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  • Elise Stefanik’s Trump Audition

    Elise Stefanik’s Trump Audition

    Elise Stefanik and I had been speaking for only about a minute when she offered this stark self-assessment: “I have been an exceptional member of Congress.”

    Her confidence reminded me of the many immodest pronouncements of Donald Trump (“I would give myself an A+”), and that’s probably not an accident. Stefanik has been everywhere lately, amassing fans among Trump’s base at a crucial moment—both for the GOP and for her future.

    Stefanik spent October presiding over the leaderless House GOP’s search for a new speaker—a post that Stefanik, the chair of the conference, conspicuously declined to seek for herself. In a congressional hearing last month, she pressed three of America’s most prominent university presidents to say whether they’d allow students to call for Jewish genocide; directly or indirectly, her interrogation brought down two of them. And for the past several weeks, Stefanik has been making an enthusiastic case for Donald Trump’s return to the White House.

    She campaigned with him in New Hampshire last weekend, defending his mental acuity in the face of obvious gaffes (“President Trump has not lost a step,” she insisted) and rejecting a jury’s conclusion that he sexually abused E. Jean Carroll. She parrots his baseless claims that the 2020 election was “rigged” and that the defendants charged with storming the Capitol to keep him in office are “hostages.” After a GOP congressional candidate was caught on tape mildly criticizing Trump, Stefanik publicly withdrew her endorsement. Barely an hour after the networks declared Trump the winner of the Iowa caucus—before Iowans had even finished voting—she issued a statement calling on his remaining opponents to drop out of the race.

    I spoke with Stefanik about her fierce defense of Trump, which has won her praise from the former president. In New Hampshire, he called her “brilliant” and lauded her questioning of the university presidents as “surgical.” (He did, however, butcher her name.) Just about everyone can see that Stefanik has been mounting an elaborate audition. The 39-year-old clearly didn’t pass up a bid for House speaker because she lacks ambition. On the contrary, she seems to have a bigger promotion in mind: not second in line to the presidency, but first. In our conversation, Stefanik didn’t make much effort to dispel the perception that she wants to be Trump’s running mate. “I’d be honored to serve in any capacity in the Trump administration,” she told me, repeating a line she’s used before.

    Her displays of fealty aside, Stefanik has a lot going for her. She has become, without question, the most powerful Republican in New York, where her prodigious fundraising helped give the GOP a majority. Stefanik’s House GOP colleagues say she is extremely smart, and she still draws compliments for her behind-the-scenes role during last fall’s speakership crisis, when she ran a tense and seemingly endless series of closed-door conference meetings. Whether or not her declining to run for speaker was tied to the vice presidency, it was politically shrewd. “It didn’t work out well for most others,” joked Representative Patrick McHenry of North Carolina, who briefly served as acting speaker and similarly turned down a chance to win the job permanently. “She saw the writing on the wall,” a fellow New York Republican, Representative Andrew Garbarino, told me. “She was smart enough to say, ‘I’m not popping my head up only to get it chopped off.’”

    The fervor that Stefanik brings to her Trump defense has made her a favorite for VP among some of his staunchest allies, including Steve Bannon, who remains a force in MAGA world. “She’s a show horse and a workhorse, and that in and of itself is pretty extraordinary in modern American politics,” Bannon told me. “She’s at, if not the top, very close to the top of the list.”

    Stefanik may not be subtle, but she’s made herself relevant in a party still devoted to Trump. Her future success now depends on his—and whether he rewards her loyalty with the prize she so clearly wants.

    Stefanik routinely boasts that she was the first member of Congress to endorse Trump’s reelection. That’s true as far as 2024 goes, but it neatly obscures the fact that she did not back his primary campaign in 2016. Nor did she show much support for Trump’s movement as it took root in the GOP.

    After graduating from Harvard, Stefanik began her political career in the George W. Bush White House and later served as an aide to Paul Ryan during his vice-presidential run. In 2014, at age 30, she was elected to the House—the youngest woman ever elected to Congress at the time—and carved out a reputation as a moderate in both policy and tone. She made an abrupt turn toward Trumpism during the former president’s first impeachment hearings, in 2019, and eagerly backed his reelection the following year. In 2021, she replaced the ousted Trump critic Representative Liz Cheney as conference chair, making her the fourth-ranking Republican in the House.

