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Tag: Fifth Amendment

  • Covid Beach Closures, the Takings Clause, and the Police Power Exception

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    Falcon1708/Dreamstime.com

     

    Co-blogger Jonathan Adler recently posted about Alford v. Walton County, an important new 11th Circuit ruling holding that a local ordinance barring property owners from accessing their beachfront property during the Covid pandemic violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

    I think the court was right to conclude there was a taking here, and that the County is therefore required to pay compensation, as required by the Takings Clause. But the court elided the difficult issue of the “police power” exception to takings liability.

    The relevant ordinance completely barred property owners from accessing or using their beach front property for several weeks during the early part of the Covid pandemic, in March-April 2020. As the court explained, this is an obvious severe restriction on property rights, and therefore part of the right to “private property” protected by the Takings Clause.

    Unlike Jonathan Adler, I think the court was also right to conclude this is a “physical taking” that qualifies as a “per se” (automatic) violation of the Takings Clause, as opposed to a mere restriction on “use” subject to the Penn Central balancing test (a vague standard that usually ends up favoring the government). As the court put it, “Ordinance 2020-09 prohibited the Landowners from physically accessing their beachfront property under any circumstances. That is different from a restriction on how the Landowners could use property they otherwise physically possessed.”

    But the court avoided what, to my mind, is the most difficult issue posed by this case: the question of the applicability of the “police power” exception to takings liability. For decades, the Supreme Court and various lower courts have held that government actions that would otherwise qualify as takings are exempt from liability if enacted under the police power, which gives government the authority to protect health and safety.

    Covid-era restrictions arguably fall within the exception, because they were meant to constrain the spread of a deadly contagious disease, one that ended up killing some 1 million Americans. During the pandemic, a number of state courts upheld Covid shutdown orders against takings challenges based on the police power rationale. I wrote about one such case here.

    However, it is far from clear how great a threat to health or safety there must be before the police power exception kicks in. If forestalling even a small risk qualifies, then virtually any restriction on private property rights is exempted from takings liability. After all, just about any use of property poses at least some small risk of spreading disease or causing injury.

    In my recent article, “The Constitutional Case Against Exclusionary Zoning” (coauthored with Josh Braver), we argue the police power exception only applies in cases where the government policy in question is preventing a particularly severe danger. For reasons outlined in the article (pp. 25-31), that approach is consistent with original meaning, and with relevant Supreme Court precedent.

    By that standard, the Walton County beach restriction and similar measures in other jurisdictions do not qualify for the police power exception. It quickly became clear that outdoor transmission of Covid does not pose much risk. Moreover, it was particularly absurd to ban even the owners from using their own property. If one of them was infected, they could much more likely spread the infection to each other while at home indoors, where the law did not prevent them from interacting with each other.

    Thus, I think the court ultimately got this case right. But they should have addressed the police power exception and how it might or might not apply here. The court rightly noted that “there is no COVID exception to the Takings Clause” and that “the government must respect constitutional rights during public emergencies, lest the tools of our security become the means of our undoing.” I agree completely! There must be strong judicial review of government invocations of emergency powers. But, though there is no “Covid exception” or “emergency exception” to the Takings Clause, there is a police power exception. And courts should deal with it, when it is potentially relevant.

    The Supreme Court, in recent years, has shown little interest in clarifying the scope of the police power exception. But it has – rightly – decided a number of cases strengthening protection for property rights under the Takings Clause generally. This makes it more likely that Takings Clause protections will run into the police power exception, as there are fewer situations where restrictions on property rights avoid takings liability for other reasons.

    Thus, the Supreme Court may well have to clarify the police power exception sooner or later. Unless and until they do so, lower courts will continue to struggle with this doctrine.

     

     

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    Ilya Somin

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  • Six months after Jeanette Vizguerra’s ICE detainment, her attorney says still in ‘legal limbo’

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    AURORA, Colo. — For more than six months, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has detained a prominent immigration rights activist in Aurora. The length of time violates her constitutional rights while subjecting her to “prolonged detention,” her attorneys assert.

    53-year-old Jeanette Vizguerra was detained by ICE on March 17. Her legal team believes Vizguerra was targeted for her criticism of U.S. immigration enforcement policies and practices over the years.

    On Monday, Vizguerra’s lawyers filed an amended version of their Writ of Habeas Corpus, which is a court filing that challenges an individual’s imprisonment. The attorneys added on a new claim, arguing that Vizguerra has been detained for too long and should be released to continue her fight against deportation from outside the Aurora facility.

    The filing describes Vizguerra’s case as being stuck in “legal limbo.”

    “According to the government, she already was deported. That’s what we’re fighting about,” lead attorney on Vizguerra’s case Laura Lichter said. “Someone could be fighting for a couple of years before these cases are actually resolved… Essentially, by providing this motion today, which essentially amended the original petition, it basically said, this has gone on long enough. This has gone on past a reasonable amount of time to have somebody facing detention while they are actively fighting their legal right to contest the government’s action.”

