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  • Ozempic Can Turn Into No-zempic

    Ozempic Can Turn Into No-zempic

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    No medication in the history of modern weight loss has inspired as much awe as the latest class of obesity drugs. Wegovy and Zepbound are so effective that they are often likened to “magic and “miracles.” Indeed, the weekly injections, which belong to a broader class known as GLP-1s, can lead to weight loss of 20 percent or more, fueling hype about a future in which many more millions of Americans take them. Major food companies including Nestlé and Conagra are considering tailoring their products to suit GLP-1 users. Underlying all this excitement is a huge assumption: They work for everyone.

    But for a lot of people, they just don’t. Anita, who lives in Arizona, told me she “took it for granted” that she would lose weight on a GLP-1 drug because “the people around me who were on it were just dropping weight like mad.” Instead, she didn’t shed any pounds. Likewise, Kathryn, from Florida, hasn’t lost any weight since starting the medication in October. “I was really hoping this was something that would be a game changer for me, but it feels like it was just a lot of wasted money,” she told me. (I’m identifying both Anita and Kathryn by their first name only to allow them to speak openly about their health issues.)

    Some people can’t tolerate the side effects of the drugs and have to stop taking them. Others simply don’t respond. For some, the strength of the dose, or length of the treatment, does not seem to make a difference. Appetites might remain robust; the “food chatter” in the brain may stay noisy. Together, both groups of less successful GLP-1 users account for a not-insignificant share of patients on these drugs—potentially up to a third. “We don’t really know why it happens, [but] we know it does happen,” Louis Aronne, an obesity-medicine specialist at Weill Cornell Medical College, told me. Despite the promise of a so-called Ozempic revolution, lots of “No-zempics” have been left behind.

    Of the two biggest reasons some people don’t lose weight on GLP-1 drugs—side effects and nonresponse—the former is much more straightforward. The GLP-1 drugs Wegovy and Zepbound (which contain the active ingredients semaglutide and tirzepatide, respectively), are known for causing potentially gnarly gastrointestinal symptoms, such as nausea and vomiting, although most people’s reactions are mild and temporary. Yet some have it far worse. Severe, albeit uncommon, side effects include pancreatitis, severe gastrointestinal distress, low blood sugar, and even hair loss, which “can push people off” the drugs, Steven Heymsfield, a professor who studies obesity at Louisiana State University, told me. In one of the biggest studies of semaglutide, encompassing more than 17,000 people over about five years, nearly 17 percent of patients discontinued the medication because of side effects.

    Far more mysterious are the people who tolerate the drugs but respond weakly to them—or sometimes not at all. Researchers have known this might happen since these drugs were in early clinical trials. About 14 percent of people who took semaglutide for obesity saw minimal impacts of less than 5 percent weight loss in one study, as did 9 to 15 percent of people who took tirzepatide in a similar one. In her own experience working with patients, “somewhere between a quarter and a third” are nonresponders, Fatima Cody Stanford, an obesity-medicine specialist at Harvard, told me, adding that it can take up to three months to determine whether the drug is working or not. That the same medication at the same dosage can lead to dramatic weight loss in one person and hardly any in another “remains confounding,” Aronne told me.

    The broad explanation is that it has something to do with genetics. The drugs work by masquerading as the appetite-suppressing hormone GLP-1 and binding to its receptor, like a key fitting into a lock. Although the lock’s overall shape is generally consistent from person to person, its nooks and crannies can vary because of genetic differences. “For some people, that key just won’t fit right,” Eduardo Grunvald, an obesity-medicine doctor at UC San Diego Health, told me. In other cases, genes may limit the effects of these drugs after they bind to GLP-1 receptors. One possibility is that people metabolize the drugs differently: Some patients may break them down too quickly for them to take effect; others may process them too slowly, potentially building up such high levels of the medications that they become toxic, Heymsfield said.

    For No-zempic patients, perhaps the most consequential impact of individual variation is on the propensity for obesity itself. “We are all very different from a genetic standpoint, in terms of our risk of weight gain,” Grunvald said. Numerous factors can drive obesity, including diet, environment, stress, and—most pertinent to GLP-1 drugs—altered brain function.

