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Tag: public-health experts

  • Why Are We Still Flu-ifying COVID?

    Why Are We Still Flu-ifying COVID?

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    Four years after what was once the “novel coronavirus” was declared a pandemic, COVID remains the most dangerous infectious respiratory illness regularly circulating in the U.S. But a glance at the United States’ most prominent COVID policies can give the impression that the disease is just another seasonal flu. COVID vaccines are now reformulated annually, and recommended in the autumn for everyone over the age of six months, just like flu shots; tests and treatments for the disease are steadily being commercialized, like our armamentarium against flu. And the CDC is reportedly considering more flu-esque isolation guidance for COVID: Stay home ’til you’re feeling better and are, for at least a day, fever-free without meds.

    These changes are a stark departure from the earliest days of the crisis, when public-health experts excoriated public figures—among them, former President Donald Trump—for evoking flu to minimize COVID deaths and dismiss mitigation strategies. COVID might still carry a bigger burden than flu, but COVID policies are getting more flu-ified.

    In some ways, as the population’s immunity has increased, COVID has become more flu-like, says Roby Bhattacharyya, a microbiologist and an infectious-disease physician at Massachusetts General Hospital. Every winter seems to bring a COVID peak, but the virus is now much less likely to hospitalize or kill us, and somewhat less likely to cause long-term illness. People develop symptoms sooner after infection, and, especially if they’re vaccinated, are less likely to be as sick for as long. COVID patients are no longer overwhelming hospitals; those who do develop severe COVID tend to be those made more vulnerable by age or other health issues.

    Even so, COVID and the flu are nowhere near the same. SARS-CoV-2 still spikes in non-winter seasons and simmers throughout the rest of the year. In 2023, COVID hospitalized more than 900,000 Americans and killed 75,000; the worst flu season of the past decade hospitalized 200,000 fewer people and resulted in 23,000 fewer deaths. A recent CDC survey reported that more than 5 percent of American adults are currently experiencing long COVID, which cannot be fully prevented by vaccination or treatment, and for which there is no cure. Plus, scientists simply understand much less about the coronavirus than flu viruses. Its patterns of spread, its evolution, and the durability of our immunity against it all may continue to change.

    And yet, the CDC and White House continue to fold COVID in with other long-standing seasonal respiratory infections. When the nation’s authorities start to match the precautions taken against COVID with those for flu, RSV, or common colds, it implies “that the risks are the same,” Saskia Popescu, an epidemiologist at the University of Maryland, told me. Some of those decisions are “not completely unreasonable,” says Costi Sifri, the director of hospital epidemiology at UVA Health, especially on a case-by-case basis. But taken together, they show how bent America has been on treating COVID as a run-of-the-mill disease—making it impossible to manage the illness whose devastation has defined the 2020s.

    Each “not completely unreasonable” decision has trade-offs. Piggybacking COVID vaccines onto flu shots, for instance, is convenient: Although COVID-vaccination rates still lag those of flu, they might be even lower if no one could predict when shots might show up. But such convenience may come at the cost of protecting Americans against COVID’s year-round threat. Michael Osterholm, an epidemiologist at the University of Minnesota School of Public Health, told me that a once-a-year vaccine policy is “dead wrong … There is no damn evidence this is a seasonal virus yet.” Safeguards against infection and milder illness start to fade within months, leaving people who dose up in autumn potentially more susceptible to exposures by spring. That said, experts are still torn on the benefits of administering the same vaccine more than once a year—especially to a public that’s largely unwilling to get it. Throughout the pandemic, immunocompromised people have been able to get extra shots. And today, an advisory committee to the CDC voted to recommend that older adults once again get an additional dose of the most recently updated COVID vaccine in the coming months. Neither is a pattern that flu vaccines follow.

    Dropping the current COVID-isolation guideline—which has, since the end of 2021, recommended that people cloister for five days—may likewise be dangerous. Many Americans have long abandoned this isolation timeline, but given how new COVID is to both humanity and science, symptoms alone don’t yet seem enough to determine when mingling is safe, Popescu said. (The dangers are even tougher to gauge for infected people who never develop fevers or other symptoms at all.) Researchers don’t currently have a clear picture of how long people can transmit the virus once they get sick, Sifri told me. For most respiratory illnesses, fevers show up relatively early in infection, which is generally when people pose the most transmission risk, says Aubree Gordon, an epidemiologist at the University of Michigan. But although SARS-CoV-2 adheres to this same rough timeline, infected people can shed the virus after their symptoms begin to resolve and are “definitely shedding longer than what you would usually see for flu,” Gordon told me. (Asked about the specifics and precise timing of the update, a CDC spokesperson told me that there were “no updates to COVID guidelines to announce at this time,” and did not respond to questions about how flu precedents had influenced new recommendations.)

    At the very least, Emily Landon, an infectious-disease physician at the University of Chicago, told me, recommendations for all respiratory illnesses should tell freshly de-isolated people to mask for several days when they’re around others indoors; she would support some change to isolation recommendations with this caveat. But if the CDC aligns the policy fully with its flu policy, it might not mention masking at all.

    Several experts told me symptom-based isolation might also remove remaining incentives to test for the coronavirus: There’s little point if the guidelines for all respiratory illnesses are essentially the same. To be fair, Americans have already been testing less frequently—in some cases, to avoid COVID-specific requirements to stay away from work or school. And Osterholm and Gordon told me that, at this point in the pandemic, they agree that keeping people at home for five days isn’t sustainable—especially without paid sick leave, and particularly not for health-care workers, who are in short supply during the height of respiratory-virus season.

    But the less people test, the less they’ll be diagnosed—and the less they’ll benefit from antivirals such as Paxlovid, which work best when administered early. Sifri worries that this pattern could yield another parallel to flu, for which many providers hesitate to prescribe Tamiflu, debating its effectiveness. Paxlovid use is already shaky; both antivirals may end up chronically underutilized.

