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Tag: Free Markets

  • Polymarket returns to U.S. users after a nearly 3-year hiatus

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    Talk is cheap—but Polymarket lets you put your money where your mouth is. Nearly four years after being shut down by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the online betting company that allows you to stake money on future events has become CFTC-compliant and relaunched for U.S. residents at the end of 2025.

    Not everybody is thrilled about Polymarket’s return. Commentators across the political spectrum have warned that betting, on sports or on anything, can cause financial and psychological harm, especially for those with a history of addiction. It’s prudent to abstain from speculating with money you can’t afford to lose, but Americans should still welcome Polymarket’s comeback.

    Shayne Coplan, an early ethereum investor and self-described cypherpunk, founded Polymarket in June 2020, when he was just 22 years old. The platform uses blockchain-backed smart contracts to operate “event markets”—futures-style markets where users bet on whether something will or will not happen. As Coplan has said, Polymarket “harness[es] the power of free markets to demystify the real world events that matter most to you” by using market prices to aggregate and transmit widely distributed knowledge—turning individual hunches into public information about the suspected likelihood of future events.

    Leading up to the 2020 presidential election, Polymarket’s monthly trading volume hit $25.9 million. Nobody can move that much money without catching the attention of the government. The CFTC launched an investigation in October 2021. By January 2022, Polymarket had settled the CFTC’s charges—facilitating event markets without registering with the CFTC—by paying a civil penalty of $1.4 million and barring U.S. residents from the platform.

    During its nearly three-year U.S. hiatus, Polymarket grew into the world’s largest prediction market, facilitating over $3 billion in monthly trades by October 2025. That same month, Intercontinental Exchange announced plans to invest as much as $2 billion in Polymarket after the company acquired a CFTC-registered contract market and clearinghouse in September.

    This article originally appeared in print under the headline “The Return of Polymarket.”

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    Jack Nicastro

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  • The real reason golden ages collapse—and how the U.S. can avoid it

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    While campaigning, President Donald Trump said, “We’re a nation in decline.”

    Now that he’s president, the left agrees.

    “We are witnessing the collapse and implosion of the American empire,” says Cornell West.

    Are the predictors of doom correct? Will America collapse like so many civilizations before us?

    If we don’t learn from history, says historian Johan Norberg, that might happen.

    “It’s a clash within every civilization on whether they should keep going, be open to innovation and progress, or whether they should retreat and decline,” he says in my new video.

    His book, Peak Human: What We Can Learn from History’s Greatest Civilizations, looks at the “golden ages” of Ancient Athens, Ancient Rome, Song China, the Abbasid Dynasty in Baghdad, Renaissance Italy, the Dutch Republic, and the Anglosphere.

    Norberg argues that once people acquire a certain amount of comfort, they say, “‘We want stability, protection, we want someone to take care of us.’…That’s what leads to stagnation.”

    People in power are generally comfortable with that.

    “They’ve built their power on a particular system of production, certain ideas, a particular mentality….Whereas trade, innovation, growth, it’s all about change….What sets these golden ages apart is that, for a period of time, they managed to lift themselves above that and give more people more freedoms. That also allowed them to experiment more and come up with better technologies and raise living standards.”

    Greece once led the world. Rome, too. Not anymore. Why?

    Because people want “safety, stability, protection,” says Norberg. “They slow things down, get that stability, but they also get stagnation and poverty.”

    China experienced a golden age during the Song Dynasty.

    “They had more freedom than other Chinese dynasties….More openness to new ideas from strange places….[Farmers] were allowed to experiment with new grain, new forms of rice from Vietnam, and to trade with others. They came up with constant innovations. It became a very urbanized society that ushered in incredible experiments with iron, steel, textile, machines.”

    The government scrapped laws that had limited what could and couldn’t be sold. They allowed markets to stay open all night (something not allowed before).

    “In traditional Chinese society, people had fixed areas where they were allowed to live and where they had to return after having done a day’s work. People did not mingle and meet people from other classes, other professions….Under the Song Dynasty, the walls were torn down….They began to mingle with one another….They could do more business, listen to concerts, go to religious ceremonies. Eventually, Chinese society realized that this is how you make progress. This is how we become wealthier. When more people meet, when more people exchange goods and services and ideas, they prosper.”

    But after the Mongols invaded, the Chinese banned ocean voyages and foreign trade. They stifled the experimentation that had made them rich.

    “They wanted stability after all this uncertainty and chaos. ‘How do we do that?’…By regulating everything, telling people to stay in their places….They got stability. They also got 500 years of stagnation, 500 years that turned the richest and greatest civilization on the planet to a desperately poor country.”

    If any country is in a golden age today, I would think it’s America, and Norberg agrees.

    “I wouldn’t want to live anywhere else in human history. We have made such remarkable progress when it comes to expanding freedoms, reducing poverty, increasing life expectancy.”

    But the American experiment is now 250 years old. Few golden ages last that long. Once affluent, people want stability, and a government that resists change.

    “That then undermines the innovation that we need to keep golden ages going,” warns Norberg. “If we want a golden age to keep going, we have to fight for it.”

    How?

    “Double down on the institutions of liberal democracy, free markets, and unleash new waves of innovation and of progress. There is still time. We can still save this golden age.”

    COPYRIGHT 2025 BY JFS PRODUCTIONS INC.

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    John Stossel

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  • The TRUMP AMERICA AI Act is every bit as bad as you would expect. Maybe worse.

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    Sometimes you can tell a bill will be really bad just from its title. So it goes with The Republic Unifying Meritocratic Performance Advancing Machine Intelligence by Eliminating Regulatory Interstate Chaos Across American Industry Act, from Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R–Tenn.). And, boy, does it deliver on that disaster of a name, managing to combine nearly every bad tech policy idea of the past half-decade—including gutting Section 230 and creating new requirements around the suppression of sexuality online—into one massive piece of Trump-branded legislation.

    The bill’s title alone is asinine, even if we put the North Korea-ness meets word-salad nature of it aside. Following the normal rules of making acronyms, it would be the TRUMP AMIERICA (or perhaps AMIBERICA) AI act, though Blackburn is throwing rules to the wind and referring to it as the TRUMP AMERICA AI act.

    If only the problems stopped there!

    Alas, Blackburn is serving up a cornucopia of proposals that could throttle free speech and free markets online. An anti-tech omnibus, if you will, sold as a simple AI regulatory scheme.

    Techdirt‘s Mike Masnick calls it a “massively destructive internet policy overhaul masquerading as AI legislation.” It “would change nearly every US government policy regarding how the internet works, tackling AI, Section 230, copyright, and a bunch of other nonsense all in one bill.”

    Masnick has a nice rundown of the bill’s myriad flaws, which include instituting a “duty of care” for AI developers to “prevent and mitigate foreseeable harm to users” (per Blackburn’s summary of the bill). This duty would be enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

    “This is one of those things that I’m sure sounds good to folks, but as we’ve explained over and over again this kind of ‘duty of care’ is basically an anti-230 that would do real damage,” writes Masnick.

    It’s basically just an invitation for lawyers to sue any time anything bad happens and someone involved in the bad thing that happened somehow used an AI tool at some point.

    And then you have to go through a big expensive legal process to explain “no, this thing was not because of AI” or whatever. It’s just a massive invitation to sue everyone, meaning that in the end you have just a few giant companies providing AI because they’ll be the only ones who can afford the lawsuits.

    And just in case that didn’t allow for enough ways to attack AI companies, another section of the bill would enable “the U.S. Attorney General, state attorneys general, and private actors to file suit to hold AI system developers liable for harms caused by the AI system for defective design, failure to warn, express warranty, and unreasonably dangerous or defective product claims.”

    Blackburn—who was once a proponent of light-touch regulation when it came to the internet—has also worked elements of the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) into the TRUMP AMERICA AI Act.

    It will require certain social media platforms, video games, stream services, and messaging applications “to implement tools and safeguards to protect users and visitors under the age of 17 to protect children from sex trafficking, suicide, and other abuses,” per Blackburn’s summary. As with KOSA, this requirement is promoted in a way that sounds unobjectionable—admirable, even—but would, in effect, require companies to suppress massive amounts of content, weaken privacy protections, and more.

    “This section generally requires covered platforms to exercise reasonable care in the design and use of features that increase minors’ online activity to prevent and mitigate harm to minors (e.g., mental health disorders and severe harassment),” the summary says.

    Enterprising lawyers can easily argue that all sorts of things contribute to mental health issues in their young clients, enabling lawsuits over generally unobjectionable (or, at the very least, totally legal) speech and neutral platform features. The biggest tech companies may be able to fight these, but all but the behemoths would be forced to preemptively ban a bunch of speech in order to avoid potential lawsuits.

    Section 11 of Blackburn’s bill is promoted as combating “the consistent pattern of bias against conservative figures demonstrated by Big Tech and AI systems.” But, in practice, it could require AI systems to have a pro-conservative slant—at least as long as President Donald Trump or other Republicans are in power.

