s account for roughly a quarter of annual flu cases, many of which lead to hospitalization and death; they seem hardier than their A cousins against certain antiviral drugs. And scientists simply know a lot less about flu B’s: how, precisely, they interact with the immune system; what factors influence their sluggish evolutionary rate; the nuances of their person-to-person spread; their oddball animal-host range. And that lack of intel on what has for decades been a formidable infectious foe creates a risk all on its own.


    Flu lineages have dipped into relative obscurity before only to come roaring back. After the end of the H2N2 pandemic of the late 1950s, H1N1 appeared to flame out—only to reemerge nearly two decades later to greet a population full of young people whose immune systems hadn’t glimpsed it before. And as recently as the 1990s, the B lineage Victoria underwent a years-long ebb in most parts of the world, before ricocheting back to prominence in the early 2000s.

    As far as researchers can tell, Victoria is alive and well; during the globe’s most recent winter seasons, the lineage appears to have ignited late-arriving outbreaks in several countries, including in South Africa, Malaysia, and various parts of Europe. But based on the viral sequences that researchers have isolated from people sick with flu, Yamagata is still nowhere to be found, says Saverio Caini, a virologist at the cancer research center ISPRO, in Italy.

    The lineage was already teetering on a precipice before the pandemic began, van de Sandt told me. Yamagata and Victoria, which splintered apart in the early 1980s, are still closely related enough that they often compete for the same hosts. And just prior to 2020, Victoria, the more diverse and fleet-footed of the two B lineages, had been reliably edging out its cousin, pushing Yamagata’s prevalence down, down, down. That trend, coupled with several years of use of a well-matched Yamagata strain in the seasonal flu vaccine, meant that Yamagata “had already decreased in incidence and circulation,” van de Sandt said. With the odds so steeply stacked, the addition of pandemic mitigations may have been the final factor that snuffed the lineage out.

    Recently, a few countries—including China, Pakistan, and Belize—have tentatively reported possible Yamagata infections. But there’s been no conclusive genetic proof, several experts told me. Several parts of the world, including the United States, regularly use flu vaccines containing active flu viruses that can trip the same viral tests that the wild, disease-causing pathogens do. “So the reports could be contaminations,” van de Sandt said. Scientists would need to scour the virus’s genetic sequences to distinguish infection from injection; those data, however, haven’t emerged.

    Should the Yamagata dry spell continue, researchers may want to start considering snipping the lineage out of vaccines altogether, perhaps as early as the middle or end of this year. Doing so would punt the world back to the early 2010s, when flu shots were trivalent—designed to protect people against two A viruses, H3N2 and H1N1, plus either Victoria or Yamagata, depending on which lineage researchers forecasted would surge more. (They were often wrong.) Or maybe the space once used for Yamagata could feasibly be filled with another flavor of H3N2, the fastest mutator of the bunch.

    But purging Yamagata from the vaccine would be a gamble. If Yamagata is not gone for good, van de Sandt worries that booting it from the vaccine would leave the world vulnerable to a massive and deadly outbreak. Even Dhanasekaran, who is among the researchers who are fairly confident that we’ve seen the last of Yamagata, told me he doesn’t want to rule out the possibility that the virus is cloistering in an immunocompromised person with a chronic infection, and it’s unclear if it could reemerge from such a hiding place. The only thing scientists can do for now is be patient, says Jayna Raghwani, a computational biologist at the University of Oxford. “If we don’t see it in successive seasons for another two to three years, that will be more convincing,” she told me.

    If Yamagata’s death knell has actually rung, though, it will have reverberating effects. There’s no telling, for instance, how other flu lineages might be affected by their colleague’s supposed retirement. Perhaps Victoria, which can swap genetic material with Yamagata, will evolve more slowly without its partner. At the same time, Victoria may have an easier time infecting people now that it no longer needs to compete as often for hosts.

    If Yamagata has gone to pasture, “there won’t be a ceremony declaring the world Yamagata free,” Lauring told me. And it’s easy, he points out, to forget things we don’t see. But even if Yamagata seems gone for now, the effects of its demise will be significant enough that it can’t be forgotten—not just yet.

