Sprinkle the sequins and pump up the volume: The annual Eurovision Song Contest reaches its climax on Saturday with a grand final broadcast live from the United Kingdom’s city of Liverpool.
There will be catchy choruses, a kaleidoscope of costumes and tributes to the spirit of Ukraine in a competition that since 1956 has captured the changing zeitgeist of a continent.
Last year, 161 million people watched the competition, according to the organiser, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), making it one of the world’s most-watched events.
Here’s what to expect as acts from across Europe – and beyond – vie for the continent’s pop crown.
Who’s competing?
This year, 37 countries sent an act to Eurovision, selected through national competitions or internal selections by broadcasters. The winner of the previous year’s event usually hosts the contest but, as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues, the UK is doing the honours this year on behalf of 2022’s winner, Ukraine.
Alyosha is competing for Ukraine this year. The country has won three times since it began taking part in 2003 [Martin Meissner/AP Photo]
Six countries automatically qualify for the final: last year’s winner and the five countries that contribute the most funding to the contest – France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK.
The others must perform in the semi-finals with 20 acts chosen by public vote on Tuesday and Thursday.
The qualifiers are: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Israel, Lithuania, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland.
The final takes place on Saturday at the Liverpool Arena.
Australia?
Eurovision is not just geography. Eurovision is hugely popular in Australia and the country was allowed to join the competition in 2015. Other entrants from outside Europe’s borders include Israel and Azerbaijan.
Who are the favourites?
It is hard to predict the winners in a contest whose past winners have ranged from ABBA to Finnish metal band Lordi, but bookmakers say Swedish diva Loreen, who won in 2012, is the favourite with her power ballad Tattoo.
Finland’s Käärijä was a crowd-pleaser in the semifinals with his pop-metal party tune Cha Cha Cha and Canadian singer La Zarra, competing for France, is also highly ranked for her Edith Piaf-style song Évidemment.
Mae Muller of the United Kingdom is hoping to turn in a strong performance on Saturday night [Martin Meissner/AP Photo]
And never underestimate left-field entries like Croatia’s Let 3, whose song Mama ŠČ! is pure Eurovision camp: an anti-war rock opera that plays like Monty Python meets Dr Strangelove.
What happens in the final?
About 6,000 people will attend the final, hosted by longtime BBC Eurovision presenter Graham Norton, Ted Lasso and West End star Hannah Waddingham, British singer Alesha Dixon and Ukrainian rock star Julia Sanina.
Each competing act must sing live and stick to a three-minute limit but is otherwise free to create its own staging – the flashier the pyrotechnics and more elaborate the choreography, the better.
Russia’s war in Ukraine will lend a solemn note to a contest famed for celebrating cheesy pop.
The show will open with a performance by last year’s winner, folk-rap band Kalush Orchestra, and singer Jamala, who won the contest in 2016, will perform a tribute to her Crimean Tatar culture. Ukraine has won the competition three times since the country started taking part in 2003.
One person who will not be appearing is Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. He asked to address the final by video but the EBU said that such a talk would breach “the nonpolitical nature of the event”.
How is the winner decided?
After all the acts have performed, viewers in participating nations can vote by phone, text message or app but are not allowed to vote for their own country.
This year for the first time, viewers watching from non-participating countries can also vote online, with the combined “rest of the world” votes being given the weight of one individual country.
Croatia’s Let 3 are singing an anti-war rock opera [Martin Meissner/AP Photo]
National juries of music industry professionals also allocate between one and 12 points to their favourite songs, with an announcer from each country popping up to declare which has been granted the coveted “douze points” (12 points).
Public and jury votes are combined to give each country a single score. Ending up with “nul points” (zero points) is considered a national embarrassment. The UK has suffered that fate several times – most recently in 2021. It bounced back last year, however, when Sam Ryder came second and is hoping this year’s contestant, Mae Muller, will also turn in a strong performance.
Where can I watch?
Eurovision is being shown by national broadcasters that belong to the EBU, including the BBC in the UK, and on the Eurovision YouTube channel. In the United States, it is being shown on NBC’s Peacock streaming service.
LUXEMBOURG — Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on Monday implored EU foreign affairs ministers to move faster on their promises to supply Kyiv with ammunition. But his plea came as officials were given new details showing the EU still has a long way to go to meet its lofty pledges.
According to several diplomats, Kuleba — who addressed a meeting of foreign ministers in Luxembourg via video link — was critical of the slow pace of the EU in delivering ammunition and missiles as part of a plan to provide 1 million shells in the next 12 months as Ukraine fights off Russia’s invasion.
The plan has already been endorsed by EU leaders but, when it comes to the technical details, has only been partially agreed upon by member states, which are still discussing the so-called track two of the scheme, which involves the joint purchase of ammunition.
The bone of contention is a legal one about exemptions for companies based outside the EU in the supply chain of the defense companies involved in the plan, but in the background doubts also remain as to whether the EU defense industry can really deliver all of these shells.
Kuleba on Monday “repeated that Ukraine needs desperately the ammunition to stand against the Russian attacks, and also to organize the counterattack,” Margus Tsahkna, the foreign minister of Estonia, which put forward the ammo plan, told POLITICO. “And ammunition is crucial.”
The problem is not only the speed of the EU in delivering the ammo, but also the quantity. The plan is being funded by a pot of money called the European Peace Fund, which partially reimburses the member states for ammo and missiles. That cash, meant to help provide ammunition quickly, comes from the so-called track one of the plan — worth a total of €1 billion — which has already been fully agreed upon. EU top diplomat Josep Borrell, speaking to journalists Monday, said that “we have received requests for reimbursement for €600 million.”
Yet according to three diplomats, not all the material that member states want reimbursing for has actually been delivered. Of the €600 million that Borrell mentioned, €180 million was for the provision of 1,080 missiles (six of which have not yet been reported as delivered) and the rest of the money was for 41,000 pieces of ammunition, of which 28,000 have not been reported as delivered, the diplomats said.
Those numbers are well short of 1 million.
Kuleba stressed “that if there is one priority, and if it’s a single burning issue, this is weapons delivery, in particular ammunition … he also asked for not being hesitant on delivering the aircraft and other modern pieces of military technology,” Slovakia’s foreign minister, Rastislav Káčer, told POLITICO. “He was pushy, politely,” Káčer added.
Borrell tried to offer reassurance on the speed of the EU decision-making process, saying: “There has been some disagreement but the work continues. We are not waiting for the legal document to be finished to start working. The work continues and everything is being prepared,” he said at a press conference after the meeting.
Diplomats reckon it’s a matter of days, likely Wednesday, before track two of the plan will be finalized.
“The truth is that there is not satisfaction about how we’re delivering on track one, in the quantity and the speed,” Káčer said. “We can do more, we can scratch more. Slovakia is trying. We are putting everything we have in the stockpiles.”
The Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are demanding an explanation from Beijing after China’s top envoy to France questioned the independence of former Soviet countries like Ukraine.
Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to France, said in an interview on Friday with French television network LCI that former Soviet countries have no “effective status” in international law.
Asked whether Crimea belongs to Ukraine, Lu said that “it depends how you perceive the problem,” arguing that it was historically part of Russia and offered to Ukraine by former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
“In international law, even these ex-Soviet Union countries do not have the status, the effective [status] in international law, because there is no international agreement to materialize their status as a sovereign country,” he said.
The comments sparked outrage among Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia — three former Soviet countries.
Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs said in a tweet that his ministry summoned “the authorized chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in Riga on Monday to provide explanations. This step is coordinated with Lithuania and Estonia.”
He called the comments “completely unacceptable,” adding: “We expect explanation from the Chinese side and complete retraction of this statement.”
Margus Tsahkna, Estonia’s foreign minister, called the comments “false” and “a misinterpretation of history.”
Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania’s foreign minister, shared the interview on Twitter with the comment: “If anyone is still wondering why the Baltic States don’t trust China to “broker peace in Ukraine,” here’s a Chinese ambassador arguing that Crimea is Russian and our countries’ borders have no legal basis.”
Kyiv also pushed back strongly against the ambassador’s comments.
“It is strange to hear an absurd version of the ‘history of Crimea’ from a representative of a country that is scrupulous about its thousand-year history,” Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office, said in a tweet on Sunday. “If you want to be a major political player, do not parrot the propaganda of Russian outsiders.”
France in a statement on Sunday stated its “full solidarity” with all the allied countries affected, which it said had acquired their independence “after decades of oppression,” according to Reuters. “On Ukraine specifically, it was internationally recognized within borders including Crimea in 1991 by the entire international community, including China,” a foreign ministry spokesperson was quoted as saying.
The foreign ministry spokesperson also called on China to clarify whether the ambassador’s statement reflects its position or not.
The row comes ahead of a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg on Monday, where relations with China are on the agenda.
RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, Germany — American-made Abrams tanks that Ukrainians will use for training will arrive in Germany in the next few weeks, allowing soldiers to begin learning to use the much-anticipated armor, according to two U.S. Defense Department officials.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin is expected to announce the move at a Friday press conference after the 11th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a gathering of more than 40 nations dedicated to supporting Kyiv against Russia’s all-out assault, said one of the DoD officials, who was granted anonymity to discuss sensitive operations.
The 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks — a Ukrainian battalion’s worth — will arrive at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany by mid-to-late May, according to the officials. The training will begin a week or two later, after the tanks go through a maintenance period.
But the tanks the Ukrainian armed forces will train on in Germany are different from the ones that will eventually arrive in Ukraine for use on the battlefield, the first DoD official added, noting that those are still being refurbished.
The training on how to operate and maintain the Abrams is expected to take up to 10 weeks and may include instruction on how to maneuver in combat, the official said. Some 250 Ukrainians are expected to go through the training program, which is run by 7th Army Training Command.
The U.S. is accelerating the delivery of the Abrams by opting to send older M1A1 versions, rather than the newer M1A2 type originally planned to go to Ukraine. The Pentagon anticipates the tanks will arrive on the battlefield by the end of the year.
During his opening remarks ahead of the contact group meeting, Austin applauded his counterparts for their donations. He noted that Italy, France, Canada and Norway are also providing air defense systems, while Estonia has spent more than 1 percent of its GDP on Ukraine.
“Our common efforts have made a huge difference to Ukraine’s defenders on the battlefield. And they underscore just how badly the Kremlin miscalculated,” Austin said. “After more than a year of Russian aggression and deceit, this contact group is as united as ever and more global than ever.”
The group is also working to deliver defense systems to counter Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, Austin said. Two Patriot missile defense systems, including one from the U.S. and one made up of components from Germany and the Netherlands, arrived in Ukraine on Wednesday.
In total, the members of the contact group have provided more than $55 billion in security assistance for Ukraine since the group’s founding a year ago. The U.S. alone has provided $35 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion began, including the most recent package of $325 million.
It’s the rumor inflating the Brussels bubble: The EU’s top executive, Ursula von der Leyen, could be crossing town to run NATO.
The rationale makes sense. She has a good working relationship with Washington. She is a former defense minister. And as European Commission president, she has experience working with most NATO heads of government. Plus, if chosen, she would become the alliance’s first-ever female leader.
The conversation has crested in recent weeks, as people eye current NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s pending exit at the end of September.
Yet according to those inside NATO and at the Commission, the murmurings are more wish-casting than hints of a pending job switch. There is no evidence von der Leyen is interested in the role, and those in Brussels don’t expect her to quit before her first presidential term ends in 2024.
The chatter is similar to the rumblings around Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, a long-serving leader who checks every box but insists he doesn’t want the job.
The speculation illustrates how much Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed NATO — and who can lead it. The war has put a new spotlight on the alliance, making the job more politically sensitive and high-profile than in the past. And allies are suddenly much more cautious about who they want on the podium speaking for them.
In short, the chatter seems to be people manifesting their ideal candidates and testing ideas rather than engaging in a real negotiation.
“The more names, the clearer there is no candidate,” said one senior European diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal alliance dynamics.
A second senior European diplomat agreed: “There is a lot of backroom gossip,” this person said, “but no clear field at this stage.”
The (very) short list
The next NATO chief, officials say, needs to be a European who can work closely with whoever is in the White House.
But that’s not all. The next NATO chief needs to be someone who backs Ukraine but is not so hawkish that it spooks countries worried about provoking Russia. And the person has to have stature — likely a former head of state or government — who can get unanimous support from 31 capitals and, most importantly, the U.S.
There are several obstacles to Usula von der Leyen’s candidacy | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images
That’s not a long list.
Von der Leyen is on it, but there are several obstacles to her candidacy.
The first is simply timing. If Stoltenberg leaves office in the fall as scheduled, his replacement would come into the office a year before von der Leyen’s term at the Commission ends in late 2024. She may even seek another five-year term.
“I don’t think she will move anywhere before the end of her mandate,” said one senior Commission official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal matters.
Speculation is rife that the current NATO chief may be asked to stay on, at least for a little while longer, to allow for a candidate such as von der Leyen to come in at a later stage.
“If Stoltenberg is prolonged until next summer, Ursula von der Leyen’s candidature would look logical,” said a third senior European diplomat.
But in an interview with POLITICO last week, Stoltenberg appeared keen to go home. The NATO chief has been in the job for over eight years, the second-longest tenure in the alliance’s seven-decade history.
Asked about gossip that he may stay on, the secretary-general shot back sarcastically: “First of all, there are many more questions in the world that are extremely more important than that.”
“My plan is to go back to Norway,” he added, “I have been here for now a long time.”
The alliance is divided on the matter. Some countries — particularly those outside the EU — would prefer a quick decision to avoid running into the EU’s own 2024 elections. The fear, a fourth European diplomat said, is that NATO becomes a “consolation prize in the broader European politics” as leaders haggle over who will run the EU’s main institutions.
Another challenge for von der Leyen would be Germany’s track record on defense spending — and her own record as Germany’s defense minister.
A decade ago, NATO countries pledged to move toward spending 2 percent of their economic output on defense by 2024. But Germany, despite being Europe’s largest economy, has consistently missed the mark, even after announcing a €100 billion fund last year to modernize its military.
From the German government’s perspective, keeping von der Leyen at the helm of the Commission might be a bigger priority than NATO | Kenzo Tribuillard/AFP via Getty Images
Additionally, some observers say von der Leyen bears some responsibility for the relatively poor state of Germany’s defenses.
From the German government’s perspective, keeping von der Leyen at the helm of the Commission might also be a bigger priority than NATO — even if she comes from the current center-right opposition. The EU executive is arguably more powerful than the NATO chief within Europe, pushing policies that affect nearly every corner of life.
Predictably, the Commission is officially dismissive of any speculation.
“The president is not a candidate for the job” of NATO secretary-general, a Commission spokesperson told POLITICO on Monday. “And she has no comment on the speculation.”
