Financing is vital for growth. Credit: Unsplash / Towfiqu Barbhuiya
Opinion by Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana (bangkok, thailand)
Inter Press Service
The writer is UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)
BANGKOK, Thailand, Apr 04 (IPS) – The unprecedented fiscal firepower used to protect the vulnerable from the harsh socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting economic contraction have pushed the average government debt level in the Asia-Pacific region to its highest since 2008.
Public debt distress is expected to worsen amid the global economic slowdown, record high inflation and rising interest rates, and uncertainty induced by the war in Ukraine.
And surging debt service payments are expected to put public debt sustainability of several developing Asia-Pacific economies at risk. Most concerning, debt distress risk is highest for countries with the highest development finance needs, including small island developing States.
Public debt is a powerful development tool in need of a major rethink
Yet, a higher debt level is not necessarily a bad thing, according to this year’s edition of the Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific. Current policy debates on public debt sustainability do not take into account the long-term positive socio-economic and environmental impact of public investments in laying the foundations of inclusive, resilient and sustainable prosperity.
Indeed, left unaddressed, development deficits and climate risks hurt economic prospects and public debt sustainability itself. Our analysis shows that social spending cuts increase poverty and inequality and undermine economic productivity in the long term.
Conversely, investing in healthcare, education, social protection and climate action is good economics.
Multilateral lenders and credit rating agencies focus excessively on keeping debt sustainable in the short term. Such perceived optimal debt levels are too low and lead to suboptimal development outcomes.
Revisiting current debt sustainability norms has also become necessary with the emergence of major non-traditional bilateral creditors and a drastic fall in concessional development lending to Asian and Pacific countries over the past decade.
It is time for a bold shift in thinking about public debt sustainability. We propose an augmented approach that assesses public debt viability that takes into account a country’s SDG investment needs, government structural development policies aiming to boost economic competitiveness, and national SDG financing strategies.
It is time for creditors, international financial institutions and credit rating agencies to consider the positive long-term economic, social and environmental outcomes of investing in the SDGs, while assessing public debt sustainability.
Our research finds that public debt is found to decline over the long term when the socio-economic and environmental benefits of public investments are incorporated.
Rather than penalizing bold fiscal support for people and the environment, international creditors should consider if such spending would boost economic productivity.
Lenders and credit rating agencies should see debt relief as helping support the fiscal outlook, rather than as a sign of an upcoming debt default.
Developing countries should also strive to balance investing in the SDGs with ensuring debt sustainability. Governments should not feel deterred from borrowing for essential, high-impact sustainable development spending; rather, funds should be used efficiently and effectively.
Public coffers should also be boosted by resource mobilization strategies designed to generate social and/or environmental benefits, such as through progressive taxation.
Effective public debt management reduces fiscal risks and borrowing costs, with several examples of good public debt management practices in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, countries with high debt distress levels may need pre-emptive, swift and adequate sovereign debt restructuring, while efforts towards common international debt resolution mechanisms and restructuring frameworks needs to be accelerated.
We are in the fourth year of the Decade of Action to accelerate progress towards the SDGs with not much to show in gains. It is time for Asia and the Pacific to rise to the challenge of mobilizing the financial resources to realise the dream of resilient and sustainable prosperity for all.
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 03 (IPS) – As signs of a new Cold War are fast emerging at the United Nations, the US continues its war of words with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The rivalry, which extends from Russia and Taiwan to Iran and Myanmar – where the UN’s two permanent members are on opposite sides of ongoing political or military conflicts– has now triggered a battle on semantics.
Is China, described as the world’s second largest economy ranking next to the US, really a “developing nation”?
The US House of Representative unanimously passed a bill March 27 directing the Secretary of State Antony Blinken to strip the PRC of its “developing country” status in international organizations
Titled “PRC Is Not a Developing Country Act” — the bill cleared the House in an overwhelming 415-0 vote. The legislation reads: “It should be the policy of the United States—
(1) to oppose the labeling or treatment of the People’s Republic of China as a developing country in any treaty or other international agreement to which the United States is a party;
(2) to oppose the labeling or treatment of the People’s Republic of China as a developing country in each international organization of which the United States is a member; and
(3) to pursue the labeling or treatment of the People’s Republic of China as an upper middle-income country, high income country, or developed country in each international organization of which the United States is a member”.
At the United Nations, China is closely allied with the 137-member Group of 77 (G77), the largest single coalition of “developing countries” (a group created in 1964 with 77 members).
Since China is not a formal member of the G77, the group describes itself either as “The G77 and China” or “The G77 plus China.”
Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury, a former Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN and a former UN Under-Secretary-General, told IPS the defining of a developing country is a complex challenge.
“There is no established framework or charter for defining a “developing country,” he noted
According to well-respected economist Jeffrey Sachs, the current divide between the developed and developing world is largely a phenomenon of the 20th century. Some economists emphasize that the binary labeling of countries is “neither descriptive nor explanatory”.
For the UN system, the G77, which provides the collective negotiating platform of the countries of the South, is in reality synonymous with nations which are identified as “developing countries, least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries and small island developing states” (SIDS).
“They are all sub-groupings of developing countries and belong to the G-77, he pointed out.
Outlining the group’s history, he said, the G-77 was established in 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries, signatories of the “Joint Declaration” issued at the end of the first session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva.
Although members of the G-77 have increased to 134 countries, the original name was retained due to its historic significance. Developing countries tend to have some characteristics in common, often due to their histories or geographies, said Ambassador Chowdhury, Chairman of the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee) of the UN General Assembly in 1997-98 and Chair of the Group of 27, working group of G-77, in 1982-83.
In October 1997, he said, China joined the G-77 while keeping its special identity by proposing the nomenclature as “G-77 and China”. China aligns its positions on the global economic and social issues with G-77 positions for negotiating purposes.
Being the largest negotiating group in the United Nations, and in view of the mutuality of their common concerns, G-77 is not expected to agree to separate China from the current collaborative arrangements.
“And more so, if the pressure comes from the US delegation, in view of the recent resolution of the House of Representatives of the US Congress, to take away the categorization of China as a developing country”, declared Ambassador Chowdhury.
In a World Bank Data Blog, Tariq Khokhar, Global Data Editor & Senior Data Scientist and Umar Serajuddin, Manager, Development Data Group, at the World Bank, point out that the IMF, in the “World Economic Outlook (WEO)” currently classify 37 countries as “Advanced Economies” and all others are considered “Emerging Market and Developing Economies” according to the WEO Statistical Annex.”
The institution notes that “this classification is not based on strict criteria, economic or otherwise” and that it’s done in order to “facilitate analysis by providing a reasonably meaningful method of organizing data.”
The United Nations has no formal definition of developing countries, but still uses the term for monitoring purposes and classifies as many as 159 countries as developing, the authors argue.
The UN maintains a list of “Least Developed Countries” which are defined by accounting for GNI per capita as well as measures of human capital and economic vulnerability.
“While we can’t find the first instance of “developing world” being used, what it colloquially refers to — the group of countries that fare relatively and similarly poorly in social and economic measures — hasn’t been consistently or precisely defined, and this “definition” hasn’t been updated.”
“The World Bank has for many years referred to “low and middle income countries” as “developing countries” for convenience in publications, but even if this definition was reasonable in the past, it’s worth asking if it has remained so and if a more granular definition is warranted.”
In its legislation, the US House of Representatives says “not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying all current treaty negotiations in which—
(a) Any international organization of which the United States and the People’s Republic of China are both current member states, the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other Federal agencies and departments as needed, shall pursue—
(1) changing the status of the People’s Republic of China from developing country to upper middle income country, high income country, or developed country if a mechanism exists in such organization to make such a change in status;
(2) proposing the development of a mechanism described in paragraph (1) to change the status of the People’s Republic of China in such organization from developing country to developed country; or
(3) regardless of efforts made pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), working to ensure that the People’s Republic of China does not receive preferential treatment or assistance within the organization as a result of it having the status of a developing country.
(b) The President may waive the application of subsection (a) with respect to any international organization if the President notifies the appropriate committees of Congress, not later than 10 days before the date on which the waiver shall take effect, that such a waiver is in the national interests of the United States.
Speaking during the debate, Representative Young Kim (Republican of California) said: “The People’s Republic of China is the world’s second largest economy, accounting for 18.6 percent of the global economy.”
“Their economy is second only to that of the United States. The United States is treated as a developed country, so should PRC,” Kim said. “And is also treated as a high-income country in treaties and international organizations, so China should also be treated as a developed country.”
“However, the PRC is classified as a developing country, and they’re using this status to game the system and hurt countries that are truly in need,” she added.
Elaborating further, Ambassador Chowdhury said the World Bank, as a part of the Bretton Woods institutions, classifies the world’s economies into four groups, based on gross national income per capita: high, upper-middle, lower-middle, and low income countries.
In 2015, the World Bank declared that the “developing/developed world categorization” had become less relevant and that they will phase out the use of that descriptor.
Instead, their reports will present data aggregations for regions and income groups.
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) accepts any country’s claim of itself being “developing”.
He said certain countries that have become “developed” in the last 20 years by almost all economic metrics, still wants to be classified as “developing country”, as it entitles them to a preferential treatment at the WTO – countries such as Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.
The term “Global South“, used by some as an alternative term to developing countries, began to be mentioned more widely since about 2004.
The Global South refers to these countries’ interconnected histories of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, and access to resources are maintained.
“Most of humanity resides in the Global South,” declared Ambassador Chowdhury.
The median ages of populations are expected to continue rising over the coming decades. East Nanjing Road, Shanghai, China. Credit: Shutterstock.
Opinion by Joseph Chamie (portland, usa)
Inter Press Service
PORTLAND, USA, Mar 27 (IPS) – Yes, lower the retirement ages! That is the key message that workers worldwide are conveying to their governments.
Rather than increasing retirement ages as many governments are now proposing, men and women worldwide want to stop working well before they reach old age, which is approximately 60 years.
After toiling for years in factories, offices, shops, backrooms, vehicles, fields, etc., most workers around the world want to stop working before they reach old age. That desire translates into exiting the labor force and receiving a government pension at approximately age 55 years.
Government officials, economic advisors, business leaders and many others calling for raising retirement ages will no doubt consider lower retirement ages to be preposterous, verging on financial blasphemy and leading to an economy’s doom. Some have argued that lowering retirement ages places an unaffordable and unfair burden on taxpayers.
On the contrary, rather than leading to an economy’s ruination, a retirement age of 55 years may usher in a “retirement renaissance” resulting in untold benefits to societies worldwide.
The renaissance will enhance and extend the quality of life for those in retirement. It is also expected to decrease unemployment rates, lead to increased motivation among younger employees to continue working until retirement, provide businesses with energetic, healthy, well-trained youthful workers as well as foster cross generational interactions, recreation, hobbies and cultural activities.
In addition, the renaissance may contribute to raising low fertility levels by making childcare more readily available. Today two-thirds of the world’s population lives in a country where the fertility rate is below the replacement level of about 2.1 births per woman.
The retirement renaissance will permit retired men and women with adult children to assist with childcare and related activities. With grandparents available for childcare, young working mothers and fathers can be expected to be more favorably disposed to having additional children.
The protests, demonstrations and objections in Asia, Europe, North America and elsewhere reflect the public’s resistance to working until, as they claim, broken-down and close to near death. Large majorities of workers have clearly conveyed their opposition to their respective government proposals requiring people to work well into old age before they are entitled to receive their promised retirement pensions.
The various projected insolvencies of government pension systems, often cited as justification for raising retirement ages to record breaking high levels, are often dismissed by workers and their supporters as irrelevant. The insolvencies, workers contend, are simply financial excuses concocted by government officials and their wealthy supporters, who object to paying their fair share of taxes, to justify their goal of raising retirement ages and cutting pension benefits.
In addition to higher taxes on the wealthy and large corporations, workers argue that governments have plenty of financial resources at their disposal to permit lowering retirement ages and financing pension programs. Some contend that countries could substantially reduce their defense spending and redirect the substantial savings to retirement pension programs.
Admittedly, it is certainly the case that on average people are living longer than in the recent past and the proportions of elderly are increasing. However, those increases in longevity have not been shared equally across populations.
In general, those with high incomes have experienced longevity gains, while low earners have seen little gain in longevity. Moreover, workers contend that living longer should not translate into working longer and receiving reduced retirement pension benefits.
Both men and women spend decades working at jobs that they don’t particularly enjoy and for bosses they loathe. Many would argue that it only seems fair and reasonable to have several decades available to workers permitting them to do what they desire before they eventually face death. People are largely opposed to working until they are tired, bed ridden and unable to enjoy the remaining years of their life.
It is also the case that women on average live several years longer than men. At age 65, for example, at the global level women live close to three years longer than men. Even larger differences in life expectancy at age 65 between women and men are observed in other countries, such as France and Japan at nearly four and five years, respectively (Figure 1).
Source: United Nations.
Taking into account those well documented sex differences in longevity, the retirement age for women could be several years greater than that for men, perhaps 57 and 54 years, respectively. Such a difference between women and men would help to ensure gender equality in the number of retirement years.
In addition, neither men nor women should be forced to work beyond the recommended lower official retirement ages for men and women. Of course, exceptions should be permitted and lower official retirement ages should not bar individuals from working in old age if they choose to do so.
Some heads of state, elected officials, government bureaucrats, investors, business owners, academics, the wealthy, entertainers as well as many others are choosing for personal reasons it appears to work beyond official retirement ages. Some current heads of state, for example, are well beyond the official retirement ages of their respective countries with few of their constituents objecting (Figure 2).