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    Katherine J. Wu

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  • Warning Signs About the First Post-pandemic Winter

    Warning Signs About the First Post-pandemic Winter

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    This fall, unlike the one before it, and the one before that, America looks almost like its old self. Schools and universities are in session; malls, airports, and gyms are bustling with the pre-holiday rush; handwashing is passé, handshakes are back, and strangers are packed together on public transport, nary a mask to be seen. On its surface, the country seems ready to enjoy what some might say is our first post-pandemic winter.

    Americans are certainly acting as if the crisis has abated, and so in that way, at least, you could argue that it has. “If you notice, no one’s wearing masks,” President Joe Biden told 60 Minutes in September, after proclaiming the pandemic “over.” Almost no emergency protections against the virus are left standing; we’re dismantling the few that are. At the same time, COVID is undeniably, as Biden says, “a problem.” Each passing day still brings hundreds of deaths and thousands of hospitalizations; untold numbers of people continue to deal with long COVID, as more join them. In several parts of the country, health-care systems are struggling to stay afloat. Local public-health departments, underfunded and understaffed, are hanging by a thread. And a double surge of COVID and flu may finally be brewing.

    So we can call this winter “post-pandemic” if we want. But given the policy failures and institutional dysfunctions that have accumulated over the past three years, it won’t be anything like a pre-pandemic winter, either. The more we resist that reality, the worse it will become. If we treat this winter as normal, it will be anything but.


    By now, we’ve grown acquainted with the variables that dictate how a season with SARS-CoV-2 will go. In our first COVID winter, the vaccines had only just begun their trickle out into the public, while most Americans hadn’t yet been infected by the virus. In our second COVID winter, the country’s collective immunity was higher, but Omicron sneaked past some of those defenses. On the cusp of our third COVID winter, it may seem that SARS-CoV-2 has few plot twists left to toss us.

    But the way in which we respond to COVID could still sprinkle in some chaos. During those first two winters, at least a few virus-mitigating policies and precautions remained in place—nearly all of which have since come down, lowering the hurdles the virus must clear, at a time when America’s health infrastructure is facing new and serious threats.

    The nation is still fighting to contain a months-long monkeypox outbreak; polio continues to plague unvaccinated sectors of New York. A riot of respiratory viruses, too, may spread as temperatures cool and people flock indoors. Rates of RSV are rising; flu returned early in the season from a nearly three-year sabbatical to clobber Australia, boding poorly for us in the north. Should flu show up here ahead of schedule, Americans, too, could be pummeled as we were around the start of 2018, “one of the worst seasons in the recent past,” says Srinivasan Venkatramanan, an infectious-disease modeler at the University of Virginia and a member of the COVID-19 Scenario Modeling Hub.

    The consequences of this infectious churn are already starting to play out. In Jackson, Mississippi, health workers are watching SARS-CoV-2 and other respiratory viruses tear through children “like nothing we’ve ever seen before,” says Charlotte Hobbs, a pediatric-infectious-disease specialist at the University of Mississippi Medical Center. Flu season has yet to go into full swing, and Hobbs is already experiencing one of the roughest stretches she’s had in her nearly two decades of practicing. Some kids are being slammed with one virus after the other, their sicknesses separated by just a couple of weeks—an especially dangerous prospect for the very youngest among them, few of whom have received COVID shots.

    The toll of doctor visits missed during the pandemic has ballooned as well. Left untreated, many people’s chronic conditions have worsened, and some specialists’ schedules remain booked out for months. Add to this the cases of long COVID that pile on with each passing surge of infections, and there are “more sick people than there used to be, period,” says Emily Landon, an infectious-disease physician at the University of Chicago. That’s with COVID case counts at a relative low, amid a massive undercount. Even if a new, antibody-dodging variant doesn’t come banging on the nation’s door, “the models predict an increase in infections,” Venkatramanan told me. (In parts of Europe, hospitalizations are already making a foreboding climb.)