    Jacob Curtis

    Jeanette Vizguerra’s attorney argues she has been detained for too long, and should be released from ICE custody.

    Since Vizguerra was first detained, a crowd rallies in her name outside of the Aurora ICE Processing Center on Monday evenings. This week, the crowd was there awaiting announcement of the attorney’s new filing.

    “We are here because in 2013, ICE messed up,” Lichter told the crowd on Monday. “They didn’t have a removal order. The facts are clear. They didn’t even do the paperwork correctly, and so they sat on it for about a dozen years, until this administration, we believe, went after Jeanette, targeted her for who she is, for what she represents, for what she says.”

    Vizguerra addressed the crowd gathered on Monday evening, speaking through a phone call and translator. She told the group that for the first time in her six months of detainment, she felt her health was deteriorating.

    “I want to make sure that the six months I’ve spent in here are not gone to waste,” the translator said, speaking on behalf of Vizguerra.

    Denver7 reached out to ICE for a comment on the new filing in Viguerra’s case, but did not receive a response.

    “She’s now been detained longer than six months. At this point, the burden shifts to the government to establish that her continued detention is actually necessary. They’re not going to have much of a basis to do that,” Lichter said. “Why? Because Jeanette is not dangerous. She’s not going to run away. She’s not any threat to anyone. She wants to be right here, doing exactly what she’s doing, fighting her case, fighting for her legal rights, but in the warm embrace of her family, with her community, outside of a private prison.”

    Lichter, who began working with Vizguerra long before she was detained in March, said complicated immigration cases can last for years before reaching a resolution.

    “Immigration law, because of its complexity, because of the politics, because of the different interpretations — whether that’s an administration through an executive order or different courts — is something that’s constantly changing,” Lichter said. “So, you will have cases that can go on for years and years and years, especially if that person has the resilience to be able to continue to fight for their rights.”

    Vizguerra is a citizen of Mexico who entered the U.S. in 1997. The filing from her attorneys states that “at the age of 25, she fled to the U.S. with her husband and daughter due to the persecution her husband experienced at his job from criminal organizations.”

    In February of 2009, Vizguerra was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument for having a fake Social Security card. At the time, Vizguerra said her Social Security card was made up of digits from her birth date, and did not belong to another person. She ended up serving a 23-day sentence after her conviction.

    That year, Vizguerra was placed in removal proceedings. She applied for a form of relief that would have authorized a judge to cancel the deportation and grant permanent residency if certain requirements were met. That application was denied in 2011, but an alternate request for voluntary departure was granted, giving Vizguerra 60 days to leave the country.

    Vizguerra’s attorneys claim she appealed that decision. In 2012, learned her mother was struggling and flew back to Mexico to see her mom one last time. That departure “triggered a subsequent, automatic withdrawal of her appeal,” according to Vizguerra’s legal team.

    Vizguerra returned to the U.S. in 2013, when the amended court filing states she was “apprehended shortly after her entry and charged criminally for illegal entry.” She was convicted in that case and sentenced to probation.

    When Vizguerra was released from criminal custody, she was turned over to ICE in El Paso, Texas. She was able to return to Colorado, and required to report to the Denver ICE Field Office in Centennial, court documents state.

    “The government believes that Jeanette is subject to reinstatement, that she was essentially deported and then illegally came back in the country,” Lichter said. “What we’ve said is, no, it wasn’t a deportation. She left on an order of voluntary departure because her mother was dying.”

    It was while Vizguerra was in Texas that a removal order was reinstated — a point in the timeline that’s debated by her attorney.

    “They made a mistake back in 2013. over a dozen years ago. They didn’t have the right facts to establish their assertion that Jeanette is actually someone who should be detained, facing the immediate threat of removal,” Lichter said. “Even if they were right, they didn’t even fill out their paperwork according to their own rules and procedures. Nothing has changed about that.”

    The filing continues to detail Vizguerra’s timeline, claiming she was granted a stay of removal by August of 2013.

    “Since that time, ICE repeatedly granted extensions of that stay of removal, with her most recent stay expiring in 2024,” the filing reads.

    Jeanette Vizguerra’s legal team says she’s in ‘legal limbo’ six months after arrest

    Read our previous coverage below

    Vizguerra was forced to seek sanctuary at a Denver church in 2017 under the first Trump administration after a hold on her deportation was not renewed. Denver7 spoke with her more than two months into her stay at First Unitarian Church in 2017 — the same year she was named to TIME Magazine’s list of the 100 most influential people in the world alongside President Trump.