    The bill would set up “audits of high-risk AI systems to undergo regular bias evaluations to prevent discrimination based on protected characteristics, including political affiliation.”

    Presumably, federal agencies would be tasked with conducting these audits, which could leave it up to political appointees—not exactly a notoriously unbiased bunch—to judge what does and doesn’t count as bias against a particular political group. How long before AI developers have to tailor their systems to spitting out politically favorable results?

    The effect of this section could be somewhat blunted by the fact that it only applies to “high-risk” systems, which Blackburn’s summary describes as “those that could pose significant risks to health, safety, rights, or economic security, including those in education, employment, law enforcement, or critical infrastructure.” But without a more precise definition, it’s hard to say how this would shake out or what it would mean for the sorts of general AI systems used by consumers.

    During the heyday of federal antitrust hearings about Big Tech, the idea of ending “self-preferencing” got a lot of play. Self-preferencing refers to tech companies using their services to promote or favor their other services, and for some reason, lawmakers are convinced that it’s a scourge.

    But self-preferencing comes with a lot of perks for tech users, not just for the companies involved. It means that when you Google a particular place or business, Google will automatically place a map of this location near the top of the search results. It means that Amazon will perhaps show you more products eligible for free shipping with a Prime membership—something Prime members want!—than products where shipping costs extra. And so on.

    The TRUMP AMERICA AI act would stop “systemically important platforms”—defined as including, but perhaps not limited to, “platforms with subscribers or monthly active users in the United States not less than 34% of the population of the United States”—from engaging in “self-preferencing or steering users to products or services offered by the platform operator,” per Blackburn’s summary.

    In effect, it would make Big Tech less user-friendly in the name of protecting us from Big Tech.

    A line tucked near the bottom of Blackburn’s summary says that the bill would prevent “systemically important platforms from disseminating sexual material harmful to minors.”

    It’s cloaked in euphemistic language: “sexual material harmful to minors” sure sounds like something very bad, like it might be referring to child pornography or other forms of illegal imagery.

    But we’ve seen, in myriad state laws targeting material harmful to minors, that this term can be used very broadly, encompassing not just any and all pornographic photos and videos but also written erotica, literature that describes sexual relationships, stories centered on gay and transgender characters, and so on.

    A requirement that big tech platforms ban “sexual material harmful to minors” would almost certainly mean that they must filter out anything that could be considered porn and perhaps much more.

    One of the most worrying bits of the bill concerns Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Blackburn’s bill would “establish a ‘Bad Samaritan’ carve-out that would deny immunity from civil liability to platforms that purposefully facilitate or solicit third-party content that violates federal criminal law.”

    Of course, Section 230 is already inapplicable to violations of federal criminal law. A company can’t break federal law and claim that Section 230 lets them do it.

    So what’s the true aim here? I think Masnick frames the issue pretty well:

    Right now, 230 lets platforms get frivolous lawsuits dismissed quickly at the motion to dismiss stage. This change would force every platform to go through lengthy, expensive litigation to prove they weren’t “facilitating” (an incredibly vague term) or “soliciting” third-party content that violates federal criminal law.

    That’s gutting the main reason Section 230 exists. Instead of quick dismissals, you get discovery, depositions, and trials, all while someone argues that because your algorithm showed someone a post, you were “facilitating” whatever criminal content they claim to find.

    Slippery words like “facilitate” and “solicit” give authorities a lot of leeway to punish tech companies for activities we generally think of as non-criminal, free-market, or speech-facilitating activities.

    The bill would put into policy Trump’s desire to ban states from passing their own AI regulation. Earlier this month, the president issued an executive order seeking to stop states from passing certain sorts of AI regulation so the country could have, instead, a “national framework”—though the order can’t actually create said framework or outright ban states from passing their own laws. Congress can, however. And Blackburn’s bill would preempt state AI laws in several arenas.

    Blackburn’s summary also lists a huge array of other changes the TRUMP AMERICA AI Act would enact. Some of these summaries are relatively vague—for instance, Section 8 is merely described as “establish[ing] requirements for companies providing AI chatbot and companion services to protect kids.”

    One section would require “interoperability for systemically important platforms, which include platforms with subscribers or monthly active users in the United States not less than 34% of the population of the United States.” Interoperability is one of those ideas that may sound nice in theory but presents huge technical challenges and security risks.

    Several sections seem designed to upend copyright laws, by ignoring concepts like fair use, satire, and parody. There’s a bit that would create “a federal right for individuals to sue companies for using their data (personal, copyrighted) for AI training without explicit consent” and another that would “hold individuals or companies liable if they produce an unauthorized digital replica of an individual in a performance.” Yet another section would deem “derivative works generated, synthesized, or produced by an AI system without authorization as infringing works, which would be ineligible for copyright protection.”

    The bill hasn’t even been formally introduced yet, let alone attracted official cosponsors, so it’s hard to say how Blackburn’s colleagues will treat the bill. But it seems clear that the measure’s title has been calculated to attract Trump’s endorsement, which could translate to a lot of Republican lawmakers falling in line, too.

    Blackburn’s announcement of the TRUMP AMERICA AI Act is also steeped in MAGA flattery and rhetoric. The bill would “codify President Trump’s executive order to create one rulebook for artificial intelligence,” it says.

    “I look forward to introducing the TRUMP AMERICA AI Act in the new year to create one federal rulebook for AI to protect children, creators, conservatives, and communities across the country and ensure America triumphs over foreign adversaries in the global race for AI dominance,” said Blackburn.


    Patient “states he has a foreign body in his rectum that is vibrating. He states he was with a girl last night and doesn’t remember much.” Using data from the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission’s emergency room visits database, Defector has compiled a list of things people got stuck in their rectums and genitals in 2025.

    New York passes an immunity bill. The bill “provides immunity from prosecution for certain individuals engaged in prostitution who are victims of or witnesses to a crime and who report such crime or assist in the investigation or prosecution,” per the legislative summary. “This law recognizes that safety must be prioritized over punishment,” said Decriminalize Sex Work Legal Director Melissa Broudo. “It is a vital and common sense public safety measure that strengthens law enforcement’s ability to identify, investigate, and convict perpetrators of violence and trafficking.”

    Did China just ban sexting? “The Chinese government has banned the sharing of ‘obscene’ content in private online messages and increased the penalties for spreading pornographic material,” reports The Washington Post. “While the revision will target the dissemination of pornography and exploitative images,” the new regulation “may also mean that consensual sexting could also be dragged into China’s legal system.”

    Lol: The URLs trumpkennedycenter.org and trumpkennedycenter.com are owned by comedy writer Toby Morton, who predicted the renaming of the D.C. performing arts institution (it will become the “The Donald J. Trump and The John F. Kennedy Memorial Center for the Performing Arts”) and snapped up the web domains in advance.


    Washington, D.C. | 2017 (ENB/Reason)

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    Elizabeth Nolan Brown

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  • Trump’s $1.1 billion tax hike on toys and games

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    Asked in April about the potential consequences of hiking tariffs on nearly all American imports, President Donald Trump delivered a memorably blunt assessment.

    “Maybe the children will have two dolls instead of 30 dolls,” Trump said during a cabinet meeting on April 30. “And maybe the two dolls will cost a couple bucks more than they would normally.”

    A “couple bucks” here and a “couple bucks” there…and eventually, that adds up to a massive tax increase.

    Federal data covering the first eight months of the year show that the government collected more than $1.1 billion in tariffs on toys, dolls, and games.

    During the same seven months in 2024, the federal government collected no revenue on imports covered by those lines in the tariff code, because toys, dolls, and similar products entered the country duty-free thanks to trade agreemens that Trump’s tariffs now supercede, explained Ed Gresser, a former assistant U.S. trade representative and vice president at the Progressive Policy Institute, in an email to Reason. (Gresser wrote a post earlier this month pegging the figure at $888 million through July, but he shared more updated figures with Reason for this post.)

    Those higher taxes paid by American importers are likely to be passed along to consumers doing their holiday shopping—and the actual total is likely quite a bit higher, since the tariff data lags by a few months.

    The direct costs of the tariffs don’t even tell the whole story. As Reason has detailed, the tariffs have created headaches for board game and toy companies across the country, as normally reliable supply chains have become more expensive and sometimes totally unworkable amid the White House’s ever-shifting tariff edicts.

    “The U.S. is our least trustworthy trading partner right now—and I say that as an American,” Price Johnson, COO of Cephalofair Games, told Reason last month. “I can’t trust what the policy is going to be tomorrow, let alone next week.”

    Two weeks ago, the Trump administration seemingly admitted that its tariffs were making some goods more expensive. The White House rolled back tariffs on coffee, bananas, and several other items. That was framed as an attempt to lower grocery prices amid rising inflation and deepening skepticism from the American public about the merits of Trump’s tariff plans.

    As Gresser notes, however, the tariffs that remain in place are in many cases bigger tax increases than the ones on goods like coffee and bananas, which have now been removed.

    “The tariff hike on toys is twice as big as that of the banana and coffee tariffs put together, and that on shoes tariff increase alone offsets the entire 238-product exclusion list,” he wrote earlier this month.

