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Tag: emergency powers

  • What to know about the Supreme Court arguments over Trump’s tariffs

    Three lower courts have ruled President Donald Trump’s use of emergency powers to impose worldwide tariffs to be illegal. Now the Supreme Court, with three justices Trump appointed and generally favorable to muscular presidential power, will have the final word.In roughly two dozen emergency appeals, the justices have largely gone along with Trump in temporarily allowing parts of his aggressive second-term agenda to take effect while lawsuits play out.But the case being argued Wednesday is the first in which the court will render a final decision on a Trump policy. The stakes are enormous, both politically and financially.The Republican president has made tariffs a central piece of his economic and foreign policy and has said it would be a “disaster” if the Supreme Court rules against him.Here are some things to know about the tariffs arguments at the Supreme Court:Tariffs are taxes on importsThey are paid by companies that import finished products or parts, and the added cost can be passed on to consumers.Through September, the government has reported collecting $195 billion in revenue generated from the tariffs.The Constitution gives Congress the power to impose tariffs, but Trump has claimed extraordinary power to act without congressional approval by declaring national emergencies under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act.In February, he invoked the law to impose tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China, saying that the illegal flow of immigrants and drugs across the U.S. border amounted to a national emergency and that the three countries needed to do more to stop it.In April, he imposed worldwide tariffs after declaring the United States’ longstanding trade deficits “a national emergency.”Libertarian-backed businesses and states challenged the tariffs in federal courtChallengers to Trump’s actions won rulings from a specialized trade court, a district judge in Washington and a business-focused appeals court, also in the nation’s capital.Those courts found that Trump could not justify tariffs under the emergency powers law, which doesn’t mention them. But they left the tariffs in place in the meantime.The appeals court relied on major questions, a legal doctrine devised by the Supreme Court that requires Congress to speak clearly on issues of “vast economic and political significance.”The major questions doctrine doomed several Biden policiesConservative majorities struck down three of then-President Joe Biden’s initiatives related to the coronavirus pandemic. The court ended the Democrat’s pause on evictions, blocked a vaccine mandate for large businesses and prevented student loan forgiveness that would have totaled $500 billion over 10 years.In comparison, the stakes in the tariff case are much higher. The taxes are estimated to generate $3 trillion over 10 years.The challengers in the tariffs case have cited writings by the three Trump appointees, Justices Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, in calling on the court to apply similar limitations on a signal Trump policy.Barrett described a babysitter taking children on roller coasters and spending a night in a hotel based on a parent’s encouragement to “make sure the kids have fun.”“In the normal course, permission to spend money on fun authorizes a babysitter to take children to the local ice cream parlor or movie theater, not on a multiday excursion to an out-of-town amusement park,” Barrett wrote in the student loans case. “If a parent were willing to greenlight a trip that big, we would expect much more clarity than a general instruction to ‘make sure the kids have fun.’”Kavanaugh, though, has suggested the court should not apply the same limiting standard to foreign policy and national security issues.A dissenting appellate judge also wrote that Congress purposely gave presidents more latitude to act through the emergency powers law.Some of the businesses that sued also are raising a separate legal argument in an appeal to conservative justices, saying that Congress could not constitutionally delegate its taxing power to the president.The nondelegation principle has not been used in 90 years, since the Supreme Court struck down some New Deal legislation.But Gorsuch authored a dissent in June that would have found the Federal Communications Commission’s universal service fee an unconstitutional delegation. Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas joined the dissent.“What happens when Congress, weary of the hard business of legislating and facing strong incentives to pass the buck, cedes its lawmaking power, clearly and unmistakably, to an executive that craves it?” Gorsuch wrote.The justices could act more quickly than usual in issuing a decisionThe court only agreed to hear the case in September, scheduling arguments less than two months later. The quick turnaround, at least by Supreme Court standards, suggests that the court will try to act fast.High-profile cases can take half a year or more to resolve, often because the majority and dissenting opinions go through rounds of revision.But the court can act quickly when deadline pressure dictates. Most recently, the court ruled a week after hearing arguments in the TikTok case, unanimously upholding a law requiring the popular social media app to be banned unless it was sold by its Chinese parent company. Trump has intervened several times to keep the law from taking effect while negotiations continue with China.

    Three lower courts have ruled President Donald Trump’s use of emergency powers to impose worldwide tariffs to be illegal. Now the Supreme Court, with three justices Trump appointed and generally favorable to muscular presidential power, will have the final word.

    In roughly two dozen emergency appeals, the justices have largely gone along with Trump in temporarily allowing parts of his aggressive second-term agenda to take effect while lawsuits play out.

    But the case being argued Wednesday is the first in which the court will render a final decision on a Trump policy. The stakes are enormous, both politically and financially.

    The Republican president has made tariffs a central piece of his economic and foreign policy and has said it would be a “disaster” if the Supreme Court rules against him.

    Here are some things to know about the tariffs arguments at the Supreme Court:

    Tariffs are taxes on imports

    They are paid by companies that import finished products or parts, and the added cost can be passed on to consumers.

