Tag: Right of Access

From Grow Universe Inc. v. Doe, decided Friday by Judge Gregory Woods (S.D.N.Y.):

Plaintiff filed this action on March 5, 2025, alleging that Defendant accessed Plaintiff’s Google business account without authorization, misappropriated the proprietary information stored within it, and deleted the account. The complaint asserts claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, as well as conversion and tortious interference under New York law.

The court had earlier refused to quash a subpoena to Spectrum seeking identification information about the defendant, plaintiff therefore identified the person that it thinks is the defendant. That person moved to intervene, asking to remain anonymous, but the court rejected the anonymity request:

Because Movant identifies only the ordinary reputational consequences attendant to civil litigation, and because this fact-intensive dispute between private parties turns on contested conduct and credibility, Movant has not overcome the strong presumption that parties must litigate in their own names….

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in intentional misconduct by accessing Plaintiff’s account without authorization, misappropriating proprietary information, and deleting the account. Even accepting Movant’s contention that these allegations could be embarrassing or reputationally harmful, they are not the type of intimate, highly personal matters—such as sexual assault or reproductive issues—that courts have found to favor anonymity. Furthermore, being named in a lawsuit, while potentially harmful to Movant’s reputation, is not the same as being found liable. Should Movant be named, she will have the opportunity to defend herself. Accordingly, the first factor weighs against permitting Movant to proceed pseudonymously….

Movant does not allege any threat of physical retaliation, nor does she submit a sworn statement attesting to likely psychological or emotional harm. Instead, she relies on generalized assertions of “embarrassment and reputational harm.” These generalized concerns do not establish the kind of harm contemplated by these factors. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (favoring anonymity where a psychiatric specialist’s affidavit “predict[ed] that revelation of [plaintiff’s] identity will likely cause psychological and emotional pain so intense that it would threaten her stability, her safety, and even her life”). Because Movant does not allege any harm beyond the generalized statements related to embarrassment and reputational injury—and she has provided no factual support even for those—the second and third factors likewise weigh against anonymity.

Movant argues that the risk of harm is heightened because she is only identified by an IP address, creating a risk of misidentification. But the cases she cites arose in a materially different context—efforts to link subscribers identified only by IP addresses to the alleged downloading of pornographic films—which some courts have treated as uniquely sensitive and stigmatizing, and the misidentification analysis was framed against that backdrop. Here, by contrast, the basis for Plaintiff’s anticipated complaint against Movant is not limited to her association with an IP address. Plaintiff submitted a sworn declaration explaining that Spectrum’s subpoena response confirmed Plaintiff’s suspicion as to Defendant’s identity and tying her alleged access to a prior relationship. And, as already described, if she is misidentified in the complaint, Movant will be able to argue that point in her defense….

Permitting a party to litigate under a pseudonym presents an inherent risk of prejudice, as “concealing the name of a party could deprive a litigant and the court of the chance that a yet unknown witness would, upon learning that fact about the case, know to step forward with valuable information about the events or the credibility of witnesses.” That “asymmetry” between the parties can also “hinder ‘the judicial interest in accurate fact-finding and fair adjudication.’”

Movant contends that because Plaintiff already knows her name, Plaintiff can “proceed with the case just as any other, only without publishing Movant’s name on the public docket.” While Plaintiff’s knowledge of Movant’s identity does reduce the risk of prejudice, it does not eliminate it. Even where a plaintiff knows the defendant’s identity, litigating against an anonymous defendant frequently requires the plaintiff to “‘make redactions’ and take other ‘measures not to disclose [the defendant]’s identity,’” increasing “both the work required and the cost” of litigation.

Here, although Plaintiff’s knowledge lessens the risk of prejudice, anonymity would still constrain Plaintiff’s ability to conduct discovery in the ordinary course, including by preventing Plaintiff from identifying Movant openly when seeking information from third parties. Those constraints impose a real burden that outweighs the mitigating effect of Plaintiff’s knowledge….

In cases concerning the legal consequences of an undisputed event, the identity of the parties is “relatively immaterial.” By contrast, where a case “turns on the credibility of parties,” “the public has a significant interest in open judicial proceedings and the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by transparency, including exposure of the parties’ identities.”

