Two people were shot by Customs and Border Patrol agents in Portland, Oregon, on Thursday.Video above: Portland City Council president gives statement on shootingA statement from the Department of Homeland Security says the shooting occurred as Border Patrol agents were conducting “a targeted vehicle stop.”DHS said it believed both the driver and the passenger had ties to the Tren de Aragua gang, but provided no evidence on why that was believed. The statement also said the passenger of the vehicle was involved in a recent shooting in Portland.”When agents identified themselves to the vehicle occupants, the driver weaponized his vehicle and attempted to run over law enforcement agents. Fearing for his life and safety, an agent fired a defensive shot. The driver drove off with the passenger, fleeing the scene,” the statement says. A news release from Portland police says officers responded to the city’s Hazelwood neighborhood around 2:20 p.m. local time for a report of a shooting. Minutes later, Portland officers were notified that a man who had been shot was calling for help.”Officers responded and found a male and female with apparent gunshot wounds. Officers applied a tourniquet and summoned emergency medical personnel,” Portland police officials said. Both people were transported to the hospital and their conditions are unknown. Portland police officials also said they determined that both people were injured in the shooting involving federal agents. Video below: FBI agents on scene after Customs and Border Patrol agents shoot two people in Portland, OregonThe shooting came after 37-year-old Renee Good was fatally shot by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer on Wednesday in Minneapolis.Protests followed the killing, which also set off a clash between federal officials who insist the shooting was an act of self-defense and Minneapolis officials who dispute that narrative.”We are still in the early stages of this incident,” Portland police Chief Bob Day said in the release. “We understand the heightened emotion and tension many are feeling in the wake of the shooting in Minneapolis, but I am asking the community to remain calm as we work to learn more.”
Two people were shot by Customs and Border Patrol agents in Portland, Oregon, on Thursday.
Video above: Portland City Council president gives statement on shooting
DHS said it believed both the driver and the passenger had ties to the Tren de Aragua gang, but provided no evidence on why that was believed. The statement also said the passenger of the vehicle was involved in a recent shooting in Portland.
“When agents identified themselves to the vehicle occupants, the driver weaponized his vehicle and attempted to run over law enforcement agents. Fearing for his life and safety, an agent fired a defensive shot. The driver drove off with the passenger, fleeing the scene,” the statement says.
A news release from Portland police says officers responded to the city’s Hazelwood neighborhood around 2:20 p.m. local time for a report of a shooting.
Minutes later, Portland officers were notified that a man who had been shot was calling for help.
“Officers responded and found a male and female with apparent gunshot wounds. Officers applied a tourniquet and summoned emergency medical personnel,” Portland police officials said.
Both people were transported to the hospital and their conditions are unknown. Portland police officials also said they determined that both people were injured in the shooting involving federal agents.
Video below: FBI agents on scene after Customs and Border Patrol agents shoot two people in Portland, Oregon
Protests followed the killing, which also set off a clash between federal officials who insist the shooting was an act of self-defense and Minneapolis officials who dispute that narrative.
“We are still in the early stages of this incident,” Portland police Chief Bob Day said in the release. “We understand the heightened emotion and tension many are feeling in the wake of the shooting in Minneapolis, but I am asking the community to remain calm as we work to learn more.”
This is a developing story. Check back for updates.
U.S. Border Patrol agents stage for an operation in the Winn Dixie parking lot in Key Largo Friday, Nov. 21, 2025.
Photo by Nick Rodriguez
Federal agents detained 12 people during an immigration enforcement operation in the Florida Keys last week.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Air and Marine Operations issued a press release Friday saying its agents participated in the operation with the Border Patrol on Nov. 21. A CBP Blackhawk helicopter was also used in the operation, the agency said.
Customs said the 12 people agents took into custody were illegally in the U.S. from countries including Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia and Guatemala. The agency said the people were taken to the Border Patrol’s station in the Middle Keys city of Marathon to be processed for removal from the country.
Agents were pulling cars over that morning in the southbound lanes of U.S. 1 at mile marker 105 in front of the Winn-Dixie supermarket in Key Largo, a witness told the Miami Herald.
A U.S. Border Patrol agent approaches a car pulled over during an immigration operation in Key Largo Friday, Nov. 21, 2025. Photo by Nick Rodriguez
Customs said all of them had “prior charges and convictions” for offenses including re-entry after deportation, driving under the influence, illegal concealed carry of a weapon, drug possession with a weapon, battery and domestic violence.
As of Friday, none of the people’s cases have shown up in public federal court records.
Increased immigration enforcement in the Florida Keys
Since the Trump administration’s crackdown on undocumented immigrants, Border Patrol and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement have ramped up operations in the Keys, according to court records.
Much of the enforcement effort appears to be happening around the Big Pine Key area in the Lower Keys.
But, increased operations appear to be happening in the Upper Keys as well. The Florida Keys Weekly reported that on Nov. 17, a man and 16-year-old boy were pulled over on the way to drop the teen off at Coral Shores High School on Plantation Key, where he is a student.
Both were detained, the newspaper reported. ICE could not immediately be reached for comment on where the boy is being held. Monroe County School District Deputy Superintendent Amber Acevedo told the Herald that she “did not have specific information” about the incident.
On Sunday, Border Patrol agents pulled over a Ford pickup truck at mile marker 99 in Key Largo because “law enforcement databases indicated that the registered owner is an illegal alien residing in the United States,” a Border Patrol complaint filed Tuesday states.
A handcuffed man sits in a U.S. Customs Air and Marine Operations boat off Rodriguez Key Tuesday, Nov. 25, 2025. U.S. Customs and Border Protection
According to the complaint, the driver, Lucas Jimenez-Ramos is a citizen of Guatemala illegally living in the U.S. The complaint states that he was previously deported in October 2019. He now faces a charge of “re-entry of a removed alien,” the complaint states.
Also this week, a Customs Air and Marine Operations crew stopped a boat Tuesday off Rodriguez Key, a small uninhabited island just offshore of Key Largo, to conduct a “vessel document check,” the agency said in a statement.
A man on the boat was a Venezuelan citizen “illegally present in the United States after deportation,” the statement said. He was also taken to the Border Patrol’s station in Marathon to be processed for removal.
David Goodhue covers the Florida Keys and South Florida for FLKeysNews.com and the Miami Herald. Before joining the Herald, he covered Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy in Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the University of Delaware.
Both before and since President Donald Trump cemented the details of his sweeping import tariffs in August, U.S. businesses have scrambled to find ways to limit the considerable cost increases attributed to the duties. Those levies have jacked up prices on finished imported products and materials, prompting companies turn to businesses developing specialized artificial intelligence (AI) tools that permit importers to keep pace with complex and shifting rules and rates — and reduce their impact on bottom lines.
While the new tariffs generated extra costs and considerable uncertainty for most companies, they’re a growth driver for logistics and customs brokerage businesses. That’s particularly true for relatively young and innovative startups in the sector. They’re now fielding a surge of requests for help from existing and prospective customers not seen since a pandemic-era spike in demand. Increasingly, those and other enterprises are offering specialized AI solutions to analyze the shifting details effecting importing costs — and help clients navigate those and gain insights about their best choices for the future.
Flexport, a San Francisco freight forwarding startup anda 2022 Inc. Best in Business honoree, this week released a slate of AI tools that automate and analyze import data, and allow users to select the best options for their near and long term future. According to a recent Wall Street Journal report on the product launch, the new apps “help retailers and manufacturers comply with rapidly changing tariff policies,” and “analyze customs filings for errors and compliance risks, and that identify ways of reducing future duties.”
The growing selection of AI-powered tech tools focus on dealing with tariff costs and compliance is as diverse as they are powerful. They optimize the timing departures and arrivals of shipments to benefit from lower transport and duty rates, and identify new suppliers in countries that face lower customs duties. Some are so granular they can audit a customer’s machinery and other assets, and identify internal parts that can be replaced with compatible alternatives with lighter levies.
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Chicago-based FourKites and New York-based Altana go even farther. Each of those startups create a digital twin of a customer’s supply chain, orders, inventory, and shipments en route. They then use that data to generate real-time risk analyses and recommendations for better and cheaper alternatives — both before and after tariffs are applied.
On the in-house side, Salesforce released a new AI agent earlier this year that client businesses can give to their own customs specialists. The automated tech allows those experts to keep track of and respond to the frequent changes to the tens of thousand import classifications and codes applicable to individual products. Those include raw supplies like steel and lumber, as well as goods assembled from a wide variety of tariff-affected materials.
Whether that AI tech focuses on specific areas of importing and tariffs, or provides a wider range of ways to assist importers, their objectives generally cover similar ground. That usually means optimizing procurement, automating product classification analysis, and ensuring compliance with U.S. Customs rules.
They also forecast a company’s developing demand for imports, then simulate freight rates for various dates to limit transport costs. Their automated preparation of customs forms using updated official rules decreases the risks of errors that can stick companies with higher duties, while speeding the clearance of shipments once they arrive.
Why should smaller businesses consider paying for AI tools to improve their supply chains and minimize the additional costs tariffs create? Because some companies risk spending even more if they don’t get that help.
According to a recent Reuters report, many legacy players in the roughly $5 billion U.S. customs brokerage industry are increasing the $4 to $7 fees they previously charged for every code number corresponding to imported products they declare for customers. The new hikes tend to add from $1 to $5 per code, with international logistic giants like UPS, FedEx, and DHL similarly increasing rates.
At the same time, all those businesses are also reinforcing their teams overseeing U.S. customs processing in response to higher demand, and updating their computer systems. Those investments are almost certain to be passed along to importing customers in the final bill they pay, further bloating the costs of tariffs.
Consequently, using AI to automate, oversee, and respond to frequently changing customs rules — and improve importers’ supply chain strategies in the process — may turn out to be the most productive and cost-effective choice for many businesses.
That same conclusion by a growing number of companies has allowed Flexports to already double its 2024 gross profit from customs brokerage this year, the Journal said. That’s expected to rise even higher in 2026.
“It’s become very complicated to calculate tariffs… (and) we hear a lot about the need for good tools to calculate this stuff” Flexport founder and chief executive Ryan Petersen told the paper. “There’s a real big role for technology in this.”
A Russian man who slipped past Danish airport security to board a flight to Los Angeles International Airport without a passport, visa or ticket was found guilty of being a stowaway, the U.S. Department of Justice announced Friday.
After a three-day trial, 46-year-old Sergey Vladimirovich Ochigava was found guilty of one count of being a stowaway on an aircraft.
He faces a maximum sentence of five years in federal prison and is scheduled to be sentenced Feb. 5.
Authorities say Ochigava slipped aboard a flight to Los Angeles on Nov. 4 after passing through a Copenhagen Airport boarding gate undetected.
He had been able to get into the airport terminal without a boarding pass a day earlier after tailgating an unsuspecting passenger through a security turnstile, prosecutors said.
During the more than 12-hour flight aboard Scandinavian Airlines Flight 931, Ochigava constantly shifted seats, spoke to several passengers, asked for two in-flight meals and tried to snack on a cabin crew member’s chocolate bar, according to court documents filed by federal prosecutors.
Upon arrival at LAX, Customs and Border Protection officers stopped Ochigava at an immigration checkpoint, and were unable to find him on the manifest of that flight or any other incoming international flights, court documents said.
Ochigava was unable to produce a passport, visa or other travel documents that would allow him entrance into the country, according to the Department of Justice. When questioned, authorities say, he provided false and misleading information about his journey to the United States, including claiming he had left his passport on the plane.
Russian and Israeli identification cards were found in his possession when police searched his bag, according to court documents.
Additional details as to the motivation behind Ochigava’s journey were not immediately available.
BRUSSELS — In early August, Bulgarian officials spotted something they weren’t sure was legal.
Barrels of Russian oil were arriving in the country priced above a $60 limit allies had adopted to sap Moscow of critical revenue for its war in Ukraine.
Bulgaria was in an unusual position among its partners. It had been given an exemption to European Union sanctions barring most imports of Russian oil, ostensibly to ensure the country wouldn’t face acute energy shortages even though the EU’s broader policy aimed to crush Russia’s main cash artery following its full-scale assault on Kyiv.
But could Bulgaria still import Russian oil if it was above the price cap? Customs officials in Sofia wanted to know for sure, so they reached out to EU officials asking for “clarification,” according to a private email exchange dated August 4 and seen by POLITICO.
The answer: Let it in.
“Crude oil imported based on these derogations does not need to be at or below $60 per barrel,” came the EU’s reply.
Green light in hand, Bulgaria proceeded to import Russian crude exclusively above the price cap from August until October, according to confidential customs data seen by POLITICO. The shipments were worth an estimated €640 million, according to calculations by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) think tank. The cash went to Russian energy firms, which pay the taxes helping fill the Kremlin’s war chest.
The sanctions gap is emblematic of the broader flaws that have corroded the EU’s attempt to stymie the billions Russia earns from energy exports. Roughly a year after adopting the initial penalties, legal loopholes have combined with poor enforcement and a mushrooming parallel trade to keep Moscow’s fossil fuel revenues flowing, and feeding almost half of Vladimir Putin’s war-hungry budget.
Russian oil is likely winding up as fuel in Europe via new routes. Enforcement across the Continent is scattered and reliant on inconsistent data. And a whole new black market has sprung up to insure, ship and hide Russia’s fuel as it travels the world.
The sanctions, in other words, have come up short. Russia’s oil export earnings have dropped just 14 percent since the restrictions were imposed. And in October, Russia’s fossil fuel revenues hit an 18-month high.
It also appears the EU has run out of steam to do much about it. The latest EU sanctions package, set to be finalized at a leaders’ summit this week, is mostly focused on administrative tweaks that experts say will do little to curb widespread evasion. Absent are any efforts to drop the level of the oil price cap further.
“The whole sanction mechanism works only if you keep adopting on a regular basis decisions that close loopholes and impose new sanctions,” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told POLITICO. “Every actor in the world has the capacity to adapt.”
The Bulgarian oversight
The reason behind Bulgaria’s price cap loophole is arguably a clerical oversight.
When the EU wrote the G7 nations’ price cap into law, officials expressly forbade EU shipping firms and insurance companies from trafficking Russian oil above the $60 threshold to non-EU countries. The aim was to squeeze the Kremlin’s revenues while keeping global oil flows steady.
But officials never thought to impose similar rules on shipments to EU countries, partly because Brussels had banned Russian seaborne crude oil imports that same day.
Except for Bulgaria.
The backdoor has meant millions in extra revenue for Moscow. According to CREA, Russian oil export earnings from Bulgarian sales between August to October — a third of which came from sales above the price cap — raised around €430 million in direct taxes for the Kremlin. All Russian-origin shipments delivered during this time — priced between $69 and $89 per barrel — relied on Western help, including from Greek ship operators and British and Norwegian insurers.