    Flu-ification also threatens to further stigmatize long COVID. Other respiratory infections, including flu, have been documented triggering long-term illness, but potentially at lower rates, and to different degrees than SARS-CoV-2 currently does. Folding this new virus in with the rest could make long COVID seem all the more negligible. What’s more, fewer tests and fewer COVID diagnoses could make it much harder to connect any chronic symptoms to this coronavirus, keeping patients out of long-COVID clinics—or reinforcing a false portrait of the condition’s rarity.

    The U.S. does continue to treat COVID differently from flu in a few ways. Certain COVID products remain more available; some precautions in health-care settings remain stricter. But these differences, too, will likely continue to fade, even as COVID’s burden persists. Tests, vaccines, and treatments are slowly commercializing; as demand for them drops, supply may too. And several experts told me that they wouldn’t be surprised if hospitals, too, soon flu-ify their COVID policies even more, for instance by allowing recently infected employees to return to work once they’re fever-free.

    Early in the pandemic, public-health experts hoped that COVID’s tragedies would prompt a rethinking of all respiratory illnesses. The pandemic showed what mitigations could do: During the first year of the crisis, isolation, masking, distancing, and shutdowns brought flu transmission to a near halt, and may have driven an entire lineage of the virus to extinction—something “that never, in my wildest dreams, did I ever think would be possible,” Landon told me.

    Most of those measures weren’t sustainable. But America’s leaders blew right past a middle ground. The U.S. could have built and maintained systems in which everyone had free access to treatments, tests, and vaccines for a longer list of pathogens; it might have invested in widespread ventilation improvements, or enacted universal sick leave. American homes might have been stocked with tests for a multitude of infectious microbes, and masks to wear when people started to cough. Vaccine requirements in health-care settings and schools might have expanded. Instead, “we seem to be in a more 2019-like place than a future where we’re preventing giving each other colds as much as we could,” Bhattacharyya told me.

    That means a return to a world in which tens of thousands of Americans die each year of flu and RSV, as they did in the 2010s. With COVID here to stay, every winter for the foreseeable future will layer on yet another respiratory virus—and a particularly deadly, disabling, and transmissible one at that. The math is simple: “The risk has overall increased for everyone,” Landon said. That straightforward addition could have inspired us to expand our capacity for preserving health and life. Instead, our tolerance for suffering seems to be the only thing that’s grown.

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    Katherine J. Wu

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  • One More COVID Summer?

    One More COVID Summer?

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    Since the pandemic’s earliest days, epidemiologists have been waiting for the coronavirus to finally snap out of its pan-season spree. No more spring waves like the first to hit the United States in 2020, no more mid-year surges like the one that turned Hot Vax Summer on its head. Eventually, or so the hope went, SARS-CoV-2 would adhere to the same calendar that many other airway pathogens stick to, at least in temperate parts of the globe: a heavy winter peak, then a summer on sabbatical.

    But three and a half years into the outbreak, the coronavirus is still stubbornly refusing to take the warmest months off. Some public-health experts are now worried that, after a relatively quiet stretch, the virus is kick-starting yet another summer wave. In the southern and northeastern United States, concentrations of the coronavirus in wastewater have been slowly ticking up for several weeks, with the Midwest and West now following suit; test-positivity rates, emergency-department diagnoses of COVID-19, and COVID hospitalizations are also on the rise. The absolute numbers are still small, and they may stay that way. But these are the clear and early signs of a brewing mid-year wave, says Caitlin Rivers, an epidemiologist at Johns Hopkins University—which would make this the fourth summer in a row with a distinct coronavirus bump.

    Even this far into the pandemic, though, no one can say for certain whether summer waves are a permanent COVID fixture—or if the virus exhibits a predictable seasonal pattern at all. No law of nature dictates that winters must come with respiratory illness, or that summers will not. “We just don’t know very much about what drives the cyclical patterns of respiratory infections,” says Sam Scarpino, an infectious-disease modeler at Northeastern University. Which means there’s still no part of the year when this virus is guaranteed to cut us any slack.

    That many pathogens do wax and wane with the seasons is indisputable. In temperate parts of the world, airborne bugs get a boost in winter, only to be stifled in the heat; polio and other feces-borne pathogens, meanwhile, often rise in summer, along with gonorrhea and some other STIs. But noticing these trends is one thing; truly understanding the triggers is another.

    Some diseases lend themselves a bit more easily to explanation: Near the equator, waves of mosquito-borne illness, such as Zika and Chikungunya, tend to be tied to the weather-dependent life cycles of the insects that carry them; in temperate parts of the world, rates of Lyme disease track with the summertime activity of ticks. Flu, too, has pretty strong data to back its preference for wintry months. The virus—which is sheathed in a fragile, fatty layer called an envelope and travels airborne via moist drops—spreads best when it’s cool and dry, conditions that may help keep infectious particles intact and spittle aloft.

    The coronavirus has enough similarities to flu that most experts expect that it will continue to spread in winter too. Both viruses are housed in a sensitive skin; both prefer to move by aerosol. Both are also relatively speedy evolvers that don’t tend to generate long-lasting immunity against infection—factors conducive to repeat waves that hit populations at a fairly stable clip. For those reasons, Anice Lowen, a virologist at Emory University, anticipates that SARS-CoV-2 will continue to show “a clear wintertime seasonality in temperate regions of the world.” Winter is also a time when our bodies can be more susceptible to respiratory bugs: Cold, dry air can interfere with the movement of mucus that shuttles microbes out of the nose and throat; aridity can also make the cells that line those passageways shrivel and die; certain immune defenses might get a bit sleepier, with vitamin D in shorter supply.

    None of that precludes SARS-CoV-2 spread in the heat, even if experts aren’t sure why the virus so easily drives summer waves. Plenty of other microbes manage it: enteroviruses, polio, and more. Even rhinoviruses and adenoviruses, two of the most frequent causes of colds, tend to spread year-round, sometimes showing up in force during the year’s hottest months. (Many scientists presume that has something to do with these viruses’ relatively hardy outer layer, but the reason is undoubtedly more complex than that.) An oft-touted explanation for COVID’s summer waves is that people in certain parts of the country retreat indoors to beat the heat. But that argument alone “is weak,” Lowen told me. In industrialized nations, people spend more than 90 percent of their time indoors.

