ReportWire

Tag: vulnerabilities

  • Amazon Is Using Specialized AI Agents for Deep Bug Hunting

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    As generative AI pushes the speed of software development, it is also enhancing the ability of digital attackers to carry out financially motivated or state-backed hacks. This means that security teams at tech companies have more code than ever to review while dealing with even more pressure from bad actors. On Monday, Amazon will publish details for the first time of an internal system known as Autonomous Threat Analysis (ATA), which the company has been using to help its security teams proactively identify weaknesses in its platforms, perform variant analysis to quickly search for other, similar flaws, and then develop remediations and detection capabilities to plug holes before attackers find them.

    ATA was born out of an internal Amazon hackathon in August 2024, and security team members say that it has grown into a crucial tool since then. The key concept underlying ATA is that it isn’t a single AI agent developed to comprehensively conduct security testing and threat analysis. Instead, Amazon developed multiple specialized AI agents that compete against each other in two teams to rapidly investigate real attack techniques and different ways they could be used against Amazon’s systems—and then propose security controls for human review.

    “The initial concept was aimed to address a critical limitation in security testing—limited coverage and the challenge of keeping detection capabilities current in a rapidly evolving threat landscape,” Steve Schmidt, Amazon’s chief security officer, tells WIRED. “Limited coverage means you can’t get through all of the software or you can’t get to all of the applications because you just don’t have enough humans. And then it’s great to do an analysis of a set of software, but if you don’t keep the detection systems themselves up to date with the changes in the threat landscape, you’re missing half of the picture.”

    As part of scaling its use of ATA, Amazon developed special “high-fidelity” testing environments that are deeply realistic reflections of Amazon’s production systems, so ATA can both ingest and produce real telemetry for analysis.

    The company’s security teams also made a point to design ATA so every technique it employs, and detection capability it produces, is validated with real, automatic testing and system data. Red team agents that are working on finding attacks that could be used against Amazon’s systems execute actual commands in ATA’s special test environments that produce verifiable logs. Blue team, or defense-focused agents, use real telemetry to confirm whether the protections they are proposing are effective. And anytime an agent develops a novel technique, it also pulls time-stamped logs to prove that its claims are accurate.

    This verifiability reduces false positives, Schmidt says, and acts as “hallucination management.” Because the system is built to demand certain standards of observable evidence, Schmidt claims that “hallucinations are architecturally impossible.”

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    Lily Hay Newman

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  • The Government Shutdown Is a Ticking Cybersecurity Time Bomb

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    Amid a government shutdown that has dragged on for more than five weeks, the United States Congressional Budget Office said on Thursday that it recently suffered a hack and moved to contain the breach. CBO provides nonpartisan financial and economic data to lawmakers, and The Washington Post reported that the agency was infiltrated by a “suspected foreign actor.”

    CBO spokesperson Caitlin Emma told WIRED in a statement that it has “implemented additional monitoring and new security controls to further protect the agency’s systems” and that “CBO occasionally faces threats to its network and continually monitors to address those threats.” Emma did not address questions from WIRED about whether the government shutdown has impacted technical personnel or cybersecurity-related work at CBO.

    With increasing instability in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) leaving Americans hungry, air traffic control personnel shortages disrupting flights, financial devastation for federal workers, and mounting operational shortages at the Social Security Administration, the shutdown is increasingly impacting every corner of the US. But researchers, former and current government workers, and federal technology experts warn that gaps in foundational activities during the shutdown—things like system patching, activity monitoring, and device management—could have real effects on federal defenses, both now and for years to come.

    “A lot of federal digital systems are still just running in the cloud throughout the shutdown, even if the office is empty,” says Safi Mojidi, a longtime cybersecurity researcher who previously worked for NASA and as a federal security contractor. “If everything was set up properly, then the cloud offers an important baseline of security, but it’s hard to rest easy during a shutdown knowing that even in the best of times there are problems getting security right.”

    Even before the shutdown, federal cybersecurity workers were being impacted by reductions in force at agencies like the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency—potentially hindering digital defense guidance and coordination across the government. And CISA has continued cutting staff during the shutdown as well.

    In a statement, spokesperson Marci McCarthy said “CISA continues to execute on its mission” but did not answer WIRED’s specific questions about how its work and digital defenses at other agencies have been impacted by the government shutdown, which she blamed on Democrats.

    The government’s transition to the cloud over the last decade, as well as increased attention to cybersecurity in recent years, does provide an important backstop for a disruption like a shutdown. Experts emphasize, though, that the federal landscape is not homogenous, and some agencies have made more progress and are better equipped than others. Additionally, missed and overlooked digital security work that accumulates during the shutdown will create a backlog when workers return that could be difficult to surmount.

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    Lily Hay Newman

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  • Why the F5 Hack Created an ‘Imminent Threat’ for Thousands of Networks

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    Thousands of networks—many of them operated by the US government and Fortune 500 companies—face an “imminent threat” of being breached by a nation-state hacking group following the breach of a major maker of software, the federal government warned on Wednesday.

    F5, a Seattle-based maker of networking software, disclosed the breach on Wednesday. F5 said a “sophisticated” threat group working for an undisclosed nation-state government had surreptitiously and persistently dwelled in its network over a “long term.” Security researchers who have responded to similar intrusions in the past took the language to mean the hackers were inside the F5 network for years.

    Unprecedented

    During that time, F5 said, the hackers took control of the network segment the company uses to create and distribute updates for BIG IP, a line of server appliances that F5 says is used by 48 of the world’s top 50 corporations. Wednesday’s disclosure went on to say the threat group downloaded proprietary BIG-IP source code information about vulnerabilities that had been privately discovered but not yet patched. The hackers also obtained configuration settings that some customers used inside their networks.

    Control of the build system and access to the source code, customer configurations, and documentation of unpatched vulnerabilities has the potential to give the hackers unprecedented knowledge of weaknesses and the ability to exploit them in supply-chain attacks on thousands of networks, many of which are sensitive. The theft of customer configurations and other data further raises the risk that sensitive credentials can be abused, F5 and outside security experts said.

    Customers position BIG-IP at the very edge of their networks for use as load balancers and firewalls, and for inspection and encryption of data passing into and out of networks. Given BIG-IP’s network position and its role in managing traffic for web servers, previous compromises have allowed adversaries to expand their access to other parts of an infected network.

    F5 said that investigations by two outside intrusion-response firms have yet to find any evidence of supply-chain attacks. The company attached letters from firms IOActive and NCC Group attesting that analyses of source code and build pipeline uncovered no signs that a “threat actor modified or introduced any vulnerabilities into the in-scope items.” The firms also said they didn’t identify any evidence of critical vulnerabilities in the system. Investigators, which also included Mandiant and CrowdStrike, found no evidence that data from its CRM, financial, support case management, or health systems was accessed.