    Indeed, some limited reductions on tariffs might be welcome, but they are hardly enough: The Yale Budget Lab estimates that Trump’s tariffs will cost the average American household around $1,700 this year.

    That might explain why retailers are bracing for a less robust holiday shopping season this year. Santa Claus might be able to smuggle toys past the authorities under the cover of darkness and with the help of magic, but many American parents are facing exactly the situation that the president predicted in April: Fewer and more expensive toys this holiday season.

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    Eric Boehm

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  • How Lina Khan is busy striving to maximize Mamdani’s power

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    Lina Khan has quickly thrown water on any hopes that she might be a benign force on New York City Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani’s transition team. The former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) chair suggested in a recent interview that she’s looking to make sure Mamdani can “unilaterally deploy” ample power as mayor.

    Khan is “exploring ways to maximize…Mamdani’s executive authority through little-used laws already in place,” as Bloomberg put it.

    “Exploring ways to maximize executive authority” is a scary enough phrase no matter who the executive in question is. But it’s got a particularly chilling ring when applied to Mandami, a Democratic Socialist who has said there’s no problem too minor for the government to get involved in, and Khan, who spearheaded some of the Biden administration’s worst efforts to disrupt free markets with heavy-handed government intervention, repeatedly tested the limits of FTC power, and attempted to do through an executive agency things that should have been left to Congress.

    In a recent interview with Pod Save America host Tommy Vietor, Khan made it clear that she envisions Mamdani’s New York City as a place where the mayor can wield ample unchecked power.

    “I’m gonna be especially focused on things like ‘how do we make sure that we have a full accounting of all of the laws and authorities that the mayor can unilaterally deploy?’” Khan said in the interview, which was taped last week but won’t air in full until November 23. She went on to talk about how her time at the FTC taught her there were “unused and underused” powers that she could wield, and she wanted to find out the full extent of authority that would be possible for Mandami as mayor.

    With Khan’s influence, we can expect the future Mamdani mayoral administration to get creative—and, perhaps, unconstitutional—in its application of existing laws and authorities to enact Mamdani’s agenda, which includes things like city-run grocery stores, free child care and bus rides, nearly doubling the minimum wage, and a freeze on raising rents.

    Much of Mamdani’s agenda would require acquiescence from state government authorities, which may make enacting it a stretch.

    Khan apparently isn’t phased. “A lot of what he is going to be looking to deliver is going to be requiring working closely with other institutional actors, be it the governor, be it the legislature, but he should also have a lot of ability to do things unilaterally,” she told Vietor.

    She also seems intent on taking elements of the Biden administration’s failed agenda to the Big Apple. “Khan is planning to look at recently-enacted and proposed legislation and regulations affecting algorithmic price discrimination, surveillance pricing and junk fees,” Bloomberg reports.

    And, of course, no Khan operation would be complete without a little bit of absolutely overreaching antitrust policy.

    At the FTC, Khan went after tech platforms and other companies “under novel theories of harm,” notes Liz Hoffman at Semafor. “In her new role, Khan has identified an early avenue in a 56-year-old NYC prohibition on business practices deemed ‘unconscionable’—a designation expansive enough to delight any regulator.”

    This could include targeting stadiums for selling high-price concessions, Hoffman reports. (No problem too small for government action, indeed.)

    If Khan’s influence takes hold, we can expect from the future Mamdani administration not just big meddling in significant aspects of city life but also the sort of low-grade authoritarianism we saw attempted under Biden, who rallied against the way cable bills were formatted and airline ticket fees were displayed.

    Using the might power of the state to make stadium hot dogs cheaper is a perfect distillation of the sort of petty populism that Khan has come to be known for—and Mamdani may, alas, be angling to adopt as NYC mayor.

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    Elizabeth Nolan Brown

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  • In tariff case, Trump’s attorneys can’t decide if foreign investment is good or bad for America

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    When the Trump administration’s lawyers go before the U.S. Supreme Court on Wednesday to argue a crucial case that will determine the limits of presidential tariff authority, they will be asking the justices to accept contradictory claims about the value of foreign investment in the United States.

    In a brief filed with the court ahead of this week’s oral argument, the government’s attorneys argue that foreigners buying up American “assets” is a serious enough threat to require emergency executive powers over trade.

    “By the end of 2024, foreigners owned approximately $24 trillion more of U.S. assets than Americans owned of foreign assets,” the administration argues. That imbalance has “weakened” the United States and “created an ongoing economic emergency of historic proportions.”

    In the same brief—indeed, just four pages later—those same attorneys warn that undoing Trump’s tariffs would jeopardize “trillions of dollars” in foreign investment that the president has successfully negotiated. They point to $600 billion in investments pledged by the European Union and another $1 trillion promised by the governments of Japan and South Korea. Those investments, the administration argues, will “rectify past imbalances.”

    How can it be that previous foreign investments are a threat to the United States—one so severe as to require an unprecedented expansion of executive power—while investments secured by the administration are the exact opposite?

    “In short, their argument is that the tariffs are necessary to reduce foreign ownership of American assets, but the Supreme Court must keep the tariffs in place to allow more foreign investment,” points out an amicus brief filed by the National Taxpayers Union Foundation in support of the small businesses challenging the legality of President Donald Trump’s tariffs.

    This is probably not the most critical legal issue upon which the tariff case will be resolved. But the glaring contradiction reveals a few important things.

    First, it once again demonstrates the incoherence of Trump’s tariff strategy. Does the administration want more foreign investment or less? It’s not sure! You can add that to the list alongside such questions as “Are the tariffs meant to generate revenue for the government or serve as negotiating tools for better trade deals?” It can’t be both, since tariffs meant as negotiating tools would have to be lowered or eliminated eventually, thus rendering them useless for producing revenue.

    In a similar vein, Trump has argued that higher tariffs on legal imports from Canada, Mexico, and China will be a useful tool for combating the flow of illegal drugs. This makes little sense. Taxing maple syrup and avocados seems about as likely to stop the flow of fentanyl as taxing beer would be effective at reducing the use of cocaine.

    Second, the confusion about foreign investments in the U.S. points to Trump’s ongoing misunderstanding of the trade deficit. A trade deficit is the difference between the total value of all imports and all exports, and America indeed runs a sizable trade deficit—in other words, we import more than we export.

    As economists who understand global trade would tell you, America’s trade deficit is offset by an investment surplus. In other words, “the US is able to sustain a large trade deficit because so many foreigners are eager to invest here,” as the Boston University economist Tarek Alexander Hassan wrote in April. The Trump administration sees that routine, trade-balancing foreign investment as a problem that demands a muscular executive response. It’s not.

    Finally, the fact that the administration’s attorneys take a very different view of foreign investments secured by the president’s negotiations ought to tell us something, too. The administration is not really making an argument against foreign investment here; it is making an argument for top-down, centrally planned foreign investment that meets the chief executive’s political needs.

    When the administration says that striking down these tariffs would jeopardize “trillions of dollars” in foreign deals, what it means is that America’s investment surplus would be determined by market forces rather than the whims of the president. But as the Supreme Court will hopefully soon remind it, the Constitution plainly does not give the president unilateral power to control foreign trade or to decide which foreign investments are good for America.

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    Eric Boehm

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  • Bob Murphy: Welcome to MAGA socialism

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    What do you call it when the state takes partial ownership of a private company? Just asking questions.

    Ten percent of Intel now belongs to the U.S. government. Today’s guest says it’s time to start using the “F word.”

    Economist Bob Murphy is no anti–Donald Trump #resistance fighter quick to shriek “fascism.” In fact, he says he was relieved when Trump won the last election. But the Austrian school economist and host of the Human Action Podcast and The Bob Murphy Show tells us he’s alarmed by the Intel news and the hints from Trump’s chief economist that more companies are next.

    This didn’t start with Trump. Remember the bank bailouts? Ever heard of Fannie Mae? What about the G.M. takeover? This moment has been a longtime coming, and Murphy says one surprising culprit is another institution the president is now trying to exert control over: the Federal Reserve.

    Watch or listen above as we discuss America’s troubling lurch toward China-style “state capitalism,” the bipartisan enthusiasm for consolidating state power over private industry, and why it’s finally time to end the Federal Reserve and how to actually do it.