This case is not about the legal consequences of an undisputed event. It turns on disputed factual allegations that Movant—who allegedly had a prior business relationship with Plaintiff—engaged in intentional misconduct related to Plaintiff’s account.. In a fact-intensive dispute of this kind, where credibility and intent are likely to be central, disclosure of Movant’s name would “enhance the public’s understanding of the proceedings and the nature of the dispute.” …

Where a suit is against the government and raises an abstract legal question affecting many similarly situated individuals, the identities of the parties bringing the suit “may be largely irrelevant to the public concern with the nature of the process” and have “little bearing on the nature of the dispute or the merits of the case.” On the other hand, “where individual defendants are sued based not on abstract challenges to public policies but rather with regard to particular actions and incidents, open proceedings nevertheless benefit the public as well as the parties and also serve the judicial interest in accurate fact-finding and fair adjudication.” …

Andrea T. Timpone (Garson, Ségal, Steinmetz, Fladgate LLP) represents plaintiff.

From a decision last week in Smith v. Solomon, by Judge André Birotte Jr.:

Plaintiff files the [application] in a case voluntarily dismissed on January 28, 2026. Plaintiff now requests an order directing the “immediate redaction and removal of all personal identifying information (“PII”)—including Plaintiff’s legal name, address, or any identifying data” from PACER, PacerMonitor, CourtListener, any automated third-party docket-aggregation websites, any public-facing pages generated by the Court, or any publicly viewable filings in this matter. Plaintiff argues that the appearance of his full legal name in court documents threatens his safety, privacy, and well-being.

First, Plaintiff asks the Court to redact certain documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. As an initial matter, it is not clear to the Court that any of the information Plaintiff seeks to have redacted falls within the scope of information that may be redacted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. Moreover, as stated in the Local Rules, “[i]t is the responsibility of the filer to ensure full compliance with the redaction requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2.” Plaintiff himself filed the information at issue without redactions. Thus, the Court cannot retroactively redact any information.

Next, Plaintiff argues the Court has the authority to protect litigants that file cases under pseudonyms. While the Court does have authority to permit a party to file under a pseudonym, the Court will exercise that authority only once a moving party has met their burden pursuant to a motion to use a pseudonym. The “normal presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real names.” To overcome this presumption, a moving party must demonstrate that the “party’s need for anonymity” outweighs the “prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Again, Plaintiff has not filed any motion to file the case under pseudonym nor has he made any argument overcoming the presumption against anonymity in his [application]….

Plaintiff’s [further] argument that his information should be redacted pursuant to the California Safe at Home confidentiality program is also not persuasive. The California Safe at Home program is administered by the California Secretary of State’s Office and offers a substitute mailing address for certain individuals who are in fear for their safety. While the Court recognizes the value of this program and Plaintiff’s membership, he has not provided any explanation as to why this program requires or merits retroactive redaction of documents filed by Plaintiff himself.

Plaintiff’s final argument that redaction is within the Court’s discretion fails for similar reasons. Plaintiff has provided no explanation as to why the Court should exercise its discretion in a manner inapposite to the general presumption against anonymous court filings….

The Court observes that, while it cannot redact these documents, Plaintiff may move to seal portions of the court documents on the record. For any application to be granted, Plaintiff is required to comply with all applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Local Rules, and this Court’s Standing Order. Failure to do so may result in denial of any subsequent applications.

I’ve been following for some time how the California Safe at Home program affects public access to court records, which is especially important when it comes to tracking repeat litigants. (Smith apparently also filed, as a John Doe, an Americans with Disabilities Act lawsuit against California Southern University just a few days after filing the now-dropped Smith v. Solomon.) Here’s a slightly modified version of a post I wrote about it in 2021, which is still mostly current (though see also this 2023 follow-up):

The California “Safe at Home Confidential Address Program” provides for special forwarding addresses for people who swear that they are “attempting to escape from actual or threatened domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, or elder or dependent adult abuse,” and need to “establish new names or addresses in order to prevent their assailants or probable assailants from finding them” (and possibly provide some corroborating evidence).

And Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 367.3, enacted in 2019, adds to that:

A protected person who is a party in a civil proceeding may proceed using a pseudonym, either John Doe, Jane Doe, or Doe, for the true name of the protected person and may exclude or redact from all pleadings and documents filed in the action other identifying characteristics of the protected person.