Source: Author’s compilation.
With the world population reaching a record-breaking 8,000,000,000 people, the number of young women and men available to work is the largest ever. Whereas the proportion of the world’s population between ages 18 to 59 was 52 percent in 1950 and numbered 1.3 billion, that proportion increased to 56 percent in 2022 and numbered 4.5 billion.
There’s no denying the fact that the world’s population is older than in the past. Over the past 70 years, the proportion of the world’s population aged 60 years and older has nearly doubled, from 8 percent in 1950 to 14 percent in 2022. However, the increase in the proportion elderly is offset by the decrease in proportion of children below age 18 years from 40 percent in 1950 to 30 percent in 2022 (Figure 3).
Source: United Nations.
Also, some believe that rapidly improving technologies, including robots,androids and artificial intelligence, can complement and broaden a country’s labor supply. Those technologies are expected to offset reductions in the size of the labor force as people retire at around 55 years of age.
Many governments have enacted or are seriously considering raising retirement ages. Increases in today’s retirement ages are viewed by workers as nothing more than pension benefits cuts.
Proposals for raising retirement ages are viewed by workers as relying on faulty actuarial analyses of bankruptcy, dire warnings of pension insolvency and catchy phrases such as “Vivre plus longtemps, travailler plus longtemps” (“live longer, work longer”).
Moreover, conservative government officials in general are resistant to raising taxes on the wealthy and large corporations. However, many of those officials are favorably disposed to raising retirement ages, which would result in reductions in pension benefits. Also, some government officials have rejected calls to return retirement ages back to 60 years.
In sum, in addition to meeting the wishes of billions of working men and women who want to retire well before reaching old age, lower official retirement ages of approximately 57 years for women and 54 years for men may usher in a “retirement renaissance” that could result in untold benefits to societies worldwide.
Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division and author of numerous publications on population issues, including his recent book, “Population Levels, Trends, and Differentials”.
It’s a struggle for artisanal miners working in South Africa to be legalised due to onerous requirements. Credit: NAAM
by Fawzia Moodley (johannesburg)
Inter Press Service
JOHANNESBURG, Mar 24 (IPS) – Greed, poverty, irresponsible legal mining giants which exploited and then abandoned South Africa’s mines, together with the government’s failure to enforce regulations on the mining giants to rehabilitate mines before closing them, have created fertile ground for a thriving illegal artisanal mining sector called Zama Zama, many of them run by criminal syndicates.
South Africa’s economy has largely been mining based, and under apartheid, white-owned mining companies exploiting lucrative gold, diamond, coal, and chrome grew rich, using cheap local and migrant labour from neighbouring countries.
Post-apartheid, the ANC government has tried to bring black ownership and small-scale miners into the mining sector and, more recently, attempted to decriminalise artisanal miners who use rudimentary tools and are largely involved in surface mining.
According to submissions made by the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), the Benchmarks Foundation, and the International Labour Research and Information Group (ILRIG), policy weaknesses, lack of enforcement, bureaucratic bungling, and red tape have ensured that the status quo from apartheid remains largely intact.
The LRC contends that retrenchments due to mechanisation or closure of unprofitable mines have increased illegal mining. The lack of enforcement of laws relating to the rehabilitation of closed mines has created space for criminal Zama Zama and artisanal miners who are perforce illegal to operate in disused or abandoned mines.
Artisanal miners in the North West province of South Africa at work. Credit: NAAM
With the publishing of the Policy on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in March 2022, artisanal miners all over the country are forming cooperatives in a bid to be legalised. But it is an uphill battle to get permits.
The LRC also warns of further conflict and xenophobia because the law precludes foreign Zama Zama from getting permits. However, Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy Gwede Mantashe says: “It must be clear that once an individual illegally enters our country and engages in illegal economic activity, such an individual cannot be sanitised through being issued with a small-scale mining license.”
Robert Krause, an environmental researcher, says that the roots of the problem lie in “the mining houses shirking their environmental rehabilitation responsibilities as well as failure to invest in a post-mining economy for workers and the surrounding community.”
There are nearly 6000 ownerless and derelict mines, many of them “abandoned by mining capital before the present regulatory dispensation under the National Environmental Management Act and the Financial Provisioning regulations.”
Krause says there is “a persisting pattern of large mining houses selling off their mines towards closure to companies they know full well will not be in a position to carry out their rehabilitation duties.”
Legal loopholes and lax regulation by the regulator enable this.
“The companies that end up with liabilities frequently go insolvent, and the financial provision for closure is often treated as just another claim.”
He says, “Mine abandonment fuels illegal or artisanal operations, as low-grade ore is left behind, convenient entrances remain open, and people in need of work are thrown out of the economy.”
When the profitable reserves are depleted, there’s an employment crisis. Then, the option for survival, mainly where closure is not done properly, is to become a Zama Zama.
Krause says the artisanal miners need material support and capacitation from mining companies and the state, “instead they are still often treated like criminals while violent criminal syndicates flourish.”
According to an Oxpeckers environment journalism probe a few years ago, “a fortune has been set aside for mine rehabilitation in South Africa. But large mines are not being properly closed, and the money cannot be touched.”
Oxpeckers say that although the money cannot be used for rehabilitation while a mine is still operational, the DMRE can use it if it is abandoned.
“The department is yet to provide an instance in which this money has been used, however. Instead, most mines are not deemed legally closed, and the money cannot be touched.”
But Mantashe says: “It is estimated that it would cost over R49 billion to rehabilitate these mines. The Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) receives R140 million per annum for the rehabilitation of mines. With this allocation, we can only rehabilitate at least three mines and seal off 40 shafts per year.”
The minister revealed in September 2022 that 135 shafts in the Eastern, Central, and Western Basins in Gauteng (province) were sealed over three years. The DMRE intended to seal off another 20 in the current financial year, prioritising the Krugersdorp area where Zama Zama gang raped a film crew in July last year.
Mantashe says that the rehabilitation of mines is a long terms project: “We must appreciate that it would take a long time to completely rehabilitate all these mines at this rate due to budget constraints and security threats to officials executing this programme.”
Advocates for the legalisation of artisanal miners say the government needs to provide resources to fund environmental assessments and facilitate a local buyers’ market via a national buying entity to sell their mined products.
“People in South Africa need to finally see the benefits of the mineral resources of South Africa, as in the past colonial and Apartheid practices coupled with large-scale mining have deprived the majority of this benefit,” the LRC group says.
Clearly, this is a pipe dream, as the struggle by artisanal miners to get permits to become legal has underlined.
The irony is that their legalisation will not only allow them to earn a living but also pay taxes and end their constant harassment by criminal elements and the police alike.
Black Sea Grain Initiative has been renewed – for now. Credit: Ihor Oinua/Unsplash
by Alexander Kozul-Wright (geneva)
Inter Press Service
GENEVA, Mar 22 (IPS) – Given the complex interplay between geopolitics and financial markets, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent shockwaves across the global economy. Admittedly, the implications both within and between countries have varied. However, there were some common denominators, including higher commodity prices.
Price disruptions were particularly severe for ‘soft’ agricultural commodities. During peacetime, Russia and Ukraine produced a large amount of the world’s grain, supplying 28 percent of globally traded wheat and 75 percent of sunflower products. Before the war, they were also among the world’s top providers of barley and corn.
After the start of hostilities, exports of grain were severely disrupted. For four months, Russian military vessels blocked Ukrainian ports. Supply constraints triggered market volatility and price rises. Wheat, for instance, reached a record high in March 2022. This left millions of people, particularly in developing countries, at the frontline of a food crisis.
Then, in July 2022, two agreements were signed: one was a memorandum of understanding between the UN and Moscow to facilitate global access for Russia’s food and fertilizer exports; the second was the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), signed by Russia and Ukraine, facilitating the safe export of grain and other foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports via the Black Sea.
Brokered by the UN and Turkey, the BSGI opened a protected maritime corridor through Ukraine. The agreement assuaged concerns about global grain supplies and led to price declines. Over 900 ships of grain and other foodstuffs have left Ukraine’s major ports since last summer.
Prior to the conflict, between 5-6 million tons of grain were exported from Ukraine’s seaports every month, according to the International Grains Council. By the end-2022, Ukraine had once again reached its historical exporting capacity (at just under 5 million tons). Production responses elsewhere also helped to increase global supplies.
Still, Ukrainian exports to developing countries remain below pre-war levels. And while unblocking the trade corridor did help to address food insecurity in 2022, export backlogs were significant. Today, grain prices (while they have come down in recent months) remain elevated.
Against this backdrop, negotiations between UN officials and Russian Federation representatives – headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin – kicked off in Geneva last Monday on a possible extension of the BSGI. Subsequent to a four-month renewal last year, the deal was set to expire on March 18th.
Earlier this month, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres highlighted the deal’s importance. He stressed that “it contributed to lowering global food costs and offered critical relief to people…, particularly in low-income countries.” Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, also called for the initiative to be extended.
For their part, Russian officials argued that ‘hidden’ sanctions – targeting fertilizer firms and the country’s main agricultural bank – have undermined commodity exports. By way of background, exemptions were carved out for some Russian food and fertilizer products after Western sanctions first targeted the Kremlin in February 2022.
In Geneva, delegates stressed that over-compliance and market avoidance by private companies had resulted in Russian commodity exports being under-traded. They noted that sanctions on its payments, logistics, and insurance systems created a barrier for Moscow to sell its grains and fertilisers in international markets.
In response, they requested that national jurisdictions enhance exemption clarifications for food and fertilizers products. “I think it’s a fair request,” says Jayati Ghosh, professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. “Hidden sanctions are impeding Russian financial transactions and undermining allegedly exempted exports.”
When the BSGI was last renewed in November, Russia threatened to renege on the deal unless hidden sanctions were addressed. While they eventually agreed to an extension, Moscow has since insisted that its own agricultural exports (notably ammonia) be included in the BSGI as a condition for its renewal.
Under the deal’s latest iteration, Russia’s pre-condition went notably unaddressed. Moscow, in turn, agreed to extend the deal for just two months. Ukraine, meanwhile, issued conflicting statements on the matter. Over the weekend, Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov tweeted that the agreement had been extended for four months.
So far, the UN has not specified the length of the renewal, but “this could be the last time an extension is agreed,” according to Ghosh. “Russia is probably going to use this latest agreement as a threat. Rejecting a third extension in the spring may force the international community to listen to their concerns”.
Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital, has been attracting hundreds of thousands of Russians since the war in Ukraine started in February 2022. The city is a favored destination where Russians can still travel visa-free.
by IPS Correspondent (tbilisi)
Inter Press Service
TBILISI, Mar 21 (IPS) – Since the war in Ukraine started in February last year, at least 1.5 million Russian citizens have crossed the Russia-Georgia border, official data states. However, as of today, it needs to be clarified how many of them stayed in the country, but walking the streets of the Georgian capital Tbilisi, the presence of Russian nationals can be seen almost everywhere.
Right after the war started and even more when Russia announced a partial mobilization in September 2022, hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens – primarily men – traveled to countries where they could travel visa-free, including Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Turkey, and Georgia. Among those destinations, Georgia is among the most enticing because of its mild climate, wine, food, and nightlife-heavy capital. At the moment, Russian citizens can spend twelve renewable months in Georgia, and many of them are planning to stay in the long term, as the war seems would still last long.
The arrival of thousands of Russians has significantly impacted Georgian society. The country is known for its hospitality, but many Georgians are concerned about the effect such a large influx could have on their country’s social fabric. There have been reports of tension between Russians and locals and concerns about potential cultural clashes. While walking in Tbilisi, the Russian language can be easily heard in most bars, cafes, and restaurants, day and night. In contrast, there is a solid pro-Ukrainian sentiment and a not-so-hidden antagonism toward Russians. Every twenty meters or so, it is possible to spot on the streets of Tbilisi a Ukrainian flag hanging from a balcony, at the entrance of a restaurant or bar, or drawn on a wall.
As the Russians poured into Georgia, many Georgians have come to fear that the emigres somehow could serve as a pretext for Putin to target their country in the future, just as it did happen to Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. For this reason, the recent influx of Russians—mainly men who fear being conscripted into arms—has created a tense social climate in Georgia and an increased distrust towards Russians.
Suspicion towards Russian emigration is also motivated by historical events indicating the two countries as potential enemies. Indeed, Russia currently occupies 20 percent of Georgia; in 2008, a five-day conflict (“South Ossetia conflict”) broke out between the two countries over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia lost control of both areas, and Russia later recognized them as independent states. As a consequence, Tbilisi cut off diplomatic relations with Moscow, after which Switzerland took up the role of mediator country.
Today, stickers reading “Russia currently occupies 20 percent of Georgian territory” are prominently displayed at the entrance to many restaurants, bars, coworking spaces, and local shops. Many Georgians believe that the Russians who have fled their country are not opponents of the Moscow government but do not want to risk their lives at the front in Ukraine. Irakli, a baker from central Tbilisi, told IPS: “If they don’t like Putin, and they don’t share his war, then they should fight and oppose him in Russia, not run away here to Georgia.”
Many Georgians fear that the recent wave of Russians fleeing to their country is less ideological than the first one that occurred right after the beginning of the war in February 2022. There is a widespread belief that, while the first wave mainly included activists, intellectuals, and anti-Putin individuals, the current wave might consist of people who fear being conscripted to fight in Ukraine but do not oppose the Russian government’s policies—including its decision to invade Ukraine.
