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  • Warning Signs About the First Post-pandemic Winter

    Warning Signs About the First Post-pandemic Winter

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    This fall, unlike the one before it, and the one before that, America looks almost like its old self. Schools and universities are in session; malls, airports, and gyms are bustling with the pre-holiday rush; handwashing is passé, handshakes are back, and strangers are packed together on public transport, nary a mask to be seen. On its surface, the country seems ready to enjoy what some might say is our first post-pandemic winter.

    Americans are certainly acting as if the crisis has abated, and so in that way, at least, you could argue that it has. “If you notice, no one’s wearing masks,” President Joe Biden told 60 Minutes in September, after proclaiming the pandemic “over.” Almost no emergency protections against the virus are left standing; we’re dismantling the few that are. At the same time, COVID is undeniably, as Biden says, “a problem.” Each passing day still brings hundreds of deaths and thousands of hospitalizations; untold numbers of people continue to deal with long COVID, as more join them. In several parts of the country, health-care systems are struggling to stay afloat. Local public-health departments, underfunded and understaffed, are hanging by a thread. And a double surge of COVID and flu may finally be brewing.

    So we can call this winter “post-pandemic” if we want. But given the policy failures and institutional dysfunctions that have accumulated over the past three years, it won’t be anything like a pre-pandemic winter, either. The more we resist that reality, the worse it will become. If we treat this winter as normal, it will be anything but.


    By now, we’ve grown acquainted with the variables that dictate how a season with SARS-CoV-2 will go. In our first COVID winter, the vaccines had only just begun their trickle out into the public, while most Americans hadn’t yet been infected by the virus. In our second COVID winter, the country’s collective immunity was higher, but Omicron sneaked past some of those defenses. On the cusp of our third COVID winter, it may seem that SARS-CoV-2 has few plot twists left to toss us.

    But the way in which we respond to COVID could still sprinkle in some chaos. During those first two winters, at least a few virus-mitigating policies and precautions remained in place—nearly all of which have since come down, lowering the hurdles the virus must clear, at a time when America’s health infrastructure is facing new and serious threats.

    The nation is still fighting to contain a months-long monkeypox outbreak; polio continues to plague unvaccinated sectors of New York. A riot of respiratory viruses, too, may spread as temperatures cool and people flock indoors. Rates of RSV are rising; flu returned early in the season from a nearly three-year sabbatical to clobber Australia, boding poorly for us in the north. Should flu show up here ahead of schedule, Americans, too, could be pummeled as we were around the start of 2018, “one of the worst seasons in the recent past,” says Srinivasan Venkatramanan, an infectious-disease modeler at the University of Virginia and a member of the COVID-19 Scenario Modeling Hub.

    The consequences of this infectious churn are already starting to play out. In Jackson, Mississippi, health workers are watching SARS-CoV-2 and other respiratory viruses tear through children “like nothing we’ve ever seen before,” says Charlotte Hobbs, a pediatric-infectious-disease specialist at the University of Mississippi Medical Center. Flu season has yet to go into full swing, and Hobbs is already experiencing one of the roughest stretches she’s had in her nearly two decades of practicing. Some kids are being slammed with one virus after the other, their sicknesses separated by just a couple of weeks—an especially dangerous prospect for the very youngest among them, few of whom have received COVID shots.

    The toll of doctor visits missed during the pandemic has ballooned as well. Left untreated, many people’s chronic conditions have worsened, and some specialists’ schedules remain booked out for months. Add to this the cases of long COVID that pile on with each passing surge of infections, and there are “more sick people than there used to be, period,” says Emily Landon, an infectious-disease physician at the University of Chicago. That’s with COVID case counts at a relative low, amid a massive undercount. Even if a new, antibody-dodging variant doesn’t come banging on the nation’s door, “the models predict an increase in infections,” Venkatramanan told me. (In parts of Europe, hospitalizations are already making a foreboding climb.)