    The company released updates for its BIG-IP, F5OS, BIG-IQ, and APM products. CVE designations and other details are here. Two days ago, F5 rotated BIG-IP signing certificates, though there was no immediate confirmation that the move is in response to the breach.

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    Dan Goodin, Ars Technica

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  • A New Attack Lets Hackers Steal 2-Factor Authentication Codes From Android Phones

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    Android devices are vulnerable to a new attack that can covertly steal two-factor authentication codes, location timelines, and other private data in less than 30 seconds.

    The new attack, named Pixnapping by the team of academic researchers who devised it, requires a victim to first install a malicious app on an Android phone or tablet. The app, which requires no system permissions, can then effectively read data that any other installed app displays on the screen. Pixnapping has been demonstrated on Google Pixel phones and the Samsung Galaxy S25 phone and likely could be modified to work on other models with additional work. Google released mitigations last month, but the researchers said a modified version of the attack works even when the update is installed.

    Like Taking a Screenshot

    Pixnapping attacks begin with the malicious app invoking Android programming interfaces that cause the authenticator or other targeted apps to send sensitive information to the device screen. The malicious app then runs graphical operations on individual pixels of interest to the attacker. Pixnapping then exploits a side channel that allows the malicious app to map the pixels at those coordinates to letters, numbers, or shapes.

    “Anything that is visible when the target app is opened can be stolen by the malicious app using Pixnapping,” the researchers wrote on an informational website. “Chat messages, 2FA codes, email messages, etc. are all vulnerable since they are visible. If an app has secret information that is not visible (e.g., it has a secret key that is stored but never shown on the screen), that information cannot be stolen by Pixnapping.”

    The new attack class is reminiscent of GPU.zip, a 2023 attack that allowed malicious websites to read the usernames, passwords, and other sensitive visual data displayed by other websites. It worked by exploiting side channels found in GPUs from all major suppliers. The vulnerabilities that GPU.zip exploited have never been fixed. Instead, the attack was blocked in browsers by limiting their ability to open iframes, an HTML element that allows one website (in the case of GPU.zip, a malicious one) to embed the contents of a site from a different domain.

    Pixnapping targets the same side channel as GPU.zip, specifically the precise amount of time it takes for a given frame to be rendered on the screen.

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    Dan Goodin, Ars Technica

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  • Vibe Coding Is the New Open Source—in the Worst Way Possible

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    Just like you probably don’t grow and grind wheat to make flour for your bread, most software developers don’t write every line of code in a new project from scratch. Doing so would be extremely slow and could create more security issues than it solves. So developers draw on existing libraries—often open source projects—to get various basic software components in place.

    While this approach is efficient, it can create exposure and lack of visibility into software. Increasingly, however, the rise of vibe coding is being used in a similar way, allowing developers to quickly spin up code that they can simply adapt rather than writing from scratch. Security researchers warn, though, that this new genre of plug-and-play code is making software-supply-chain security even more complicated—and dangerous.

    “We’re hitting the point right now where AI is about to lose its grace period on security,” says Alex Zenla, chief technology officer of the cloud security firm Edera. “And AI is its own worst enemy in terms of generating code that’s insecure. If AI is being trained in part on old, vulnerable, or low-quality software that’s available out there, then all the vulnerabilities that have existed can reoccur and be introduced again, not to mention new issues.”

    In addition to sucking up potentially insecure training data, the reality of vibe coding is that it produces a rough draft of code that may not fully take into account all of the specific context and considerations around a given product or service. In other words, even if a company trains a local model on a project’s source code and a natural language description of goals, the production process is still relying on human reviewers’ ability to spot any and every possible flaw or incongruity in code originally generated by AI.

    “Engineering groups need to think about the development lifecycle in the era of vibe coding,” says Eran Kinsbruner, a researcher at the application security firm Checkmarx. “If you ask the exact same LLM model to write for your specific source code, every single time it will have a slightly different output. One developer within the team will generate one output and the other developer is going to get a different output. So that introduces an additional complication beyond open source.”

    In a Checkmarx survey of chief information security officers, application security managers, and heads of development, a third of respondents said that more than 60 percent of their organization’s code was generated by AI in 2024. But only 18 percent of respondents said that their organization has a list of approved tools for vibe coding. Checkmarx polled thousands of professionals and published the findings in August—emphasizing, too, that AI development is making it harder to trace “ownership” of code.

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    Lily Hay Newman

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  • This Microsoft Entra ID Vulnerability Could Have Been Catastrophic

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    As businesses around the world have shifted their digital infrastructure over the last decade from self-hosted servers to the cloud, they’ve benefitted from the standardized, built-in security features of major cloud providers like Microsoft. But with so much riding on these systems, there can be potentially disastrous consequences at a massive scale if something goes wrong. Case in point: Security researcher Dirk-jan Mollema recently stumbled upon a pair of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure’s identity and access management platform that could have been exploited for a potentially cataclysmic takeover of all Azure customer accounts.

    Known as Entra ID, the system stores each Azure cloud customer’s user identities, sign-in access controls, applications, and subscription management tools. Mollema has studied Entra ID security in depth and published multiple studies about weaknesses in the system, which was formerly known as Azure Active Directory. But while preparing to present at the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas in July, Mollema discovered two vulnerabilities that he realized could be used to gain global administrator privileges—essentially god mode—and compromise every Entra ID directory, or what is known as a “tenant.” Mollema says that this would have exposed nearly every Entra ID tenant in the world other than, perhaps, government cloud infrastructure.

    “I was just staring at my screen. I was like, ‘No, this shouldn’’t really happen,’” says Mollema, who runs the Dutch cybersecurity company Outsider Security and specializes in cloud security. “It was quite bad. As bad as it gets, I would say.”

    “From my own tenants—my test tenant or even a trial tenant—you could request these tokens and you could impersonate basically anybody else in anybody else’s tenant,” Mollema adds. “That means you could modify other people’s configuration, create new and admin users in that tenant, and do anything you would like.”

    Given the seriousness of the vulnerability, Mollema disclosed his findings to the Microsoft Security Response Center on July 14, the same day that he discovered the flaws. Microsoft started investigating the findings that day and issued a fix globally on July 17. The company confirmed to Mollema that the issue was fixed by July 23 and implemented extra measures in August. Microsoft issued a CVE for the vulnerability on September 4.