    00:00 Intro monologue

    00:01:30 Government ownership and capitalism

    00:05:17 Historical context of government intervention

    00:09:24 Sovereign wealth funds: pros and cons

    00:13:20 The role of AI in government policy

    00:17:13 Concerns over nationalization and corporate influence

    00:21:09 The future of corporate partnerships with government

    00:36:13 Trump’s war on the Federal Reserve

    00:39:25 The Federal Reserve’s independence and accountability

    00:46:05 Critique of the Federal Reserve’s effectiveness

    00:55:20 The case against the Federal Reserve

    01:06:14 Navigating the current economic landscape

    Mentioned in the podcast:

    1. Masa Son Pitches $1 Trillion US AI Hub to TSMC, Trump Team,” by Min-Jeong Lee, Mackenzie Hawkins, and Anto Antony
    2. Decoding the Structure of the Federal Reserve System,” by TradingView
    3. U.S. Core Inflation Rate, according to Trading Economics
    4. Economic volatlity pre– and post–Federal Reserve, by the Heritage Foundation
    5. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) on Truth Social: “The CEO of INTEL is highly CONFLICTED and must resign, immediately. There is no other solution to this problem. Thank you for your attention to this problem!
    6. Acyn on X: “Lutnick: Intel agreed to give us 10% of their company—It is not socialism. This is capitalism.”
    7. NEC Director Kevin Hassett on Intel deal: It’s possible government will take stake in more companies,” by CNBC
    8. Trump announces $500 billion ‘Stargate’ AI infrastructure project,” by LiveNOW from FOX
    9. Bob Murphy on X: “maga rn
    10. A Comprehensive Case for Ending the Fed,” by Bob Murphy on The Human Action Podcast
    11. Has the Fed been a failure? by George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence White
    12. ZEROHEDGE DEBATE! Should We End the Fed? Bob Murphy vs David Beckworth (George Gammon moderates),” by Robert Murphy
    13. Kelsey Piper: The AI Race is Accelerating,” by Just Asking Questions podcast

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    Liz Wolfe

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  • Trump promised ‘reciprocal’ tariffs. The numbers tell a different story.

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    For months on the campaign trail and after taking office, President Donald Trump promised that his tariff policies would be based on a simple principle: reciprocity.

    “Whatever they tax us, we will tax them,” Trump told a joint session of Congress in March, outlining plans for higher tariffs on imports from much of the world. When some of those tariff rates were unveiled in early April—before being paused, amended, altered, and in some cases finally imposed—the president reiterated that point. “They’re reciprocal—so whatever they charge us, we charge them,” Trump said.

    The White House has dropped that talking point in recent months. Even so, the executive order that invoked emergency powers to impose those tariffs still promises that they will be “reciprocal.” And in courts where the Trump administration is defending the president’s use of those expansive (and possibly unconstitutional) powers, the administration’s attorneys continue to refer to that set of tariffs as the “reciprocal” tariffs—to distinguish them from tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico that were imposed in February for different reasons.

    So are the tariffs actually reciprocal? Not even close.

    Consider Switzerland. Last year, the average Swiss tariff on U.S. goods was a minuscule 0.2 percent, while the U.S. charged an average tariff of 1.4 percent on goods imported from Switzerland.

    To make trade with Switzerland “reciprocal,” then, Trump would have had to lower American tariffs on Swiss goods. In fact, he’d have to lower them even more, because in January the Swiss government abolished all of its tariffs on industrial goods from America—an arrangement that Swiss officials said would allow more than 99 percent of American items into the country duty-free.

    Trump responded to that by imposing a staggering 39 percent tariff on imports from Switzerland. This is reciprocity?

    The Swiss tariffs are where the Trump administration’s claim of reciprocity is most disconnected from reality, but it is hardly the only example.

    Singapore does not charge any tariffs on imports from the United States. Nevertheless, Trump’s 10 percent baseline tariff applies to anything that Americans want to purchase from individuals or businesses in Singapore. The average tariff charged by the European Union on American goods is a scant 1.7 percent, but imports from there will now face a 15 percent tariff here. Vietnam charges an average tariff of less than 3 percent on American goods, but Vietnamese goods will face a 20 percent tariff when coming into the U.S.—and that’s after Vietnam negotiated with Trump to lower what had been a 46 percent rate announced in April.

    In all, about 80 percent of the Trump administration’s supposedly “reciprocal” tariffs are higher than the tariffs charged by those countries on American goods, according to a new analysis from the Cato Institute.

    “This revelation is more than just a rhetorical gotcha: tariff advocates, including Trump himself, have long justified new US tariffs on the grounds that they were needed to balance foreign tariffs, which are supposedly quite high, on American goods,” write Scott Lincicome and Alfredo Carrillo Obregon, the co-authors of the Cato analysis. “Overall, the data further demonstrate that US tariffs today are about protectionism, with ‘fairness’ and other buzzwords simply a cover for achieving it.”

    There’s nothing fair about charging Americans higher taxes in an attempt to restrict global trade. And there’s nothing reciprocal about it at all.

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    Eric Boehm

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  • Biden and Trump are pushing the same failed trade policies

    Biden and Trump are pushing the same failed trade policies

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    In a letter to House Democrats urging their support for his re-election, President Joe Biden slammed Donald Trump’s recent call for a 10-percent across-the-board tariff on imported products, complaining that it will boost household costs on the average American by $2,500 a year.

    He’s onto something. Tariffs, which are levies imposed on foreign products generally as a means to prop up domestic manufacturers, are just a fancy term for tax hikes. They limit consumer choices as other countries stop shipping goods to our markets. They boost inflation. For instance, Trump’s steel tariffs protected the U.S. steel industry, but raised the price on every item that relies upon steel.

    They lead to trade wars, as other countries retaliate by placing tariffs on U.S. products. By limiting competition, tariffs reduce innovation. Competition is the key to building better mousetraps, but why innovate and cut costs when the government protects your industry from market forces? Unlike with, say, sales taxes, consumers never know why that Toyota suddenly costs an extra thousand bucks.

    The letter understands that Trump’s proposed tariffs will erode Americans’ buying power, but here’s a report from The Wall Street Journal two days later about Biden’s latest policy: “The U.S. will levy a 25 percent tariff on Mexican imports containing steel from China and a 10 percent duty on products made with aluminum from the country.” How can anyone take his letter seriously?

    The media have focused intently on Biden’s fitness for office after a debate performance that focused attention on his age. Reporters love horse race stories. Will he stay or will he go? It’s a legitimate topic, as are stories about Trump’s rallies with his characteristic free associations and rabble-rousing. But there’s been insufficient news coverage of both candidates’ economic policies.

    The problem is their trade policies are roughly the same. Sure, they embrace high tariffs for different reasons. Democrats want to protect domestic unions. Republicans of the populist and national-conservative variety are mostly worried about threats from China. They all sound more radical these days than Bernie Sanders.

    “We must put American workers first, bring jobs back to American soil, and reject radical climate mandates that make China rich and America poor,” said U.S. Sen. Josh Hawley (R–Mo.), known for giving January 6 protesters a fist pump, while introducing a bill to slap tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. At a recent National Conservatism conference, Hawley attacked the free market in a way not much different than leftists.

    As I regularly note, we’re seeing the horseshoe theory of politics, as right and left find themselves in roughly the same place (like ends of a horseshoe) rather than far apart along a line. As a Politico in May explained, Trump’s plans for tariffs in 2018 were met with “widespread derision,” but now are broadly embraced by both parties.

    “The contrasting reactions to similar policy moves just a few years apart is yet another reminder of just how much the U.S. political consensus has shifted against free trade,” according to the article. There are many reasons for our current bout of inflation, but I’ve yet to see intense news coverage of the likely link between tariffs and rising prices.

    It’s time to revisit the basics. The Heritage Foundation, the group now closely associated with Trumpism, argued in 2021 that tariffs helped push aluminum prices up 50 percent. It defanged one of the main progressive/national-conservative arguments in favor of them—that they’re needed to prevent countries from “dumping” low-priced goods in the United States.

    “In fact, the idea of dumping is one of the great unicorns of trade policy: oft-imagined but rarely seen in reality,” Heritage researchers concluded. “Even state-supported Chinese firms cannot sustain such losses, bleeding money with each shipment of aluminum sent across the ocean.” Indeed. But tariff advocates need scare stories to pump up their high-tax policies, as they put rent-seeking corporations and unions above American consumers.

    I always love to quote Ronald Reagan, especially now that conservatives have largely abandoned his legacy: “Free trade serves the cause of economic progress, and it serves the cause of world peace. When governments get too involved in trade, economic costs increase and political disputes multiply.” Of course, Reagan sometimes violated his own principles.

    The year after that 1982 speech, he spearheaded 45-percent tariffs on imported heavy motorcycles—a blatant attempt to protect Harley Davidson from Japanese competition. The Japanese mainly adjusted their model lineups and Harley doubled down on its niche market and has been in perpetual decline. Many observers trace the company’s current struggles to those tariffs.

    I’m for free trade because it promotes freedom, reduces government control, promotes innovation, reduces prices, relieves international tensions, lessens overseas poverty, reduces pressure for immigration, and boosts worldwide living conditions. Sadly, whichever of these candidates wins the 2024 election, we’re stuck with a new round of terrible trade policies.

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    Steven Greenhut

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  • Argentina, Once One of the Richest Countries, Is Now One of the Poorest. Javier Milei Could Help Fix That.

    Argentina, Once One of the Richest Countries, Is Now One of the Poorest. Javier Milei Could Help Fix That.

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    Argentina actually elected a libertarian president.

    Javier Milei campaigned with a chainsaw, promising to cut the size of government.