    That said, an accumulation of many small influences can together create a seasonal tipping point. Summer is a particularly popular time for travel, often to big gatherings. Many months out from winter and its numerous infections and vaccinations, population immunity might also be at a relative low at this time of year, Rivers said. Plus, for all its similarities to the flu, SARS-CoV-2 is its own beast: It has so far affected people more chronically and more severely, and has generated population-sweeping variants at a far faster pace. Those dynamics can all affect when waves manifest.

    And although certain bodily defenses do dip in the cold, data don’t support the idea that immunity is unilaterally stronger in the summer. Micaela Martinez, the director of environmental health at WE ACT for Environmental Justice, in New York, told me the situation is far more complicated than that. For years, she and other researchers have been gathering evidence that suggests that our bodies have distinctly seasonal immunological profiles—with some defensive molecules spiking in the summer and another set in winter. The consequences of those shifts aren’t yet apparent. But some of them could help explain when the coronavirus spreads. By the same token, winter is not a time of disease-ridden doom. Xaquin Castro Dopico, an immunologist at the Karolinska Institute, in Sweden, has found that immune systems in the Northern Hemisphere might be more inflammation-prone in the winter—which, yes, could make certain bouts of illness more severe but could also improve responses to certain vaccinations.

    All of those explanations could apply to COVID’s summer swings—or perhaps none does. “Everybody always wants to have a very simple seasonal answer,” Martinez told me. But one may simply not exist. Even the reasons for the seasonality of polio, a staunch summertime disease prior to its elimination in the U.S., have been “an open question” for many decades, Martinez told me.

    Rivers is hopeful that the coronavirus’s permanent patterns may already be starting to peek through: a wintry heyday, and a smaller maybe-summer hump. “We’re in year four, and we’re seeing the same thing year over year,” she told me. But some experts worry that discussions of COVID-19 seasonality are premature. SARS-CoV-2 is still so fresh to the human population that its patterns could be far from their final form. At an extreme, the patterns researchers observed during the first few years of the pandemic may not prelude the future much at all, because they encapsulate so much change: the initial lack and rapid acquisition of immunity, the virus’s evolution, the ebb and flow of masks, and more. Amid that mishmash of countervailing influences, says Brandon Ogbunu, an infectious-disease modeler at Yale, “you’re going to get some counterintuitive dynamics” that won’t necessarily last long term.

    With so much of the world now infected, vaccinated, or both, and COVID mitigations almost entirely gone, the global situation is less in flux now. The virus itself, although still clearly changing at a blistering pace, has not pulled off an Omicron-caliber jump in evolution for more than a year and a half. But no one can yet promise predictability. The cadence of vaccination isn’t yet settled; Scarpino, of Northeastern University, also isn’t ready to dismiss the idea of a viral evolution surprise. Maybe summer waves, to the extent that they’re happening, are a sign that SARS-CoV-2 will remain a microbe for all seasons. Or maybe they’re part of the pandemic’s death rattle—noise in a system that hasn’t yet quieted down.

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    Katherine J. Wu

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  • The Age of Vaccine Pessimism

    The Age of Vaccine Pessimism

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    The world has just seen the largest vaccination campaign in history. At least 13 billion COVID shots have been administered—more injections, by a sweeping margin, than there are human beings on the Earth. In the U.S. alone, millions of lives have been saved by a rollout of extraordinary scope. More than three-fifths of the population elected to receive the medicine even before it got its full approval from the FDA.

    Yet the legacy of this achievement appears to be in doubt. Just look at where the country is right now. In Florida, the governor—a likely Republican presidential candidate—openly pursues the politics of vaccine resistance and denial. In Ohio, kids are getting measles. In New York, polio is back. A football player nearly died on national TV, and fears about vaccines fanned across the internet. Vaccinologists, pediatricians, and public-health experts routinely warn that confidence is wavering for every kind of immunization, and worry that it may collapse in years to come.

    In other words, America is mired in a paradoxical and pessimistic moment. “We’ve just had a national vaccination campaign that has exceeded almost all previous efforts in a dramatic fashion,” says Noel Brewer, a psychologist at the University of North Carolina who has been studying decision making about vaccines for more than 20 years, “and people are talking about vaccination as if there’s something fundamentally wrong.”

    It’s more than talk. Americans are arguing, Americans are worrying, Americans are obsessing over vaccines; and that fixation has produced its own, pathological anxiety. To fret about the state of public trust is rational: When vaccine adherence wobbles, lives are put in peril; in the midst of a pandemic, the mortal risk is even greater. More than 60 million Americans haven’t gotten a single COVID shot, and a few thousand deaths are attributed to the disease every week. But the scale of this concern—the measure of our instability—may be distorted by the heights to which we’ve climbed. Evidence that the nation has arrived at the brink of collapse does not hold up to scrutiny. No one knows where vaccination rates are really heading, and the coming crash is more an idea—a projection, even—than a certainty. The future of vaccination in America may be no worse than its recent past. In the end, it might be better.

    The first alarms about a widespread vaccination crisis—the first suggestions that a leeriness of COVID shots had “spread its tentacles into other diseases”—were raised by clinicians. Megha Shah, a pediatrician with the Los Angeles public-health department, told me that she began to worry in the spring of 2021, while volunteering at a medical center. Two years earlier, she recalled, working there had been uneventful. She’d meet with parents—mostly from low-income Latino families—to discuss the standard vaccination schedule: Okay, here’s what we’re recommending for your child. This protects against this; that protects against that. The parents would ask a couple of questions, and she’d answer them. The child would be immunized, almost every time.

    But in the middle of the COVID-vaccine rollout, she found that those conversations were playing out differently. “Oh, I’m just not sure,” she said some parents told her. Or, “I need to talk this over with my partner.” She saw families refuse, flat-out, to give their infants routine shots. “It just was very, very surprising,” Shah said. “I mean, questions are good. We want parents to be engaged and informed decision makers.” But it seemed to her—and her colleagues too—that healthy “engagement” had gone sour.