And it was all technically legal.
The situation “reveals that Bulgaria has aided Russia to exploit this glaring loophole to maximize the Kremlin’s budget revenues from these oil sales without any apparent benefits for Bulgarian consumers,” said Martin Vladimirov, a senior analyst at the Sofia-based Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) think tank, which has studied the issue.
More broadly, Bulgaria’s exemption from the Russian oil ban has been lining the pockets of both Russia’s largest private oil firm, Lukoil, which dominates Bulgaria’s fuel production with its sprawling Black Sea refinery, and the Kremlin itself.
More broadly, Lukoil’s crude oil imports to Bulgaria raked in over €2 billion in export revenues for Russia since the sanctions went into effect in February, according to a new CREA and CSD analysis. And the Kremlin has made €1 billion in direct taxes from the sales, POLITICO revealed last month.
There is now mounting pressure to mend these money-making fissures.
Bulgaria has vowed to cut short its opt-out from the Russian oil ban by six months, provisionally moving the deadline up to March.
And Kiril Petkov, the former prime minister who leads one of two parties controlling Bulgaria’s current governing coalition, told POLITICO the price cap workaround should “absolutely” be closed too. He vowed to pressure the government and ask the European Commission, the EU’s executive in Brussels, to do so, while insisting that Bulgaria is accelerating its efforts to shake off its Russian energy ties, unlike nearby countries like Slovakia.
Bulgaria proceeded to import Russian crude exclusively above the price cap from August until October, according to confidential customs data seen by POLITICO | Robert Ghement/EPA-EFE
“We do not like the $60 loophole that was created by the EU Commission derogation,” Petkov said. “We don’t want Putin to receive any euro that he doesn’t have to.”
The Bulgarian case “highlights one of the many loopholes that make sanctions less effective at lowering Russian export earnings used to finance the Kremlin’s war chest,” according to Isaac Levi, who leads CREA’s Russia-Europe team.
Bulgaria’s finance ministry and Lukoil didn’t respond to requests for comment.
‘Not all rainbows and unicorns’
A major challenge is poor monitoring and enforcement.
In October, a report commissioned by the European Parliament found EU sanctions enforcement is “scattered” across over 160 local authorities, while capitals have “dissimilar implementation systems” that include “wide discrepancies” in penalties for violations.
That assumes you can find a breach to begin with. Even those involved in shipping oil get only limited access to information on trades, according to Viktor Katona, chief crude analyst at the Kpler market intelligence firm.
Insurers, for example, rely on a single document from firms buying and selling oil cargoes pledging the sale is not above $60 per barrel, which amounts to a “declaration of faith,” he said.
The EU’s upcoming 12th package of sanctions is trying to crack down on this problem with new rules forcing traders to actually itemize specific costs. The goal is to prevent buyers from purchasing Russian oil above the limit and then hiding the extra costs as insurance or transport fees. But few in the industry have high hopes the added paperwork will stop the workaround.
Several EU countries with large shipping industries are also reluctant to tighten the price cap, making things even trickier. During the latest round of sanctions, Cyprus, Malta and Greece once again raised concerns over calls to strengthen the restrictions, according to two EU diplomats, who like others in the story were granted anonymity to speak freely.
A diplomat from a major maritime EU nation said stricter sanctions would only push Russia to use more non-Western operators to ship oil. Instead, the diplomat argued, the focus should be on broadening the countries adhering to the price cap. Currently, the G7, the EU and Australia are on board.
“It would be stupid to push for price caps, and then other shipping registers do not abide by it because they are not EU members,” the diplomat said, adding that “all that will be achieved is the total destruction of the shipping industry.”
Meanwhile, EU countries are still allowing Russian oil cargoes to cross their waters on their way elsewhere.
CREA research on behalf of POLITICO found that 822 ships transporting Moscow’s crude transferred their cargo to another ship in EU territorial waters — the majority in Greek, but also Maltese, Spanish, Romanian and Italian waters — since the oil sanctions kicked off last December. The volumes were equivalent to 400,000 barrels per day.
A Commission spokesperson defended the EU sanctions, noting Russia has been forced to spend “billions of dollars” to adapt to the new reality, including on new tankers, and its oil extraction and export infrastructure as Western demand shriveled.
That has caused “serious and ongoing economic and policy consequences,” the Commission spokesperson said. And CREA did find that the oil price limit has stripped the Kremlin of €34 billion in export revenues, equivalent to roughly two months of earnings this year.
Others point out that teething issues are normal — it’s the first time the EU has deployed sanctions at such a scale.
“Let’s be fair … all of the sanctions measures are unprecedented, so there’s an element of learning by doing it, as well,” said one of the EU diplomats. “We don’t live in a perfect world: it’s not all rainbows and unicorns.”
Deep dark waters
Instead of accepting the tough rules designed to drain its finances, Moscow has sparked a sanctions circumvention arms race, looking for loopholes as part of what one senior Ukrainian official has described as a “cockroach strategy.”
To ensure it can sell its fossil fuels at whatever price it can get, in violation of the oil price cap and other restrictions, Russia has presided over the creation of a parallel shipping market that, through a mixture of law-breaking and law-bending, is lining the pockets of its state energy firms and oligarchs.
A “shadow fleet” of aging tankers has emerged, mysteriously managed through a network of companies that obscure their ownership, frequently trading their cargo of fuel with other ships at sea. To help them escape the jurisdiction of Western sanctions while meeting basic maritime requirements, a cottage industry of murky insurance firms has sprung up in countries like India.
“When they were introduced, the sanctions seemed to be having an effect for a very short time. But now the state of play is most of the sanctions that have beeninplace have not really worked — or they’ve been very limited in terms of what they’ve been able to do,” said Byron McKinney, a director at trade and commodity firm S&P.
As Russian trades move increasingly away from Western operators and traders, that makes tracking them even more difficult, said Katona, the Kpler oil analyst.
“Every single” Russian type of oil now trades above the price cap, he said, while CREA estimates only 48 percent of Russian oil cargoes were carried on tankers owned or insured in G7 and EU countries in October.
“It’s like coming to a party and telling everyone not to drink alcohol, but not coming to the party yourself,” Katona said. “How do you make sure that no one’s drinking?”
At the same time, countries like India have increased their imports of cheap Russian crude by 134 percent, CREA found, processing it and then selling it everywhere. That means European consumers could unknowingly be filling up their cars with fuel produced from Russian crude, bankrolling Moscow’s armed forces at the same time.
The waning West?
The EU is well aware of the problem.
“Unless you have big players like India and China as part of it, effectiveness sooner or later fades away,” conceded one senior Commission official.
“It shows us the limits of what the tools of Western players can achieve at a global level,” the official added, noting it’s “a lesson in how much the [global] power balance has changed compared to 10 or 20 years ago.”
Expectations are low, however, that India or China — or Turkey, another critical shipping country — will come around to the price cap any time soon.
And back in Brussels, political leaders seem to be throwing up their hands. When EU leaders gather for their summit on Thursday, the sanctions package they’re expected to endorse will do little to stanch the flow of Russia’s energy cash, omitting any measures targeting Russian oil or lowering the price cap.
Until such steps are taken, Russia’s finances won’t truly wither, said Alexandra Prokopenko, an economist and nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
“The oil price is now the only real channel of transmission for external risk,” she said. “Russia will feel extremely bad if the average price on its oil is $40 or $50 per barrel — that would be painful for its budget and for Putin’s ability to finance expenditures.”
Getting to that point, however, was never going to be easy.
“The Russian economy was quite a big animal,” Prokopenko said, “that makes it hard to shoot it with a single shot.”
Victor Jack and Giovanna Coi reported from Brussels. Gabriel Gavin reported from Yerevan.
Claudia Chiappa contributed reporting from Brussels.
Mumbai: 61-Year-Old Borivali Resident Arrested For Importing 7857 gm Ganja; Customs Probe Uncovers Network Of Marijuana Trade | Freepik
The Special Investigation and Intelligence Branch (SIIB), Import of the Customs department on Saturday arrested a 61-year-old Borivali resident for allegedly importing 7857 grams of cannabis plant. The agency is now probing from where the consignment was imported and about the persons who were to receive the consignment.
Details of Probe
According to the Customs, on the regular course of examination one import consignment was examined on 17 and 18 November by the officers of Import Shed, Airport Cargo Customs (ACC), Mumbai; which resulted into the recovery of a total of 7857gms of flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant purported to be Ganja/Marijuana. The same was seized under the provisions of the NDPS Act.
On November 18, the statement of the suspect, who is associated with the customs clearing agency and two others were recorded by the Customs. Simultaneously, on the same day, search was undertaken at the office of the customs clearing agency and at the delivery address provided by the importer.
Investigation discloses involvement of more people
According to the officials, it was revealed that the accused failed to do the KYC verification of the documents of the importer and also to ascertain the genuineness of the importer. The said facts state that the accused is involved in the import of the contraband and have contravened…
KYIV — Sergeant Yegor Firsov, deputy commander of a Ukrainian army strike drone unit, sounds exhausted in a voice message he sent to POLITICO from Avdiivka, an industrial city at the center of intense fighting on the eastern front.
Russian troops have been storming Avdiivka relentlessly for more than two weeks in an all-out effort to encircle the Ukrainian forces there.
“The situation is very difficult. We are fighting for the heights around the city,” Firsov said. “If the enemy controls these heights, then all logistics and roads leading to the city will be under its control. This will make it much harder to resupply our forces.”
Facing an enemy with superior numbers of troops and armor, the Ukrainian defenders are holding on with the help of tiny drones flown by operators like Firsov that, for a few hundred dollars, can deliver an explosive charge capable of destroying a Russian tank worth more than $2 million.
The FPV — or “first-person view” — drones used in such strikes are equipped with an onboard camera that enables skilled operators like Firsov to direct them to their target with pinpoint accuracy. Before the war, a teenager might hope to get one for a New Year present. Now they are being used as agile weapons that can transform battlefield outcomes. Others are watching, and learning, from a technology that is giving early adopters an asymmetric advantage against established methods of warfare.
“It’s hard to handle the emotion when a drone pilot hits a tank. The whole group and the whole platoon are happy like babies. Infantry units are rejoicing nearby. Everyone is screaming, and hugging. Although they do not know the guy who gave them this happiness,” Firsov wrote in a Facebook post.
A typical FPV weighs up to one kilogram, has four small engines, a battery, a frame and a camera connected wirelessly to goggles worn by a pilot operating it remotely. It can carry up to 2.5 kilograms of explosives and strike a target at a speed of up to 150 kilometers per hour, explains Pavlo Tsybenko, acting director of the Dronarium military academy outside Kyiv.
“This drone costs up to $400 and can be made anywhere. We made ours using microchips imported from China and details we bought on AliExpress. We made the carbon frame ourselves. And, yeah, the batteries are from Tesla. One car has like 1,100 batteries that can be used to power these little guys,” Tsybenko told POLITICO on a recent visit, showing the custom-made FPV drones used by the academy to train future drone pilots.
“It is almost impossible to shoot it down,” he said. “Only a net can help. And I predict that soon we will have to put up such nets above our cities, or at least government buildings, all over Europe.”
Contagious technology
Commercial drones were first weaponized in Azerbaijan’s — ultimately successful — campaign to retake the Nagorno-Karabakh breakaway region from Armenian separatists. Their use has expanded rapidly in the 20-month-old Russian war in Ukraine.
And, earlier this month, Hamas militants flew drones to knock out Israeli border defenses during a surprise attack in which they massacred more than 1,400 people and took around 200 hostages. For Ukrainians, the video clip of a Hamas drone destroying an Israeli main battle tank by dropping a grenade was a film they had seen before.
Ukrainian drone experts and intelligence officials are convinced that Russian specialists have trained Hamas in the art of drone warfare — although Moscow denies this.
Some experts worry that militants across the world will soon learn how to use FPV drones to sow terror | Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images
“Only we and the Russians know how to do this — and we definitely did not teach them,” Andriy Cherniak, a representative of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate, told POLITICO.
Ruslan Belyaiev, head of the Dronarium military academy, shares that view. He warns that other militants will soon learn how to use FPV drones to sow terror.
“No one is immune from such attacks,” said Belyaiev. “In theory, a specialist with my level of expertise could plan and execute an operation to liquidate the first persons of any European state … Pandora’s box is open.”
Secret training
While NATO militaries hesitate to use commercial drones that are mostly made in China, or made from Chinese components, some Western democracies have already shown interest in learning from Ukraine’s experience of drone warfare.
Several figures in Ukraine’s drone community, granted anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, told POLITICO that special forces and anti-terrorist units of two NATO countries bordering Russia have taken courses from Ukrainian drone operators over the past six months.
Their focus is on countering small kamikaze drones and commercial drones that can be successfully used for reconnaissance, correcting artillery fire and video signal transmission, one person with direct knowledge said.
Basic training for a drone pilot takes five days. Learning how to pilot a kamikaze drone takes more than 20 days, Tsybenko said.
Battlefield experience has led the Ukrainian government to shift its preference away from conventional military drones, which are miniature fixed-wing aircraft with a long enough range to strike targets inside Russian territory. The effectiveness of FPV drones at closer quarters has led Defense Minister Rustam Umerov to simplify approvals for new models to be deployed.
“FPV drones are effective tools for destroying the enemy and protecting our country. The Ministry of Defense is doing everything possible to increase number of drones,” Umerov said in a statement on Wednesday.
Team players
Every FPV drone pilot works in tandem with aerial reconnaissance units, who fly a DJI Mavic or other type of drone with video and audio transmitters to observe their mission. “An FPV loses its video signal close to the target. So, the other drone helps the pilot and supporting units to understand the target was indeed hit,” Tsybenko said.
Firsov confirmed that in a Facebook post from the front. What looks simple on video in fact requires close coordination between dozens of people.
“Everything seems so simple, put on glasses — and “Bam!” you destroyed a tank,” said Firsov. “In fact, aerial scouts spend hours looking for targets. A decryptor looks at video and finds targets that the enemy has carefully hidden. A navigator who is nearby helps the pilot to fly along the route. An engineer attaching explosives, a sapper, who twists standard ammunition for drones and many, many others.”
Russian forces use FPV drones to target single soldiers | John Moore/Getty Images
Most FPV drones are kamikaze, Tsybenko said. And their effectiveness has changed the stakes. The Russians, who at first lagged behind Ukraine in mastering drone warfare, have learned from their mistakes. And now they are scaling up Ukraine’s methods of drone warfare.
Russian forces now have “countless” FPV drones that they now use to target single soldiers.