Such litigants must confidentially inform the other parties and the court of their true identity, but the identity may not appear in the court records. No showing is required of any specific reason for pseudonymity, beyond the person’s participation in the Safe at Home program.

Does this mean that a person, just by joining the Safe at Home program, may also retroactively reopen his past cases, and then get them sealed or pseudonymized? Several recent federal decisions, all apparently involving one litigant (a self-described “avid blogger on record sealing expungement, and First Amendment issues”), deal with the subject.

[1.] The cases make clear that § 367.3 isn’t binding in federal courts: A federal court “is bound by Ninth Circuit precedent regarding public access to court records rather than the California Code of Civil Procedure.” “California’s Government Code and Code of Civil Procedure inform the Court’s exercise of [its] power [to determine whether to make information in the record confidential], but they do not bind the Court because they provide procedural protections in dealing with California’s state government and for litigants in California state courts.” (One court seemed open to the possibility that § 367.3 might apply to cases involving California substantive law, but didn’t reach the issue because the case involved only federal law and Nevada law.)

[2.] Even federal courts seem willing to use their discretion to redact street addresses and e-mail addresses of people covered by § 367.3. See here and here.

[3.] But when it comes to pseudonymization, the record is mixed. For instance, from Chaker-Delnero v. Nevada Federal Credit Union, decided by Magistrate Judge Elayna Youchah (D. Nev.):

The Ninth Circuit held that “the identity of the parties in any action, civil or criminal, should not be concealed except in an unusual case, where there is a need for a cloak of anonymity.” When determining whether pseudonymity is necessary, the Court will balance the need to protect a person from injury or harassment against the presumption that the identity of parties is public information. However, Plaintiff fails to explain how redacting information contained within public filings in this case, available throughout this dispute that began in 2006, will protect him from some current or future harm or harassment. Plaintiff has not introduced any additional evidence that he is currently a victim of harassment.

And from Del Nero v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., decided by Judge Joshua Wolson (E.D. Pa.):

The public’s common law right of access extends to the true names of the parties involved in litigation. Under Third Circuit law, litigants may proceed anonymously in exceptional cases where a reasonable fear of severe harm exists. To make that determination, courts consider a lengthy, non-exhaustive list of factors. Most importantly, sealing Mr. Del Nero’s identity will not shield him from further harassment, and leaving his name on the public docket will not subject him to additional harassment. The people who have targeted Mr. Del Nero know who he is, and their harassment has nothing to do with his involvement in this case. Thus, considering the unique facts of this case, the Court will not permit Mr. Del Nero to use a pseudonym in this matter.

Del Nero v. Allstate Ins. Co., decided by Judge Philip Gutierrez (C.D. Cal.), takes the same view, and adds this about the plaintiff’s attempt to seal the entire case based on the supposed identifying information in the record: “The Court has reviewed the record and Plaintiff’s address does not appear anywhere. Although the twenty-one-year-old complaint mentions the name of the city that Plaintiff lived in at the time, Plaintiff has not shown that the Safe At Home program protects the name of the city he lived in over twenty years ago.”

On the other hand, Doe v. Collectco, Inc., decided by Magistrate Judge Daniel Albregts (D. Nev.), rejected the request to “seal the entire record” but allowed pseudonymization:

Here, the Court finds good reason to redact Plaintiff’s address and email and replace his name with “John Doe.” Plaintiff has provided evidence of his participation in the Safe at Home Program, of a threat, and of his connection with a criminal event. And through his motions, Plaintiff seeks to follow the recommendations of the Safe at Home Program, asking—in the alternative to sealing—for the Court to replace his name with “John Doe” and redact his addresses. The Court finds the Southern District of California’s approach to Plaintiffs’ similar requests persuasive ….

And in Doe v. Winn & Sims, decided by Judge Marilyn Huff (S.D. Cal.), the court likewise rejected the “request to seal the entire record” but allowed pseudonymization:

That being said, sufficient cause supports Plaintiff’s supplemental request to redact his name from the docket and allow him to proceed under the pseudonym “John Doe.” The Ninth Circuit allows parties to proceed anonymously when the party’s “need for anonymity” to avoid physical injury outweighs the “prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” That is the case here. Additionally, redacting Plaintiff’s name from the record would not prejudice any party because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action over fifteen years ago. Further, the public’s interest in this case primarily centers around the underlying nature of the action, a class action against a debt collection service, not Plaintiff’s identity.