    Not one for public introspection, Stefanik has never fully explained her transformation into a Trump devotee beyond saying she was impressed by his policies as president. The simplest answer is that she followed the will of her upstate–New York constituents, who came to embrace Trump after favoring Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. “I reflect, I would say, the voters in my district,” she told me shortly before the 2020 election.

    To say that Stefanik displays the zeal of a convert doesn’t do justice to the phrase. She has become one of Trump’s foremost defenders and enforcers in Congress. At first “it was surprising,” former Representative Adam Kinzinger, a Republican colleague of Stefanik’s for eight years, told me of her Trump pivot. “Now it’s just gross.”

    Kinzinger and Stefanik had both served as leaders of a group of moderate House Republicans, but they took opposite paths during the Trump years. Kinzinger voted to impeach Trump after January 6 and left Congress two years later. “In her core, she’s a deep opportunist and has put her personal ambition over what she knows is good for the country,” Kinzinger said. Although Stefanik has been in Trump’s corner for more than four years now, Kinzinger said she “has ramped up her sycophancy” as the chances of Trump’s renomination—and the possibility of her serving on the national ticket—have come more fully into view.

    Close allies of Stefanik naturally dispute this characterization; they told me that although they think she’d make an excellent vice president, she has not once brought up the topic with them. “He’s going to have great options, but Elise will be at the top of that list,” Majority Leader Steve Scalise told me. When I asked Stefanik whether she was campaigning to be on Trump’s ticket, she replied: “I’m focused on doing my job.”

    Other contenders frequently mentioned as possible Trump running mates include South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem; Arkansas Governor Sarah Huckabee Sanders, who served as one of Trump’s White House press secretaries; Senator Tim Scott of South Carolina; and the businessman Vivek Ramaswamy.

    One senior Republican who is friendly with both Stefanik and Trump lauded her leadership skills and political acumen but doubted that Trump would pick her. “She doesn’t have executive experience,” the Republican told me, speaking on the condition of anonymity to talk candidly about Stefanik’s chances. A Trump-campaign spokesperson did not return a request for comment.

    Even as they praise her, Stefanik allies occasionally describe her in ways that suggest she lacks authenticity. “She’s a highly intelligent, calculated individual,” Chris Tague, a Republican in the New York legislature, told me. Representative Marc Molinaro, a member of New York’s House delegation, described Stefanik as “a calming force” inside a House Republican conference often marred by infighting. When I noted that this characterization seemed to be at odds with her combative style in public, Molinaro explained that Stefanik’s “outward persona” helps her keep the conference from getting out of hand. “We all know Elise. She’s strong. She’s tough,” he said. “She didn’t need to be that person, because we know she can be that person.”

    Still, Kinzinger said, unlike some Republicans in Congress, Stefanik does not speak differently about Trump in private than she does in public. “I got that wink and nod from a lot of people, not from her,” he said. “She’s smart enough to know that if she says something in private, it could get out.”

    Stefanik is also smart enough, Kinzinger told me, to understand that Trump’s claims about the 2020 election, which she now recites, are not true. “She knows the drill,” he said. “She would say exactly what I would say if she had the freedom to do it, but she’s all in.”

    To interview Stefanik is to strike a sort of deal: access in exchange for browbeating. She answered my questions even as she rebuked me for asking about such trifling matters as election denialism and January 6. “Everyday Americans are sick and tired of the biased media, including you, Russell, and the types of questions you’re asking,” Stefanik told me. I started to ask her about her recent appearance on Meet the Press, where she had casually referred to the January 6 defendants as “hostages”—an unsubtle echo of Trump’s language. The comment prompted a predictable round of shocked-but-not-surprised reactions from Democrats and anti-Trump Republicans. A New York Democrat, Representative Dan Goldman, introduced a resolution to censure Stefanik over the remark.