Russia has also launched its own production lines and is devising new tactics to deploy drones in swarms. “One manager and all the others will repeat the movement. This controlled pack is a very big threat on the battlefield,” Tsybenko warned.
China factor
However, neither Ukraine nor Russia are able to produce drones for warfare by themselves. They still source crucial parts from China — the leading maker of commercial drones. Earlier this year the Chinese Ministry of Commerce imposed restrictions on drone exports to both Ukraine and Russia out of “fear it would be used for military purposes.”
Still, it’s possible to obtain components and drones via third countries. “Yes, China can either stop or stall the export of parts if it sees ‘Ukraine’ in export data. But it can’t control what we buy in Europe. Russia has fewer problems and a common border with China, and that makes drone imports way easier.”
“Every lock has its key. Indeed, the commercial drones we buy in stores are synchronizing their data with a server. But we learned how to create user logins that are completely anonymized. Even the drone might think it is flying somewhere in Canada — and not in Donbas,” Tsybenko said.
“When we talked to Europeans, they were amazed at how easy it is to hack and anonymize Chinese drones. It is safe to use them, we tried to persuade our partners,” Tsybenko said, adding that Ukraine did not have the luxury of time to independently develop and certify its own drones.
“If we waited, the war would be over when they finally arrived.”
YEREVAN, Armenia — Azerbaijan has agreed to reopen the only highway linking Armenia to the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh provided local leaders accept aid from Azerbaijan as well, a senior Azerbaijani official told POLITICO on Saturday.
The news comes after authorities in the ethnic Armenian-controlled exclave — inside Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders — announced earlier in the day that it would accept humanitarian shipments from the Russian Red Cross via an alternative road from Aghdam, inside Azerbaijani government-held territory.
According to Hikmet Hajiyev, foreign policy adviser to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, “Azerbaijan expressed its consent as a goodwill gesture to ensure simultaneous opening” of the so-called Lachin Corridor for ICRC cargo. The road connects the mountainous territory to Armenia. The acceptance, he said, would pave the way for a separate deal to allow passage from Armenia. “In the Lachin checkpoint, Azerbaijan’s customs and border regime must be observed,” he said.
For close to two months, aid organizations including the Red Cross have said they have been unable to transport supplies of food and fuel into Nagorno-Karabakh, despite a 2020 ceasefire agreement between the two sides guaranteeing free use of the road under the supervision of Russian peacekeepers. With essential provisions running low, local Armenians say a humanitarian crisis is already unfolding and the former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, last month issued a report warning that a “genocide” was under way.
Both the U.S. and the EU have urged Azerbaijan to reopen the Lachin Corridor. The South Caucasus country denies it is orchestrating a blockade, and has insisted the Karabakh Armenians must accept humanitarian supplies from inside Azerbaijan.
Arayik Harutyunyan, the former de facto president of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, told POLITICO in July that he would refuse to accept the supplies despite a deteriorating humanitarian situation because “Azerbaijan created this crisis and cannot be the solution to it.”
Harutyunyan, who resigned last month amid the ongoing crisis, was due to be replaced on Saturday in a presidential election. However, according to Hajiyev, the “sham elections” are a “serious setback and counterproductive” for the situation.
Instead, he reiterated a call from the Azerbaijani government for the Karabakh Armenians to lay down their arms and accept being governed as part of Azerbaijan. “It is the only way to a lasting peace where Armenian and Azerbaijani residents of Karabakh can live and coexist,” he said.
Hajiyev later clarified in a statement on social media that the Lachin Corridor would not be opened immediately, but under the terms of a deal allowing indefinite access for Azerbaijani aid from Aghdam.
KYIV — Ukraine’s long-range Beaver drones seem to be making successful kamikaze strikes in the heart of Moscow, but Serhiy Prytula is coy about how much he knows.
“We are not sure whether we are involved in this,” he says with a charming but inscrutable smile, when asked about these mysterious new weapons.
Prytula rose to fame — just like President Volodymyr Zelenskyy — as an actor, TV star and comedian, but is now best known for his contribution to the war, running a foundation that acquires components, helps support domestic arms production and supplies front-line forces. Tracking down parts for drones has proved to be one of his fortes.
Whether or not Prytula played any role in finding parts for the Beaver, it has now joined the ranks of other homegrown creations such as the Shark, Leleka and Valkyrie.
From the outside, his foundation looks like any other nondescript five-story apartment block in the quiet side streets of Kyiv. Inside, it is a chaotic human hive of volunteers, preparing packages and dispatching deliveries to soldiers on the front. On August 9, the team packed 75 drones for military units. That’s barely a drop in the ocean, given the needs of Ukraine’s forces across a 1,000-kilometer front, but every extra eye in the sky can help save dozens of lives.
The crowd of young, energetic volunteers at Prytula’s headquarters epitomizes an important dimension of the war: Ukrainians are increasingly taking matters into their own hands when it comes to weapons supply. With the defense ministry and the traditional state arms sector widely criticized for inefficiency and tarnished by corruption scandals over past years, the country is now witnessing an explosion of private enterprise to deliver kit to the front lines and to ramp up domestic production in the most hazardous of conditions. With arms-makers being prime targets for Russian cruise missiles, factories are spreading their manufacturing over numerous secret locations.
This sense that Ukrainians need to take the initiative at home both by scouring the global arms bazaar for hi-tech gizmos and by making more of their own heavy armor and shells is only amplified by the looming threat of a return to the White House by Donald Trump, who argues that America should not be “sending very much” to Ukraine and that Kyiv should sue for peace with the invader. Other Republican candidates have only heightened Ukrainians’ fears that the next U.S. president could sell out their young democracy to the Kremlin.
In addition to the aerial drones, there have been other homegrown success stories — Ukrainian-made armored vehicles are on the front lines beside U.S. Bradleys and locally made maritime drones have hit Russian ships in the Black Sea.
Not that anyone reckons going it alone is an option. Ukraine cannot even begin to match the vast military expenditure of Russia — Kyiv is expected to spend €24 billion on defense over 2023, while Russia is probably splurging well over €80 billion — so foreign assistance will always prove vital to keeping Ukraine in the fight.
But that’s no reason to sit idly by. Almost an entire country has mobilized for national defense, and there are many ways in which entrepreneurial private suppliers are now proving nimbler than state behemoths and bureaucrats in getting soldiers what they need.
When it came to the key question — on every Ukrainian’s mind — of continued Western support, Prytula stressed the efforts that Ukrainians were making to defend themselves made it less likely that outside aid would diminish. “I am convinced that they will keep supplying us with weapons because the world sees the war efforts of Ukrainian society.”
Beaver blitz
The back story of the Beaver is a closely guarded secret.
Last year, Ukrainian blogger and volunteer Ihor Lachenkov announced he was aiming to collect 20 million hryvnia (about €500,000) to produce and buy five Beaver drones for military intelligence, and later posted pictures of himself hugging one. Since then drones that looked like Beavers have hammered Russian oil depots and other military targets deep inside Russian territory and even hit Moscow’s business district. Officially, Ukraine is saying nothing about where this kit is coming from, and men such as Lachenkov and Prytula provide a useful smokescreen.
The country is now witnessing an explosion of private enterprise to deliver kit to the front lines | Sergey Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images
Prytula in late July also showed off grinning pictures of himself walking past three Beaver drones on a landing strip, quipping ironically: “We have no idea what can fly to Moscow.”
Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Prytula’s foundation has raised $135 million, which has been used to buy more than 7,000 drones, 1,200 vehicles, over 17,000 communication devices and much more.
When asked about his role in getting the Beaver drones, Prytula diplomatically said a volunteer’s job is to buy what the military needs and hand it over. “But it is not always necessary to talk about it. We honestly always say that we have nothing to do with it. When we see oil bases are exploding somewhere in Russia, or that there are some attacks on military facilities, we are glad that our army has learned to take out the enemy outside the country,” Prytula said.
Indeed, Prytula’s volunteers play a key middleman role in acquiring components more quickly than the state bureaucracy can.
China is a key part of the puzzle as the Ukrainian defense ministry cannot buy Chinese-made civilian drones directly. Shenzhen-based drone maker DJI no longer openly sells to Russia or to Ukraine, so the key trick is to acquire their wares quickly from third countries, or pick up parts and components internationally that can be assembled by Ukrainian technicians. There is a boom in small Ukrainian arms producers, with more than 100 companies active in the field.
“For the Russians, it was always easier to get [the Chinese products] in the never-ending race. So, when I hear Ukrainians managed to snatch up 10,000 components for … drones from Russians, I am happy,” Prytula said, sitting in his office, beside a giant wooden map of Ukraine.
This sense that Ukrainians need to take the initiative at home is only amplified by the looming threat of a return to the White House by Donald Trump, who argues that America should not be “sending very much” to Ukraine and that Kyiv should sue for peace with the invader | Brandon Bell/Getty Images
“The defense ministry also can’t buy [drones] that are not in serial production yet. But we can, and the producers can reinvest the money to increase the number, if soldiers’ feedback from the front was good,” Prytula continued. “So, by donating money people are not only helping the army, but also stimulating domestic military production.”
The game-changing role of drone producers has also made them a target. Over the weekend, Russia attacked a theater in the center of Chernihiv, a city north of Kyiv, where drone producers and volunteers had organized a closed meeting with the help of the local military administration. Most of them managed to escape to shelter but people walking around the theater on the central square did not, with seven killed and 129 injured.
Bringing it all back home
While almost everyone now wants to get involved in the defense business, that wasn’t always the case. Just as Russia was building up its military from 1991 to 2014, Ukraine neglected its own arms factories. In the wild years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, illegal networks smuggled out arms. While the country remained a heavyweight military producer, it focused on export earnings rather than tailoring weapons for Ukraine’s own forsaken troops.
“No one predicted any military conflicts either with Russia or other countries,” Maksym Polyvianyi, acting director of the National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries, told POLITICO. “In a way, Russia’s 2014 invasion boosted our defense industry. Dozens of defense companies appeared and started the modernization of Ukrainian armory and the army.”
Still, the old scourge of corruption held the country back, even after Russia seized Crimea in 2014. Under the presidency of Petro Poroshenko, the state arms industry was rocked by scandals in which money was siphoned off, even as the country faced open conflict against Russia in the east.
Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 forced another change, however, accelerating diversification from the state industrial complex. “As of 2022, Ukrainian armed forces buy up to 70 percent of defense products from private military companies,” Polyvianyi said.
Under the presidency of Petro Poroshenko, the state arms industry was rocked by scandals in which money was siphoned off, even as the country faced open conflict against Russia in the east | Chris McGrath/Getty Images
With the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s defense producers became primary targets for Russian missiles. Many were bombed. But others managed to relocate to western Ukraine and spread out production.
“You have to be creative to survive nowadays. Two months after the start of the invasion, we resumed our work,” Vladislav Belbas, director general of Ukrainian Armor, told POLITICO. Since 2018, Ukrainian Armor produced the Varta and Novator armored vehicles, as well as 60mm, 82mm, and 120 mm-caliber mortars for the army. “We recently restarted production even though we’ve lost an important components contractor. It is now located on the territory controlled by Russia.”
Secrecy is also crucial. “We do everything to protect our staff, hide information about our production whereabouts. We move and test equipment at night, when it is more difficult to track us. We try not to concentrate equipment in one place,” Belbas said.
Oleksandr Kamyshin, Ukraine’s strategic industries minister, stressed output was rising dramatically but that it was inconceivable to match Russia without major foreign support. “In seven months of 2023, we made 10 times more artillery and mortar ammo than in the entire 2022. But we are still very far from what we need,” he told POLITICO. “Today we have a war of such a scale that the entire capacity of the free world is not enough to support our consumption. We definitely cannot do this without help.”
Ministry malaise
The defense ministry — the main supplier of weapons, food, uniforms and other necessities — is struggling to shake off a reputation for graft and inefficiency.
In a high-profile profiteering scandal earlier this year, it transpired the ministry had paid absurdly inflated prices for soldiers’ rations to a contractor. The ministry denies violations, but keeps hiding behind military secrecy.
Oleksandr Kamyshin, Ukraine’s strategic industries minister, stressed output was rising dramatically but that it was inconceivable to match Russia without major foreign support | Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images
Other more recent scandals and procurement hiccups have focused on the ministry’s failure to secure delivery of everything it paid for. In private, Ukrainian officials admit the defense ministry is not up to scratch in supplying the army, and some Ukrainian lawmakers openly criticize the minister, Oleksii Reznikov, over his record on procurement.
The Ukrainian government has found alternative ways to cover some of the needs of the Ukrainian army, with the digital transformation ministry engaging in drone supplies, using state donations platform UNITED 24, and liberalizing customs and production rules for drones in Ukraine.
“President Zelenskyy took domestic defense production under personal control,” Kamyshin said.
Prytula, the founder of the foundation, said it was hard to judge the defense ministry during war. “They are quite successful when it comes to accumulating help in the international arena, but have some troubles at home. I think the defense ministry is doing what it can in terms of its responsibility. But with such a war it is never enough,” he said.
But Polyvianyi noted that’s where volunteers were coming into their own as parallel supply lines, filling the gaps left by the ministry. “The task of the state today is to provide heavy equipment. Without help, the state cannot provide all the needs of each army unit. Charitable foundations work in close connection with the ministry of defense and other structures.”
That’s a partnership in which Prytula is one of the most important players. But he is among the first to admit that all of Ukraine’s Herculean efforts at home will amount to nothing without the support of the international coalition.
“So it is hard to imagine we can win if we’re left on our own. As in the war of two formerly Soviet armies, the one with more people and weapons will win. Only better technology can help change the situation,” Prytula said. “It will be very difficult for us to fight alone with such a huge monster. But the civilized world has two options: to help us restore our 1991 borders, or to throw away all claims of shared values and just watch us bleed.”
The pictures posted on the Chinese company’s website show a tall, Caucasian man with a crew cut and flattened nose inspecting body armor at its factory.
“This spring, one of our customers came to our company to confirm the style and quantity of bulletproof vests, and carefully tested the quality of our vests,” Shanghai H Win, a manufacturer of military-grade protective gear, proudly reported on its website in March. The customer “immediately directly confirmed the order quantity of bulletproof vests and subsequent purchase intention.”
The identity of the smiling customer isn’t clear, but there’s a fair chance he was Russian: According to customs records obtained by POLITICO, Russian buyers have declared orders for hundreds of thousands of bulletproof vests and helmets made by Shanghai H Win — the items listed in the documents match those in the company’s online catalog.
Evidence of this kind shows that China, despite Beijing’s calls for peace, is pushing right up to a red line in delivering enough nonlethal, but militarily useful, equipment to Russia to have a material impact on President Vladimir Putin’s 17-month-old war on Ukraine. The protective gear would be sufficient to equip many of the men mobilized by Russia since the invasion. Then there are drones that can be used to direct artillery fire or drop grenades, and thermal optical sights to target the enemy at night.