    Last year, she and her colleagues took a closer look. For a study published in Pediatrics, they drew on national survey data collected from April 2020 through early 2022, of parents’ attitudes toward standard childhood vaccines. In some respects, the results looked good: Parents endorsed the importance and effectiveness of these vaccines at a high and stable rate throughout the pandemic—in the vicinity of 91 percent. But over the same period, concerns about potential harms marched upward. In April 2020, about 25 percent of those surveyed agreed that vaccines “have many known harmful side effects” and “may lead to illness or death”; by the end of the year, that number had increased to 30 percent, and then to nearly 35 percent the following June. “Parents still seemed very confident overall in the benefits of vaccinations,” Shah told me, “but there was a huge jump over the course of the pandemic about the safety.”

    Those results jibed with a theory that has now been invoked so many times, it reads as common knowledge: “Perhaps this was a spillover effect,” Shah said, “from all of the vaccine misinformation that was circling during the pandemic.” That effect—the spreading tentacles of doubt—can be seen around the world, says Heidi Larson, a professor at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine who has studied attitudes toward vaccination across Europe since the start of the coronavirus pandemic. “The public-health community was assuming that COVID would be a great boon to public confidence in vaccines, but it hasn’t worked out that way. The trend has been actually a negative knock-on effect,” Larson told me. In a troubling alignment, even anti-vaccine activists now endorse the notion of hesitancy spillover, calling it a “wonderful silver lining” to the pandemic.

    But hold on a minute. Here in the U.S., it’s certainly true that vaccine worries have been broadcast and rebroadcast, at ever greater volumes, through a clamorous network of influencers and politicians. This campaign of hesitancy is growing more open and insistent by the day, and the consequences can be atrocious: Americans with false beliefs about vaccines are falling sick and dying stubborn and alone. But even as these anecdotes accrue, misinformation’s greater sway—the extent to which it shapes Americans’ behavior toward vaccines for COVID, measles, or the flu—remains murky, if not altogether undetectable. The best numbers to go on in this country, drawn from polls of people’s attitudes about vaccines and official vaccination surveys from the CDC, don’t hint at any comprehensive change. When concerning blips and mini-trends arise—shifts in parents’ attitudes, as seen in Shah’s research, or drops in local rates of children getting immunized—they’re set against a landscape with a flat horizon.

    It’s not a pretty view, for that: The U.S. lags five points behind the average wealthy country in its rate of people fully vaccinated against COVID, and two points behind in its vaccination rate for measles. And even blips can translate into many thousands of at-risk kids, Shah pointed out. Yet one might still be grateful for the sameness overall. A seedbed of resistance to the COVID shots, disproportionately Republican, was already present near the start of the pandemic, and hasn’t seemed to thrive despite two years’ worth of fertilizer runoff from Fox News and other outlets spewing doubt. In August 2020, the Harris Poll’s weekly COVID-19 tracker found that 15 percent of American adults said they were “not at all likely” to get the vaccine when it finally became available. In August 2022, Harris reported that 17 percent weren’t planning to be immunized. Other long-running surveys have found similar results. In September 2020, Kaiser Family Foundation’s vaccine monitor pegged the rate of refusal at 20 percent. In December 2022, it was … still 20 percent.

    The most recent uptake numbers from the CDC suggest that children born in 2018 and 2019 (who would have been babies or toddlers when COVID first appeared) had higher vaccination rates by age 2 than children born in 2016 and 2017. Some of these kids did miss out on shots amid the pandemic’s early lapses in routine medical care, but they quickly caught up. Another, more alarming batch of data from the CDC shows that measles-mumps-rubella coverage among the nation’s kindergartners has dropped for two years in a row, down from 95.2 to 93.5 percent, and is now lower than it’s been since at least 2013. Still, the proportion of kids who get exempted from school vaccine requirements for medical or philosophical reasons has hardly changed at all, and the headline-grabbing “slide” in rates appears instead to be at least in part a product of “provisional enrollments”—i.e., children who missed some vaccinations (perhaps in early 2020) and were allowed to enter school while they caught up. If there really is a wave of newly red-pilled, anti-vaxxer parents, then going by these data, they’re nowhere to be seen.

    Some public-health disasters hit like hurricanes; others spread like rust. “We may not have a full picture yet,” Shah told me, referring to the latest evidence from the CDC on where vaccination rates are heading. “My gut and my clinical experience tell me that it’s too soon to say.”

    Other experts share that view. Robert Bednarczyk, an epidemiologist at Emory University, has been estimating the susceptibility of U.S. children to measles outbreaks since 2016. National immunization surveys have not shown substantial drops in coverage for 2020 and 2021, he told me, “but there is a large caveat to this. These surveys have a lag time.” Any children from the CDC’s data set who were born in 2018, he noted, would have gotten most of their vaccines before the pandemic started, during their first year of life. The same problem applies to teens. The government’s latest stats for adolescents—which looked as good as ever in 2021—capture many who would have gotten all their shots pre-COVID. Until more data are released, researchers still won’t know whether or how far kids’ vaccination rates have really dipped during the 2020s.

    The time delay is just one potential problem. Parents who are suspicious of vaccines, and angry at the government for encouraging their use, may be less willing to participate in CDC surveys, Daniel Salmon, the director of the Institute for Vaccine Safety at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, told me. “Having studied this for 25 years, I would be surprised if we don’t see a substantial COVID effect on childhood vaccines,” he said. “These data are a little bit reassuring, that it’s not, like, an oh-my-god huge effect. But we need more time and more data to really know the answer.”

    Uncertainty doesn’t have to be a source of terror, though. Early uptake data already provide some signs of a “vaccine-hesitancy spillover effect” happening in reverse, UNC’s Brewer told me, driving more enthusiasm, not less, for getting different kinds of shots. Just look at how the push to dose the nation with half a billion COVID shots goosed the rates of grown-ups getting flu shots: For decades now, our public-health establishment has pushed for better influenza coverage, even as the rate for older Americans was stuck at roughly 65 percent. Then COVID came along and, voilà, senior citizens’ flu-shot coverage jumped to 75 percent—higher than it ever was before. This all fits with a familiar idea in the field, Brewer said, that going in for any one vaccine makes you much more likely to get another in the future. “There does seem to be a sort of positive spillover,” he said, “probably because the forces that led to previous vaccinations are still mostly in place.”