Who else can do it?
As with von der Leyen, it is unclear if some other names floated are actually available.
Dutch Prime Minister Rutte has dismissed speculation about a NATO role, telling reporters in January that he wanted to “leave politics altogether and do something completely different.”
A spokesperson for the prime minister reiterated this week that the his view has not changed.
Insiders, however, say the Dutch leader shouldn’t be counted out. In office since 2010, Rutte has significant experience working with leaders across the alliance and promotes a tight transatlantic bond.
The Netherlands is also relatively muscular on defense — it has been one of Europe’s largest donors to Ukraine — but not quite as hawkish as countries on the eastern flank.
“Rutte’s name keeps popping up,” said the second senior European diplomat, “but no movement on this beyond gossip.”
Others occasionally mentioned as possible candidates are Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, and to a lesser extent British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová.
But despite the gossip, officials acknowledge many of these names are not politically feasible at this stage.
Kallas, for instance, is perceived as too hawkish. And conversely, Canada and some southern European countries are viewed within the alliance as laggards on defense investment. Then there’s the fact that some capitals would oppose a non-EU candidate, complicating a Wallace candidacy.
As a result, a senior figure from a northern or western EU country appears the most likely profile for a successful candidate. Yet for now, who that person would be remains murky. Officials do have a deadline, though: the annual NATO summit in July.
“Either a new secretary general will be announced,” said a fifth senior European diplomat, “or the mandate of Jens Stoltenberg will be prolonged.”
The EU has reached a deal to send Ukraine 1 million rounds of ammunition within the next 12 months.
The plan — seen by POLITICO — will see the EU both donate ammunition from its own stockpiles and also jointly purchase new shells for Ukraine. It also leaves open the possibility that the EU could help countries collectively buy missiles for Ukraine. And it sets a goal to “jointly procure” these munitions “in the fastest way possible” before October.
Diplomats and ministers finalized the strategy during meetings in Brussels on Sunday and Monday. EU leaders are expected to give their final blessing at a summit in Brussels later this week.
The deal represents a landmark juncture for the EU, marking the first time the self-described peace project has plotted to jointly buy arms for a country at war. Officials have argued the EU must evolve to meet the extraordinary moment — no less than the fate of democracy on European soil is at stake, they insist.
“A historic decision,” tweeted Josep Borrell, the EU’s top diplomat, once the deal was clinched Monday.
The plan has come together rapidly in recent weeks amid fears that Kyiv is running out of shells to hold off Russia’s unyielding assault. Ukrainian officials have said they need at least 1 million 155-millimeter shells to restock and maintain their defenses — a figure that far outstrips Europe’s annual production capacity.
To make up for the shortfall, the EU has drafted a multi-stage blueprint.
First, it will dedicate €1 billion to countries able to either donate ammunition immediately from their own stockpiles or redirect existing orders. Then, it will set aside another €1 billion to jointly buy more ammunition (and possibly missiles) for Ukraine and replace Europe’s donated shells. Finally, it wants to explore ways to boost Europe’s ability to manufacture the arms it needs for years to come.
Borrell in his final remarks speaking to journalists said countries had agreed to the €2 billion total. But diplomats said the legal texts were still being finalized.
Funding for the endeavor is expected to come from the so-called European Peace Facility, formerly an obscure program that has become the EU’s main wartime vehicle to partially reimburse countries for their weapons donations to Ukraine.
Less firm is what the EU plans beyond the €2 billion meant to jointly buy ammunition and cover donations of existing munitions. EU countries did not put forward anything about how to fund the last phase of its plan: growing industrial capacity for years to come. The document circulating Monday merely invited the European Commission to explore the issue and “present concrete proposals.”
“We have an industrial problem,” one seniorofficial conceded late last week, referring to Europe’s struggles to bolster homegrown defense manufacturing.
The €2 billion, Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu agreed Monday, is “a clear and solid step further but it won’t be enough.”
Still, the ammunition agreement is a victory for Estonia, which first floated the idea of quickly providing Ukraine with 1 million fresh rounds as part of its push to get EU countries to send more weapons to Kyiv.
It’s also poised to be a boon for France and its many defense firms, as well as numerous defense companies across the EU. France, which has the bloc’s strongest defense sector, has long led the charge to augment European defense spending within EU borders, and the plan approved Monday will essentially do just that, instructing all joint EU contracts to go to EU firms. The only exception is Norway, which is already closely integrated into the EU market.
Several diplomats said French officials were also the ones pushing to include missiles in the scheme, although others chalked it up to Ukraine’s need for the weapons.
Despite the agreement, officials still need to hammer out exactly how the program will operate in practice. Officials have been going back and forth over whether the joint contract negotiations should go through EU agencies, or whether countries should just band together on their own.
EU officials were keen to see the plan identify a role for the European Defense Agency (EDA), the EU body meant to help countries cooperate on national security issues. But some countries have been wary about empowering Brussels to essentially become Europe’s arms negotiator.
The final decision, in classic EU fashion, is an all-of-the-above approach.
Ultimately, only 18 countries signed an agreement to work with the EDA on “the collaborative procurement” of ammunition. On the list are EU heavyweights like Germany, France and the Netherlands (as well as Norway), but not Italy or Spain. The pact envisions two parallel efforts — “a two-year, fast-track procedure for 155mm artillery rounds and a seven-year project to acquire multiple ammunition types.”
But countries will also be able to form groups of three or more to jointly negotiate contracts on their own. Three diplomats said the Netherlands and Denmark, for instance, have expressed interest in joining Germany in its national efforts to procure more ammunition.
Officials acknowledged that considerable work lay ahead.
“Definitely there are many details to be solved,” said Hanno Pevkur, Estonia’s defense minister.
Gregorio Sorgi and Nicolas Camut contributed reporting.
BRUSSELS — The EU is finalizing a €2 billion deal to jointly restock Ukraine’s dwindling ammunition supplies while refilling countries’ stocks, according to documents obtained by POLITICO.
The plan has two major elements.
First, the EU will spend €1 billion to partially reimburse countries that can immediately donate ammunition from their own stockpiles. Secondly, countries will work together to jointly purchase €1 billion in new ammunition — the idea being that together they can negotiate bigger contracts at a lower price-per-shell.
EU ambassadors will discuss the proposal — prepared by the EU’s diplomatic wing, the European External Action Service — during a meeting on Wednesday.
The scheme — which POLITICO first reported on earlier this month — has come together rapidly in recent weeks in response to Ukraine’s pleas for more ammunition, specifically the 155-millimeter artillery shells it desperately needs to both hold territory and launch a spring counteroffensive.
And the figures, one of the documents notes, respond “to a specific request made by the Ukrainian minister of defense.”
The numbers are stark.
Estonia, which helped start the conversation in February about how the EU could jointly help fill a looming munitions shortage, has estimated that Russia is burning through 20,000-60,000 shells per day while Ukraine is trying to judiciously only use between 2,000 and 7,000.
Covering that figure will not come easy — or cheap.
Thus far, EU countries have only provided Ukraine with 350,000 155-millimeter shells in total, with the EU spending €450 million on partial reimbursements, said one EU official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive topic. But the official pegged the cost for each new shell at €4,000, meaning costs are growing.
To cover both the losses of countries dipping into their stockpiles and funding new ammunition buys, the EU is tapping the so-called European Peace Facility. The little-known fund sits outside of the EU’s normal budget, giving officials the flexibility to use it to cover weapons purchases — once a verboten concept within the EU, a self-proclaimed peace project.