These shipments point to a China-sized loophole in the West’s attempts to hobble Putin’s war machine. The sale of so-called dual-use technology that can have both civilian and military uses leaves just enough deniability for Western authorities looking for reasons not to confront a huge economic power like Beijing.
The wartime strength of China’s exports of dual-use products to Russia is confirmed by customs data. And, while Ukraine is a customer of China too, its imports of most of the equipment covered in this story have fallen sharply, the figures show.
Russia has imported more than $100 million-worth of drones from China so far this year — 30 times more than Ukraine. And Chinese exports of ceramics, a component used in body armor, increased by 69 percent to Russia to more than $225 million, while dropping by 61 percent to Ukraine to a mere $5 million, Chinese and Ukrainian customs data show.
“What is very clear is that China, for all its claims that it is a neutral actor, is in fact supporting Russia’s positions in this war,” said Helena Legarda, a lead analyst specializing in Chinese defense and foreign policy at the Mercator Institute for China Studies, a Berlin think tank.
Were China to cross the red line and sell weapons or military equipment to Russia, Legarda said she would expect the EU to enforce secondary sanctions targeting enablers of Putin’s war of aggression.
But, she added, equipment like body armor, thermal imaging, and even commercial drones that can be used in offensive frontline operations are unlikely to trigger a response.
“Then there’s this situation that we’re in at the moment — all these dual-use components or equipment and how you handle those,” Legarda explained. “I would not expect the EU to be able to agree to sanctions on that.”
Disappearing customer
Shanghai H Win, like other Chinese companies producing dual-use equipment, has enjoyed a surge in business since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
According to customs records obtained by POLITICO, Russia has ordered hundreds of thousands of bulletproof vests and helmets made by Shanghai H Win | Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images
“Because of the war, a lot of trading companies are looking for us and ask: ‘Are you making this kind of vest?’ We received a lot of inquiries,” a sales representative told POLITICO over the phone.
At first, the representative said Shanghai H Win wasn’t allowed to export directly to Russia unless the Chinese military issues a certificate and it can provide documentary proof of its final customer.
Yet when asked who the man in the pictures was, and where he was from, the representative denied that he was even a customer — even though the website said so.
“He is our customer’s customer. We cannot ask him directly, ‘Where are you from?’ But I guess maybe he is from Europe — maybe Ukraine, maybe Poland, even maybe from Russia. I’m not sure.”
Shortly after the call, Shanghai H Win took down the post featuring the mystery shopper from its website.
Who are the buyers?
So, who exactly are those customers? Evidence of deals — importers, suppliers, and product descriptions — can be found in a registry of declarations of conformity by anyone with access to the Russian internet who is familiar with international customs classifications.
In an earlier story, POLITICO searched these filings and found evidence that sniper bullets made in the United States were reaching Russia, where they were freely available on the black market.
The declarations enable the final buyer to certify that the products are genuine and, in effect, make it possible to import goods without the express consent of the maker. If goods are traded through an intermediary, the maker may not even be aware that its goods are going to Russia. The registry is, however, searchable so it’s still easy to find the ultimate buyers of the Chinese kit.
One is Silva, a company headquartered in the remote Eastern Siberian region of Buryatia. It filed declarations in January of this year detailing orders for 100,000 bulletproof vests and 100,000 helmets. The manufacturer? Shanghai H Win.
Such importers often bear the hallmarks of “one-day” firms, as shell companies are known in Russia, set up by actors who want to conceal their dealings. They tend to be new, listed at obscure residential addresses, and have few staff or assets. Their financial statements often don’t report the levels of turnover that the filings would imply.
According to public records, Silva was registered only last September. It reported zero revenues for 2022. A Google Street View search of its address in Ulan-Ude, the capital of Buryatia, takes visitors to a dilapidated apartment block.
POLITICO tried to contact Silva but the phone number given on its filings rang off the hook and a message sent to its email address bounced.
The sale of so-called dual-use technology that can have both civilian and military uses leaves enough deniability for Western authorities looking for reasons not to confront China | STR/AFP via Getty Images
Another Russian company called Rika declared a smaller shipment of body armor from Shanghai H Win in March. Before that, in January, Rika declared a consignment of helmets from a company called Deekon Shanghai, which shares an address with Shanghai H Win. The two companies are affiliated, another Shanghai H Win representative said.
A woman who answered the phone at Rika said: “We buy in Russia, not in China.” The company didn’t reply to a follow-up email from POLITICO.
The denial is hardly plausible: In addition to the protective gear, a search of declarations by Rika threw up hits for deals for thermal optical equipment from China. That was corroborated by customs data accessed by POLITICO, which revealed more than 220 shipments, worth $11 million, for thermal optics and protective equipment since the outbreak of the war. Rika advertises Chinese-made night sights right at the top of its website.
Another Russian company called Legittelekom, whose homepage reveals it to be a Moscow freight forwarding company, also appears as a buyer of 100,000 items of headgear and 100,000 suits of outerwear from Deekon Shanghai, according to filings dated last November 24.
A man who answered a call to Legittelekom declined to comment on POLITICO’s findings and would not say whether the company supplied the Russian military.
“This is a commercial activity and we do not disclose our commercial activities,” the man said in response to both questions.
Bigger deal
Then there’s Pozitron, a company based in Rostov-on-Don, the southern city briefly captured by warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner mercenaries in their failed uprising last month. It imported more than $60 million-worth of “airsoft helmets,” “miscellaneous ceramics,” and other items from Chinese firm Beijing KRNatural in November and December 2022, according to customs data shared by ImportGenius.
These flows check out with Pozitron’s own declarations of conformity between late October and December 2022, for a total of 100,000 helmets. The declarations also reveal that Pozitron acquired a range of drones from Chinese multinational SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd last December.
Although the quantity is unclear, the models specified include ones known to have been used in the Ukrainian theater of war, like DJI’s Mavic 2 Enterprise Advanced quadcopter or the Mini 2 lightweight drone.
At first sight, the product descriptions in the declarations and customs records appear harmless enough — the “airsoft helmets,” for example, are said to be for use in paintball games and “not for military use, not for dual use.”
Sanctions and defense experts say, however, that it’s common practice to mislabel dual-use goods as being for civilian purposes when they’re in fact destined for the battlefield.
At any rate, Pozitron, which was only founded in March 2021, is having a very good war: Its revenues exploded from 31 million rubles — around $400,000 — in 2021 to 20 billion rubles — almost $300 million — in 2022, according to its financial statement.
Reached by email, Pozitron’s general director, Andrey Vitkovsky, said that his company has “never imported drones and similar products” from the People’s Republic of China.
“The main activity of Pozitron LLC is the purchase and sale of consumer goods, sporting goods, and fabrics, both produced in the Russian Federation and imported from China,” Vitkovsky added, saying that his company’s activities were “exclusively peaceful in nature, in compliance with all rules and restrictions.”
The denial is typical — Russian companies have good reason to fear Western sanctions if they are implicated in trade that supports the Kremlin’s war effort. After POLITICO reported in March that a company called Tekhkrim was importing Chinese assault weapons, and declaring them as “hunting rifles,” the firm was sanctioned by the United States.
Pozitron is on the West’s radar, said one sanctions expert, who was granted anonymity as they are not authorized to speak publicly.
As for Beijing KRNatural, POLITICO was able to trace a company with a similar name at the address given in the Pozitron filings. The company, Beijing Natural Hanhua International Trade Co., Ltd, is listed as a “small and micro enterprise.” It was founded in April 2022, a few months before the Pozitron deals. Nobody answered when POLITICO called.
Heavenly mechanics
In contrast to the bulk consignments of protective gear that appear intended to equip a large fighting force, the orders for drones found by POLITICO are more dispersed among different buyers — both companies and individuals.
In addition to Pozitron, buyers of drones from DJI and its subsidiaries include firms called Gigantshina and Vozdukh — neither of which responded to emailed requests for comment. Another is Nebesnaya Mekhanika (“Heavenly Mechanics”), which before the war was the Chinese company’s official distributor in Russia.
A DJI spokesperson said that the company and its subsidiaries had voluntarily stopped all shipments to, and operations in, Russia and Ukraine on April 26, 2022 — two months after the war broke out.
“We stand alone as the only drone company to clearly denounce and actively discourage use of products in combat,” the spokesperson said in comments emailed to POLITICO.
DJI said it had also broken off its relationship with Nebesnaya Mekhanika, although the Russian company filed further declarations for shipments of the Chinese company’s drones last September 15 and on March 27 of this year.
The spokesperson said that DJI was not in any way involved in the drafting of the declarations of conformity found by POLITICO: “These documents would have been filled out by Russian parties, and they do not indicate in any shape or form who ex- or imported the products that are being declared conform.”
“We have seen media reports and other documents that appear to show how our products are being transported to Russia and Ukraine from other countries where they can be bought off-the-shelf,” the spokesperson added. “However, it is not in our power to influence how our products are being used once they leave our control.”
Still, a search of ImportGenius shows that a Chinese company called Iflight has continued to ship DJI drones to Nebesnaya Mechnika via Hong Kong, care of a local company called Lotos. The most recent consignment was delivered last October 10. In an apparent anomaly, Russia is stated as the country of origin for the shipments.
Nebesnaya Mekhanika, which still advertises DJI drones on its website, did not respond to a request for comment.
Political will
The trafficking of low-tech body armor to high-tech drones and thermal optics highlights a vulnerability in the Western sanctions regime. The ambiguity surrounding the dual-use status of this equipment, coupled with the fact that a significant portion of it is manufactured in China, seems, at least for now, to have placed the possibility of the West taking meaningful action beyond reach.
Then there is the flow of technology through China that may include components made in the West that could be of direct military use.
Russia is fully aware of the China loophole and is using it to buy Western technology to fight its war against Ukraine, according to a recent analysis by the KSE Institute, a think tank affiliated to the Kyiv School of Economics. More than 60 percent of imported critical components in Russian weapons found on the battlefield came from U.S. companies, the researchers found.
It’s an issue that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken brought up on a visit to Beijing last month — the first by Washington’s top diplomat in five years. He told reporters that China had given assurances that “it is not and will not provide lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine.” Blinken, however, expressed “ongoing concerns” that Chinese firms may be providing technology that Russia can use to advance its aggression in Ukraine. “And we have asked the Chinese government to be very vigilant about that.”
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters that China had given assurances that “it is not and will not provide lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine” during a visit to Beijing last month | Pool photo by Leah Millis/AFP via Getty Images
France is also concerned that China is delivering dual-use equipment to Russia. “There are indications that they are doing things we would prefer them not to do,” Emmanuel Bonne, President Emmanuel Macron’s top diplomatic adviser, told the recent Aspen Security Forum. Pressed on whether China was supplying weapons, Bonne said: “Well, kind of military equipment … as far as we know they are not delivering massively military capacities to Russia but (we need there to be) no delivery.”
Yet there’s little the West can do to twist Beijing’s arm into halting flows of dual-use products into Russia. Only the United States would have the real power to impose an outright ban on dollar-denominated transactions — as Washington did when it sanctioned Iran over its secret nuclear program.
The EU, however, lacks such a strong sanctions weapon because the euro is far less ubiquitous on global markets. It’s also been hesitant to act. In its latest package of Russia sanctions last month, the EU compiled a list of seven Chinese companies that shouldn’t be allowed to trade with the bloc. But, after lobbying by Beijing, Brussels dropped four companies from the blacklist.
Elina Ribakova, one of the authors of the KSE Institute report, said indirect shipments via China pose challenges in terms of both the scope and enforcement of Western sanctions. Secondary sanctions may not be sufficient, she said. She called for manufacturers to be forced to take responsibility for where their products end up — just as banks were required by regulators to step up customer oversight and anti-money laundering operations in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.
“What we can do differently is to create the same infrastructure for the corporates,” explained Ribakova, who is director of the international program at the Kyiv School of Economics. “We have to threaten them with serious fines.”
Maxim Mironov, a sanctions expert and assistant professor of finance at the IE Business School in Madrid, reckons that the West, despite expanding sanctions to punish Putin’s helpers, lacks the political conviction to enforce them against Beijing.
“Do politicians have enough will to put sanctions on China? Basically, the answer is no,” said Mironov.
“China signals: You can try, but I don’t care what you are trying to do,” Mironov added. “And the European Union is like: If you don’t like it, we are not going to do it. And if the Chinese see that, they are just going to continue doing what they think is in their best interest.”
The European Commission, the U.S. National Security Council and the Chinese Mission to the EU did not respond to requests for comment.
Stuart Lau contributed reporting.
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Sarah Anne Aarup, Sergey Panov and Douglas Busvine
As gear reviews go, it was a glowing one: In a 60-second video clip posted on Telegram, a masked sniper sporting the death’s-head insignia of the Wagner mercenary army sings the praises of the Russian-made Orsis T-5000 rifle.
“The equipment comes very well recommended,” the soldier, pictured in the charred interior of a building, tells a war reporter from the Zvezda TV channel run by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Pulling out the clip of the weapon at his side, he continues: “It uses Western .338 caliber ammunition. It works very well. It can penetrate light cover if the enemy is behind it. And, in the open, it can strike the enemy at a range of up to 1,500 meters.”
Filings obtained by POLITICO indicate that Promtekhnologiya and another Russian firm called Tetis have acquired hundreds of thousands of rounds made by Hornady, a U.S. company that trademarks its wares as “Accurate. Deadly. Dependable.” Hornady, founded in 1949, sums up its philosophy with the phrase: “Ten bullets through one hole.”
The findings add to a growing body of evidence that supplies of lethal and nonlethal military equipment are still reaching Russia despite the West’s imposition of unprecedented sanctions in response to President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine last year. The exigencies of war have exposed Russia’s lack of capacity to manufacture high-end sniper rounds, say defense experts, and that is fueling a flourishing black market for Western ammunition.
Information on the procurement of such gear is hiding in plain sight: Details of deals — importers, suppliers and product descriptions — can be found online by anyone with access to the Russian internet and a grasp of international customs classification codes.
Anything but bulletproof
In a “declaration of conformity” filed with a Russian government registry and dated August 12, 2022, Promtekhnologiya stated that it planned to sourcea batch of 102,200 Hornady lead bullets for the assembly of “hunting cartridges” used in “civilian weapons with a rifled barrel.” The specifications — .338 Lapua Magnum bullets weighing 285 grains — match those of a product in the Hornady catalog.
A second declaration bearing the same date is for a batch of “uncapped cartridge cases for assembling civilian firearms cartridges” made by Hornady with the same .338 Lapua Magnum specification.