    And where the demand for care increases, supply does not always follow suit. Health workers continue to evacuate their posts. Some have taken early retirement, worried that COVID could exacerbate their chronic conditions, or vice versa; others have sought employment with better hours and pay, or left the profession entirely to salvage their mental health. A wave of illness this winter will pare down forces further, especially as the CDC backs off its recommendations for health-care workers to mask. At UAB Hospital, in Birmingham, Alabama, “we’ve struggled to have enough people to work,” says Sarah Nafziger, an emergency physician and the medical director for employee health. “And once we get them here, we have a hard time getting them to stay.”

    Clinical-laboratory staff at Deaconess Hospital, in Indiana, who are responsible for testing patient samples, are feeling similar strain, says April Abbott, the institution’s microbiology director. Abbott’s team has spent most of the past month below usual minimum-staffing levels, and has had to cut some duties and services to compensate, even after calling in reinforcements from other, already shorthanded parts of the lab. “We’re already at this threshold of barely making it,” Abbott told me. Symptoms of burnout have surged as well, while health workers continue to clock long hours, sometimes amid verbal abuse, physical attacks, and death threats. Infrastructure is especially fragile in America’s rural regions, which have suffered hospital closures and an especially large exodus of health workers. In Madison County, Montana, where real-estate values have risen, “the average nurse cannot afford a house,” says Margaret Bortko, a nurse practitioner and the region’s health officer and medical director. When help and facilities aren’t available, the outcome is straightforward, says Janice Probst, a rural-health researcher at the University of South Carolina: “You will have more deaths.”

    In health departments, too, the workforce is threadbare. As local leaders tackle multiple infectious diseases at once, “it’s becoming a zero-sum game,” says Maria Sundaram, an epidemiologist at the Marshfield Clinic Research Institute. “With limited resources, do they go to monkeypox? To polio? To COVID-19? To influenza? We have to choose.” Mati Hlatshwayo Davis, the director of health in St. Louis, told me that her department has shrunk to a quarter of the size it was five years ago. “I have staff doing the jobs of three to five people,” she said. “We are in absolute crisis.” Staff have left to take positions as Amazon drivers, who “make so much more per hour.” Looking across her state, Hlatshwayo Davis keeps watching health directors “resign, resign, resign.” Despite all that she has poured into her job, or perhaps because of it, “I can’t guarantee I won’t be one of those losses too.”


    This winter is unlikely to be an encore of the pandemic’s worst days. Thanks to the growing roster of tools we now have to combat the coronavirus—among them, effective vaccines and antivirals—infected people are less often getting seriously sick; even long COVID seems to be at least a bit scarcer among people who are up-to-date on their shots. But considering how well our shots and treatments work, the plateau of suffering at which we’ve arrived is bizarrely, unacceptably high. More than a year has passed since the daily COVID death toll was around 200; nearly twice that number—roughly three times the daily toll during a moderate flu season—now seems to be a norm.

    Part of the problem remains the nation’s failed approach to vaccines, says Avnika Amin, a vaccine epidemiologist at Emory University: The government has repeatedly championed shots as a “be-all and end-all” strategy, while failing to rally sufficient uptake. Boosting is one of the few anti-COVID measures still promoted, yet the U.S. remains among the least-vaccinated high-income countries; interest in every dose that’s followed the primary series has been paltry at best. Even with the allure of the newly reformulated COVID shot, “I’m not really getting a good sense that people are busting down the doors,” says Michael Dulitz, a health worker in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Nor can vaccines hold the line against the virus alone. Even if everyone got every shot they were eligible for, Amin told me, “it wouldn’t make COVID go away.”

    The ongoing dry-up of emergency funds has also made the many tools of disease prevention and monitoring more difficult to access. Free at-home tests are no longer being shipped out en masse; asymptomatic testing is becoming less available; and vaccines and treatments are shifting to the private sector, putting them out of reach for many who live in poor regions or who are uninsured and can least afford to fall ill.

