The biggest news of the past few days has been the decision by the Biden Administration to send cluster munitions for the first time to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The war, obviously, has not stopped for the news cycle and new developments continue to come in from the front lines.
On the Eastern Front we are getting some idea of the deployment location for the “Swedish Brigade” presumed to be the 21st Mechanized Brigade but not yet confirmed. The “Swedish Brigade” is an unofficial nickname for a Ukrainian brigade that was entirely trained in Sweden to NATO standards, then equipped with Swedish manufactured CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, Strv 122 (Swedish modified Leopard 2A5 equivalents) tanks, and the highly advanced fully automatic firing 155mm Archer Artillery Systems.
Kreminna is very far from some of the biggest fighting in the south—more than 200km northeast of the battles around Robotyne, south of the city of Zaporizhzhia.
This follows a trend of Ukraine gradually committing forces on a broad front offensive, as opposed to committing its main force on a single focus point in an attempt to punch through Russia’s main defenses in one go.
Broadly speaking, offensives can be divided into two distinct philosophies. There can be blitzkrieg-style offensives that concentrate offensive force into a single armored fist that aims to punch through the enemy defensive line at a decisive point and destroy the enemy with a single all-out blow.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive at Kharkiv in September 2022 can be characterized quite fairly in this manner, where Ukraine drew Russia’s attention to the fighting south of Izium, before launching a massive surprise assault on the Russian rear.
The developing Ukrainian Summer Counteroffensive of 2023 is not this type of offensive. Ukraine has kept more than half of its nine NATO-trained brigades in reserve, and some of the most powerful and famed units in the Ukrainian army like the 1st Tank Brigade (with Leopard 2s) or the 25th/82nd Air Assault Brigades (with Challenger 2s) have seen no action.
I estimated in a prior post that Ukraine had committed only six of the 16 armored brigades at its disposal. The commitment of the “Swedish Brigade” to Kreminna would represent a seventh.
David Axe at Forbes points out that the Swedish Brigade is particularly well suited for forest combat due to the close-quarters battles proficiency of the CV90s. The combat in the forests west of Kremmina perfectly suits the CV90.
The CV90s paid their respects to the ruined husk of a T90M tank (Russia’s most advanced tank that has seen combat), which has become a veritable landmark between Lyman and Kreminna.
The commitment of the “Swedish Brigade” should push Russia into making some tough decisions about what to do with their limited reserves. Do they allow Ukraine to begin pressing back their forces around Kreminna (and Lysychansk and Severodonetsk beyond there)? Or do they keep their reserves available to hedge against a crisis in the South?
This type of offensive, where the main force is kept in reserve as the attacker gradually attacks in multiple areas on an ever-widening broad front is also known as a “broad front offensive.” A textbook example would be Eisenhower’s push across northern France in 1944, as Eisenhower rejected calls for a risky all-out push by either Patton or Montgomery’s forces in a gamble to penetrate the German lines. Eisenhower opted for a methodical broad front offensive that focused on securing lines of logistics and striking the Germans all along the front to drain them of reserves.
Broad front offensives are effective when the attacker has a significant advantage in the number of reserves—grinding down the enemy forces until the enemy line shows a critical weakness somewhere. And the main armored force pounces at that weakness.
UK intelligence has repeatedly noted that Ukrainian attacks in Bakhmut and the southern front have left Russia with few operational reserves remaining.
With Russian artillery losses also mounting, Ukraine appears to be attempting to stretch Russian defenses to the breaking point.
The First PT-91 loss shows the difficulting of covering the ukraine war
One piece of bad news from the front lines was the first confirmed loss of a Polish PT-91 tank.
The PT-91s are highly upgraded Soviet-era T-72 with modern night optics and fire control systems, an advanced dual-axis stabilization system that make fire accurate even when moving at high speeds, and ERAWA reactive armor blocks that improve its survivability.
A T-72EA tank and an M117 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) were also confirmed lost in the same vicinity. It appeared that they were immobilized in a minefield and then destroyed by artillery.
Losing three armored fighting vehicles, including 2 fairly modern tanks, is a painful loss. But this isn’t the kind of disaster that unfolded north of Robotyne in the opening days of the counter-offensive, where Ukraine lost four Leopard 2s and at least 17 Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
What is somewhat challenging about making sense of this loss is the geolocated location. Multiple OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) accounts placed the PT-91 loss in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and noted it was part of the 22nd Mechanized.
The reason this has me scratching my head is that the 22nd Mechanized was geolocated four days ago on July 5th fighting southwest of Bakhmut, around Klishchiivka—Donetsk Oblast, over 100km from the nearest area of Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
So that leaves me with a couple of possibilities.