The description is misleading: The .338 Lapua Magnum isn’t a “hunting cartridge;” it’s a high-powered, long-range projectile that was developed by Western militaries in the 1980s and used by their snipers in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Reached by POLITICO, Steve Hornady, CEO of the family company based in Grand Island, Nebraska, denied selling ammunition to Russia in wartime.
“The instant Russia invaded Ukraine, we were done,” Hornady said in a brief telephone call.
Hornady declined at first to elaborate and, when asked to review the evidence, requested that it be sent by fax or courier as he did not use email. He eventually responded after POLITICO sent written requests for comment with supporting documentation by courier.
“We categorically are NOT exporting anything to Russia and have not had an export permit for Russia since 2014,” he replied. “We do not support any sale of our product to any Russian son-of-a-bitch and if we can find out how they acquire, if in fact they do, we will take all steps available to stop it.”
Hornady added that he had contacted the U.S. authorities following POLITICO’s inquiry. He pointed out that current U.S. law required that customers must obtain permission from the Department of Commerce to re-export articles made in the United States. “To the best of our knowledge, none of our customers violate that law,” he said.
Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, asked which ammunition his troops used, told POLITICO they had “a huge amount of NATO-issue ammunition left over from the Ukrainian army.” In a sarcastic voice message sent to a POLITICO journalist, the Russian warlord also asked for help procuring F-35 combat jets and U.S.-made sniper rifles, machine guns and grenade launchers.
Promtekhnologiya denied filing any customs declarations to import ammunition; said it had no relationship with Hornady; and that it had the capacity to manufacture its own ammunition. The company also said in emailed comments to POLITICO that the Orsis rifle and the ammunition the company makes are intended for “hunting and sporting” purposes and are freely available on the civilian market.
Both Promtekhnologiya and Alexander Zinovyev, listed as the company’s general director in the filings, have been sanctioned by Ukraine, which cites evidence that its Orsis rifles “have been used in Russian military operations in Eastern Ukraine.”
Promtekhnologiya is also in Washington’s sights: “We take any allegation of sanctions violation or evasion seriously and are committed to ensuring that sanctions are fully enforced,” a spokesperson for the National Security Council said in response to a request for comment from POLITICO.
“We have taken steps to hold Russia accountable for its war in Ukraine and have imposed an unprecedented sanctions regime to disrupt Russia’s ability to access funds and weapons that fuel Putin’s war machine. That includes sanctioning companies like Promtekhnologiya.”
Criminal, or wilful, violations of U.S. sanctions can trigger penalties of up to $1 million per violation, as well as up to 20 years’ imprisonment for individuals. Civil penalties can run to the higher of either twice the value of the underlying transaction or around $350,000 per violation.
Describing military-grade ammunition as for hunting or sporting use, as the filings do, amounts to a thinly veiled ruse to evade targeted “smart” sanctions aimed at starving the Russian military of the means to fight the war, said defense analyst Maria Shagina.
“Strictly speaking, smart sanctions are not supposed to target anything civilian to avoid humanitarian collateral damage,” said Shagina, a research fellow at the U.K.-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “But the targets in authoritarian countries will really exploit this.”
Steve Hornady, CEO of the family company based in Grand Island, Nebraska, denied selling ammunition to Russia in wartime | Leon Neal/Getty Images
Russia reloaded
Another Russian buyer of Hornady ammunition is a company called Tetis, which has disclosed two shipments since Russia’s full-scale invasionof Ukraine beganon February 24, 2022. The most recent was in April for more than 300,000 “units” comprising a wide range of products that checked out with the Hornady catalog.
The main owners of Tetis, Alexander Levandovsky and Sergey Senchenko — who each own stakes of 41.1 percent — have links to the Russian military.
Both were previously listed as shareholders in another company called Kampo, which according to company filings holds licenses to make weapons and military equipment and has done business with the Ministry of Defense and the Special Flight Detachment that operates Putin’s presidential plane.
Although Tetis doesn’t offer Hornady ammo on its website, it does advertise itself as an international distributor for RCBS, a U.S. maker of reloading equipment. This is used to assemble cases, primer, propellants and projectiles into cartridges that can then be fired — as seen in this video posted by a Russian gun enthusiast.
A database check revealed that the most recent declaration of conformity filed by Tetis for RCBS, for electronic weighing scales, predated Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24 of last year by just over a month.
Russia’s trade bureaucracy allows local firms to vouch for the goods they are importing by filing declarations of conformity, such as those that mention the Hornady products. This means that the supplier listed on the form may not be aware of specific shipments that could have been handled by an intermediary.
Tetis did not respond to an emailed request for comment.
Matt Rice, a spokesman for RCBS owner Vista Outdoor, said Tetis was no longer an international distributor for RCBS. “Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, our business made the decision to end all sales of goods with the country,” Rice said in an email, adding that RCBS would remove the listing for Tetis from its website.
Doing the rounds
Hornady ammunition or its components are freely available in Russia, along with other high-end foreign military gear.
Take the “Sniper Shop” on Telegram, an encrypted messaging app that is popular in Russia: It features a current offer for a full range of Hornady products, with the seller inviting buyers to visit a showroom in Sokolniki, a Moscow district, and offering delivery throughout Russia by courier or post. Contacted by POLITICO, the poster confirmed the Hornady ammo was in stock but declined to comment further on how it was sourced.
Then there is “Anton,” who advertises products from Hornady and RCBS on his profile. He also touts gear from Nightforce, maker of thermal optical sights; Lapua, which helped design the eponymous .338 ammo; MDT, a maker of chassis systems, magazines and accessories for rifles; and precision gunsmith AREA 419. All are American with the exception of Lapua, which is based in Finland and owned by a Norwegian company called Nammo.
Western high-end foreign military gear seems to be freely available in Russia | Leon Neal/Getty Images
“Anton” posted an offer for Hornady cartridges last October 24. Contacted via Telegram to ask whether he was still stocking Hornady, he replied: “We don’t do ammunition.”
POLITICO has, in the course of its research, also found declarations from several other Russian companies for ammunition made in Germany, Finland and Turkey.
The thriving black market reflects a structural deficit in Russia’s war economy. Its military-industrial complex can produce good small arms, like the Orsis rifle, but lacks the capacity to churn out the amount of ammunition needed by an army fighting a war across a front stretching hundreds of miles.
“Despite the quality of the rifles produced, a successful hit directly depends on the components used in the cartridges, and they, unfortunately, are imported,” a correspondent lamented in a post on a Russian military news site a few months into the war. Gunpowder produced in Russia lacks stability, the correspondent added, saying this is “unacceptable in the framework of high-precision shooting.”
The continuing access to specialized rifle cartridges made in the West, such as the .338 Lapua Magnum, by a sanctioned Russian small arms manufacturer like Orsis maker Promtekhnologiya is “egregious,” said Gary Somerville, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a British defense think tank.
“At present, there is only one manufacturer of this cartridge in Russia,” he added. “Preventing the shipment of these types of ammunition from Western countries to Russia is an easy win for those seeking to constrain Russia’s ability to wage war in Ukraine.”
Balkan route
It’s not just ammunition from the U.S. that is reaching the battlefront around Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, recently captured by Prigozhin’s mercenaries after a bloody, months-long battle.
There also appear to be cartridges from the European Union, which has imposed no fewer than 10 rounds of sanctions against Russia in a so-far inconclusive attempt to starve Putin’s war machine of the means to fight on.
Promtekhnologiya has filed four declarations since October covering shipments of 460,000 units described as “Orsis hunting cartridges” — most are of the .338 Lapua Magnum type. These identify a Slovenian company called Valerian as the supplier.
The first of the filings, dated October 13, 2022, includes an air waybill number whose first three digits — 262 — indicate that the shipper was Ural Airlines, a Russian carrier. It was not immediately possible to trace the route of the flight, however.
Valerian was founded on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with paid-in capital of €7,500 by Gašper Heybal, who previously worked for U.S. military outfitter Voodoo Tactical. On its home page, Valerian says: “Our goal is to equip you for your mission, whatever it might be, and wherever you are going.”
In online posts over the past decade — including on a Facebook Group called EU Guns with a declared mission of “easier transfer of weapons between European gun owners” — Heybal has done little to dispel the impression that he is an active small arms dealer.
Bakhmut was recently captured by Prigozhin’s mercenaries, the Wagner mercenary group| Olga Maltseva/AFP via Getty Images
The telephone number Heybal shared publicly in those posts is the same as the one for Valerian, which is registered at an address in a village around 40 minutes’ drive southeast of the Slovenian capital Ljubljana.
Reached at that number, Heybal denied that Valerian had shipped ammunition to Russia: “We don’t sell any … firearms or ammunition, and also there is an embargo on Russia,” said Heybal.
In a follow-up email on the declarations of conformity, Heybal said: “Firstly, we must stress that we do not know, nor do we understand how the name of our company, Valerian d.o.o., appears on the document.”
“Secondly, Valerian is not listed there as a supplier but as the producer, and this is not possible, as we do not produce ammunition. That being said, it still makes absolutely no sense to us as to how our name could appear on it. We are glad you brought this to our attention so we can figure out what is going on.”
A Slovenian diplomat said that, while Valerian had never applied for authorization to export weapons or ammunition to Russia, it had shipped “individual parts” to Kyrgyzstan.
The Central Asian state is one of the countries that the EU has in mind as it discusses an 11th round of measures targeting third countries that are suspected of helping Russia evade sanctions.
“The competent services in the Republic of Slovenia have already initiated the appropriate procedures to investigate the facts concerning the company,” the diplomat told POLITICO, adding that they would verify the possible diversion of goods to the Russian Federation. “Slovenia is firmly committed to supporting Ukraine, we have been supportive of all sanctions packages and especially this anti-circumvention one.”
An official at the European Commission deflected a request for comment, saying the bloc’s member countries were responsible for implementing sanctions. “As this seems like a very specific case, these allegations need to be investigated further by the competent authorities,” the official said.
Sergey Panov reported from Spain, Sarah Anne Aarup from Brussels and Douglas Busvine from Berlin. Additional reporting by Steven Overly in Washington.
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Sergey Panov, Sarah Anne Aarup and Douglas Busvine
LONDON — A new system of border checks on goods arriving from Europe is expected to force rocketing U.K. food prices even higher as businesses grapple with hundreds of millions of pounds in extra fees.
British business groups last week got sight of the U.K. government’s long-awaited post-Brexit border plans, via a series of consultations. One person in attendance said the proposals will “substantially increase food costs” for consumers from January.
That could spell trouble in a country which imports nearly 30 percent of all its food from the EU, according to 2020 figures from the British Retail Consortium, and where the annual rate of food and drink inflation just hit 19.2 percent — its highest level in 45 years.
Government officials told business reps at one consultation that firms will be hit with £400 million in extra costs as a result of long-deferred new checks at the U.K. border for goods entering from the EU.
Ministers have argued that the full implementation of the new post-Brexit procedures — which will eventually include full digitization of paperwork and a “trusted trader scheme” for major importers in order to reduce border checks — will more than offset these costs in the long-run as they will also be rolled out for imports coming from non-EU countries as well.
Supply-chain disruption caused by the Ukraine war, poor weather and new trade barriers due to Brexit have all been blamed for the U.K.’s surge in food prices.
A member of a major British business group, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that incoming post-Brexit red tape will mean “some producers on the EU side will find it is no longer possible to trade with the U.K.” and that “some small businesses will find themselves shut out.”
“It will add to the costs, and probably inflation, but I think we need to go through this so we can work with the EU to find advantageous improvements,” they said.
“We can’t keep running away from the fact we need to implement our own border checks.”
‘Not business as usual’
Britain has delayed the implementation of full post-Brexit border checks multiple times, while the EU began its own more than two years ago.
The government’s new “target operating model,” published last month, will see the phased implementation of new border and customs checks for EU imports from October.
This will include a new fee that must be paid from January for all goods that are eligible for border checks, including items like chilled meat, dairy products and vegetables.
A new fee will be applied from January for all goods that are eligible for border checks, including items like chilled meat, dairy products and vegetables | Paul Faith/AFP via Getty Images
Each batch of goods that could be subject to checks, even if they are ultimately not chosen by border staff for inspection, will be hit with a fee of between £23 to £43 at inland ports.
The first business figure quoted above said the scale of the new fees came as a surprise, after firms had been previously assured by the government that these costs would be dependent on whether goods had actually been checked.
“[Former minister] Jacob Rees-Mogg said there would be minimal costs. Initially we thought it was business as usual, but it’s not,” they said.
“There were people at this [consultation] saying that this is not a massive increase, but it will substantially increase food costs.”
William Bain, trade expert at the British Chambers of Commerce, said there is a “strong prospect” of higher inflation due to the new Brexit checks.
“EU suppliers may be less willing to trade with British based companies, because of increased costs and paperwork. The costs of imported goods would almost certainly increase,” he said.
But he added: “We knew this day was coming and that inbound controls on goods would be applied. It’s a part of having a functional border and complying with the U.K.’s international commitments.”
Reality check
The U.K. has seen trade flows with the EU disrupted since leaving the bloc’s single market and customs union.
Recent analysis by the Financial Times found that Britain’s goods exports are dropping at a faster rate than in any other G7 country.
Recent figures from the Office for National Statistics meanwhile show that U.K. trade in goods with EU countries fell at a much faster rate than from non-EU countries in January.
Conservative MP Tobias Ellwood told POLITICO that he fears his party will pay a price at the next general election, due to be held by January 2025, if the government does not seek better trading arrangements with the EU.
“There’s certainly a revision across the nation when it comes to Brexit — people are realising that what we have today isn’t what they imagined, whether you voted for Remain or for Brexit,” he said.
“The reality check is that it has become tougher economically to do business with the Continent and quite rightly there’s an expectation that we fix this.”
A government spokesperson said: “The target operating model implements important border controls which will help protect consumers and our environment and assure our trade partners about the quality of our exports.
“It implements these important controls in a way which minimises costs for businesses and prevents delays at the border.”
LONDON — After four months of intense talks (and plenty of squabbling before that), the EU and U.K. have a deal to resolve their long-running post-Brexit trade row over Northern Ireland.
But as U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak works to sell the so-called “Windsor framework” on the Northern Ireland protocol to Brexiteers and unionists, lawmakers on both sides of the English Channel and of the Irish Sea are getting to grips with the details.
From paperwork to plants, let POLITICO walk you through the new agreement, asking: Who has given ground, and how exactly will the deal thrashed out by EU and U.K. negotiators aim to keep the bloc’s prized single market secure?
Customs paperwork and checks
For businesses taking part in an expanded “trusted trader scheme,” the Windsor framework aims to considerably cut customs paperwork and checks on goods moving from Great Britain but destined to stay in Northern Ireland.
