BELFAST — First its government collapsed. Then austerity began to bite. Now fresh elections are set to be cancelled, and tens of thousands of workers are going on strike.
This is Northern Ireland in 2024 — a land of political deadlock, public sector cuts and mass labor unrest, with neither British ministers in London nor local powerbrokers the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) willing to do what is needed to restore a coherent government in this ever-divided corner of the United Kingdom.
Nearly two years after the DUP first sabotaged the Northern Ireland Executive — the cross-community government at the heart of the region’s decades-old peace process — its leadership appears no closer to ending its boycott on cooperation with Sinn Féin. The Irish republicans overtook their DUP opponents as the most popular party at the last Stormont election in May 2022, but have been waiting ever since to lead a government under a power-sharing system the DUP refuses to revive.
Similarly unwilling to fill the political vacuum is Northern Ireland Secretary Chris Heaton-Harris, who refuses to resume “direct rule” from Westminster. Northern Ireland was governed directly from London through most of its decades of bloodshed during the 20th century, and through a previous collapse of powersharing at Stormont between 2002-07.
At least partly filling the vacuum over the past year have been Northern Ireland’s senior civil servants, abandoned to run their country without the help of elected politicians. They protest they lack both the power and democratic mandate to make essential spending and cost-cutting decisions — a weakness that has left public services to wither from within.
This long-running crisis has triggered months of labor unrest, finally reducing Northern Ireland to a standstill on Thursday as 16 unions staged the region’s first coordinated mass strike in a half-century. It may not be the last.
“This is a campaign we will continue,” said Gerry Murphy of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. “This is a campaign we will win.”
Labor pains
More than 170,000 workers — nearly a fifth of the entire workforce — shut down schools, transport links, non-emergency healthcare and almost all government-funded services on Thursday in a mass demand for long-withheld pay raises.
The promised salary hikes were secured in principle years ago as part of wider U.K. labor agreements, but most of this money has yet to reach paychecks and pensions in Northern Ireland because the relevant Stormont ministers aren’t in office. In their absence, the U.K. Treasury is withholding the required funds.
That was supposed to change as part of a conditional funding package that Heaton-Harris presented to local parties last month in a bid to break the DUP logjam. If Democratic Unionist leader Jeffrey Donaldson agreed to lead his party back to Stormont, Heaton-Harris announced, the U.K. would provide £3.3 billion in exceptional financial supports to make the relaunch of power-sharing a success. Included in the package: £584 million for the outstanding pay claims.
But to the exasperation of other parties, and despite Donaldson’s own efforts to telegraph a coming move, the DUP leader failed to persuade his most powerful deputies to grasp the offer as a moment for compromise.
Donaldson since has insisted that talks with U.K. government officials will drag out indefinitely until the DUP wins further concessions on Northern Ireland’s complex post-Brexit trading arrangements, which unionists fear are pushing the economy toward a united Ireland.
The DUP leader failed to persuade his most powerful deputies to grasp the offer as a moment for compromise | Charles McQuillan/Getty Images
Indeed, dangling billions in front of the DUP seems only to have backfired. Heaton-Harris has repeatedly said the £3.3 billion will not be forthcoming until the DUP returns to Stormont — a condition that both British unionists and Irish nationalists have denounced as blackmail.
Mass unrest
Reflecting that anger, tens of thousands of striking workers braved freezing conditions on Thursday to march in central Belfast, Londonderry and Enniskillen, venting their anger and demanding their salaries be boosted to the levels of their professional peers in England, Scotland and Wales.
As one example, they cited how a newly qualified teacher in Northern Ireland earns around £24,000 a year, versus £30,000 elsewhere in the U.K. Official U.K. statistics indicate that public sector workers in Northern Ireland have seen the value of their incomes fall by 11 percent in real terms during the past two years of government collapse.
Heaton-Harris, an arch Brexiteer who was appointed to the post by ex-PM Liz Truss during her brief Downing Street reign, has struggled to find any pressure point that works on Donaldson, whose DUP is frequently cited as the most stubborn political party in Europe.
Heaton-Harris’ most common threat — to call an early election for Stormont — has proved particularly absurd because it would potentially help the DUP. Donaldson would hope to claw back ground lost to politicians representing the moderate middle ground, who did unusually well in the 2022 vote.
Indeed, the prospect of fresh elections is one reason why Donaldson keeps playing for time. Accepting a deal now — and so accepting the current post-Brexit trade arrangements are here to stay — would likely split his party and drive support toward Traditional Unionist Voice, an even harder-line unionist rival that rejects working with Sinn Féin in all circumstances.
Reflecting that anger, tens of thousands of striking workers braved freezing conditions on Thursday to march in central Belfast | Paul Faith/AFP via Getty Images
And so the stasis — and the misery — looks set to continue.
The unions behind Thursday’s mass strike have vowed to conduct a rolling series of similar protests until Heaton-Harris untethers their pay demands from any proposed DUP sweetheart deal.