Because of these concerns, a survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers in February-March 2022 revealed that 66 percent of Georgians favor re-introducing a visa regime for Russians. That visa regime was abolished for Russians in 2012, but now many Georgians think it should be revisited. However, the same survey revealed that 49 percent of respondents approved the Georgian national government’s rejection of imposing sanctions on Russia. On the one hand, this data could be interpreted as a tightening of ties with the Kremlin. More simply, it should be read as a policy aimed at not worsening diplomatic relations, as Georgia could fear some retaliation—even military—from Moscow.
Furthermore, Georgia depends on remittances from its citizens working in Russia, and, in the past, its tourism industry has prospered from Russian visitors. Most Georgian politicians agree that the country is pursuing a ‘pragmatic and careful stance toward Russia’ by not imposing sanctions and keeping the current visa-free regime. For example, Eka Sepashvili, a member of parliament who left the governing Georgian Dream party, remains aligned with it on this policy.
Adverse effects aside, Russian migration to Georgia has undoubtedly stimulated the local economy. Many among those migrants are information technology (IT) remote workers, sometimes even hired by Western companies. Therefore, their salaries are way higher than the Georgian average (300-500 US dollars per month), and their living in Georgia guarantees an essential boost to local consumption.
According to the World Bank, the 2022 Georgian economic growth was 10 percent. The surge in money transfers from Russia, the recovery in domestic demand, and the rebound of tourism after the pandemic have been the main reasons for the positive performance. The World Bank further forecasted a 4 percent and 5 percent economic growth for 2023 and 2024, respectively.
Furthermore, a recent Transparency International (TI) report shows 17,000 Russian companies are registered in Georgia. More than half of them were registered after the start of the war in Ukraine. Only in March-September of 2022, up to 9,500 Russian companies were registered, which, according to the report, is ten times more than the entire figure for 2021. According to TI, this trend indicates that many Russian nationals plan to stay in Georgia long term. Not coincidentally, in April-September 2022, remittances from Russia to Georgia amounted to 1,135 million US dollars—a fivefold increase.
Artem, a Russian engineer in his forties, arrived in Tbilisi in October 2022 after Putin announced the partial mobilization. He works remotely, so he can afford to continue living in Georgia as long as his salary allows. He stays in a guest house that is usually intended for tourists. The structure has six single rooms and two with more beds to share. In recent months, 95 percent of the tenants have been Russians who have started living here for medium-to-long periods.
Since it is the low tourist season, the landlord has agreed to rent to Russians. Still, with the arrival of the high season in May, he may return to prefer the more profitable short-term rentals.
“For now, I am staying here, but with the arrival of spring, I will probably have to look for a new place,” Artem told IPS.
Despite having a higher salary than the local average, Artem cannot afford many accommodations since prices have skyrocketed. Talking to him and other current tenants of the guest house – all Russian men – it isn’t easy to find someone who would say he doesn’t like Putin. They say they are against the war and worried about the current situation. Still, they go no further, perhaps for fear of sharing their ideas or probably because their opposition to the Moscow government is, in fact, minimal, as many Georgians believe.
Georgi, a Georgian tour guide, tells us that, according to him, Russian migrants are divided into two large groups: men—especially IT workers—who are mainly afraid of being called up but are not great opponents of Putin and those who oppose him fervently. The latter are activists, journalists, intellectuals, and members of the LGBT community—people who risked their lives in Russia—even before the start of the war in Ukraine.
The distrust towards Russians emerged even more during the first days of March when many Georgians complained that Russian citizens living in Georgia had not taken to the streets with them to protest against the so-called “foreign agents’ law.”
The law, which lawmakers dropped on March 11 after days of mass protests in Tbilisi, would have required individuals, civil society organizations, and media outlets that receive 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as an “agent of foreign influence” with the Georgian Justice Ministry.
The law was largely criticized by civil society groups, opposition politicians, human rights organizations, and even US and EU institutions. They argued the law was an attempt to suppress dissent and restrict freedom of expression in the country, and they compared it to similar legislation in Russia that Moscow has used to crack down on NGOs and independent journalism.
The government of Georgia has been defending the law, saying it was necessary to prevent foreign interference in the country’s political affairs. The term “foreign agent” has highly negative connotations in Georgia and is often associated with espionage and foreign interference. Therefore, supporters of the law argue that foreign governments or organizations may influence “agents” receiving funding from foreign sources and that it is important to ensure that they are transparent about their funding sources. On the other hand, critics of the law argue that by forcing entities and individuals to register as “foreign agents,” the government is trying to delegitimize them in the eyes of the public and stigmatize them as tools of foreign powers.
Alisa, a Russian woman who arrived in Tbilisi in April 2022 and who clearly defines herself as anti-Putin, told IPS that she was contacted on social media by a local resident with whom she had interacted. That person pressed for her to take to the streets to protest against the “foreign agents” law. The Georgian person told Alisa that it was not fair that Russians living in Georgia stand by and watch the protests without joining them and that if they wanted to enjoy the freedoms that are lacking in Russia, then they should actively participate in all aspects of the civic life of an ordinary Georgian citizen, including protesting against that law.
“I didn’t join the protests, not because I disagreed with the demonstrators. Indeed, it was a glorious moment for democracy and the demand for freedom. However, some Georgians should understand that for some Russian citizens, exposing themselves in a protest that is also indirectly against Russia can threaten their lives,” Alisa told IPS.
As Georgia continues to navigate its relationship with Russia and the West, the influx of Russians will undoubtedly play a role in shaping the country’s future. As of today, it is still not clear whether the Georgian government will change its policy toward Russian migrants. The country seems trapped in a dilemma that crosses economic, social, political, and geopolitical aspects. The need to ensure the continuation of economic growth in the short and medium terms suggests keeping the doors open to Russians.
On the other hand, this influx is causing ever-higher prices, which in the long run will probably end up harming the living conditions of the more economically vulnerable locals, facilitating urban gentrification and, potentially, higher social tensions. Finally, from a political and geopolitical perspective, the government in Tbilisi will have to deal with a growing push from the population to get closer to the West and Europe – as seen with the recent protests against the “foreign agents” law – in the face of an inevitable growing link with Russia, precisely given the strong presence of Russians in the country.
As Georgia continues to navigate its relationship with Russia and the West, the influx of Russians will undoubtedly play a role in shaping the country’s future. As of today, it is still not clear whether the Georgian government will change its policy toward Russian migrants. The country seems trapped in a dilemma that crosses economic, social, political, and geopolitical aspects.
The need to ensure the continuation of economic growth in the short and medium terms suggests keeping the doors open to Russians. On the other hand, this influx is causing ever-higher prices, which in the long run will probably end up harming the living conditions of the more economically vulnerable locals, facilitating urban gentrification and, potentially, higher social tensions. Finally, from a political and geopolitical perspective, the government in Tbilisi will have to deal with a growing push from the population to get closer to the West and Europe in the face of an inevitable growing link with Russia, precisely given the strong presence of Russians in the country.
BP’s recent journey points to the need for instruments that influence profits specifically, and notably reconsideration of the controversial price control tool: a climate-driven price cap on oil. Credit: Bigstock
Opinion by Philippe Benoit (washington dc)
Inter Press Service
WASHINGTON DC, Mar 13 (IPS) – BP, the oil company that previously brought us “Beyond Petroleum” and more recently robust corporate climate goals, has announced a return in emphasis to its traditional business of producing oil. Drawn by the inescapable appeal of oil’s latest high profits, has BP rebranded itself as “Back to Petroleum?”
This type of shift highlights the importance of stronger market incentives for reducing emissions so that companies interested in decarbonizing see their financial interest align with that course. BP’s recent journey points to the need for instruments that influence profits specifically, and notably reconsideration of the controversial price control tool: a climate-driven price cap on oil.
These record profits — driven in part by high gas prices resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — also point to a major vulnerability for any market-driven climate effort. With the lure of these type of returns from the traditional petroleum business, it is difficult to see or sustain financial motivation to shift away.
Indeed, as BP made clear in announcing its ambitious 2022 climate targets: “bp is committed to delivering attractive returns to shareholders” — and petroleum, with its upside, is uniquely placed to deliver the potential of a high return. So long as there are big profits to be made from oil, these companies will continue to be drawn to their petroleum activities, notwithstanding any stated desire to shift to renewables.
However, this also points to what needs to be a focus of an effective climate policy for oil: reducing its profitability. Over the years, think tanks, academics and others have put forward carbon pricing as the most efficient emissions reduction instrument, but this discourse has failed to deliver significant results in practice, especially when it comes to oil companies.
As emissions continue to rise and the carbon budget shrinks, the time has come to explore other solutions. One tool that merits consideration — more precisely, reconsideration — is a cap on oil prices.
This “climate oil price cap” would be designed to increase the relative profitability and so financial appeal of renewables by limiting the upside on oil activities specifically (something a customary windfall profits tax set at the corporate level wouldn’t accomplish). It would thereby support and encourage BP and other oil companies to transform themselves from a traditional petroleum company into an “integrated energy company” (BP’s own term), one that can generate significant profits from renewables and other low-carbon products relative to its petroleum activities.
Oil price controls are, of course, not new and have a checkered history (e.g., President Nixon’s effort in the US 50 years ago). But the climate emergency presents a new threat that merits re-examining this instrument. Importantly, a price cap could also help energy-importing developing countries, as well as vulnerable households there and elsewhere, avoid the harmful impact of the high oil prices experienced in 2022 (another potential advantage over a windfall profits tax ).
Any effort needs to consider the lessons from the failed efforts of the past. For example, the cap should be set at a sufficient level to attract the desired supply – including to energy-importing developing countries — even as it precludes the type of record profits the oil industry saw last year. It should also build on the experience with the current Russian price cap.
While, admittedly today there isn’t sufficient support for aggressive climate policies, the prospect for strong action will likely increase over time as heat waves, flooding and other extreme weather events wreak havoc exacerbated by climate change. This in turn can be expected to increase the willingness of politicians and policymakers to be more ambitious down the road in taking climate action.
In anticipation of this changing landscape, creative options beyond traditional carbon pricing mechanisms should be explored and put before these decision-makers by think tanks, academics and others.
In this regard, the combination of BP’s recent record profits and shift in corporate policy points to the appropriateness of considering a price cap on oil as a possible tool to fight climate change by improving the relative profitability of low-carbon investments.
Opinion by Sudip Ranjan Basu, Sanjay Srivastava (bangkok, thailand)
Inter Press Service
BANGKOK, Thailand, Mar 10 (IPS) – Two destructive Category 4 tropical cyclones, Judy and Kevin, and an earthquake of 6.5 magnitude impacted over 80 per cent of the Vanuatu population from 1 to 3 March 2023. To address this emergency situation, the UN, along with Pacific member States have deployed personnel on the ground to coordinate humanitarian assistance and prepare post-disaster damage assessment.
Sitting in the Pacific “Ring of Fire,” Vanuatu experiences frequent volcanic and seismic activity. And along with the other Pacific small island developing States (SIDS), Vanuatu faces existential threats due to rising sea level, ocean acidification and the increased frequency and severity of natural disasters and is on the front line of climate crisis.
The twin cyclones and an earthquake in just 48 hours remind the world that seismic and climate risks are converging and intensifying – no community feels this stronger than those of the Blue Pacific Continent.
On macro-economic impact, in fact, Pacific SIDS face Average Annual Losses from multiple hazards totaling to US$ 1.1 billion in the current scenario. This figure is set to increase to US$ 1.3 billion under moderate and US$1.4 billion under worst-case climate warming scenarios. As a percentage of GDP, Vanuatu, Tonga and Palau are projected to face highest losses – Vanuatu is projected to lose a staggering 20 per cent GDP annually due to disasters.
Figure 1: Tropical cyclones Judy and Kevin track with wind speed zones (UNITAR-UNOSAT)
Intensifying and expanding climate crisis
In ESCAP’s recent report, the analysis shows that at 1.5 to 2.0 °C warming, there are likely intensifying annual wind speeds of tropical cyclones and that the risk of tropical cyclones is expected to expand and include newer areas beyond the historical tracks (Figure 2). Vanuatu in particular, will experience higher risk of tropical cyclone both in terms of the intensification as well as geographic expansion of the riskscape.
As cyclone hazards are intensifying and deviating from their traditional tracks, their greater complexity results in deeper uncertainties in the ability to predict. Our Blue Pacific Continent is not sufficiently prepared.
Figure 2: Intensifying and expanding cyclone risks under new climate change scenarios
Formulating transformative actions
As the climate changes, the riskscape is transforming. These disaster risks compound and cascade to amplify the great hardship experienced by the Pacific SIDS in terms of population and critical infrastructure exposure. The argument for transformative action to mitigate and adapt to intensifying and expanding disaster risks in the Blue Pacific Continent has never been more compelling.
First, early warning for all is an imperative, needs to capture compounding risks.
Relative to other countries in the subregion, Vanuatu’s Target G scores are high, reporting substantial to comprehensive coverage of multi-hazard early warning systems across all indicators. WMO’s Regional Specialized Meteorological Centre in Nadi, Fiji was providing early warnings in the face of power outages and surmounting uncertainties – as a result, there have been no reported fatalities.
Figure 3: Sendai Framework for DRR Target G scores for countries in the Pacific region
Second, transformative adaptation solutions are needed.
To minimize and prevent systemic and cascading risk, we need to make new infrastructure and water resource management more resilient. Improving dryland crop production and using nature-based solutions such as increasing mangroves protection are also priority adaptation solutions.
1.5 per cent of GDP for adaptation investment is estimated to be needed in Pacific SIDS – three times less than the average losses projected. These adaptation investments must be risk-informed and strategically directed towards policy actions that yield high cost-benefits. Where there are multi-hazard risk hotspots across the region, risk-informed policy and transformative actions should capitalize on inter-sectoral synergies and co-benefits.