These goods will pass through a “green lane” requiring minimal paperwork and be labeled “Not for EU,” while those heading for the EU single market in the Republic of Ireland will undergo full EU customs checks in Northern Ireland’s ports under a “red lane.”
Traders in the green lane will only need to complete a single, digitized certificate per truck movement, rather than multiple forms per load.
Sunak has already claimed that this means “any sense of a border in the Irish Sea” — deeply controversial among Northern Ireland’s unionist politicians — has now been “removed.”
However, it’s by no means a total end to Irish Sea red tape. An EU official said that although the deal delivers a “dramatic reduction” in the number of physical food safety checks, for example, there will still be some — those seen as “essential” to avoid the risk of goods entering the single market.
These checks will be based on risk assessments and intelligence, and aimed at preventing smuggling and criminality.
U.K. public health and safety standards will meanwhile apply to all retail food and drink within the U.K. internal market. British rules on public health, marketing, organics, labeling, genetic modification, and drinks such as wines, spirits and mineral waters will apply in Northern Ireland. This will remove more than 60 EU food and drink rules in the original protocol, which were detailed in more than 1,000 pages of legislation.
Supermarkets, wholesalers, hospitality and food producers are likely to welcome the new arrangements. Many had stopped supplying to Northern Ireland because the cost of filling out hundreds of certificates for each consignment was deemed too high for a market as small as Northern Ireland.
Export declarations have been removed for the vast majority of goods moving from Northern Ireland to Great Britain.
The EU’s safeguards: While offering to drastically reduce the volume of checks carried out, the EU has toughened its criteria to become a trusted trader under the expanded scheme. The EU will now have access to databases tracking shipments of goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland in real time. The system was tested through the winter, helping build trust in Brussels, and is being fed with data from traders and U.K. authorities. The European Commission will be able to suspend part or all of these trade easements if the U.K. fails to comply with the new rules.
The timeline: The U.K. government said it will consult with businesses in the “coming months” before implementing the new rules. The green lane will come into force this fall. Labels for meat, meat products and minimally-processed dairy products such as fresh milk will come into force from October 1, 2024. All relevant products will be marked by July 1, 2025. “Shelf-stable” products like bread and pasta will not be labeled.
Governance
A key plank of the deal is the bid to address complaints by Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) — currently boycotting the power-sharing assembly in the region in opposition to the protocol — that lawmakers there did not have a say in the imposition of new EU rules in the region.
Under the terms of the new agreement, the Commission will have to give the U.K. government notice of future EU regulations intended to apply in Northern Ireland. According to Sunak, Stormont will be given a new power to “pull an emergency brake on changes to EU goods rules” based on “cross-community consent.”
Under this mechanism, the U.K. government will be able to suspend the application in Northern Ireland of an incoming piece of EU law at the request of at least 30 members of the assembly — a third of them. But if unionist parties in Northern Ireland want to trigger the new “Stormont brake,” they must first return to the power-sharing institutions which they abandoned last May. The EU and the U.K. could subsequently agree to apply such a rule in a meeting of the Joint Committee, which oversees the protocol.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said this new tool remains an emergency mechanism that hopefully will not need to be used. A second EU official said it would be triggered “under the most exceptional circumstances and as a matter of last resort in a well-defined process” set out in a unilateral declaration by the U.K. These include that the rules have a “significant and lasting impact on the everyday lives” of people in the region.
If the EU disagrees with the U.K.’s trigger of the Stormont brake, the two would resolve the issue through independent arbitration, instead of involving the Court of Justice of the EU.
Meanwhile, Northern Ireland’s courts will consider disputes over the application of EU rules in the region, and judges could decide whether to consult the CJEU on how to interpret them. In a key concession, the Commission has agreed not to unilaterally refer a case to the CJEU, although it retains the power to do so.
The EU’s safeguards: The CJEU will remain the “sole and ultimate arbiter of EU law” and will have the “final say” on EU single market disputes, von der Leyen stressed. Whether Brexiteers and the DUP are willing to accept that remains the million-dollar question.
Tax, state aid and EU rules
The U.K. government will now be able to set rules in areas such as VAT and state aid that will also apply in Northern Ireland — two major wins for Sunak that were rejected by the Commission in previous rounds of negotiations with other U.K. prime ministers.
It will, Sunak was at pains to point out Monday, allow Westminster to pass on a cut in alcohol duty that previously passed Northern Ireland by.
But London has had to give up on its idea of establishing a dual-regulatory mechanism that would have allowed Northern Ireland businesses to choose whether they would follow EU or British rules when manufacturing goods, depending on whether they intended to sell them in the EU single market or in the U.K. The whole idea was deemed by Brussels as impossible to police.
The EU’s safeguards: Northern Irish businesses producing goods for the U.K. internal market will only have to follow “less than 3 percent” of EU single market rules, a U.K. official said. But the nature of these regulations remains unclear, and there will be increased market surveillance and enforcement by U.K. authorities to try and reassure the EU.
The timeline: The U.K. government will be able to exercise these powers as soon as the Windsor framework comes into force.
Parcels
The EU and the U.K. have agreed to scrap customs processes for parcels being sent between consumers in Great Britain to Northern Ireland.
The EU’s safeguards: Parcels sent between businesses will now move through the new green lane, as is the case for other goods destined to stay in Northern Ireland. That should allow them to be monitored, but remove the need to undergo international customs procedures. Parcel operators will share commercial data with the U.K.’s tax authority, HMRC, in a bid to reduce risks to the EU single market.
Timeline: These new arrangements will take effect September 2024.
Pets
Residents in Great Britain will be able to take their dogs, cats and ferrets to Northern Ireland without having to fulfill a requirement for a rabies vaccine, tapeworm treatment and other checks.
Pets traveling from Northern Ireland to Great Britain and back will not be required to have any documentation, declarations, checks or health treatments.
The EU’s safeguards: Microchipped pets will be able to travel with a life-long pet travel document issued for free by the U.K.’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Pet owners will tick a box in their travel booking acknowledging they accept the scheme rules and will not move their pet into the EU.
The timeline: The new rules will take effect fall 2023.
Medicines
Drugs approved for use by the U.K.’s medicines regulator, the MHRA, will be automatically available in every pharmacy and hospital in Northern Ireland, “at the same time and under the same conditions” as in the U.K., von der Leyen said.
Businesses will need to secure approval for a U.K.-wide license from the MHRA to supply medicines to Northern Ireland, rather than having to go through the European Medicines Agency. The agreement removes any EU Falsified Medicines Directive packaging, labeling and barcode requirements for medicines. This means manufacturers will be able to produce a single medicines pack design for the whole of the U.K., including Northern Ireland.
Drugs being shipped into Northern Ireland from Great Britain will be freed of customs paperwork, checks and duties, with traders only being required to provide ordinary commercial information.
The EU’s safeguards: Medicines traveling from Great Britain to Northern Ireland will do so via the new green lane, which will have monitoring to protect the single market built in.
The timeline: The U.K. government said it will engage with the medicines industry soon on these changes.
Plants
The deal lifts the protocol’s ban on seed potatoes entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain, and its prohibition on trees and shrubs deemed of “high risk” for the EU single market. This will enable garden centers and other businesses in Northern Ireland to sell 11 native species to Great Britain and some from other regions.
The Windsor framework also removes sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on all these plants, and ditches red tape on their shipment into Northern Ireland.
The EU’s safeguards: Supplying businesses will have to obtain a Northern Ireland plant health label, which will be the same as the plant passport already required within Great Britain, but with the addition of the words “for use in the U.K. only” and a QR code linking to the rules.
The timeline: The new scheme and the lifting of the bans will all come into force in the fall.
LONDON — It was clear when Boris Johnson was forced from Downing Street that British politics had changed forever.
But few could have predicted that less than six months later, all angry talk of a cross-Channel trade war would be a distant memory, with Britain and the EU striking a remarkable compromise deal over post-Brexit trade rules in Northern Ireland.
Private conversations with more than a dozen U.K. and EU officials, politicians and diplomats reveal how the Brexit world changed completely after Johnson’s departure — and how an “unholy trinity” of little-known civil servants, ensconced in a gloomy basement in Brussels, would mastermind a seismic shift in Britain’s relationship with the Continent.
They were aided by an unlikely sequence of political events in Westminster — not least an improbable change of mood under the combative Liz Truss; and then the jaw-dropping rise to power of the ultra-pragmatic Rishi Sunak. Even the amiable figure of U.K. Foreign Secretary James Cleverly would play his part, glad-handing his way around Europe and smoothing over cracks that had grown ever-wider since 2016.
As Sunak’s Conservative MPs pore over the detail of his historic agreement with Brussels — and await the all-important verdict of the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland — POLITICO has reconstructed the dramatic six-month shift in Britain’s approach that brought us to the brink of the Brexit deal we see today.
Bye-bye Boris
Johnson’s departure from Downing Street, on September 6, triggered an immediate mood shift in London toward the EU — and some much-needed optimism within the bloc about future cross-Channel relations.
For key figures in EU capitals, Johnson would always be the untrustworthy figure who signed the protocol agreement only to disown it months afterward.
In Paris, relations were especially poisonous, amid reports of Johnson calling the French “turds”; endless spats with the Elysée over post-Brexit fishing rights, sausages and cross-Channel migrants; and Britain’s role in the AUKUS security partnership, which meant the loss of a multi-billion submarine contract for France. Paris’ willingness to engage with Johnson was limited in the extreme.
Truss, despite her own verbal spats with French President Emmanuel Macron — and her famously direct approach to diplomacy — was viewed in a different light. Her success at building close rapport with negotiating partners had worked for her as trade secretary, and once she became prime minister, she wanted to move beyond bilateral squabbles and focus on global challenges, including migration, energy and the war in Ukraine.
“Boris had become ‘Mr. Brexit,’” one former U.K. government adviser said. “He was the one the EU associated with the protocol, and obviously [Truss] didn’t come with the same baggage. She had covered the brief, but she didn’t have the same history. As prime minister, Liz wanted to use her personal relationships to move things on — but that wasn’t the same as a shift in the underlying substance.”
Indeed, Truss was still clear on the need to pass the controversial Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, which would have given U.K. ministers powers to overrule part of the protocol unilaterally, in order to ensure leverage in the talks with the European Commission.
Truss also triggered formal dispute proceedings against Brussels for blocking Britain’s access to the EU’s Horizon Europe research program. And her government maintained Johnson’s refusal to implement checks on goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain, causing deep irritation in Brussels.
But despite the noisy backdrop, tentative contact with Brussels quietly resumed in September, with officials on both sides trying to rebuild trust. Truss, however, soon became “very disillusioned by the lack of pragmatism from the EU,” one of her former aides said.
“The negotiations were always about political will, not technical substance — and for whatever reason, the political will to compromise from the Commission was never there when Liz, [ex-negotiator David] Frost, Boris were leading things,” they said.
Former British Prime Minister Liz Truss announces her resignation outside 10 Downing Street in central London on October 20, 2022 | Daniel Leal/AFP via Getty Images
Truss, of course, would not be leading things for long. An extraordinary meltdown of the financial markets precipitated her own resignation in late October, after just six weeks in office. Political instability in Westminster once again threatened to derail progress.
But Sunak’s arrival in No. 10 Downing Street — amid warnings of a looming U.K. recession — gave new impetus to the talks. An EU official said the mood music improved further, and that discussions with London became “much more constructive” as a result.
David Lidington, a former deputy to ex-PM Theresa May who played a key role in previous Brexit negotiations, describes Sunak as a “globalist” rather than an “ultra-nationalist,” who believes Britain ought to have “a sensible, friendly and grown-up relationship” with Brussels outside the EU.
During his time as chancellor, Sunak was seen as a moderating influence on his fellow Brexiteer Cabinet colleagues, several of whom seemed happy to rush gung-ho toward a trade war with the EU.
“Rishi has always thought of the protocol row as a nuisance, an issue he wanted to get dealt with,” the former government adviser first quoted said.
One British officialsuggested the new prime minister’s reputation for pragmatism gave the U.K. negotiating team “an opportunity to start again.”
Sunak’s slow decision-making and painstaking attention to detail — the subject of much criticism in Whitehall — proved useful in calming EU jitters about the new regime, they added.
“When he came in, it wasn’t just the calming down of the markets. It was everyone across Europe and in the U.S. thinking ‘OK, they’re done going through their crazy stage,’” the same officialsaid. “It’s the time he takes with everything, the general steadiness.”
EU leaders “have watched him closely, they listened to what he said, and they have been prepared to trust him and see how things go,” Lidington noted.
Global backdrop
As months of chaos gave way to calm in London, the West was undergoing a seismic reorganization.
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered a flurry of coordinated work for EU and U.K. diplomats — including sanctions, military aid, reconstruction talks and anti-inflation packages. A sense began to emerge that it was in both sides’ common interest to get the Northern Ireland protocol row out of the way.
“The war in Ukraine has completely changed the context over the last year,” an EU diplomat said.
A second U.K. official agreed. “Suddenly we realized that the 2 percent of the EU border we’d been arguing about was nothing compared to the massive border on the other side of the EU, which Putin was threatening,” they said. “And suddenly there wasn’t any electoral benefit to keeping this row over Brexit going — either for us or for governments across the EU.”
A quick glance at the electoral calendar made it clear 2023 offered the last opportunity to reach a deal in the near future, with elections looming for both the U.K. and EU parliaments the following year — effectively putting any talks on ice.
“Rishi Sunak would have certainly been advised by his officials that come 2024, the EU is not going to be wanting to take any new significant initiatives,” Lidington said. “And we will be in election mode.”
The upcoming 25th anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday peace agreement on April 10 heaped further pressure on the U.K. negotiators, amid interest from U.S. President Joe Biden in visiting Europe to mark the occasion.
“The anniversary was definitely playing on people’s minds,” the first U.K. official said.“Does [Sunak] really want to be the prime minister when there’s no government in Northern Ireland on the anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement?”
The pressure was ramped up further when Biden specifically raised the protocol in a meeting with Truss at the U.N. General Assembly in New York in late September, after which British officials said they expected the 25th anniversary to act as a “key decision point” on the dispute.
The King and I
Whitehall faced further pressure from another unlikely source — King Charles III, who was immediately planning a state visit to Paris within weeks of ascending the throne in September 2022. Truss had suggested delaying the visit until the protocol row was resolved, according to two European diplomats.
The monarch is now expected to visit Paris and Berlin at the end of March — and although his role is strictly apolitical, few doubt he is taking a keen interest in proceedings. He has raised the protocol in recent conversations with European diplomats, showing a close engagement with the detail.