    And where the demand for care increases, supply does not always follow suit. Health workers continue to evacuate their posts. Some have taken early retirement, worried that COVID could exacerbate their chronic conditions, or vice versa; others have sought employment with better hours and pay, or left the profession entirely to salvage their mental health. A wave of illness this winter will pare down forces further, especially as the CDC backs off its recommendations for health-care workers to mask. At UAB Hospital, in Birmingham, Alabama, “we’ve struggled to have enough people to work,” says Sarah Nafziger, an emergency physician and the medical director for employee health. “And once we get them here, we have a hard time getting them to stay.”

    Clinical-laboratory staff at Deaconess Hospital, in Indiana, who are responsible for testing patient samples, are feeling similar strain, says April Abbott, the institution’s microbiology director. Abbott’s team has spent most of the past month below usual minimum-staffing levels, and has had to cut some duties and services to compensate, even after calling in reinforcements from other, already shorthanded parts of the lab. “We’re already at this threshold of barely making it,” Abbott told me. Symptoms of burnout have surged as well, while health workers continue to clock long hours, sometimes amid verbal abuse, physical attacks, and death threats. Infrastructure is especially fragile in America’s rural regions, which have suffered hospital closures and an especially large exodus of health workers. In Madison County, Montana, where real-estate values have risen, “the average nurse cannot afford a house,” says Margaret Bortko, a nurse practitioner and the region’s health officer and medical director. When help and facilities aren’t available, the outcome is straightforward, says Janice Probst, a rural-health researcher at the University of South Carolina: “You will have more deaths.”

    In health departments, too, the workforce is threadbare. As local leaders tackle multiple infectious diseases at once, “it’s becoming a zero-sum game,” says Maria Sundaram, an epidemiologist at the Marshfield Clinic Research Institute. “With limited resources, do they go to monkeypox? To polio? To COVID-19? To influenza? We have to choose.” Mati Hlatshwayo Davis, the director of health in St. Louis, told me that her department has shrunk to a quarter of the size it was five years ago. “I have staff doing the jobs of three to five people,” she said. “We are in absolute crisis.” Staff have left to take positions as Amazon drivers, who “make so much more per hour.” Looking across her state, Hlatshwayo Davis keeps watching health directors “resign, resign, resign.” Despite all that she has poured into her job, or perhaps because of it, “I can’t guarantee I won’t be one of those losses too.”


    This winter is unlikely to be an encore of the pandemic’s worst days. Thanks to the growing roster of tools we now have to combat the coronavirus—among them, effective vaccines and antivirals—infected people are less often getting seriously sick; even long COVID seems to be at least a bit scarcer among people who are up-to-date on their shots. But considering how well our shots and treatments work, the plateau of suffering at which we’ve arrived is bizarrely, unacceptably high. More than a year has passed since the daily COVID death toll was around 200; nearly twice that number—roughly three times the daily toll during a moderate flu season—now seems to be a norm.

    Part of the problem remains the nation’s failed approach to vaccines, says Avnika Amin, a vaccine epidemiologist at Emory University: The government has repeatedly championed shots as a “be-all and end-all” strategy, while failing to rally sufficient uptake. Boosting is one of the few anti-COVID measures still promoted, yet the U.S. remains among the least-vaccinated high-income countries; interest in every dose that’s followed the primary series has been paltry at best. Even with the allure of the newly reformulated COVID shot, “I’m not really getting a good sense that people are busting down the doors,” says Michael Dulitz, a health worker in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Nor can vaccines hold the line against the virus alone. Even if everyone got every shot they were eligible for, Amin told me, “it wouldn’t make COVID go away.”

    The ongoing dry-up of emergency funds has also made the many tools of disease prevention and monitoring more difficult to access. Free at-home tests are no longer being shipped out en masse; asymptomatic testing is becoming less available; and vaccines and treatments are shifting to the private sector, putting them out of reach for many who live in poor regions or who are uninsured and can least afford to fall ill.