    Argentina’s leftists had so clogged the country’s economic arteries with regulations that what once was one of the world’s richest countries is now one of the poorest.

    Inflation is more than 200 percent.

    People save their whole lives—and then find their savings worth nearly nothing.

    They got so fed up they did something never done before in modern history: They elected a full-throated libertarian.

    Milei understands that government can’t create wealth.

    He surprised diplomats at the World Economic Forum this month by saying, “The state is the problem!”

    He spoke up for capitalism: “Do not be intimidated by the political caste or by parasites who live off the state…. If you make money, it’s because you offer a better product at a better price, thereby contributing to general well-being. Do not surrender to the advance of the state. The state is not the solution.”

    Go, Milei! I wish current American politicians talked that way.

    In the West, young people turn socialist. In Argentina, they live under socialist policies. They voted for Milei.

    Sixty-nine percent of voters under 25 voted for him. That helped him win by a whopping 3 million votes.

    He won promising to reverse “decades of decadence.” He told the Economic Forum, “If measures are adopted that hinder the free functioning of markets, competition, price systems, trade, and ownership of private property, the only possible fate is poverty.”

    Right.

    Poor countries demonstrate that again and again.

    The media say Milei will never pass his reforms, and leftists may yet stop him.

    But already, “He was able to repeal rent controls, price controls,” says economist Daniel Di Martino in my new video. He points out that Milei already “eliminated all restrictions on exports and imports, all with one sign of a pen.”

    “He can just do that without Congress?” I ask.

    “The president of Argentina has a lot more power than the president of the United States.”

    Milei also loosened rules limiting where airlines can fly.

    “Now [some] air fares are cheaper than bus fares!” says Di Martino.

    He scrapped laws that say, “Buy in Argentina.” I point out that America has “Buy America” rules.

    “It only makes poor people poorer because it increases costs!” Di Martino replies, “Why shouldn’t Argentinians be able to buy Brazilian pencils or Chilean grapes?”

    “To support Argentina,” I push back.

    “Guess what?” Says Di Martino, “Not every country is able to produce everything at the lowest cost. Imagine if you had to produce bananas in America.”

    Argentina’s leftist governments tried to control pretty much everything.

    “The regulations were such that everything not explicitly legal was illegal,” laughs Di Martino. “Now…everything not illegal is legal.”

    One government agency Milei demoted was a “Department for Women, Gender and Diversity.” DiMartino says that reminds him of Venezuela’s Vice Ministry for Supreme Social Happiness. “These agencies exist just so government officials can hire their cronies.”

    Cutting government jobs and subsidies for interest groups is risky for vote-seeking politicians. There are often riots in countries when politicians cut subsidies. Sometimes politicians get voted out. Or jailed.

    “What’s incredible about Milei,” notes Di Martino, “is that he was able to win on the promise of cutting subsidies.”

    That is remarkable. Why would Argentinians vote for cuts?

    “Argentinians are fed up with the status quo,” replies Di Martino.

    Milei is an economist. He named his dogs after Milton Friedman, Murray Rothbard, and Robert Lucas, all libertarian economists.

    I point out that most Americans don’t know who those men were.

    “The fact that he’s naming his dogs after these famous economists,” replies Di Martino, “shows that he’s really a nerd. It’s a good thing to have an economics nerd president of a country.”

    “What can Americans learn from Argentina?”

    “Keep America prosperous. So we never are in the spot of Argentina in the first place. That requires free markets.”

    Yes.

    Actually, free markets plus rule of law. When people have those things, prosperity happens.

    It’s good that once again, a country may try it.

    COPYRIGHT 2024 BY JFS PRODUCTIONS INC.

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    John Stossel

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  • Why frozen pizza is the best pizza

    Why frozen pizza is the best pizza

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    Debates about pizza are a lot like debates about religion, or politics, or monetary policy: There are a lot of strongly held beliefs, but very little is ever truly resolved.

    Yet if one were to make a list of candidates for the best pizza in New York City—which, with apologies to Chicago, Detroit, and New Haven, is a reasonable proxy for the best pizza in America—then Di Fara Pizza would almost certainly make the cut.

    Di Fara is something of a legend among pizza enthusiasts. In 2009, The New York Times called it “one of the most acclaimed and sought-after pizza shops in New York City.” The shop has repeatedly won contests for best pizza in New York and has at times been overrun by bustling crowds and long lines. A slice of Di Fara isn’t just a piece of pizza; it’s a tradition, a public ritual, a foodie culture event.

    Di Fara is located on Avenue J in a heavily Orthodox Jewish neighborhood of Brooklyn called Midwood. Taking the subway from Manhattan takes the better part of an hour, and when you arrive, you encounter a shop that has been open since 1965 and looks the part: Outside, there’s a large, heavily weathered sign advertising “PIZZA” and “ITALIAN HEROS,” though most of the place’s nonpizza items were discontinued long ago. Inside, Di Fara is what one might politely call unassuming—or, less politely, dilapidated.

    After you order a slice, it takes about five minutes to heat it up in one of the shop’s gas-powered metal ovens. The slice also looks unassuming. There is nothing on the plate or in the shop to visibly signal this is trendy food, sought after by connoisseurs. There is no pretense in the presentation of the product, which is served on a paper plate and a tear of tinfoil. Aside from a slightly elevated price of $5, there is little to indicate this slice is all that different from any of the other hundreds or thousands of slices of pizza one could eat in the greater New York area.

    Instead, it is simply, casually, almost indifferently excellent, an edible lesson in pizza perfection. The cheesy top is bubbly and gently browned; the not-too-sweet sauce tastes like summer-fresh tomatoes; the crust is crackly and buttery, with the hint of warm softness one can obtain only from freshly heated bread.

    Di Fara was founded by Domenico DeMarco, an Italian immigrant who passed away in 2022. When he died, New York Times restaurant critic Pete Wells described him as “a living link between the cooking of Southern Italy, where he was born in 1936, and New York City’s corner-slice culture.” DeMarco was famously fussy about ingredients, and the results are apparent in every astounding bite.

    A slice from Di Fara simply tastes better than I ever imagined pizza could. Months later, I can still recall the sublime balance of flavors, the light and crispy texture. I can say with certainty it is the single most delicious, most satisfying piece of pizza I have ever had.

    But Di Fara does not make the best pizza in America. Nor does any other celebrated pizza shop in New York or elsewhere. Not even Chicago.

    The best pizza in America doesn’t come from an oven in Brooklyn or some other cult foodie mecca, where it was fastidiously handmade by some aging artisan. It comes from the freezer case at your local grocery store, where it arrived on a semitruck after being constructed on an assembly line at a nondescript factory in the middle of the country.

    The best pizza in America is made by Red Baron, a catchall mass-market brand owned by the frozen-food megacorporation Schwan’s. Red Baron makes frozen pizza with a variety of toppings and in an array of styles, from Thin & Crispy to Classic Crust to Deep Dish, because big corporations don’t judge if you prefer Chicago-style. Personally, I’m fond of Brick Oven Pepperoni, but the particulars are largely irrelevant. Whereas a Di Fara slice tastes indifferently excellent, Red Baron tastes merely indifferent. The sauce is a little too spicy and a little too sweet, without the lively burst of tomato flavor. The cheese and pepperoni have a salty, fatty, processed edge to them. The crust is a little too crispy and a little too brittle. After you pull a Red Baron pizza out of the oven and take your first, slightly-too-hot bite, you are likely to react with a shrug and the thought: Sure, not bad! Judged strictly on its culinary merits—taste, texture, smell, visual appeal—Red Baron is vaguely competent at best. If you cook it properly, it can be reasonably enjoyable, especially in times of stress or exhaustion, but it is never memorable.

    Red Baron’s merits are not culinary, at least not in the usual sense. Its virtues have more to do with convenience, consistency, and price.

    Red Baron is never great pizza, but it is never bad pizza either. It’s also shockingly inexpensive: A whole pizza costs about the same as a single slice from Di Fara. Unlike a hot slice from Di Fara, which can only be found in a couple of locations in New York, Red Baron can be found in grocery stores practically anywhere in the country—and in household freezers anywhere in the country.

    Red Baron is the best pizza not because it’s the tastiest, but because it’s cheap, abundant, and always there.

    Red Baron—along with its many mass-market, corporate-produced, grocery-store-freezer-case contemporaries, such as DiGiorno—represents a kind of culinary miracle, the product of decades of technological innovation and industrial processes, as well as the complex cultural evolution of pizza itself, which began not as an artisanal delicacy but as a lowly, versatile, inexpensive street food for the poor.

    Red Baron is not only the best pizza in America: It is, in at least one underappreciated way, the most authentic.

    Pizza Freedom

    Pizza as we know it originated as a regional street food in Naples, Italy. From the earliest recorded observations, it was a flexible, forgettable food, an on-the-go bite for lazzaroni, or day laborers.Because it was so adaptable, and because it was associated with a class of workers whose lives were unstructured and unplanned, pizza was also associated with a kind of live-as-thou-wilt lifestyle freedom.