But Heaton-Harris looks poised to kick the Stormont can down the road yet again, meaning Northern Ireland’s public services keep suffering via piecemeal funding half-measures.
The minister is expected to unveil emergency legislation next week that gives both himself, and Northern Ireland’s permanent secretaries, a new “hybrid” mix of powers and responsibilities over the region.
But a former permanent secretary who oversaw the Brexit process in Northern Ireland, Andrew McCormick, said Heaton-Harris’ mismanagement of the situation to date meant neither the Stormont mandarins nor the secretary of state himself “have a legal basis for the strategic decisions that are needed. The government can and should change course as a matter of urgency. Abdication is not acceptable.”
The legislation also is expected to delay, once again, the legally required date for the next Stormont election to early 2025 — by which time a U.K.-wide general election will likely have ended the Conservative government’s 14-year reign and turned Northern Ireland into a problem for the British Labour Party.
BERLIN — Germans gave the world schadenfreude for a reason. And southern Europe couldn’t be more pleased.
For countries that spent years on the receiving end of Europe’s German-inspired fiscal Inquisition, there’s no sweeter sight than to see Germany splayed on the high altar of Teutonic parsimony.
The irony is that Germany put itself there on purpose and has no clue how it will find redemption.
A jaw-dropping constitutional court ruling earlier this month effectively rendered the core of the German government’s legislative agenda null and void left the country in a collective shock. In order to circumvent Germany’s self-imposed deficit strictures, which give governments little room to spend more than they collect in taxes, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s coalition relied on a network of “special funds” outside the main budget. Scholz was convinced the government could tap the money without violating the so-called debt brake.
The court, in no uncertain terms, disagreed. The ruling raises questions about the government’s ability to access a total of €869 billion parked outside the federal budget in 29 “special funds.” The court’s move forced the government to both freeze new spending and put approval of next year’s budget on hold.
Nearly two weeks after the decision, both the magnitude of the ruling and the reality that there’s no easy way out have become increasingly clear. Though Scholz has promised to come up with a new plan “very quickly,” few see a resolution without imposing austerity.
The expectation in the Bundestag is that Scholz will find enough cuts to deal with the immediate €20 billion hole the decision created in next year’s budget, but not much more.
In the meantime, his government is on edge. While Economy Minister Robert Habeck, a Green, has been telling any microphone he can find that Germany’s economic future is hanging in the balance, Finance Minister Christian Lindner has triggered panic and confusion by announcing a series of ill-defined spending freezes.
On Thursday, the government was forced to deny a report that a special fund created to bolster Germany’s armed forces after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine would be affected by the cuts.
At a press conference with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni late Wednesday, Scholz endured the humiliation of a reporter asking his guest whether she considered Germany to be a reliable partner given its budget crisis. A magnanimous Meloni, whose country knows a thing or two about creative accounting, gave Scholz a shot in the arm, responding that in her experience he was “very reliable.”
Greek accounting
Between the lines, the justices of Germany’s constitutional court suggested the use of the shadow funds by Scholz’s coalition amounted to a bookkeeping sleight of hand — the same sort of accounting alchemy Berlin upbraided Greece for more than a decade ago. Perhaps unwittingly, the court ruling echoed then-Chancellor Angela Merkel’s unsolicited advice to Athens during Greece’s debt crisis: “Now is the time to do the homework!”
For eurozone countries with a recent history of debt trouble — a group that alongside Greece includes the likes of Spain, Portugal and Italy — Germany’s financial pickle must feel like déjà vu all over again. From 2010 onwards, they found themselves in the unenviable position of trying to explain to Wolfgang Schäuble, Merkel’s taskmaster finance minister, how they planned to return to the path of fiscal rectitude. At Schäuble’s urging, Greece nearly ditched the euro altogether.
The expectation in the Bundestag is that Scholz will find enough cuts to deal with the immediate €20 billion hole the decision created in next year’s budget, but not much more | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images
In recent months, Germany has once again assumed the role of the fiscal scold in Brussels, where officials have been negotiating a new framework for the eurozone’s rulebook on government spending, known as the Stability and Growth Pact. The pact, which dates to 1997, has been suspended since the pandemic hit, but it is set to take effect again next year. Many countries want to loosen the rules given the huge budget pressures that have followed multiple crises in recent years. Berlin is open to reform but skeptical of granting its fellow euro countries too much leeway on spending.
The latest budget mess certainly won’t help the Germans make their case.
Simple hubris
The allure of the strategy the court has now deemed illegal was that the government thought it could spend money it salted away in the special funds without violating Germany’s constitutional debt brake, which restricts the federal deficit to 0.35 percent of GDP, except in times of emergency.
Put simply, Scholz’s coalition wanted to have its cake and eat it too, creating a veneer of fiscal discipline while spending freely to finance an ambitious agenda.
Despite ample warning from legal experts that the government’s plan to repurpose a huge chunk of emergency pandemic-related funds might not withstand a court challenge, Scholz and his partners went ahead anyway. What’s more, they staked their entire political agenda on the assumption that the strategy would go off without a hitch.