    It doesn’t help, either, that the country’s level of preparedness lays out as a patchwork. People who vaccinate and mask tend to cluster, Amin told me, which means that not all American experiences of winter will be the same. Less prominent, less privileged parts of the country will quietly bear the brunt of outbreaks. “The biggest worry is the burden becoming unnoticed,” Venkatramanan told me. Without data, policies can’t change; the nation can’t react. “It’s like flying without altitude or speed sensors. You’re looking out the window and trying to guess.”


    There’s an alternative winter the country might envision—one unencumbered by the policy backslides the U.S. has made in recent months, and one in which Americans acknowledge that COVID remains not just “a problem” but a crisis worth responding to.

    In that version of reality, far more people would be up-to-date on their vaccines. The most vulnerable in society would be the most protected. Ventilation systems would hum in buildings across the country. Workers would have access to ample sick leave. Health-care systems would have excesses of protective gear, and local health departments wouldn’t want for funds. Masks would come out in times of high transmission, especially in schools, pharmacies, government buildings, and essential businesses; free tests, boosters, and treatments would be available to all. No one would be asked to return to work while sick—not just with COVID but with any transmissible disease. SARS-CoV-2 infections would not disappear, but they would remain at more manageable levels; cases of flu and other cold-weather sicknesses that travel through the air would follow suit. Surveillance systems would whir in every state and territory, ready to detect the next threat. Leaders might even set policies that choreograph, rather than simply capitulate to, how Americans behave.

    We won’t be getting that winter this year, or likely any year soon. Many policies have already reverted to their 2019 status quo; by other metrics, the nation’s well-being even seems to have regressed. Life expectancy in the U.S. has fallen, especially among Native Americans and Alaskan Natives. Institutions of health are beleaguered; community-outreach efforts have been pruned.

    The pandemic has also prompted a deterioration of trust in several mainstays of public health. In many parts of the country, there’s worry that the vaccine hesitancy around COVID has “spread its tentacles into other diseases,” Hobbs told me, keeping parents from bringing their kids in for flu shots and other routine vaccines. Mississippi, once known for its stellar rate of immunizing children, now consistently ranks among those with the fewest young people vaccinated against COVID. “The one thing we do well is vaccinate children,” Hobbs said. That the coronavirus has reversed the trend “has astounded me.” In Montana, sweeping political changes, including legislation that bans employers from requiring vaccines of any kind, have made health-care settings less safe. Fewer than half of Madison County’s residents have received even their primary series of COVID shots, and “now a nurse can turn down the Hepatitis B series,” Bortko told me. Health workers, too, feel more imperiled than before. Since the start of the pandemic, Bortko’s own patients of 30 years, “who trusted me with their lives,” have pivoted to “yelling at us about vaccination concerns and mask mandates and quarantining and their freedoms,” she told me. “We have become public enemy No. 1.”

    At the same time, many people with chronic and debilitating conditions are more vulnerable than they were before the pandemic began. The policies that protected them during the pandemic’s height are gone—and yet SARS-CoV-2 is still here, adding to the dangers they face. The losses have been written off, Bortko told me: Cases of long COVID in Madison County have been dismissed as products of “risk factors” that don’t apply to others; deaths, too, have been met with a shrug of “Oh, they were old; they were unhealthy.” If, this winter, COVID sickens or kills more people who are older, more people who are immunocompromised, more people of color, more essential and low-income workers, more people in rural communities, “there will be no press coverage,” Hlatshwayo Davis said. Americans already expect that members of these groups will die.

    It’s not too late to change course. The winter’s path has not been set: Many Americans are still signing up for fall flu and COVID shots; we may luck out on the viral evolution front, too, and still be dealing largely with members of the Omicron clan for the next few months. But neither immunity nor a slowdown in variant emergence is a guarantee. What we can count on is the malleability of human behavior—what will help set the trajectory of this winter, and others to come. The U.S. botched the pandemic’s beginning, and its middle. That doesn’t mean we have to bungle its end, whenever that truly, finally arrives.

