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Tag: eurozone

  • Opinion | The Crisis in Paris Is That No One Recognizes the Real Crisis

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    France’s welfare state is in desperate need of reform, but Macron is obsessing over Marine Le Pen.

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    Joseph C. Sternberg

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  • EU capitals fear Russian retaliation and cyberattacks after asset freezes

    EU capitals fear Russian retaliation and cyberattacks after asset freezes

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    The EU’s unrelated effort to funnel cash to Ukraine from its central budget faced serious political resistance, prompting governments to look at alternative sources of money. It took weeks of diplomatic backchanneling before leaders convinced Hungary on Feb. 1 to lift its veto over the EU’s €50 billion cash pot for Ukraine.

    Financial stability

    The assets confiscation plan could generate over €200 billion to support Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction, according to backers of the proposal. G7 countries are aiming to come up with a coordinated roadmap amid growing pressure from the United States, which, along with the United Kingdom and Canada, has fewer qualms than EU countries such as Germany, France and Italy.

    In Europe, there are fears Moscow might retaliate by lodging a flurry of appeals against Euroclear, a Belgium-based financial depository that holds the vast majority of Russian reserves in Europe.

    “An institution like Euroclear is a very systemic financial institution,” Belgian Finance Minister Vincent Van Peteghem said | Nicolas Maeterlinck/Belga/AFP via Getty Images

    “An institution like Euroclear is a very systemic financial institution,” Belgian Finance Minister Vincent Van Peteghem told reporters at the end of January. “We should … try to avoid an impact [of Russian asset confiscation] on financial stability.”

    In a sign of the sort of retaliation countries fear might come, Russian entities have already filed 94 lawsuits in Russia demanding payback to Euroclear, which operates under Belgian law, after their investments and their profits in Europe were frozen, according to a Belgian official with knowledge of the proceedings.

    Top Russian lenders, including Rosbank, Sinara Bank and Rosselkhozbank, filed legal claims against Euroclear worth hundreds of millions of rubles.



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    Gregorio Sorgi

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  • Germany chokes on its own austerity medicine

    Germany chokes on its own austerity medicine

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    BERLIN — Germans gave the world schadenfreude for a reason. And southern Europe couldn’t be more pleased.

    For countries that spent years on the receiving end of Europe’s German-inspired fiscal Inquisition, there’s no sweeter sight than to see Germany splayed on the high altar of Teutonic parsimony. 

    The irony is that Germany put itself there on purpose and has no clue how it will find redemption.

    A jaw-dropping constitutional court ruling earlier this month effectively rendered the core of the German government’s legislative agenda null and void left the country in a collective shock. In order to circumvent Germany’s self-imposed deficit strictures, which give governments little room to spend more than they collect in taxes, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s coalition relied on a network of “special funds” outside the main budget. Scholz was convinced the government could tap the money without violating the so-called debt brake.

    The court, in no uncertain terms, disagreed. The ruling raises questions about the government’s ability to access a total of €869 billion parked outside the federal budget in 29 “special funds.” The court’s move forced the government to both freeze new spending and put approval of next year’s budget on hold.

    Nearly two weeks after the decision, both the magnitude of the ruling and the reality that there’s no easy way out have become increasingly clear. Though Scholz has promised to come up with a new plan “very quickly,” few see a resolution without imposing austerity.

    The expectation in the Bundestag is that Scholz will find enough cuts to deal with the immediate €20 billion hole the decision created in next year’s budget, but not much more.

    In the meantime, his government is on edge. While Economy Minister Robert Habeck, a Green, has been telling any microphone he can find that Germany’s economic future is hanging in the balance, Finance Minister Christian Lindner has triggered panic and confusion by announcing a series of ill-defined spending freezes.

    On Thursday, the government was forced to deny a report that a special fund created to bolster Germany’s armed forces after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine would be affected by the cuts. 

    At a press conference with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni late Wednesday, Scholz endured the humiliation of a reporter asking his guest whether she considered Germany to be a reliable partner given its budget crisis. A magnanimous Meloni, whose country knows a thing or two about creative accounting, gave Scholz a shot in the arm, responding that in her experience he was “very reliable.” 

    Greek accounting

    Between the lines, the justices of Germany’s constitutional court suggested the use of the shadow funds by Scholz’s coalition amounted to a bookkeeping sleight of hand — the same sort of accounting alchemy Berlin upbraided Greece for more than a decade ago. Perhaps unwittingly, the court ruling echoed then-Chancellor Angela Merkel’s unsolicited advice to Athens during Greece’s debt crisis: “Now is the time to do the homework!”

    For eurozone countries with a recent history of debt trouble — a group that alongside Greece includes the likes of Spain, Portugal and Italy — Germany’s financial pickle must feel like déjà vu all over again. From 2010 onwards, they found themselves in the unenviable position of trying to explain to Wolfgang Schäuble, Merkel’s taskmaster finance minister, how they planned to return to the path of fiscal rectitude. At Schäuble’s urging, Greece nearly ditched the euro altogether.

    The expectation in the Bundestag is that Scholz will find enough cuts to deal with the immediate €20 billion hole the decision created in next year’s budget, but not much more | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images

    In recent months, Germany has once again assumed the role of the fiscal scold in Brussels, where officials have been negotiating a new framework for the eurozone’s rulebook on government spending, known as the Stability and Growth Pact. The pact, which dates to 1997, has been suspended since the pandemic hit, but it is set to take effect again next year. Many countries want to loosen the rules given the huge budget pressures that have followed multiple crises in recent years. Berlin is open to reform but skeptical of granting its fellow euro countries too much leeway on spending.

    The latest budget mess certainly won’t help the Germans make their case.

    Simple hubris

    The allure of the strategy the court has now deemed illegal was that the government thought it could spend money it salted away in the special funds without violating Germany’s constitutional debt brake, which restricts the federal deficit to 0.35 percent of GDP, except in times of emergency.