- Was the July 5th geolocation mistaken?
- Is the PT-91 loss geolocation mistaken?
- Is the PT-91 not a part of the 22nd Mechanized?
- Is the 22nd Mechanized split up, with one or more battalions in Bakhmut and another in Zaporizhzhia Oblast?
At this point, I don’t have any good answers, and it highlights some of the confusing and conflicting information that floats around on OSINT (open source intelligence).
What are other options for Cluster Munition aid?
With American cluster munitions already on their way to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, we discussed the moral and legal implications of sending cluster munitions in depth here.
In brief, though cluster munitions cause numerous civilian casualties over a longer period due to unexploded munitions, well-documented Russian human rights abuses (torture, child abductions, systematic sexual violence, mass murder, and missile/drone attacks on civilian infrastructure) make any moral calculus difficult—the harm of cluster munitions must be balanced against insufficient ammunition delaying or preventing the liberation of occupied Ukraine. There is no clear moral answer to this issue.
Such decisions should be left to the Ukrainian people and their democratically elected representatives, the Ukrainian Government. Since Ukraine’s government has been requesting cluster munitions since Summer 2022, weapons should be provided to them.
Next, we discussed the actual cluster munition that has been confirmed to have been sent to Ukraine, the DPICM (Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition) 155mm shell, A cluster munition with a field-tested dud rate of 2.5% (although some real-world sampling data indicates they may be closer to 14%), it releases 88 submunitions that spread out like a shotgun and can eliminate infantry and lightly armored vehicles in a wide area.
I noted how the DPICM’s greatest importance may lie not in its effectiveness over conventional munitions, but in the size of the US stockpile. An educated guess at available Ukrainian 155mm munitions may be somewhere around 400,000. With Ukraine likely running a deficit of over 100,000 shells per month compared to US/EU shell production, Ukraine might have run out of shells by late October.
With over four million DPICM 155mm shells stockpiled, the shells resolve Ukraine’s artillery shortages for at least the next two years. The shells are also very well suited for taking out entrenched infantry positions.
Thus far, the Biden Administration has only approved the sending of DPICM shells. However, now that the “cluster munition” category has been opened up as possibilities for military assistance for Ukraine, it is worth surveying some highlights of weapons that are particularly likely to be helpful to Ukraine on the battlefield.
MK20 Rockeye II / CBU-100 Rockeye II Cluster Bombs
First developed in 1968 and used extensively during the Vietnam War, the MK20/CBU-100 Rockeye II is a dated and arguably archaic cluster bomb.
Nonetheless, the Rockeye cluster bomb is a no-brainer weapon that should be sent to Ukraine. Field testing indicates a dud rate of 2% meeting the Biden Administrations guidelines (below 2.5%), although NGOs point out the Vietnam-era Rockeye bomb has left numerous dud submunitions in Vietnam, Kuwait, and Iraq, thus doubts about the accuracy of the dud rate have been expressed.
However, the dud rate is somewhat beside the point, as Ukraine doesn’t want the Rockeye bomb to use as a cluster munition, but to cut it open and remove the bomblets themselves.
Each Rockeye bomb contains 247 Mk118 HEAT anti-tank munitions.
The Mk118 munition is rated as capable of penetrating 190mm of steel armor equivalent.
Ukraine has been making use of drones carrying antitank grenades, particularly the ubiquitous Soviet RKG3 antitank grenade, to attack Russian armor.
The RKG3 was a Soviet anti-tank grenade developed in 1950. It had enough penetrative force to punch through 125mm of rolled homogenous armor (RHA). It is powerful enough that it can penetrate the weaker top armor of almost any contemporary armored personnel carrier. It can even penetrate weak points in tank designs, but the grenade must carefully hit the tank at its weakest points to cause any damage.
By the early 1960s, it was considered obsolete not because it was too weak to destroy enemy armored vehicles, but because it was considered nearly impossible (or suicidal) for infantry to approach close enough to throw the heavy grenade at such vehicles. Antitank grenades were supplanted by RPGs (unguided rocket-propelled grenades) and by ATGMs (anti-tank-guided missiles).
However, most former Soviet bloc nations including Ukraine had large stockpiles of Soviet RKG3 grenades in storage. Ukraine began making use of them by dropping them from drones.
Even today, armor protection for tanks is optimized (for weight and cost reasons) to protect against horizontal threats. Their protection from threats from above tends to be suboptimal—a good hit in the right places can still cause significant damage. But particularly against more modern Russian tanks, it can be more difficult for the penetrative force of the RKG3 (125mm penetration RHA) to cause any significant damage.