    Through September, the government has reported collecting $195 billion in revenue generated from the tariffs.

    The Constitution gives Congress the power to impose tariffs, but Trump has claimed extraordinary power to act without congressional approval by declaring national emergencies under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

    In February, he invoked the law to impose tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China, saying that the illegal flow of immigrants and drugs across the U.S. border amounted to a national emergency and that the three countries needed to do more to stop it.

    In April, he imposed worldwide tariffs after declaring the United States’ longstanding trade deficits “a national emergency.”

    Libertarian-backed businesses and states challenged the tariffs in federal court

    Challengers to Trump’s actions won rulings from a specialized trade court, a district judge in Washington and a business-focused appeals court, also in the nation’s capital.

    Those courts found that Trump could not justify tariffs under the emergency powers law, which doesn’t mention them. But they left the tariffs in place in the meantime.

    The appeals court relied on major questions, a legal doctrine devised by the Supreme Court that requires Congress to speak clearly on issues of “vast economic and political significance.”

    The major questions doctrine doomed several Biden policies

    Conservative majorities struck down three of then-President Joe Biden’s initiatives related to the coronavirus pandemic. The court ended the Democrat’s pause on evictions, blocked a vaccine mandate for large businesses and prevented student loan forgiveness that would have totaled $500 billion over 10 years.

    In comparison, the stakes in the tariff case are much higher. The taxes are estimated to generate $3 trillion over 10 years.

    The challengers in the tariffs case have cited writings by the three Trump appointees, Justices Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, in calling on the court to apply similar limitations on a signal Trump policy.

    Barrett described a babysitter taking children on roller coasters and spending a night in a hotel based on a parent’s encouragement to “make sure the kids have fun.”

    “In the normal course, permission to spend money on fun authorizes a babysitter to take children to the local ice cream parlor or movie theater, not on a multiday excursion to an out-of-town amusement park,” Barrett wrote in the student loans case. “If a parent were willing to greenlight a trip that big, we would expect much more clarity than a general instruction to ‘make sure the kids have fun.’”

    Kavanaugh, though, has suggested the court should not apply the same limiting standard to foreign policy and national security issues.

    A dissenting appellate judge also wrote that Congress purposely gave presidents more latitude to act through the emergency powers law.

    Some of the businesses that sued also are raising a separate legal argument in an appeal to conservative justices, saying that Congress could not constitutionally delegate its taxing power to the president.

    The nondelegation principle has not been used in 90 years, since the Supreme Court struck down some New Deal legislation.

    But Gorsuch authored a dissent in June that would have found the Federal Communications Commission’s universal service fee an unconstitutional delegation. Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas joined the dissent.

    “What happens when Congress, weary of the hard business of legislating and facing strong incentives to pass the buck, cedes its lawmaking power, clearly and unmistakably, to an executive that craves it?” Gorsuch wrote.

    The justices could act more quickly than usual in issuing a decision

    The court only agreed to hear the case in September, scheduling arguments less than two months later. The quick turnaround, at least by Supreme Court standards, suggests that the court will try to act fast.

    High-profile cases can take half a year or more to resolve, often because the majority and dissenting opinions go through rounds of revision.

    But the court can act quickly when deadline pressure dictates. Most recently, the court ruled a week after hearing arguments in the TikTok case, unanimously upholding a law requiring the popular social media app to be banned unless it was sold by its Chinese parent company. Trump has intervened several times to keep the law from taking effect while negotiations continue with China.

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  • Fifth Circuit Will Rehear Alien Enemies Act Case En Banc

    AI-generated image.

    Earlier this week the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided to grant an en banc rehearing in W.M.M. v. Trump. The panel decision in that case ruled that Trump’s invocation of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 was illegal, because illegal migration and drug trafficking and other activities of the Venezuelan drug gang Tren de Aragua do not qualify as a war, “invasion,” or “predatory incursion.” The AEA can only be used to detain and deport immigrants when one of these extraordinary conditions, or a threat thereof, exists.The case will now be reheard by all 17 active Fifth Circuit judges.

    In an amicus brief I coauthored in the case on behalf of the Brennan Center, the Cato Institute, and others, we argue that “invasion” and “predatory incursion” require a military attack, and that courts should not defer to presidential assertions that these extraordinary conditions exist. As James Madison put it in addressing this issue, “invasion is an operation of war.”

    Otherwise, the AEA and the Constitution’s grant of extraordinary emergency powers when an “invasion” exists could be invoked by the president anytime he wants, thereby creating grave dangers to civil liberties and to the separation of powers. For example, the Constitution states that, in the event  of “invasion,” the federal government can suspend the writ of habeas corpus, thereby authorizing indefinite detention without due process – not only of recent immigrants, but also US citizens.

    Prominent conservative Judge Andrew Oldham wrote a lengthy dissent to the panel decision, arguing that the definition of “invasion” and other terms in the AEA is left to the unreviewable discretion of the executive. I outlined some key flaws in his argument here. In a solo concurring opinion in United States v. Abbott, a previous Fifth Circuit en banc case, Judge James Ho, another well-known conservative, similarly argued  the definition of “invasion” is an unreviewable “political question,” left to the determination of the executive, and also of state governments (under Ho’s approach, they too can claim and “invasion” exists whenever there is illegal migration or drug smuggling). I criticized Judge Ho’s reasoning here.