    Put simply, Scholz’s coalition wanted to have its cake and eat it too, creating a veneer of fiscal discipline while spending freely to finance an ambitious agenda.

    Despite ample warning from legal experts that the government’s plan to repurpose a huge chunk of emergency pandemic-related funds might not withstand a court challenge, Scholz and his partners went ahead anyway. What’s more, they staked their entire political agenda on the assumption that the strategy would go off without a hitch.

    Last week’s court decision is the national equivalent of a rich kid being cut off from his trust fund: Daddy’s money is still there, but junior can’t touch it and has to exchange his Porsche for an Opel.

    What many in Berlin cite as the main reason for what they are calling der Schlamassel  (fiasco), however, is simple hubris.

    Scholz’s mild-mannered public persona belies a know-it-all approach to governing. A lawyer by training who has served for decades in the top ranks of German government, Scholz, at least in his own mind, is generally the smartest person in the room.  

    During coalition negotiations in 2021, Scholz sold the budget trick idea to his future partners — the conservative liberal Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens — as a way to square the circle between the welfare agenda of his own Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens’ expensive climate agenda, and the FDP’s demands for fiscal rigor (or at least the appearance thereof).

    Indeed, it’s doubtful the coalition would have ever been formed in the first place without the plan. The Greens and FDP happily went along; after all Scholz, Germany’s finance minister from 2018-2021, knew what he was doing. Or so they thought. 

    Finance minister or ‘fuck-up’?

    Scholz’s role notwithstanding, his successor as finance minister, FDP leader Christian Lindner, shares a lot of the responsibility for the snafu, for the simple reason that it was his ministry that oversaw the strategy. 

    During the coalition talks in 2021, Lindner was torn between a desire to govern and the fiscal strictures long championed by his party. Scholz offered him what appeared to be an elegant way to do both. 

    Scholz’s role notwithstanding, his successor as finance minister, FDP leader Christian Lindner, shares a lot of the responsibility for the snafu | Sean Gallup/Getty Images

    When Lindner, who had never served in an executive government role before, was poised to secure the finance ministry, some critics questioned his qualifications to lead the financial affairs of Europe’s largest economy. 

    POLITICO once asked the question more directly: “Finance minister or ‘fuck-up’?” 

    Many Germans have no doubt made their determinations in recent weeks. 

    Green machine 

    In contrast to the FDP, the Greens, had no qualms about endorsing Scholz’s bookkeeping tricks. 

    When it comes to realizing the Greens’ environmental goals, the ends have long justified the means. 

    In the early 2000s, for example, party leaders sold Germans on the idea of switching off the country’s nuclear plants and transitioning to renewables. They won the argument by promising that the subsidies consumers would be forced to finance to pay for the rollout of solar and wind power wouldn’t cost more every month than a “scoop of ice cream.”

    In the end, the collective annual bill for German households was €25 billion, enough to have cornered the global ice cream market many times over. 

    The Greens’ ice cream strategy — secure difficult-to-reverse legislative commitments and worry about the financial details later — also informed their approach to what they call the “social, ecological transformation,” a plan to make Germany’s economy carbon neutral. 

    That’s why the shock of the court decision has hit the Greens hardest. After more than 15 years in opposition, the Greens saw the alliance with Scholz and Lindner as the culmination of their effort to convince Germans to embrace their ecological vision for the future. Just as the hoped-for revolution was within reach, it has slipped from their grasp.

    Habeck, the face of the Green transformation, has looked like a man at his wits’ end in recent days, making dire predictions about the coming economic Armageddon.

    “This marks a turning point for both the German economy and the job market,” Habeck told German public television this week, predicting that it would become much more difficult for the country to maintain the level of prosperity it has enjoyed for decades. 

    Road to perdition 

    For all his candor, Habeck failed to address the elephant in the room: It’s a fake debt crisis.

    There is no objective reason for Germany to be in this dilemma. A best-of-class credit rating means Berlin can borrow money on better terms than almost any country on the planet. With a budget deficit of 2.6 percent of GDP last year and a total debt load amounting to 66 percent of GDP, Germany is also well above average compared to its eurozone peers in terms of fiscal discipline — even counting the debt raised for the special funds. 

    The only reason Germany can’t spend the money in the special funds is not because it can’t afford to, but rather because it remains beholden to an almost religious fiscal orthodoxy that views deficit debt as the road to perdition. 

    That conviction prompted Germany to anchor the so-called debt brake in its constitution in 2009, thereby allowing the government to run only a minor deficit, barring a natural disaster or other emergency, such as a war. 

    For eurozone countries with a recent history of debt trouble — a group that alongside Greece includes the likes of Spain, Portugal and Italy — Germany’s financial pickle must feel like déjà vu all over again | Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images

    The constitutional amendment passed by a comfortable margin with broad support from both the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the SPD, which shared power in a grand coalition led by Merkel. At the time, Germany was still recovering from the shock triggered by the 2008 collapse of investment bank Lehman Brothers and had to commit billions to shore up its banking sector.

    The country’s federal government and states had begun planning a reform of fiscal rules even before the crisis. The emergency gave them additional impetus to pursue a debt brake enshrined in the constitution as a way to restore public trust. 

    In that respect, it worked as planned. As countries such as Greece and Spain struggled with their public finances in the years that followed, Germany’s debt brake looked prescient. 

    Even as southern Europe struggled, the German economy went into high gear powered by strong demand for its wares from Asia and North America, allowing the government to not just balance its budget but to run a string of surpluses, peaking in 2018 with a €58 billion windfall.

    Goodbye to all that

    The good times ended with the pandemic. Germany, along with the rest of the world, was forced to dig deep. It had the fiscal capacity to do so, however, as the pandemic justified lifting the debt brake in both 2020 and 2021.

    The fallout from Russia’s attack on Ukraine forced the government to do so again in 2022. 

    By drawing from special funds, Scholz and Lindner believed they could avoid a repeat in 2023. But the court’s ruling dashed that plan. 