    “We mitigated the newly identified issue quickly, and accelerated the remediation work underway to decommission this legacy protocol usage, as part of our Secure Future Initiative,” Tom Gallagher, Microsoft’s Security Response Center vice president of engineering, told WIRED in a statement. “We implemented a code change within the vulnerable validation logic, tested the fix, and applied it across our cloud ecosystem.”

    Gallagher says that Microsoft found “no evidence of abuse” of the vulnerability during its investigation.

    Both vulnerabilities relate to legacy systems still functioning within Entra ID. The first involves a type of Azure authentication token Mollema discovered known as Actor Tokens that are issued by an obscure Azure mechanism called the “Access Control Service.” Actor Tokens have some special system properties that Mollema realized could be useful to an attacker when combined with another vulnerability. The other bug was a major flaw in a historic Azure Active Directory application programming interface known as “Graph” that was used to facilitate access to data stored in Microsoft 365. Microsoft is in the process of retiring Azure Active Directory Graph and transitioning users to its successor, Microsoft Graph, which is designed for Entra ID. The flaw was related to a failure by Azure AD Graph to properly validate which Azure tenant was making an access request, which could be manipulated so the API would accept an Actor Token from a different tenant that should have been rejected.

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    Matt Burgess, Lily Hay Newman

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  • These are the Password Managers You Should Use Instead of Your Browser

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    Setting up and migrating to Dashlane from another password manager is simple, and you’ll use a secret key to encrypt your passwords, much like BitWarden’s setup process. In practice, Dashlane is very similar to the others on this list. Dashlane offers a 30-day free trial, so you can test it out before committing.

    After signing up, download the app for Android and iOS, and grab the browser extensions for Firefox, Chrome, and Edge.


    Best for Bundled Services

    Photograph: Nordpass

    You might know Nord better for its VPN service, but the company also offers a password manager, NordPass, and a pretty nice online storage system, NordLocker. A part of the appeal of NordPass comes in bundling it with the company’s other services for some compelling deals. As a password manager, NordPass offers everything you need. It uses a zero-knowledge setup in which all data is encrypted on your device before it’s uploaded to the company’s servers. Unlike most services here, NordPass uses XChaCha20 for encryption. It would require a deep dive into cryptography to get into the differences, but the short story is that it’s just as secure and maybe slightly faster than the AES-256 encryption used by other services.

    There’s a personal information storage feature to keep your address, phone number, and other personal data safe and secure, but easy to access. NordPass also offers an emergency access feature, which allows you to grant another NordPass user emergency access to your vault. It works just like the same feature in 1Password, allowing trusted friends or family to access your account if you cannot.

    Other nice features include support for two-factor authentication to sign in to your account, as well as security tools to evaluate the strength of your passwords and alert you if any of your data is compromised. Note that NordPass Premium is theoretically $3 a month, but there are always sales that bring that much lower.

    The downside, and my one gripe about all Nord services, is that there is no monthly plan. As noted above, the best deal comes in combining NordPass, NordVPN, and NordLocker for a bundled deal. A free version of NordPass is available, but it’s restricted to only a single device.

    After signing up, download the app for Android and iOS, and grab the browser extensions for Firefox, Chrome, and Edge.


    Best DIY Options (Self-Hosted)

    Want to retain more control over your data in the cloud? Sync your password vault yourself. The services below do not store any of your data on their servers. This means attackers have nothing to target. Instead of storing your passwords, these services use a local vault to store your data, and then you can sync that vault using a file-syncing service like Dropbox, NextCloud, or Edward Snowden’s recommended service, SpiderOak. There are two services to keep track of in this scenario, making it a little more complex. But if you’re already using a file-syncing file service, this can be a good option.

    You can also properly host your own vault with network-attached storage or a local server.

    Screenshot of Enpass password manager app on desktop

    Courtesy of Enpass

    Enpass does not store any data on its servers. Syncing is handled through third-party services. Enpass doesn’t do the syncing, but it does offer apps on every platform. That means once you have syncing set up, it works just like any other service. And you don’t have to worry about Enpass being hacked, because your data isn’t on its servers. Enpass supports syncing through Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive, iCloud, Box, Nextcloud, or any service using WebDAV. Alas, SpiderOak is not currently supported. You can also synchronize your data over a local WLAN or Wi-Fi network.

    All of the features you expect in a password manager are here, including auto-generating passwords, breach-monitoring, biometric login (for devices that support it), auto-filling passwords, and options to store other types of data, like credit cards and identification data. There’s also a password audit feature to highlight any weak or duplicate passwords in your vault. One extra I particularly like is the ability to tag passwords for easier searching. Enpass also makes setting up the syncing through the service of your choice very easy. Enpass added support for passkeys, too.

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    Scott Gilbertson, Jacob Roach

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  • The War on Passwords Is One Step Closer to Being Over

    The War on Passwords Is One Step Closer to Being Over

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    The password-killing tech known as “passkeys” have proliferated over the past two years, developed by the tech industry association known as the FIDO Alliance as an easier and more secure authentication alternative. And although superseding any technology as entrenched as passwords is difficult, new features and resources launching this week are pushing passkeys toward a tipping point.

    At the FIDO Alliance’s Authenticate Conference in Carlsbad, California, on Monday, researchers are announcing two projects that will make passkeys easier for organizations to offer—and easier for everyone to use. One is a new technical specification called Credential Exchange Protocol (CXP) that will make passkeys portable between digital ecosystems, a feature that users have increasingly demanded. The other is a website, called Passkey Central, where developers and system administrators can find resources like metrics and implementation guides that make it easier to add support for passkeys on existing digital platforms.

    “To me, both announcements are part of the broader story of the industry working together to stop our dependence on passwords,” Andrew Shikiar, CEO of the FIDO Alliance, told WIRED ahead of Monday’s announcements. “And when it comes to CXP, we have all these companies who are fierce competitors willing to collaborate on credential exchange.”

    CXP comprises a set of draft specifications developed by the FIDO Alliance’s “Credential Provider Special Interest Group.” Development of technical standards can often be a fraught bureaucratic process, but the creation of CXP seems to have been positive and collaborative. Researchers from the password managers 1Password, Bitwarden, Dashlane, NordPass, and Enpass all worked on CXP, as did those from the identity providers Okta as well as Apple, Google, Microsoft, Samsung, and SK Telecom.

    The specifications are significant for a few reasons. CXP was created for passkeys and is meant to address a longstanding criticism that passkeys could contribute to user lock-in by making it prohibitively difficult for people to move between operating system vendors and types of devices. In many ways, though, this problem already exists with passwords. Export features that allow you to move all of your passwords from one manager to another are often dangerously exposed and essentially just dump a list of all of your passwords into a plaintext file.