    Even though Stefanik made a show of protesting my line of inquiry, she beat me to the question. I had barely uttered “Meet the Press … ” before she started speaking over me: “I know—you’re so predictable—what you’re going to ask. You’re going to ask about the January 6 hostages.” Bingo. Without missing a beat, Stefanik proceeded to read aloud snippets from New York Times and NPR reports about poor conditions and alleged mistreatment of inmates charged with January 6 crimes. “The American people are smart. They see through this,” she said. “They know that there is a double standard of justice in this country.”

    Stefanik was trying to argue that these news reports justified her use of a term usually reserved for victims of terrorism. The specifics of the reports weren’t really the point. More than anything, she seemed to want to demonstrate that, like Trump, she wouldn’t back down or apologize. She sounded almost cheerful, like a happy warrior for Trump—his pugnacious defender who would engage with the biased mainstream media without giving in to them, without conceding a single premise or hemming and hawing through an interview.

    Stefanik was riding high in MAGA world when we spoke. Her Meet the Press appearance was “a master class,” Bannon told me. In addition to the “hostages” line, she refused to commit to certifying the 2024 election, generating outrage that only added to the performance. “This is what we’re thinking. This is us. This is who we are,” Susan McNeil, a GOP county chair in Stefanik’s district, told me, referring to Stefanik’s comments about certification. “Do I trust this election right now? No.”

    “For her to stand strong and make those statements? Good. You’re not being bullied,” McNeil continued. “You’re not gonna get pressured to cave in to saying something that you’re not ready to dignify with an answer yet.”

    Stefanik has no interest in appearing humble or self-deprecating. When I brought up the Meet the Press interview, she used the same word that Bannon had to describe her performance. “It was a master class in pushing back” against the media, she told me, “and it has been widely hailed.”

    Cooperating with this story, like appearing on the D.C. establishment’s favorite talk show, seemed to be part of Stefanik’s unofficial, unacknowledged audition for VP. It was a low-risk bet. A positive portrayal might impress the media-conscious Trump. If, on the other hand, she didn’t like how the piece turned out, she could hold it up to Trump supporters as confirmation that the press has it out for them. Stefanik’s team lined up nearly a dozen local and national validators to speak with me, including Bannon, Scalise, and Representative James Comer, who heads the committee leading the Biden-impeachment inquiry.

    Trump clearly prizes loyalty above just about anything else. Mike Pence displayed that quality in spades, until suddenly, at the most climactic moment of Trump’s presidency, he did not. To test whether Stefanik’s allegiance had a limit, I asked whether a Trump conviction for any of the crimes with which he’s been charged would affect her support in any way. “No,” she replied without hesitation. “It’s a witch hunt by the Department of Justice. I believe Joe Biden is the most corrupt president not just in modern history, but in the history of our country.”

    Stefanik was more circumspect when I asked her what she would have done differently from Pence had she been responsible, as vice president, for presiding over the certification of Electoral College ballots on January 6. Trump had pressured Pence to throw out ballots from states where he was contesting the vote. Pence had refused. Given Stefanik’s apparent interest in Pence’s old job, it seemed relevant.

    At first, she dodged the question by claiming that the election was rigged and referring to a speech she delivered on the House floor in the early hours of January 7, when she voted against certifying Biden’s victory in Pennsylvania. But that speech was worded far more carefully than the outright claims of fraud that Stefanik makes today. Back then, she couched her objections as representing the views of her “concerned” constituents. She didn’t say the election was stolen, nor did she say what action Pence should have taken.

    When I pressed her on Pence’s decision not to intervene and what she would have done, Stefanik replied simply, “I disagreed, and I believe it was an unconstitutional election.” She would go no further than that.

    At some point over the next several months, Stefanik’s dual roles as Trump booster and protector of the vanishing House majority could come into conflict. She has made clear that she wants Republicans to unify around Trump, and sooner rather than later. Control of the House, however, might well be determined in her deep-blue state, where the nation’s most vulnerable Republicans represent districts that Trump lost in 2020. Embracing Trump this fall could cost some of them their seats.

    Now the longest-serving Republican in the New York delegation, Stefanik serves as a mentor for several of the state’s more recent arrivals to the House. She has helped get them seats on desired committees, and, during the speaker battle in October, she arranged for the various candidates to sit for interviews with the delegation. But Stefanik has also worked to keep them in line.