    GLP-1 drugs target a pathway that regulates appetite and insulin levels. Some cases of obesity can be caused by a disruption in that particular mechanism, in which case GLP-1s can indeed be wondrous. But “not everyone has dysfunction in this particular pathway,” Stanford said. When that is the case, the drugs won’t be very effective. A different pathway, for example, controls the absorption of fat from food; another increases energy expenditure. In these people, GLP-1s might tamp down appetite to a degree, maybe leading to some weight loss, but a different drug may be required to treat obesity at its root. “It is not all about food intake,” Stanford said.

    That’s not to say that No-zempics are out of options. They might have better success switching from one GLP-1 to the other, or even stacking them, Heymsfield said. Some patients who don’t respond to GLP-1s at all can get better results with older drugs that work on different obesity pathways, Aronne said. One, called Qysmia, a combination of the decades-old drugs phentermine and topiramate, can lead to an average weight loss of 14 percent body weight at its highest dose. If medications don’t work, bariatric surgery remains a powerful option, one that may even be growing in popularity. Last year, the number of bariatric surgeries performed in the U.S. grew despite the boom in GLP-1 usage, a trend that some expect to continue, because so many people don’t tolerate the drugs.

    The intense hype around the game-changing nature of GLP-1s makes it easy to forget that they are, in fact, just drugs. “Every drug that’s ever been made” works in some people and not in others, Heymsfield said; there’s no reason to think GLP-1s would be any different. Remembering that they are in an early stage of development has a sobering effect. Eventually, obesity drugs may leave fewer people behind. The category is expanding rapidly: By one count, more than 90 new drug candidates are in development.

    They are evolving to attack obesity from multiple fronts, which, at least in theory, widens their net of potential users. In an early study on an experimental candidate named retatrutide—called a triple agonist because it acts on GLP-1 as well as two other targets involved in obesity, GIP and glucagon receptors—100 percent of people on the highest dose lost 5 percent or more of their body weight. New candidates are also expected to have fewer side effects. They have to, Heymsfield said, because the competition is so steep that any new drug has to be “as good with less side effects, or better.”

    But no matter how good these drugs get, it’s unrealistic to think that they’ll become a one-size-fits-all treatment for everyone with obesity. The disease is simply too complex, with too many drivers, for a single type of medication to treat it. More than 200 different drugs exist for treating high blood pressure alone; in comparison, Aronne said, regulating weight is “far more complicated.” The future, rife with options, holds promise that No-zempics may find a way forward. Yet considering all the unknowns about obesity and what causes it, that may not be enough to guarantee that they will see the results they want.

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    Yasmin Tayag

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  • The Israeli Crisis Is Testing Biden’s Core Foreign-Policy Claim

    The Israeli Crisis Is Testing Biden’s Core Foreign-Policy Claim

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    President Joe Biden’s core foreign-policy argument has been that his steady engagement with international allies can produce better results for America than the impulsive unilateralism of his predecessor Donald Trump. The eruption of violence in Israel is testing that proposition under the most difficult circumstances.

    The initial reactions of Biden and Trump to the attack have produced exactly the kind of personal contrast Biden supporters want to project. On Tuesday, Biden delivered a powerful speech that was impassioned but measured in denouncing the Hamas terror attacks and declaring unshakable U.S. support for Israel. Last night, in a rambling address in Florida, Trump praised the skill of Israel’s enemies, criticized Israel’s intelligence and defense capabilities, and complained that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had tried to claim credit for a U.S. operation that killed a top Iranian general while Trump was president.

    At this somber moment, Trump delivered exactly the sort of erratic, self-absorbed performance that his critics have said make him unreliable in a crisis. Trump’s remarks seemed designed to validate what Senator Chris Murphy, a Democrat from Connecticut who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee that focuses on the Middle East, had told me in an interview a few hours before the former president’s speech. “This is the most delicate moment in the Middle East in decades,” Murphy said. “The path forward to negotiate this hostage crisis, while also preventing other fronts from opening up against Israel, necessitates A-plus-level diplomacy. And you obviously never saw C-plus-level diplomacy from Trump.”