    Both Ho’s approach and Oldham’s would give the president (and, in Ho’s case, also state governments) unlimited authority to declare an “invasion” at any time, and thereby wield sweeping authority to undermine civil liberties and the separation of powers. The federal government could use this power to detain and deport even legal immigrants, and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus (including for US citizens). Under the Constitution, in the event of “invasion” state governments can “engage in war” even without congressional authorization. I wrote about the dangers of that in greater detail here, as well as in the amicus brief.

    Such vast unilateral authority goes against the text and original meaning of both the Constitution and the Alien Enemies Act. British violations of the writ of habeas corpus were one of the main grievances that led to the American Revolution, and the Founding Fathers did not intend to give the president  the power to replicate those abuses anytime he might want.

    I will have more to say about these issues as the AEA litigation continues in this case and in other cases currently before various federal courts. We will likely file an updated version of our amicus brief before the en banc Fifth Circuit.

    Ilya Somin

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  • Supreme Court Will Hear Our Case Challenging Trump’s Tariffs – and Two Other Related Cases

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    Today, the Supreme Court decided to review V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, our case challenging President Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs. The case was filed by the Liberty Justice Center and myself on behalf of five small businesses harmed by the tariffs. It is consolidated with a similar suit filed by twelve state governments, led by the state of Oregon. Both challenge massive tariffs Trump has imposed using his supposed authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), and both will now be heard on the same accelerated schedule. The Supreme Court also decided to hear Learning Resources v. Trump, a case challenging many of the same tariffs, filed by two importers in a different federal court.

    We, the twelve states, and the Learning Resources plaintiffs all prevailed in the lower courts, and I hope the Supreme Court will also recognize the IEEPA tariffs are illegal for a variety of reasons. Fundamentally, these cases come down to whether the president has virtually unlimited power to impose taxes in the form of tariffs on the American people, much like an absolute monarch. The Framers of the Constitution deliberately denied the executive the kind of unbridled tax authority claimed by power-grabbing English kings, like Charles I.

    The Court’s order is short. For convenience, I reprint it here in full:

    LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL. V. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF U.S., ET AL. [24-1287]
    TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF U.S., ET AL. V. V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL. [25-250]

    The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment in No. 24-1287 is granted. The motion to expedite and the petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 25-250 are granted. The cases are consolidated, and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument. Respondents in No. 24-1287 and petitioners in No. 25-250 shall file an opening brief on the merits on or before Friday, September 19, 2025. Any amicus curiae briefs in support or in support of neither party shall be filed on or before Tuesday, September 23, 2025. Petitioners in No. 24-1287 and respondents in No. 25-250 shall file response briefs on the merits on or before Monday, October 20, 2025. Any amicus curiae briefs in support shall be filed on or before Friday, October 24, 2025. A reply brief shall be filed by Thursday, October 30, 2025. The cases will be set for argument in the first week of the November 2025 argument session.

    The Liberty Justice Center has issued a statement about the order, which I reprint below. No one will be surprised that I agree with it! Here it is:

    Today, the Supreme Court granted the government’s expedited request for Supreme Court review (writ of certiorari) in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, agreeing to review whether the Trump Administration’s “Liberation Day” tariffs exceed the President’s legal and constitutional authority. Given the importance of the issues and the need for a prompt resolution, the Liberty Justice Center agreed to the government’s request.

    The Liberty Justice Center, along with legal scholar Ilya Somin, filed this case on April 14 in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) on behalf of five American small businesses harmed by the tariffs. The CIT held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, does not give the President unlimited unilateral authority to impose tariffs on the American people whenever he wants, at whatever level he wants, for whatever countries and products he wants, and for as long as he wants.

    The government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, where the Liberty Justice Center was joined by leading appellate lawyers and constitutional scholars, Judge Michael W. McConnell and Neal Katyal. And on August 29, in a 7–4 decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision, holding that IEEPA does not authorize the President’s so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs. The Supreme Court will now decide whether to affirm those rulings.

    Recognizing the urgency of the matter, the Supreme Court has now set this case on an expedited schedule, with oral argument to take place the first week of November.

    “We are confident that the Supreme Court, like the CIT and the Federal Circuit, will recognize that the President does not have unilateral tariff power under IEEPA,” said Jeffrey Schwab, Senior Counsel and Director of Litigation at the Liberty Justice Center. “Congress, not the President alone, has the constitutional power to impose tariffs.”

    The issues in the case are covered in much greater detail in our various legal filings (see the Liberty Justice Center site for a compilation), and in my earlier writings about this litigation.