    Long before the current crisis, it had become clear to most in government — both conservative and left-leaning — that the debt brake was a hampering investment in public infrastructure (Merkel’s coalition emphasized paying down debt instead of investing the surpluses) and, by extension, Germany’s economic competitiveness. Hence the liberal use of the now-closed special fund loophole. 

    Trouble is, even as many politicians have woken up to the perils of the debt brake, the public remains strongly in favor of it. Nearly two-thirds of Germans continue to support the measure, according to a poll published this week by Der Spiegel. 

    Repealing or even reforming the brake would require Germany’s political class not just to convince them otherwise, but also to muster a super majority in parliament, which at the moment is unlikely.  

    Late Thursday, the finance minister signaled that the debt brake would have to fall for 2023 as well. That means the government will have to retroactively declare an emergency — likely in connection with the war in Ukraine — and then hope that the constitutional court buys it. 

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    Matthew Karnitschnig

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  • EU gives France an ‘F’ grade on spending plans

    EU gives France an ‘F’ grade on spending plans

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    BRUSSELS / PARIS ― The French government has been told by the European Commission it urgently needs to adjust next year’s spending plans to fall into line with the EU’s debt and deficit rules when they return after a four-year suspension.

    Paris is among four governments handed warnings over their budget plans by the bloc’s executive in its role policing member countries’ public expenditure. The rules, aimed at preventing instability in financial markets and the build-up of public debt, will retake effect on January 1 after they were shelved to allow greater investment during and after the COVID pandemic.

    “France’s draft budgetary plan risks not being in line” with the bloc’s rules, Commission Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis told reporters in Strasbourg, pointing to rising public expenditure and insufficient cuts to energy support.

    Belgium, Finland, and Croatia fall into the same category, the Commission said in its statement on Wednesday. Ignoring warnings could trigger a so-called Excess Deficit Procedure, a lengthy process that includes specific demands to rein in spending and potentially concludes with financial sanctions.

    These reports cards, and the resumption of the Stability and Growth Pact rules in general, come at a critical time with Europe’s economic growth remaining feeble and high interest rates making borrowing more expensive. Russia’s war in Ukraine and growing tensions in the Middle East add to uncertainty for governments and central banks in Europe and beyond.

    ‘Whatever it takes’

    Pressure on France shifts the focus from Italy, which has long been considered the bad boy of Europe when it comes to public spending. Rome isn’t fully out of the woods: its budget is “not fully in line” with the rules, the Commission said. The same goes for Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia.

    French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire has repeatedly stressed that France’s 2024 budget would mark the end of the era of “whatever it takes” in economic spending, pledging to phase out emergency measures linked to the pandemic and the energy crisis.

    As the Commission announced its assessments, a French economy ministry official was quick to stress Paris was unlikely to be punished with an Excessive Deficit Procedure and that it would not need to modify its budget law.

    “We won’t have to take any adjustment measure on this evolution of primary net spending,” the official said, on condition of anonymity, noting that the gap between France’s spending and Brussels’ recommendation was “very small.”

    The official insisted that, contrary to other EU countries, France did not receive a written request from Brussels.

    Paris sees a deficit next year of 4.4 percent of GDP — exceeding the EU’s 3 percent threshold — and spending cuts of €5 billion. The French budget is still being discussed in the country’s parliament and is set to be approved by Christmas.

    Commission Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis | Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty Images

    The Commission also raised concerns France’s debt-to-GDP ratio will rise to 110 percent of GDP next year. The EU’s limit is 60 percent.

    ‘Because it’s France’

    Brussels is under some pressure to show it is serious about enforcing the EU’s deficit and debt rules, regardless of whether governments can agree on their overhaul by the end of the year — a deal that France is trying to broker. The EU wants to make them more flexible and better tailored to individual countries’ circumstances but Germany is leading a group of governments demanding that some strict targets over debt and deficit reduction remain.

    France’s violation of the deficit criteria means the Commission could theoretically launch an “excessive deficit procedure” (EDP) from next spring — a red-flag label that means offending countries must adjust their spending.

    The French case is particularly sensitive because Paris has received special treatment before. In 2016, the Commission’s last president, Jean-Claude Juncker, justified his decision to give Paris leeway on its budget wrongdoing merely “because it is France.”

    This article has been updated with quotes from Strasbourg and Paris.

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  • WTF is Christine Lagarde up to?

    WTF is Christine Lagarde up to?

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    Deep in the Wyoming wilderness last month, Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank, stood before a large audience of elite central bankers and casually predicted the collapse of the international financial order. Resplendent in red and black, she resembled a humanoid Lindor chocolate truffle — and though her warning was diluted by the usual impenetrable jargon, the subtext was sufficiently clear and dramatic. 

    “There are plausible scenarios where we could see a fundamental change in the nature of global economic interactions,” Lagarde announced drily to the crowd, which was gathered for the annual central banker confab in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. The assumptions that have long informed the technocratic management of the global order were breaking down. The world, she said, could soon enter a “new age” in which “past regularities may no longer be a good guide for how the economy works.”

    “For policymakers with a stability mandate,” she added with understatement, “this poses a significant challenge.”

    A “new age”? — and coming from a member of that most dreary and unimaginative of the global technocratic-priesthoods, the central bankers? The warning at Jackson Hole wasn’t even the first time Lagarde has fretted publicly about the fate of the international order of free markets, dollar dominance and globalization that she had a hand in creating. While others have raised the issue, Lagarde has been outspoken. Just in April, she was the first major Western central banker to raise explicit concerns about the fragility of the greenback, whose international dominance she said “should no longer be taken for granted.”

    It was, all told, decidedly odd from the leader of the hallowed monetary authority, whose communications department rarely holds forth on anything more gripping than balance sheet policy and deposit rate adjustments. Coming from a woman whose long career in the upper echelons has been defined by a deference to the U.S.-led international order, it was apostasy, even. Most alarming was Lagarde’s seeming indifference to the power of her own words over the state of said international order. One official at the ECB was startled enough by the April comments that he asked the speechwriter what they meant, only to be reassured that they had been “misinterpreted” and were simply an affirmation of the institution’s narrow mandate for price stability.