Third, the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent provides a clear pathway
With the adoption of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent in July 2022, Pacific SIDS have developed a clear pathway to synergize regional priorities with accelerated implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the SAMOA Pathway.
Next generation risk analytics, advances in climate science, geo-spatial modeling, Artificial Intelligence and machine learning must be at the heart of people-centered and evidence-based decision-making. And, the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific is an ideal platform to take forward some of the policy decisions.
Strengthening subregional and regional cooperation platform
Tropical cyclones, often transboundary in nature, require an architecture of regional co-operation mechanisms to effectively manage the shared risks. In this instance, local capacities and regional support mechanisms should be commended. To further strengthen this work, the lesson from Vanuatu’s back-to-back cyclones and earthquake is to have effective, impact-based and risk informed early warning systems that can capture the complexity and dynamisms of a compounding risk.
The Asia-Pacific Risk and Resilience Portal was developed by ESCAP with the goal of creating a user-friendly one stop platform for policymakers to access a vast array of scientific information and decision support tools to promote risk informed policy decisions.
Furthermore, the Vanuatu incidents underscores the need for conducting a rapid post-disaster needs assessment that can support formulation of a long-term recovery strategy and plan for its reconstruction by applying a standardized approach with innovative methodology and framework.
The overlapping and transboundary nature of risks experienced by countries of the Blue Pacific Continent cannot be addressed without solidarity and collective action towards strengthening regional cooperation platform.
Sanjay Srivastava is Chief, Disaster Risk Reduction, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP);
Sudip Ranjan Basu is Deputy Head, ESCAP Subregional Office for the Pacific
Mangroves in Tai O, Hong Kong. Coastal wetland protection and restoration is an example of the kind of multifunctional solution that is needed to address multiple global crises together. Credit: Chunyip Wong / iStock
Opinion by Paula Harrison – Pamela McElwee – David Obura (bonn)
Inter Press Service
BONN, Mar 02 (IPS) – When global crises are interlinked, they overlap and compound each other. In such cases, the most effective solutions are those that work at the nexus of all these challenges.
In September, almost every Government on Earth will gather at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York to take stock at the halfway mark of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of what has been achieved and what remains to be done.
Despite some progress, global development efforts have been hamstrung by unprecedented environmental, social and economic crises, in particular biodiversity loss and climate change, compounded of course by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Tackling these interlinked challenges separately risks creating situations even more damaging to people and communities around the world, and exacerbates the already high risk of not meeting the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
This is especially true because the myriad drivers of risk and damage affect many different sectors at once, across scales from local to global, and can result in negative impacts being compounded. For example, when demands for food and timber combine with the effects of pollution and climate change, they can decimate already degraded ecosystems, driving species to extinction and severely reducing nature’s contributions to people.
The global food system offers another example of this negative spiral of interlocking crises – where food that is produced unsustainably leads to water overconsumption and waste, pollution, increased health risks and loss of biodiversity. It also leads to excessive greenhouse gas emissions, contributing to climate change.
Yet policies often treat each of these global threats in isolation, resulting in separate, uncoordinated actions that typically address only one of the root causes and fail to take advantage of the many potential solution synergies. In the worst cases, actions taken on one challenge directly undermine those needed to tackle another because they fail to account for trade-offs, resulting in unintended consequences, or the impacts being externalised, as someone else’s problem.
This is why almost 140 Governments turned to the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) – requesting IPBES to undertake a major multiyear assessment of the interlinkages among biodiversity, water, food and health in the context of the rapidly-changing climate. This ‘Nexus Assessment’ is among the most complex and important expert assessments ever undertaken – crossing key biophysical domains of climate and biodiversity and elements central to human wellbeing like food, water and health. It will also address how interactions are affected by energy, pollution, conflict and other socio-political challenges.
To fully address this ‘nexus’, the assessment is considering interactions across scales, geographic regions and ecosystems. It also covers past, present and future trends in these interlinkages. And, most importantly, it will offer concrete options for responses to the crises that address the interactions of risk and damage jointly and equitably – providing a vital set of possible solutions for the more sustainable future we want for people and our planet.
One example of the mutifunctional solutions that will be explored is nature-based solutions – such as coastal wetland protection and restoration. When coastal wetland ecosystems are healthy – whether conserved or where necessary, restored – they are a refuge and habitat for biodiversity, improving fish stocks for greater food security and contributing to improve human health and wellbeing. They can also sequester carbon, helping to mitigate climate change, and protect adjacent communities and settlements from flooding and sea level rise.
To develop and implement these kinds of multi-functional solutions, responses for dealing with the major global crises need to be better coordinated, integrated, and made more synergistic across sectors, both public and private. Decision-makers at all levels need better evidence and knowledge to implement such solutions.
Work on the nexus assessment began in 2021 – with the final report expected to be considered and adopted by IPBES member States in 2024. A majority of the 170 expert authors and review editors from around the world are meeting in March in the Kruger National Park in South Africa to further strengthen the draft report, responding to the many thousands of comments received during a first external review period.
The assessment will also include evidence and expertise contributed by indigenous peoples and local communities – whose rich and varied direct experiences and knowledge systems that consider humans and nature as an interconnected whole have embodied a nexus approach for generations.
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the recently-agreed Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework provide the roadmaps for tackling the climate and biodiversity crises. The IPBES nexus assessment will offer policymakers a practical guide to bridge the vital interlinkages across the two challenges, to other relevant frameworks, and link to the sustainable development agenda.
For more information about IPBES or about the ongoing progress on the nexus assessment, go to www.ipbes.net or follow @ipbes on social media.
Prof. Paula Harrison is a Principal Natural Capital Scientist and Professor of Land and Water Modelling at the UK Centre for Ecology & Hydrology, United Kingdom.
Prof. Pamela McElwee is a Professor in the Department of Human Ecology in the School of Environmental and Biological Sciences at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, USA.
Dr. David Obura is a Founding Director of CORDIO (Coastal Oceans Research and Development – Indian Ocean) East Africa, Kenya.
Credit: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Opinion by Gadir Lavadenz, Pablo Fajardo Mendoza (quito, ecuador / la paz, bolivia)
Inter Press Service
QUITO, Ecuador / LA PAZ, Bolivia, Feb 27 (IPS) – The Chief Executive of the twelfth largest oil producer – Sultan Al Jaber of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) – has been appointed as president of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) COP28, the biggest climate change conference that will take place in November, 2023 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
In brief, the leadership of a Climate Conference that should deliver on ways to create a fossil-free future is in the hands of the representative of one of the top 15 corporations most responsible for carbon emissions globally. Like any other oil company, ADNOC’s very reason for existence is to profit off of the very product that has sent global greenhouse gas emissions soaring and spurred a global climate emergency.
In fact, ADNOC Drilling under ADNOC Groups reported a rise of 33 percent in 2022 net profit with a projection of record net profit in 2023 fueled by further oil and gas expansion plans. And now at least 12 employees of ADNOC have been given organizing roles for COP28. That means this year the global climate negotiations will literally be run by the fossil fuel industry.
Fierce criticism has arisen from all over the world and in particular from climate activists that have been long fighting for a fossil fuel free climate COP. In reaction to this appointment, more than 450 climate and human rights organizations wrote a letter to UN Secretary General António Guterres and Simon Stiell, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC condemning the appointment of Al Jaber as COP28 President.
The thin argument presented for the appointment of Al Jaber is his involvement in renewables as chairman of Masdar, a “clean-energy innovator” investing in renewables. But that alone does not compare to the evidence on the negative role and powerful influence of the fossil fuel industry in the climate talks.
The fossil fuel industry has completely co-opted climate policy from the inside out. The most offensive illustration of this co-option and corporate capture of climate talks is the current reality that someone like Al Jaber will preside over a crucial session of climate negotiations at such a time when complete and equitable phase out of fossil fuels is a critical and immediate action needed to protect the planet.
And this is not happening for the first time!
More than 630 fossil fuel industry lobbyists participated in COP27 last year at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt and 18 out of 20 COP27 sponsors were either directly partnered with or are linked to the fossil fuel industry.
This ongoing 30-year experiment of allowing the largest polluters, their financiers, and polluter governments to undermine a meaningful global response to climate change has delivered predictably poor and unacceptable results.
Several reports last year including this report by the UN Environmental Programme showed that the world will miss the target set in the Paris Agreement by world leaders to limit global warming below 1.5?.
So, what’s the solution?
It’s time for international climate policy to finally be protected from polluting interests, and this is the reason many are proposing a concrete drawing from other UN precedents to systematically weed out this undue interference.
The UN Secretary General has recently equated the fossil fuel industry’s modus operandi as “inconsistent with human survival,” also agreeing that “those responsible must be held to account.’
A concrete Accountability Framework should be implemented by the UNFCCC drawing from other UN precedents to systematically weed out this undue interference.
Parties to the UNFCCC have to change the course of how climate talks are moving and provide immediate and clear signs of deep structural changes that can lead to just transition. Governments across the world should be actively protecting climate action from being written, bankrolled, and weakened by polluting interests.
Rather, it’s (past) time to implement real, proven, and people-centered solutions and hold polluting corporations liable for their decades-long deception and deceit. These are not new ideas. These are not even radical ideas. They are necessary ones.
The indigenous peoples, peasants, women and frontline communities who face and suffer the serious consequences of the impacts of climate change, together with the social groups of the world that have a real interest in curbing the emissions of greenhouse gasses, demand that the decision makers implement the necessary changes in order to ensure that appropriate measures are adopted by the world and governments at COP28 to prevent the collapse of the planet.
If these necessary measures are not rectified and implemented immediately, it is world leaders and the decision makers who would be mainly responsible for the collapse of our planet. For us it is clear, Sultan Al Jaber does not have the moral or ethical rectitude to lead and deliver on a COP28 that is for the peoples.
Pablo Fajardo Mendoza is with the Union of People Affected by Chevron-Texaco (UDAPT); and Gadir Lavadenz is Global Coordinator, Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice
LONDON, Feb 23 (IPS) – It’s been 25 years since the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to the creation of the G20 forum for finance ministers; and 15 years since this became a leader-level meeting following the global financial crisis. During this period, there has been significant shift in the global finance and economic landscape.
The ascent of several emerging economies has seen their contributions to the multilateral finance system that supports development rise significantly. Our new report collates those contributions over the last decade for the first time. It charts how China’s annual contributions to the UN and multilateral development banks rose twenty-fold from $0.1bn to $2.2bn.
But it also looks collectively at a group of 13 rising economies whose developmental contributions to multilateral finance institutions have risen five-fold to over $6bn over the last decade.
These contributions now make up an eighth of the total; and have seen the creation of two new multilateral finance institutions.
In this piece, we draw out key findings from our analysis, including the balance between funding existing and new institutions like the New Development Bank.
We consider whether continued growth in the 13 emerging actors could generate enough new funding for development over the next quarter century, and even create an institution as large at the World Bank’s fund for low-income countries (IDA).
Despite recent rhetoric around the return to a bipolar world order, this report is evidence that a wide group of countries are already playing major role in the global economic and development system, and will continue to do so in years to come
The transformational effect of economic growth on the multilateral system
In 1990 most people in the world lived in low-income countries; by 2020, this share had fallen dramatically to just seven percent of people. Meanwhile, the share of the global population living in middle-income countries swelled from 30 percent in 1990 to 73 percent in 2020.
Such a transformation implies a greater number of countries with the economic output to contribute internationally: widening and deepening participation in the multilateral system.
And this is just what we’ve seen. Over the decade to 2019, we find a group of emerging actors have significantly increased their contributions of development finance to multilateral organisations.
These include thirteen major economies outside the group of more established providers within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which tend to receive more attention.
Ten of these emerging actors are G20 members, including the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—but others have grown quickly too: Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Collectively, we refer to these thirteen emerging actors as the “E13.”
Over the decade, the E13’s annual contributions of development finance to multilateral organisations (both core and funding earmarked for particular purposes) have increased almost five-fold, from $1.3bn in 2010 to $6.3bn in 2019 (up 377 percent). And their unrestricted core contributions have risen even more: increasing from $1.0bn to $5.2bn (up 410 percent).
Of these core contributions, we see that those to UN agencies more than quadrupled over the decade, steadily rising from $0.3bn to $1.2bn (up 330 percent). But by far the most striking development in E13 core contributions has come from the creation and capitalisation of two new multilateral organisations: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB).
The role of China
Although China has recently stepped back its bilateral finance efforts, its multilateral contributions increased steadily to 2019; and provided a third (34 percent) of the E13 total over the decade. Our colleagues have examined this in detail, including how China has the second highest aggregate voting share after the US in international finance institutions it supports.
Still, our analysis also highlights the importance of Russia, Brazil and India who each contributed over $3bn over the period and collectively contributed a further third of the total. While China’s multilateral contributions have been concentrated (59 percent) in new institutions it co-founded (see below), other providers have concentrated funding in traditional institutions: for example, Argentina, Chile and Mexico did not support the new institutions while for Saudi Arabia and UAE they were 17 percent and 21 percent respectively.
Creating new multilateral finance organisations
Over the ten-year period we examine, almost half of the E13’s core multilateral contributions were to the two new institutions (AIIB and NDB). After 2016, funding provided to these institutions made up over two-thirds of their contributions. Indeed, in 2016 the first financial contributions to AIIB and NDB causedE13 multilateral development finance to triple in a single year.
The E13 provided an additional $6.0bn of core funds for AIIB and NDB in 2016, without reducing their multilateral contributions through other channels.