    Ilya Somin

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  • The Government’s Cert Petition to the Supreme Court in Our Tariff Case – and Our Response

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    Earlier this week, the Trump administration filed a petition for certiorari urging the Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit decision in the case challenging the president’s massive “Liberation Day” tariffs, brought by the Liberty Justice Center and myself on behalf of five small businesses harmed by the tariffs (we were later joined by leading constitutional law scholars and Supreme Court litigators Neal Katyal and Michael McConnell). The government also submitted a motion for expedited review.

    Today, we submitted a response to the petition, in which we agree the Supreme Court should hear the case and resolve it quickly, so as to put an end to the harm caused by the illegal tariffs as quickly as possible. We previously prevailed in the Court of International Trade, and on appeal in the Federal Circuit, and I hope the Supreme Court – should it take the case – will rule the same way.

    Our case is consolidated with one filed by twelve state governments, led by the state of Oregon. Both challenge massive tariffs Trump has imposed under his supposed authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA).

    By now, this litigation has generated thousands of pages of briefs and other filings, and 176 pages of judicial opinions (if I have the count right). But underneath all the legalese, the central issue at stake is actually a simple one: Does our constitutional system give one man – the president – the power to impose any tariffs he wants, in any amount, on any nation, at any time, for any reason? If the answer is “no,” then the IEEPA tariffs are illegal.

    And the answer should indeed be “no,” because the Framers of the Constitution carefully avoided giving the executive the kind of unbridled tax authority claimed by power-grabbing English monarchs, like Charles I. The president cannot wield monarchical power, and letting him do so is an affront to the rule of law.

    We have presented an assortment of more detailed reasons why “no” is the right answer to the central question raised by this case: the fact that IEEPA doesn’t even mention tariffs and has never previously been used to impose them, that there is no “unusual and extraordinary threat” of the kind required to invoke IEEPA, the major questions doctrine, the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, and more. These points are covered in much greater detail in our various legal filings (see the Liberty Justice Center site for a compilation), and in some of my earlier writings about the litigation.

    If the Supreme Court takes the case, there may well be many additional briefs, and other filings. Such materials are important. But it is also essential to remember the deeper principle underlying all the details: the president is not a king, and our Constitution does not grant him monarchical power.

    Ilya Somin

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  • Fifth Circuit Rules Trump’s Use of Alien Enemies Act is Illegal

    A prison guard transfers Alien Enemies Act deportees from the U.S., alleged to be Venezuelan gang members, to the Terrorism Confinement Center in Tecoluca, El Salvador. Mar. 16, 2025 (El Salvador Presidential Press Office)

     

    Yesterday, in W.M.M. v. Trump, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that President Trump’s invocation of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 as a tool to deport Venezuelans is illegal. While multiple federal district courts have issued similar rulings, as have individual concurring opinions by judges on two other circuit courts, this is the first full-blown appellate court decision on the subject. It is therefore an important precedent. There is a lengthy 130 page dissenting opinion by Judge Andrew Oldham. But it’s serious flaws merely confirm the weaknesses of the government’s position.

    The AEA allows detention and deportation of foreign citizens of relevant states (including legal immigrants, as well as illegal ones) “[w]henever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or government.” Trump has tried to use the AEA to deport Venezuelan migrants the administration claims are members of the Tren de Aragua drug gang.

    The Fifth Circuit majority opinion by Judge Leslie Southwick (a Republican George W. Bush appointee) holds that TdA’s activities – drug smuggling, illegal migration, and related crimes – don’t qualify as an “invasion” or a “predatory” incursion and therefore the AEA cannot be used here. Everyone agrees there is no declared war.

    On the definition of “invasion,” Judge Southwick concludes, after a review of the evidence:

    Congress’s use of the word in the AEA is consistent with the use in the Constitution, that “invasion” is a term about war in the traditional sense and requires military action by a foreign nation. Petitioners have the sense of the distinctions in saying that responding to another country’s invasion is defensive; declaring war is an offensive, assertive action by Congress; and predatory incursion is for lesser conflicts. Of course, after this country has been attacked by an enemy with invading forces, Congress might then declare a war. That occurred in World War II after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Still, when the invasion precedes a declaration, the AEA applies when the invasion occurs or is attempted. Therefore, we define an invasion for purposes of the AEA as an act of war involving the entry into this country by a military force of or at least directed by another country or nation, with a hostile intent.

    Every other court to have ruled on the definition of “invasion” has reached similar conclusions, and I argue for that conclusion in the amicus brief I coauthored in W.M.M. on behalf of the Brennan Center, the Cato Institute, and others.

    Here is the Fifth Circuit on the definition of “predatory incursion”:

    These different sources of contemporary meaning that we have identified from dictionaries, the writings of those from the time period of the enactment, and from the different requirements of the Alien Enemies Act and the Alien Friends Act, convince us that a “predatory incursion” described armed forces of some size and cohesion, engaged in something less than an invasion, whose objectives could vary widely, and are directed by a foreign government or nation. The success of an incursion could transform it into an invasion. In fact, it would be hard to distinguish some attempted invasions from a predatory incursion.

    This too is similar to previous court decisions, and to the approach outlined in our amicus brief, which explains that a “predatory incursion” is a smaller-scale act of war. The one exception is a district court opinion that adopted an extremely broad definition of “predatory incursion,” which I critiqued here.