    Even some of the scariest signals we’ve seen so far—reports that anti-vaccine sentiment is clearly on the rise—can seem ambiguous, depending on one’s breadth of view. Consider the finding from Heidi Larson’s group, that vaccine confidence has declined across the whole of the European Union throughout the pandemic, according to surveys taken in 2020 and 2022. The same report says that attitudes have now returned to where they were in 2018 and that confidence in the MMR vaccine, in particular, remains higher than it was four years ago. Given that the 2020 surveys were conducted mostly in March, at the very onset of the first pandemic lockdowns, they might have captured a temporary spike of interest in vaccines. After all, vaccines can seem more useful when you’re terrified of death.

    In other words, America may truly have experienced a recent drop in vaccine confidence—but from an inflated and unsustainable high. That could help explain other recent findings too, including Shah’s. “You need to take the long view,” says Douglas Opel, a pediatric bioethicist at Seattle Children’s Hospital who has been studying the ups and downs of vaccine hesitancy for more than a decade. For a paper published last July, he and colleagues looked at vaccine attitudes among 4,562 parents from late 2019 to the end of 2020. They found that the parents grew more enthusiastic about childhood immunizations when the pandemic started, but their feelings later returned to baseline.

    Larson told me that a “transient COVID effect” may well explain some of what her team has found, but said it was very unlikely to account in full for the worrying trend. In any case, she told me, “we shouldn’t assume this and should instead make an extra effort to continue to build confidence.”

    No crunching of the numbers can excuse the spread of vaccine misinformation, or suggest that those who peddle it are anything but a hateful scourge on individuals and a threat to public health. But you can’t simply ignore the fact that, as far as we can see, all the gnashing about vaccines’ supposed risks simply hasn’t changed a lot of people’s minds. It certainly hasn’t caused a steep and sudden rise in vaccine refusal. The idea that we’re in the midst of some new vaccine-hesitancy contagion is based as much on vibes as proven fact.

    The problem is, bad vibes can leave us prone to misinterpretation. Take the recent measles outbreak in Ohio: It’s alarming, but not so relevant to recent trends in vaccination, despite many claims to that effect. More than one-quarter of the affected children were too young to have been eligible for the MMR vaccine, while others were old enough to have missed their first shot by 2020, before any hesitancy “spillover” could have taken place. And at least a meaningful proportion of the affected families, from the state’s Democratic-leaning Somali American community, wouldn’t seem to represent the GOP’s white, unvaccinated constituency.

    The stark politicization of the COVID shots can be misread too. Despite the 30-point gap between Democrats and Republicans in COVID vaccination rates, those rates are much, much higher—for members of both parties—than they’ve ever been for flu shots. And interparty differences in flu-shot uptake seem to be long-standing. A preprint study from Minttu Rönn, a researcher at the Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, and colleagues found a broadening divide in coverage between Democratic- and Republican-voting states, based on data going back to 2010. But this may not be a bad thing. Rönn doesn’t think the change arises from a loss of trust among Republicans; rather, she told me, it looks to be related to rising flu-shot coverage overall, with proportionally greater gains in Democratic-leaning areas. (That difference could be the result of local attitudes, ease of access, or insurance coverage, she said.) In other words, red states aren’t necessarily falling behind on vaccination. Blue states are surging forward.

    Optimism here may seem perverse. COVID booster uptake is absurdly low right now, even for the elderly. The politicization of vaccines (whenever it began) certainly isn’t letting up. Given what would happen if trust in vaccination really did collapse, perhaps it makes more sense to err on the side of freaking out. As Larson said, every effort should be taken to build confidence, no matter what.

    But the truth of what we know right now ought to be important too. Maybe it’s okay to feel okay. Maybe there’s value in maintaining calm and taking stock of what we’ve accomplished or what we’ve maintained in the face of all these efforts to confuse us. At the risk of trying way too hard to find some solace in disturbing facts, here’s another case in point. Remember Shah’s results, that parents’ concerns about the health effects of childhood vaccines have steadily gone up throughout the pandemic, even as their belief in vaccines’ benefits stayed high? That increase wasn’t clearly more pronounced in any specific group. Belief that vaccination can result in illness or death went up across the board for men and women in the survey, for young and old, for Black and white alike. It rose among Republicans and also Democrats—in just about the same proportions. If America’s parents have been getting more attuned to potential risks from vaccination, we’re doing it together.

    I’m in that number too. As a scientist by training and a science journalist by trade, I’ve been reporting and editing stories about vaccination for years. Still, I’ve never thought so hard about the topic, and in such critical detail, as I have since 2021. At no point in my life has vaccination been this pervasive, perplexing, and important. When it came time to get my children COVID shots, I learned everything I could about potential risks and benefits. I looked at data on the incidence of myocarditis, I considered very rare but deadly outcomes, and I weighed the efficacy of different shots against their measured side effects. These investigations did not arise from distrust of authority, podcast propaganda, or a belief in microchips so small they fit inside of a syringe. I wasn’t fearful; I was curious. I had questions, and I got answers—and now every member of my family has gotten their shots.

    We’ve all been forced by circumstance to think in different ways about our health. Before the pandemic, Larson told me, most people simply didn’t have to pay attention to vaccines. Parents with young children, sure, but everybody else? “I think they probably said, Yeah, vaccines are important. Yeah, they’re safe enough,” she said. But now the stakes are raised across the population. “I mean, there are these groups around the world where you’re like, ‘why do they care about vaccines?’ And it’s because of COVID.”

    The emergence of so many groups with newfound interest in vaccines could end up being dangerous, of course—in the same way that newly minted drivers are a menace on the road. “A lot of people went online asking questions about vaccines,” Larson told me, in a tone that made it sound as though online were a synonym for “straight to hell.” But sometimes asking questions gets you useful information, and sometimes useful information leads to wise decisions. Debates about vaccines may be louder than they’ve ever been before, but that doesn’t mean that vaccination rates are bound to fall.