Though annual contributions reduced to $3.1bn in 2019, AIIB and NDB still accounted for half of the E13’s multilateral development finance in that year, leaving their contributions at the end of the decade far ahead of the beginning.
Figure 1. E13 core and earmarked contributions of development finance to multilateral organisations (nominal USD billions)Source: Authors’ analysis
Emerging actors fund a sixth of the UN system
As well as higher absolute contributions (Figure 1), the E13’s role in the multilateral system has also grown in relative terms (Figure 2). As a share of the level of finance provided by the 29 high-income countries in the OECD DAC, the E13’s core multilateral contributions rose from 5 percent in 2010 to 12 percent in 2019—more than doubling their relative significance.
This was largely due to the effect of AIIB and NDB (clearly seen by the 2016 peak), but we also see that E13 core contributions to the UN system steadily and quickly rose as a share of the DAC level across the decade: from 5 percent in 2010 to 17 percent in 2019.
Figure 2. E13 core contributions of development finance to multilateral organisations as a share of contributions from DAC countriesSource: Authors’ analysis
A look to 2050—what role might the emerging economies play?
As the economies of the E13 continue to grow, what might this mean for their multilateral contributions in the future? Figure 3 shows how the share of economic output provided as development finance to multilateral organisations (either core or earmarked) tends to increase with higher levels of income per capita.
Though the relationship is steeper for the DAC than the E13, even the E13’s current trajectory implies a significant increase in future multilateral development finance from this group.
Ian Mitchell is Co-Director, Development Cooperation in Europe and Senior Policy Fellow at the Center for Global Development. Sam Hughes is a Research Assistant at the Center for Global Development.
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 20 (IPS) – When the United Nations began negotiations on a legally binding treaty to protect and regulate the high seas, one diplomat pointedly remarked: “It’s a jungle out there”—characterizing a wide-open ocean degraded by illegal and over-fishing, plastics pollution, indiscriminate sea bed mining and the destruction of marine eco-systems.
Although the origins of the proposed treaty go back to 2002, the initial negotiations began in 2018, with a new round scheduled to take place February 20 through March 3.
The discussions will include four elements of the 2011 package that have guided the negotiations, namely marine genetic resources (MGRs), questions on benefit-sharing, area-based management tools (ABMTs), marine protected areas (MPAs), environmental impact assessments (EIAs), capacity building and the transfer of marine technology (CB&TT).
Without a strong Treaty, says Greenpeace, it is practically impossible to protect 30% of the world’s oceans by 2030: the 30×30 target which was agreed at COP15 in Montreal in December 2022.
Dr Laura Meller, Oceans Campaigner and Polar Advisor, Greenpeace Nordic said:
“The oceans support all life on Earth. Their fate will be decided at these negotiations. The science is clear. Protecting 30% of the oceans by 2030 is the absolute minimum necessary to avert catastrophe. It was encouraging to see all governments adopt the 30×30 target last year, but lofty targets mean nothing without action.”
“This special session taking place so soon after the last round of negotiations collapsed gives us hope,” she said.
“If a strong Treaty is agreed on the 3rd of March, it keeps 30×30 alive. Governments must return to negotiations ready to find compromises and deliver an effective Treaty. We’re already in extra time. These talks are one final chance to deliver. Governments must not fail,” she declared.
Dr Palitha Kohona, former co-Chair, UN Ad Hoc Working Group on Biological Diversity Beyond National Jurisdiction, told IPS even though the goal of the UN Preparatory Committee is clear, the details have bedevilled negotiating parties.
As during previous negotiations on shared global resources, he said, it is the difficulty involved in making compromises on the “key issues of financing and monetary benefit- sharing from Marine Genetic Resources” exploitation that has prevented the conclusion of the much-anticipated binding legal instrument.
“While the conservation of marine biological diversity is a priority for the globe, and is consistent with the SDGs, the developing world feels (with considerable justification) that they should also have access to the wealth that is expected to flow (gush) from the exploitation of marine genetic resources.”
Past negative experiences of missing out on new and lucrative developments, colour the thinking of the developing world. If both sides are to emerge with a win/win outcome, compromises will have to be made, he argued.
“The precedent of the Sea Bed Authority and the many environmental treaties could be adapted to the needs of the proposed treaty. Imaginative and ambitious thinking is required”.
Given the dire situation confronting the oceans and the unimaginable consequences for humanity of a collapse of the biological resources of the oceans, (small scale fisherfolk, especially in poor countries are crying for a positive outcome, where the protein intake comes mainly from the oceans), “let us hope that pragmatic compromises could be arrived at the next round of negotiations”, said Dr Kohona, a former Sri Lankan Ambassador to the UN and current envoy in Beijing.
More than 50 High Ambition Coalition countries promised a Treaty in 2022 and they failed. Many of the self-proclaimed ocean champions from the Global North refused to compromise on key issues such as financing and monetary benefit sharing from Marine Genetic Resources until the final days of talks. They offered too little, too late, said Greenpeace.
The sticking points which must be resolved are on finance, capacity building and the fair sharing of benefits from Marine Genetic Resources. Resolving these impasses depends on the Global North making a fair and credible offer to the Global South
Asked about the primary issues holding up the final treaty, James Hanson, a Greenpeace spokesperson, told IPS finding an agreement will largely depend on a fair agreement on the finance behind supporting developing nations to implement the Treaty (how much money, and who will be paying?) and finding a fair compromise on the sharing of monetary benefits from marine genetic resources.
The key to resolving these issues will be High Ambition Coalition countries returning to the table with a credible and timely offer on both issues. These countries are the ones which have committed to delivering a Treaty, and so the onus is on them to compromise to get a Treaty over the line.
China also will have a crucial role to play as a power broker, holding significant sway over many developing nations. China’s welcomed flexibility at the last round of talks on ABMTs is encouraging, and we hope this continues at this next round of talks.
China’s position on MGRs is still at odds with the EU’s, and this impasse must be resolved through compromise on both sides.
Asked whether he expects the outstanding issues to be resolved in the current sessions, Hanson said there seems to be willingness and desire from all sides to deliver a Treaty at this last round of talks.
“The progress made last time, and this special session being called so soon after the last round of talks failed, gives us hope. We encourage countries to return to the table with willingness to compromise and seek agreement, for the sake of the oceans,” he declared.
Pepe Clarke, Oceans Practice Leader at WWF International said: “For most people, the high seas are out of sight, out of mind. But the ocean is a dynamic mosaic of habitats, and the high seas play an important role in the healthy functioning of the whole marine system.”
With two-thirds of the ocean falling outside national waters, a High Seas Treaty is an essential precondition for protecting 30% of marine areas worldwide, he noted.
“We have a chance to achieve a global, legally binding agreement that would address the current gaps in international ocean governance. We’re optimistic the COP15 biodiversity agreement will provide the shot in the arm needed for governments to get this important agreement over the line,” Clarke noted.
The waters beyond national jurisdiction, known as the high seas, comprise nearly two-thirds of the ocean’s area, but only roughly 1% of this huge swathe of the planet is protected, and even then often with little effective management in place.
The high seas play a key role for many important species of sharks, tuna, whales and sea turtles, and support billions of dollars annually in economic activity.
Jessica Battle, Senior Global Ocean Governance and Policy Expert, who is leading WWF’s team at the negotiations, said overfishing and illegal fishing, habitat destruction, plastic and noise pollution, as well as climate change impacts, are all rife in the high seas.
“Heavily subsidized, industrial fishers seek to exploit and profit from ocean resources that, by law, belong to everyone. It’s a tragedy of the commons.”
She said a legally binding High Seas Treaty would help to break down the current silos between isolated management bodies, and result in less cumulative impacts and better cooperation across the ocean – it would create a forum where all ocean issues can be discussed as a whole.
“The high seas, the wildlife that migrates through these waters, and the climate-regulation functions of the ocean need urgent protection from both current and new threats, such as deep sea mining,” declared Battle.
LONDON, Feb 10 (IPS) – Thulani Maseko knew speaking out in Eswatini was a risky business. An activist and well-known human rights lawyer, he’d previously spent 14 months in jail for criticising the country’s lack of judicial independence. Now he’s dead, shot in his home by unknown assailants.
Among those Maseko litigated against was the country’s tyrannical ruler, King Mswati III. Mswati, in power since 1986, is Africa’s last remaining absolute monarch. In 2018, in one indication of his unchecked power, he changed the country’s name to Eswatini from Swaziland, unilaterally and without warning. Maseko was planning to take Mswati to court to challenge the renaming on constitutional grounds.
Maseko was chair of the Multi-Party Forum, a network bringing together civil society groups, political parties, businesses and others to urge a peaceful transition to multiparty democracy. He was also the lawyer of two members of parliament – Bacede Mabuza and Mthandeni Dube – arrested and detained in 2021 on terrorism charges for calling for constitutional democracy.
It isn’t yet clear why Maseko was killed or whether those who did the deed were acting on their own initiative or following someone else’s orders. But for many in the country’s democracy movement, it’s more than a little suspicious that just before the killing Mswati is reported to have said the state would ‘deal with’ people calling for democratic reforms. Maseko had reportedly received death threats.
Civil society is calling for Maseko’s killing to be properly investigated. Those carrying out the investigation should be independent and ensure whoever is behind it is held to account, however high the trail goes. But there seems little hope of that.
Blood on the king’s hands
If Maseko’s killing was a reaction to his human rights work, it’s an extreme form of reprisal, but it’s not the only recent mysterious death. In May 2021, law student Thabani Nkomonye disappeared. When his body was discovered a few days later, it bore signs of torture. The police did little to investigate; many believed they were responsible for the killing.
When news of Nkomonye’s killing broke, students protested to demand justice – and multiparty democracy, because only under democracy can state institutions be held accountable. This was the trigger for months of protests that swept Eswatini in 2021.
As protests went on some people started to target businesses owned by the monarchy. When protesters started fires, the state’s response was lethal. Dozens were killed and around a thousand injured as security forces fired indiscriminately at protesters, in a shoot-to-kill policy evidently ordered by Mswati. Even if Mswati doesn’t turn out to have Maseko’s blood on his hands, there are plenty of other killings he’s likely responsible for.
Part of a pattern?
Amid continued repression, people have little hope that the killing of Maseko will be the last, and if anything the fear is that it could mark an escalation. If the state is behind the attack, it suggests an increased boldness to its repression: it may be targeting high-profile figures in confident expectation of impunity.
There are other indications this may be the case: Penuel and Xolile Malinga of the People’s United Democratic Movement, the major political party, have twice had their home fired upon in the last few months. In December 2022, human rights lawyer Maxwell Nkambule survived an apparent assassination attempt when his car was fired on.
The state signalled it had more interest in repression than investigating Maseko’s killing when two protesters were shot in a march demanding justice. The danger is of growing lawlessness and further waves of state lethality in response to any protest violence.
Genuine dialogue needed
What the democracy movement is asking for is commonplace elsewhere: the right for people to have a say in the decisions that affect their lives. People want to pick the prime minister themselves, instead of the king doing it. They want to be able to vote for political parties, which are banned from elections. They want the king to be subject to the law, which requires a constitutional rather than absolute monarchy. And they want an economy that works for everyone: currently Mswati lives a life of rockstar luxury, funded through his family’s direct control of key state assets, while most people live in dire poverty.
An agreement to hold a national dialogue – struck with South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) following the 2021 protests – hasn’t been honoured. Even if it happened, many doubt such dialogue would be genuine.
South Africa has a special responsibility to urge democracy, as the country that’s home to Eswatini’s many civil society and political exiles. It’s time for South Africa and SADC to stand up to Mswati, demand genuine accountability over the killing of Maseko and push harder for real dialogue, constitutional reform and a path towards democracy.
Opinion by Purnaka de Silva, Geetika Chandwani (new york)
Inter Press Service
NEW YORK, Feb 10 (IPS) – The opioid addiction crisis in the United States is an acute public health emergency and a profound threat to national security – which is caused by the over-prescription, misuse, illegal production, and criminal trafficking and sale of opioid pharmaceutical drugs to Americans. It is estimated that over 130 people die every day from opioid overdoses in the U.S.
The crisis has been linked to the dramatic increase in the prescription of opioid pain relievers since the late 1990s, as well as the rise of the use of heroin and powerful, highly-addictive synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl.
The opioid addiction crisis has had a horrific impact at the individual, family, and community levels across the country, as well as on the U.S. healthcare system at the federal, state, and local level.
Opioid addiction in the U.S. has become a prolonged epidemic, threatening public health, economic output, and national security. Hundreds of people die every week from opioid-related overdoses, a toll that spiked across the country during the COVID-19 pandemic.
As communities, healthcare providers, and government agencies join forces in combating the epidemic of opioid overdose deaths and solving the opioid addiction crisis, it is not enough to focus all available resources on treating people already addicted to opioids.
The million-dollar question is how to prevent people that do not have opioid addiction disorders, from becoming addicted. In this equation, it is crucial to examine pain and its relationship with deficiencies for example as in the case of Vitamin D deficiency and its relationship to musculoskeletal health, and thereby address specific factors that may trigger the need for long-term opioid use.
Opioids are recognized as a legitimate medical therapy for selected patients with severe, chronic pain that does not respond to other treatments. However, there can be unintended consequences. According to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports, nearly 500,000 people died from an overdose involving any type of opioid, including prescription and illicit opioids, from 1999-2019.
These overdose deaths are a direct cause of significant damage to the U.S. economy from lost spending, wages, and productivity, and indirectly from lower employment and other trickle-down effects.