One former senior diplomat involved in several of the king’s visits said that Charles has long held “a private interest in Ireland, and has wanted to see if there was an appropriately helpful role he could play in improving relations [with the U.K].”
By calling the deal the Windsor framework and presenting it at a press conference in front of Windsor Castle, one of the king’s residences, No. 10 lent Monday’s proceedings an unmistakable royal flavor.
The king also welcomed von der Leyen for tea at the castle following the signing of the deal. A Commission spokesperson insisted their meeting was “separate” from the protocol discussion talks. Tory MPs were skeptical.
Cleverly does it
The British politician tasked with improving relations with Brussels was Foreign Secretary Cleverly, appointed by Truss last September. He immediately began exploring ways to rebuild trust with Commission Vice-President and Brexit point-man Maroš Šefčovič, the second U.K. official cited said.
His first hurdle was a perception in Brussels that the British team had sabotaged previous talks by leaking key details to U.K. newspapers and hardline Tory Brexiteers for domestic political gain. As a result, U.K. officials made a conscious effort to keep negotiations tightly sealed, a No. 10 official said.
“The relationship with Maroš improved massively when we agreed not to carry out a running commentary” on the content of the discussions, the second U.K. official added.
This meant keeping key government ministers out of the loop, including Northern Ireland Minister Steve Baker, an arch-Brexiteer who had been brought back onto the frontbench by Truss.
British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly is welcomed by European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič ahead of a meeting at the EU headquarters in Brussels on February 17, 2023 | Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty Images
The first U.K. official said Baker would have “felt the pain,” as he had little to offer his erstwhile backbench colleagues looking for guidance while negotiations progressed, “and that was a choice by No. 10.”
Cleverly and Šefčovič “spent longer than people think just trying to build rapport,” the second U.K. officialsaid, with Cleverly explaining the difficulties the protocol was raising in Northern Ireland and Šefčovič insistent that key economic sectors were in fact benefiting from the arrangement.
Cleverly also worked at the bilateral relationship with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, while Sunak made efforts to improve ties with French President Emmanuel Macron, Lidington noted.
A British diplomat based in Washington said Cleverly had provided “a breath of fresh air” after the “somewhat stiff” manner of his predecessors, Truss and the abrasive Dominic Raab.
By the Conservative party conference in early October, the general mood among EU diplomats in attendance was one of expectation. And the Birmingham jamboree did not disappoint.
Sorry is the hardest word
Baker, who had once described himself as a “Brexit hard man,” stunned Dublin by formally apologizing to the people of Ireland for his past comments, just days before technical talks between the Commission and the U.K. government were due to resume.
“I caused a great deal of inconvenience and pain and difficulty,” he said. “Some of our actions were not very respectful of Ireland’s legitimate interests. I want to put that right.”
The apology was keenly welcomed in Dublin, where Micheál Martin, the Irish prime minister at the time, called it “honest and very, very helpful.”
Irish diplomats based in the U.K. met Baker and other prominent figures from the European Research Group of Tory Euroskeptics at the party conference, where Baker spoke privately of his “humility” and his “resolve” to address the issues, a senior Irish diplomat said.
“Resolve was the keyword,” the envoy said. “If Steve Baker had the resolve to work for a transformation of relationships between Ireland and the U.K., then we thought — there were tough talks to be had — but a sustainable deal was now a possibility.”
There were other signs of rapprochement. Just a few hours after Baker’s earth-shattering apology, Truss confirmed her attendance at the inaugural meeting in Prague of the European Political Community, a new forum proposed by Macron open to both EU and non-EU countries.
Sunak at the wheel
The momentum snowballed under Sunak, who decided within weeks of becoming PM to halt the passage of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill in the House of Lords, reiterating Britain’s preference for a negotiated settlement. In exchange, the Commission froze a host of infringement proceedings taking aim at the way the U.K. was handling the protocol. This created space for talks to proceed in a more cordial environment.
An EU-U.K. agreement in early January allowed Brussels to start using a live information system detailing goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland, seen as key to unlocking a wider agreement on physical checks under the protocol.
The U.K. also agreed to conduct winter technical negotiations in Brussels, rather than alternating rounds between the EU capital and London, as was the case when Frost served as Britain’s chief negotiator.
Trust continued to build. Suddenly the Commission was open to U.K. solutions such as the “Stormont brake,” a clause giving the Northern Ireland Assembly power of veto over key protocol machinations, which British officials did not believe Brussels would accept when they first pitched them.
The Stormont brake was discussed “relatively early on,” a third U.K. official said. “Then we spent a huge amount of effort making sure nobody knew about it. It was kept the most secret of secret things.”
Yet a second EU diplomat claimed the ideas in the deal were not groundbreaking and could have been struck “years ago” if Britain had a prime minister with enough political will to solve the dispute. “None of the solutions that have been found now is revolutionary,” they said.
An ally of Johnson described the claim he was a block on progress as “total nonsense.”
The ‘unholy trinity’
Away from the media focus, a group of seasoned U.K. officials began to engage with their EU counterparts in earnest. But there was one (not so) new player in town.
Tim Barrow, a former U.K. permanent representative to the EU armed with a peerless contact book, had been an active figure in rebuilding relations with the bloc since Truss appointed him national security adviser. He acquired a more prominent role in the protocol talks after Sunak dispatched him to Brussels in January 2023, hoping EU figures would see him as “almost one of them,” another adviser to Sunak said.
Ensconced in the EU capital, Barrow and his U.K. team of negotiators took over several meeting rooms in the basement of the U.K. embassy, while staffers were ordered to keep quiet about their presence.
Besides his work on Northern Ireland trade, Barrow began to appear in meetings with EU representatives about other key issues creating friction in the EU-U.K. relationship, including discussions on migration alongside U.K. Home Secretary Suella Braverman.
Barrow “positioned himself very well,” the first EU diplomat quoted above said. “He’s very close to the prime minister — everybody in Brussels and London knows he’s got his ear. He’s very knowledgeable while very political.”
But other British officials insist Barrow’s presence was not central to driving through the deal. “He has been a figure, but not the only figure,” the U.K. adviser quoted above said. “It’s been a lot of people, actually, over quite a period of time.”
When it came to the tough, detailed technical negotiations, the burden fell on the shoulders of Mark Davies — the head of the U.K. taskforce praised for his mastery of the protocol detail — and senior civil servant and former director of the Northern Ireland Office, Brendan Threlfall.
The three formed an “unholy trinity,” as described by the first U.K. official, with each one bringing something to the table.
Davies was “a classic civil servant, an unsung hero,”the official said, while Threlfall “has good connections, good understanding” and “Tim has met all the EU interlocutors over the years.”
Sitting across the table, the EU team was led by Richard Szostak, a Londoner born to Polish parents and a determined Commission official with a great CV and an affinity for martial arts. His connection to von der Leyen was her deputy head of cabinet until recently, Stéphanie Riso, a former member of Brussels’ Brexit negotiating team who developed a reputation for competence on both sides of the debate.
Other senior figures at the U.K. Cabinet Office played key roles, including Cabinet Secretary Simon Case and senior official Sue Gray.
The latter — a legendary Whitehall enforcer who adjudicated over Johnson’s “Partygate” scandal — has a longstanding connection to Northern Ireland, famously taking a career break in the late 1980s to run a pub in Newry, where she has family links. More recently, she spent two years overseeing the finance ministry.
Gray has been spotted in Stormont at crunch points over the past six months as Northern Ireland grapples with the pain of the continued absence of an executive.
Some predict Gray could yet play a further role, in courting the Democratic Unionist Party as the agreement moves forward in the weeks ahead.
For U.K. and EU officials, the agreement struck with Brussels represented months of hard work — but for Sunak and his Cabinet colleagues, the hardest yards may yet lie ahead.
This story was updated to clarify two parts of the sourcing.
LONDON — Whisper it softly, but the Brexit endgame has arrived.
Eighteen months after Brussels and London reopened talks on the contentious Northern Ireland protocol — and more than three years after Britain actually left the EU — panicked officials on both sides of the English Channel are frantically trying to manage expectations as reports of a technical-level deal between the two sides emerge.
“They’re still in calls with the EU, but it’s literally just lawyers tidying up bits of text,” one senior British government official said Wednesday, in reference to the U.K. negotiating team. “We’re done.”
Multiple reports suggest U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak now has a draft technical deal on his desk to consider, despite a wave of both official and unofficial denials from politicians and diplomats on all sides.
“I suspect it is more the technical shape of a deal than a deal per se,” said a second person close to the talks on the U.K. side, “which might be giving them wriggle room to deny it.”
Denials of an outright agreement were still coming thick and fast Wednesday night after the Times reported that London and Brussels had indeed reached a deal on the key customs and governance disputes that have dogged talks over the protocol. Crucially — and most contentiously — its front page story suggested the EU has given ground on the role its top court will play in resolving future disputes.
Talks on smoothing the operation of the Northern Ireland protocol have been ongoing since the summer of 2021, with negotiators long targeting a deal this month, ahead of an expected visit to Ireland by U.S. President Joe Biden in April.
The protocol arrangement, agreed as part of the Brexit divorce deal, sees Northern Ireland continue to follow the EU’s customs union and single market rules, in an effort to avoid a politically-sensitive hard border with the neighboring Republic of Ireland, which remains an EU member state.
Yet Northern Ireland’s unionist politicians have long objected to the protocol, with the Democratic Unionist Party boycotting power-sharing and arguing that checks on goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland effectively separate the region from the rest of the U.K. They’re backed by critics in Sunak’s governing Conservative Party who resent the Court of Justice of the European Union’s place in protocol governance.
Officially, both sides are sticking to the script and insisting that talks continue.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told reporters Wednesday: “I’m very sorry, but I cannot give partial elements — because you never know in the very end how the package looks like.”
In Downing Street, Sunak’s official spokesperson tried to steer journalists away from what he called “speculative” reporting.
“No deal has been agreed, there is still lots of work to do on all areas, with significant gaps remaining between the U.K. and EU positions,” the spokesperson said. “Talks are ongoing on potential solutions including on goods.”
But the senior U.K. official quoted before said the message from No. 10 that negotiations are ongoing only applied at a political level.
They added: “It’s now up to politicians to decide ‘yay’ or ‘nay.’ Rishi could have further technical talks with Ursula von der Leyen and [EU Brexit point-man] Maroš Šefčovič and stuff like that, but officials are done. It’s plain as day.”
According to the second person close to the talks, Sunak has been receiving regular updates on the evolving technical shape of the deal.
“As far as I know, he hasn’t given it the green light yet,” they said. “But it is all being quite ‘secret squirrel’ in the [U.K.] Cabinet Office. So I don’t think many people will be fully in the loop.”
In Brussels and in London, EU diplomats were busy rubbishing reports of an imminent resolution, while acknowledging that information on the state of play is being kept tight. European ambassadors were briefed on Wednesday morning that a breakthrough is yet to be reached, and that the CJEU issue remains particularly tricky.
Even inside the U.K., claim and counter-claim were flying. Another British official close to the talks said it was “just wrong [that a deal] is close,” with “fundamental” issues outstanding “including making sure there isn’t a border.” They would not, the person added, “expect anything in the short term.”
One EU diplomat summed up the mood: “If somebody tells you they know what’s happening, they’re lying.”
In truth, a final agreement on Brexit has never looked so close.
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Leonie Kijewski, Esther Webber and Cristina Gallardo
BERLIN — The saga of the Chinese spy balloon has plunged relations between Washington and Beijing into fresh crisis. For European governments, that spells all kinds of trouble.
With relations worsening between the two superpowers, EU leaders seem likely to come under intensifying pressure from the White House to pick sides and join forces against China, just as they were hoping for a thaw in tricky relations with Beijing.
And then there’s the war.
Russia is preparing a major offensive in Ukraine over the next few weeks but EU diplomats fear the balloon incident risks distracting President Joe Biden’s team at exactly the moment when American support for Kyiv will be needed most.
“We never expected 2023 to be easy, but this is off to a really tough start,” one European diplomat said.
On Saturday, the U.S. shot down what it identified as a Chinese surveillance balloon off the coast of South Carolina with an air-to-air missile from an F-22 stealth fighter jet.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken indefinitely postponed a visit to Beijing that had been scheduled for this week, the first such trip planned for a U.S. cabinet-level official under Biden’s presidency.
Images of the incident have circulated in dramatic video footage on social media, taken mostly by excited onlookers cheering the theatrical show of military might.
Beijing insists the giant solar panel-powered object was a “civilian airship” that went off course while conducting “mainly meteorological” research. In response to the missile strike, the Chinese government expressed “strong dissatisfaction” and protested against the use of force by the U.S. to attack the unmanned, civilian craft. It added that it would “reserve the right to take further necessary responses.”
U.S. foreign policy, while still heavily invested in supporting Ukraine militarily, may be distracted by the sharpening clashes with Beijing. Right-wing U.S. politicians have been calling for more attention on China since Russia invaded Ukraine a year ago.
As the “U.S.-China rivalry sharpens, there will be more pressure on Europeans, whose approach to China is very diverse, to pick sides,” said Ricardo Borges de Castro, head of the Europe in the World Program at the European Policy Centre, a Brussels-based think tank. “The reality is, if the world becomes increasingly dominated by two poles — U.S. and China — the EU and Europeans will need to pick sides for as long as Europe’s security and defense depends on the U.S. umbrella.”
Russia, in the meantime, is expected to launch massive offensives in just a few weeks, when the harshest winter season comes to an end, according to Ukrainian officials.
A plane flies past the Chinese spy balloon (top right) | Nell Redmond/EPA
“Washington will be busy with Beijing for some time now,” a senior EU diplomat said on Sunday. “It’s not goodnews for the EU because Russia is still the main concern.”
Bad timing
For Europe, the incident also comes at an inconvenient moment as senior officials have been preparing to re-engage with Beijing.
The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, is understood to be making plans for a trip to Beijing in April, when he would also be expected to travel to Japan for a G7 ministerial meeting. Separately, French President Emmanuel Macron has also announced his intention to meet President Xi Jinping in the Chinese capital early this year; he would be interested in taking a top official from the European Commission to join him, according to an official with knowledge of the plans.
The latest U.S.-China flare-up “means that we would now have to be watching how badly China reacts, and whether these [planned] trips will be treated as a propaganda success by Beijing in splitting up the transatlantic ties,” a diplomat said on condition of anonymity as he was not authorized to speak on this subject.
“In the wake of the Ukraine war, the China policy coordination between both sides of the [the Atlantic is] losing steam,” said Reinhard Bütikofer, chair of the European Parliament’s delegation on relations with China. “While Washington D.C. enhances pressure against Beijing particularly on the technological front and in the Taiwan context, Brussels, Berlin and Paris show new hesitancy.”