    It doesn’t help, either, that the country’s level of preparedness lays out as a patchwork. People who vaccinate and mask tend to cluster, Amin told me, which means that not all American experiences of winter will be the same. Less prominent, less privileged parts of the country will quietly bear the brunt of outbreaks. “The biggest worry is the burden becoming unnoticed,” Venkatramanan told me. Without data, policies can’t change; the nation can’t react. “It’s like flying without altitude or speed sensors. You’re looking out the window and trying to guess.”


    There’s an alternative winter the country might envision—one unencumbered by the policy backslides the U.S. has made in recent months, and one in which Americans acknowledge that COVID remains not just “a problem” but a crisis worth responding to.

    In that version of reality, far more people would be up-to-date on their vaccines. The most vulnerable in society would be the most protected. Ventilation systems would hum in buildings across the country. Workers would have access to ample sick leave. Health-care systems would have excesses of protective gear, and local health departments wouldn’t want for funds. Masks would come out in times of high transmission, especially in schools, pharmacies, government buildings, and essential businesses; free tests, boosters, and treatments would be available to all. No one would be asked to return to work while sick—not just with COVID but with any transmissible disease. SARS-CoV-2 infections would not disappear, but they would remain at more manageable levels; cases of flu and other cold-weather sicknesses that travel through the air would follow suit. Surveillance systems would whir in every state and territory, ready to detect the next threat. Leaders might even set policies that choreograph, rather than simply capitulate to, how Americans behave.

    We won’t be getting that winter this year, or likely any year soon. Many policies have already reverted to their 2019 status quo; by other metrics, the nation’s well-being even seems to have regressed. Life expectancy in the U.S. has fallen, especially among Native Americans and Alaskan Natives. Institutions of health are beleaguered; community-outreach efforts have been pruned.

    The pandemic has also prompted a deterioration of trust in several mainstays of public health. In many parts of the country, there’s worry that the vaccine hesitancy around COVID has “spread its tentacles into other diseases,” Hobbs told me, keeping parents from bringing their kids in for flu shots and other routine vaccines. Mississippi, once known for its stellar rate of immunizing children, now consistently ranks among those with the fewest young people vaccinated against COVID. “The one thing we do well is vaccinate children,” Hobbs said. That the coronavirus has reversed the trend “has astounded me.” In Montana, sweeping political changes, including legislation that bans employers from requiring vaccines of any kind, have made health-care settings less safe. Fewer than half of Madison County’s residents have received even their primary series of COVID shots, and “now a nurse can turn down the Hepatitis B series,” Bortko told me. Health workers, too, feel more imperiled than before. Since the start of the pandemic, Bortko’s own patients of 30 years, “who trusted me with their lives,” have pivoted to “yelling at us about vaccination concerns and mask mandates and quarantining and their freedoms,” she told me. “We have become public enemy No. 1.”

    At the same time, many people with chronic and debilitating conditions are more vulnerable than they were before the pandemic began. The policies that protected them during the pandemic’s height are gone—and yet SARS-CoV-2 is still here, adding to the dangers they face. The losses have been written off, Bortko told me: Cases of long COVID in Madison County have been dismissed as products of “risk factors” that don’t apply to others; deaths, too, have been met with a shrug of “Oh, they were old; they were unhealthy.” If, this winter, COVID sickens or kills more people who are older, more people who are immunocompromised, more people of color, more essential and low-income workers, more people in rural communities, “there will be no press coverage,” Hlatshwayo Davis said. Americans already expect that members of these groups will die.

    It’s not too late to change course. The winter’s path has not been set: Many Americans are still signing up for fall flu and COVID shots; we may luck out on the viral evolution front, too, and still be dealing largely with members of the Omicron clan for the next few months. But neither immunity nor a slowdown in variant emergence is a guarantee. What we can count on is the malleability of human behavior—what will help set the trajectory of this winter, and others to come. The U.S. botched the pandemic’s beginning, and its middle. That doesn’t mean we have to bungle its end, whenever that truly, finally arrives.

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    Katherine J. Wu

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