Once seen as mainly affecting white people of Caucasian descent, the opioid crisis disproportionately harms people of color now. Unequally distributed insurance coverage, limited access to medical services, and serious racial disparities exist in the U.S. healthcare system.
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, African American and Hispanic and Latino American people receive worse pain care. And alarmingly, the number and proportion of Americans 65-years and older with Substance Use Disorders (SUDs) are increasing.
Musculoskeletal Disorders (MSDs) are the leading source of pain and disability globally but are especially prevalent in industrialized nations, including the United States. Pain associated with MSDs is prevalent among construction workers, which is followed by increased prescription opioid use.
Musculoskeletal injuries are also a severe problem in sports medicine. Chronic pain is more common among combat veterans than non-veterans and their injuries are often more catastrophic. According to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, military veterans suffer long years of musculoskeletal injury-related limitations.
MSDs, such as degenerative spine, arthritic conditions, and osteoporosis, are the most common causes of chronic pain among the elderly. Approximately 10 million Americans have osteoporosis, and another 44 million have low bone density, placing them at increased risk. By 2050, the incidence of hip fracture is expected to increase by 240% and 310% in women and men, respectively.
Vitamin D affects muscle strength, muscle size and neuromuscular performance. Since Vitamin D is a crucial nutrient for bone health, it is critical to question whether Vitamin D deficiency contributes to chronic pain-related opioid addiction. Vitamin D deficiency is commonly seen in patients with chronic pain, and an even higher percentage of patients with musculoskeletal pain are found to be Vitamin D deficient.
The latest study by Massachusetts General Hospital proves that Vitamin D deficiency enormously exaggerates the craving for opioids, potentially increasing the risk of dependence and addiction. Vitamin D deficiency occurs when the body does not get enough Vitamin D from sunlight or diet.
About 42% of the U.S. population is Vitamin D deficient, with some people even having higher deficiency levels. This includes premenopausal women, those with poor nutritional habits, people over 65, and individuals who avoid even minimal sun exposure.
There are also concerns related to Vitamin D deficiency due to regular sunscreen usage. And many youngsters spend more time on computers, mobile phones and video games, and lack a regular exercise regime. National data shows that most American children over the age of eight do not get enough calcium, a deficiency that increases their risk of developing osteoporosis in adulthood.
Vitamin D is naturally present in some foods and available as a dietary supplement. Regardless of fortification, the amount of Vitamin D a person gets from food depends on the person’s choice of food or drinks. The skin’s ability to produce Vitamin D decreases with age. At over 65 years of age, a person generates only one-fourth as much Vitamin D compared to when they were in their 20s.
And people with darker skin typically have lower Vitamin D levels than lighter-skinned individuals. On average, African Americans have about half as much Vitamin D in their blood compared to white Americans of Caucasian descent. While vitamin supplements have surged in popularity, some people are overdoing it, which can be toxic.
The American case study can present a learning model on a global scale, since the opioid crisis in the U.S. displays an extraordinary heterogeneity in society, with large pockets of poverty, and the absence of comprehensive health care for every citizen.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), an estimated 40 million people need palliative care each year and 78% live in middle and low-income countries. Regularized pain treatment is limited or non-existent in most parts of the world. Such suffering can be alleviated with access to pain relief treatment. Poorly managed pain and inadequate palliative therapy can lead people to turn to illicitly obtained prescriptions or street drugs.
Consumer appetite is what drives demand. MSDs are the most common cause of disability worldwide, and according to the World Health Organization (WHO), approximately 1.71 billion people have musculoskeletal conditions globally.
Changes in worldwide populations, global migration patterns, increase in communicable and non-communicable diseases, and environments where people tend to live and work indoors, impact upon nutrition and Vitamin D levels, with adverse knock-on effects on musculoskeletal health.
As populations age, chronic pain and diseases tend to increase, along with the need for pain relief medications. Vitamin D is crucial for bone health, a fact that probably half the world’s population may understand but does not consider such information to be crucial. A relatively simple step, such as paying attention to Vitamin D deficiency screening and treatment can lead to improved health, which in turn may decrease the need for and abuse of opioids.
For that reason alone, there should be a compulsory policy implemented nationwide in the U.S. for everyone to be screened for Vitamin D deficiency, starting from 10-years-old (middle school) to 60-years to identify and treat at-risk populations.
The opioid addiction crisis in the U.S. is undoubtedly a national security emergency. It has resulted in a manifold increase in opioid-related deaths, decline in national public safety, and given rise to transcontinental organized criminal enterprises that are involved in the production and trafficking of illegal prescription drugs, such as fentanyl.
The current opioid addiction epidemic has also had a profound economic impact, costing the U.S. economy an estimated $78.5 billion in 2015. The precise total financial burden of the opioid addiction crisis to the U.S. economy is not easy to quantify.
Some estimates indicate that the total economic costs of the opioid addiction crisis in the U.S. could be as high as $504 billion per annum – i.e., including costs associated with healthcare provision, lost productivity, addiction treatment, criminal justice funding, and other associated expenditures.
The opioid addiction crisis has created the perfect storm – i.e., public health emergency and a significant national security threat – where transnational drug cartels and associated national criminal organizations are profiteering from the situation, boosting their profits, and expanding and deepening their illegal operations and networks.
The U.S. government’s measures to rise to this challenge and combat the opioid addiction crisis, include increased resources and powers for law enforcement investigation and interdiction, as well as access to treatment, funding for research, public health awareness initiatives, education etc., all part and parcel of a national security strategy aimed at protecting the American public.
The U.S. government has also taken steps to strengthen border security, and combat the trafficking of opioids, including from China where the most amount of fentanyl is manufactured and smuggled into America. However, these measures alone are not enough to address the opioid addiction crisis in the U.S.
The opioid crisis is a complex dilemma that requires wide-ranging, concerted national health and security policies, strategies, and tactics – i.e., that must focus on prevention, treatment, public awareness, and education, together with more effective and robust law enforcement with teeth.
It requires a coordinated multistakeholder effort involving federal, state, and local governments working together with law enforcement, public health providers, the private sector, and not-for profit organizations, faith-based nongovernmental organizations and religious orders that are engaged in generating public health awareness.
The U.S. government and lawmakers on Capitol Hill must continue to take bipartisan steps to address the opioid addiction crisis in America and fully ensure that the national security of the United States is sacrosanct and not compromised in any way, shape, or form.
Opinion by David Ferrari – Sudip Ranjan Basu – Kimberly Roseberry (bangkok, thailand)
Inter Press Service
BANGKOK, Thailand, Feb 09 (IPS) – The last three years have seen the Pacific impacted negatively due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The tourism industry, a key source of national revenue and jobs creation, received a severe blow due to closure of borders and reduced travel.
In April 2020, a major cyclone caused widespread destruction in the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga. In early 2022, a volcanic eruption in Tonga further caused significant damage to domestic physical infrastructure.
Adding to these existing pressures, the food, fuel and finance crises have had a crippling impact on national economies throughout the Pacific. The vulnerabilities to both manmade and natural disasters are all but obvious. There is a need for an acceleration of transformative energy policy actions and ambitions.
Growing costs of fuel imports
A glance at the data shows that most Pacific countries – particularly the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) – remain highly dependent on imported petroleum fuels and are expected to do so for many years.
Outside of Australia and New Zealand, oil makes up about 80 per cent of the Pacific’s total energy supply, of which 52 per cent is used for transport, 37 per cent for electricity generation and 12 per cent for other applications such as process heating. Renewable energy accounts for only 17 per cent of the total energy supply.
Fuel imports cost the region US$6 billion annually, or around 5 to 15 per cent of GDP for each economy. This is an enormous economic burden. With its vast natural resources, a history and culture of independence and subsistence together with its low energy intensity, the Pacific subregion offers great advantages for energy transition leadership. So, there are solutions to alleviate this cost.
ESCAP’s new report – Pacific Perspectives 2022: Accelerating Climate Action – makes the case for a rapid transition of the Pacific’s energy sector away from fossil fuel imports and to increase access to modern energy services to deliver Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) in harmony with global climate goals.
This strengthens the case for alleviating reliance on imported fossil fuels. A move to locally generated renewable energy sources is supported by both the economic gains and the energy security benefits.
Advancing the implementation of SDG 7
It is widely recognized that the Pacific is not on track to deliver universal access to clean cooking fuels and technology by 2030. In fact, this target may present one of the largest hurdles to achieving SDG 7.
However, experts have recognized that energy access is best achieved through utilization of solar energy, and for many of those who remain without electricity across the Pacific, the best access solution will be the installation of stand-alone solar home systems.
Experts now suggest moving beyond minimum levels of electricity access and employing metrics such as multi-tier frameworks or the “modern energy minimum” of consumption of at least 1,000 kWh per year as a better indicator of access.
On the other hand, the rates of access to clean cooking fuels and technologies are amongst the lowest in the world as depicted in the chart below. In 2020, almost 10 million people across the Pacific lacked access to clean cooking, the bulk of whom (8.1 million people) were in Papua New Guinea. Furthermore, the rate of access to clean cooking in many countries is stagnating and, in some cases, even declining.
Figure 1: Proportion of population with access to clean cooking fuels and technologies (Data source: World Health Organization, via the Asia Pacific Energy Portal. Data was unavailable for New Caledonia, Northern Mariana Is., American Samoa, French Polynesia and Guam.)
Focusing on solution-oriented energy transition policies
A wide range of policy interventions and intergovernmental mechanisms are available to support policymakers to address the issues of over-reliance on fossil fuels and the lack of access to modern energy.
Firstly, renewable energy offers some very low hanging fruit. As imported petroleum accounts for about 72 per cent of the electricity supply and almost 100 per cent of transport energy; renewable sources can in many situations deliver clean energy at a lower cost. Developing infrastructure to support the shift to electric vehicles offers an opportunity to channel renewable energy into the transport sector.
Secondly, the business case for energy efficiency is strong and brings with it the potential to reduce energy demand across multiple sectors. However, a large proportion of these opportunities remain unfulfilled.
Finally, policymakers should collaborate through existing Pacific regional initiatives to support the scaling-up of local capability and capacity through coordinated training and knowledge transfer in the area of energy transition.
By putting people at the center of policymaking, the ESCAP Commission remains the most agile and vibrant anchor to accelerate energy transition and promote regional solidarity.
While it raises some complex questions, researchers have analysed the relationship between energy efficiency and demand response in various situations and determined that a high degree of complementarity is possible.
David Ferrari is ESCAP Consultant, Sudip Ranjan Basu is Deputy Head and Senior Economic Affairs Officer and Kimberly Roseberry is Economic Affairs Officer
Hydrogen (H2) is an essential component of today’s energy and industrial systems. Credit: Shutterstock.
Opinion by Adalberto Castaneda Vidal (new york)
Inter Press Service
The region is definitely taking this opportunity seriously. Over the past years, 11 countries in the region have published national hydrogen strategies. While this is an excellent policy signal, it might not be enough to win the race against other regions.
For the region to realize its hydrogen exporting potential, I would argue that governments should move from broad national roadmaps to a more tailored and assertive hub development strategy.
This is because the first movers are going to be the ones securing the offtake contracts and attracting investments. Following are some considerations and proposals to promote low-hydrogen hubs across the region to turn Latin America into a hydrogen success story.
Hydrogen’s potential in Latin America
Hydrogen (H2) is an essential component of today’s energy and industrial systems. Around 90 million tons (Mt) of H2 are produced and used yearly from natural gas and coal, emitting 9-23 kg CO2/kg H2.
Chemicals, refineries, and steel production dominate today’s demand. Recent technological developments that allow the production of low-carbon hydrogen, position it as an alternative to decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors. In optimistic scenarios, hydrogen’s global demand can reach 115 Mt by 2030 and 528 Mt by 2050.
The two most prominent low-carbon hydrogen types are:
Green hydrogen, produced through water electrolysis paired with 100% renewable electricity, emits (0 CO2/kg H2).
Blue hydrogen, produced from fossil fuels combined with carbon capture and sequestration technologies (CCS), emits 1-3 kg CO2/ kg H2.
The global hydrogen generation market was valued at USD 129.85 billion in 2021 and is expected to expand at a compound annual growth rate of 6.4% from 2022 to 2030. New value chains will be needed to support this upscaling, including installing electrolyzer manufacturing plants in the region, which could create thousands of high-quality jobs.
Latin America has a competitive advantage in the global hydrogen race as it has one of the most abundant endowments of solar and wind resources which are key for the production of green hydrogen.
Reasons for a hydrogen-hub strategy for Latin America
Some examples of planned hydrogen hubs already exist in Chile and Brazil. However, most hydrogen strategies in the region present broad national targets that lack demarcation and definition of particular incentives directed at the most strategic locations.
A hub is a specific geographic location with resources that provide a competitive advantage for developing the hydrogen supply chain. This pathway could facilitate cooperation between public and private stakeholders and community engagement. It also may provide increased visibility to attract first movers.
In this regard, hydrogen hubs are industrial areas with a competitive advantage in developing multiple projects for hydrogen production, distribution, utilization, and export. These hubs also have the presence of potential off-takers and existing infrastructure, which could be repurposed as the base for the hydrogen supply chain.
Hydrogen hubs can also be defined in opposition to its alternative, which is developing stand-alone individual projects. The lack of success of CCS projects over the past decade provide a good example of how stand-alone models face significant technical and commercial risks that can lead to inconsistent policy support and investments.
According to a study by the University of California, 80 percent of CCS projects ended in failure in the US. The projects failed due to a lack of off-takers, poor plant siting, and little support from local coalitions. These conditions impacted the project’s credibility of revenues and continued incentives support, which weakened their financial footing.
