ReportWire

Tag: vaccine coverage

  • COVID Vaccines Are Turning Into Flu Shots

    COVID Vaccines Are Turning Into Flu Shots

    [ad_1]

    For all the legwork that public-health experts have done over the past few years to quash comparisons between COVID-19 and the flu, there sure seems to be a lot of effort nowadays to equate the two. In an advisory meeting convened earlier today, the FDA signaled its intention to start doling out COVID vaccines just like flu shots: once a year in autumn, for just about everyone, ad infinitum. Whatever the brand, primary-series shots and boosters (which might no longer be called “boosters”) will guard against the same variants, making them interchangeable. Doses will no longer be counted numerically. “This will be a fundamental transition,” says Jason Schwartz, a vaccine policy expert at Yale—the biggest change to the COVID-vaccination regimen since it debuted.

    Hints of the annual approach have been dropping, not so subtly, for years. Even in the spring of 2021, Pfizer’s CEO was floating the idea of yearly shots; Peter Marks, the director of the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, teased it throughout 2022. This past September, Joe Biden officially endorsed it as “a new phase in our COVID-19 response,” and Ashish Jha, the White House’s COVID czar, memorably highlighted the convenience of combining a flu shot and a COVID shot into a single appointment: “I really believe this is why God gave us two arms.”

    Still, in today’s meeting, FDA officials were pushier than ever in their advocacy for the flu-ification of COVID vaccines. “We think that simplification of the vaccination regimen would contribute to easier vaccine deployment, better communication, and improved vaccine coverage,” Jerry Weir, the FDA’s director of the division of viral products, said at the meeting. The timing is important: After renewing the U.S.’s pandemic-emergency declaration earlier this month, the Biden administration seems set to allow its expiration this coming April. That makes the present moment awfully convenient for repackaging a chaotic, crisis-caliber vaccination paradigm as a scheduled, seasonal, normal-seeming one. A once-a-year strategy, modeled on a routine recommendation, suggests that “we’re no longer in emergency mode,” says Maria Sundaram, a vaccine researcher at the Marshfield Clinic Research Institute. Or at least, that’s the message that the public is likely to hear.

    But federal regulators may be trying to fit a COVID-shaped peg into a flu-shaped hole. The experts I spoke with largely agreed: Eventually, someday, annual autumn shots for COVID “will probably be sufficient,” says Gregory Poland, a vaccinologist at Mayo Clinic. “Are we ready for that yet? I’m not sure that’s the case at all.”

    Even in the short term, COVID-vaccination tactics need a revamp. “It’s clear above all that the current approach isn’t working,” Schwartz told me. Despite abundant supply, demand for COVID boosters in the U.S. has been abysmal—and interest seems to be declining with each additional dose. Last fall’s bivalent shot has reached the arms of only 15 percent of Americans; even among adults over 65—a majority of whom sign up for flu shots each fall—the vaccination rate hasn’t yet reached 40 percent.

    For most of the time that COVID shots have been around, figuring out when to get them has been a hassle, with different guidelines and requirements that depend on age, sex, risk factors, vaccination history, and more. Pharmacies have had to stock an absurd number of vials and syringes to accommodate the various combinations of brands and dose sizes; record-keeping on flimsy paper cards has been a total joke. “I do this for a living, and I can barely keep track,” Schwartz said. Recommendations on the proper timing and number of doses have also changed so many times that many Americans have simply checked out. After the bivalent recipe debuted, polls found that an alarming proportion of people didn’t even know the shot was available to them.

    Streamlining COVID-vaccine recommendations will remove a lot of that headache, Sundaram told me. Most people would need to keep only one mantra in mind—one dose, each fall—and could top off their flu and COVID immunity at the same time. Burdens on pharmacies and clinics would be lower, and communication would be far easier—a change that could make an especially big difference for those with children, among whom COVID-vaccine uptake has been the lowest. “It’ll be more scheduled, more systematic,” says Charlotte Hobbs, a pediatric infectious-disease specialist at the University of Mississippi Medical Center. COVID shots could simply be offered at annual well-child visits, she told me. “It’s something we already know works well.”