Further complicating matters is Beijing’s apparent lack of interest in helping the West put pressure on Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine.
Worse, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal, China has emerged as the dominant supplier of dual-use goods to Russia, providing technology that Moscow’s military needs to prosecute its invasion. Chinese state-owned defense companies have shipped navigation equipment, jamming technology and fighter-jet parts to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies, according to the article.
European leaders have repeatedly warned Beijing not to aid Moscow militarily.
China’s top foreign policy official, Wang Yi, has dropped a plan to visit Brussels even though he would be traveling to Germany for the Munich Security Conference in February, two diplomats told POLITICO.
Europe’s reaction to the balloon incident was muted. The EU merely noted the U.S.’s right to defend its airspace. “Safety and protection of airspace is an issue of national security and therefore a competence, responsibility and prerogative” of the specific state or states involved, an EU spokesperson said on Sunday.
China’s Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu visited Moscow last week to reassure his Russian counterparts | Johannes Eisele/ AFP via Getty Images
Few European countries supported the Biden administration’s decision in public, highlighting a general sense of reluctance to aggravate Beijing. One of the exceptions was Estonia, where Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu, retweeting a BBC report about the balloon’s downing, said: “I support USA operation to defend its sovereignty. I fully condemn provocations jeopardising USA national security.”
Other U.S. allies did not hold back. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau praised the operation, tweeting “Canada strongly supports this action — we’ll keep working together … on our security and defense.”
South Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin, during a visit to Washington, said “I sufficiently understand the decision to postpone Secretary [Blinken]’s visit to China and I think that China should make a swift and very sincere explanation about what happened.”
Tom Tugendhat, U.K. security minister and a long-time skeptic of Beijing, called for concern over other forms of Chinese threats. “Worried about being spied on from the sky? Look at what some apps are collecting on your phone and consider your cyber security. Some risks are much closer to home,” he tweeted.
EU foreign policy in 2023 may be defined by which of these expires first: European indecision over China, or America’s appetite for providing Europe’s defense.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal has a tight two-year timetable for securing EU membership that is bound to dominate discussions at this week’s historic EU-Ukraine summit, the first to take place on Ukrainian soil.
The problem? No one within the EU thinks this is realistic.
When EU commissioners travel to Kyiv later this week ahead of Friday’s summit with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the heads of the European Commission and Council, their main task is likely to involve managing expectations.
Shmyhal himself is imposing a tough deadline. “We have a very ambitious plan to join the European Union within the next two years,” he told POLITICO. “So we expect that this year, in 2023, we can already have this pre-entry stage of negotiations,” he said.
This throws down a gauntlet to the EU establishment, which is trying to keep Ukrainian membership as a far more remote concept.
French President Emmanuel Macron said last year it could be “decades” before Ukraine joins. Even EU leaders, who backed granting Ukraine candidate status at their summit last June, privately admit that the prospect of the country actually joining is quite some years away (and may be one reason they backed the idea in the first place.) After all, candidate countries like Serbia, Turkey and Montenegro have been waiting for many years, since 1999 in Ankara’s case.
Ukraine is a conundrum for the EU. Many argue that Brussels has a particular responsibility to Kyiv. It was, after all, Ukrainians’ fury at the decision of President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of a political and economic association agreement with the EU at Russia’s behest that triggered the Maidan uprising of 2014 and set the stage for war. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen put it: Ukraine is “the only country where people got shot because they wrapped themselves in a European flag.”
Ukraine’s close allies in the EU such as Poland and the Baltic countries strongly support Kyiv’s membership push, seeing it as a democracy resisting an aggressor. Many of the EU old guard are far more wary, however, as Ukraine — a global agricultural superpower — could dilute their own powers and perks. Ukraine and Poland — with a combined population of 80 million — could team up to rival Germany as a political force in the European Council and some argue Kyiv would be an excessive drain on the EU budget.
Short-term deliverables
Friday’s summit in Kyiv — the first EU meeting of its kind to take place in an active war zone — will be about striking the right balance.
Though EU national leaders will not be in attendance, European Council officials have been busy liaising with EU member states about the final communiqué.
Some countries are insisting the statement should not stray far from the language used at the June European Council — emphasizing that while the future of Ukraine lies within the European Union, aspirant countries need to meet specific criteria. “Expectation is quite high in Kyiv, but there is a need to fulfill all the conditions that the Commission has set out. It’s a merit-based process,” said one senior EU official.
Ukraine is a conundrum for the EU. Many argue that Brussels has a particular responsibility to Kyiv | Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images
Still, progress is expected when Zelenskyy meets with von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel.
Shmyhal told POLITICO he hopes Ukraine can achieve a “substantial leap forward” on Friday, particularly in specific areas — an agreement on a visa-free regime for industrial goods; the suspension of customs duties on Ukrainian exports for another year; and “active progress” on joining the SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) payments scheme and the inclusion of Ukraine into the EU’s mobile roaming area.
“We expect progress and acceleration on our path towards signing these agreements,” he said.
Anti-corruption campaign
The hot topic — and one of the central question marks over Ukraine’s EU accession — will be Ukraine’s struggle against corruption. The deputy infrastructure minister was fired and deputy foreign minister stepped down this month over scandals related to war profiteering in public contracts.
“We need a reformed Ukraine,” said one senior EU official centrally involved in preparations for the summit. “We cannot have the same Ukraine as before the war.”
Shmyhal insisted that the Zelenskyy government is taking corruption seriously. “We have a zero-tolerance approach to corruption,” he said, pointing to the “lightning speed” with which officials were removed this month. “Unfortunately, corruption was not born yesterday, but we are certain that we will uproot corruption,” he said, openly saying that it’s key to the country’s EU accession path.
He also said the government was poised to revise its recent legislation on the country’s Constitutional Court to meet the demands of both the European Commission and the Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe. Changes could come as early as this week, ahead of the summit, Shmyhal said.
Though Ukraine has announced a reform of the Constitutional Court, particularly on how judges are appointed, the Venice Commission still has concerns about the powers and composition of the advisory group of experts, the body which selects candidates for the court. The goal is to avoid political interference.
Shmyhal said these questions will be addressed. “We are holding consultations with the European Commission to see that all issued conclusions may be incorporated into the text,” he told POLITICO.
Nonetheless, the symbolic power of this week’s summit is expected to send a strong message to Moscow about Ukraine’s European aspirations.
European Council President Michel used his surprise visit to Kyiv this month to reassure Ukraine that EU membership will be a reality for Ukraine, telling the Ukrainian Rada (parliament) that he dreams that one day a Ukrainian will hold his job as president of the European Council.
“Ukraine is the EU and the EU is Ukraine,” he said. “We must spare no effort to turn this promise into reality as fast as we can.”
The key question for Ukrainians after Friday’s meeting will be how fast the rhetoric and promises can become a reality.
The transatlantic reset between Brussels and Washington is on life support.
After four years of discord and disruption under Donald Trump, hopes were high that Joe Biden’s presidency would usher in a new era of cooperation between Europe and the U.S. after he declared: “America is back.”
But when senior officials from both sides meet in Washington on Monday for a twice-yearly summit on technology and trade, the mood will be gloomier than at any time since Trump left office.
The European Union is up in arms over Biden’s plans for hefty subsidies for made-in-America electric cars, claiming these payments, which partly kick in from January 1, are nothing more than outright trade protectionism.
At the same time, the U.S. is increasingly frustrated the 27-country bloc won’t be more aggressive in pushing back against China, accusing some European governments of caving in to Beijing’s economic might.
Those frictions are expected to overshadow the so-called EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC) summit this week. At a time when the Western alliance is seeking to maintain a show of unity and strength in the face of Russian aggression and Chinese authoritarianism, the geopolitical stakes are high.
Biden may have helped matters last Thursday, during a joint press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron, by saying he believed the two sides can still resolve some of the concerns the EU has raised.
“We’re going to continue to create manufacturing jobs in America but not at the expense of Europe,” Biden said. “We can work out some of the differences that exist, I’m confident.”
But, as ever, the details will be crucial.
It is unclear what Biden can do to stop his Buy American subsidies from hurting European car-markers, for example, many of which come from powerful member countries like France and Germany. The TTC summit offers a crucial early opportunity for the two sides to begin to rebuild trust and start to deliver on Biden’s warm rhetoric.
Judging by the TTC’s record so far, those attending, who will include U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, will have their work cut out.
More than 20 officials, policymakers and industry and society groups involved in the summit told POLITICO that the lofty expectations for the TTC have yet to deliver concrete results. Almost all of the individuals spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal deliberations.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken will be attending the TTC | Sean Gallup/Getty Images
Some officials privately accused their counterparts of broken promises, particularly on trade. Others are frustrated at a lack of progress in 10 working groups on topics like helping small businesses to digitize and tackling climate change.
“With these kinds of allies, who needs enemies?” said one EU trade diplomat when asked about tensions around upcoming U.S. electric car subsidies. A senior U.S. official working on the summit hit back: “We need the Europeans to play ball on China. So far, we haven’t had much luck.”
Much of the EU-U.S. friction is down to three letters: IRA.
Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, which provides subsidies to “Buy American” when it comes to purchasing electric vehicles, has infuriated officials in Brussels who see it as undermining the multilateral trading system and a direct threat to the bloc’s rival car industry.
“The expectation the TTC was established to provide a forum for precisely these advanced exchanges with a view to preventing trade frictions before they arise appears to have been severely frustrated,” said David Kleimann, a trade expert at the Bruegel think tank in Brussels.
Biden’s room for flexibility is limited. The context for the subsidies and tax breaks is his desire to make good on his promise to create more manufacturing jobs ahead of an expected re-election run in 2024. The U.S. itself is hovering on the edge of a possible recession.
In addition, the U.S. trade deficit with the EU hit a record $218 billion in 2021, second only to the U.S. trade deficit with China. The U.S. also ran an auto trade deficit of about $22 billion with European countries, with Germany accounting for the largest share of that.
Washington has few, if any, meaningful policy levers at its disposal to calm European anger. During a recent visit to the EU, Katherine Tai, the U.S. trade representative, urged European countries to pass their own subsidies to jumpstart Europe’s electric car production, according to three officials with knowledge of those discussions.
“It risks being the elephant in the room,” said Emily Benson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, when asked about the electric car dispute.
After a push from Brussels, there were increasing signs on Friday that the TTC could still play a role. In the latest version of the TTC’s draft declaration, obtained by POLITICO, both sides commit to addressing the European concerns over Biden’s subsidies, including via the Trade and Tech Council. Again, though, there was no detail on how Washington could resolve the issue.
Politicians across Europe are already drawing up plans to fight back against Biden’s subsidies. That may include taking the matter to the World Trade Organization, hitting the U.S. with retaliatory tariffs or passing a “Buy European Act” that would nudge EU consumers and businesses to buy locally made goods and components.
Officials and business leaders pose for a photo during the TTC in September 2021 | Pool photo by Rebecca Droke/AFP via Getty Images
Privately, Washington has not been in the mood to give ground. Speaking to POLITICO before Biden met Macron, five U.S. policymakers said the IRA was not aimed at alienating allies, stressing that the green subsidies fit the very climate change goals that Europe has long called on America to adopt.
“There’s just a huge amount to be done and more frankly to be done than the market would provide for on its own,” said a senior White House official, who was not authorized to speak on the record. “We think the Inflation Reduction Act is reflective of that type of step, but we also think there is a space here for Europe and others, frankly, to take similar steps.”
China tensions
Senior politicians attending the summit are expected to play down tensions this week when they announce a series of joint EU-U.S. projects.
These include funds for two telecommunications projects in Jamaica and Kenya and the announcement of new rules for how the emerging technology of so-called trustworthy artificial intelligence can develop. There’s also expected to be a plan for more coordination to highlight potential blockages in semiconductor supply chains, according to the draft summit statement obtained by POLITICO.
Yet even on an issue like microchips — where both Washington and Brussels have earmarked tens of billions of euros to subsidize local production — geopolitics intervenes.
For months, U.S. officials have pushed hard for their European counterparts to agree to export controls to stop high-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment being sent to China, according to four officials with knowledge of those discussions.
Washington already passed legislation to stop Chinese companies from using such American-made hardware. The White House had been eager for the European Commission to back similar export controls, particularly as the Dutch firm ASML produced equipment crucial for high-end chipmaking worldwide.
Yet EU officials preparing for the TTC meeting said such requests had never been made formally to Brussels. The draft summit communiqué makes just a passing reference to China and threats from so-called non-market economies.
Unlike the U.S., the EU remains divided on how to approach Beijing as some countries like Germany have long-standing economic ties with Chinese businesses that they are reluctant to give up. Without a consensus among EU governments, Brussels has little to offer Washington to help its anti-China push.
“In theory, the TTC is not about China, but in practice, every discussion with the U.S. is,” said one senior EU official, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “If we talk with Katherine Tai about Burger King, it has an anti-China effect.”
Gavin Bade, Clea Caulcutt, Samuel Stolton and Camille Gijs contributed reporting.
Kahmann will oversee HR responsibilities and support company culture initiatives.
Press Release –
Feb 23, 2022
KANSAS CITY, Mo., February 23, 2022 (Newswire.com)
– The Scarbrough Group proudly announces the promotion of Jennifer Kahmann to Director of People Operations. Jennifer will spearhead efforts to ensure Scarbrough continues to build on its people-first priorities with abundant resources and support for its team.
“The promotion is overdue and well-deserved,” Scarbrough Group President and COO Adam Hill said. “Jenn’s level of care and concern for her people only shows how much we need her in this role. Given Jenn’s ability to positively impact her own team, her new role will allow for that impact to be felt throughout the Scarbrough Group.”
Jennifer brings an extensive management background to her new role within People Operations. She became a Licensed Customs Broker and Certified Customs Specialist after starting with Scarbrough as an intern. Jennifer spent time with both imports and exports to eventually land a position as Senior Manager, Regional Operations. In that role, she oversaw Scarbrough International’s customs brokerage and export teams in both St. Louis and Kansas City, where she developed an in-depth understanding of people-centric management.
These experiences will support Jennifer in her role as Director of People Operations. The new position is set to help the Scarbrough Group community thrive.
“Scarbrough has always done an excellent job maintaining a culture that puts our people first,” Jennifer said. “I look forward to continuing to find ways to help our people grow and our culture flourish.”
About the Scarbrough Group
Founded in 1984, The Scarbrough Group has grown its global logistics operation one client and one employee at a time. Whether international freight forwarding, customs brokerage, domestic trucking, or warehousing, The Scarbrough Group manages supply chains differently. It remains a people-first organization with a dedication to traditional values and support for its community. Expect More™ from your logistics provider.