    In the mid-1830s, Alexandre Dumas, the French novelist behind books like The Three Musketeers, traveled to the Italian city, and several years later he published Sketches of Naples, a book about his experiences. Several long passages of the book are devoted to the lazzaroni and to one of their primary foods of choice, pizza.

    “Other men have houses,” wrote Dumas, “other men have villas, other men have palaces, the lazzarone has the world. The lazzarone has no master, the lazzarone is amenable to no laws, the lazzarone is above social exigencies; he sleeps when he is sleepy, he eats when he is hungry, he drinks when he is thirsty.”

    The lazarrone diet, in Dumas’ telling, consisted primarily of two foods: watermelon in the summer, and in the winter a curious and deceptively complex dish called pizza. “At first sight,” he wrote, “the pizza appears to be a simple dish, upon examination it proves to be compound. The pizza is prepared with bacon, with lard, with cheese, with tomatas, with fish.”

    The revolving selection of toppings wasn’t just a nod to differing tastes; it was a marker of the city economy’s health. “The price of the pizza rises and falls according to the abundance or scarcity of the year. When the fish-pizza sells at a half grain, the fishing has been good; when the oil-pizza sells at a grain, the yield of olives has been bad. The rate at which the pizza sells is, also, influenced by the greater or less degree of freshness; it will be easily understood that yesterday’s pizza will not bring the same price as today’s.” Pizza, Dumas declared, was “the gastronomic thermometer of the market.” (Even in its earliest incarnations, pizza had something in common with monetary policy.)

    In the century after Dumas described pizza in Naples, pizza began to spread—first around Italy, and then to the shores of the U.S., following waves of Italian immigration. Lombardi’s, often recognized as the first dedicated U.S. pizzeria, opened on Spring Street in Manhattan in 1905, selling pizzas for five cents; as always, it was a thermometer of the market. Other pizzerias soon followed, mostly in the New York area, and eventually beyond. Pizza was initially treated as an Italian specialty food, but even the earliest iterations were Americanized, adapted to domestic tastes and ingredients.

    As Italian pizza began to take root in America in the early 1900s, another innovation was in the works: frozen food.

    A man named Clarence Birdseye had begun experimenting with methods to rapidly freeze all sorts of food, with a focus on fish and vegetables, using methods designed to lock in fresh flavor. Some forms of frozen food already existed when Birdseye began his experiments, but they were slow frozen, resulting in mushy, flavorless food. They were considered so awful that New York passed a law that banned giving frozen food to prisoners. It also required stores to prominently note the presence of frozen foodstuffs in large lettering above their entryways.

    Birdseye saw a different future for frozen food. As a young man he’d worked a series of jobs that took him to far-flung places—the untamed West of the early 1900s, the remote chill of Labrador, Canada—and on his journeys he always missed the taste of fresh food. Like many men of the era, he believed in the power of science and industry; he ended up with hundreds of patents to his name, many of which had nothing to do with food. Unlike many men of the era, he was obsessed with preparing food. His early letters were filled with recipes he’d developed using novel ingredients.

    This combination of interests and experience combined in 1924, when Birdseye obtained a patent for a novel method of freezing fish, based heavily on a quick freezing method he’d learned from the Inuit while working in Canada. Some early freezing machines had existed as early as the mid-1800s, but Birdseye was the first to both grasp and develop such a product’s commercial potential.

    As Mark Kurlansky writes in his 2012 biography, Birdseye, many of the man’s important innovations came not from one-off technological improvements but from the development and marketing of freezing infrastructure. He not only had to implement methods to store and transport frozen food; he had to convince skeptical grocery store owners and consumers that frozen food was in fact worthwhile. He lent expensive freezers to grocers for free so long as they carried his products. He staged elaborate dinners for investors, revealing only at the end that everything they’d eaten had been frozen. He was as much a marketer as an inventor.

    At the heart of Birdseye’s project was a belief in technological progress and the power of industrialization to improve the world. It was a fundamentally different worldview than the one shared by most elite consumers today, which elevates labor-intensive, relatively rare craft products. Understanding Birdseye’s innovations, Kurlansky writes, means understanding that his worldview was shaped by an inescapable localism. “We need to grasp that people who are accustomed only to artisanal goods long for the industrial. It is only when the usual product is industrial that the artisanal is longed for.”

    The Frozen Pizza Revolution

    So it was with pizza. In the years after World War II, pizza became a staple of American dining both out and at home. By the late 1950s, make-at-home pizza recipes were appearing in Betty Crocker cookbooks, still labeled as Italian specialties.

    But pizza of the era was, by definition, artisanal, local, handmade, and labor-intensive. It tasted best when fresh from the oven, which meant you had to be pretty close to where it was cooked in order to enjoy it properly. The problem for pizza was much the same that Birdseye had identified for fish and vegetables: How could people enjoy fresh food without proximity to where it was produced?

    Thanks in part to Birdseye’s innovations, Americans in the postwar era had started buying freezers and refrigerators for their homes. Local entrepreneurs were the first to spot the opportunity: Like other food, pizza could be chilled and reheated at home. In June 1950, The New York Times described a Boston company selling refrigerated pizzas that could be warmed up in the oven; the cost, by this time, was 49 cents a pie. “The tangy pies have a bread-textured crust and are delightfully seasoned with oregano, thyme and a variety of spices,” the Times reported, while recommending that consumers bake them longer than the packaging instructions recommend. Just two weeks after opening, the New York outpost of the company was already churning out 3,000 pizzas a day. Clearly this was an idea with promise.

    Other producers sprang up around the country, often to great success: As a 2020 CNBC story on the history of frozen pizza notes, ads in Massachusetts touted frozen pizzas for just 33 cents—even then, everything was more expensive in New York—while the frozen and refrigerated pizza business boomed everywhere from Akron, Ohio, to Chicago.

    True industrial production came to pizza in the early 1960s, thanks to a Minnesota couple named Jim and Rose Totino. In 1951, when the couple opened an Italian restaurant in Minneapolis, pizza was still enough of an unknown that Rose reportedly had to bake her bank’s loan officer a pizza in order to get funding approved, according to an obituary in the Minneapolis Star Tribune. But the business expanded, and in 1962 the company started making frozen pizzas en masse in a factory in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, a short drive from Minneapolis.

    By the early 1970s, their brand, Totino’s, was the best-selling frozen pizza in the country. A magazine ad picturing Rose advertised “quality, variety and innovation” while touting such new products as “Pizza Slices” and “Microwave Pizza.” In 1974, the company recorded $50 million in sales, and the couple sold their brand to Pillsbury for $20 million in 1975. The following year, Schwan’s launched Red Baron, which would be marketed by a fleet of World War II–era stunt planes. By 2022 it would be the country’s second-most-popular frozen brand, with more than $250 million in sales in the first four months of the year alone.

    Even Bad Pizza

    There is a saying about pizza: Pizza is like sex—even when it’s bad, it’s still pretty good. Serious foodies and sexual progressives (but I repeat myself) might disagree, with some cause.

    But the old saw is at least directionally true. Even the worst pizza is usually not so awful, and the merely mediocre examples are, if considerably short of exquisite, often quite satisfying.

    Red Baron pizza is far better than bad. At its best, it’s a pleasantly tacky treat that’s superior to its competition—that includes DiGiorno, the best-selling frozen pizza brand. When DiGiorno came to market in 1995, it was the first frozen pizza to offer a rising crust that expanded into soft, chewy pizza dough when cooked. This helped the brand compete against fresh-baked takeout and delivery pizzas, hence the brand’s long-running slogan: It’s not delivery. It’s DiGiorno.

    DiGiorno’s rising crust pizza was a triumph of industrial innovation that launched the brand to the top of the frozen pizza sales charts. It was also a heavy, bready, crust-dominated pizza that could be enjoyable for a few bites but was simply too dense to truly enjoy after more than a slice. The sales figures say millions of frozen pizza fans disagree with me, but I find Red Baron superior for its balance of peppery sauce, molten cheese, and thin-but-not-too-crackly crust.

    Red Baron’s relative lightness makes it ideal when consumed late at night after a drink (or several) when your local delivery spot has closed for the evening. My favorite local pizzeria stops delivering around 10 p.m. on weeknights. Red Baron, in contrast, respects my night-owl tendencies; as long as I’ve got a box in my freezer, I can have a warm and crispy pie ready in about half an hour, regardless of the time.

    Red Baron’s around-the-clock availability is complemented by its almost absurdly low price point. Even in an expensive grocery market like Washington, D.C., a whole pepperoni pizza—which provides a little more than 1,300 calories—typically sells for roughly $7, and supermarket sales occasionally bring the cost down to half that. My favorite local delivery option starts at $22, and that’s before add-on toppings, delivery, and tip. Red Baron might not taste quite as good, but it’s a fraction of the cost.

    Even as food inflation has skyrocketed since 2020, frozen pizzas have stayed affordable, leading to an 11 percent jump in overall frozen pizza sales in 2022, according to Restaurant Business. As in 17th century Naples, pizza remains a thermometer of the economy.