    The advantages of a flu-ified COVID shot aren’t just about convenience. If we have to shoehorn COVID vaccines into an existing paradigm, Sundaram told me, influenza’s is the best candidate. SARS-CoV-2, like the flu, is excellent at altering itself to dodge our defenses; it spreads readily in winter; and our immunity to infection tends to fade rather quickly. All of that adds up to a need for regularly updated shots. Such a system has been in place for decades for the flu: At the end of each winter, a panel of experts convenes to select the strains that should be targeted by the next formulation; manufacturers spend the next several months whipping up big batches in time for an autumn-ish rollout. The pipeline depends on a global surveillance system for flu viruses, as well as regular surveys of antibody levels in the community to suss out which strains people are still protected against. The premise has been so well vetted by now that researchers can skip the chore of running large-scale clinical trials to determine the efficacy and safety of each new, updated recipe.

    But a seasonal strategy works best for a seasonal virus—and SARS-CoV-2 just isn’t there yet, says Hana El Sahly, an infectious-disease physician at Baylor College of Medicine. Though flu viruses tend to hop between the globe’s hemispheres, alternately troubling the north and the south during their respective cold months, this new coronavirus has yet to confine its spread to one part of the calendar. (Marks, of the FDA, tried to address this concern at today’s meeting, asserting that “we’re starting to see some seasonality” and that fall was indeed the very sensible for an annual rollout.) SARS-CoV-2 has also been spitting out concerning variants and subvariants at a faster rate than the flu (and flu shots already have a hard time keeping up with evolution). The FDA’s new proposal suggests picking SARS-CoV-2 variants in June to have a vaccine ready by September, a shorter timeline than is used for flu. That still might not be fast enough: “By the time we detect a variant, it will have ripped through the global population and, in a few more weeks, died down,” El Sahly told me. The world got a preview of this problem with last year’s bivalent shot, which overlapped with the dominance of its target subvariants for only a couple of months. A flu model for COVID would make more sense “if we had stable, predictable dynamics,” says Avnika Amin, a vaccine epidemiologist at Emory University. “I don’t think we’re at that point.”

    Murkiness around vaccine effectiveness makes this transition complicated too. Experts told me that it’s gotten much more difficult to tell how well our COVID vaccines are working, and for how long, fueling debates over how often they should be given and how often their composition should change. Many people have now been infected by the virus multiple times, which can muddy calculations of vaccine effectiveness; better treatments also alter risk profiles. And many researchers told me they’re concerned that the data shortcuts we use for flu—measures of antibodies as a proxy for immune protection—just won’t fly for COVID shots. “We need better clinical data,” El Sahly told me. In their absence, the hasty adoption of a flu framework could lead to our updating and distributing COVID shots too often, or not often enough.

    A flu-ish approach also wouldn’t fix all of the COVID vaccines’ problems. Today’s discussion suggested that, even if a new COVID-shot strategy change goes through, officials will still need to recommend several different dose sizes for several different age groups—a more complex regimen than flu’s—and may advise additional injections for those at highest risk. At the same time, COVID shots would continue to be more of a target for misinformation campaigns than many other vaccines and, at least in the case of mRNA-based injections, more likely to cause annoying side effects. These issues and others have driven down interest—and simply pivoting to the flu paradigm “is not going to solve the uptake problem,” says Angela Shen, a vaccine-policy expert at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia.

    Perhaps the greatest risk of making COVID vaccines more like flu shots is that it could lead to more complacency. In making the influenza paradigm a model, we also threaten to make it a ceiling. Although flu shots are an essential, lifesaving public-health tool, they are by no means the best-performing vaccines in our roster. Their timeline is slow and inefficient; as a result, the formulations don’t always match circulating strains. Already, with COVID, the world has struggled to chase variants with vaccines that simply cannot keep up. If we move too quickly to the fine-but-flawed framework for flu, experts told me, it could disincentivize research into more durable, more variant-proof, less side-effect-causing COVID shots. Uptake of flu vaccines has never been stellar, either: Just half of Americans sign up for the shots each year—and despite years of valiant efforts, “we still haven’t figured out how to consistently improve that,” Amin told me.