    Even if the situation isn’t getting that much worse, the country might still be left to wallow in its status quo. Yes, more than 200 million Americans have been fully immunized against COVID—and more than 100 million haven’t. “This has been a problem for a long time,” Daniel Salmon told me. “It was already ‘a crisis in confidence’ a dozen years ago. We don’t see a free fall—that’s somewhat reassuring—but that’s very different from saying that we’re good to go.”

    The fact of this crisis, however long it’s been around, will never matter more than its effects. After all, “confidence” itself is not the only factor, or even the most important one, that determines who gets shots. “Generally speaking, access to vaccination is a much bigger driver than what people think and feel,” Noel Brewer told me. Early in the pandemic, lots of parents wanted to vaccinate their kids and simply couldn’t. Now many of them can. But obstacles persist, and their effects aren’t evenly distributed. According to the CDC, toddlers’ vaccination rates are somewhat lower among those who live in poverty, or reside in rural areas, or don’t identify as white or Asian. Since the pandemic started, these gaps in opportunity appear to have increased. A grand and tragic spillover of people’s vaccination doubts—the anti-vaxxers’ hoped-for “silver lining” to the pandemic—may or may not come. In the meantime, though, there are other problems to address.

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    Daniel Engber

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  • COVID Vaccines Are Turning Into Flu Shots

    COVID Vaccines Are Turning Into Flu Shots

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    For all the legwork that public-health experts have done over the past few years to quash comparisons between COVID-19 and the flu, there sure seems to be a lot of effort nowadays to equate the two. In an advisory meeting convened earlier today, the FDA signaled its intention to start doling out COVID vaccines just like flu shots: once a year in autumn, for just about everyone, ad infinitum. Whatever the brand, primary-series shots and boosters (which might no longer be called “boosters”) will guard against the same variants, making them interchangeable. Doses will no longer be counted numerically. “This will be a fundamental transition,” says Jason Schwartz, a vaccine policy expert at Yale—the biggest change to the COVID-vaccination regimen since it debuted.

    Hints of the annual approach have been dropping, not so subtly, for years. Even in the spring of 2021, Pfizer’s CEO was floating the idea of yearly shots; Peter Marks, the director of the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, teased it throughout 2022. This past September, Joe Biden officially endorsed it as “a new phase in our COVID-19 response,” and Ashish Jha, the White House’s COVID czar, memorably highlighted the convenience of combining a flu shot and a COVID shot into a single appointment: “I really believe this is why God gave us two arms.”

    Still, in today’s meeting, FDA officials were pushier than ever in their advocacy for the flu-ification of COVID vaccines. “We think that simplification of the vaccination regimen would contribute to easier vaccine deployment, better communication, and improved vaccine coverage,” Jerry Weir, the FDA’s director of the division of viral products, said at the meeting. The timing is important: After renewing the U.S.’s pandemic-emergency declaration earlier this month, the Biden administration seems set to allow its expiration this coming April. That makes the present moment awfully convenient for repackaging a chaotic, crisis-caliber vaccination paradigm as a scheduled, seasonal, normal-seeming one. A once-a-year strategy, modeled on a routine recommendation, suggests that “we’re no longer in emergency mode,” says Maria Sundaram, a vaccine researcher at the Marshfield Clinic Research Institute. Or at least, that’s the message that the public is likely to hear.

    But federal regulators may be trying to fit a COVID-shaped peg into a flu-shaped hole. The experts I spoke with largely agreed: Eventually, someday, annual autumn shots for COVID “will probably be sufficient,” says Gregory Poland, a vaccinologist at Mayo Clinic. “Are we ready for that yet? I’m not sure that’s the case at all.”

    Even in the short term, COVID-vaccination tactics need a revamp. “It’s clear above all that the current approach isn’t working,” Schwartz told me. Despite abundant supply, demand for COVID boosters in the U.S. has been abysmal—and interest seems to be declining with each additional dose. Last fall’s bivalent shot has reached the arms of only 15 percent of Americans; even among adults over 65—a majority of whom sign up for flu shots each fall—the vaccination rate hasn’t yet reached 40 percent.

    For most of the time that COVID shots have been around, figuring out when to get them has been a hassle, with different guidelines and requirements that depend on age, sex, risk factors, vaccination history, and more. Pharmacies have had to stock an absurd number of vials and syringes to accommodate the various combinations of brands and dose sizes; record-keeping on flimsy paper cards has been a total joke. “I do this for a living, and I can barely keep track,” Schwartz said. Recommendations on the proper timing and number of doses have also changed so many times that many Americans have simply checked out. After the bivalent recipe debuted, polls found that an alarming proportion of people didn’t even know the shot was available to them.

    Streamlining COVID-vaccine recommendations will remove a lot of that headache, Sundaram told me. Most people would need to keep only one mantra in mind—one dose, each fall—and could top off their flu and COVID immunity at the same time. Burdens on pharmacies and clinics would be lower, and communication would be far easier—a change that could make an especially big difference for those with children, among whom COVID-vaccine uptake has been the lowest. “It’ll be more scheduled, more systematic,” says Charlotte Hobbs, a pediatric infectious-disease specialist at the University of Mississippi Medical Center. COVID shots could simply be offered at annual well-child visits, she told me. “It’s something we already know works well.”

    The advantages of a flu-ified COVID shot aren’t just about convenience. If we have to shoehorn COVID vaccines into an existing paradigm, Sundaram told me, influenza’s is the best candidate. SARS-CoV-2, like the flu, is excellent at altering itself to dodge our defenses; it spreads readily in winter; and our immunity to infection tends to fade rather quickly. All of that adds up to a need for regularly updated shots. Such a system has been in place for decades for the flu: At the end of each winter, a panel of experts convenes to select the strains that should be targeted by the next formulation; manufacturers spend the next several months whipping up big batches in time for an autumn-ish rollout. The pipeline depends on a global surveillance system for flu viruses, as well as regular surveys of antibody levels in the community to suss out which strains people are still protected against. The premise has been so well vetted by now that researchers can skip the chore of running large-scale clinical trials to determine the efficacy and safety of each new, updated recipe.