But in a different federal case, in Arizona, the judge did completely seal a case on the same litigant’s request.

The nature of this particular litigant’s case-specific justification for pseudonymization—which federal courts require, given that they aren’t bound by the automatic pseudonymization required by the California statute—is hard to piece together, since some of his motions to seal and many of the exhibits accompanying them are themselves sealed. The best I could see from the documents that haven’t been sealed is that “Plaintiff states that he enrolled in the program because he escaped two near death experiences and received several threats.”

[4.] What about in California court? There, § 367.3 does apply, but the record there too is mixed. The same litigant apparently got the San Diego Superior Court to pseudonymize a lawsuit against him by Scott McMillan—as it happens, a lawsuit that indirectly stems in part from an attempt to get McMillan to remove a case mentioning the litigant from a caselaw repository that McMillan operates. The litigant has moved to do the same as to the appeal of that lawsuit (that motion is pending). Likewise, in a case involving an entirely different litigant (B.M.M. v. Baca, Contra Costa County), there was at least a tentative decision allowing pseudonymity on the strength of § 367.3, though there was also another traditional basis for pseudonymity present—plaintiff was alleged to be a sexual assault victim:

Although this action was filled prior to the enactment of CCP §367.3, Plaintiff qualifies as a “protected person” entitled to use a pseudonym since he is an active participant in an address confidentiality program under Gov. Code §6205. In order to comply with the requirements of CCP §367.3, however, Plaintiff shall file and serve “a confidential information form for this purpose that includes the protected person’s name and other identifying characteristics being excluded or redacted.” CCP §367.3(b)(1). The Court will keep the confidential information form confidential as required by that section of the Code.

Even if Plaintiff did not qualify for the protections of this statute, he still would be entitled to the use of a pseudonym given the sensitive, personal nature of the claims made in this suit since they involve allegations of sexual assault. The Court finds that any prejudice to Defendant from the use of the pseudonym is slight. California courts have frequently recognized the appropriateness of the use of a pseudonym in such circumstances.

On the other hand, in another case involving another litigant (Danon v. Johnson, Los Angeles County), there was at least a tentative decision concluding that § 367.3 wouldn’t ordinarily call for retroactive pseudonymization; the court took the view that such requests remain subject to the standard California sealing rules, Cal. R. Ct. 2.550 & 2.551:

Defendant identifies an overriding interest in Plaintiff’s safety or confidentiality that overcomes the right of public access to the records in this proceeding. In support that a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced without sealing, Defendant attests to being a victim of sexual crimes by the Plaintiff; that Plaintiff has threatened to track and kill Defendant; and that the public would have access to sensitive details of actions committed against her as a matter of public record. The foregoing supports an interest in Plaintiff’s safety or confidentiality that Code of Civil Procedure section 367.3 supports is an overriding interest, by providing that participants are entitled to proceed pseudonymously.

However, in this case, the court does not find that a substantial probability exists the overriding interest will be prejudiced without redaction and supporting sealing the record. Defendant requests retroactive redaction of Defendant’s name and address from numerous documents in this action over the course of approximately eighteen months. “[T]here is no justification for sealing records that contain only facts already known or available to the public.” (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 898.)

Prior to Defendant’s first motion to redact documents, the parties proceeded for over thirteen months, both sides filing documents without anonymity…. As a practical matter, Defendant’s identity has been publicly available in this action for a significant time, as well as in the other action.

Next, the court notes that the primary purpose of the Safe at Home program is to provide a means for the victim to keep a new residence address confidential; and the Defendant has not brought facts to the court’s attention that a new residential address used by Defendant has been disclosed in the filings. These facts undermine Defendant’s argument that Defendant’s interest in safety and confidentiality under the Safe at Home program would be prejudiced if the record is not sealed or redacted, as the information disclosing the Defendant’s identity have been public for at least this time, and there is no showing that a new residential address has been disclosed. (Cf. Savaglio v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 588, 600 (unsealed documents filed before obtaining order to seal inconsistent with intent to enforce rights to obtain sealed records).)

And, returning to the litigant in the federal cases I began with, the California Court of Appeal in April rejected (without detailed explanation) a § 367.3 motion to pseudonymize the litigation in Chaker v. Superior Court.