This is why Ukraine is interested in the Rockeye II cluster bomb. The 247 Mk118 HEAT munitions can penetrate 190mm of armor, an over 50% improvement over the RKG3 grenades. Dropped from drones, they can be aimed to try to target weak sections of tanks and other armored vehicles. Ukraine believes that the Mk118 would provide a significant boost to Ukrainian Drone operators’ anti-tank abilities.
There is little reason to doubt that Ukraine’s comments on how they plan to use the Rockeye II bombs are genuine. The Rockeye II is a conventional bomb—it is unguided and has no glide bombing ability. It is inaccurate and entirely reliant on the spread of the munitions to score any hits.
Ukrainian fighter bombers are highly unlikely to be able to approach close enough to deploy these weapons. Ukrainian fighter-bombers take high risks to deploy JDAM glide bombs 30-40km away from their targets in toss bombing missions. To deploy a Rockeye II, the bomber would need to approach within 2-3km of its target, it is extremely unlikely that this level of penetration into Russian air defenses is practicable or advisable for Ukrainian bombers.
The last time the US military used the Rockeye II in significant quantities was during the Gulf War, over 30 years ago. Most anti-tank munitions the US uses are now guided, including guided anti-tank cluster munitions. The CBU-97 cluster bomb is the US’ standard anti-tank cluster munition, deploying homing anti-tank bomblets.
To say the nearly 60-year-old Rockeye Ii is outdated is an understatement. There is little reason to think the US would ever deploy the Rockeye II in any future conflict.
Department of Defense reports indicate the US has 14.5M Rockeye II submunitions in its stockpile. At 247 submunitions per bomb, it would appear the US has 58,700 or so Rockeye IIs in storage. Ukraine should be given however many of these munitions as they would like.
In sum:
- Ukraine has already received cluster weapons from the US, so there is little reason to regard other cluster weapons as taboo.
- The Rockeye II has a tested 2% dud rate, meeting self-imposed safety criteria for export. While the true dud rate in combat conditions may be higher, it is beside the point as they are being deployed as conventional munitions.
- It should significantly improve Ukranian anti-tank capabilities.
- They are hopelessly outdated, and there is little reason to think the US would deploy them in any future conflict.
GMLRS DPICM
The HIMARS rocket artillery system hardly needs an introduction at this point, but this advanced guided rocket system has been one of the mainstays of Western firepower since its deployment in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
HIMARS primarily fires one of two types of rockets. The shorter-ranged GMRLS rocket can strike targets up to about 70km. And the ATACMS ballistic missile with a range of up to 300km. Both varieties of rockets/missiles come in a few variations.
The GMLRS rockets all have the same guidance systems, the same accuracy, and the same range, but there are three warhead varieties with differing effects.
- GMLRS Unitary: a single high explosive warhead. Most common variety in use by Ukraine.
- GMLRS AW (Aka M30A1/A2): contains 180,000 small pieces of tungsten shrapnel that can destroy enemy soft targets (infantry/unarmored vehicles) in a wide radius. Also in use by Ukraine.
- GMRLS DPICM: Cluster munition with 404 M101 antipersonnel grenades (bomblets) Testing indicates it can replace six unitary warhead GMLRS in striking unarmored targets.
The GMRLS AW has been reported been highly successful for Ukrainian forces—meant to simulate the effects of a cluster weapon without the dangerous duds left behind, videos of successful deployments against Russian fortified positions and light vehicle concentrations have been many.
The supply of the missiles has remained a limiting factor, but the GMLRS DPICM can provide a similar effect. If it can be provided in any quantity, it could be a significant factor.
A 2021 Department of Defense Report indicates that only the US and Saudi Arabia continue to maintain a stockpile of GMLRS DPICM missiles, but the number is classified. A 2006 Department of Defense report indicates that the GMLRS DPICM missiles had a dud rate of 5% (success rate of 95%).
However, there are good reasons to consider sending the GMLRS DPICM despite the dud rate. For one, stocks of the missile are likely to be dramatically lower than 155mm DPICM shells. Ukraine will receive likely hundreds of thousands of DPICM shells. Ukraine might be fortunate to receive hundreds of GMLRS DPICM rockets.
When the number of rockets is small compared to the artillery shells, the slightly higher tested dud rate hardly makes much of a difference.
Let us do a hypothetical. Say Ukraine uses 500,000 DPICM shells and 1000 GMLRS DPICM missiles.