Thus far, the facility has been used solely to partially reimburse countries for their weapons donations to Ukraine. Now, documents show countries are willing to funnel an additional €2 billion into the facility — €1 billion to cover some ammunition donations and €1 billion to support joint purchases of replacement shells.
Ukrainian artillerymen in the vicinity of Bakhmut, Donetsk | Ihor Tkachov/AFP via Getty Images
The documents foresee the European Defense Agency, an EU agency meant to better coordinate members’ security efforts, possibly playing a role in coordinating the joint procurement efforts. But individual countries could also help spearhead these negotiations, as long as the country is working with at least two other EU members and not creating competing bids for the shells that drive up prices.
The joint procurement plan covers not just EU countries but Norway as well — as POLITICO first reported — potentially opening the door to some of the money going to non-EU-based companies. Norway, however, which produces ammunition, is already relatively integrated into the EU market.
EU officials are now aiming to get a consensus agreement on the plan during a meeting on Monday of foreign and defense ministers, before getting final sign-off from the 27 EU leaders at a summit in Brussels a few days later.
The Baltic states and Poland want to make it easier to sanction the family members and entourage of Russia’s richest men and women but are facing resistance from Hungary, several EU diplomats told POLITICO.
Under its current rules, the EU can freeze the assets and impose visa bans on “leading businesspersons operating in Russia.” Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland now want to expand this definition, according to their proposal seen by POLITICO, to include “their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them.”
The EU has sanctioned more than 1,400 people in relation to Russia’s activities in Ukraine, many of who are Russian oligarchs. An additional 96 people could be added to the EU’s next sanctions package, draft documents seen by POLITICO indicate. Including oligarchs’ family members and other associates of oligarchs would make it possible to sanctions thousands more people without having to prove that they are directly involved in the war in Ukraine or acting in the economic interest of the Russian state.
This could, for example, apply to the ex-wife of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lyudmila Ocheretnaya, whose daughters have been sanctioned but has not been herself, and other members of the oligarchs’ entourage.
While some countries had doubts, legal experts are on board, said one of the diplomats.
Yet, in a meeting on Tuesday, at which EU ambassadors discussed the bloc’s next round of sanctions, Hungary resisted such plans, the diplomats said. Budapest argued that this is not part of the 10th sanctions package, said one of the diplomats. Hungary has long been skeptical of including too many names on the list.
Hungary also pushed to strike four people out the already existing sanctions list, two of the diplomats said.
It was not immediately possible to learn the identity of the four individuals.
That request is igniting tensions, and will be likely subject to another heated debate during a meeting of EU ambassadors on Wednesday. During that meeting, they will not only discuss the new package of sanctions against Russia, but also the so-called rollover of the 1,400-plus names already on the list to keep them sanctioned.
That’s because the regime is subject to a six-month review, which has hitherto been more or less a formality. Now, Hungary is using this extension review as leverage by insisting that four specific people have to be struck from the EU’s existing sanctions list before it will agree to the rollover. If Hungary blocks the rollover and refuses to compromise, all 1,400 people would be de-listed, the two diplomats warned.
One of the diplomats didn’t hide his frustration: “It shows Hungary’s disregard for unity and European values that they are willing to risk this in the week where we commemorate one year since the Russian invasion,” he said.
And those aren’t the only measure that Hungary takes issue with. It also is chiefly against sanctioning personnel working in the nuclear sector.
But a Hungarian official poured water on this last point, saying that “the only open issue for Hungary is with the length of the rollover and not with the listings.”
On the oligarchs issue and the proposal of the Baltics and Poland, the same Hungarian official said that this is not part of the 10th package.
As all EU countries have to agree to the proposal, any country could veto the move even if all other 26 EU countries were in favor. Time is running out, with the EU wanting to adopt the 10th sanctions package before the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Friday.
“I woke at 5 o’clock,” the Estonian prime minister recalled recently. The phone was ringing. Her Lithuanian counterpart was on the line.
“Oh my God, it’s really happening,” came the ominous words, according to Kallas. Another call came in. This time it was the Latvian prime minister.
It was February 24, 2022. War had begun on the European continent.
The night before, Kallas had told her Cabinet members to keep their phones on overnight in anticipation of just this moment: Russia was blitzing Ukraine in an attempt to decapitate the government and seize the country. For those in Estonia and its Baltic neighbors, where memories of Soviet occupation linger, the first images of war tapped into a national terror.
“I went to bed hoping that I was not right,” Kallas said.
Across Europe, similar wakeup calls rolled in, as Russian tanks barrelled into Ukraine and missiles pierced the early morning sky. In recent weeks, POLITICO spoke with prime ministers, high-ranking EU and NATO officials, foreign ministers and diplomats — nearly 20 in total — to reflect on the war’s early days as it reaches its ruinous one-year mark on Friday. All described a similar foreboding that morning, a sense that the world had irrevocably changed.
Within a year, the Russian invasion would profoundly reshape Europe, upending traditional foreign policy presumptions, cleaving it from Russian energy and reawakening long-dormant arguments about extending the EU eastward.
But for those centrally involved in the war’s buildup, the events of February 24 are still seared in their memories.
In an interview with POLITICO, Charles Michel — head of the European Council, the EU body comprising all 27 national leaders — recalled how he received a call directly from Kyiv as the attacks began.
“I was woken up by Zelenskyy,” Michel recounted. It was around 3 a.m. The Ukrainian president told Michel: “The aggression had started and that it was a full-scale invasion.”
Michel hit the phones, speaking to prime ministers across the EU throughout the night.
Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell speak to the press on February 24, 2022 | Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty Images
By 5 a.m., EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell was in his office. Three hours later, he was standing next to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as the duo made the EU’s first major public statement about the dawning war. Von der Leyen then convened the 27 commissioners overseeing EU policy for an emergency meeting.
Elsewhere in Brussels, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg was on the phone with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who were six hours behind in Washington, D.C. He then raced over to NATO headquarters, where he urgently gathered the military alliance’s decision-making body.
The mood that morning, Stoltenberg recalled in a recent conversation with reporters, was “serious” but “measured and well-organized.”
In Ukraine, missiles had begun raining down in Kyiv, Odesa and Mariupol. Volodymyr Zelenskyy took to social media, confirming in a video that war had begun. He urged Ukrainians to stay calm.
These video updates would soon become a regular feature of Zelenskyy’s wartime leadership. But this first one was especially jarring — a message from a president whose life, whose country, was now at risk.
It would be one of the last times the Ukrainian president, dressed in a dove-gray suit jacket and crisp white shirt, appeared in civilian clothes.
Europe’s 21st-century Munich moment
February 24, 2022 is an indelible memory for those who lived through it. For many, however, it felt inevitable.
Five days before the invasion, Zelenskyy traveled to the Munich Security Conference, an annual powwow of defense and security experts frequented by senior politicians.
It was here that the Ukrainian leader made one final, desperate plea for more weapons and more sanctions, hitting out at Germany for promising helmets and chiding NATO countries for not doing enough.
“What are you waiting for?” he implored in the highly charged atmosphere in the Bayerischer Hof hotel. “We don’t need sanctions after bombardment happens, after we have no borders, no economy. Why would we need those sanctions then?”
The symbolism was rife — Munich, a city forever associated with appeasement following Neville Chamberlain’s ill-fated attempt to swap land for peace with Adolf Hitler in 1938, was now the setting for Zelenskyy’s last appeal to the West.