    “She’s not afraid to be blunt,” Garbarino said, recalling times when Stefanik chastised him for a public statement she didn’t like. Her message? “We don’t have to do everything publicly,” Garbarino said. “Sometimes it’s better if you say this stuff behind the scenes to somebody instead of smacking them in the face publicly about it.”

    Stefanik has taken the lead in fighting Democratic attempts to gerrymander New York in their favor, part of an effort to reclaim the House majority. (A recent state-court ruling didn’t help her cause.) To that end, she is working to ensure that none of the state’s GOP House members tries to save their own seat at the party’s expense or says anything in public that could undermine a potential Republican legal challenge. “She’s cracking the whip,” one Republican strategist in the state told me, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

    Stefanik’s toughest task, though, might be getting her colleagues to support Trump. Two swing-district Republicans in New York, Representatives Nick LaLota and Brandon Williams, have endorsed Trump as he easily captured the first two primary states. But others in the delegation have yet to heed Stefanik’s call. In interviews, a few of them seemed hesitant even to utter his name. “I have avoided presidential politics, and Elise has always respected that,” Molinaro told me. As for Trump, he would say only, “I intend to support the presidential nominee.”

    Garbarino used almost exactly the same words when I asked about the presidential race. Two other New York Republicans in districts that Biden won, Representatives Mike Lawler and Anthony D’Esposito, declined interview requests. When I asked Stefanik if they would back Trump, she offered a guarantee: “They’re going to support President Trump, who will be the nominee, as Republicans will across the country.”

    Privately, Stefanik has delivered an additional message to vulnerable Republicans in New York, according to several people I spoke with. “Stefanik has been very clear to not attack President Trump,” the GOP strategist said. “Everyone knows that in New York.” As Stefanik sees it, criticizing Trump would hurt even swing-district Republicans, because the MAGA base is now a sizable constituency in districts that Biden carried. Still, other House leaders haven’t exerted nearly as much public pressure on rank-and-file Republicans. “We all each individually take different approaches to growing our majority,” Scalise told me. “I don’t tell anybody how to manage their politics back home.”

    As Stefanik’s profile has grown, and as her rhetoric has become even Trumpier, Democrats have sought to turn her into a political liability for swing-district Republicans, just as they have the former president. After Stefanik’s “hostages” comment, House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, who also hails from New York, said that Stefanik “should be ashamed of herself.”

    But then he pivoted to a political angle. “The real question,” Jeffries told reporters, “is why haven’t House Republicans in New York, like Mike Lawler or others, denounced Elise Stefanik, and why do they continue to rely on her fundraising support in order to try to fool the voters in New York and pretend like they believe in moderation?” None of the New York Republicans took the bait, choosing to remain silent rather than cross Stefanik. (“I didn’t see the clip,” Garbarino told me, in one characteristic dodge.)

    Stefanik clearly welcomes these attacks. In the MAGA world she now inhabits, enraging Democrats is the coin of the realm. Taking their fire only pushes her closer to the place she really wants to be: at Trump’s side.

    Russell Berman

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  • The End Is Coming for Trump’s GOP Rivals

    The End Is Coming for Trump’s GOP Rivals

    The arctic chill that upended the final weekend of the Iowa Republican caucus provided a fitting end to a contest that has seemed frozen in place for months.

    This caucus has felt unusually lifeless, not only because former President Donald Trump has maintained an imposing and seemingly unshakable lead in the polls. That advantage was confirmed late Saturday night when the Des Moines Register, NBC, and Mediacom Iowa released their highly anticipated final pre-caucus poll showing Trump at 48 percent and, in a distant battle for second place, Nikki Haley at 20 percent and Ron DeSantis at 16 percent.

    The caucus has also lacked energy because Trump’s shrinking field of rivals has never appeared to have the heart for making an all-out case against him. “I think there was actually a decent electorate that had supported Trump in the past but were interested in looking for somebody else,” Douglas Gross, a longtime GOP activist who chaired Mitt Romney’s 2012 campaign in Iowa, told me. But neither DeSantis nor Haley, he adds, found a message that dislodged nearly enough of them from the front-runner. “Trump has run as an incumbent, if you will, and dominated the media so skillfully that it took a lot of the energy out of the race,” Gross said.