    But a seasonal strategy works best for a seasonal virus—and SARS-CoV-2 just isn’t there yet, says Hana El Sahly, an infectious-disease physician at Baylor College of Medicine. Though flu viruses tend to hop between the globe’s hemispheres, alternately troubling the north and the south during their respective cold months, this new coronavirus has yet to confine its spread to one part of the calendar. (Marks, of the FDA, tried to address this concern at today’s meeting, asserting that “we’re starting to see some seasonality” and that fall was indeed the very sensible for an annual rollout.) SARS-CoV-2 has also been spitting out concerning variants and subvariants at a faster rate than the flu (and flu shots already have a hard time keeping up with evolution). The FDA’s new proposal suggests picking SARS-CoV-2 variants in June to have a vaccine ready by September, a shorter timeline than is used for flu. That still might not be fast enough: “By the time we detect a variant, it will have ripped through the global population and, in a few more weeks, died down,” El Sahly told me. The world got a preview of this problem with last year’s bivalent shot, which overlapped with the dominance of its target subvariants for only a couple of months. A flu model for COVID would make more sense “if we had stable, predictable dynamics,” says Avnika Amin, a vaccine epidemiologist at Emory University. “I don’t think we’re at that point.”

    Murkiness around vaccine effectiveness makes this transition complicated too. Experts told me that it’s gotten much more difficult to tell how well our COVID vaccines are working, and for how long, fueling debates over how often they should be given and how often their composition should change. Many people have now been infected by the virus multiple times, which can muddy calculations of vaccine effectiveness; better treatments also alter risk profiles. And many researchers told me they’re concerned that the data shortcuts we use for flu—measures of antibodies as a proxy for immune protection—just won’t fly for COVID shots. “We need better clinical data,” El Sahly told me. In their absence, the hasty adoption of a flu framework could lead to our updating and distributing COVID shots too often, or not often enough.

    A flu-ish approach also wouldn’t fix all of the COVID vaccines’ problems. Today’s discussion suggested that, even if a new COVID-shot strategy change goes through, officials will still need to recommend several different dose sizes for several different age groups—a more complex regimen than flu’s—and may advise additional injections for those at highest risk. At the same time, COVID shots would continue to be more of a target for misinformation campaigns than many other vaccines and, at least in the case of mRNA-based injections, more likely to cause annoying side effects. These issues and others have driven down interest—and simply pivoting to the flu paradigm “is not going to solve the uptake problem,” says Angela Shen, a vaccine-policy expert at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia.

    Perhaps the greatest risk of making COVID vaccines more like flu shots is that it could lead to more complacency. In making the influenza paradigm a model, we also threaten to make it a ceiling. Although flu shots are an essential, lifesaving public-health tool, they are by no means the best-performing vaccines in our roster. Their timeline is slow and inefficient; as a result, the formulations don’t always match circulating strains. Already, with COVID, the world has struggled to chase variants with vaccines that simply cannot keep up. If we move too quickly to the fine-but-flawed framework for flu, experts told me, it could disincentivize research into more durable, more variant-proof, less side-effect-causing COVID shots. Uptake of flu vaccines has never been stellar, either: Just half of Americans sign up for the shots each year—and despite years of valiant efforts, “we still haven’t figured out how to consistently improve that,” Amin told me.

    Whenever the COVID-emergency declaration expires, vaccination will almost certainly have to change. Access to shots may be imperiled for tens of millions of uninsured Americans; local public-health departments may end up with even fewer resources for vaccine outreach. A flu model might offer some improvements over the status quo. But if the downsides outweigh the pluses, Poland told me, that could add to the erosion of public trust. Either way, it might warp attitudes toward this coronavirus in ways that can’t be reversed. At multiple points during today’s meeting, FDA officials emphasized that COVID is not the flu. They’re right: COVID is not the flu and never will be. But vaccines can sometimes become a lens through which we view the dangers they fight. By equating our frontline responses to these viruses, the U.S. risks sending the wrong message—that they carry equal threat.

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    Katherine J. Wu

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  • How Many COVID Deaths Will Chinese Protesters Accept?

    How Many COVID Deaths Will Chinese Protesters Accept?

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    Anti-lockdown protests erupted across China following a deadly apartment fire in Xinjiang last week. The country’s zero-COVID policy may have been to blame, as first responders were apparently restricted from accessing the scene. Heavy-handed quarantines and endless testing are causing many harms, including food shortages and widespread unemployment. But they’re also keeping China’s COVID death toll very, very low: A study out in May from Nature Medicine, led by Shanghai researchers, estimated that without these strict measures in place, a massive wave of new Omicron infections could overwhelm critical-care units and leave 1.55 million people dead. As protesters call on the government to loosen up, how do they make sense of this potential trade-off?

    Few, if any, of the people in the street are asking for a total rollback of the country’s COVID measures. Global public-health experts and China scholars who have been following the protests either from the ground in China or through contacts overseas told me that the movement lacks a precise set of demands. In general, however, the protesters have expressed a wish for easing restrictions, rather than a to-hell-with-it approach. They may not be opposed to post-exposure quarantine, for example, but they’d like to do it in their homes rather than inside government facilities. And footage of the demonstrations shows that many of the protesters are wearing masks (presumably to protect themselves from the coronavirus) even as they agitate for less aggressive testing programs and greater freedom of movement.

    It’s not that people don’t understand the seriousness of COVID, especially in a nation where only two-thirds of those over the age of 80 are fully vaccinated. “People are very much aware of COVID infection, and to some extent, they may even overestimate some of the immediate health risks,” Jeremiah Jenne, a historian and writer based in Beijing, told me. Propaganda circulated by the government has painted other countries as being overrun with deaths from the disease, and China as the only place where people can be safe. But a growing number of citizens, particularly in urban areas and among those who are more internationally aware, are adjusting how they weigh the risks of COVID against the economic hardships and other costs of permanent, draconian restrictions.

    The World Cup has helped fuel this change in attitude, China scholars told me. David Moser, a professor at Beijing Capital Normal University who’s been in China for 35 years, pointed to the broadcasts of the matches, which showed crowds of unmasked people in the stands, leading undisturbed lives. Chinese observers “got a sense that other countries are handling this by self-quarantining, by allowing a certain amount of infections, and letting people make their own medical decisions,” he said. Protesters may not expect to venture into stadiums without a mask anytime soon, or travel without restrictions, but they would like to see some steps in that direction. “They’re asking for a plan that provides an effective way to deal with the pandemic and keep people safe,” Jenne said, “not to go to Paris in March.”