    Whenever the COVID-emergency declaration expires, vaccination will almost certainly have to change. Access to shots may be imperiled for tens of millions of uninsured Americans; local public-health departments may end up with even fewer resources for vaccine outreach. A flu model might offer some improvements over the status quo. But if the downsides outweigh the pluses, Poland told me, that could add to the erosion of public trust. Either way, it might warp attitudes toward this coronavirus in ways that can’t be reversed. At multiple points during today’s meeting, FDA officials emphasized that COVID is not the flu. They’re right: COVID is not the flu and never will be. But vaccines can sometimes become a lens through which we view the dangers they fight. By equating our frontline responses to these viruses, the U.S. risks sending the wrong message—that they carry equal threat.

    [ad_2]

    Katherine J. Wu

    Source link

  • Polio Is Exploiting a Very Human Weakness

    Polio Is Exploiting a Very Human Weakness

    [ad_1]

    In 1988, the World Health Assembly announced a very ambitious goal: Polio was to be vanquished by the year 2000. It was a reach, sure, but feasible. Although highly infectious, polioviruses affect only people, and don’t hide out in wild animals; with two extraordinarily effective vaccines in regular use, they should be possible to snuff out. Thanks to a global inoculation campaign, infections had, for years, been going down, down, down.

    But 2000 came and went, as did a second deadline, in 2005, and a third, in 2012, and so on. The world will almost certainly miss an upcoming target at the end of 2023 too. In theory, eradication is still in sight: The virus remains endemic in just two countries—Pakistan and Afghanistan—and two of the three types of wild poliovirus that once troubled humanity are gone. And yet, polio cases are creeping up in several countries that had eliminated them, including the United Kingdom, Israel, and the United States. Earlier this year, New York detected America’s first paralytic polio case in nearly a decade; last week, the governor declared a state of emergency over a fast-ballooning outbreak.

    This is the cruel logic of viruses: Give them enough time—leave enough hosts for them to infect—and they will eventually find a way to spread again. “You have to stop transmission everywhere, all at the same time,” says Kimberly Thompson, a health economist and the president of the nonprofit Kid Risk. Which means eradication will demand a near-perfect syncing of vaccine supply, access, equity, political will, public enthusiasm, and more. To beat the virus, population immunity must outlast it.

    Right now, though, the world’s immunological shield is too porous to stop polio’s spread. At the center of the new epidemics are vaccine-derived polioviruses that have begun to paralyze unimmunized people in places where immunity is low—a snag in the eradication campaign that also happens to be tightly linked to one of its most essential tools. Vaccine performance has always depended on both technology and human behavior. But in this case especially, because of the nature of the foe at hand, those twin pillars must line up as precisely as possible or risk a further backslide into a dangerous past.


    In the grand plan for eradication, our two primary polio vaccines were always meant to complement each other. One, an ultra-effective oral formulation, is powerful and long-lasting enough to quash wild-poliovirus transmission—the perfect “workhorse” for a global vaccination campaign, says Adam Lauring, an evolutionary virologist at the University of Michigan. The other, a supersafe injectable, sweeps in after its colleague has halted outbreaks one country at a time, maintaining a high level of immunity in post-elimination nations while the rest of the world catches up.

    For decades, the shot, chaser approach found remarkable success. In the 1980s, wild poliovirus struck an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 people each year; by 2021, the numbers had plummeted to single digits. But recently, as vaccine coverage in various countries has stalled or slipped, the loopholes in this vaccination tactic have begun to show themselves and grow.

    The oral polio vaccine (OPV), delivered as drops in the mouth, is one of the most effective inoculations in the world’s roster. It contains weakened forms of polioviruses that have been altered away from their paralysis-causing forms but still mimic a wild infection so well that they can stop people from spreading wild pathogens for years, even decades. In the weeks after people receive the vaccine, they can also pass the weakened virus to others in the community, helping protect them too. And OPV’s transportability, low price point, and ease of administration make it a “gold standard for outbreak interruption,” says Ananda Bandyopadhyay, the deputy director for the polio team at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Since its mid-20th-century debut, OPV has helped dozens of countries—including the U.S.—eliminate the virus. Those nations were then able to phase out OPV and switch to inoculating people with the injected vaccine.

