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Tag: Bank of Israel

  • Foreign workers replace Palestinian labor in Israel, face hurdles

    Restructuring of work permits and recruitment policies is reshaping construction, agriculture, and services while raising concerns about long-term economic and social effects.

    After more than two years of war, Israel’s labor market is feeling the consequences, undergoing a striking transformation as longstanding employment patterns are reshaped by new policies, security developments, and shifting economic needs.

    One result of the war has been a sharp reduction in the number of Palestinian laborers permitted to enter Israel. Previously, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were allowed to work in Israel. That figure has fallen as Israel cites major security concerns and a push to wean itself from reliance on Palestinian workers.

    In response, authorities have expanded the entry of foreign workers, altering the composition of the workforce.

    For decades, Palestinian workers, mainly from areas in the West Bank controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA), but also from Gaza, filled a large share of low-paid jobs in agriculture and construction.

    They worked through permits allocated and issued by Israel’s Population and Immigration Authority (PIBA) and by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, the military unit responsible for implementing the government’s civilian and humanitarian efforts in the territories.

    An illustrative image of Palestinian laborers working on a construction project in Israel. (credit: Menahem Kahana/AFP via Getty Images)

    According to Kav LaOved, a nongovernmental organization focused on protecting workers’ rights in Israel, roughly 100,000 Palestinians were employed in Israel. Since October 2023, the entry of Palestinian workers has been cut to about 8,000, driven by heightened security restrictions and political tensions that have disrupted the labor market and major sectors such as construction.

    Data published by PIBA last week showed that almost 61,000 new work permits were issued to foreign workers in 2025 in an attempt to fill the widening labor gap, bringing the total number of foreign workers to 227,044.

    This new migrant workforce is employed not only in construction and agriculture, the traditional sectors of non-Israeli labor, but also increasingly in caregiving, trade, services, and renovation, roles previously held by Palestinian workers.

    Israelis have long been reluctant to fill many of these positions. Part of that reluctance stems from the high cost of living and the preference among many Israelis for higher-paying jobs over lower-paid occupations in sectors now staffed by foreign workers.

    A government decision in May 2024 sought to increase the number of foreign workers, raising the quota to 3.3% of the country’s population. For now, a shortfall of 100,000 workers remains.

    According to Moshe Nakash, director of the Foreign Workers Administration at PIBA, that quota could still rise.

    “There are large numbers of workers coming into Israel in an effort to fill the different quotas of each sector,” Nakash told The Media Line. “This is part of a great effort on our part to close the gap.”

    The recalibration of the workforce has been most acute in sectors heavily reliant on manual labor. Construction firms, already grappling with staffing shortages, are taking advantage of the influx of foreign workers. At the same time, restaurants and manufacturing have begun tapping into foreign labor quotas.

    But while foreign labor alleviates immediate staffing shortages, it also adds complexity to wage dynamics and labor-rights enforcement in a market still reeling from conflict-related disruptions.

    “What we are seeing is no less than a structural change of the labor market, and decision makers must understand the meaning of this,” Dror Litvak, CEO of ManpowerGroup Israel, told The Media Line. “This is not some temporary event and could eventually lead to a rise in unemployment amongst Israelis.”

    BOI: Unemployment in Israel at 2.9%

    Unemployment in Israel currently stands at 2.9%, according to figures published by the Bank of Israel.

    Litvak noted: “If someone thinks that unemployment will remain low, they are mistaken. Foreigners are already occupying positions previously occupied by Israelis.”

    Hamas’ surprise attack and the subsequent war shook Israel to its core. In the labor market, that upheaval left decision makers and employers scrambling for solutions. One key response has been not only to increase the number of foreign workers admitted into the country, but also to expand the sectors in which they are permitted to work.

    “Decision makers are not looking at the long term, and they are trying to put the fires out,” said Litvak. “This will create a completely different reality.”

    Litvak does not see Palestinian laborers being allowed back into Israel in the coming decade.

    For Palestinian workers, their families, and the Palestinian economy, this is a major blow.

    “This is creating a major financial and social crisis that is politically motivated and not based on clear-cut security reasons,” Shai Grunberg, a spokesperson for Gisha, an Israeli NGO that focuses on freedom of movement for Palestinians, told The Media Line.

    Even before the war, the far-right Israeli government pushed to adopt policies that would sever ties with the PA. The outbreak of the war only intensified those calls.

    Some Israeli security officials have called for Palestinian work permits to be reinstated to prevent a major crisis in the PA. The government has not acted on those calls.

    For now, workers from Thailand and Sri Lanka are stocking supermarket shelves and cleaning the streets. Employers say they are satisfied with the new labor supply.

    Litvak also raised concerns about the employment conditions of the new workers.

    “Israel is at risk of creating a slave market rather than a job market,” he said. “The conditions that some of the workers live in are worse than Israeli prisoners, and in the end, this will create even greater problems.”

    In a separate move that has alarmed international aid agencies and the United Nations, Israel has begun a sweeping regulatory overhaul that would drastically affect the work of foreign humanitarian NGOs in Gaza and the West Bank.

    Under new rules enforced from the beginning of 2026, more than 30 organizations face license suspension unless they comply with stringent transparency and registration requirements, including detailed disclosure of Palestinian staff and funding sources.

    Israel will no longer allow NGOs to bring supplies into Gaza or send international staffers into the war-torn territory.

    “The most acute consequence will be to the ability of the civilian population in Gaza to survive,” said Grunberg. “Since the beginning of the war, Israel has hindered the work of the NGOs, and this new mechanism, with its disproportionate and draconian measures, will deal a severe blow to essential health services in Gaza.”