Last week’s court decision is the national equivalent of a rich kid being cut off from his trust fund: Daddy’s money is still there, but junior can’t touch it and has to exchange his Porsche for an Opel.
What many in Berlin cite as the main reason for what they are calling derSchlamassel (fiasco), however, is simple hubris.
Scholz’s mild-mannered public persona belies a know-it-all approach to governing. A lawyer by training who has served for decades in the top ranks of German government, Scholz, at least in his own mind, is generally the smartest person in the room.
During coalition negotiations in 2021, Scholz sold the budget trick idea to his future partners — the conservative liberal Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens — as a way to square the circle between the welfare agenda of his own Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens’ expensive climate agenda, and the FDP’s demands for fiscal rigor (or at least the appearance thereof).
Indeed, it’s doubtful the coalition would have ever been formed in the first place without the plan. The Greens and FDP happily went along; after all Scholz, Germany’s finance minister from 2018-2021, knew what he was doing. Or so they thought.
Finance minister or ‘fuck-up’?
Scholz’s role notwithstanding, his successor as finance minister, FDP leader Christian Lindner, shares a lot of the responsibility for the snafu, for the simple reason that it was his ministry that oversaw the strategy.
During the coalition talks in 2021, Lindner was torn between a desire to govern and the fiscal strictures long championed by his party. Scholz offered him what appeared to be an elegant way to do both.
Scholz’s role notwithstanding, his successor as finance minister, FDP leader Christian Lindner, shares a lot of the responsibility for the snafu | Sean Gallup/Getty Images
When Lindner, who had never served in an executive government role before, was poised to secure the finance ministry, some critics questioned his qualifications to lead the financial affairs of Europe’s largest economy.
Many Germans have no doubt made their determinations in recent weeks.
Green machine
In contrast to the FDP, the Greens, had no qualms about endorsing Scholz’s bookkeeping tricks.
When it comes to realizing the Greens’ environmental goals, the ends have long justified the means.
In the early 2000s, for example, party leaders sold Germans on the idea of switching off the country’s nuclear plants and transitioning to renewables. They won the argument by promising that the subsidies consumers would be forced to finance to pay for the rollout of solar and wind power wouldn’t cost more every month than a “scoop of ice cream.”
In the end, the collective annual bill for German households was €25 billion, enough to have cornered the global ice cream market many times over.
The Greens’ ice cream strategy — secure difficult-to-reverse legislative commitments and worry about the financial details later — also informed their approach to what they call the “social, ecological transformation,” a plan to make Germany’s economy carbon neutral.
That’s why the shock of the court decision has hit the Greens hardest. After more than 15 years in opposition, the Greens saw the alliance with Scholz and Lindner as the culmination of their effort to convince Germans to embrace their ecological vision for the future. Just as the hoped-for revolution was within reach, it has slipped from their grasp.
Habeck, the face of the Green transformation, has looked like a man at his wits’ end in recent days, making dire predictions about the coming economic Armageddon.
“This marks a turning point for both the German economy and the job market,” Habeck told German public television this week, predicting that it would become much more difficult for the country to maintain the level of prosperity it has enjoyed for decades.
Road to perdition
For all his candor, Habeck failed to address the elephant in the room: It’s a fake debt crisis.
There is no objective reason for Germany to be in this dilemma. A best-of-class credit rating means Berlin can borrow money on better terms than almost any country on the planet. With a budget deficit of 2.6 percent of GDP last year and a total debt load amounting to 66 percent of GDP, Germany is also well above average compared to its eurozone peers in terms of fiscal discipline — even counting the debt raised for the special funds.
The only reason Germany can’t spend the money in the special funds is not because it can’t afford to, but rather because it remains beholden to an almost religious fiscal orthodoxy that views deficit debt as the road to perdition.
That conviction prompted Germany to anchor the so-called debt brake in its constitution in 2009, thereby allowing the government to run only a minor deficit, barring a natural disaster or other emergency, such as a war.
For eurozone countries with a recent history of debt trouble — a group that alongside Greece includes the likes of Spain, Portugal and Italy — Germany’s financial pickle must feel like déjà vu all over again | Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images
The constitutional amendment passed by a comfortable margin with broad support from both the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the SPD, which shared power in a grand coalition led by Merkel. At the time, Germany was still recovering from the shock triggered by the 2008 collapse of investment bank Lehman Brothers and had to commit billions to shore up its banking sector.
The country’s federal government and states had begun planning a reform of fiscal rules even before the crisis. The emergency gave them additional impetus to pursue a debt brake enshrined in the constitution as a way to restore public trust.
In that respect, it worked as planned. As countries such as Greece and Spain struggled with their public finances in the years that followed, Germany’s debt brake looked prescient.
Even as southern Europe struggled, the German economy went into high gear powered by strong demand for its wares from Asia and North America, allowing the government to not just balance its budget but to run a string of surpluses, peaking in 2018 with a €58 billion windfall.