    Xi Chen, a health-policy professor at the Yale School of Public Health, told me that many young people protesting think the risks are much smaller than the ones described in the study from last May, which predicted 1.55 million deaths. “I was circulating the number from that Nature paper to younger friends in my network earlier this year, [and] they don’t buy this idea.” They know that easing off the zero-COVID policy will lead to people dying, but they don’t imagine it would reach that scale. According to Chen, some protesters are asking that public resources be prioritized for helping older adults and other vulnerable people in an attempt to mitigate the harm. The Nature study, for what it’s worth, estimated that if the Chinese government could fill the gaps in vaccination and provide shots for every eligible senior, the death toll from a rampant COVID outbreak would be roughly 600,000, while adding widespread use of antiviral therapies would drive it down much further. (The numbers from that model might not be exactly right, says Albert Ko, an infectious-disease epidemiologist and physician at the Yale School of Public Health, but they’re within the realm of possibility. “Whether it’s 1 million or 1.5 million or 2 million, that’s a huge burden.”)

    Whatever the costs, the protesters are convinced that the zero-COVID policy is unsustainable. Public-health experts agree. “The government should address these concerns, because without jobs, people cannot pay for food and medications,” Chen said. In the end, China will need to navigate reopening while attempting to mitigate loss, Ko told me. “This should have been done much earlier.”

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    Zoya Qureshi

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  • Are We Really Getting COVID Boosters Every Year Forever?

    Are We Really Getting COVID Boosters Every Year Forever?

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    School is in session, pumpkin spice is in season, and Americans are heading to pharmacies for what may soon become another autumn standby: your annual COVID shot. On Tuesday, the White House announced the start of a “new phase” of the pandemic response, one in which “most Americans” will receive a COVID-19 vaccine just “once a year, each fall.” In other words, your pandemic booster is about to become as routine as your physical exam or—more to the point—your flu shot. One more health-related task has been added to your calendar, and it’s likely to remain there for the rest of your life.

    From a certain standpoint, this regimen makes a lot of sense. The pandemic’s biggest surges so far have come in the winter, and a fall booster could go a long way toward mitigating the next of those surges. What’s more, the new plan greatly simplifies COVID-vaccination regimens, both for the public and for providers. “It has been bewildering in many cases to understand who is eligible for a booster, how many boosters, when, which boosters, how far apart,” Jason Schwartz, a vaccine-policy expert at Yale, told me. “I think that has held down booster uptake in some really discouraging ways.” In a sense, White House COVID-19 Response Coordinator Ashish Jha told me, the new plan just codifies the way things already worked: The last time low-risk Americans became eligible for another shot was last fall. (The elderly and immunocompromised have operated on a different schedule and will likely continue to do so, Jha said.)

    Still, some public-health experts worry that the White House is jumping the gun. Back in April, a number of them told Stat News’s Helen Branswell they were concerned that the U.S. would adopt such a policy without the data needed to support it. When the White House made its announcement on Tuesday, many felt their concerns had been vindicated. “We’ve had twists and turns and surprises every single step of the way with COVID, and the idea that we’re going to have one shot and then we’re done is not really consistent with how things have worked in the past,” Walid Gellad, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, told me. The plan, in his view, glosses over considerable uncertainties.

    For one thing, it assumes that the virus will follow an annual schedule with peaks in the fall and winter—not unlikely, but also not a given. For another, we still don’t have a firm grasp on the magnitude or duration of the benefits offered by the new Omicron-specific vaccine. For all we know, Gellad told me, the added protection afforded to someone who gets the shot tomorrow may have largely dissipated by New Year’s Eve.

    And that’s not to mention the massive uncertainty presented by the specter of future variants. In a briefing Tuesday, Jha acknowledged that “new variant curveballs” could change the government’s plans. But the announcement itself includes no such caveats, which some public-health experts worry could cause problems if course corrections are needed down the line. For all we know, new variants could necessitate more frequent updates, or, if viral mutation slows, we might not even need annual shots, Paul Thomas, an immunologist at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, in Tennessee, told me.

    If the routine the White House describes sounds a lot like flu shots, that’s no accident. The announcement explicitly recommends that COVID vaccines be taken between Labor Day and Halloween—“just like your annual flu shot.” That comparison, though, is part of what concerns critics, who worry that the shift into a more flu-like framework will entail the adoption of a vaccines-only approach to COVID prevention. Many of the interventions that have proved so effective over the past two and a half years—masking, distancing, widespread testing—have not traditionally been a major part of our flu-season protocols. If we treat COVID like flu, the thinking goes, such interventions risk falling even further by the wayside. The announcement, which makes no mention of any other prevention tactics, doesn’t offer much reassurance to the contrary.

    But that reading, Jha told me, is “just clearly wrong.” Although vaccines are “the central pillar of our strategy,” he said, testing, masking, and improving indoor air quality are all important as well. But as my colleague Katherine Wu has written, the country has been relying more and more on vaccines—and less and less on the other interventions at our disposal—for some time. Even if you do read the new policy as an abnegation of masking, ventilation, and the like, it may not functionally be much of a departure from the status quo.

    For now, Thomas said, the White House’s plan makes sense—as long as it stays sensitive to changing circumstances. “We keep learning new things about this virus,” he told me. “The rate of mutation is changing. The spread through the population is changing.” And as such, he said, our response must be flexible.

    The White House announcement seems like a good-faith attempt to balance competing priorities: on the one hand, the need to communicate uncertainty and acknowledge complexity; on the other, the need to keep the message from getting so complex that it confuses people to the point that they tune it out entirely. In this case, the administration seems to have come down on the side of simplicity. That could be a mistake, Gellad says—one that public-health authorities have made over and over throughout the pandemic. “When you try and make things simple and understandable and present them without sufficient uncertainty,” he told me, “you get into trouble when things change.”

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    Jacob Stern

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