Here is how the number of duds left behind if the GMLRS has a 2% dud rate, vs a 5% dud rate
500,000 (155mm shell) x 88 munitions x 2% dud rate = 880,000 dud bomblets
- Hypothetical 1000 GMRLS x 404 x 2% dud rate = 808 duds
- Actual 1000 GMLRS x 404 x 5% dud rate = 2020 duds.
Difference: 880,808 duds vs. 882,020 duds. That amounts to a 0.1% difference in the number of duds left behind.
Because guided missiles are used in very specific circumstances, at very low rates of use, the precise dud rate is very unlikely to make any significant difference in the total number of duds left behind to endanger civilians or friendly troops. Even if the dud rate on the GMLRS missile was 30%, it would amount to 880,808 duds vs. 892,120 duds—or a 1.3% difference in the end duds produced.
Thus, unless the Biden Administration plans on sending tens of thousands of GMLRS DPICM missiles (highly unlikely) the 2% vs 5% dud rate is essentially insignificant and should be ignored.
The value of additional precision weapons that can destroy concentrations of lightly armored Russian vehicles (particularly artillery units in counterbattery fire) is too valuable to be ignored.
The Biden administration should strongly consider sending some GMLRS DPICM missiles to Ukraine, stockpiles permitting.
ATACMS BLock 1
The Army Tactical Missile System, better known as ATACMS is a HIMARS or M270 MLRS-fired ballistic missile. While the GMLRS missile is limited to a 70km range, the ATACMS Block 1 has a range of 165 km, while the Block 1A-Cluster and Block 1A-Unitary Warhead varieties have a range of 300 km.
Discussion of sending ATACMS to Ukraine began in the early Summer of 2022, and as the US had not sent any cluster munitions, the discussion focused on the unitary warhead variety of ATACMS.
However, the US should give serious consideration to sending particularly the older stocks of ATACMS Block 1 missiles to Ukraine.
The ATACMS Block 1 is the original and oldest type of ATACMS missile, first introduced in 1990. Unlike later varieties, its range is limited to 165km, almost half that of the ATACMS Block 1A or Unitary Warhead (M48/M57) varieties with a 300km range.
The ATACMS Block1/1A-cluster differs from the unitary warhead missile in that they contain 950 (Block I) or 300 (Block 1A) M74 anti-personnel/anti-material grenades (bomblets). For Block I, the bomblets are distributed over an area of 33000 m2. That is an area a little larger than six American football fields.
The ATACMS is slated to be replaced by a yet-to-be-determined missile that meets the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) baseline requirements. The PrSM must have a range of 500km, vastly outranging the aging ATACMS Block I with a range of just 165km. The PrSM’s specifications reflect and continue the Army’s trend away from broad-area destruction weapons in favor of longer-ranged precision strike weapons.
1650 ATACMS Block 1 missiles were produced, of which 401 are known to have been used in the Gulf War and the Iraq War, thus over 1200 remain likely in US stockpiles.
The Biden Administration cited military readiness concerns and low tactical missile stockpiles as a reason against providing ATACMS to Ukraine. It would seem that out of all the tactical missiles in the US Army’s arsenal, the ATACMS block I am the least like the missiles of the future it requires. This may be the most expendable.
The ATACMS Block I has a listed 2% dud rate in a 2005 Department of Defense report, thus likely meets the Biden Administrations’ 2.5% dud rate export requirement.
The 300km ranged ATACMS Block1A-Unitary would be a highly welcome addition to Ukraine’s arsenal. But in terms of its ability to devastate and clear out large sections of Russian defense lines of any infantry or light vehicles, the ATACMS Block 1 cluster munition may be one of the most powerful options to provide to Ukraine.
If any can be spared, they would represent a major improvement to Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. But the ATACMS Block I would provide a weapon very different from the Storm Shadow or GMLRS—the ability to destroy all light vehicles and infantry in an area the size of six football fields in an instant could help Ukraine make operational level gains if deployed immediately preceding breaching operations against main Russian defenses.
Any one of these cluster munitions would give new capabilities and advanced firepower to Ukrainian forces. However, as mentioned on the Ukraine Update for Saturday, by averting Ukraine’s potential 155mm shell crisis, the most important issue to address has been completed Any of these weapon systems might be considered icing on the cake.
The Rockeye II in particular seems likely, if only because from a readiness or a humanitarian standpoint, it seems there is little rational reason why one might object to sending what is essentially a parcel of antitank grenades.
In the attempts to break through Russian defensive lines, however, the precision cluster munition rockets and missiles of the GMLRS DPICM and the ATACMS Block I might prove invaluable. Due to their long range, a HIMARS system can hit a broad range of targets, bringing destruction to defensive Russian infantry concentrations on demand.
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