Goodbye to all that
The good times ended with the pandemic. Germany, along with the rest of the world, was forced to dig deep. It had the fiscal capacity to do so, however, as the pandemic justified lifting the debt brake in both 2020 and 2021.
The fallout from Russia’s attack on Ukraine forced the government to do so again in 2022.
By drawing from special funds, Scholz and Lindner believed they could avoid a repeat in 2023. But the court’s ruling dashed that plan.
Long before the current crisis, it had become clear to most in government — both conservative and left-leaning — that the debt brake was a hampering investment in public infrastructure (Merkel’s coalition emphasized paying down debt instead of investing the surpluses) and, by extension, Germany’s economic competitiveness. Hence the liberal use of the now-closed special fund loophole.
Trouble is, even as many politicians have woken up to the perils of the debt brake, the public remains strongly in favor of it. Nearly two-thirds of Germans continue to support the measure, according to a poll published this week by Der Spiegel.
Repealing or even reforming the brake would require Germany’s political class not just to convince them otherwise, but also to muster a super majority in parliament, which at the moment is unlikely.
Late Thursday, the finance minister signaled that the debt brake would have to fall for 2023 as well. That means the government will have to retroactively declare an emergency — likely in connection with the war in Ukraine — and then hope that the constitutional court buys it.
ATHENS — Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis was attacked in central Athens late on Friday, suffering a broken nose, cuts and bruises.
The assault, which his party DiEM25 described as a “brazen fascist attack,” took place while Varoufakis was dining in the central Exarchia district with party members from all over Europe.
“A small group of thugs stormed the place shouting aggressively, falsely accusing him of signing off on Greece’s bailouts with the troika [the country’s bailout creditors],” DiEM25 said in a statement. “Varoufakis stood up to talk to them, but they immediately responded with violence, savagely beating him while filming the scene.”
Politicians from across the political spectrum swiftly condemned the assault in Varoufakis, the motorbike-riding, leather-jacket-wearing politician who became well-known as the country’s finance minister in 2015.
As part of the left-wing Syriza-led Greek government, Varoufakis battled the so-called troika and Europe-imposed austerity. While the Greek administration eventually capitulated and signed a bailout agreement, Varoufakis quit government and founded a cross-border far-left political movement, DiEM25.
“They were not anarchists, leftists, communists or members of any movement,” Varoufakis said in a tweet early Saturday. “Thugs for hire they were (and looked it), who clumsily invoked the lie that I sold out to the troika. We shall not let them divide us.”
The Exarchia neighborhood has a reputation for being a bastion of self-styled anarchists. Varoufakis was publicly harassed in 2015 while dining in the same district at the height of the financial crisis.
Greek Minister of Citizen Protection Takis Theodorikakos said police would take all measures to identify and arrest the perpetrators of Friday’s attack. He noted that the DiEM25 leader, “at his own initiative, was not accompanied by his personal police detail” while at the restaurant.
Greece has been hit by the biggest mass demonstrations since the eurozone crisis in recent days, as Greeks have taken to the streets almost on a daily basis to protest the country’s deadliest train crash, ramping up pressure on the conservative New Democracy government ahead of coming elections. The wave of public rage follows a train collision on February 28 that killed 57 people and raised profound questions about the management of the rail system.
The train crash has also sparked deeper questions about the functioning of the Greek state and fresh anger against the political system.
“Let us please stay focused: We are mourning the 57 victims of rail privatization. We support the spontaneous youth rallies, the greatest hope that Greece can change. See you at the demonstrations,” Varoufakis tweeted, as another big rally is scheduled for Sunday.
LONDON — Elon Musk’s controversial Twitter firing spree is sending workers into the arms of organized labor, according to the new head of Britain’s Trades Union Congress.
“Elon Musk is a perfect recruitment tool for the trade union movement,” Paul Nowak told POLITICO. Since the Tesla billionaire took over the social media platform in October, Prospect, one of the trade union federation’s 48 affiliates, “has seen its membership in Twitter go up tenfold,” he said.
The influx is “precisely in response” to Musk, argued Nowak, who “thinks he can issue a directive from San Francisco that somehow just happens all around the world with no regard to employment law.”
Musk has fired roughly 3,700 employees — nearly half of Twitter’s workforce — in a round of mass layoffs since buying the company.
U.K. Twitter employees earmarked for an exit received an email saying their job would be “potentially” impacted or “at risk,” because, under British law, firms are required to consult with staff over mass redundancies.
In November, Musk meanwhile gave staff an email ultimatum to either go “extremely hardcore” by “working long hours at high intensity” or quit the company.
Musk’s behavior is, Nowak said, “a great recruiting tool for us.”
“If I was a young worker in tech, I’d be thinking that being a union member might be a good investment at the moment,” he said. “If it can happen at Twitter, it can happen anywhere.”
Unions have in recent years ramped up their activity in another part of the tech world: the gig economy. Uber and food delivery service Deliveroo recently signed agreements with unions, while some Apple stores have voted for union recognition. Last year also saw the first-ever industrial action ballots at a U.K. Amazon warehouse.