    The majority also persuasively argues that the definitions of “invasion,” “predatory incursion” and other statutory terms are not unreviewable issues  simply left to executive discretion.

    The majority does, however, rule that courts must, to a degree, defer to presidential fact-finding regarding whether an “invasion” or a “predatory incursion” is occurring. It concludes, here, that the facts alleged in the President’s Proclamation do not meet the requirements of the correct definition of that term. This may leave open the possibility that the president could simply legalize the AEA by claiming the existence of different (more egregious) “facts,” even if the claims are patently false. I have criticized excessive deference on such factual issues in this recent article, and in the amicus brief. Deference on factual questions should not allow the president to invoke extraordinary emergency powers merely by mouthing some words and making bogus, unsubstantiated claims.

    That said, the majority does suggest that factual deference must be limited:

    The Supreme Court’s recent J.G.G. opinion shows Ludecke is to be understood as requiring courts to interpret the AEA after the President has invoked it…. Interpretation
    cannot be just an academic exercise, i.e., a court makes the effort to define a term like “invasion” but then cannot evaluate the facts before it for their fit with the interpretation. Thus, interpretation of the AEA allows a court to determine whether a declaration of war by Congress remains in effect, or whether an invasion or a predatory incursion has occurred. In other words, those questions are justiciable, and the executive’s determination that certain facts constitute one or more of those events is not conclusive. The Supreme Court informs us that we are to interpret, and we do not create special rules for the AEA but simply use traditional statutory interpretive tools.

    If courts must “use traditional… interpretive tools” and “determine… whether an invasion or a predatory incursion has occurred,” they cannot simply blindly acquiesce to whatever factual claims the government might make, no matter how specious. Otherwise, interpretation will indeed become “just an academic exercise.”

    Prominent conservative Judge Andrew Oldham wrote a lengthy 130 page dissent. He’s undoubtedly a highly capable jurist. But his herculean efforts here just underscore the radical and dangerous nature of the government’s position.

    Surprisingly, Judge Oldham doesn’t seriously dispute the definitions of “invasion” and “predatory incursion.” He just argues that these issues are left to the completely unreviewable discretion of the executive. If that’s true, the president could use the AEA to detain or deport virtually any noncitizens he wants, at any time, for any reason, so long as he proclaims there is an “invasion” or “predatory incursion,” regardless of whether anything even remotely resembling these things is actually happening. A power that is supposed to be used only in the event of a dire threat to national security would become a routine tool that can be deployed at the president’s whim.

    And, under Judge Oldham’s analysis, the president also could deport and detain these people with little, if any, due process. He contends the government has no obligation to prove that the people detained are actually TdA members. And in fact there is no evidence that most of those deported under the AEA are members of the gang or have committed any crimes at all.  Thus, Judge Oldham is essentially claiming the AEA gives the president unlimited, unreviewable power to detain and deport non-citizens – including legal migrants – whenever he wants (again, so long as he proclaims the right words).

    Nothing in the text or history of the AEA even approaches this. Instead the text says that the AEA can only be used when a war, invasion, predatory incursion or threat thereof, exists, not merely when the president says so.

    Oldham argues in detail that various precedents require the latter outcome. But, as the majority notes, those precedents – including the Supreme Court’s recent decision in J.G.G. specifically indicate that there is room for judicial review. Moreover, if the AEA really did grant the president such unlimited power, one would have expected contemporaries in 1798 to point that out and object on constitutional grounds, as they did in the case of the contemporaneous Alien Friends Act, which really did give the president sweeping deportation and detention powers, even in peacetime, and which was duly denounced as unconstitutional by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, among others. The Alien Enemies Act, by contrast, was far less controversial, precisely because it was understood to be limited to genuine wartime situations, not anything the president might speciously label as such.

    Moreover, under Suspension Clause of the Constitution, in the event of an “invasion,” the federal government can suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and thereby detain people – including US citizens – without any due process. There is no way the Founders understood themselves to have given the president unreviewable authority to trigger that power anytime he wants.

    I won’t try to go through all of Judge Oldham’s analysis of precedent here. But I will give one example of how problematic it is. The judge argues that Supreme Court’s 1862 decision in The Prize Cases gives the president unreviewable authority to determine there is a war going on, and exercise war powers accordingly. The majority opinion in that case does no such thing. Rather, it emphasized the fact that then-ongoing Civil War was a conflict “which all the world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war known in the history of the human race.” Thus, President Lincoln’s power to establish a blockade in response could not be negated by “by subtle definitions and ingenious sophisms.”

    The Court then went on to make the point cited by Oldham:

    Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-chief in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted. “He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.” The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure under the circumstances peculiar to the case.

    But notice the president only gets deference on the question of whether the “insurrection” he is “fulfilling his duties” by combatting is one of “such alarming proportions” as to justify a wartime blockade. He does not get deference on the question of whether an insurrection exists in the first place (in that case, as the Court noted, it obviously did). Had Lincoln instead imposed a blockade to prevent, say, illegal smuggling of contraband goods  and then claimed smuggling qualifies as war, he would not get the same deference.