    The crisis is highlighting more than the distance in personal demeanor between the two men. Two lines in Biden’s speech on Tuesday point toward the policy debate that could be ahead in a potential 2024 rematch over how to best promote international stability and advance America’s interests in the world.

    Biden emphasized his efforts to coordinate support for Israel from U.S. allies within and beyond the region. And although Biden did not directly urge Israel to exercise “restraint” in its ongoing military operations against Hamas, he did call for caution. Referring to his conversation with Netanyahu, Biden said, “We also discussed how democracies like Israel and the United States are stronger and more secure when we act according to the rule of law.” White House officials acknowledged this as a subtle warning that the U.S. was not giving Israel carte blanche to ignore civilian casualties as it pursues its military objectives in Gaza.

    Both of Biden’s comments point to crucial distinctions between his view and Trump’s of the U.S. role in the world. Whereas Trump relentlessly disparaged U.S. alliances, Biden has viewed them as an important mechanism for multiplying America’s influence and impact—by organizing the broad international assistance to Ukraine, for instance. And whereas Trump repeatedly moved to withdraw the U.S. from international institutions and agreements, Biden continues to assert that preserving a rules-based international order will enhance security for America and its allies.

    Even more than in 2016, Trump in his 2024 campaign is putting forward a vision of a fortress America. In almost all of his foreign-policy proposals, he promises to reduce American reliance on the outside world. He has promised to make the U.S. energy independent and to “implement a four-year plan to phase out all Chinese imports of essential goods and gain total independence from China.” Like several of his rivals for the 2024 GOP nomination, Trump has threatened to launch military operations against drug cartels in Mexico without approval from the Mexican government. John Bolton, one of Trump’s national security advisers in the White House, has said he believes that the former president would seek to withdraw from NATO in a second term. Walls, literal and metaphorical, remain central to Trump’s vision: He says that, if reelected, he’ll finish his wall across the Southwest border, and last weekend he suggested that the Hamas attack was justification to restore his ban on travel to the U.S. from several Muslim-majority nations.

    Biden, by contrast, maintains that America can best protect its interests by building bridges. He’s focused on reviving traditional alliances, including extending them into new priorities such as “friend-shoring.” He has also sought to engage diplomatically even with rival or adversarial regimes, for instance, by attempting to find common ground with China over climate change.

    These differences in approach likely will be muted in the early stages of Israel’s conflict with Hamas. Striking at Islamic terrorists is one form of international engagement that still attracts broad support from Republican leaders. And in the Middle East, Biden has not diverged from Trump’s strategy as dramatically as in other parts of the world. After Trump severely limited contact with the Palestinian Authority, Biden has restored some U.S. engagement, but the president hasn’t pushed Israel to engage in full-fledged peace negotiations, as did his two most recent Democratic predecessors, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. Instead, Biden has continued Trump’s efforts to normalize relations between Israel and surrounding Sunni nations around their common interest in countering Shiite Iran. (Hamas’s brutal attack may have been intended partly to derail the ongoing negotiations among the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia that represent the crucial next stage of that project.) Since the attack last weekend, Trump has claimed that Hamas would not have dared to launch the incursion if he were still president, but he has not offered any substantive alternative to Biden’s response.

    Yet the difference between how Biden and Trump approach international challenges is likely to resurface before this crisis ends. Even while trying to construct alliances to constrain Iran, Biden has also sought to engage the regime through negotiations on both its nuclear program and the release of American prisoners. Republicans have denounced each of those efforts; Trump and other GOP leaders have argued, without evidence, that Biden’s agreement to allow Iran to access $6 billion in its oil revenue held abroad provided the mullahs with more leeway to fund terrorist groups like Hamas. And although both parties are now stressing Israel’s right to defend itself, if Israel does invade Gaza, Biden will likely eventually pressure Netanyahu to stop the fighting and limit civilian losses well before Trump or any other influential Republican does.

    Murphy points toward another distinction: Biden has put more emphasis than Trump on fostering dialogue with a broad range of nations across the region. Trump’s style “was to pick sides, and that meant making enemies and adversaries unnecessarily; that is very different from Biden’s” approach, Murphy told me. “We don’t know whether anyone in the region right now can talk sense into Hamas,” Murphy said, “but this president has been very careful to keep lines of communication open in the region, and that’s because he knows through experience that moments can come, like this, where you need all hands on deck and where you need open lines to all the major players.”