Organized labor is “beginning to make inroads” in tech, Nowak said — but it still needs “to step up that work.” Twitter had not responded to a request for comment by the time of publication.
Strikes
Nowak takes the helm at the TUC at a time of major industrial unrest in the U.K, as employees in a host of sectors rail against stagnant wages amid soaring inflation.
U.K. Twitter employees earmarked for an exit received an email saying their job would be “potentially” impacted or “at risk” | Justin Sullivan/Getty Images
“It doesn’t matter whether it’s railway workers, postal workers, nurses, paramedics, our members aren’t on strike for the sake of it,” he said.
Since the financial crisis in 2008, the median income in Britain has fallen behind neighboring countries in Europe. An analysis by the TUC shows workers are £20,000 poorer, on average, since 2008 because pay has failed to keep up with inflation. By 2025 the union group expects that gap to increase to £24,000, with even larger gulfs for frontline healthcare staff who are striking.
Britain’s Retail Price Index measure inflation reached 14 percent last year, and economists forecast inflation — in part spurred by the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — will persist longer in the U.K. than among its G7 partners.
“Households can’t afford as much as they have been able to in the past,” said Josie Dent, managing economist at the Centre for Economics and Business Research. “Naturally that creates weaker demand.”
Against that backdrop, Novak said he wants the British government to stimulate domestic demand by putting more pay in workers’ pockets. The government argues boosting public sector pay will further fuel inflation and push its already shaky public finances further into the red.
“What do our members do when our members get paid and get decent pay rises? They go and spend that money in local shops, hotels, restaurants,” said Nowak, and “they don’t squirrel it away in offshore bank accounts, or save it away for a rainy day.”
“You have to create demand internally in the economy as well,” he added. “We’ve had the government sort of turn that common sense on its head.”
The last time a British finance minister revealed tax and spending plans, markets went haywire and the country’s prime minister ultimately lost her job. The new government is not looking for a repeat performance.
On Thursday, Chancellor Jeremy Hunt is due to unveil a budget that will aim to restore confidence in the United Kingdom’s ability to manage its public finances. But that may be easier said than done.
Media reports indicate that the government is looking to come up with between £50 billion ($59 billion) and £60 billion ($70 billion) through a mix of tax increases and spending cuts, many of which may not take effect until after the next election in 2024.
“If you do too much, too soon, you risk worsening the recession,” said Ben Zaranko, a senior research economist at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. “If you delay everything until after the next election, you risk not being seen as credible.”
A new wave of austerity could help restore the government’s reputation with financial markets after the budget from former Prime Minister Liz Truss — which featured an unorthodox combination of major tax cuts and ramped-up borrowing — unleashed panic.
But it will do little to ease fears about the country’s grim economic prospects. The United Kingdom is one of two G7 economies to havecontracted in the third quarter. It’s now smaller than it was before the coronavirus pandemic. The Bank of England is forecasting a lengthy recession, which could stretch into 2024.
New cuts could make matters worse. When the government adopted an austerity program in 2010 on the heels of the Great Recession, it shaved 1% off the country’s GDP, according to the UK budget watchdog. Just four years ago, former Prime Minister Theresa May pledged to bring nearly a decade of austerity to a close.
Now, tax rises could further depress consumer confidence — already near a record low — and spending cuts risk placing further strain on public services that are already buckling under enormous pressure.
Still, Hunt intends to show he has a plan to reduce government debt as a proportion of GDP in the medium-term. It currently stands at 98%. The Office for Budget Responsibility said in July that it could reach nearly 320% in 50 years.
“We do have to do some tax rises, do some spending cuts, if we’re going to show we’re a country that pays our way,” Hunt told Sky News on Sunday.
How did the United Kingdom get here? There’s no shortage of finger pointing.
Part of the problem is global in nature. Interest rates have risen rapidly around the world as central banks attempt to rein in inflation. That’s pushed up borrowing costs for the government, dealing a shock after years in which money was cheap.
At the same time, skyrocketing energy costs, exacerbated by Russia’s war in Ukraine, have compelled governments to step in to cushion the blow of crippling energy bills — shortly after they spent significant sums helping households and businesses through the pandemic.
Hunt has scrapped plans to cap energy bills for typical households at £2,500 ($2,981) for the next two years. Instead, support will only be guaranteed until next spring. But the measures will still prove costly.
The government can’t blame all its problems on the rest of the world, however.
“You can just look at how the UK is performing relative to every other country in Europe, and it’s obvious there’s a UK-specific element to this,” Zaranko said.
The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union has weighed on trade and contributed to shortages of workers in key industries.
“The UK economy as a whole has been permanently damaged by Brexit,” former Bank of England official Michael Saunders told Bloomberg TV this week. “If we hadn’t had Brexit, we probably wouldn’t be talking about an austerity budget this week. The need for tax rises, spending cuts wouldn’t be there.”
And while inflation in the United States cooled more than expected in October, falling to 7.7%, it’s still rising sharply in the United Kingdom, reaching a 41-year high of 11.1% last month.