    But it’s hard not to wonder whether Lagarde, after a lifetime managing the global establishment from crisis to crisis, has identified a potential extinction event — and is making her pitch that, once more, it is she who ought to help the world avert it. “I agree she’s on to something,” said the retired fixed-income investor Jay Newman. “There will be big shifts in trade and investment.” Paul Podolsky, another longtime trader, speculated that Lagarde was preparing the ECB, in trademark French fashion, for a “possible situation in which the euro would have more leadership in the global system than it would normally have.”

    Elsewhere, the prevailing sense is confusion, not least at Lagarde’s apparent disregard for the tradition of blandness in a business where every utterance is heavily scrutinized by obsessive, knee-jerk market forces. “What Lagarde said is not the natural thing for a central banker to say, in the sense that they typically don’t go for the tail-risk as a baseline,” panicked one analyst in nervous anonymity, referring to a kind of risk that is rare but deadly. “Maybe she doesn’t realize what an unusual communication it is for a central banker — or maybe she knows something we don’t.”

    So what does Lagarde want? The problem is it’s tricky to get a grip on what, if anything, actually moves her. Few have been able to discern in her any strong feelings or guiding principles beyond some vague notion of “service” to the institutions she invariably ends up leading through dramatic, epoch-defining crises. A sphinx with a winning smile, she possesses a charm that can come off as both authentic and calculated. “She could be funny when she needed to be,” said one former colleague. 

    What does she do for fun? She rarely reads for pleasure. Nobody interviewed by POLITICO has ever seen her read a book, or anything that isn’t a policy briefing. She has scant time, understandably, for the pursuit of hobbies. She does enjoy making jam, in July, for her family, and she is prone to the odd round of golf with the central bankers. She used to swim regularly but now not as often, constrained as she is by an intense work schedule. In terms of world-view, those who know her deduce that if she believes in anything she’s a centrist, or vaguely center-right. But most stop short at “pragmatic.”

    Unlike many of the technocrats she finds herself surrounded by, however, she is a charming chancer and a skilled communicator. She possesses an uncanny, Forrest-Gump-like predisposition for finding the driving beat of history — and if not exactly seizing it, surviving it. 

    From the outset, she enjoyed a near-vertical trajectory, rising from the depths of suburban Normandy to lead the major Chicago law firm Baker McKenzie, where she wooed colleagues and the international business elite alike. (“She is perhaps the nicest person I’ve ever had the pleasure of knowing,” said former Baker colleague Marc Levey.) At a time of peak globalization, the firm helped big upstart firms like Dell break into Europe, and by 2005 her growing prominence had landed her in an unelected role in French politics. As finance minister, she wrestled with the financial crisis, professed undying allegiance to Nicolas Sarkozy (“Use me for as long as it suits you,” she wrote the then French president) and was later convicted for “negligence” in a sordid affaire involving payments of public funds to a billionaire businessman — but escaped punishment when the judge took pity on her. (“She acted on orders,” a former political colleague told the Guardian newspaper. “She has done nothing wrong in her life.“)

    With uncommon ease, Lagarde remained at the ever-changing forefront of establishment consensus, a quasi-ceremonial, Elizabeth II-like figure who was perceived as an effective steward but was nevertheless often constrained by circumstance from exercising any real power. Consider her time as managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the venerable, 77-year-old institution that lends out money, often on harsh terms, to indebted countries when nobody else will. She joined the IMF in 2011. It was a dark time — the height of the eurozone crisis. Greece was the unhappy protagonist, forced to near-fatally gut its public spending at the behest of its Franco-German creditors after a decade-long spending binge, the effects of which it masked by manipulating its official data.

    As part of the French government, Lagarde, in line with the prevailing consensus, had resisted the IMF’s involvement. But when the fund’s chief, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was arrested on sexual assault charges in New York, she leaped for the top job. She embarked on a glitzy world tour, schmoozed China and split the Latin American vote, handily beating her rival, the distinguished Mexican central banker Agustín Carstens. Given the trashed reputation of her predecessor — and in spite of previous assurances that the Europeans would cede control to the emerging economies who were now among their creditors — it was a sleek, if ultimately predictable, victory.

    Once in office, however, she was rarely more than an elegant middle manager, readily admitting that she was not the one making the big decisions. Neither, she admitted, was she much of an economist — her own chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, likened her, with warmth, to a “first-year undergraduate.” “I’ll try to be a good conductor,” Lagarde said upon joining. “And, you know, without being too poetic about it, not all conductors know how to play the piano, the harp, the violin, or the cello.” She was principally an informed mediator who would sway but not dictate, there to build consensus among the nation-states represented on the IMF’s board — which in practice, according to some, meant winning acceptance for whatever decision the Europeans and U.S. had already made beforehand.

    She played upstart nations against one another, offering big concessions to the most powerful new arrival, China, while sidelining others, according to Paulo Nogueira Batista, the Brazilian board member at the time. “The managing director and staff of the fund would approach us individually to explain what they were thinking, and explain their views, and they’d say, ’Look, we understand you’re not happy with the solution, but let me tell you, we already have the required majority,’” Batista recalled. “And then, if we were still resisting, we’d be in the minority.” She was also conspicuously close to the American board member, David Lipton. “Christine wouldn’t have been so good without David, and David needed her to be the face of the fund — with her charisma and her charm,” said Daniel Heller, who represented Switzerland on the board. 

    The result? Against the advice of the U.S., many emerging world members and the Fund’s own thinkers, including Blanchard, the Fund bowed to European pressure and signed up to a deal that left Greece lumbering under its debts for a further four years before it had another chance to renegotiate. Even when Lagarde herself came around to Blanchard’s view, pressure from a German-led bloc in Europe meant she could change little. Exactly nobody was surprised when, in 2015, the tensions caused by that bailout came to a heady boil, triggering the rise of a rebel left-wing government in Greece. 