    It’s gotten much easier to sync passkeys across your devices through a single password manager, but CXP aims to standardize the technical process for securely transferring them between platforms so users are free—and safe—to roam the digital landscape. Importantly, while CXP was designed with passkeys in mind, it is really a specification that can be adapted to securely exchange other secrets as well, including passwords or other types of data.

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    Lily Hay Newman

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  • Stealthy Malware Has Infected Thousands of Linux Systems for Years

    Stealthy Malware Has Infected Thousands of Linux Systems for Years

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    Other discussions include: Reddit, Stack Overflow (Spanish), forobeta (Spanish), brainycp (Russian), natnetwork (Indonesian), Proxmox (Deutsch), Camel2243 (Chinese), svrforum (Korean), exabytes, virtualmin, serverfault and many others.

    After exploiting a vulnerability or misconfiguration, the exploit code downloads the main payload from a server, which, in most cases, has been hacked by the attacker and converted into a channel for distributing the malware anonymously. An attack that targeted the researchers’ honeypot named the payload httpd. Once executed, the file copies itself from memory to a new location in the /temp directory, runs it, and then terminates the original process and deletes the downloaded binary.

    Once moved to the /tmp directory, the file executes under a different name, which mimics the name of a known Linux process. The file hosted on the honeypot was named sh. From there, the file establishes a local command-and-control process and attempts to gain root system rights by exploiting CVE-2021-4043, a privilege-escalation vulnerability that was patched in 2021 in Gpac, a widely used open source multimedia framework.

    The malware goes on to copy itself from memory to a handful of other disk locations, once again using names that appear as routine system files. The malware then drops a rootkit, a host of popular Linux utilities that have been modified to serve as rootkits, and the miner. In some cases, the malware also installs software for “proxy-jacking,” the term for surreptitiously routing traffic through the infected machine so the true origin of the data isn’t revealed.

    The researchers continued:

    As part of its command-and-control operation, the malware opens a Unix socket, creates two directories under the /tmp directory, and stores data there that influences its operation. This data includes host events, locations of the copies of itself, process names, communication logs, tokens, and additional log information. Additionally, the malware uses environment variables to store data that further affects its execution and behavior.

    All the binaries are packed, stripped, and encrypted, indicating significant efforts to bypass defense mechanisms and hinder reverse engineering attempts. The malware also uses advanced evasion techniques, such as suspending its activity when it detects a new user in the btmp or utmp files and terminating any competing malware to maintain control over the infected system.

    By extrapolating data such as the number of Linux servers connected to the internet across various services and applications, as tracked by services such as Shodan and Censys, the researchers estimate that the number of machines infected by Perfctl is measured in the thousands. They say that the pool of vulnerable machines—meaning those that have yet to install the patch for CVE-2023-33426 or contain a vulnerable misconfiguration—is in the millions. The researchers have yet to measure the amount of cryptocurrency the malicious miners have generated.

    People who want to determine if their device has been targeted or infected by Perfctl should look for indicators of compromise included in Thursday’s post. They should also be on the lookout for unusual spikes in CPU usage or sudden system slowdowns, particularly if they occur during idle times. Thursday’s report also provides steps for preventing infections in the first place.

    This story originally appeared on Ars Technica.

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    Dan Goodin, Ars Technica

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  • YubiKeys Are a Security Gold Standard—but They Can Be Cloned

    YubiKeys Are a Security Gold Standard—but They Can Be Cloned

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    The YubiKey 5, the most widely used hardware token for two-factor authentication based on the FIDO standard, contains a cryptographic flaw that makes the finger-sized device vulnerable to cloning when an attacker gains temporary physical access to it, researchers said Tuesday.

    The cryptographic flaw, known as a side channel, resides in a small microcontroller used in a large number of other authentication devices, including smartcards used in banking, electronic passports, and the accessing of secure areas. While the researchers have confirmed all YubiKey 5 series models can be cloned, they haven’t tested other devices using the microcontroller, such as the SLE78 made by Infineon and successor microcontrollers known as the Infineon Optiga Trust M and the Infineon Optiga TPM. The researchers suspect that any device using any of these three microcontrollers and the Infineon cryptographic library contains the same vulnerability.

    Patching Not Possible

    YubiKey maker Yubico issued an advisory in coordination with a detailed disclosure report from NinjaLab, the security firm that reverse engineered the YubiKey 5 series and devised the cloning attack. All YubiKeys running firmware prior to version 5.7—which was released in May and replaces the Infineon cryptolibrary with a custom one—are vulnerable. Updating key firmware on the YubiKey isn’t possible. That leaves all affected YubiKeys permanently vulnerable.

    “An attacker could exploit this issue as part of a sophisticated and targeted attack to recover affected private keys,” the advisory confirmed. “The attacker would need physical possession of the YubiKey, Security Key, or YubiHSM; knowledge of the accounts they want to target; and specialized equipment to perform the necessary attack. Depending on the use case, the attacker may also require additional knowledge, including username, PIN, account password, or authentication key.”

    Side channels are the result of clues left in physical manifestations such as electromagnetic emanations, data caches, or the time required to complete a task that leaks cryptographic secrets. In this case, the side channel is the amount of time taken during a mathematical calculation known as a modular inversion. The Infineon cryptolibrary failed to implement a common side-channel defense known as constant time as it performs modular inversion operations involving the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Constant time ensures the time-sensitive cryptographic operations execute is uniform rather than variable depending on the specific keys.

    More precisely, the side channel is located in the Infineon implementation of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, a method for, among other things, computing the modular inverse. By using an oscilloscope to measure the electromagnetic radiation while the token is authenticating itself, the researchers can detect tiny execution time differences that reveal a token’s ephemeral ECDSA key, also known as a nonce. Further analysis allows the researchers to extract the secret ECDSA key that underpins the entire security of the token.

    In Tuesday’s report, NinjaLab cofounder Thomas Roche wrote:

    In the present work, NinjaLab unveils a new side-channel vulnerability in the ECDSA implementation of Infineon 9 on any security microcontroller family of the manufacturer. This vulnerability lies in the ECDSA ephemeral key (or nonce) modular inversion, and, more precisely, in the Infineon implementation of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA for short). To our knowledge, this is the first time an implementation of the EEA is shown to be vulnerable to side-channel analysis (contrarily to the EEA binary version). The exploitation of this vulnerability is demonstrated through realistic experiments and we show that an adversary only needs to have access to the device for a few minutes. The offline phase took us about 24 hours; with more engineering work in the attack development, it would take less than one hour.