That’s bolstering expectations that the Bank of England will need to keep raising interest rates and could hold them higher for longer, though recession may complicate those forecasts.
The country’s labor market also remains extremely tight, with an employment rate lower than before the coronavirus hit and a record number of people who aren’t working due to long-term illness.
“The UK does stand out in that labor supply has been very constrained, perhaps more so than in other countries,” said Ruth Gregory, senior UK economist at Capital Economics.
LIVERPOOL, England — On the long picket line outside the gates of Liverpool’s Peel Port, rain-soaked dock workers warm themselves with cups of tea as they listen to 1980s pop.
Dozens of buses, cars and trucks honk in solidarity as they pass.
Dockers’ strikes are not new to Liverpool, nor is depravation. But this latest walk-out at Britain’s fourth-largest port is part of something much bigger, a great wave of public and private sector strikes taking place across the U.K. Railways, postal services, law courts and garbage collections are among the many public services grinding to a halt.
The immediate cause of the discontent, as elsewhere, is the rising cost of living. Inflation in the United Kingdom breached the 10 percent mark this year, with wages failing to keep pace.
But the U.K.’s economic woes long predate the current crisis. For more than a decade, Britain has been beset by weak economic growth, anaemic productivity, and stagnant private and public sector investment. Since 2016, its political leadership has been in a state of Brexit-induced flux.
Half a century after U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger looked at the U.K.’s 1970s economic malaise and declared that “Britain is a tragedy,” the United Kingdom is heading to be the sick man of Europe once again.
The immediate cause of Liverpool dockers’ discontent that brought them to strike is the rising cost of living. | Christopher Furlong/Getty Images
Here in Liverpool, the “scars run very deep,” said Paul Turking, a dock worker in his late 30s. British voters, he added, have “been misled” by politicians’ promises to “level up” the country by investing heavily in regional economies. Conservatives “will promise you the world and then pull the carpet out from under your feet,” he complained.
“There’s no middle class no more,” said John Delij, a Peel Port veteran of 15 years. He sees the cost-of-living crisis and economic stagnation whittling away the middle rung of the economic ladder.
“How many billionaires do we have?” Delij asked, wondering how Britain could be the sixth-largest economy in the world with a record number of billionaires when food bank use is 35 percent above its pre-pandemic level. “The workers put money back into the economy,” he said.
What would they do if they were in charge? “Invest in affordable housing,” said Turking. “Housing and jobs.”
Falling behind
The British economy has been struck by particular turbulence over recent weeks. The cost of government borrowing soared in the wake of former PM Liz Truss’ disastrous mini-budget on September 23, with the U.K.’s central bank forced to step in and steady the bond markets.
But while the swift installation of Rishi Sunak, the former chancellor, as prime minister seems to have restored a modicum of calm, the economic backdrop remains bleak. Spending and welfare cuts are coming. Taxes are certain to rise. And the underlying problems cut deep.
U.K. productivity growth since the financial crisis has trailed that of comparator nations such as the U.S., France and Germany. As such, people’s median incomes also lag behind neighboring countries over the same period. Only Russia is forecast to have worse economic growth among the G20 nations in 2023.
In 1976, the U.K. — facing stagflation, a global energy crisis, a current account deficit and labor unrest — had to be bailed out by the International Monetary Fund. It feels far-fetched, but today some are warning it could happen again.
The U.K. is spluttering its way through an illness brought about in part through a series of self-inflicted wounds that have undermined the basic pillars of any economy: confidence and stability.
The political and economic malaise is such that it has prompted unwanted comparisons with countries whose misfortunes Britain once watched amusedly from afar.
“The existential risk to the U.K. … is not that we’re suddenly going to go off an economic cliff, or that the country’s going to descend into civil war or whatever,” said Jonathan Portes, professor of economics at King’s College London. “It’s that we will become like Italy.”
Portes, of course, does not mean a country blessed with good weather and fine food — but an economy hobbled by persistently low growth, caught in a dysfunctional political loop that lurches between “corrupt and incompetent right-wing populists” and “well-intentioned technocrats who can’t actually seem to turn the ship around.”
“That’s not the future that we want in the U.K,” he said.
Reviving the U.K.’s flatlining economy will not happen overnight. As Italy’s experience demonstrates, it’s one thing to diagnose an illness — another to cure it.
Experts speak of an unbalanced model heavily reliant upon Britain’s services sector and beset with low productivity, a result of years of underinvestment and a flexible labor market which delivers low unemployment but often insecure and low-paid work.
“We’re not investing in skills; businesses aren’t investing,” said Xiaowei Xu, senior research economist at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. “It’s not that surprising that we’re not getting productivity growth.”
But any attempt to address the country’s ailments will require its economic stewards to understand their underlying causes — and those stretch back at least to the first truly global crisis of the 21st century.
Crash and burn
The 2008 financial crisis hammered economies around the world, and the U.K. was no exception. Its economy shrunk by more than 6 percent between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009. Five years passed before it returned to its pre-recession size.