    At the ensuing tense summits of the eurozone’s finance ministers, situated at a long table in a windowless, harshly lit room in Brussels,  she was able to offer the occasional morsel of benign distraction. “She was great fun,” said Jeroen Dijsselbloem, then the Eurogroup’s head, recalling that at the “most impossible moments,” with the fate of Greece and the eurozone in the balance, “she’d reach into her bag and take out some M&M’s and say, ‘Let’s have some chocolates.’” 

     “Yes, Lagarde was personally warm,” granted Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s finance minister at the time. But to him, that counted for little.  “Because she was straitjacketed by the IMF, she was powerless,” he said. “And given that she was very keen not to jeopardize her position in the institutional pecking order, she was happy to go along with our crushing.” 

    With the U.S. exasperated and with the eurozone appearing to have overcome its existential crisis, the Fund withdrew from tense negotiations over a third bailout with the Greek government at the 11th hour, citing major disagreements between Athens and her creditors. Lagarde — her hands carefully washed of whatever would come next — emerged with her reputation intact.

    So what to make of her recent turn as a minor visionary? Lagarde has always held forth on the big, worthy problems of the day across an eclectic range of media — appearing last year on Irish prime-time TV, for instance, to offer an armchair psychological diagnosis of Vladimir Putin, and discussing her sex life in Elle France magazine in 2019. But now, her words — as she learned the hard way — carry momentous weight.

    Initially, with trademark tact, she claimed she didn’t even want the job at the ECB, though within months she was asked to run, and by November 2019 she got it, as a compromise candidate that saw the German Ursula von der Leyen take charge of the European Commission. “So Lagarde was brought in for, like, greening up the economy, and other stuff beyond monetary policy,” recalled Carsten Brzeski, the chief economist at ING Economics and a wry critic of Lagarde. “And then we had the pandemic.”

    The novel coronavirus was more than a match for Lagarde’s vaunted communication skills (or, indeed, anyone else’s). But that didn’t mean she couldn’t do a whole lot of damage. Disaster came right at the pandemic’s outset, at a conference on March 12, 2020, when she was answering questions from the media about the early alarming spread of COVID-19 in northern Italy. Asked whether she would act to reduce the perilously high “spread” on the interest paid on Italian debt, Lagarde offered a now-infamous response that blew up the Italian economy — and much of her credibility with it.

    The cataclysmic soundbite? “We are not here to close spreads.” 

    It may not sound like much, but in the arcane world of central banking, it was tantamount to uttering a hex. Years before, Mario Draghi, Lagarde’s predecessor, had famously “saved the eurozone” by announcing that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to back billions of euros of at-risk sovereign debt. Central banking relies on a certain enigmatic mysticism, which Draghi, the reclusive, Jesuit-trained technocrat par excellence, had in spades. At the Italian’s mere beckoning, debt markets calmed. Draghi didn’t even need to deploy the figurative “bazooka” of actually flooding the eurozone with money. His words were enough. 

    Lagarde’s comment was “whatever it takes” in reverse — a bazooka turned faceward. “I saw the Draghi spirit leave the room,” recalled Brzeski hauntedly. “For years we were spoiled by his famous magic — the man could calm financial markets just by reading out the telephone book — and then Lagarde comes and ruins it in ten minutes. The Draghi magic was exorcized, and Lagarde was the exorcist.”

    The bond markets exploded. Before joining the bank, Lagarde had been pitched as an arbiter whose main role would be to forge consensus among the central bank governors who make decisions at the ECB. But the “spreads” fiasco was a sharp reminder that she was uniquely accountable as the voice of euro monetary policy. And she blew it. Her authority collapsed. “In the past, we knew we needed to listen very carefully to Draghi,” said Brzeski. “Now markets know it’s normally not Lagarde who calls the shots.” Plus, she was enjoying herself too much, pontificating on climate change and social justice. “As a central banker you don’t improvise,” harrumphed Brzeski. “You are boring, you repeat the same messages over and over again.” Once, when a presser ended, recalled one analyst, reporters swamped the ECB’s head of market operations Isabel Schnabel — leaving Lagarde alone, taking notes. 

    Former colleagues wonder whether she misses the IMF, where she was able to be a rockstar financier, to propound without worrying about how her pronouncements landed. “I mean that job is incredible, it connects you with global power at the highest level,” said Heller, the Swiss board member. French media, as usual, speculated that her eye was really on the presidency, a rumor that has never entirely gone away.

    “Maybe she looks down on central banking,” wondered Brzeski, sounding wounded. “Maybe she finds it boring.”

    All that is to say that now, when Lagarde says something, it’s safe to assume she’s saying it with intent. “She had a very steep learning curve, but she also climbed the learning curve very quickly,” said Klaas Knot, the governor of the Dutch central bank. Even Brzeski observed that the past year’s harrowing experience of inflation has forced a certain weary seriousness onto Lagarde, and she recently snapped at a Reuters journalist who questioned her shifting views on monetary policy. She looks lifeless at the pulpit, bored and no longer having fun — a growing despair, Brzeski said, that has at least made her more credible with the markets.

    Just as she has offered her thoughts on climate change and the war in Ukraine, it may be that Lagarde, with her recent comments, is looking for that next big crisis over which to assume ceremonial leadership. As well as policy tightening, her overworked publicity team prioritizes policy branding: snappy soundbites, alliterative triplets, cartoon-based policy explainers. “She sees the big picture,” said Latvian central bank Governor Mārtiņš Kazāks. “Just look at her CV.” “I think she’s jealous and still looking for her ‘whatever it takes’ moment,” said the ECB staffer cited above, somewhat less charitably. 

