Financial disruptions in 2008 contributed to the deep economic downturn that came to be known as the Great Recession. Could recent bank failures similarly lead to a broad U.S. recession?
The $532 billion of assets of the three banks that failed in March and April 2023 exceed the inflation-adjusted value of $526 billion of assets of the 25 banks that failed in 2008. Yet the current situation differs in many ways from the underlying economic circumstances at the outset of the Great Recession.
Still, that experience, as well as others, show how financial distress can lead to macroeconomic weakness which then contributes to further financial distress, resulting in a downward spiral during which credit becomes tight, investment is curtailed and growth stalls.
Bank distress can have adverse consequences for borrowers and the broader economy. One source of recent U.S. bank vulnerabilities is the rapid increase in interest rates. Banks take in deposits that can be withdrawn in the short term and use them to make loans and invest in securities at interest rates that are fixed for some time.
As interest rates rise, the value of banks’ existing portfolio decreases as new investments at higher rates are more attractive. By one estimate, the U.S. banking system’s market value of assets is $2.2 trillion lower than suggested by their book value of assets accounting for loan portfolios held to maturity.
These book losses are realized if banks have to sell those assets to cover withdrawals from depositors. At the same time banks face challenges in maintaining deposit levels, depositors are less willing to place their money in low-return checking and savings accounts as higher-interest opportunities become increasingly available.
Banks that failed in 2023 have had specific weaknesses that made them particularly vulnerable. Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), for example, was particularly exposed to risk from rising interest rates as it had heavily invested in longer-term government bonds which lost market value as interest rates rose and its management failed to hedge against this risk.
SVB was also especially vulnerable to a run by depositors because over 90% of the value of its deposits exceeded the $250,000 amount guaranteed by the Federal through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Depositors holding accounts in excess of this guaranteed amount, both individuals and companies (whose accounts were used for making payroll, among other reasons) are only partially protected in case of bank failure so they have an incentive to withdraw funds at the first sign of trouble.
Moreover, depositors were connected to each other through business and social groups, so news traveled quickly seeding the conditions for a classic bank run at Twitter speed. Signature Bank also had about 90% of its assets uninsured and its portfolio was heavily concentrated in crypto deposits. Both banks grew rapidly with inadequate risk and liquidity management practices in place and, while regulators had raised concerns about these risks, they had not taken more forceful actions to address them, according to a GAO report. Meanwhile, First Republic Bank, catered to wealthy depositors and for this reason also had a high share of uninsured deposits that made it more vulnerable to a bank run as its bond assets lost value amidst rising interest rates.
Commercial banks reduce lending when their deposits fall or when they otherwise cannot meet regulatory requirements. Deposits represent an important source of banks’ ability to lend. As a bank’s deposits decrease, it has less resources available for lending since other sources of funds are not as easily obtained.
A bank may also cut lending in an effort to satisfy regulations such as meeting or exceeding the Capital Adequacy Ratio. Regulators require banks to have enough capital on reserve to handle a certain amount of loan losses. The Capital Adequacy Ratio decreases when loans fail and the bank sees its loan loss reserves decline. The bank can then increase its Capital Adequacy Ratio by using funds that would otherwise be devoted to commercial loans or by shifting from loans to other assets that are less risky (such as government securities).
There is evidence that this effect contributed to the cutback in bank lending in New England in the 1990-1991 U.S. recession when there was a collapse in that region’s real estate market. A bank may choose to reduce lending if there are concerns about solvency even if it is not yet hitting up against the formal capital adequacy ratio requirement.
A credit crunch occurs when borrowers who would otherwise receive loans are precluded from doing so because of a restriction on the supply of loans by banks. But a reduction in bank lending could also reflect a decrease in borrowers’ demand for loans.
Researchers have used a variety of methods to identify when there is a credit crunch rather than just a lower demand for loans. For example, a credit crunch could be identified through looking for differential borrowing, employment, and performance patterns by bank-dependent companies as compared to those that have access to financing through bond or equity markets. Bank-dependent companies are typically smaller than those that have access to other types of financing.
Credit crunches due to bank distress can undermine investment and economic growth. An early and influential analysis by Ben Bernanke, who went on to chair the Federal Reserve and served during the 2008 Great Financial Crisis, analyzed the effects of bank failures during the Great Depression. He found that bank failures had a particularly strong effect in reducing the amount of borrowing by households, farmers, and small businesses in that period, which contributed to the severity and duration of the Great Depression.
The U.S. banking system has been made more resilient since that time, but there is still evidence of the effect of a credit crunch on regional U.S. economies. The April 2023 IMF Global Financial Stability Report argued that a credit crunch in the United States could reduce lending by 1%, which would lower GDP growth by almost 0.5 percentage points.
Michael Klein is the executive editor of EconoFact. He is the William L. Clayton Professor of International Economic Affairs at The Fletcher School at Tufts University.
This commentary was originally published by EconoFact: Banks, Credit Crunches, and the Economy.
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