    But OPV’s most potent superpower is also its greatest weakness. Given enough time and opportunity to spread and reproduce, the neutered virus within the vaccine can regain the ability to invade the nervous system and cause paralysis in unvaccinated or immunocompromised people (or in very, very rare cases, the vaccine recipient themselves). Just a small handful of genetic modifications—three or fewer—can spark a reversion, and the mutants, which are “better at replicating” than their kin, can take over fast, says Raul Andino, a virologist at UC San Francisco. In recent years, a few thousand cases of vaccine-derived polio have been detected around the world, far outstripping the toll of wild viruses; dozens of countries, the U.S. now among them, are battling such outbreaks, and the numbers seem to be only going up. Vaccine-derived polio is still a true rarity: Billions of oral vaccines have been delivered since the global campaign began. But it underscores “the real problem” with OPV, Lauring told me. “You’re fighting fire with fire.”

    The injected polio vaccine, or IPV, which contains only chemically inactivated versions of the virus, carries none of that risk. To purge all polio cases, “you have to stop using oral polio vaccine,” Thompson told me, and transition the entire globe to IPV. (Post-eradication, countries would need to keep IPV in their routine immunization schedule for at least 10 years, experts have said.) But the injected vaccine has a different drawback. Although the shot can very effectively stave off paralysis, IPV doesn’t elicit the kind of immunity that stops people from getting infected with polioviruses and then passing them on. In places that rely on injected vaccines, “even immune individuals can participate in transmission,” Thompson told me. Which opens up a vulnerability when too many people have skipped both types of vaccines: Paralyzing polioviruses erupt out of communities where the oral vaccine is still in use—then can spread in undervaccinated areas. It might be tempting to blame OPV for our troubles. But that’s not the main threat, Bandyopadhyay told me. “It’s the lack of adequate vaccination.”

    As things stand, the goal in the endemic countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan remains achieving sufficiently high vaccine coverage, Bandyopadhyay said. But many of the communities in these nations are rural or nomadic, and tough to reach even with convenient drop-in-the-mouth vaccines. Civil and political unrest, misinformation, natural disasters, and most recently, the COVID pandemic have raised additional hurdles. So have intermittent bans on house-to-house vaccination in Afghanistan, says John Vertefeuille, the chief of the polio-eradication branch at the CDC. Cases of wild polio have experienced a recent jump in Pakistan, and have also been imported into the non-endemic countries of Malawi and Mozambique.

    But the toll of those outbreaks—all featuring type 1 polio—currently pales in comparison with those featuring vaccine-derived type 2. The last case of wild type 2 polio was detected in 1999, but that version of the virus has persisted in its modified form in oral polio vaccines. And when it reverts to its dangerous form, it gains particularly infectious oomph, allowing it to spread unchecked wherever immunity is low. Some 30 countries around the world are battling outbreaks of poliovirus whose origin can be traced back to the oral inoculations; vaccine-derived type 2 is what’s been circulating in Jerusalem, London, and New York, where it ultimately paralyzed an unvaccinated young man. The extent to which the virus is churning in other parts of the country isn’t fully known; routine immunization has dropped since the COVID pandemic’s start, and the U.S. hasn’t regularly surveyed its wastewater for the pathogen.

    The success of these vaccine-derived viruses is largely the result of our own hubris—of a failure, experts told me, to sync the world’s efforts. In 2016, 17 years after the last wild type-2 case had been seen, officials decided to pivot to a new version of OPV that would protect against just types 1 and 3, a sort of trial run for the eventual obsolescence of OPV. But the move may have been premature. The switch wasn’t coordinated enough; in too many pockets of the world, type-2 polio, from the three-part oral vaccine, was still moseying about. The result was disastrous. “We opened up an immunity gap,” Thompson told me. Into it, fast-mutating vaccine-derived type-2 viruses spilled, surging onto a global landscape populated with growing numbers of children who lacked protection against it.