    It is also highly likely that she earnestly believes things are taking a turn for the worse, and is, in a way, mourning the collapse of the globalized system that she shaped and that in turn shaped her. And in grappling with a world off balance, it helps to have a lawyer deliver the bad news. Effective monetary policy requires the synthesis of planetary volumes of data, and, as her colleagues say, Lagarde has the training to inhale great galaxies of the stuff, spending much of her waking life wading through dense briefing material. “Read the footnotes in her speech,” the veteran market-watcher Podolsky urged. “All she is doing is, lawyerly-like, reading — or having her staff read — all the staff research coming from the ECB, OECD, and IMF, and pulling out the pieces that support her questioning.” 

    Like an owl before an earthquake, Lagarde seems alive, said Podolsky, to the prospect of “a more hostile world,” of war and deglobalization, of Chinese decline and inflation that never quite dies. It is a chaotic uncertainty that left the ECB’s own Governing Council divided and markets uneasy, ahead of an announcement Thursday on whether the bank will continue to raise interest rates or take a break, an acknowledgment that the economy — and the politically sensitive manufacturing sector in particular — has cooled. (The ECB and Lagarde, through the bank’s press office, declined to comment for this article.)

    There’s another possibility, however. As Lagarde has learned, predictions from a major central banker carry the risk of being self-fulfilling. “If she was finance minister nobody would pay attention,” noted the analyst speaking on condition of anonymity. With inflation raging, as Lagarde herself noted in a recent speech, the public is ever more attuned to the bank’s operations and communications, which makes the economy, in turn, more sensitive to Lagarde’s touch. This, she added, provides “a valuable window of time to deliver our key messages.”

    Key messages! Monetary policy is already a weak form of mass mind control — could Lagarde be trying to verbalize into existence a new economic paradigm on which to hitch her professional fortunes? She has always been willing to say, well, whatever it takes, for her survival, even when doing so strains beyond her level of competence. A legacy as the ECB chief who oversaw the euro’s rise as a challenge to the domination of the dollar would be an elegant feather in her cap.

    And if armageddon never arrives? She’ll be well placed to take credit for averting it. Lagarde — as with most central bankers — was humiliated by the sudden rise in inflation. As Brad Setser, a former staff economist at the U.S. Treasury, said, her recent comments reflect a desire to emphasize the risks as a form of damage control. “It comes from a need to be reserved,” he said.

    Call it apocalyptic expectations management. If ECB policy fails to steer Europe safely through global economic fragmentation, Lagarde can quite comfortably say that, well, sorry, but she always warned it might. And then, as usual, she will emerge from the calamity blameless — sure, the opera house may be flaming rubble, the brass players at each other’s throats and the wind section reduced to cinders, but she’s just the “conductor” after all.

    Lettering by Evangeline Gallagher for POLITICO. Source images by Hollie Adams/Bloomberg via Getty Images, Thomas Lohnes/Getty Images, Boris Roessler/Picture Alliance via Getty Images and pool photo by Sebastian Gollnow via Getty Images. Animation by Dato Parulava/POLITICO.

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  • Greece’s conservatives win election majority to secure second term

    Greece’s conservatives win election majority to secure second term

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    ATHENS — Greece’s conservatives won big on Sunday’s parliamentary elections, securing an outright majority. Far-right parties also made gains, while the left struggled, giving Greece’s parliament its most rightward slant since the restoration of democracy in 1974.

    The New Democracy party of Kyriakos Mitsotakis managed to widen its double-digit lead over its main rival, the left-wing Syriza party, and secured 158 seats in the country’s 300-seat parliament, under the new electoral system which awards the winning party 50 bonus seats.

    “Our goals are high and must be high in a second term that can transform Greece with dynamic growth rates that will raise wages and reduce inequalities,” Mitsotakis said in his first message from his party’s headquarters.

    “People gave us a safe majority. The major reforms will therefore proceed with speed as this is the choice of the Greek people and I will honor it in full.”

    Sunday’s elections were the second held in the country in five weeks, after New Democracy came first on May 21 but fell short of an outright majority.

    New Democracy got 40.5 percent of the vote on Sunday, while Syriza was lagging with only 17.8 percent and 47 seats, according to official results. The socialist PASOK party had 11.9 percent and 32 seats, and the communists KKE had 7.6 percent and 20 seats. The participation rate was at 52.7 percent, the Interior Ministry reported.

    Far-right gains

    Four fringe parties — mainly from the far-right — also managed to top the 3 percent threshold to make it into parliament.

    Last-minute contender the Spartans party — which recently added a jailed MP from the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, Ilias Kasidiaris, to its list of backers — saw its support rise to 4.7 percent within days and secured 13 seats in parliament. The conservative government had passed an amendment aiming to ban him from parliament.

    New Democracy’s dominance is another sign of how Southern European countries are moving to the right, after a decades-long financial crisis in the eurozone that led the rise of left-wing parties.

    Ultra-nationalist, pro-Russian Greek Solution got 4.5 percent and 12 seats, while anti-abortion, religious party Niki got 3.7 percent and 10 MPs. To the left, Course of Freedom, led by former member of Syriza Zoi Konstantopoulou, got 3.1 percent and 8 seats.

    The far right has performed well in recent elections in Finland and Spain, and is polling particularly well in Germany. Its savvier elements — like Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni — are beginning to assert themselves at the European level.

    But the main story of Sunday’s election was New Democracy’s dominance, which is another sign of how Southern European countries are moving to the right, after a decades-long financial crisis in the eurozone that led to the rise of left-wing parties.

    “This is a clear victory for Kyriakos Mitsotakis, for [New Democracy] and for the EPP,” said Thanasis Bakolas, the center-right European People’s Party secretary general.

    “In politics, what you stand for matters. This is what we see in Greece, also what we saw earlier this year in national elections in Finland and regional elections in Spain. And this is precisely what we will see again in upcoming parliamentary elections in Spain in July and Poland in October. EPP parties are dominating the centre, while the centre-left is barricaded to its fringes.”