    After a long phase of understanding Infineon implementation through side-channel analysis on a Feitian 10 open JavaCard smartcard, the attack is tested on a YubiKey 5Ci, a FIDO hardware token from Yubico. All YubiKey 5 Series (before the firmware update 5.7 11 of May 6th, 2024) are affected by the attack. In fact all products relying on the ECDSA of Infineon cryptographic library running on an Infineon security microcontroller are affected by the attack. We estimate that the vulnerability exists for more than 14 years in Infineon top secure chips. These chips and the vulnerable part of the cryptographic library went through about 80 CC certification evaluations of level AVA VAN 4 (for TPMs) or AVA VAN 5 (for the others) from 2010 to 2024 (and a bit less than 30 certificate maintenances).

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    Dan Goodin, Ars Technica

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  • Powerful Spyware Exploits Enable a New String of ‘Watering Hole’ Attacks

    Powerful Spyware Exploits Enable a New String of ‘Watering Hole’ Attacks

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    In recent years, elite commercial spyware vendors like Intellexa and NSO Group have developed an array of powerful hacking tools that exploit rare and unpatched “zero-day” software vulnerabilities to compromise victim devices. And increasingly, governments around the world have emerged as the prime customers for these tools, compromising the smartphones of opposition leaders, journalists, activists, lawyers, and others. On Thursday, though, Google’s Threat Analysis Group is publishing findings about a series of recent hacking campaigns—seemingly carried out by Russia’s notorious APT29 Cozy Bear gang—that incorporate exploits very similar to ones developed by Intellexa and NSO Group into ongoing espionage activity.

    Between November 2023 and July 2024, the attackers compromised Mongolian government websites and used the access to conduct “watering hole” attacks, in which anyone with a vulnerable device who loads a compromised website gets hacked. The attackers set up the malicious infrastructure to use exploits that “were identical or strikingly similar to exploits previously used by commercial surveillance vendors Intellexa and NSO Group,” Google’s TAG wrote on Thursday. The researchers say they “assess with moderate confidence” that the campaigns were carried out by APT29.

    These spyware-esque hacking tools exploited vulnerabilities in Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android that had largely already been patched. Originally, they were deployed by the spyware vendors as unpatched, zero-day exploits, but in this iteration, the suspected Russian hackers were using them to target devices that hadn’t been updated with these fixes.

    “While we are uncertain how suspected APT29 actors acquired these exploits, our research underscores the extent to which exploits first developed by the commercial surveillance industry are proliferated to dangerous threat actors,” the TAG researchers wrote. “Moreover, watering hole attacks remain a threat where sophisticated exploits can be utilized to target those that visit sites regularly, including on mobile devices. Watering holes can still be an effective avenue for … mass targeting a population that might still run unpatched browsers.”

    It is possible that the hackers purchased and adapted the spyware exploits or that they stole them or acquired them through a leak. It is also possible that the hackers were inspired by commercial exploits and reverse engineered them by examining infected victim devices.

    “NSO does not sell its products to Russia,” Gil Lainer, NSO Groups vice president for global communications, told WIRED in a statement. “Our technologies are sold exclusively to vetted US & Israel-allied intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Our systems and technologies are highly secure and are continuously monitored to detect and neutralize external threats.”

    Between November 2023 and February 2024, the hackers used an iOS and Safari exploit that was technically identical to an offering that Intellexa had first debuted a couple of months earlier as an unpatched zero-day in September 2023. In July 2024, the hackers also used a Chrome exploit adapted from an NSO Group tool that first appeared in May 2024. This latter hacking tool was used in combination with an exploit that had strong similarities to one Intellexa debuted back in September 2021.

    When attackers exploit vulnerabilities that have already been patched, the activity is known as “n-day exploitation,” because the vulnerability still exists and can be abused in unpatched devices as time passes. The suspected Russian hackers incorporated the commercial spyware adjacent tools, but constructed their overall campaigns—including malware delivery and activity on compromised devices—differently than the typical commercial spyware customer would. This indicates a level of fluency and technical proficiency characteristic of an established and well-resourced state-backed hacking group.

    “In each iteration of the watering hole campaigns, the attackers used exploits that were identical or strikingly similar to exploits from [commercial surveillance vendors], Intellexa and NSO Group,” TAG wrote. “We do not know how the attackers acquired these exploits. What is clear is that APT actors are using n-day exploits that were originally used as 0-days by CSVs.”

    Updated at 2pm ET, August 29, 2024: Added comment from NSO Group.

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    Lily Hay Newman

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  • Google Researchers Found Nearly a Dozen Flaws in Popular Qualcomm Software for Mobile GPUs

    Google Researchers Found Nearly a Dozen Flaws in Popular Qualcomm Software for Mobile GPUs

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    Demand for graphics processing units or GPUs has exploded in recent years as video rendering and artificial intelligence systems have expanded the need for processing power. And while most of the most visible shortages (and soaring stock prices) relate to top-tier PC and server chips, mobile graphics processors are the version that everyone with a smartphone is using everyday. So vulnerabilities in these chips or how they’re implemented can have real-world consequences. That’s exactly why Google’s Android vulnerability hunting red team set its sights on open-source software from the chip giant Qualcomm that’s widely used to implement mobile GPUs.

    At the Defcon security conference in Las Vegas on Friday, three Google researchers presented more than nine vulnerabilities—now patched—that they discovered in Qualcomm’s Adreno GPU, a suite of software used to coordinate between GPUs and an operating system like Android on Qualcomm-powered phones. Such “drivers” are crucial to how any computer is designed and have deep privileges in the kernel of an operating system to coordinate between hardware peripherals and software. Attackers could exploit the flaws the researchers found to take full control of a device.

    For years, engineers and attackers alike have been most focused on potential vulnerabilities in a computer’s central processing unit (CPU) and have optimized for efficiency on GPUs, leaning on them for raw processing power. But as GPUs become more central to everything a device does all the time, hackers on both ends of the spectrum are looking at how GPU infrastructure could be exploited.

    “We are a small team compared to the big Android ecosystem—the scope is too big for us to cover everything, so we have to figure out what will have the most impact,” says Xuan Xing, manager of Google’s Android Red Team. “So why did we focus on a GPU driver for this case? It’s because there’s no permission required for untrusted apps to access GPU drivers. This is very important, and I think will attract lots of attackers’ attention.”

    Xing is referring to the fact that applications on Android phones can talk to the Adreno GPU driver directly with “no sandboxing, no additional permission checks,” as he puts it. This doesn’t in itself give applications the ability to go rogue, but it does make GPU drivers a bridge between the regular parts of the operating system (where data and access are carefully controlled), and the system kernel, which has full control over the entire device including its memory. “GPU drivers have all sorts of powerful functions,” Xing says. “That mapping in memory is a powerful primitive attackers want to have.”