    As for the taste and texture, Red Baron is a standout, at least among its peers—and not only according to me.

    In July, Consumer Reports published superlatives for frozen pizzas that put Red Baron Classic at the very top, with an Editor’s Choice award. “Red Baron is the crowd pleaser,” the magazine declared. “You get the distinct taste of crust, sauce, and cheese in each bite.” That might sound like a low bar: It’s pizza that, uh, tastes more or less like pizza. But in the sprawling universe of frozen pies, it’s more than enough to rise to the top.

    That universe is almost comically vast. In October 2022, a Twitter user named Michael Bradley shared a video of the frozen pizza selection at a Woodman’s grocery store in Wisconsin. The video lasted just a single minute, but as the camera strolled past case after case and aisle after aisle of frozen pizza, it seemed to go on practically forever, offering endless permutations of frozen crust, sauce, and cheese waiting to be reheated at home. The video, simply captioned “a frozen pizza section in Wisconsin,” became enough of a viral sensation that it was featured on the Today show.

    Frozen food has been with us for most of a century, and frozen pizza has been a staple for over 50 years. Yet even now, the sheer, silly abundance of the stuff remains enough to astound. The variety and expansiveness of a frozen pizza section in Wisconsin is literally awesome: It can provoke a kind of awe.

    That abundance is what Red Baron represents. Red Baron is not, objectively, the single best pizza, period. This year, Pizza Today named a New Haven, Connecticut, pizzeria as the nation’s top pizza joint. The best pizza I’ve ever had, based on a large but not completist sample, is a slice from Di Fara—but Di Fara is in New York, and I live in Washington, D.C. (And while Di Fara will ship frozen pizzas packed with dry ice to my door, they have nothing on the price and convenience of Red Baron.)

    Meanwhile, Red Baron is never farther away than a short trip to the grocery store. Most of the time, it’s in my freezer. That’s why, for me and millions of others, it is frequently the best pizza that is reasonably affordable and available right now. It’s not a bucket-list item for adventuresome foodies, but it is a tasty, filling, and cheap snack for today’s lazzaroni: the working-class eater who owns little but has no masters and is amenable to no laws.

    That sort of virtue, the fruit of industrialization and mass production, of consistency and affordability, is often overlooked in today’s culture—in food especially, but in other goods as well. We live in an era of awesome abundance, of inexpensive availability, of good-enough stuff that is the best not because it’s the most exquisite but because it’s cheap and instantly available and sometimes even surprisingly good for the price. As the story of Clarence Birdseye reminds us, it is only because of that taken-for-granted abundance that we can fully appreciate the elevated excellence of the Di Faras of the world.

    Ironically, Di Fara, too, was once considered something of a déclassé product by the pizza elites of the world. Di Fara heats single slices in gas-powered metal ovens that reach lower temperatures than the wood-fired, whole-pizza brick ovens that some pizza purists consider truly authentic. But over time, Di Fara won over the skeptics by demonstrating the delicate, delicious virtues of single-slice setups. The debate about the best pizza will never be resolved, but perhaps someday the industrially produced wonder that is Red Baron will finally make the list.

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    Peter Suderman

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  • Giving away food from government to government isn’t the best way to solve world hunger

    Giving away food from government to government isn’t the best way to solve world hunger

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    Thanksgiving week is a time to be grateful for the nutritional abundance you enjoy, and for many an appropriate time to think about how to help those who have so much less. A study released last month by the Cato Institute suggests that those who support U.S. government-to-foreign-government food delivery aid as the best means to ensure more abundant food access across the globe should think again.

    The study, written by Chris Edwards, Colin Grabow, and Krit Chanwong, close-focuses on three specific food aid programs under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and details their overarching flaws. These problems include that “US food aid can undermine agriculture in recipient countries and exacerbate conflicts in strife‐​torn regions. Even in situations where food aid can reduce hunger, shipping US food abroad is an expensive way to help poor countries, particularly because of cargo preference rules requiring the use of US‐​flagged ships. It is also usually slower to ship US food to needy countries than to procure it locally near aid recipients.”

    One program examined, Food for Peace, arose in 1954 mostly as a means to get rid of excess U.S. food production encouraged by government subsidies to American farmers. It involves direct shipping of food overseas, mostly for emergencies; the U.S. spent $2.28 billion on this in 2022. Another aid program, Food for Progress (2022 cost: $127 million), ships U.S. food abroad, not for direct giveaways to the hungry, but to be sold in foreign markets for cash that is then supposed to be used to help foreign development. A 2002 program known as McGovern-Dole (2022 cost: $193 million), as the Cato study explains, “donates food to schoolchildren and other groups in poor countries, while also helping countries expand their government food programs.”

    The study details some of the problems with these seemingly unobjectionable schemes of hunger philanthropy. These include harming local farmers trying to sell their products by displacing them in the markets where they need to sell to survive. A 2017 study cited by the Cato authors, written by Simon Gao and Barrett E. Kirwan of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, called “Does U.S. Food Aid Crowdout Local Food Production?” found that “U.S. cereal aid reduces cereal production in recipient countries… In terms of food aid quantity, if the average amount of food aid were to double, food aid would increase by 70,832 metric tons (MT) and production in the recipient country would fall by 173,952 MT.”

    Free food in certain foreign countries can just create a valuable thing to be fought over, militarily or in decisions about which elements in a country get cared for. As the Cato authors write:

    In a statistical study covering the years 1971 to 2006 across 125 countries, Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian found that “an increase in US food aid increases the incidence and duration of civil conflicts.” Nunn and Qian explain, “Because food aid is regularly transported across vast geographic territories, it is a particularly attractive target for armed factions.” Furthermore, “Governments that receive aid often target it to specific populations, excluding opposition groups or populations in potentially rebellious regions. This has been noted to increase hostilities and promote conflict.”  

    …The problem with the USDA’s aid programs is that they are rigidly based on shipping US‐​sourced food that can be hijacked by warring parties and used to extend conflicts, which can be a counterproductive way to help troubled countries.

    And far from being a quick way to deal with overseas food emergencies, “the lengthy amount of time needed for delivery reduces its usefulness. US food aid shipments typically take four to six months to reach destinations abroad.”

    The authors point out that aid programs that procure food in markets near where it’s needed are far quicker and cheaper ways to deliver food aid, but are not beloved of domestic agricultural interests.

    Policies designed to help domestic interests while supposedly meant to help hungry foreigners extend to how we deliver food aid overseas. As the study reports:

    the Cargo Preference Act of 1954…requires that at least half the tonnage of government‐​impelled cargo—including food aid—be shipped on US‐​flagged vessels. Food for Peace, Food for Progress, and McGovern‐​Dole must abide by these rules. Competition is limited among US‐​flagged vessels, and they are about three times more expensive to operate than their foreign‐​flagged counterparts.

    According to economist Vincent Smith and Senator Jim Risch (R‑ID), the “overwhelming majority” of US food aid is transported on dry‐​bulk ships. There are only four such ships in the US merchant fleet, three of which are owned by a single company. The GAO has pointed to the “very small pool” of US‐​flagged vessels eligible to transport food aid, which “limits agencies’ selection and flexibility, and leads to inefficient choices of trade.” By mandating the use of expensive US ships, cargo preference rules result in higher taxpayer costs for aid programs….A USAID spokesperson at a 2019 hearing said that US‐​flagged ships are “twice as expensive as normal vessels from other countries.”

    The Cato scholars argue that a movement toward general international market liberalization is likely a more effective way to reduce world hunger than shipping food bought from U.S. farmers slowly across the sea on expensive ships, insisting that indeed freer markets have already demonstrated their effectiveness in that regard: “The average share of populations undernourished in the least‐​free quartile of countries is 20 percent compared to the most‐​free quartile at just 3 percent. To reduce hunger, poor nations should free their economies, and many nations have. Despite a recent reversal due to conflicts and the COVID-19 pandemic, global hunger has plunged over the past half‐​century as more countries have adopted market‐​based economic policies,” something we can all be thankful for.

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    Brian Doherty

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  • All hail the grocery store

    All hail the grocery store

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    If I had one chance to show a medieval peasant the glories of the modern world, I wouldn’t take them to a space launch or a science lab. I would take them to a grocery store. 

    What more could you want to awe the medieval imagination? Ginormous, GMO’d strawberries in January? Check. Fifty different kinds of soup? Check. Whatever the hell this is? You bet. American grocery stores don’t just have a shocking abundance of food; they have a variety almost completely unknown to humanity. 

    Our grocery stores are famously astounding to outsiders—from Mikhail Gorbachev to Venezuelan immigrants like Daniel Di Martino, our grocery stores showcase the bounties available in a free society with free markets.

    And never is this abundance more on display than during Thanksgiving.

    As the holiday approaches, Americans everywhere will be whipping up their favorite stuffing recipe, cranking open a can of cranberry sauce, and possibly burning down their house in an attempt to deep-fry a whole turkey. And adding to the holiday cheer, not only will they be able to pick from a truly massive range of culinary options, they’ll do it much, much less than their parents did.