Zelenskyy, never missing a moment, seized the historical analogy.
Five days before the invasion, Zelenskyy traveled to the Munich Security Conference, where he made one final, desperate plea for more weapons and more sanctions | Pool photo by Ronald Wittek/Getty Images
“Has our world completely forgotten the mistakes of the 20th century?” he asked. “Where does appeasement policy usually lead to?”
But his calls for more arms were ignored, even as countries began ordering their citizens to evacuate and airlines began canceling flights in and out of the country.
A few days later, Zelenskyy’s warnings were coming true. On February 22, Vladimir Putin inched closer to war, recognizing the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine. It was a decisive moment for the Russian president, paving the way for his all-out assault less than 48 hours later.
The EU responded the next day — its first major action against Moscow’s activities in Ukraine since the escalation of tensions in 2021. Officials unveiled the first in what would be nine sanction packages against Russia (and counting).
In an equally significant move, a reluctant Germany finally pulled the plug on Nord Stream 2, the yet unopened gas pipeline linking Russia to northern Germany — the decision, made after months of pressure, presaged how the Russian invasion would soon upend the way Europeans powered their lives and heated their homes.
Summit showdown
As it happened, EU leaders were already scheduled to meet in Brussels on February 24, the day the invasion began. Charles Michel had summoned the leaders earlier that week to deal with the escalating crisis, and to sign off on the sanctions.
Throughout the afternoon, Brussels was abuzz — TV cameras from around the world had descended on the European quarter. Helicopters circled overhead.
European leaders gathered in Brussels following the invasion | Pool photo by Olivier Hoslet/AFP via Getty Images
Suddenly, the regular European Council meeting of EU leaders, oftena forum for technical document drafting as much as political decision-making, had become hugely consequential. With war unfolding, the world was looking at the EU to respond — and lead.
The meeting was scheduled to begin at 8 p.m. As leaders were gathering, news came that Russia had seized the Chernobyl nuclear plant, Moldova had declared a state of emergency and thousands of people were pouring out of Ukraine. Later that night, Zelenskyy announced a general mobilization:every man between the ages of 18 and 60 was being asked to fight.
Many leaders were wearing facemasks, a reminder that another crisis, which now seemed to pale in comparison, was still ever-present.
Just before joining colleagues at the Europa building in Brussels, Emmanuel Macron phoned Putin — the French president’s latest effort to mediate with the Russian leader. Macron had visited Moscow on February 7 but left empty-handed after five hours of discussions. He later said he made the call at Zelenskyy’s request, to ask Putin to stop the war.
“It did not produce any results,” Macron said of the call. “The Russian president has chosen war.”
Arriving at the summit, Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš captured the gravity of the moment. “Europe is experiencing the biggest military invasion since the Second World War,” he said. “Our response has to be united.”
But inside the room, divisions were on full display. How far, leaders wondered, could Europe go in sanctioning Russia, given the potential economic blowback? Countries dug in along fault lines that would become familiar in the succeeding months.
The realities of war soon pierced the academic debates. Zelenskyy’s team had set up a video link as missile strikes encircled the capital city, wanting to get the president talking to his EU counterparts.
One person present in the room recalled the percolating anxiety as the video feed beamed through — the image out of focus, the camera shaky. Then the picture sharpened and Zelenskyy appeared, dressed in a khaki shirt and looking deathly pale. His surroundings were faceless, an unknown room somewhere in Kyiv.
“Everyone was silent, the atmosphere was completely tense,” said the official who requested anonymity to speak freely.
Zelenskyy, shaken and utterly focused, told leaders that they may not see him again — the Kremlin wanted him dead.
Black smoke rises from a military airport in Chuguyev near Kharkiv on February 24, 2022 | Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images
“If you, EU leaders and leaders of the free world, do not really help Ukraine today, tomorrow the war will also knock at your door,” he warned, invoking an argument he would return to again and again: that this wasn’t just Ukraine’s war — it was Europe’s war.
Within hours, EU leaders had signed off on their second package of pre-prepared sanctions hitting Russia. But a fractious debate had already begun about what should come next.
The Baltic nations and Poland wanted more — more penalties, more economic punishments. Others were holding back. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi aired their reluctance about expelling Russian banks from the global SWIFT payment system. It was needed to pay for Russian gas, after all.
How quickly that would change.
Sanctions were not the only pressing matter. There was a humanitarian crisis unfolding on Europe’s doorstep. The EU had to both get aid into a war zone and prepare for a mass exodus of people fleeing it.
Janez Lenarčič, the EU’s crisis management commissioner, landed in Paris on the day of the invasion, returning from Niger. Officials started making plans to get ambulances, generators and medicine into Ukraine — ultimately comprising 85,000 tons of aid.
“The most complex, biggest and longest-ever operation” of its kind for the EU, he said.
By that weekend, there was also a plan for the refugees escaping Russian bombs. At a rare Sunday meeting, ministers agreed to welcome and distribute the escaping Ukrainians — a feat that has long eluded the EU for other migrants. Days later, they would grant Ukrainians the instant right to live and work in the EU — another first in an extraordinary time. Decisions that normally took years were now flying through in hours.
Looming over everything were Ukraine’s repeated — and increasingly dire — entreaties for more weapons. Europe’s military investments had lapsed in recent decades, and World War II still cast a dark shadow over countries like Germany, where the idea of sending arms to a warzone still felt verboten.
There were also quiet doubts (not to mention intelligence assessments). Would Ukraine even have its own government next week? Why risk war with Russia if it was days away from toppling Kyiv?
“What we didn’t know at that point was that the Ukrainian resistance would be so successful,” a senior NATO diplomat told POLITICO on condition of anonymity. “We were thinking there would be a change of regime [in Kyiv], what do we do?”
That, too, was all about to change.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed Germany on the night of Russia’s invasion | Pool photo by Hannibal Hanschke/Getty Images
By the weekend, Germany had sloughed off its reluctance, slowly warming to its role as a key military player. The EU, too, dipped its toe into historic waters that weekend, agreeing to help reimburse countries sending weapons to Ukraine — another startling first for a self-proclaimed peace project.
“I remember, saying, ‘OK, now we go for it,’” said Stefano Sannino, secretary-general of the EU’s diplomatic arm.
Ironically, the EU would refund countries using the so-called European Peace Facility — a little-known fund that was suddenly the EU’s main vehicle to support lethal arms going to a warzone.
Over at NATO, the alliance activated its defense plans and sent extra forces to the alliance’s eastern flank. The mission had two tracks, Stoltenberg recounted — “to support Ukraine, but also prevent escalation beyond Ukraine.”
Treading that fine line would become the defining balancing act over the coming year for the Western allies as they blew through one taboo after another.
Who knew what, when
As those dramatic, heady early days fade into history, Europeans are now grappling with what the war means — for their identity, for their sense of security and for the European Union that binds them together.
The invasion has rattled the core tenets underlying the European project, said Ivan Krastev, a prominent political scientist who has long studied Europe’s place in the world.
“For different reasons, many Europeans believed that this is a post-war Continent,” he said.
Post-World War II Europe was built on the assumption that open economic policies, trade between neighbors and mild military power would preserve peace.
“For the Europeans to accept the possibility of the war was basically to accept the limits of our own model,” Krastev argued.
The disbelief has bred self-reflection: Has the war permanently changed the EU? Will a generation that had confined memories of World War II and the Cold War to the past view the next conflict differently?
And, perhaps most acutely, did Europe miss the signs?