    The researchers say the vulnerabilities they uncovered are all flaws that come out of the intricacies and complicated interconnections that GPU drivers must navigate to coordinate everything. To exploit the flaws, attackers would need to first establish access to a target device, perhaps by tricking victims into side-loading malicious apps.

    “There are a lot of moving parts and no access restrictions, so GPU drivers are readily accessible to pretty much every application,” says Eugene Rodionov, technical leader of the Android Red Team. “What really makes things problematic here is complexity of the implementation—that is one item which accounts for a number of vulnerabilities.”

    Qualcomm released patches for the flaws to “original equipment manufacturers” (OEMs) that use Qualcomm chips and software in the Android phones they make. “Regarding the GPU issues disclosed by Android Security Red Team, patches were made available to OEMs in May 2024,” a Qualcomm Spokesperson tells WIRED. “We encourage end users to apply security updates from device makers as they become available.”

    The Android ecosystem is complex, and patches must move from a vendor like Qualcomm to OEMs and then get packaged by each individual device maker and delivered to users’ phones. This trickle-down process sometimes means that devices can be left exposed, but Google has spent years investing to improve these pipelines and streamline communication.

    Still, the findings are yet another reminder that GPUs themselves and the software supporting them have the potential to become a critical battleground in computer security.

    As Rodionov puts it, “combining high complexity of the implementation with wide accessibility makes it a very interesting target for attackers.”

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    Lily Hay Newman

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  • A Flaw in Windows Update Opens the Door to Zombie Exploits

    A Flaw in Windows Update Opens the Door to Zombie Exploits

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    New research being presented at the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas today shows that a vulnerability in Windows Update could be exploited to downgrade Windows to older versions, exposing a slew of historical vulnerabilities that then can be exploited to gain full control of a system. Microsoft says that it is working on a complex process to carefully patch the issue, dubbed “Downdate.”

    Alon Leviev, the SafeBreach Labs researcher who discovered the flaw, says he started looking for possible downgrade attack methods after seeing that a startling hacking campaign from last year was using a type of malware (known as the “BlackLotus UEFI bootkit”) that relied on downgrading the Windows boot manager to an old, vulnerable version. After probing the Windows Update flow, Leviev discovered a path to strategically downgrading Windows—either the entire operating system or just specifically chosen components. From there, he developed a proof-of-concept attack that utilized this access to disable the Windows protection known as Virtualization-Based Security (VBS) and ultimately target highly privileged code running in the computer’s core “kernel.”

    “I found a downgrade exploit that is fully undetectable because it is performed by using Windows Update itself,” which the system trusts, Leviev told WIRED ahead of his conference talk. “In terms of invisibility, I didn’t uninstall any update—I basically updated the system even though under the hood it was downgraded. So the system is not aware of the downgrade and still appears up-to-date.”

    Leviev’s downgrade capability comes from a flaw in the components of the Windows Update process. To perform an upgrade, your PC places what is essentially a request to update in a special update folder. It then presents this folder to the Microsoft update server, which checks and confirms its integrity. Next, the server creates an additional update folder for you that only it can control, where it places and finalizes the update and also stores an action list—called “pending.xml”—that includes the steps of the update plan, such as which files will be updated and where the new code will be stored on your computer. When you reboot your PC, it takes the actions from the list and updates the software.

    The idea is that even if your computer, including your update folder, is compromised, a bad actor can’t hijack the update process because the crucial parts of it happen in the server-controlled update folder. Leviev looked closely at the different files in both the user’s update folder and the server’s update folder, though, and he eventually found that while he couldn’t modify the action list in the server’s update folder directly, one of the keys controlling it—called “PoqexecCmdline”—was not locked. This gave Leviev a way to manipulate the action list, and with it the entire update process, without the system realizing that anything was amiss.

    With this control, Leviev then found strategies to downgrade multiple key components of Windows, including drivers, which coordinate with hardware peripherals; dynamic link libraries, which contain system programs and data; and, crucially, the NT kernel, which contains the most core instructions for a computer to run. All of these could be downgraded to older versions that contain known, patched vulnerabilities. And Leviev even cast a wider net from there, to find strategies for downgrading Windows security components including the Windows Secure Kernel; the Windows password and storage component Credential Guard; the hypervisor, which creates and oversees virtual machines on a system; and VBS, the Windows virtualization security mechanism.

    The technique does not include a way to first gain remote access to a victim device, but for an attacker who already has initial access, it could enable a true rampage, because Windows Update is such a trusted mechanism and can reintroduce a vast array of dangerous vulnerabilities that have been fixed by Microsoft over the years. Microsoft says that it has not seen any attempts to exploit the technique.

    “We are actively developing mitigations to protect against these risks while following an extensive process involving a thorough investigation, update development across all affected versions, and compatibility testing, to ensure maximized customer protection with minimized operational disruption,” a Microsoft spokesperson told WIRED in a statement.

    Part of the company’s fix involves revoking vulnerable VBS system files, which must be done carefully and gradually, because it could cause integration issues or reintroduce other, unrelated problems that were previously addressed by those same system files.

    Leviev emphasizes that downgrade attacks are an important threat for the developer community to consider as hackers endlessly seek paths into target systems that are stealthy and difficult to detect.

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    Lily Hay Newman

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  • How Infostealers Pillaged the World’s Passwords

    How Infostealers Pillaged the World’s Passwords

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    These platforms take cues in how they are designed and marketed from legitimate information and ecommerce services. Many markets and forums charge a subscription fee to access the platform and then have different pricing structures for data depending on how valuable it might be. Currently, Gray says, Russian Market has so much stolen data available from infostealers that it has been charging a low flat rate, typically no more than $10, for any subset of data users want to download.

    “Organizations have become very good with their security, and people have also gotten more savvy, so they’re not the best targets now,” for traditional tailored attacks, Gray says. “So attackers need something that’s less targeted and more based on what they can make use of. Infostealers are modular and often sold on a subscription basis, and that evolution probably aligns with the rise of modern subscription services like video streaming.”

    Infostealers have been especially effective with the rise of remote work and hybrid work, as companies adapt to allowing employees to access work services from personal devices and personal accounts from work devices. This creates opportunities for infostealers to randomly compromise individuals on, say, their home computers but still end up with corporate access credentials because the person was logged into some of their work systems as well. It also makes it easier for infostealing malware to get around corporate protections, even on enterprise devices, if employees are able to have their personal email or social media accounts open.