    She was given a two-year reprieve, which allowed her to stay in the country until March of 2019 after Sen. Michael Bennet and then-Rep. Jared Polis — now Colorado’s governor — introduced so-called private bills to give her a path to become a permanent resident. But her two-year stay was not renewed and Vizguerra was further denied a U Visa — which allows undocumented victims of certain crimes to live legally in the U.S.

    A timeline provided by ICE showed Vizguerra was twice granted a stay of deportation in both 2021 and 2023, lasting for a year each.

    Denver

    Woman who sought sanctuary in CO church reacts to removal of ‘sensitive areas’

    When Vizguerra was most recently detained, a spokesperson with ICE told Denver7 Vizguerra would “remain in ICE custody pending removal from the United States.” The statement continued, calling Vizguerra “a convicted criminal” with “a final order of deportation issued by a federal immigration judge.”

    ICE asserted Vizguerra has received legal due process in immigration court throughout the process.

    Court records show that Vizguerra’s team has previously asked the judge to consider releasing her on bond. A decision on bond has not been made yet.

    “If the judge agrees with us, she could order Jeanette to be released, or she could order that Jeanette have a bond hearing. We would hope where the burden is going to be on the government, for them to prove that they have a right or a need to keep her detained,” Lichter said.

    The federal government will respond to their filing within the next three weeks, according to Lichter. Then, Vizguerra’s team will have two weeks to file any counterarguments they may have.

    After that, Lichter said both sides will be awaiting the judge’s ruling in the case.

    COLETTE CALL TO ACTION.jpg

    Denver7 | Your Voice: Get in touch with Colette Bordelon

    Denver7’s Colette Bordelon covers stories that have an impact in all of Colorado’s communities, but specializes in reporting on crime, justice and issues impacting our climate and environment. If you’d like to get in touch with Colette, fill out the form below to send her an email.

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    Colette Bordelon

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  • 4 reasons Trump says a judge should dismiss charges in the classified documents case

    4 reasons Trump says a judge should dismiss charges in the classified documents case

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    In four motions filed late last week in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Florida, Donald Trump’s lawyers seek dismissal of 40 felony charges based on his retention of classified documents after leaving the White House in January 2021. They argue that his decision to keep the documents is shielded by “absolute” presidential immunity for “official acts,” that he had complete discretion to designate records as personal rather than presidential, and that the charges related to mishandling “national defense information” are based on an “unconstitutionally vague” statute. They also argue that Special Counsel Jack Smith, who obtained the indictment, was improperly appointed, making all of the charges invalid.

    The motion based on presidential immunity, which seeks dismissal of the 32 counts alleging unlawful retention of specific classified documents, rehashes the argument that a D.C. Circuit panel unanimously rejected this month in the federal case based on Trump’s attempts to remain in office after he lost the 2020 presidential election. “The D.C. Circuit’s analysis is not persuasive,” Trump’s lawyers write, “and President Trump is pursuing further review of that erroneous decision, including en banc review if allowed, and review in the U.S. Supreme Court if necessary.” They say U.S. District Judge Aileen M. Cannon, who is overseeing the documents case in Florida, “should not follow the D.C. Circuit’s non-binding, poorly reasoned decision.”

    As Trump sees it, the separation of powers bars federal courts from sitting in judgment of a former president’s “official acts,” whether in the context of a civil case or in the context of a criminal prosecution. The D.C. Circuit, including Republican appointee Karen L. Henderson, was troubled by the implications of that position, which would allow presidents to commit grave crimes, including assassination of political opponents, without being held accountable unless they were impeached and removed from office based on the same conduct.

    Trump’s lawyers read the Supreme Court’s 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison as prohibiting judicial review of any presidential act. But as the D.C. Circuit emphasized, federal courts historically have passed judgment on the legality of presidential decisions, most famously in the 1952 case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. In that case, the appeals court noted, the Supreme Court “exercised its cognizance over Presidential action to dramatic effect” by holding that “President Harry Truman’s executive order seizing control of most of the country’s steel mills exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority and was therefore invalid.”

    Strictly speaking, however, Youngstown dealt with an order issued by the secretary of commerce rather than the president himself. “To be sure,” Trump’s lawyers say,  federal courts “sometimes review the validity of the official acts of subordinate executive officials below the president, and such review may reflect indirectly on the lawfulness of the president’s own acts or directives. But the authority of judicial review of the official acts of subordinate officers has never been held to extend to the official acts of the president himself.”

    Marbury drew a distinction between “discretionary” and “ministerial” acts. Regarding the first category, Chief Justice John Marshall said in the majority opinion, “the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience.” In that situation, he said, “the subjects are political and the decision of the executive is conclusive,” meaning it “can never be examinable by the courts.”