[5.] And the cases I outline above help show, I think, the value of having people litigate under their own name. Among many other reasons,

• Knowing a party’s name can help writers who cover court cases (like me) see if a lawsuit is part of a broader pattern of litigation, and show readers any patterns that might emerge.
• It can help us figure out whether one of the parties had been found to be a vexatious litigant.
• It can help us figure out whether one of the parties had been adjudicated to have done things that may suggest that he’s not trustworthy.
• It can also help us see if the party had actually been successful in interesting and important past cases (see this First Amendment case and this First Amendment-adjacent case).

And open court records can help courts and opposing parties as well. For instance, in Chaker v. Superior Court, the court apparently searched for past filings by the petitioner to verify certain statements in the petition; that would have been at least much harder if those past filings had been pseudonymized. (It’s possible for a court to keep its files indexed not just by the party’s public identified name, but also by the otherwise sealed actual name, to facilitate such searches by judicial system insiders; but I’m not sure that courts generally do that, and it would be especially difficult if the search requires reviewing files from multiple courts.) Likewise, opposing parties may search for past filings by a party and see whether any are related to the current case, and whether such filings make any admissions or arguments that may be relevant to this case.

The general First Amendment rule, and the general rule under California common law principles, is that parties to lawsuits aren’t pseudonymized unless there’s a real factual basis to justify the pseudonymity (with the substantial exception of cases involving minors):

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require plaintiffs to disclose their names in the instrument they file to commence a lawsuit. Public access to this information is more than a customary procedural formality; First Amendment guarantees are implicated when a court decides to restrict public scrutiny of judicial proceedings.

I’m therefore inclined to say that being in the Safe At Home program shouldn’t by itself be a categorical exception from this rule, and that there should at least be a specific showing of exactly how including the protected party’s name in a court filing—especially in an old case, but even in a new one—would actually create a material risk of harm to the party. In any event, I’m writing a law review article about pseudonymous litigation for an upcoming symposium, and I hope to consider such matters in more detail there.

Cultivatr, Inc. and Sproutr, LLC … ask this Court to seal portions of the transcript of a bench trial held before the Court, claiming that publication will do harm to their business interests. Because this Court finds that they have not made a showing strong enough to outweigh the public interest in open proceedings, the Motion is denied….

This matter was commenced by Counterclaim Defendants Cultivatr and Sproutr as declaratory judgment Plaintiffs, with Nora Peterson filing a breach of contract counterclaim. The dispute centered around a verbal promise made by Cultivatr’s principals to Ms. Peterson to grant equity in Cultivatr in exchange for Ms. Peterson’s agreeing to join Sproutr as an executive. After a three-day bench trial, this Court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately holding that Cultivatr indeed breached an enforceable verbal agreement when it failed to provide Ms. Peterson with the shares it owed her….

[T]he Cultivatr Parties ask this Court to seal portions of the bench trial transcript which deal with an investment into Sproutr made by a third party (the “Investor”). The Cultivatr Parties ask this Court to redact every mention of the name of the third party…. [T]he Cultivatr Parties also seek to redact large swaths of testimony and argument which discusses the investment, and particularly: (1) the amount of money invested; (2) the percentage of Sproutr acquired; and (3) the different options explored for treating the money as a matter of accounting….

This information was not merely contextual to the matter at trial, nor was it inconsequential or collateral. To the contrary, this Court found this investment was a motivating factor in the decisions by the principals of Cultivatr to welch on their promise to deliver equity to Nora Peterson…. “At base, this Court concludes that this is a case where [Cultivatr’s Principal], perhaps a bit overeager and bit inexperienced, rushed in and made a firm offer which was giving up more than she appreciated at the time. When a later investment made that offer much more expensive to live up to, she had buyer’s remorse and wishes she had included all sorts of bells and whistles that she did not.” … Further, the amount and nature of the investment provided the Court with the best available evidence from which it could make a reasonable calculation of the value of the shares which went undelivered at the time they reneged on their promise….

[T]he right to attend civil trials is protected by the First Amendment, and while the right is not absolute, “as a First Amendment right it is to be accorded the due process protection that other fundamental rights enjoy.” … Even the agreement of the parties does not bind our courts; indeed courts can deny sealing sua sponte or on motion of a third party….