For Britain, the crisis in fact began in September 2007, a year before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when wobbles in the U.S. subprime mortgage market sparked a run on the British bank Northern Rock.
The U.K. discovered it was particularly vulnerable to such a shock. Over the second half of the 20th century, its manufacturing base had largely eroded as its services sector expanded, with financial and professional services and real estate among the key drivers. As the Bank of England put it: “The interconnectedness of global finance meant that the U.K. financial system had become dangerously exposed to the fall-out from the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market.”
The crisis was a “big shock to the U.K.’s broad economic model,” said John Springford, from the Centre for European Reform. Productivity took an immediate hit as exports of financial services plunged. It never fully recovered.
“Productivity before the crash was basically, ‘Can we create lots and lots of debt and generate lots and lots of income on the back of this? Can we invent collateralized debt obligations and trade them in vast volumes?’” said James Meadway, director of the Progressive Economy Forum and a former adviser to Labour’s left-wing former shadow chancellor, John McDonnell.
A post-crash clampdown on City practises had an obvious impact.
“This is a major part of the British economy, so if it’s suddenly not performing the way it used to — for good reasons — things overall are going to look a bit shaky,” Meadway added.
The shock did not contain itself to the economy. In a pattern that would be repeated, and accentuated, in the coming years, it sent shuddering waves through the country’s political system, too.
The 2010 election was fought on how to best repair Britain’s broken economy. In 2009, the U.K. had the second-highest budget deficit in the G7, trailing only the U.S., according to the U.K. government’s own fiscal watchdog, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).
The Conservative manifesto declared “our economy is overwhelmed by debt,” and promised to close the U.K.’s mounting budget deficit in five years with sharp public sector cuts. The incumbent Labour government responded by pledging to halve the deficit by 2014 with “deeper and tougher” cuts in public spending than the significant reductions overseen by former Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.
The election returned a hung parliament, with the Conservatives entering into a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. The age of austerity was ushered in.
Austerity nation
Defenders of then-Chancellor George Osborne’s austerity program insist it saved Britain from the sort of market-led calamity witnessed this fall, and put the U.K. economy in a condition to weather subsequent global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the fallout from the war in Ukraine.
“That hard work made policies like furlough and the energy price cap possible,” said Rupert Harrison, one of Osborne’s closest Treasury advisers.
Pointing to the brutal market response to Truss’ freewheeling economic plans, Harrison praised the “wisdom” of the coalition in prioritizing tackling the U.K.’s debt-GDP ratio. “You never know when you will be vulnerable to a loss of credibility,” he noted.
But Osborne’s detractors argue austerity — which saw deep cuts to community services such as libraries and adult social care; courts and prisons services; road maintenance; the police and so much more — also stripped away much of the U.K.’s social fabric, causing lasting and profound economic damage. A recent study claimed austerity was responsible for hundreds of thousands of excess deaths.
Under Osborne’s plan, three-quarters of the fiscal consolidation was to be delivered by spending cuts. With the exception of the National Health Service, schools and aid spending, all government budgets were slashed; public sector pay was frozen; taxes (mainly VAT) rose.
But while the government came close to delivering its fiscal tightening target for 2014-15, “the persistent underperformance of productivity and real GDP over that period meant the deficit remained higher than initially expected,” the OBR said. By his own measure, Osborne had failed, and was forced to push back his deficit-elimination target further. Austerity would have to continue into the second half of the 2010s.
Many economists contend that the fiscal belt-tightening sucked demand out of the economy and worsened Britain’s productivity crisis by stifling investment. “That certainly did hit U.K. growth and did some permanent damage,” said King’s College London’s Portes.
“If that investment isn’t there, other people start to find it less attractive to open businesses,” former Labour aide Meadway added. “If your railways aren’t actually very good … it does add up to a problem for businesses.”
A 2015 study found U.K. productivity, as measured by GDP per hour worked, was now lower than in the rest of the G7 by a whopping 18 percentage points.
“Frankly, nobody knows the whole answer,” Osborne said of Britain’s productivity conundrum in May 2015. “But what I do know is that I’d much rather have the productivity challenge than the challenge of mass unemployment.”
‘Jobs miracle’
Rising employment was indeed a signature achievement of the coalition years. Unemployment dropped below 6 percent across the U.K. by the end of the parliament in 2015, with just Germany and Austria achieving a lower rate of joblessness among the then-28 EU states. Real-term wages, however, took nearly a decade to recover to pre-crisis levels.
Economists like Meadway contend that the rise in employment came with a price, courtesy of Britain’s famously flexible labor market. He points to a Sports Direct warehouse in the East Midlands, where a 2015 Guardian investigation revealed the predominantly immigrant workforce was paid illegally low wages, while the working conditions were such that the facility was nicknamed “the gulag.”
The warehouse, it emerged, was built on a former coal mine, and for Meadway the symbolism neatly charts the U.K.’s move away from traditional heavy industry toward more precarious service sector employment. “It’s not a secure job anymore,” he said. “Once you have a very flexible labor market, the pressure on employers to pay more and the capacity for workers to bargain for more is very much reduced.”