    The election outcome is considered market-friendly and puts Greece firmly on track to regain an investment-grade rating towards the end of the year, analysts say.

    Mitsotakis has promised that his first two bills will include a further reform of the public administration and the economy. He has also promised overhauls in the judicial, health and education sectors and expressed his intention to create a family ministry to help address Greece’s shrinking, and ageing, population.

    “The resounding victory will provide ND with a comfortable majority, putting Mitsotakis in a good position to push through investor-friendly reforms,” said Wolfango Piccoli, co-founder of risk analysis company Teneo.

    But the fringe parties will have a platform to broadcast their populist message and attempt to disrupt the government’s agenda, exploiting politically toxic issues like migration, the relationship with Turkey, abortion, the role of religion in education, Russia sanctions, he added.

    “It remains to be seen how Mitsotakis — often perceived to be more vulnerable to attacks from the far-right given his distinct liberal, center-right orientation — will manage to deal with the possible challenge posed by far-right opposition lawmakers.”

    Main opposition Syriza performed very poorly, raising questions about whether its status as the main opposition could now be challenged by Pasok party. It also means that conservatives could govern without particular scrutiny.

    “Although the danger of collapse was avoided and Syriza remains the official opposition, we have suffered a serious electoral defeat,” the party’s leader Alexis Tsipras said, setting the European elections next year as a goal for the party’s reimposition and adding that he will put his leadership to the judgment of the party members.

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    Nektaria Stamouli

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  • The tension at the heart of the ECB

    The tension at the heart of the ECB

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    FRANKFURT ― The markets are jittery and inflation still needs taming. Coming together, those two things put the European Central Bank in a real bind.

    Fight one fire and it could cause the other to flare. The ECB can keep raising interest rates to try to get inflation under control, but that risks fueling financial market tensions. Conversely, it can give banks some breathing space by slowing its rate-hiking, but that carries the danger of prolonging the region’s economic malaise.

    Frankfurt’s official line is that it can do both with no serious consequences. Many economists in the eurozone don’t buy that.

    In private, it’s a dilemma that splits the ECB’s decision-makers, and even in public differences of opinion are bubbling to the surface. Here’s what’s at stake:

    Why is the ECB raising rates?

    The idea is that increasing interest rates subdues inflation because it makes consumers and businesses less likely to borrow ― so that results in reduced spending.

    As inflation has started to pick up since last summer, the ECB has raised interest rates at a record pace. They’ve gone from -0.5 to 3 percent as the annual rate of price rises has surged to a eurozone record 10.6 percent in October.

    The Bank tries to keep inflation at 2 percent so it’s currently way off target.

    How this contributed to the crisis

    The unpleasant side effect is that with rising borrowing costs (because of higher interest rates), the value of bonds that banks hold usually fall. This gives investors a bad case of the jitters. After the collapse in March of lenders like Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse ― though their problems seemed unconnected ― it was this that prompted concerns they might not be the only institutions with troubles, and fueled contagion fears around the globe.

    But Lagarde plowed on regardless

    The ECB remained unfazed in the face of emerging banking troubles: It delivered a previously signaled 0.5 percentage-point rate increase in March, less than a week after SVB failed and at a time when Swiss banking giant Credit Suisse was teetering.

    Following that decision, ECB President Christine Lagarde stressed that she sees no trade-off between ensuring price stability and financial stability.  

    In fact, she said the Bank could continue to lift rates while addressing banking troubles with other tools.

    The case against

    Many economists disagree with Lagarde that the battle for price stability can be pursued without risking financial stability.

    The ECB delivered 0.5 percentage-point rate increase in March, less than a week after SVB failed | Patrick T. Fallon/AFP via Getty Images

    Claiming so “should be a career-ending statement,” said Stefan Gerlach, chief economist at EFG Bank in Zurich and a former deputy governor of the Central Bank of Ireland. “This is the idea of the ‘separation principle’ of 2008 revisited. That wasn’t a good idea then, and isn’t now either,” he added.

    What’s the separation principle?

    In 2008, at the start of the financial crisis, as well as in 2011, when the sovereign debt crisis hit, the ECB adhered to the idea that interest rates could be used to ensure price stability at the same time as other measures, such as generous liquidity injections, could ease market tension.

    But this just added to the problems and had to be unwound quickly.

    This time around, the Portuguese member on the ECB Governing Council, whose country suffered particularly under the consequences of the sovereign debt crisis, is less blasé than Lagarde.

    “Our history tells us that we had to backtrack a couple of times already during processes of tightening given threats to financial stability. We cannot risk that this time,” Mario Centeno told POLITICO in an interview. 

    The case for Lagarde

    After the initial fears that troubles could spread across the eurozone, investor nerves have calmed and bank shares started to recover. At the same time, new data showed that underlying inflation pressures kept rising, suggesting that Lagarde and her colleagues were right to stick to their guns ― at least for now.

    If that’s the case, March’s interest rate rise ― what Commerzbank economist Jörg Krämer described as “necessary” investment in the central bank’s credibility ― will have paid off.

    Market turmoil actually helps

    The nervous markets could help the ECB to reach its inflation target without having to raise interest rates as aggressively as previously thought.

    Banks tend to slap an additional risk premium on their lending rates which raises the cost of borrowing money for consumers and business. So banks end up doing part of the tightening job for the central bank.

    ECB Vice President Luis de Guindos suggested as much in an interview released last month, though he cautioned that it was too early to assess how much impact exactly it may have.

    What’s the endgame?

    The challenge for the ECB is to strike the right balance. If it doesn’t it risks either the repeat of 2008-style financial troubles or a return to the stagflationary period (low growth on top of high inflation) that roiled the Continent in the 1970s.

    If it raises rates too aggressively, bank failures followed by a recession risks forcing the ECB into an interest rate U-turn for the third time, creating massive credibility risks. Conversely, if they don’t hike enough, the central bank may lose a grip on inflation, which is its main mandate.