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    Katherine J. Wu

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  • Polio Is Exploiting a Very Human Weakness

    Polio Is Exploiting a Very Human Weakness

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    In 1988, the World Health Assembly announced a very ambitious goal: Polio was to be vanquished by the year 2000. It was a reach, sure, but feasible. Although highly infectious, polioviruses affect only people, and don’t hide out in wild animals; with two extraordinarily effective vaccines in regular use, they should be possible to snuff out. Thanks to a global inoculation campaign, infections had, for years, been going down, down, down.

    But 2000 came and went, as did a second deadline, in 2005, and a third, in 2012, and so on. The world will almost certainly miss an upcoming target at the end of 2023 too. In theory, eradication is still in sight: The virus remains endemic in just two countries—Pakistan and Afghanistan—and two of the three types of wild poliovirus that once troubled humanity are gone. And yet, polio cases are creeping up in several countries that had eliminated them, including the United Kingdom, Israel, and the United States. Earlier this year, New York detected America’s first paralytic polio case in nearly a decade; last week, the governor declared a state of emergency over a fast-ballooning outbreak.

    This is the cruel logic of viruses: Give them enough time—leave enough hosts for them to infect—and they will eventually find a way to spread again. “You have to stop transmission everywhere, all at the same time,” says Kimberly Thompson, a health economist and the president of the nonprofit Kid Risk. Which means eradication will demand a near-perfect syncing of vaccine supply, access, equity, political will, public enthusiasm, and more. To beat the virus, population immunity must outlast it.

    Right now, though, the world’s immunological shield is too porous to stop polio’s spread. At the center of the new epidemics are vaccine-derived polioviruses that have begun to paralyze unimmunized people in places where immunity is low—a snag in the eradication campaign that also happens to be tightly linked to one of its most essential tools. Vaccine performance has always depended on both technology and human behavior. But in this case especially, because of the nature of the foe at hand, those twin pillars must line up as precisely as possible or risk a further backslide into a dangerous past.


    In the grand plan for eradication, our two primary polio vaccines were always meant to complement each other. One, an ultra-effective oral formulation, is powerful and long-lasting enough to quash wild-poliovirus transmission—the perfect “workhorse” for a global vaccination campaign, says Adam Lauring, an evolutionary virologist at the University of Michigan. The other, a supersafe injectable, sweeps in after its colleague has halted outbreaks one country at a time, maintaining a high level of immunity in post-elimination nations while the rest of the world catches up.

    For decades, the shot, chaser approach found remarkable success. In the 1980s, wild poliovirus struck an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 people each year; by 2021, the numbers had plummeted to single digits. But recently, as vaccine coverage in various countries has stalled or slipped, the loopholes in this vaccination tactic have begun to show themselves and grow.

    The oral polio vaccine (OPV), delivered as drops in the mouth, is one of the most effective inoculations in the world’s roster. It contains weakened forms of polioviruses that have been altered away from their paralysis-causing forms but still mimic a wild infection so well that they can stop people from spreading wild pathogens for years, even decades. In the weeks after people receive the vaccine, they can also pass the weakened virus to others in the community, helping protect them too. And OPV’s transportability, low price point, and ease of administration make it a “gold standard for outbreak interruption,” says Ananda Bandyopadhyay, the deputy director for the polio team at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Since its mid-20th-century debut, OPV has helped dozens of countries—including the U.S.—eliminate the virus. Those nations were then able to phase out OPV and switch to inoculating people with the injected vaccine.