    But that is not true, Marshall added, “when the legislature proceeds to impose on [an executive official] other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts.” Then “he is so far the officer of the law, is amenable to the laws for his conduct, and cannot at his discretion, sport away the vested rights of others.” In those circumstances, he is acting as a “ministerial officer compellable to do his duty, and if he refuses, is liable to indictment.”

    Although Trump’s lawyers do not explicitly address that distinction, they argue that the counts charging him with illegally retaining 32 listed classified documents are based on 1) presidential decisions that 2) fell within the “discretionary” category. Both of those conclusions seem dubious.

    The indictment says Trump “caused scores of boxes, many of which contained classified documents, to be transported” from the White House to Mar-a-Lago. Trump’s lawyers say the indictment “makes clear that this decision and the related transportation of records occurred while President Trump was still in office.”

    As Trump’s lawyers see it, in other words, the first 32 counts are all based on actions that he took as president. That interpretation seems problematic based on the text of the statute and the wording of the indictment.

    Trump is charged with violating 18 USC 793(e), which applies to someone who has “unauthorized possession” of “information relating to the national defense” and  “willfully retains” it when he “has reason to believe” it “could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” The indictment says Trump “did willfully retain the documents and fail to deliver them to the officer and employee of the United States entitled to receive them.”

    Retaining the documents and failing to deliver them are distinct from the initial act of transportation. While the latter may have happened while Trump was still in office, the former included his conduct during the year and a half that elapsed from the end of his term until an FBI search of Mar-a-Lago discovered the 32 documents, along with 70 or so others marked as classified, on August 8, 2022. During that time, Trump delivered some classified documents but retained others, even after he claimed to comply with a federal subpoena demanding their return. But for that continuing resistance, the FBI would not have obtained a search warrant and Trump would not be facing these charges.

    Why does Trump think the initial act of bringing the documents to Mar-a-Lago was within his discretion as president? Under the Presidential Records Act, he argues in another motion, he had complete authority to classify documents as personal, meaning he could keep them rather than turn them over to the National Archives. His possession of those documents therefore was not “unauthorized,” as required for a conviction under Section 793(e). And since the FBI’s investigation was not legally justified, Trump’s lawyers say, the other eight counts, including conspiracy to obstruct justice, concealing records, and lying to federal investigators, also should be dismissed.

    That reading of the Presidential Records Act is counterintuitive given its motivation and text. The impetus for the law was President Richard Nixon’s assertion of the very authority that Trump is now claiming. Rather than allow a president to destroy or retain official documents at will, Congress declared that “the United States shall reserve and retain complete ownership, possession, and control of Presidential records.”

    The law defines presidential records as “documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, created or received by the President, the President’s immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise or assist the President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President.” That term excludes “personal records,” defined as “all documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, of a purely private or nonpublic character which do not relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President.”

    As Trump reads the Presidential Records Act, however, it “conferred unreviewable discretion on President Trump to designate the records at issue as personal.” That interpretation would, on its face, render the statute a nullity. If a president has total discretion to decide that a document is “of a purely private or nonpublic character,” regardless of its content, the situation that Congress sought to rectify would be unchanged in practice.

    Trump also argues that Section 793(e), as applied to him, violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process because it is so vague that it does not “give people of common intelligence fair notice of what the law demands of them.” In particular, his lawyers say, the phrases “unauthorized possession,” “relating to the national defense,” and “entitled to receive” have no clear meaning.

    Finally, Trump says the indictment is invalid because “the Appointments Clause does not permit the Attorney General to appoint, without Senate confirmation, a private citizen and like-minded political ally to wield the prosecutorial power of the United States.” Smith therefore “lacks the authority to prosecute this action.”

    The Appointments Clause empowers the president to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.” Because there is “no statute establishing the Office of Special Counsel,” Trump’s motion says, “Smith’s appointment is invalid and any prosecutorial power he seeks to wield is ultra vires”—i.e., without legal authority.

    This question, the motion says, is “an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit,” which includes Florida. But in 2019, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that Trump is deploying here, holding that Special Counsel Robert Mueller was an “inferior” rather than “principal” officer, meaning that Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein had the authority to appoint him.

    Trump is asking Cannon to approve “discovery and pretrial hearings on factual disputes” relevant to his motions. That is apt to delay the trial in this case, which had been scheduled to begin on May 20.

    The Section 793(e) charges require the government to show that the 32 documents listed in the indictment contained information that could compromise national security, a task complicated by their classified status. But the obstruction-related counts, which include allegations that Trump defied the federal subpoena, deliberately concealed classified records, and tried to cover up his cover-up by instructing his underlings to delete incriminating surveillance camera footage, may be the strongest charges that he faces across four criminal cases. Assuming the government can prove the facts it alleges in the indictment, it seems pretty clear that Trump is guilty of multiple felonies, including half a dozen that are punishable by up to 20 years in prison.

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    Jacob Sullum

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