Ukrainian refugees gather and rest upon their arrival at the main railway station in Berlin | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images
“The start of that war has changed our lives, that’s for sure,” said Romanian Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu. It wasn’t, however, unexpected, he argued. “We are very attentive to what happens in our region,” he said. “The signs were quite clear.”
Aurescu pointed back to April 2021 as the moment he knew: “It was quite clear that Russia was preparing an aggression against Ukraine.”
Not everyone in Europe shared that assessment, though — to the degree that U.S. officials became worried. They started a public and private campaign in 2021 to warn Europe of an imminent invasion as Russia massed its troops on the Ukrainian border.
In November 2021, von der Leyen made her first trip to the White House. She sat down with Joe Biden in the Oval Office, surrounded by a coterie of national security and intelligence officials. Biden had just received a briefing before the gathering on the Russia battalion buildup and wanted to sound the alarm.
“The president was very concerned,” said one European official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive conversations. “This was a time when no one in Europe was paying any attention, even the intelligence services.”
But others disputed the narrative that Europe was unprepared as America sounded the alarm.
“It’s a question of perspective. You can see the same information, but come to a different conclusion,” said one senior EU official involved in discussions in the runup to the war, while conceding that the U.S. and U.K. — both members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance — did have better information.
Even if those sounding the alarm proved right, said Pierre Vimont, a former secretary-general of the EU’s diplomatic wing and Macron’s Russia envoy until the war broke out, it was hard to know in advance what, exactly, to plan for.
“What type of military operation would it be?” he recalled people debating. A limited operation in the east? A full occupation? A surgical strike on Kyiv?
Here’s where most landed: Russia’s onslaught was horrifying — its brutality staggering. But the signs had been there. Something was going to happen.
“We knew that the invasion is going to happen, and we had shared intelligence,” Stoltenberg stressed. “Of course, until the planes are flying and the battle tanks are rolling, and the soldiers are marching, you can always change your plans. But the more we approached the 24th of February last year, the more obvious it was.”
Then on the day, he recounted, it was a matter of dutifully enacting the plan: “We were prepared, we knew exactly what to do.”
“You may be shocked by this invasion,” he added, “but you cannot be surprised.”
Clea Caulcutt and Cristina Gallardo contributed reporting.
MUNICH — NATO’s eastern flank has found its voice — but Joe Biden’s visit is a reminder that Western capitals still have the weight.
After Russia bombed its way into Ukraine, the military alliance’s eastern members won praise for their prescient warnings (not to mention a few apologies). They garnered respect for quickly emptying their weapons stockpiles for Kyiv and boosting defense spending to new heights. Now, they’re driving the conversation on how to deal with Russia.
In short, eastern countries suddenly have the ear of traditional Western powers — and they are trying to move the needle.
“We draw the red line, then we waste the time, then we cross this red line,” Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said over the weekend at the Munich Security Conference, describing a now-familiar cycle of debates among Ukraine’s partners as eastern capitals push others to move faster.
The region’s sudden prominence will be on full display as U.S. President Joe Biden travels to Poland this week, where he will sit down with leaders of the so-called Bucharest Nine — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
The choice is both symbolic and practical. Washington is keen to show its eastern partners it wants their input — and to remind Vladimir Putin of the consequences should the Kremlin leader spread his war into NATO territory.
Yet when it comes to allies’ most contentious decisions, like what arms to place where, the eastern leaders ultimately still have to defer to leaders like Biden — and his colleagues in Western powers like Germany. They are the ones holding the largest quantities of modern tanks, fighter jets and long-range missiles, after all.
“My job,” Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said in Munich, is “to move the pendulum of imagination of my partners in western Europe.”
“Our region has risen in relevance,” added Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský in an interview. But Western countries are still “much stronger” on the economic and military front, he added. “They are still the backbone.”
They’re listening … now
When Latvian Defense Minister Ināra Mūrniece entered politics over a decade ago, she recalled the skepticism that greeted her and like-minded countries when they discussed Russia on the global stage.
“They didn’t understand us,” she said in an interview earlier this month. People saw the region as “escalating the picture,” she added.
Latvian Defense Minister Ināra Mūrniece | Gints Ivuskans/AFP via Getty Images
February 24, 2022, changed things. The images of Russia rolling tanks and troops into Ukraine shocked many Westerners — and started changing minds. The Russian atrocities that came shortly after in places like Bucha and Irpin were “another turning point,” Mūrniece said.
Now, the eastern flank plays a key role in defining the alliance’s narrative — and its understanding of Russia.
“Our voice is now louder and more heard,” said Romanian Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu.
The Bucharest Nine — an informal format that brings together the region for dialogue with the U.S. and occasionally other partners — is one of the vehicles regional governments are using to showcase their interests.
“It has become an authoritative voice in terms of assessment of the security situation, in terms of assessment of needs,” Aurescu said in an interview in Munich. NATO is listening to the group for a simple reason, he noted: “The security threats are coming from this part of our neighborhood.”
Power shifts … slowly
While the eastern flank has prodded its western partners to send once-unthinkable weapons to Ukraine, the power balance has not completely flipped. Far from it.
Washington officials retain the most sway in the Western alliance. Behind them, several western European capitals take the lead.
“Without the Germans things don’t move — without the Americans things don’t move for sure,” said one senior western European diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak publicly.
And at this stage of the war, as Ukraine pushes for donations of the most modern weapons — fighter jets, advanced tanks, longer-range missile systems — it’s the alliance’s largest economies and populations that are in focus.
“It’s very easy for me to say that, ‘Of course, give fighter jets’ — I don’t have them,” Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas told reporters earlier this month.
Asked if his country would supply Kyiv with F-16 fighter jets, Morawiecki conceded in Munich, “we have not too many of them.” | Omar Marques/Getty Images
“So it’s up to those countries to say who have,” she said. “If I would have, I would give — but I don’t.”
And even some eastern countries who have jets don’t want to move without their Western counterparts.
Asked if his country would supply Kyiv with F-16 fighter jets, Morawiecki conceded in Munich, “we have not too many of them.” He did say, however, that Poland could offer older jets — if the allies could pull together a coalition, that is.
Another challenge for advocates of a powerful eastern voice within NATO is that the eastern flank itself is diverse.
Priorities vary even among like-minded countries based on their geographies. And, notably, there are some Russia-friendly outliers.
Hungary, for example, does not provide any weapons assistance to Ukraine and continues to maintain a relationship with the Kremlin. In fact, Budapest has become so isolated in Western policy circles that no Hungarian government officials attended the Munich Security Conference.
“I think the biggest problem in Hungary is the rhetoric of leadership, which sometimes really crosses the red line,” said the Czech Republic’s Lipavský, who was cautious to add that Budapest does fulfill NATO obligations, participating in alliance defense efforts.
Just for now?
There are also questions about whether the east’s moment in the limelight is a permanent fixture or product of the moment. After all, China, not Russia, may be seizing western attention in the future.
“It’s obvious that their voice is becoming louder, but that’s also a consequence of the geopolitical situation we’re in,” said the senior western European diplomat. “I’m not sure if it’s sustainable in the long run.”
A second senior western European diplomat, who also spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal alliance dynamics, said that the eastern flank countries sometimes take a tough tone “because of the fear of the pivot to China.”
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has also reiterated that western alliance members play a role in defending the eastern flank | Johannes Simon/Getty Images
Asked if the war has changed the balance of influence within the alliance, French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna said: “Yes and no.”