    But OPV’s most potent superpower is also its greatest weakness. Given enough time and opportunity to spread and reproduce, the neutered virus within the vaccine can regain the ability to invade the nervous system and cause paralysis in unvaccinated or immunocompromised people (or in very, very rare cases, the vaccine recipient themselves). Just a small handful of genetic modifications—three or fewer—can spark a reversion, and the mutants, which are “better at replicating” than their kin, can take over fast, says Raul Andino, a virologist at UC San Francisco. In recent years, a few thousand cases of vaccine-derived polio have been detected around the world, far outstripping the toll of wild viruses; dozens of countries, the U.S. now among them, are battling such outbreaks, and the numbers seem to be only going up. Vaccine-derived polio is still a true rarity: Billions of oral vaccines have been delivered since the global campaign began. But it underscores “the real problem” with OPV, Lauring told me. “You’re fighting fire with fire.”

    The injected polio vaccine, or IPV, which contains only chemically inactivated versions of the virus, carries none of that risk. To purge all polio cases, “you have to stop using oral polio vaccine,” Thompson told me, and transition the entire globe to IPV. (Post-eradication, countries would need to keep IPV in their routine immunization schedule for at least 10 years, experts have said.) But the injected vaccine has a different drawback. Although the shot can very effectively stave off paralysis, IPV doesn’t elicit the kind of immunity that stops people from getting infected with polioviruses and then passing them on. In places that rely on injected vaccines, “even immune individuals can participate in transmission,” Thompson told me. Which opens up a vulnerability when too many people have skipped both types of vaccines: Paralyzing polioviruses erupt out of communities where the oral vaccine is still in use—then can spread in undervaccinated areas. It might be tempting to blame OPV for our troubles. But that’s not the main threat, Bandyopadhyay told me. “It’s the lack of adequate vaccination.”

    As things stand, the goal in the endemic countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan remains achieving sufficiently high vaccine coverage, Bandyopadhyay said. But many of the communities in these nations are rural or nomadic, and tough to reach even with convenient drop-in-the-mouth vaccines. Civil and political unrest, misinformation, natural disasters, and most recently, the COVID pandemic have raised additional hurdles. So have intermittent bans on house-to-house vaccination in Afghanistan, says John Vertefeuille, the chief of the polio-eradication branch at the CDC. Cases of wild polio have experienced a recent jump in Pakistan, and have also been imported into the non-endemic countries of Malawi and Mozambique.

    But the toll of those outbreaks—all featuring type 1 polio—currently pales in comparison with those featuring vaccine-derived type 2. The last case of wild type 2 polio was detected in 1999, but that version of the virus has persisted in its modified form in oral polio vaccines. And when it reverts to its dangerous form, it gains particularly infectious oomph, allowing it to spread unchecked wherever immunity is low. Some 30 countries around the world are battling outbreaks of poliovirus whose origin can be traced back to the oral inoculations; vaccine-derived type 2 is what’s been circulating in Jerusalem, London, and New York, where it ultimately paralyzed an unvaccinated young man. The extent to which the virus is churning in other parts of the country isn’t fully known; routine immunization has dropped since the COVID pandemic’s start, and the U.S. hasn’t regularly surveyed its wastewater for the pathogen.

    The success of these vaccine-derived viruses is largely the result of our own hubris—of a failure, experts told me, to sync the world’s efforts. In 2016, 17 years after the last wild type-2 case had been seen, officials decided to pivot to a new version of OPV that would protect against just types 1 and 3, a sort of trial run for the eventual obsolescence of OPV. But the move may have been premature. The switch wasn’t coordinated enough; in too many pockets of the world, type-2 polio, from the three-part oral vaccine, was still moseying about. The result was disastrous. “We opened up an immunity gap,” Thompson told me. Into it, fast-mutating vaccine-derived type-2 viruses spilled, surging onto a global landscape populated with growing numbers of children who lacked protection against it.