    A new oral vaccine, listed for emergency use by the WHO in 2020, could help get the global campaign back on track. The fresh formulation, developed in part by Andino and his colleagues, still relies on the immunity-boosting powers of weakened, replicating polioviruses. But the pathogens within have had their genetic blueprints further tweaked. “We mucked around” with the structure of poliovirus, Andino told me, and figured out a way to make a modified version of type 2 that’s far stabler. It’s much less likely to mutate away from its domesticated, non-paralyzing state, or swap genes with related viruses that could grant the same gifts.

    Technologically, the new oral vaccine, nicknamed nOPV2, seems to be as close to a slam dunk as immunizations can get. “To me, it’s just super cool,” Lauring told me. “You keep all the good things about OPV but mitigate this evolutionary risk.” In the year and a half since the vaccine’s world premiere, some 450 million doses of nOPV2 have found their way into children in 22 countries—and a whopping zero cases of vaccine-derived paralysis have followed.

    But nOPV2 is “not a silver bullet,” Andino said. The vaccine covers just one of the three poliovirus types, which means it can’t yet fully replace the original oral recipe. (Trials for type-1 and -3 versions are ongoing, and even after those recipes are ready for prime time, researchers will have to confirm that the vaccine still works as expected when the three recipes are mixed.) The vaccine’s precise clinical costs are also still a shade unclear. nOPV2 is a safer oral polio vaccine, but it’s still an oral polio vaccine, chock-full of active viral particles. “You can think of it as more attenuated,” Thompson said. “But I don’t think anybody expects that it won’t have any potential to evolve.” And nOPV2’s existence doesn’t change the fact that the world will still have to undergo a total, coordinated switch to IPV before eradication is won.

    As has been the case with COVID vaccines, and so many others, the primary problem isn’t the technology at all—but how humans have deployed it, or failed to. “Vaccine sitting in a vial, no matter how genetically stable and how effective it is, that’s not going to solve the problem of the outbreaks,” Bandyopadhyay said. “It’s really vaccination and getting to that last child in that last community.”

    If dwindling vaccination trends don’t reverse, even our current vaccination strategies could require a rough reboot. In 2013, health officials in Israel—which had, for years prior, run a successful IPV-only campaign for its children—detected wild type-1 virus, imported from abroad, in the country’s sewage, and decided to roll out another round of oral vaccines to kids under 10. Within a few weeks, nearly 80 percent of the targeted population had gotten a dose. Even “polio-free countries are not polio-risk-free,” Bandyopadhyay told me. The situation in New York is different, in part because type-1 polio causes paralysis more often than type-2 does. But should circumstances grow more dire—should substantial outbreaks start elsewhere in the country, should the nation fail to bring IPV coverage back to properly protective levels—America, too, “may have to consider adding OPV as a supplement,” says Purvi Parikh, an immunologist and a physician at NYU, “especially in rural areas” where emergency injected-vaccine campaigns may be tough. Such an approach would be a pretty extreme move, and a “very big political undertaking,” Thompson said, requiring a pivot back to a vaccine that was phased out of use decades ago. And even then, there’s no guarantee that Americans would take the offered oral drops.

    The CDC, for now, is not eager for such a change. Noting that most people in the U.S. are vaccinated against polio, Katherina Grusich, an agency spokesperson, told me that the CDC has no plans to add OPV or nOPV to the American regimen. “We are a long way from reaching for that,” she said.

    But this week, the U.S. joined the WHO’s list of about 30 nations with circulating vaccine-derived-poliovirus outbreaks. The country could have avoided this unfortunate honor had it kept shot uptake more uniformly high. It’s true, as Grusich pointed out, that more than 90 percent of young American children have received IPV. But they are not distributed evenly, which opens up vulnerabilities for the virus to exploit. Here, the U.S., in a sense, had one job: maintain its polio-free status while the rest of the world joined in. That it did not is an admonition, and a reminder of how unmerciful the virus can be. Polio, a fast mutator, preys on human negligence; the vaccines that guard against it contain both a form of protection and a catch that reinforces how risky treating these tools as a discretionary measure can be.

    [ad_2]

    Katherine J. Wu

    Source link