It is crucial to learn from these examples to mitigate such risks, considering particular vulnerabilities in Latin America that are hard to control, such as higher capital costs and exchange rate risks.
A hydrogen hub approach as a way to mitigate investments risks
While hydrogen’s potential is huge in the energy transition, as of the end of 2021, investments were still $863 billion short. This is when competition with other regions comes into play. Latin American economies must show more ambitious strategies to generate new opportunities and attract that capital. The key to facilitating the allocation of capital is to mitigate risks with strong market signals and the development of key infrastructure.
The benefits of a more focused hydrogen hubs promotion strategy can be divided into three parts: risk reductions, optimization of resource allocation, and securing policy and social support.
First, hubs can help mitigate market risks by building redundancy of supply and demand. This prevents risks associated with allocating production and demand to individual projects. Furthermore, it can help distribute technical risks among more players for the construction of key infrastructure projects, such as transmission lines, pipelines, and geological storage.
Second, according to experiences obtained from other clean energy projects, hubs are more efficient for optimizing planning and operation. Sole point-to-point projects run the risk of tailoring the technical decisions to the specific needs of one producer and one off-taker. However, with a hub approach, big market players cooperate and can involve smaller players, hence providing more opportunities to take advantage of economies of scale.
Lastly, stakeholders need to generate community acceptance and ensure the support of local authorities. Research from the Inter-American Development Bank found that of 200 conflict-affected infrastructure projects, 36 were canceled, 162 faced delays, and 116 faced cost overruns.
Therefore, community engagement cannot be regarded as a secondary requirement. A transparent hub proposal regarding its benefits, costs, and transition plans for communities and workers could help garner local support and, therefore, ensure consistent policy and social backing.
While clean hydrogen hubs can help reduce risks, optimize resource allocation, and garner local support, key decisions must be made by several actors with different goals. This creates a risk of delaying the projects or failing to reach agreements to get to final investment decisions. In this regard, it is important to consider lessons learned from failures and successes in other regions.
For instance, Europe is at the forefront of clean hydrogen development with a top-down and stakeholder-based approach. Lessons on the role of both national and local authorities in the pioneer hubs in Teesside and Rotterdam need to be taken into consideration.
In Latin America, Chile provides an excellent example of how to map and market hydrogen hubs at a global scale. In 2020, the Ministry of Energy published its National Green Hydrogen Strategy, outlining national priorities and targets. While the national strategy provided insights for three regions, in 2022, the government published a new report that identified two potential hydrogen hubs in Antofagasta (Atacama desert) and Magallanes. Both regions have well-defined projects and are working to attract investments and secure long-term offtake contracts with international partners.
To reproduce this strategy, the first hypothesis governments need to prove is the availability of natural resources, renewable resources for the development of green hydrogen or suitable geological storage, for blue hydrogen. The regions must ideally have the presence of relevant industries with experience in similar sectors, such as natural gas producers or renewable developers, as well as potential off-takers.
Then the government needs to devise a plan for incentives, such as tax deductions, accelerated depreciation, and customs exemptions, among others. On top of that, policy accelerators need to be implemented to allow faster deployment of technology, such as specialized land tenders and fast-track licensing and permitting.
Companies with international experience can work closely with local governments and federal agencies to ensure regulations do not hinder projects’ development.
Parallelly, hub participants need to engage with local communities. Plans must be outlined diligently to conduct consultations and provide attractive compensation when needed. A poor implementation of this requirement can create a bad reputation for key stakeholders and the industry as a whole.
While some international and regional examples show the benefits of following a hub-centered strategy, Latin American countries must face crucial challenges to make it work. First, the recent leftist turn in the region may pose some uncertainties about market-aligned policies.
With so much risk and lower margins, governments must prove they can attract and lay appropriate foundations for private investments.
On the other hand, with the broader land requirements for hydrogen projects, companies must show their commitment to building local support and respecting communities and regulations. A clean energy business cannot be developed with old dirty tactics. The potential for the region is evident. Will Latin America be able to work in teams and win this race?
Adalberto Castañeda Vidal is a second-year student of the Master of Public Administration at Columbia University – School of International and Public Affairs concentrating in Energy. He worked as a research assistant for the Center on Global and Energy Policy, where he participated in research projects about hydrogen and natural gas. He is originally from Tabasco, Mexico, and holds a bachelor’s in International Relations from the National Autonomous University of Mexico.
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 02 (IPS) – On 25 January, roughly six weeks after being sworn in following her predecessor’s removal, Peruvian president Dina Boluarte finally recognised that elections were the only way out of political crisis. Elections were rescheduled for April 2024, much earlier than the end of the presidential term she’s been tasked with completing, but not soon enough for thousands who’ve taken to the streets demanding her immediate resignation.
Boluarte’s call for a ‘national truce’ has been met with further protests. Their repression has led to major bloodshed: the Ombudsman’s office has reported close to 60 dead – mostly civilians killed by security forces – and 1,500 injured.
What happened and what it means
It’s unusually easy to impeach Peru’s presidents: a legislative majority can vote to remove them on vaguely defined grounds.
Pedro Castillo, elected president in July 2021, had already survived two removal attempts and faced a third. On 7 December he made a pre-emptive strike: he dissolved Congress and announced a restructuring of the judiciary, as former president Alberto Fujimori had done decades earlier in the ‘self-coup’ that started several years of authoritarian rule.
Castillo announced the establishment of an exceptional emergency government where he would rule by decree and promised to hold congressional elections soon. The new Congress, he said, would have the power to draft a new constitution.
But unlike Fujimori, Castillo enjoyed meagre support, and within hours Congress voted to remove him from office. He was arrested and remains in pretrial detention on rebellion charges. Vice-president Boluarte was immediately sworn in.
In the whirlwind that followed there was much talk that a coup, or a coup attempt, had taken place – but opinions differed radically as to who was the victim and who was the perpetrator.
The prevailing view was that Castillo’s dissolution of Congress was an attempt at a presidential coup. But others saw Castillo’s removal as a coup. Debate has been deeply polarised on ideological grounds, making clear that in Peru and Latin America, a principled rather than partisan defence of democracy is still lacking.
Permanent crisis
Recent events are part of a bigger political crisis that has seen six presidents in six years. In 2021, a polarising presidential campaign was followed by an extremely fragmented vote. The runoff election yielded an unexpected winner: a leftist outsider of humble origins, Castillo, defeated the right-wing heiress of the Fujimori dynasty by under one percentage point. Keiko Fujimori initially rejected the results and baselessly claimed fraud. Castillo’s presidency was born fragile. It was an unstable government, with a high rotation of ministers and fluctuating congressional support.
Although Castillo had promised to break the cycle of corruption, his government, himself and close associates soon became the target of corruption allegations coming not just from the opposition but also from state watchdog institutions. Castillo’s response was to attack the prosecutor and ask the Organization of American States (OAS) to apply its Democratic Charter to preserve Peruvian democracy supposedly under attack. The OAS sent a mission that ended with a call for dialogue. Only two weeks later, Castillo embarked on his short-lived coup adventure.
Protests and repression
According to Peru’s Constitution, Boluarte should complete Castillo’s term. But observers generally agree there’s no way she can stay in office until 2024, never mind 2026, given the rejection she faces from protesters and political parties in Congress.
A wave of protests demanding her resignation rose as soon as she was sworn in, led mostly by students, Indigenous groups and unions. Many also demanded Castillo’s freedom and government action to address poverty and inequality. Some demands went further, including a call for a constituent assembly – the promise Castillo made before being removed from office – to produce more balanced representation, particularly for Indigenous people. For many of Peru’s poorest people, Castillo represented hope for change. With him gone, they feel forgotten.
Four days into the job, Boluarte declared a regional state of emergency, later extended to the whole country. Protests only increased, and security forces responded with extreme violence, often shooting to kill. No wonder so many Peruvians feel this isn’t a democracy anymore.
The state of Peruvian democracy
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index rates Peru as a ‘flawed democracy’. A closer look at the index’s components suggests what’s wrong with Peruvian democracy: it gets its lowest score in the political culture dimension. In line with this, the Americas Barometer shows Peru has one of the lowest levels of support for democracy in Latin America and is the country where opposition to coups is weakest.
Peru’s democracy scores low on critical indicators such as checks and balances, corruption and political participation. This points to the heart of the problem: it’s a dysfunctional system where those elected to govern fail to do so and public policies are inconsistent and ineffective.
According to every survey, just a tiny minority of Peruvians are satisfied with their country’s democracy. The fact that no full-fledged alternative has yet emerged seems to be the only thing currently keeping democracy alive. Democratic renewal is urgently needed, or an authoritarian substitute could well take hold.
SYDNEY, Jan 27 (IPS) – As the year 2022 drew to an end, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) warned, “Developing countries face ‘impossible trade-off’ on debt”, that spiralling debt in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) has compromised their chances of sustainable development.
Anis ChowdhuryIn early December, an opinion piece in The New York Times headlined, “Defaults Loom as Poor Countries Face an Economic Storm”. And the World Bank’s International Debt Report highlighted rising debt-related risks for all developing economies—low- as well as middle-income economies.
Debt on the rise
Debt build-up accelerated in the wake of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (GFC). The World Bank’s, Global Waves of Debt reveals that total (public & private; domestic & external) debt in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) reached an all-time high of around 170% of GDP ($55 trillion) – more than double the 2010 figure – by 2018, before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Total debt in low-income countries (LICs), after a steep fall from the peak of around 120% of GDP in the mid-1990s to around 48% ($137 billion) in 2010, increased to 67% of GDP ($270 billion) in 2018.
Pandemic debt
The COVID-19 pandemic greatly lengthened the list of EMDEs in debt distress as rich nations and institutions dominated by them, e.g., the World Bank, failed to provide any meaningful debt reliefs or increase financial support to adequately respond to the health and economic crises.
The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics 2022 reveals that the external debt stock of LMICs in 2021 rose to $9.3 trillion (an increase of 7.8% compared to 2020) – more than double a decade ago in 2010. For many countries, the increase was by double digit percentages.
Riskier debt
Over the past decade, the composition of debt has changed significantly, with the share of external debt owed to private creditors increasing sharply. At the end of 2021, LMICs owed 61% of their public and publicly guaranteed external debt to private creditors—an increase of 15 percentage points from 2010.
The private creditors charge higher interest rates, and offer little or no scope for restructuring or refinancing at favourable terms, as they maximise profit. The private creditors also usually offer credits for shorter duration, while development financing needs are for longer-terms.
Failed aid promises
Development needs of developing countries have increased many-folds, especially for meeting internationally agreed development goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and now Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The LMICs’ estimated aggregate investment needs are $1.5–$2.7 trillion per year—equivalent to 4.5–8.2% of annual GDP— between 2015 and 2030 to just meet infrastructure-related SDGs. But the rich nations spectacularly failed to honour their promises of finance made at the 2015 UN conference on financing for development (FfD) in Addis Ababa.
In fact, they failed all their past aid promises, e.g., to provide 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) as aid, a promise made over half a century ago. While aid hardly reached half the promised percentage of GNI, it in fact declined from the peak of around 0.55% of GNI in the early 1960s to around 0.34% in recent years. Oxfam estimated 50 years of unkept promises meant rich nations owed $5.7 trillion to poor countries by 2020!
At their 2005 Gleneagles Summit, G7 leaders pledged to double their aid by 2010, earmarking $50 billion yearly for Africa. But actual aid delivery has been woefully short. G7 and other rich OECD countries also broke their 2009 pledge to give $100 billion annually in climate finance until 2020.
Promoting private finance
Meanwhile institutions dominated by rich nations – the World Bank and OECD, in particular – promoted private financing of development. The World Bank, the IMF and multilateral regional development banks, e.g. Asian Development Bank jointly released From billions to trillions, just before the 2015 FfD conference.
The document optimistically but misleadingly advised governments to “de-risk” development projects for enticing trillions of dollars of private capital in public private partnerships (PPPs). While de-risking effectively meant governments bearing financial risks, or socialise private investors’ loss, PPPs are found to have dubious impacts on SDGs, especially poverty reduction and enhancing equity.
Meanwhile the OECD donors advocated “blended finance” (BF) to use aid money to leverage, again trillions of dollars of private capital. But as The Economist noted, BF is struggling to grow, stuck since 2014 “at about $20 billion a year…far off the goal of $100 billion set by the UN in 2015”, despite suspected double counting. Like PPPs, BF has effectively transferred risk from the private to the public sector. On average, the public sector has borne 57% of the costs of BF investments, including 73% in LICs.
Collateral damage
In the wake of the GFC the rich countries followed so-called unconventional monetary policies that kept interest rates exceptionally low – in some cases at zero – for a decade. This saw capital flowing from rich countries to EMDEs in search for higher returns, as exceptionally low interest rates enticed EMDE governments and businesses.
The opportunity to borrow at low rates also made the EMDE governments lazy in their domestic revenue mobilisation efforts. Such policy complacency was rewarded by the donor community, especially the World Bank, through its now discredited Doing Business Report, encouraging a harmful race to the bottom tax competition among countries to cut corporate and other direct taxations. The World Bank and IMF also advised to remove or lower easier to collect indirect taxes, e.g., excise duties in exchange for regressive and difficult to implement goods & services or value-added tax in poorer countries.
Bleeding revenues
Meanwhile transnational corporations (TNCs) continue to avoid and evade paying taxes using creating accounting, aided by tax havens, mostly situated in rich nations’ territories. Developing countries lost approximately $7.8 trillion in illicit financial flows from 2004 to 2013, mostly through TNCs’ transfer mispricing, or the fraudulent mis-invoicing of trade in cross-border tax-related transactions.