    “I started paying attention to this once it became an enterprise problem,” Mandiant’s Carmakal says. “And particularly around 2020, because I started seeing more intrusions of enterprises first starting from compromises of home computers—through phishing of people’s Yahoo accounts, Gmail accounts, and Hotmail accounts that were totally unrelated to any enterprise targeting, but to me look very opportunistic.”

    Victoria Kivilevich, director of threat research at security firm KELA, says that in some instances criminals can use cybercrime markets to search for the domain of potential targets and see if any credentials are available. Kivilevich says the sale of infostealer data can be considered as the “supply chain” for various types of cyberattacks, including ransomware operators looking for the details of potential victims, those involved in business email compromise, and even initial access brokers who can sell the details along again to other cybercriminals.

    On various cybercrime marketplaces and Telegram, Kivilevich says, there have been more than 7,000 compromised credentials linked to Snowflake accounts being shared. In one instance, a criminal has been touting access to 41 companies from the education sector; another cybercriminal claims to be selling access to US companies with revenues between $50 million and $8 billion, according to Kivilevich’s analysis.

    “I don’t think there was one company that came to us and had zero accounts compromised by infostealer malware,” Kivilevich says of the threat that infostealer logs provide to businesses, with KELA saying infostealer-related activity jumped in 2023. Irina Nesterovsky, KELA’s chief research officer, says millions of credentials have been collected by infostealing malware in recent years. “This is a real threat,” Nesterovsky says.

    Carmakal says there are multiple steps companies and individuals can take to protect themselves from the threat of infostealers and their aftereffects, including using antivirus or EDR products to detect malicious activity. Companies should be strict on enforcing multifactor authentication across their users, he says. “We try to encourage people to not synchronize passwords on their corporate devices with their personal devices,” Carmakal adds.

    The use of infostealers has been working so well that it is all but inevitable that cybercriminals will look to replicate the success of compromise sprees like Snowflake and get creative about other enterprise software services that they can use as entry points for access to an array of different customer companies. Carmakal warns that he expects to see this result in more breaches in the coming months. “There’s no ambiguity about this,” he says. “Threat actors will start hunting for infostealer logs, and looking for other SaaS providers, similar to Snowflake, where they log in and steal data, and then extort those companies.”

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    Lily Hay Newman, Matt Burgess

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  • Huge Microsoft Outage Linked to CrowdStrike Takes Down Computers Around the World

    Huge Microsoft Outage Linked to CrowdStrike Takes Down Computers Around the World

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    Banks, airports, TV stations, hotels, and countless other businesses are all facing widespread IT outages, leaving flights grounded and causing widespread disruption, after Windows machines have displayed errors worldwide.

    In the early hours of Friday, companies in Australia running Microsoft’s Windows operating system started reporting devices showing Blue Screens of Death (BSODs). Shortly after, reports of disruptions started flooding in from around the world, including from the UK, the Netherlands, and the US: TV station Sky News went offline, and US airlines United, Delta, and American Airlines issued a “global ground stop” on all flights.

    The widespread Windows outages have been linked to a software update from cybersecurity giant ​​Crowdstrike. It is not believed the issues are linked to a malicious cyberattack. Engineers from the company posted to the company’s Reddit forum that it has seen “widespread reports of BSODs on Windows hosts” occurring across its software, is working on the problem, and has advised a workaround for impacted systems.

    The incident, so far, appears to only be impacting devices running Windows and not other operating systems. It is unclear exactly how widespread the issues are and how long they will take to resolve. Microsoft and Crowdstrike did not immediately respond to WIRED’s requests for comment on the outage.

    However, the incident could result in “millions” being lost by organizations impacted who have had to halt their operations or stop business, says Lukasz Olejnik, an independent cybersecurity consultant, who says the Crowdstrike update appears to be linked to its Falcon Sensor product. The Falcon system is part of Crowdstrike’s security tools and can block attacks on systems, according to the company.

    “It reminds us about our dependence on IT and software,” Olejnik says. “When a system has several software systems maintained by various vendors, this is equivalent to placing trust on them. They may be a single point of failure—like here, when various firms feel the impact.”

    This is a developing story and is being updated with new information.

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    Matt Burgess

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  • Microsoft’s Recall Feature Is Even More Hackable Than You Thought

    Microsoft’s Recall Feature Is Even More Hackable Than You Thought

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    Microsoft’s CEO Satya Nadella has hailed the company’s new Recall feature, which stores a history of your computer desktop and makes it available to AI for analysis, as “photographic memory” for your PC. Within the cybersecurity community, meanwhile, the notion of a tool that silently takes a screenshot of your desktop every five seconds has been hailed as a hacker’s dream come true and the worst product idea in recent memory.

    Now, security researchers have pointed out that even the one remaining security safeguard meant to protect that feature from exploitation can be trivially defeated.

    Since Recall was first announced last month, the cybersecurity world has pointed out that if a hacker can install malicious software to gain a foothold on a target machine with the feature enabled, they can quickly gain access to the user’s entire history stored by the function. The only barrier, it seemed, to that high-resolution view of a victim’s entire life at the keyboard was that accessing Recall’s data required administrator privileges on a user’s machine. That meant malware without that higher-level privilege would trigger a permission pop-up, allowing users to prevent access, and that malware would also likely be blocked by default from accessing the data on most corporate machines.

    Then on Wednesday, James Forshaw, a researcher with Google’s Project Zero vulnerability research team, published an update to a blog post pointing out that he had found methods for accessing Recall data without administrator privileges—essentially stripping away even that last fig leaf of protection. “No admin required ;-)” the post concluded.

    “Damn,” Forshaw added on Mastodon. “I really thought the Recall database security would at least be, you know, secure.”

    Forshaw’s blog post described two different techniques to bypass the administrator privilege requirement, both of which exploit ways of defeating a basic security function in Windows known as access control lists that determine which elements on a computer require which privileges to read and alter. One of Forshaw’s methods exploits an exception to those control lists, temporarily impersonating a program on Windows machines called AIXHost.exe that can access even restricted databases. Another is even simpler: Forshaw points out that because the Recall data stored on a machine is considered to belong to the user, a hacker with the same privileges as the user could simply rewrite the access control lists on a target machine to grant themselves access to the full database.

    That second, simpler bypass technique “is just mindblowing, to be honest,” says Alex Hagenah, a cybersecurity strategist and ethical hacker. Hagenah recently built a proof-of-concept hacker tool called TotalRecall designed to show that someone who gained access to a victim’s machine with Recall could immediately siphon out all the user’s history recorded by the feature. Hagenah’s tool, however, still required that hackers find another way to gain administrator privileges through a so-called “privilege escalation” technique before his tool would work.