“We have to defend our territories, it is as simple as that,” she told POLITICO in Munich. “In order to do so we had to reinforce the eastern flank — Russia is on that part of the continent.”
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has also reiterated that western alliance members play a role in defending the eastern flank.
Asked whether NATO’s center of gravity is shifting east, he said on a panel in Munich that “what has shifted east is NATO’s presence.”
But, he added, “of course many of those troops come from the western part of the alliance — so this demonstrates how NATO is together and how we support each other.”
And in western Europe, there is a sense that the east does deserve attention at the moment.
“They might not have all the might,” said the second senior western European diplomat. “But they deserve solidarity.”
The EU was quick to hit Russia with sanctions after Vladimir Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine — but it took time and an escalation of measures before Moscow started to feel any real damage.
Since the war started in late February last year, November was the first month when the value of EU imports from Russia was lower than in the same month of 2021. Until then, the bloc had been sending more cash than before the conflict — every month, for nine months. More recent data is not yet available.
The main reason behind this? Energy dependency on Russia and skyrocketing energy prices. But that’s not the whole story: Some EU countries were much quicker than others to reduce trade flows with Moscow — and some were still increasing them at the end of last year.
Here is a full breakdown of how the war has changed EU trade with Russia, in figures and charts:
Tensions between Russia and Baltic EU member countries Estonia and Latvia escalated Monday after Moscow told Estonia’s ambassador to leave.
The Russian foreign ministry said it had asked Estonia’s ambassador to depart on February 7, citing “Russophobia” and Tallinn’s reduction of Russian embassy staff in the country.
“The Estonian leadership has been deliberately destroying the entire set of relations with Russia in recent years. Total Russophobia and the cultivation of animosity with regards to our country have been elevated by Tallinn to the rank of a state policy,” the Russian ministry said in a statement.
Earlier this month, Estonia told Russia to cut the number of diplomats in Tallinn to eight to match the number of Estonian diplomats in Moscow. Because of this, the Russian foreign ministry said Monday it would downgrade diplomatic relations with Tallinn and each country would be represented by an interim charge d’affaires instead of an ambassador.
Estonia responded in kind by saying the Russian ambassador in Tallinn must also leave the country on February 7.
“Russia’s steps will not deter us from providing continued support to Ukraine, which has been fighting for its sovereignty and the security of us all for nearly a year now,” said Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu. “We will continue to support Ukraine as Russia is planning large-scale attacks, and we call on other like-minded countries to increase their assistance to Ukraine.”
Neighboring Latvia’s Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs later said his country would follow Estonia and also lower the level of diplomatic relations with Russia, effective February 24, “demanding Russia to act accordingly.”
Lithuania’s foreign ministry voiced “full solidarity” with Estonia and said Russia’s “unfounded and unjustified” move was “a sign of simple desperation.” Vilnius already expelled its Russian ambassador in April after reports of atrocities by Russian soldiers in the Ukrainian town of Bucha.
The diplomatic row came as EU foreign ministers met in Brussels to discuss Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, among other topics. The three Baltic countries have been vocal about demanding tougher sanctions for Russia as well as better assistance for Ukraine, with the trio urging Germany over the weekend to provide Leopard tanks to Kyiv.
Federal prosecutors announced a plea deal and $2 billion forfeiture Tuesday with Danske Bank, one of Denmark’s largest banks, for illegally allowing foreign actors to funnel money through their branch in Estonia in order to gain unlawful access to the US financial system.
The guilty plea marks the end of a years-long investigation into the company after accusations that it funneled billions of dollars in illicit payments from high-risk clients, including in Russia, into countries including the United States.
Danske Bank agreed forfeit over $2 billion as part of the plea agreement, according to the Justice Department, which required the bank to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud.
In addition to the criminal guilty plea, the SEC announced a separate settlement with Danske Bank over the allegations of money laundering in which the bank agreed to pay approximately $413 million.
The Justice Department said that it will credit the bank approximately $850 million to settle other claims with SEC and the Danish authorities.
“Today’s guilty plea by Danske Bank and two-billion-dollar penalty demonstrate that the Department of Justice will fiercely guard the integrity of the U.S. financial system from tainted foreign money – Russian or otherwise,” Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco said in a statement Tuesday. “Whether you are a U.S. or foreign bank, if you use the U.S. financial system, you must comply with our laws… Failure to do so may well be a one-way ticket to a multi-billion-dollar guilty plea.”
The bank, according to the Justice Department, was aware of billions of dollars being funneled over an eight-year period through an Estonia branch into accounts in the United States and elsewhere without the proper anti-money laundering information about each account. The Estonia branch of the bank processed around $160 billion during that time period, prosecutors say.
The bank promised customers they could move money through an Estonia branch with little to no oversight, prosecutors allege. Bank employees in Estonia conspired with their customers, the department alleged, and helped “to shield the true nature of their transactions, including by using shell companies that obscured actual ownership of the funds.”
Though Danske Bank was aware the branch had potentially broken the law and was not meeting the standards of the company’s anti-money laundering program, executives overlooked the transactions and lied about information regarding Danske Bank Estonia’s customers and their risk profile.
European far-right politicians just stormed to victory in Italy, after achieving historic results in France and Sweden.
“Everywhere in Europe, people aspire to take their destiny back into their own hands!” said Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s far-right National Rally Party.
But if you think there is a new wave of right-wing radicalism sweeping Europe, you’d be wrong. Something else is going on.
Analysis by POLITICO’s Poll of Polls suggests far-right parties in the region on average did not increase their support by even one percentage point between the start of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine in February and today.
POLITICO looked at the median and average increase of all parties organized in right-wing European Parliament groups of Identity and Democracy, the European Conservatives and Reformists or unaffiliated parties with political far-right positions.
Overall, the results indicate that if an increase in support occurred for far-right parties, it happened several years ago.
The Sweden Democrats’ first surge happened after the 2014 election, when the party grew from around 10 percent to 20 percent, the same one-fifth share of the vote they received in this year’s election. The far-right Alternative for Germany AfD in Germany grew fast in 2015 and 2016 reaching 14 percent in POLITICO’s polling tracker. In Italy, the Northern League overtook Forza Italia for the first time in early 2015, and peaked in 2019 at 37 percent before starting a downward trend ending on 9 percent in last month’s election. In the Italian election, voters mostly switched between rival right-wing camps.
The far-right has moved from the fringes of politics into the mainstream, not only influencing the political center but also entering the arena of power.
“There is a normalization of far-right parties as an integral part of the political landscape,” said Cathrine Thorleifsson, who researches extremism at the University of Oslo. “They have been accepted by the electorate and also by other, conventional parties.”
Cooperation between the center-right and the extreme-right has become less taboo.
“The rise of far-right parties is only part of the story. The facilitating and mainstreaming of far-right parties as well as the adoption of far-right frames and positions by other parties is at least as important,” tweeted Cas Mudde, a leading scholar on the issue.
This may risk destabilizing Europe even more than winning a couple of percentage points in the polls.
Italy’s far-right firebrand Giorgia Meloni is a clear-cut example. While her party draws its origin from groups founded by former fascists, she’ll now lead the EU’s third-largest economy.
Leader of Italian far-right party “Fratelli d’Italia” (Brothers of Italy), Giorgia Meloni | Pitro Cruciatti/AFP via Getty Images
In Sweden, the center-right party has started coalition talks for a minority government which would have to draw on opposition support, most likely from the far-right Swedish Democrats. Far-right parties have also entered governments in Austria, Finland, Estonia and Italy. Other countries are likely to follow.