    Proponents within the Israeli government maintain that the measures are needed to prevent exploitation of aid by Palestinian terrorist groups.

    Citing security concerns, the government is determined to implement the policy despite international condemnation. Coupled with tighter control of Palestinian movement and the drastic reduction in Palestinian laborers, Israel appears to be seeking to sever as many connections as possible to Palestinians and the PA.

    “These are different expressions of the same political rationale by which further control over Palestinians and their movements has a greater impact on the civilian population in the West Bank and Gaza,” said Grunberg. “This is a policy that is intended to bring about the falling apart of the fabric of Palestinian life.”

    The reality emerging is not merely a wartime adjustment, but what appears to be a fundamental shift in Israel’s labor market. The rapid replacement of Palestinian workers with foreign labor, alongside tighter restrictions on humanitarian actors, reflects a policy of breaking away from dependence on Palestinian labor, with far-reaching consequences.

    While these measures may ease immediate economic pressures, they risk creating new vulnerabilities, straining labor standards, deepening the crisis in an already struggling Palestinian economy, and potentially fueling greater instability over time.

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  • Turkey’s ‘big move’ of cutting economic ties with Israel probably won’t last

    Turkey has suspended trade and airspace access to Israel, but past patterns suggest rhetoric may outpace impact as Israel adapts and Ankara weighs its own costs.

    Turkey announced Friday that it is cutting all economic and commercial ties with Israel. Turkish ports would be closed to Israeli vessels. Turkish ships will be barred from Israeli harbors. Israeli aircraft will not be allowed in Turkish airspace.

    Many hours after the announcement, Turkish diplomatic sources said that the closure of airspace only applies to official Israeli government planes as well as aircraft carrying weapons to Israel, and not to civilian flights. Still, the Turkish government has yet to make an official announcement regarding this clarification.

    The measures mark a sharp escalation in already tense relations, though experience shows Ankara’s declarations often sound tougher than their actual impact.

    The question is not whether these measures sting in the short term, but whether they will endure or materially change the balance between the two countries. Israel has navigated Turkish restrictions before, with more noise than bite. The country’s diversified supply chains and its habit of building redundancies give it room to maneuver.

    Consider the numbers. In 2023, two-way trade was roughly $7 billion. Turkish exports to Israel accounted for about six percent of Israel’s total imports, and Israeli exports to Turkey were in the range of $1.5-$1.6 billion.

    Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan poses with Hisar medium air defense surface-to-air missile system and Siper high to medium air defense surface-to-air missile system ,during a ceremony at Aselsan Golbasi Campus in Ankara, Turkey, August 27, 2025. (credit: Murat Kula/Presidential Press Office/Handout)

    When Ankara tightened the screws, the Bank of Israel stated that the economy’s “open” structure helped mitigate the shock and that the impact on imports and prices was limited. In other words, Israel found substitutes at a rapid pace, including for sensitive inputs such as cement.

    Enforcement has also proved inconsistent. “Sweeping” proclamations in 2024 were followed by reports of goods moving via third countries. Reuters reported that Turkish exporters with firm orders quickly explored routes through hubs such as Greece, Bulgaria, or Romania once the ban hit.

    A Reuters data graphic later highlighted a jump in recorded exports to the Palestinian territories, raising questions about whether some goods were still reaching Israel after transshipment.

    Even during the boycott period, practice diverged from politics in surprising ways. As the Post reported in August 2024, “IDF bases are powered by [a] Turkish-owned plant,” an awkward reminder that business realities, long-term contracts, and infrastructure ties rarely stop on a dime. That dissonance is not an argument for complacency; it is a reason to treat Ankara’s latest move as pressure, not permanence.

    Erdogan makes bold statements, weak actions

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rhetoric has consistently escalated alongside these steps, often framing Israel in apocalyptic terms to satisfy domestic politics and regional positioning. Yet the economic and diplomatic calculus points in another direction.

    Turkey remains a NATO member that depends on Western markets and investment. A prolonged freeze on all Israel-related trade, shipping, and overflight would also exact costs on Turkish producers who value access to Israel’s consumer market and to Israeli technology and services.

    The rivalry is part of a wider competition that stretches from the eastern Mediterranean to northern Syria. In April, the Post reported that Israel and Turkey were exploring a “deconfliction mechanism in Syria,” with the aim to “prevent friction” as both operate in the same battle space. A companion analysis argued that such a channel is necessary given the pace of Israeli air activity and Ankara’s ambitions to shape Syria’s future.

    What should Israel do now? First, keep the temperature low and the logistics nimble. Importers have already diversified toward Europe and Asia. The government should accelerate regulatory smoothing for substitute suppliers, monitor spot prices for key materials, and publish regular updates on supply chains to reassure consumers and builders alike.

    Second, treat the embargo as a strategic lesson, not just an inconvenience. Reducing single-country dependencies is prudent, and the last year has shown that private ingenuity, combined with clear government signals, can close gaps.

    Third, maintain focus on the strategic theater where miscalculation would be most costly. If there is a real channel to coordinate in Syria, Israel should test it, carefully and quietly, with clear redlines. This does not mean normalizing relations with Ankara on Turkey’s terms – it means minimizing operational risk where both sides already operate, while continuing to expose and counter Turkish support for actors that threaten Israeli security.

    In the near term, expect more drama than transformation. Turkey may enforce the new measures tightly for weeks or months; a complete and enduring rupture is unlikely. Turkish products can still reach Israel through third-party hubs, and Israeli buyers will lean harder on alternate suppliers, which reduces Ankara’s leverage over time.

    The smart bet is that, after the shouting, practice will again creep ahead of proclamation.

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