    The only way Lagarde can win is to deliver both price stability and financial stability. In that sense, there is no trade-off ― one without the other just won’t be enough.

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  • Former Greek Finance Minister Varoufakis attacked in central Athens

    Former Greek Finance Minister Varoufakis attacked in central Athens

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    ATHENS — Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis was attacked in central Athens late on Friday, suffering a broken nose, cuts and bruises.

    The assault, which his party DiEM25 described as a “brazen fascist attack,” took place while Varoufakis was dining in the central Exarchia district with party members from all over Europe.

    “A small group of thugs stormed the place shouting aggressively, falsely accusing him of signing off on Greece’s bailouts with the troika [the country’s bailout creditors],” DiEM25 said in a statement. “Varoufakis stood up to talk to them, but they immediately responded with violence, savagely beating him while filming the scene.”

    Politicians from across the political spectrum swiftly condemned the assault in Varoufakis, the motorbike-riding, leather-jacket-wearing politician who became well-known as the country’s finance minister in 2015.  

    As part of the left-wing Syriza-led Greek government, Varoufakis battled the so-called troika and Europe-imposed austerity. While the Greek administration eventually capitulated and signed a bailout agreement, Varoufakis quit government and founded a cross-border far-left political movement, DiEM25.

    “They were not anarchists, leftists, communists or members of any movement,” Varoufakis said in a tweet early Saturday. “Thugs for hire they were (and looked it), who clumsily invoked the lie that I sold out to the troika. We shall not let them divide us.”

    The Exarchia neighborhood has a reputation for being a bastion of self-styled anarchists. Varoufakis was publicly harassed in 2015 while dining in the same district at the height of the financial crisis.

    Greek Minister of Citizen Protection Takis Theodorikakos said police would take all measures to identify and arrest the perpetrators of Friday’s attack. He noted that the DiEM25 leader, “at his own initiative, was not accompanied by his personal police detail” while at the restaurant.

    Greece has been hit by the biggest mass demonstrations since the eurozone crisis in recent days, as Greeks have taken to the streets almost on a daily basis to protest the country’s deadliest train crash, ramping up pressure on the conservative New Democracy government ahead of coming elections. The wave of public rage follows a train collision on February 28 that killed 57 people and raised profound questions about the management of the rail system.

    The train crash has also sparked deeper questions about the functioning of the Greek state and fresh anger against the political system.

    “Let us please stay focused: We are mourning the 57 victims of rail privatization. We support the spontaneous youth rallies, the greatest hope that Greece can change. See you at the demonstrations,” Varoufakis tweeted, as another big rally is scheduled for Sunday.

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    Nektaria Stamouli

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  • Europe could dodge a recession. But the UK is in a mess | CNN Business

    Europe could dodge a recession. But the UK is in a mess | CNN Business

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    CNN
     — 

    Business activity across the 20 countries that use the euro expanded in January for the first time in six months, according to data published Tuesday, providing fresh evidence that Europe’s economy could confound expectations and dodge a recession this year.

    An initial reading of the eurozone’s Purchasing Managers’ Index, which tracks activity in the manufacturing and service sectors, rose to 50.2 in January from 49.3 in December, indicating the first expansion since June. A reading above 50 represents growth.

    The return to modest growth was helped by falling energy prices and an easing of supply chain stress, which helped temper rising input costs for producers.

    The uptick was accompanied by a sharp improvement in optimism about the year ahead, as the recent reopening of China’s economy following the lifting of Covid restrictions helped push confidence to its highest level since last May. Growing optimism in Europe that China’s consumers will start spending again was reflected in Swiss watch maker Swatch

    (SWGAF)
    ’s prediction Tuesday of record sales for 2023.

    “A steadying of the eurozone economy at the start of the year adds to evidence that the region might escape recession,” said Chris Williamson, chief business economist at S&P Global Market Intelligence, the company that publishes the survey of executives at private sector companies.

    Williamson added, however, that a “renewed slide into contraction” should not be ruled out as borrowing costs rise off the back of interest rate hikes by the European Central Bank. But any downturn “is likely to be far less severe than previously feared,” he said.

    Berenberg chief economist Holger Schmieding said in a research note that “the still-low level of consumer confidence and the lagged impact of ECB rate hikes still point to a slight contraction in eurozone GDP near-term before the recovery can start to take hold.”

    Consumer sentiment in Germany, the region’s biggest economy, looks set to improve for a fourth consecutive month in February from a very low base, according to a separate survey published by GfK Tuesday.

    The picture looks far less promising in the United Kingdom, however, where January’s PMI survey showed the steepest decline in business activity since the national Covid lockdown two years ago, as higher interest rates and low consumer confidence depressed activity in the dominant services sector.

    The initial reading fell to 47.8 in January, from 49 in December, to remain in a state of contraction for the sixth consecutive month. The UK survey is conducted in conjunction with the Chartered Institute of Procurement & Supply.

    “Weaker-than-expected PMI numbers in January underscore the risk of the UK slipping into recession,” Williamson said. “Industrial disputes, staff shortages, export losses, the rising cost of living and higher interest rates all meant the rate of economic decline gathered pace again at the start of the year,” he added.

    The UK economy lost more working days to strikes between June and November 2022 than in any six-month period over the previous 30 years, according to data published last week by Britain’s Office for National Statistics.

    Williamson said Tuesday’s data reflected not only short-term hits to growth, such as strike action, but “ongoing damage to the economy from longer-term structural issues such as labor shortages and trade woes linked to Brexit.”

    Despite the gloomy start to the year, UK business expectations for the year ahead hit their highest level for eight months, driven by hopes of an improving global economic backdrop and cooling inflation.

    Separate data published by the ONS on Tuesday showed that UK government borrowing hit £27.4 billion ($33.7 billion) in December, the highest figure for that month since records began in 1993. This was driven by a sharp increase in spending on support for household energy bills, as well as the soaring cost of paying interest on government debt.

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