    Judge Oldham’s reliance on other precedents has similar flaws. Nearly all of them also arose from genuinely massive wars, not attempts to pass off drug smuggling or other similar activity as an “invasion.” Oldham complains that “[f]or over 200 years, courts have recognized that the AEA vests sweeping discretionary powers in the Executive,” and that “until President Trump took office a second time, courts had never countermanded the President’s determination that an invasion, or other similar hostile activity, was threatened or ongoing.” But the AEA has previously only been invoked in connection with three indisputable international conflicts: the War of 1812, World War I, and World War II. You don’t have to be an expert to see the difference between these conflicts and the activities of a drug gang.

    The majority, the concurring opinion by Judge Ramirez, and the dissent also address a number of other issues, particularly various procedural questions. I will pass over them for now, as this post is already long.

    The Trump administration may well appeal this case to the Supreme Court. If the Court takes it, I hope they, too, will recognize that the AEA doesn’t give the president a blank check to wield sweeping extraordinary power whenever he wants.

    In the meantime, litigation over this issue continues in various federal courts around the country.

     

    Ilya Somin

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  • Federal Circuit Rules Against Trump’s Massive IEEPA Tariffs in Our Case Challenging Them

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    Today the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled against President Trump’s massive “Liberation Day” tariffs in VOS Selections v. Trump, a case filed by Liberty Justice Center and myself on behalf of five small US businesses (we have since been joined by prominent Supreme Court litigators Michael McConnell and Neal Katyal; Neal skillfully conducted the oral argument before the Federal Circuit). The ruling also covers the case filed by twelve states led by Oregon; they prevailed, as well. On these points, a 7-4 majority of the en banc Federal Circuit affirmed the earlier trial court decision issued by the Court of International Trade. The court also remanded the issue of how broad the injunction against the tariffs should be to the Court of International Trade. That litigation is, however, postponed until October 14, to give the government a chance to ask the Supreme Court to review the case.

    The majority concluded that the tariffs in question are not authorized by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977  (IEEPA), and that the major questions doctrine precludes interpreting IEEPA to give the president the virtually unlimited tariff authority he claims.

    The majority, concurring and dissenting opinions, are 127 pages long, and I will not attempt to cover everything in them here. I will merely highlight some key points.

    Here is an excerpt from the per curiam majority decision (issued in the name of all seven majority judges), explaining why IEEPA doesn’t authorize the tariffs imposed by the president:

    [I]n each statute delegating tariff power to the President, Congress has provided specific substantive limitations and procedural guidelines to be followed in imposing any such tariffs. It seems unlikely that Congress intended, in enacting IEEPA, to depart from its past practice and grant the President unlimited authority to impose tariffs. The statute neither mentions tariffs (or any of its synonyms) nor has procedural safeguards that contain clear limits on the President’s power to impose tariffs….

    [W]henever Congress intends to delegate to the President the authority to impose tariffs, it does so explicitly, either by using unequivocal terms like tariff and duty, or via an overall structure which makes clear that Congress is referring to tariffs. This is no surprise, as the core Congressional power to impose taxes such as tariffs is vested exclusively in the legislative branch by the Constitution; when Congress delegates this power in the first instance, it does so clearly and unambiguously…

    Contrary to the Government’s assertion, the mere authorization to “regulate” does not in and of itself imply the authority to impose tariffs. The power to “regulate” has long been understood to be distinct from the power to “tax.” In fact, the Constitution vests these authorities in Congress separately. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 1, 3; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 201 (1824) (“It is, that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform. In a separate clause of the enumeration, the power to regulate commerce is
    given, as being entirely distinct from the right to levy taxes and imposts, and as being a new power, not before conferred. The constitution, then, considers these powers as
    substantive, and distinct from each other.”); Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552, 567 (2012) (holding that the individual mandate provision of the Patient
    Protection and Affordable Care Act was a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing power but exceeded Congress’s power to regulate commerce). While Congress may use its taxing power in a manner that has a regulatory effect,… the power to tax is not always incident to the power to regulate…

    Upon declaring an emergency under IEEPA, a President may, in relevant part, “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” the “importation or exportation of . . . any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). “Regulate” must be read in the context of these other verbs, none of which involve monetary actions or suggest the power to tax or impose tariffs…

    The majority also emphasized that the government’s claim to unlimited tariff authority goes against the major questions doctrine:

    The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA as providing the President power to impose unlimited tariffs also runs afoul of the major questions doctrine. See, e.g., Oral Arg.16at 19:28–19:39 (the Government stating “there is no limit on the cap of the tariff in IEEPA itself”). The Supreme Court has explained that the doctrine applies in “cases in
    which the ‘history and the breadth of the authority . . . asserted’” by the Government entails vast “economic and political significance.”West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697,
    721 (2022)…. In such cases, there may be a “‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such authority.” Id…. When the major questions doctrine is
    implicated, the Government must point to “clear congressional authorization” for that asserted power. Id. at 732….