African countries received $161.6 billion in 2015, primarily through loans, personal remittances and aid. But, $203 billion was extracted, mainly through TNCs repatriating profits and illegally moving money out of the continent.
International tax rules are designed by the rich nations. They continue to oppose developing countries’ demand for an inclusive international tax regime under the auspices of the UN.
Perfect storm
Global supply-demand mis-matches due to the pandemic, the Ukraine war and sanctions are a perfect recipe for a perfect storm. The advanced countries’ inflation fight is causing adverse spill-over on developing countries.
Higher interest rates have slowed the world economy, and triggered capital outflows from developing countries, depreciating their currencies, besides lowering export earnings. Together, these are causing devastating debt crises in many developing countries, similar to what happened in the 1980s.
In October 2022, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report estimated that 54 countries, accounting for more than half of the world’s poorest people, needed immediate debt relief to avoid even more extreme poverty and give them a chance of dealing with climate change.
Rich nations fail again
As pandemic debt distress became obvious, the G20 countries devised the so-called Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) for 75 poorest countries, supposedly to provide some modest relief between May and December 2020. DSSI does not cancel debt, but only delays re-payments, to be paid fully later with the interest cost accumulating – thus effectively “kicks the can down the road”. As the private lenders refused to join the G20’s initiative, unsurprisingly only 3 countries expressed interest in DSSI. Moreover, the G20 initiative does not address debt problems facing MICs, many of which also face debt servicing, including repayment issues.
Although the IMF acted innovatively at the start of the pandemic debt distress with debt service cancellation for 25 eligible LICs (estimated at $213.5 million), the World Bank’s Chief refused to supplement, let alone complement the IMF’s debt service cancellation for the most vulnerable LICs. Nonetheless, the Bank’s President hypocritically advocates debt relief as “critical”. He wants to have the cake and eat it too; apparently wanting to increase lending, but without sacrificing the institution’s AAA credit rating.
China debt trap diplomacy?
Meanwhile the rich nations accuse China of “debt trap diplomacy” that China is deliberately pushing loans to poorer countries for geopolitical and economic advantages. Less than 20% of LICs external debt is owed to China as against more than 50% to the commercial lenders.
Most Chinese loans are concessional, and China has provided more debt relief than any other country, bilaterally negotiating around $10.8 billion of relief since the onset of the pandemic.
Damaging trade-off
Rising debt servicing in the face of higher import costs, falling export revenues and declining remittances, are forcing developing countries to a damaging trade-off. They are forced to service external debt owed to rich nations and international financiers at the cost of development.
Solar panels with a capacity to generate 30 kilowatts no longer work in the Darora Community of the Macuxi people, an indigenous group from Roraima, a state in the far north of Brazil. The batteries only worked for a month before they were damaged because they could not withstand the charge. CREDIT: Boa Vista City Hall
by Mario Osava (boa vista, brazil)
Inter Press Service
BOA VISTA, Brazil, Jan 25 (IPS) – “Our electric power is of bad quality, it ruins electrical appliances,” complained Jesus Mota, 63. “In other places it works well, not here. Just because we are indigenous,” protested his wife, Adélia Augusto da Silva, of the same age.
The Darora Community of the Macuxi indigenous people illustrates the struggle for electricity by towns and isolated villages in the Amazon rainforest. Most get it from generators that run on diesel, a fuel that is polluting and expensive since it is transported from far away, by boats that travel on rivers for days.
Located 88 kilometers from the city of Boa Vista, capital of the state of Roraima, in the far north of Brazil, Darora celebrated the inauguration of its solar power plant, installed by the municipal government, in March 2017. It represented modernity in the form of a clean, stable source of energy.
A 600-meter network of poles and cables made it possible to light up the “center” of the community and to distribute electricity to its 48 families.
But “it only lasted a month, the batteries broke down,” Tuxaua (chief) Lindomar da Silva Homero, 43, a school bus driver, told IPS during a visit to the community. The village had to go back to the noisy and unreliable diesel generator, which only supplies a few hours of electricity a day.
Fortunately, about four months later, the Boa Vista electricity distribution company laid its cables to Darora, making it part of its grid.
“The solar panels were left here, useless. We want to reactivate them, it would be really good. We need more powerful batteries, like the ones they put in the bus terminal in Boa Vista,” said Homero, referring to one of the many solar plants that the city government installed in the capital.
Tuxaua (chief) Lindomar Homero of the Darora Community is calling for new adequate batteries to reactivate the solar power plant, because the electricity they receive from the national grid is too expensive for the local indigenous people. Behind him stands his predecessor, former tuxaua Jesus Mota. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS
Expensive energy
But indigenous people can’t afford the electricity from the distributor Roraima Energía, he said. On average, each family pays between 100 and 150 reais (20 to 30 dollars) a month, he estimated.
Besides, there are unpleasant surprises. “My November bill climbed to 649 reais” (130 dollars), without any explanation,” Homero complained. The solar energy was free.
“If you don’t pay, they cut off your power,” said Mota, who was tuxaua from 1990 to 2020.”In addition, the electricity from the grid fails a lot,” which is why the equipment is damaged.
Apart from the unreliable supply and frequent blackouts, there is not enough energy for the irrigation of agriculture, the community’s main source of income. “We can do it with diesel pumps, but it’s expensive; selling watermelons at the current price does not cover the cost,” he said.
“In 2022, it rained a lot, but there are dry summers that require irrigation for our corn, bean, squash, potato, and cassava crops. The energy we receive is not enough to operate the pump,” said Mota.
A photo of the three water tanks in the village of Darora, one of which holds water that is made potable by chemical treatment. The largest and longest building is the secondary school that serves the Macuxi indigenous community that lives in Roraima, in northern Brazil. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS
Achilles’ heel
Batteries still apparently limit the efficiency of solar energy in isolated or autonomous off-grid systems, with which the government and various private initiatives are attempting to make the supply of electricity universal and replace diesel generators.
Homero said that some of the Darora families who live outside the “center” of the village and have solar panels also had problems with the batteries.
Besides the 48 families in the village “center” there are 18 rural families, bringing the community’s total population to 265.
A solar plant was also installed in another community made up of 22 indigenous families of the Warao people, immigrants from Venezuela, called Warao a Janoko, 30 kilometers from Boa Vista.
But of the plant’s eight batteries, two have already stopped working after only a few months of use. And electricity is only guaranteed until 8:00 p.m.
“Batteries have gotten a lot better in the last decade, but they are still the weak link in solar power,” Aurelio Souza, a consultant who specializes in this question, told IPS from the city of São Paulo. “Poor sizing and the low quality of electronic charging control equipment aggravate this situation and reduce the useful life of the batteries.”
The low quality of the electricity supplied to Darora is due to the discrimination suffered by indigenous people, according to Adélia Augusto da Silva. The water they used to drink was also dirty and caused illnesses, especially in children, until the indigenous health service began to chemically treat their drinking water. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS
In Brazil’s Amazon jungle, close to a million people live without electricity, according to the Institute of Energy and the Environment, a non-governmental organization based in São Paulo. More precisely, its 2019 study identified 990,103 people in that situation.
Another three million inhabitants of the region, including the 650,000 people in Roraima, are outside the National Interconnected Electricity System. Their energy therefore depends mostly on diesel fuel transported from other regions, at a cost that affects all Brazilians.
The government decided to subsidize this fossil fuel so that the cost of electricity is not prohibitive in the Amazon region.
This subsidy is paid by other consumers, which contributes to making Brazilian electricity one of the most expensive in the world, despite the low cost of its main source, hydropower, which accounts for about 60 of the country’s electricity.
Solar energy became a viable alternative as the parts became cheaper. Initiatives to bring electricity to remote communities and reduce diesel consumption mushroomed.
But in remote plants outside the reach of the grid, good batteries are needed to store energy for the nighttime hours.
Part of the so-called “downtown” in Darora, which has lamp posts, houses, a soccer field and a shed where the community meets. A larger community center is needed, says the leader of the Macuxi village located near Boa Vista, the capital of the northern Brazilian state of Roraima. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS
A unique case
Darora is not a typical case. It is part of the municipality of Boa Vista, which has a population of 437,000 inhabitants and good resources, it is close to a paved road and is within a savannah ecosystem called “lavrado”.
It is at the southern end of the São Marcos indigenous territory, where many Macuxi indigenous people live but fewer than in Raposa Serra do Sol, Roraima’s other large native reserve. According to the Special Secretariat for Indigenous Health (Sesai), there were 33,603 Macuxi Indians living in Roraima in 2014.
The Macuxi people also live in the neighboring country of Guyana, where there are a similar number to that of Roraima. Their language is part of the Karib family.
Although there are no large forests in the surrounding area, Darora takes its name from a tree, which offers “very resistant wood that is good for building houses,” Homero explained.
The community emerged in 1944, founded by a patriarch who lived to be 93 years old and attracted other Macuxi people to the area.
The progress they have made especially stands out in the secondary school in the village “center”, which currently has 89 students and 32 employees, “all from Darora, except for three teachers from outside,” Homero said proudly.
A new, larger elementary and middle school for students in the first to ninth grades was built a few years ago about 500 meters from the community.
Water used to be a serious problem. “We drank dirty, red water, children died of diarrhea. But now we have good, treated water,” said Adélia da Silva.
“We dug three artesian wells, but the water was useless, it was salty. The solution was brought by a Sesai technician, who used a chemical substance to make the water from the lagoon drinkable,” Homero said.
The community has three elevated water tanks, two for water used for bathing and cleaning and one for drinking water. There are no more health problems caused by water, the tuxaua said.
His current concern is to find new sources of income for the community. Tourism is one alternative. “We have the Tacutu river beach 300 meters away, great fruit production, handicrafts and typical local gastronomy based on corn and cassava,” he said, listing attractions for visitors.
Despite unprecedented challenges, 2022 also opened windows of opportunity to move the needle around critical anti-corruption issues, such as anti-money laundering, asset recovery, beneficial ownership, and renewable energy. Credit: Shutterstock.
Opinion by Sanjeeta Pant (sanjeeta pant)
Inter Press Service
Sanjeeta Pant, Jan 25 (IPS) – The G20 India Presidency is marked by unprecedented geopolitical, environmental, and economic crises. Rising inflation threatens to erase decades of economic development and push more people into poverty. Violent extremism is also on the rise as a result of increasing global inequality, and the rule of law is in decline everywhere. All of these challenges impact the G20’s goal of realizing a faster and more equitable post-pandemic economic recovery.
But as India prioritizes its agenda for 2023, it is corruption that is at the heart of all of these other problems- and which poses the greatest threat to worldwide peace and prosperity.
An Idea Whose Time Has Come
Despite unprecedented challenges, 2022 also opened windows of opportunity to move the needle around critical anti-corruption issues, such as anti-money laundering, asset recovery, beneficial ownership, and renewable energy. When global leaders meet during the G20 Indian Presidency , they must prioritize and build on this progress, rather than make new commitments around these issues that they then fail to implement.
According to the UN, an estimated 2-5% of global GDP, or up to $2 trillion, is laundered annually. Although the G20 has repeatedly committed to the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) anti-money laundering standards, member countries have been slow to implement policy reforms. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and ineffective economic sanctions against Russian oligarchs, governments have started reexamining existing policy and institutional gaps, especially recognizing the role of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), also known as “gatekeepers.”
G20 member countries are responding to concerns and criticisms from their national counterparts regarding failures to adopt FATF recommendations and clamp down on “dirty money.” Grappling with the need to be able to prosecute money-laundering cases and recover billions of dollars worth of frozen assets, they are also amending national laws to be able to do so.
Lack of beneficial ownership transparency is also aiding the flow of laundered money globally. The G20 recognizes beneficial ownership data as an effective instrument to fight financial crime and “protect the integrity and transparency of the global financial system.”
The Russian invasion helped drive home this message, especially among countries that are popular destinations for those buying luxury goods and assets. FATF’s amendment of its beneficial ownership recommendations in early 2022 was timely. Member countries are also introducing new reporting rules, and fast-tracking policies and processes to set up beneficial ownership registers. While there are still gaps in the proposed policies – as identified here– these are important first steps.
Similarly, the transition to renewable energy, initially raised as an environmental issue and then as a national security concern is increasingly gaining attention from a resource governance perspective. Given the scale of the potential investment, there is a need to tackle corruption in the energy sector to avoid potential pitfalls resulting from a lack of open and accountable systems as we transition to a net zero economy.
The cross-cutting nature of the industry means a wide range of issues– from procurement and conflict of interest in the public sector to beneficial ownership transparency- need to be considered. The global energy crisis and the Indonesian Presidency’s prioritization of the issue have helped build momentum around corruption in the renewable energy transition, and this focus must continue.
Calling on India
Corruption-related issues identified here are transnational in nature and have global implications, including for India. For instance, with money laundering cases rising in India, it cannot afford to regard it as a problem limited to safe havens like the UK or the US. The same is true for the lack of beneficial ownership transparency or corruption in the renewable energy transition, which fuels illicit financial networks in India and beyond, and which often transcend national borders.
Finally, corruption has a disproportionate impact on the global poor. Almost 10% of the global population lives in extreme poverty, many of whom live in countries such as India. The G20, under the Indian Presidency, provides a unique opportunity to ensure the voices of the most vulnerable are heard at the global level. By prioritizing the anti-corruption agenda and building on past priority issues and commitments, the Indian government can lead efforts to bridge the North-South divide.
Sanjeeta Pant is Programs and Learning Manager at Accountability Lab. Follow the Lab on Twitter @accountlab