George Simion, the leader of Romania’s far-right party, Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), celebrated Meloni’s win in Italy, saying his party is likely to follow in their footsteps.
Spain heads to the ballot box next year and socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez may have a tough time winning re-election. The conservative People’s Party is between five and seven points ahead of the Spanish socialists in all the published polls, but it is unlikely to garner enough votes to secure a governing majority outright.
That means it may have to come to an agreement with far-right party Vox, whose leader, Santiago Abascal, is an ally of Meloni’s. While the People’s Party previously refused to govern with Vox, last spring its newly elected leader, Alberto Núnez-Feijóo, greenlit a coalition agreement with the ultranationalist group in Spain’s central Castilla y León region.
Tom Van Grieken, the right-wing Belgian politician, also pointed to Spain as the next likely example, especially because of the possible cooperation with the PP. “All over Europe, we see conservative parties who are considering breaking the cordon sanitaire,” he said, referring to the refusal of other parties to work with the far-right. “They are tired of compromising with their ideological counterparts, the parties at the left end of the spectrum.”
Chairman of Vlaams Belang party Tom Van Grieken | Stephanie Le Coqc/EFE via EPA
This didn’t happen overnight. The far-right worked hard to shrug off their extremist, neo-Nazi image.
“In some of the reporting on the Swedish Democrats, you’d think they’ll deport people on trains as soon as they’re in power. Come on, these parties have changed,” said one EU official with right-wing affiliations.
The far-right invested in “image adjustment and trying to tread carefully with some issues, while unashamedly catering to others,” said Nina Wiesehomeier, a political scientist at the IE University of Madrid. “This is particularly obvious in Italy right now, with Meloni sticking to the slogan of ‘God, homeland, family,’ as a continuation, while having tried to purge the party from more radical elements.”
In Belgium’s northern region of Flanders, the right-wing Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) explicitly dismisses the label “extreme-right.” Just like his counterparts in Italy, Sweden and France, Van Grieken, the party’s president, denounced the more extremist positions of his group’s founding fathers and moderated his political message to make voting for the far-right socially acceptable.
Overt racism is taboo. Instead, the rhetoric changes to criticizing an open-door migration policy. By carefully catering to centrist voters, the far-right aims for a bigger slice of the cake, while still riding on the anti-establishment discontent.
“There is a clear fault line between the winners of globalization and the nationalists,” Van Grieken told POLITICO. “This comes on top on the concerns about mass migration, whether it’s in Malmö, Rome or other European cities.”
Perfect storm
Now, the time is right to capitalize on that transformation.
As Europe is battling record inflation and Europeans fear exorbitant heating bills, governments warn about the political implications of a “winter of discontent.”
“It’s a massive drainage of European prosperity,” Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo told POLITICO recently. “In the current situation, it’s hard to believe in progress, it’s very hard to make progress. So there’s a very pessimistic feeling.”
The current war in Ukraine is the latest in a succession of crises — in global finance, migration and the pandemic. Experts argue that this is key to understanding the rising support for the far-right.
“Such existential crises have a destabilizing effect and lead to fear,” said Carl Devos, a professor in political science at Ghent University. “Fear is the breeding ground for the far-right. People tend to translate that fear and outrage into radical voting behaviour.”
Migration and identity politics are less prominent in the media because of the Ukraine war and rising energy prices, but they’re still key issues in right-wing debate.
In Austria, the coalition parties fought over whether or not asylum seekers should receive climate bonuses. In the Netherlands, the death of a baby at the asylum center Ter Apel led to a renewed debate over the overcrowded migration centers.
The combination of those issues is likely to feed into more right-wing wins across the continent. “The far-right offers nationalist, protectionist solutions to the globalized crises, said Thorleifsson. “We see how the migration issue was momentarily off the agenda during the pandemic, but now it’s back.”
Aitor Hernández-Morales, Camille Gijs and Ana Fota contributed reporting.
The presidents of nine NATO countries in central and eastern Europe declared on Sunday that they would never recognize the annexation by Russia of several Ukrainian regions. Hungary and Bulgaria were conspicuously absent from the signatories.
In a joint statement, the leaders also supported a path to NATO membership for Ukraine.
The nine leaders demanded that “Russia immediately withdraw from all occupied territories” and encouraged “all allies to substantially increase their military aid to Ukraine,” according to the statement.
“We reiterate our support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine,” they wrote.
The statement comes two days after Russian President Vladimir Putin declared he was annexing four Ukrainian regions, a move the West has described as an illegal land-grab. It was signed by the presidents of Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro and North Macedonia.
The signatories also wrote that they “firmly stand behind” a NATO decision in 2008 over Ukraine’s future membership to the alliance. At the time, NATO allies pledged that Ukraine would eventually become a member. But as that process stalled over the years, it seemed increasingly unlikely that Ukraine’s bid would become a reality.
In the wake of the annexations, Ukraine formally applied for a fast-track accession to NATO, with hopes to jump-start its membership bid.
On Sunday, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted that 10 NATO countries supported Ukraine’s membership to the alliance — including many countries that used to belong to the former Soviet bloc.
NATO countries however have hesitated at including a new member that is at war — and by treaty they would be forced to defend. In recent months, NATO has also welcomed the application of two new countries in Europe – Finland and Sweden, spurred by security concerns after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The European startup Payoro launches its fintech platform Payoro Connect — the first in a suite of innovative open banking initiatives from the young company
Press Release –
updated: Sep 29, 2021
TALLINN, Estonia, September 29, 2021 (Newswire.com)
– European fintech startups are growing fast. With solid regulatory frameworks, advanced technology and a dynamic, tight-knit European market, many consider these upstart fintechs well-poised to take on the global financial world.
Established in COVID-19-stricken 2020, Payoro is a new European fintech startup. Based out of Gibraltar and Estonia, Payoro aims to develop open banking technology products, offering both B2C and B2B bank-tech solutions. Now, Payoro launches Payoro Connect, a platform that may change how banking relationships are established.
Martin Osterloh, the newly appointed CEO of Payoro, comes from the traditional banking sector. For 13 years, he worked as Vice President Digital Sales at Wirecard Bank. He sees the launch of Payoro Connect as a vital step in the young company’s journey. “With the launch of Payoro Connect, we want to position Payoro as an innovative player in the banking technology and embedded finance space. Our solution allows large companies to move fast and adapt to the ever-changing financial landscape. What used to take days, maybe even weeks, now takes mere minutes — all whilst satisfying strict SCA rules.”
At its core, the Payoro Connect platform is a bank account servicing tool, connecting consumers with European financial institutions. Payoro Connect enables dynamic bank account servicing and money transfer through partner relationships and innovative fintech. In accordance with PSD2, all user information is verified based on strong customer authentication (SCA). Payoro Connect allows international banks and electronic money institutions to focus on what they are best at: handling money and building customer relationships.
Osterloh has high hopes for future products and services. “Payoro Connect is the first product we are launching, but certainly not the last. It makes great sense for Payoro to continue its innovation-fueled exploration of the exciting intersection of banking, technology and user experience. The embedded finance market alone is estimated to reach a market value of $3 billion by 2030. That is really where we see the opportunity — to lodge ourselves between traditional banks and future savvy consumers and companies.”
Established in 2020, Payoro is a banking technology company with offices in Gibraltar and Estonia.
More Information: Martin Osterloh, CEO of Payoro, martin@payoro.com