    The tariffs at issue in this case implicate the concerns animating the major questions doctrine as they are both “unheralded” and “transformative.” Id. at 722, 724; see also
    id. at 725 (“[J]ust as established practice may shed light on the extent of power conveyed by general statutory language, so the want of assertion of power by those who presumably would be alert to exercise it, is equally significant in determining whether such power was actually conferred.)” ….

    Since IEEPA was promulgated almost fifty years ago, past presidents have invoked IEEPA frequently. But not once before has a President asserted his authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs on imports or adjust the rates thereof. Rather, presidents have typically invoked IEEPA to restrict financial transactions with specific countries or entities that the President has determined pose an acute threat to the country’s interests….

    Additionally,…  tariffs are a core Congressional power. The “basic and consequential
    tradeoffs” that are inherent in the President’s decision to mpose the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs “are ones that Congress would likely have intended for itself.” Ne-
    braska, 600 U.S. at 506 (quoting West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 730). Moreover, the United States imports more than $4 trillion of goods annually; these imports account for
    14 percent of the nation’s economy. J.A. 215. The Government itself has claimed that the Reciprocal Tariffs will “generate between $2.3 trillion and $3.3 trillion over the
    budget window….” The Executive’s use of tariffs qualifies as a decision of vast economic and political significance, so the Government must “point to clear
    congressional authorization” for its interpretation of IEEPA. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723…

    For the reasons discussed above, we discern no clear congressional authorization by IEEPA for tariffs of the magnitude of the Reciprocal Tariffs and Trafficking Tariffs.
    Reading the phrase “regulate . . . importation” to include imposing these tariffs is “a wafer-thin reed on which to rest such sweeping power.” Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 594 U.S. 758, 765 (2021)

    The majority goes on to reject claims that the major questions doctrine does not apply to delegations to the president (their reasoning is similar to that which I outlined here). It also rejects the argument that the doctrine does not apply because tariffs are a “foreign affairs” power.

    The majority did not address whether the government’s claim of unlimited tariff authority would also run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine, which limits the extent to which Congress can delegate legislative authority to the executive. But it does note the significance of the fact that tariffs are a “core congressional power.”

    The majority explicitly chose not resolve the issue of whether IEEPA can be used to impose any tariffs at all. But their reasoning suggests either that such imposition is indeed categorically barred, or that any tariff authority that exists under IEEPA is strictly limited.

    The concurring opinion, written by Judge Cunningham, on behalf of four judges goes further than the majority. It concludes that IEEPA does not authorize any tariffs at all. It also indicates that the sort of sweeping delegation of tariff authority claimed by the president here is precluded by the nondelegation doctrine, which which limits the extent to which Congress can delegate legislative power to the president, relying in part on the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in FCC v. Consumers’ Research (which was helpful to our case in a number of ways):

    The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA would render it an unconstitutional delegation. Because taxation authority constitutionally rests with Congress, any delegation of that authority to the President must at least set out an intelligible principle that includes “both ‘the general policy’” that the President “must pursue and ‘the boundaries of [its] delegated authority.’” FCC v. Consumers’ Rsch., 145 S. Ct. 2482, 2497 (2025)… Similarly, Congress must “provide[ ] sufficient standards to enable both ‘the courts and the public [to] ascertain’” whether the President “has followed the law.” Id…. Because this is undoubtedly a case that “affect[s] the entire national economy,” the “‘guidance’ needed is greater . . . than when [Congress] addresses a narrow, technical issue.” Id…. For taxes, both “quantitative” and “qualitative limits on how much money” the President can raise are permissible, but it would “pose a constitutional problem” if the “statute gives the [executive branch] power, all on its own, to raise [a] hypothetical $5 trillion” with no “ceiling.” Id. at 2501–02.

    The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA would be a functionally limitless delegation of Congressional taxation authority.

    The majority did however vacate the trial court’s universal injunction against the tariffs, and remand the issue of the scope of the injunction to the trial court to determine how broad it should be, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling restricting universal injunctions, in Trump v. CASAWe have a variety of arguments as to why a broad injunction is appropriate in this case, even after CASA (see relevant section of our brief).

    The dissent by Judge Taranto, on behalf of himself and three other judges, largely accepts many of the government’s arguments. I won’t go over them in detail here, as this post is already too long. Obviously, I have responded to these arguments in some detail in previous writings, and our legal team also did so in our briefs.

    The court has, for the moment, stayed its ruling until October 14, to give the government a chance to ask the Supreme Court to review the decision. We shall see what the justices choose to do.

    Ilya Somin

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  • A War on Blue America

    A War on Blue America

    During his term in the White House, Donald Trump governed as a wartime president—with blue America, rather than any foreign country, as the adversary. He sought to use national authority to achieve factional ends—to impose the priorities of red America onto Democratic-leaning states and cities. The agenda Trump has laid out for a second term makes clear that those bruising and divisive efforts were only preliminary skirmishes.