    In multiple national polls, Republican and Democratic voters now express almost mirror-image views on whether and how the U.S. should interact with the world. For the first time in its annual polling since 1974, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs this year found that a majority of Republicans said the U.S. would be best served “if we stay out of world affairs,” according to upcoming results shared exclusively with The Atlantic. By contrast, seven in 10 Democrats said that the U.S. “should take an active part in world affairs.”

    Not only do fewer Republicans than Democrats support an active role for the U.S. in world affairs, but less of the GOP wants the U.S. to compromise with allies when it does engage. In national polling earlier this year by the nonpartisan Pew Research Center, about eight in 10 Democrats said America should take its allies’ interests into account when dealing with major international issues. Again in sharp contrast, nearly three-fifths of GOP partisans said the U.S. instead “should follow its own interests.”

    As president, Trump both reflected and reinforced these views among Republican voters. Trump withdrew the U.S. from the World Health Organization, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Paris climate accord, and the nuclear deal with Iran that Obama negotiated, while also terminating Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks. Biden effectively reversed all of those decisions. He rejoined both the Paris Agreement and the WHO on his first days in office, and he brought the U.S. back into the Human Rights Council later in 2021. Although Biden did not resuscitate the TPP specifically, he has advanced a successor agreement among nations across the region called the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Biden has also sought to restart negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, though with little success.

    Peter Feaver, a public-policy and political-science professor at Duke University, told me he believes that Trump wasn’t alone among U.S. presidents in complaining that allies were not fully pulling their weight. What makes Trump unique, Feaver said, is that he didn’t see the other side of the ledger. “Most other presidents recognized, notwithstanding our [frustrations], it is still better to work with allies and that the U.S. capacity to mobilize a stronger, more action-focused coalition of allies than our adversaries could was a central part of our strength,” said Feaver, who served as a special adviser on the National Security Council for George W. Bush. “That’s the thing that Trump never really understood: He got the downsides of allies, but not the upsides. And he did not realize you do not get any benefits from allies if you approach them in the hyper-transactional style that he would do.”

    Biden, Feaver believes, was assured an enthusiastic reception from U.S. allies because he followed the belligerent Trump. But Biden’s commitment to restoring alliances, Feaver maintains, has delivered results. “There’s no question in my mind that Biden got better results from the NATO alliance [on Ukraine] in the first six months than the Trump team would have done,” Feaver said.

    As the Middle East erupts again, the biggest diplomatic hurdle for Biden won’t be marshaling international support for Israel while it begins military operations; it will be sustaining focus on what happens when they end, James Steinberg, the dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, told me. “The challenge here is how do you both reassure Israel and send an unmistakably tough message to Hamas and Iran without leading to an escalation in this crisis,” said Steinberg, who served as deputy secretary of state for Obama and deputy national security adviser for Clinton. “That’s where the real skill will come: Without undercutting the strong message of deterrence and support for Israel, can they figure out a way to defuse the crisis? Because it could just get worse, and it could widen.”

    In a 2024 rematch, the challenge for Biden would be convincing most Americans that his bridges can keep them safer than Trump’s walls. In a recent Gallup Poll, Americans gave Republicans a 22-percentage-point advantage when asked which party could keep the nation safe from “international terrorism and military threats.” Republicans usually lead on that measure, but the current advantage was one of the GOP’s widest since Gallup began asking the question, in 2002.

    This new crisis will test Biden on exceedingly arduous terrain. Like Clinton and Obama, Biden has had a contentious relationship with Netanyahu, who has grounded his governing coalition in the far-right extremes of Israeli politics and openly identified over the years with the GOP in American politics. In this uneasy partnership with Netanyahu, Biden must now juggle many goals: supporting the Israeli prime minister, but also potentially restraining him, while avoiding a wider war and preserving his long-term goal of a Saudi-Israeli détente that would reshape the region. It is exactly the sort of complex international puzzle that Biden has promised he can manage better than Trump. This terrible crucible is providing the president with another opportunity to prove it.

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    Ronald Brownstein

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