    According to data from The American Farm Bureau Federation, an agricultural lobbying group, the cost of a Thanksgiving dinner for 10 is down around 21 percent since 1986, when adjusting for inflation. As Marian L. Tupy, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, recently pointed out, with increases in typical blue-collar wages, it now takes the average blue-collar worker 2.01 hours to afford a Thanksgiving dinner, while it took the same workers 3.2 hours in 1986.

    While inflation has increased the estimated cost of a family Thanksgiving over the past few years, it’s still thankfully true that making a ginormous meal for your family and friends is much more affordable for current American workers than in previous generations.

    The only thing keeping us from grocery store maximalism—and even better access to cheaper and higher quality goods—are bureaucrats and politicians, who use protectionism and overwrought regulation to prop up favored industries. While municipal governments have attempted to tax us away from soda and booze, politicians in Congress have given billions in subsidies and bailouts to the faltering dairy industry while trying to spike sales of plant-based milk. And perhaps worst of all, last year’s devastating baby formula shortage shows just how harmful anti-competition regulations can be.

    But despite the ample room for improvement, I can’t help but keep loving grocery stores.

    When I think about what makes me proudest to be an American—something that fills me with true, cheesy, unadulterated patriotic pride—I think about those aisles and aisles of abundance. And this Thanksgiving, I’m particularly grateful for the, ahem, cornucopia they offer. 

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    Emma Camp

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  • Milton Friedman was no conservative

    Milton Friedman was no conservative

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    Milton Friedman: The Last Conservative, by Jennifer Burns, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 592 pages, $35

    As Jennifer Burns writes in her excellent new biography of the libertarian economist Milton Friedman, “Many aspects of our contemporary world that today seem commonplace have their origins in one of Friedman’s seemingly crazy ideas. If you’ve had taxes withheld from a paycheck, planned or postponed a foreign holiday due to the exchange rate, considered the military as a career, wondered if the Federal Reserve really knows what it’s doing, worked at or enrolled your child in a charter school, or gotten into an argument about the pros and cons of universal basic income, you’ve had a brush with Friedman.”

    Burns, a Stanford University–based historian who also wrote a good biography of Ayn Rand, emphasizes the intellectual over the personal—rarely does her book seem interested in understanding Friedman the man as opposed to Friedman the mind. But Milton Friedman: The Last Conservative shines as an exploration of Friedman’s ideas and accomplishments.

    Sharply intelligent, a great arguer, and inclined toward math, this son of Jewish immigrant New Jersey shopkeepers got his master’s degree in economics at the University of Chicago, where his destiny was shaped by his professors and fellow students (including his eventual wife and writing partner, Rose Director) and by the Chicago school of economics’ yen for applying price theory to as many aspects of life as possible. Burns detects a thread of Chicago price theory spun through Friedman’s lifework, which led him to craft “a dizzying array of policies with a consistent theme: setting prices free. This idea underlies everything, from Friedman’s support of school vouchers and his calls to abolish the draft to his insistence that governments stop controlling the price of their currencies.”

    Burns guides the reader handily through Friedman’s New Deal and wartime years. She details some of his innovations in statistical analysis, and she relates one of the first times he raised fellow economists’ hackles by coming to overly libertarian conclusions (a paper that fingered the American Medical Association as a price-raising cartel). She also covers his role in helping the Treasury Department develop income tax withholding as an emergency measure for war financing—a temporary policy that, to Friedman’s regret, became permanent.

    Burns is impressively effective for a noneconomist at explaining how “monetarism,” Friedman’s philosophy of how a central bank should behave, clashed with the Federal Reserve’s real-world practice and with economic orthodoxy over the last half of the 20th century. The core of monetarism was the belief that the supply of money, mediated by how often it changed hands, is the key factor in price levels—or, in slogan form, that “inflation is everywhere and always a monetary phenomenon.”

    This led Friedman to believe it would be better if the Fed did not practice discretionary monetary policy at all, with the money supply simply growing a bit every year based on preset rules. While the Federal Reserve never embraced all of Friedman’s recommendations, Burns skillfully explains how his ideas did importantly shape the inflation-busting efforts of Fed Chair Paul Volcker in the early 1980s.

    The tight connection between money supply and inflation that Friedman and Anna Schwartz detailed in their epochal 1963 A Monetary History of the United States seemed to slip in the post-Reagan decades. This worried Friedman, but he ultimately satisfied himself that the connection between money supply and inflation could be rescued by shifting the particular measure of money supply to watch, and by admitting that the rate at which money changed hands was more variable than he first thought. The inflation of the past two years has helped revive the world’s belief in Friedman’s connection between growth in the money supply and growth in prices.

    Inevitably for a book published in 2023, this biography at times adopts a modern race-and-gender lens. On race, Burns upbraids the economist for opposing the 1964 Civil Rights Act: While Friedman, as Burns notes, opposed Jim Crow laws, he did reject the aspects of the 1964 law that would give the government the power to compel private citizens to associate with those they did not wish to. He preferred, again, the course of setting prices free: Friedman expected that racial prejudice would be largely priced out of the market in a freer economy.

    When it comes to women, Burns sees Friedman relying heavily, and often with insufficient credit, on various female collaborators, stressing Schwartz’s vital role as the original driving force of the research project that led to A Monetary History and the person who gave literary verve to what could have been just a series of historical data charts. When it comes to one of the books that built Friedman’s professional reputation, A Theory of the Consumption Function (1957), Burns provides evidence that two female researchers, Dorothy Brady and Margaret Reid, likely deserved co-author credit.

    Friedman’s relationship with his wife Rose is presented (with a couple of personal tragedies and some intellectual disagreements along the way) as solid and vital to his success as a popular writer—though big aspects of it will remain forever opaque, as Rose burned all her correspondence with her husband.

    Having written a book this smart and detailed about a libertarian thinker, Burns is oddly reluctant to explain to her readers that there was such a thing as a distinctly American libertarian movement from World War II on.

    She notes, for example, that Friedman worked in the 1940s and ’50s with the Foundation for Economic Education and the William Volker Fund. She writes that these groups “were part of a broader backlash against Keynesian economics.” While calling them “important early manifestations of modern American conservatism,” she acknowledges that “neither identified as a conservative organization.”

    Yet she does not adequately explain that these organizations were foundation stones of a distinct, nonconservative, more radically pro-market and freedom-oriented libertarian intellectual and activist movement. Nor does she stress that Friedman moved near or in this movement from the time it first coalesced after World War II, alongside his more respectable Republican affiliations. (Friedman had advisory relationships of various levels of closeness with Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan.)

    As Friedman told me in a 1995 interview, “I have a party membership as a Republican, not because they have any principles, but because that’s the way I am the most useful and have most influence. My philosophy is clearly libertarian.”

    Burns recognizes that after Friedman worked near the libertarian economist F.A. Hayek at the University of Chicago in the 1950s, Hayekian ideas and phrases began showing up in Friedman’s writing, and that “shifts in Friedman’s thinking emerged clearly in 1956, during a series of summer lectures at Wabash College.” These events “were one of several invitation-only summer conferences sponsored by the Volker Fund,” and they eventually “would form the seedbed of Capitalism and Freedom,” one of Friedman’s most influential books. She does not adequately explain, though, that those “shifts” represent a more full-hearted slotting, after some early conflicts and disagreements, into the libertarian movement’s beliefs.

    That shift in a more libertarian direction is an important part of Friedman’s intellectual evolution. From education to monetary policy, the more integrated he became in libertarian communities of affinity that he valued—from the Mont Pelerin Society to the New Individualist Review—the less he believed government should do. (One of his more radical areas of libertarian activism in later years, arguing against the war on drugs, is not mentioned in this book at all.)

    Burns’ discussion of Friedman’s family is thinner than you might expect from a biography of this heft. In one of a mere handful of sentences on his son David, she notes the younger Friedman was an advocate of “anarcho-capitalism” without explaining what that meant in the context of his father’s thinking. But Milton Friedman was part of a movement of intellectuals and organizations in which anarchism was an idea he had to grapple with and be judged against. Friedman, truly no conservative, told me in that 1995 interview that he “would like to be a zero-government libertarian” like his son but was discouraged that he didn’t see enough “historical examples of that kind of a system developing.”

    Appearing as it does in the post-Trump era, it is natural that this book would adopt a subtitle like “The Last Conservative.” Donald Trump’s presidency—based on restricting international trade, refusing to touch entitlement spending, hostility to immigrants (Friedman thought illegal immigration was the best kind), and loose Fed policy to goose the economy for the president’s short-term political benefit—was wildly anti-Friedmanite.

    Stressing that Friedman was in fact a libertarian would have helped a reader understand how and why he seems a relic to the conservative movement. The current American right has no use for what Burns characterized as an early 21st century “world closer to [Friedman’s] ideal, where capital moved freely across borders, governments retrenched from social spending, and a culture of expressive individualism celebrated freedom above all else.”

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    Brian Doherty

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