    A new oral vaccine, listed for emergency use by the WHO in 2020, could help get the global campaign back on track. The fresh formulation, developed in part by Andino and his colleagues, still relies on the immunity-boosting powers of weakened, replicating polioviruses. But the pathogens within have had their genetic blueprints further tweaked. “We mucked around” with the structure of poliovirus, Andino told me, and figured out a way to make a modified version of type 2 that’s far stabler. It’s much less likely to mutate away from its domesticated, non-paralyzing state, or swap genes with related viruses that could grant the same gifts.

    Technologically, the new oral vaccine, nicknamed nOPV2, seems to be as close to a slam dunk as immunizations can get. “To me, it’s just super cool,” Lauring told me. “You keep all the good things about OPV but mitigate this evolutionary risk.” In the year and a half since the vaccine’s world premiere, some 450 million doses of nOPV2 have found their way into children in 22 countries—and a whopping zero cases of vaccine-derived paralysis have followed.

    But nOPV2 is “not a silver bullet,” Andino said. The vaccine covers just one of the three poliovirus types, which means it can’t yet fully replace the original oral recipe. (Trials for type-1 and -3 versions are ongoing, and even after those recipes are ready for prime time, researchers will have to confirm that the vaccine still works as expected when the three recipes are mixed.) The vaccine’s precise clinical costs are also still a shade unclear. nOPV2 is a safer oral polio vaccine, but it’s still an oral polio vaccine, chock-full of active viral particles. “You can think of it as more attenuated,” Thompson said. “But I don’t think anybody expects that it won’t have any potential to evolve.” And nOPV2’s existence doesn’t change the fact that the world will still have to undergo a total, coordinated switch to IPV before eradication is won.

    As has been the case with COVID vaccines, and so many others, the primary problem isn’t the technology at all—but how humans have deployed it, or failed to. “Vaccine sitting in a vial, no matter how genetically stable and how effective it is, that’s not going to solve the problem of the outbreaks,” Bandyopadhyay said. “It’s really vaccination and getting to that last child in that last community.”

    If dwindling vaccination trends don’t reverse, even our current vaccination strategies could require a rough reboot. In 2013, health officials in Israel—which had, for years prior, run a successful IPV-only campaign for its children—detected wild type-1 virus, imported from abroad, in the country’s sewage, and decided to roll out another round of oral vaccines to kids under 10. Within a few weeks, nearly 80 percent of the targeted population had gotten a dose. Even “polio-free countries are not polio-risk-free,” Bandyopadhyay told me. The situation in New York is different, in part because type-1 polio causes paralysis more often than type-2 does. But should circumstances grow more dire—should substantial outbreaks start elsewhere in the country, should the nation fail to bring IPV coverage back to properly protective levels—America, too, “may have to consider adding OPV as a supplement,” says Purvi Parikh, an immunologist and a physician at NYU, “especially in rural areas” where emergency injected-vaccine campaigns may be tough. Such an approach would be a pretty extreme move, and a “very big political undertaking,” Thompson said, requiring a pivot back to a vaccine that was phased out of use decades ago. And even then, there’s no guarantee that Americans would take the offered oral drops.

    The CDC, for now, is not eager for such a change. Noting that most people in the U.S. are vaccinated against polio, Katherina Grusich, an agency spokesperson, told me that the CDC has no plans to add OPV or nOPV to the American regimen. “We are a long way from reaching for that,” she said.

    But this week, the U.S. joined the WHO’s list of about 30 nations with circulating vaccine-derived-poliovirus outbreaks. The country could have avoided this unfortunate honor had it kept shot uptake more uniformly high. It’s true, as Grusich pointed out, that more than 90 percent of young American children have received IPV. But they are not distributed evenly, which opens up vulnerabilities for the virus to exploit. Here, the U.S., in a sense, had one job: maintain its polio-free status while the rest of the world joined in. That it did not is an admonition, and a reminder of how unmerciful the virus can be. Polio, a fast mutator, preys on human negligence; the vaccines that guard against it contain both a form of protection and a catch that reinforces how risky treating these tools as a discretionary measure can be.

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    Katherine J. Wu

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