    With Forshaw’s technique, “you don’t need any privilege escalation, no pop-up, nothing,” says Hagenah. “This would make sense to implement in the tool for a bad guy.”

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    Andy Greenberg

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  • The US Government Is Asking Big Tech to Promise Better Cybersecurity

    The US Government Is Asking Big Tech to Promise Better Cybersecurity

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    The pledge offers examples of how companies can meet the goals, although it notes that companies “have the discretion to decide how best” to do so. The document also emphasizes the importance of companies publicly demonstrating “measurable progress” on their goals, as well as documenting their techniques “​​so that others can learn.”

    CISA developed the pledge in consultation with tech companies, seeking to understand what would be feasible for them while also meeting the agency’s goals, according to Goldstein. That meant making sure the commitments were feasible for companies of all sizes, not just Silicon Valley giants.

    The agency originally tried using its Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative to prod companies into signing the pledge, according to the tech industry official, but that backfired when companies questioned the use of an operational cyberdefense collaboration group for “a policy and legal issue,” the industry official says.

    “Industry expressed frustration about trying to use the JCDC to obtain pledges,” the official says, and CISA “wisely pulled back on that effort.”

    CISA then held discussions with companies through the Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council and tweaked the pledge based on their feedback. Originally, the pledge contained more than seven goals, and CISA wanted signatories to commit to “firm metrics” for showing progress, according to the industry official. In the end, this person says, CISA removed several goals and “broadened the language” about measuring progress.

    John Miller, senior vice president of policy, trust, data, and technology at the Information Technology Industry Council, a major industry trade group, says that change was smart, because concrete progress metrics—like the number of users using multi-factor authentication—could be “easily misconstrued.”

    Goldstein says the number of pledge signatories is “exceeding my expectations about where we’d be” at this point. The industry official says they’re not aware of any company that has definitively refused to sign the pledge, in part because vendors want to “keep open the option of signing on” after CISA’s launch event at RSA. “Everyone’s in a kind of wait-and-see mode.”

    Legal liability is a top concern for potential signatory companies. “If there ends up being, inevitably, some type of security incident,” Miller says, “anything [a] company has said publicly could be used in lawsuits.”

    That said, Miller predicts that some global companies facing strict new European security requirements will sign the US pledge to “get that credit” for something they already have to do.

    CISA’s Secure by Design campaign is the centerpiece of the Biden administration’s ambitious plan to shift the burden of cybersecurity from users to vendors, a core theme of the administration’s National Cybersecurity Strategy. The push for corporate cyber responsibility follows years of disruptive supply-chain attacks on critical software makers like Microsoft, SolarWinds, Kaseya, and Change Healthcare, as well as a mounting list of widespread software vulnerabilities that have powered ransomware attacks on schools, hospitals, and other essential services. White House officials say the pattern of costly and often preventable breaches demonstrates the need for increased corporate accountability.

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    Eric Geller

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  • The Mystery of ‘Jia Tan,’ the XZ Backdoor Mastermind

    The Mystery of ‘Jia Tan,’ the XZ Backdoor Mastermind

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    Ultimately, Scott argues that those three years of code changes and polite emails were likely not spent sabotaging multiple software projects, but rather building up a history of credibility in preparation for the sabotage of XZ Utils specifically—and potentially other projects in the future. “He just never got to that step because we got lucky and found his stuff,” says Scott. “So that’s burned now, and he’s gonna have to go back to square one.”

    Technical Ticks and Time Zones

    Despite Jia Tan’s persona as a single individual, their yearslong preparation is a hallmark of a well-organized state-sponsored hacker group, argues Raiu, the former Kaspersky lead researcher. So too are the technical hallmarks of the XZ Utils malicious code that Jia Tan added. Raiu notes that, at a glance, the code truly looks like a compression tool. “It’s written in a very subversive manner,” he says. It’s also a “passive” backdoor, Raiu says, so it wouldn’t reach out to a command-and-control server that might help identify the backdoor’s operator. Instead, it waits for the operator to connect to the target machine via SSH and authenticate with a private key—one generated with a particularly strong cryptographic function known as ED448.

    The backdoor’s careful design could be the work of US hackers, Raiu notes, but he suggests that’s unlikely, since the US wouldn’t typically sabotage open source projects—and if it did, the National Security Agency would probably use a quantum-resistant cryptographic function, which ED448 is not. That leaves non-US groups with a history of supply chain attacks, Raiu suggests, like China’s APT41, North Korea’s Lazarus Group, and Russia’s APT29.

    At a glance, Jia Tan certainly looks East Asian—or is meant to. The time zone of Jia Tan’s commits are UTC+8: That’s China’s time zone, and only an hour off from North Korea’s. However, an analysis by two researchers, Rhea Karty and Simon Henniger, suggests that Jia Tan may have simply changed the time zone of their computer to UTC+8 before every commit. In fact, several commits were made with a computer set to an Eastern European or Middle Eastern time zone instead, perhaps when Jia Tan forgot to make the change.

    “Another indication that they are not from China is the fact that they worked on notable Chinese holidays,” say Karty and Henniger, students at Dartmouth College and the Technical University of Munich, respectively. They note that Jia Tan also didn’t submit new code on Christmas or New Year’s. Boehs, the developer, adds that much of the work starts at 9 am and ends at 5 pm for Eastern European or Middle Eastern time zones. “The time range of commits suggests this was not some project that they did outside of work,” Boehs says.

    Though that leaves countries like Iran and Israel as possibilities, the majority of clues lead back to Russia, and specifically Russia’s APT29 hacking group, argues Dave Aitel, a former NSA hacker and founder of the cybersecurity firm Immunity. Aitel points out that APT29—widely believed to work for Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, known as the SVR—has a reputation for technical care of a kind that few other hacker groups show. APT29 also carried out the Solar Winds compromise, perhaps the most deftly coordinated and effective software supply chain attack in history. That operation matches the style of the XZ Utils backdoor far more than the cruder supply chain attacks of APT41 or Lazarus, by comparison.

    “It could very well be someone else,” says Aitel. “But I mean, if you’re looking for the most sophisticated supply chain attacks on the planet, that’s going to be our dear friends at the SVR.”

    Security researchers agree, at least, that it’s unlikely that Jia Tan is a real person, or even one person working alone. Instead, it seems clear that the persona was the online embodiment of a new tactic from a new, well-organized organization—a tactic that nearly worked. That means we should expect to see Jia Tan return by other names: seemingly polite and enthusiastic contributors to open source projects, hiding a government’s secret intentions in their code commits.

    Updated 4/3/2024 at 12:30 pm ET to note the possibility of Israeli or Iranian involvement.

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    Andy Greenberg, Matt Burgess

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