Enforcement sua sponte makes good sense. It is certainly true that our system of justice relies heavily on the adversarial system to present important issues to the Court. But sometimes, where the issue involves the interest of the public or of the Court itself, the interests of the adversarial party may not align strongly enough with those other interests to reliably ensure the issue will be zealously litigated, or even litigated at all.

Indeed, the Court’s extensive experience with litigation has shown time and again that parties often “go along to get along” when it comes to confidentiality. Where that party does not particularly care about the publicity of a given case, it is often easier to just accept confidentiality designations than to spend their own money challenging them. Similarly, where a party knows they need certain sensitive documents to prove their case, they often will simply agree to a confidentiality designation to take the path of least resistance. These are entirely reasonable litigation decisions from a private party seeking to vindicate its own private interests. But given the powerful societal interest in the openness of our courthouses, it does create a gap which courts must diligently maintain….

The Cultivatr Parties … argue that the terms of the Investor’s investment are not public and not intended for public view. But that cannot carry the day. Many an embarrassing series of text messages or damaging private admission regularly are aired out in our courtrooms. In fact, that is largely what a courtroom is for. The fact that there was an intention that the nature of this investment be kept a secret does not mean that it gets to stay that way once implicated in federal litigation.

Next the Cultivatr Parties argue that the confidentiality agreement between them and the Investor supports sealing the transcript. But the private contractual relationship between Sproutr and the Investor does nothing to bind the court, and Ms. Peterson’s agreement to honor it is similarly without impact. There may well be collateral consequences to Sproutr as a result of these documents becoming relevant in this litigation. But that is a consideration to weigh before (not after) committing to a course of conduct likely to lead to litigation.

Notably, it was the Cultivatr Parties themselves who commenced this litigation as a declaratory action. Regardless of the outcome of this case, Cultivatr and Sproutr, in electing not to give Ms. Peterson the shares, put themselves on a set of tracks aimed squarely at litigation. The disclosure of information related to equity in the companies is a natural consequence of that decision, which should have been weighed at that time, or at various points in settlement discussions. They cannot now unilaterally impose the terms and conditions of their contract with the Investor upon the public.

The Cultivatr Parties next argue, with no factual support, that disclosure of this information could permit others to take advantage of them or the Investor. Given that there is no factual information presented by the Cultivatr Parties that this is so, the Court could reject that out of hand. But, addressing the merits, this does not strike the court as particularly credible. This involves a completed transaction from more than two years ago. How the terms of an investment agreement could possibly cause Sproutr or the Investor to lose customers is mystifying. At any rate, it is surely the sort of vague and non-specific argument that this Court is precluded from assigning weight under In re Avandia [the key Third Circuit precedent], and therefore this Court disregards it….

Any business in America would rather not have their internal documents out in the public. But that does not mean that litigants have a right to hide them from the public once they are implicated in court proceedings. It takes something more than the desire for secrecy to exclude information from the docket. A party seeking to seal needs articulated facts with specific examples. The Cultivatr Parties do not come close….

To the extent this ruling seems harsh, this Court will address three further points which are worth noting here. The first is that we are here, in Court, because the Cultivatr Parties filed a lawsuit. While the standard is not different for plaintiffs and defendants, the Cultivatr Parties can hardly claim to be surprised to find that documents related to equity ownership in Sproutr have come to public view in litigation over an equity dispute with a former employee.

More importantly, however, as Ms. Peterson observed in her opposition, the Cultivatr Parties publicly filed, as an attachment to their Complaint, the name of the Investor they seek to seal and the exact amount of that investment. So, too, does the Court refer to the Investor, the amount of the investment, and the discussions regarding the accounting consequences of that investment repeatedly in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. There has been no motion to seal those filings…. [T]he identity of the Investor has been no secret to any diligent court watcher since the very first filing in this case.

Finally, the Court is sympathetic to the possibility that the Cultivatr Parties may rather not have tried the case at all, had they known the Investor’s name would be made public. If that were the case, however, they could have gotten this determination before trial and strategized accordingly. They could have moved before trial to seal the courtroom, but they did not, or made some other pretrial motion as to maintaining confidentiality designations for trial purposes.

For the same reasons articulated here, this Court would, in all likelihood, have denied the motion. But at least the Cultivatr Parties would have had the lay of the land, and understand what proceeding to trial meant. But they did not, and are left with the consequences of the string of choices which brought them to this point….