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    Presidents always pursue policies that reflect the priorities of the voters and regions that supported them. But Trump moved in especially aggressive ways to exert control over, or punish, the jurisdictions that resisted him. His 2017 tax bill, otherwise a windfall for taxpayers in the upper brackets, capped the federal deductibility of state and local taxes, a costly shift for wealthy residents of liberal states such as New York and California. He moved, with mixed success, to deny federal law-enforcement grants to so-called sanctuary cities that didn’t fully cooperate with federal immigration agents. He attempted to strip California of the authority it has wielded since the early 1970s to set its own, more stringent pollution standards.

    In Trump’s final year in office, he opened a new, more ominous front in his campaign to assert control over blue jurisdictions. As the nation faced the twin shocks of the coronavirus pandemic and the protests that followed the murder of George Floyd, Trump repeatedly dispatched federal law-enforcement agents to blue cities, usually over the opposition of Democratic mayors, governors, or both. Trump sent an array of federal personnel to Portland, Oregon, ostensibly to protect a federal courthouse amid the city’s chaotic protests; reports soon emerged of camouflage-clad federal agents without any identifying insignia forcing protesters into unmarked vans. Trump responded to the huge racial-justice protests in Washington, D.C., by dispatching National Guard troops drawn from 11 states, almost all of them led by Republican governors. Later he sent other federal law-enforcement officers to combat rising crime in Kansas City and Chicago, a city Trump described as “worse than Afghanistan.”

    Trump has signaled that in a second presidential term, he would further escalate his war on blue America. He’s again promising federal legislation that would impose policies popular in red states onto the blue states that have rejected them. He has pledged to withhold federal funding from schools teaching critical race theory and “gender ideology.” He says he will initiate federal civil-rights investigations into liberal big-city prosecutors (whom he calls “Marxist local District Attorneys”) and require cities to adopt policing policies favored by conservatives, such as stop-and-frisk, as a condition for receiving federal grants.

    Even more dramatic are Trump’s open pledges to launch militarized law-enforcement campaigns inside blue cities. He has proposed initiatives that cumulatively could create an occupying federal force in the nation’s largest cities. Trump has indicated that “in cities where there’s been a complete breakdown of public safety, I will send in federal assets, including the National Guard, until law and order is restored.”

    Trump envisions an even more invasive door-to-door offensive against undocumented immigrants. In an early-2023 speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference, Trump said he “will use all necessary state, local, federal, and military resources to carry out the largest domestic deportation operation in American history.” Stephen Miller, who was his top immigration aide in the White House, later added that Trump envisions establishing massive internment camps for undocumented immigrants awaiting deportation. Trump has also promised “to use every tool, lever, and authority to get the homeless off our streets,” and move them to camps as well. (On this front, Trump has said he would work with states, but in practice that would likely involve partnering with Republican governors to impose policies to clear the streets opposed by their own Democratic mayors.)

    Michael Nutter, a former mayor of Philadelphia, told me that if a reelected Trump sought to implement these policies, the result would be “chaos, confusion,” and “massive demonstrations.” “Nobody is going to allow that to just happen,” Nutter said. “You are just going to see standoffs. It is going to be the Philadelphia Police Department versus the National Guard. Neighbors are going to be surrounding people’s houses. Folks are going to rush and seek safety in churches and synagogues and mosques and temples.”

    Of course, Trump would face other obstacles in attempting to implement these plans. The president’s legal authority to deploy federal forces over the objections of local officials is murky. And the relatively small number of federal law-enforcement officers under his direct control at agencies such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection could limit his options, according to Richard Briffault, a professor at Columbia University Law School who studies relations among cities, states, and the federal government.

    But in Trump’s final months in office, he got creative about augmenting the forces at his command by drawing on National Guard troops provided by sympathetic Republican governors. His advisers are already talking about doing the same to staff his deportation agenda, as well as using the emergency authority he cited to fund his border wall to build his camps for undocumented immigrants without congressional approval.

    Briffault told me that the inevitable court challenges to any Trump-ordered projections of force into blue cities would likely pivot on the courts’ interpretation of how much authority the president possesses under various emergency statutes. His advisers have already discussed invoking the 19th-century Insurrection Act, for example. As legal scholars have pointed out, the scope of the president’s emergency powers is much broader than most Americans recognize, and Trump is clearly signaling that if he returns to the White House, he intends to test the outer boundaries of that authority. The question for the courts will be “to what extent can he engage directly in law enforcement and having militarized law enforcement in the United States, in the absence of a request by a governor or a mayor that there is a riotlike condition or civil disorder?” Briffault said. “Can he declare an emergency even though he’s not being asked for it?”

    As president, Trump seemed to view himself less as the leader of a unified republic than as the champion of a red nation within a nation—one that constitutes the real America. If anything, Trump has assumed that factional role even more overtly in his 2024 campaign, promising that he will deliver “retribution” for his supporters and dehumanizing his opponents. Powered by such fetid resentments and grievances, the agenda Trump seeks to impose on blue cities and states could create the greatest threat to the nation’s cohesion since the Civil War.


    This article appears in the January/February 2024 print edition with the headline “A War on Blue America.”

    Ronald Brownstein

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