Throughout the period, the Bank of England — the U.K.’s central bank — kept interest rates low and pursued a policy of quantitative easing. “That tends to distort what happens in the economy,” argued Meadway. QE, he said, is a “good [way of] getting money into the hands of people who already have quite a lot” and “doesn’t do much for people who depend on wage income.”
Meanwhile — whether necessary or not — the U.K.’s austerity policies undoubtedly worsened a decades-long trend of underinvestment in skills and research and development (Britain lags only Italy in the G7 on R&D spending). At British schools, there was a 9 percent real terms fall in per-pupil spending between 2009 and 2019, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ Xu. “As countries get richer, usually you start spending more on education,” Xu noted.
Two senior ministers in the coalition government — David Gauke, who served in the Treasury throughout Osborne’s tenure, and ex-Lib Dem Business Secretary Vince Cable — have both accepted that the government might have focused more on higher taxation and less on cuts to public spending. But both also insisted the U.K had ultimately been correct to prioritize putting its public finances on a sounder footing.
It was February 2018 before Britain finally achieved Osborne’s goal of eliminating the deficit on its day-to-day budget.
Austerity was coming to an end, at last. But Osborne had already left the Treasury, 18 months earlier — swept away along with Cameron in the wake of a seismic national uprising.
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David Cameron had won the 2015 election outright, despite — or perhaps because of — the stringent spending cuts his coalition government had overseen, more of which had been pledged in his 2015 manifesto. Also promised, of course, was a public vote on Britain’s EU membership.
The reasons for the leave vote that followed were many and complex — but few doubt that years of underinvestment in poorer parts of the U.K. were among them.
Regardless, the 2016 EU referendum triggered a period of political acrimony and turbulence not seen in Westminster for generations. With no pre-agreed model of what Brexit should actually entail, the U.K.’s future relationship with the EU became the subject of heated and protracted debate. After years of wrangling, Britain finally left the bloc at the end of January 2020, severing ties in a more profound way than many had envisaged.
While the twin crises of COVID and Ukraine have muddled the picture, most economists agree Brexit has already had a significant impact on the U.K. economy. The size of Britain’s trade flows relative to GDP has fallen further than other G7 countries, business investment growth trails the likes of Japan, South Korea and Italy, and the OBR has stuck by its March 2020 prediction that Brexit would reduce productivity and U.K. GDP by 4 percent.
Perhaps more significantly, Brexit has ushered in a period of political instability. As prime ministers come and go (the U.K. is now on its fifth since 2016), economic programs get neglected, or overturned. Overseas investors look on with trepidation.
“The evidence that the referendum outcome, and the kind of uncertainty and change in policy that it created, have led to low investment and low growth in the U.K. is fairly compelling,” said professor Stephen Millard, deputy director at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
Beyond the instability, the broader impact of the vote to leave remains contentious.
Portes argued — as many Remain supporters also do — that much harm was done by the decision to leave the EU’s single market. “It’s the facts, not the uncertainty that in my view is responsible for most of the damage,” he said.
Brexit supporters dismiss such claims.
“It’s difficult statistically to find much significant effect of Brexit on anything,” said professor Patrick Minford, founder member of Economists for Brexit. “There’s so much else going on, so much volatility.”
Minford, an economist favored by ex-PM Truss, acknowledged that “Brexit is disruptive in the short run, so it’s perfectly possible that you would get some short-run disruption.” But he added: “It was a long-term policy decision.”
Where next?
Plenty of economists can rattle off possible solutions, although actually delivering them has thus far evaded Britain’s political class. “It’s increasing investment, having more of a focus on the long-term, it’s having economic strategies that you set out and actually commit to over time,” says the IFS’ Xu. “As far as possible, it’s creating more certainty over economic policy.”
But in seeking to bring stability after the brief but chaotic Truss era, new U.K. Chancellor Jeremy Hunt has signaled a fresh period of austerity is on the way to plug the latest hole in the nation’s finances. Leveling Up Secretary Michael Gove told Times Radio that while, ideally, you wouldn’t want to reduce long-term capital investments, he was sure some spending on big projects “will be cut.”
This could be bad news for many of the U.K.’s long-awaited infrastructure schemes such as the HS2 high-speed rail line, which has been in the works for almost 15 years and already faces a familiar mix of local resistance, vested interests, and a sclerotic planning system.
“We have a real problem in the sense that the only way to really durably raise productivity growth for this country is for investments to pick up,” said Springford, from the Centre for European Reform. “And the headwinds to that are quite significant.”
For dock workers at Liverpool’s Peel Port, the prospect of a fresh round of austerity amid a cost-of-living crisis is too much to bear. “Workers all over this country need to stand up for themselves and join a union,” insisted Delij.
For him, it’s all about priorities — and the arguments still echo back to the great crash of 15 years ago. “They bailed the bankers out in 2007,” he said, “and can’t bail hungry people out now.”