    In retrospect, the constrictive boundaries for the GOP race were established when the candidates gathered for their first debate last August (without Trump, who has refused to attend any debate). The crucial moment came when Bret Baier, from Fox News Channel, asked the contenders whether they would support Trump as the nominee even if he was convicted of a crime “in a court of law.” All the contenders onstage raised their hand to indicate they would, except for Chris Christie and Asa Hutchinson, two long shots at the periphery of the race. With that declaration, the candidates effectively placed the question of whether Trump is fit to be president again—the most important issue facing Republicans in 2024—out of bounds.

    That collective failure led to Christie’s withering moral judgment on the field when he quit the race last week: “Anyone who is unwilling to say that he is unfit to be president of the United States is unfit themselves to be president of the United States.” But even in practical political terms, the choice not to directly address Trump’s fitness left his principal rivals scrambling to find an alternative way to contrast with the front-runner.

    Over time, DeSantis has built a coherent critique of Trump, though a very idiosyncratic one. DeSantis runs at Trump from the right, insisting that the man who devised and articulated the “America First” agenda can no longer be trusted to advance it. In his final appearances across Iowa, his CNN debate with Haley last week, and a Fox town hall, DeSantis criticized Trump’s presidential record and 2024 agenda as insufficiently conservative on abortion, LGBTQ rights, federal spending, confronting the bureaucracy, and shutting down the country during the pandemic. He has even accused Trump of failing to deport enough undocumented immigrants and failing to construct enough of his signature border wall.

    On issues where politicians in the center or left charge Trump with extremism, DeSantis inverts the accusation: The problem, he argues, is that Trump wasn’t extreme enough. The moment that best encapsulated DeSantis’s approach came in last week’s CNN debate. At one point, the moderators asked him about the claim from Trump’s lawyer that he cannot be prosecuted for any presidential action—including ordering the assassination of a political rival—unless he was first impeached and convicted. DeSantis insisted the problem was that in office, Trump was too restrained in using unilateral presidential authority. He complained that Trump failed to call in the National Guard over the objections of local officials to squelch civil unrest in the Black Lives Matter protests following the 2020 murder of George Floyd. When DeSantis visited campaign volunteers last Friday, he indignantly complained “it’s just not true” that he has gone easy on Trump in these final days. “If you watched the debate,” DeSantis told reporters, “I hit on BLM, not building the wall, the debt, not draining the swamp, Fauci, all those things.”

    Perhaps the prospect of impending defeat has concentrated the mind, but DeSantis in his closing trek across Iowa has offered perceptive explanations for why these attacks against Trump have sputtered. One is that Trump stifled the debates by refusing to participate in them. “It’s different for me to just be doing that to a camera versus him being right there,” DeSantis told reporters. “When you have a clash, then you guys have to cover it, and it becomes something that people start to talk about.” The other problem, he maintained, was that conservative media like Fox News act as “a praetorian guard” that suppresses criticism of Trump, even from the right.

    Those are compelling observations, but incomplete as an explanation. DeSantis’s larger problem may be that the universe of voters that wants Trumpism but doesn’t think Trump can be relied on to deliver it is much smaller than the Florida governor had hoped. One top Trump adviser told me that the fights Trump engaged in as president make it almost impossible to convince conservatives he’s not really one of them. Bob Vander Plaats, a prominent Iowa evangelical leader who has endorsed DeSantis, likewise told me that amid all of Trump’s battles with the left, it’s easier to try to convince evangelical conservatives that the former president can’t win in November than that he has abandoned their causes.

    The analogy I’ve used for DeSantis’s strategy is that Trump is like a Mack truck barreling down the far-right lane of American politics, and that rather than trying to pass in all the space he’s left in the center of the road, DeSantis has tried to squeeze past him on the right shoulder. There’s just not a lot of room there.

    Even so, DeSantis’s complaints about Trump look like a closing argument from Perry Mason compared with the muffled, gauzy case that Haley has presented against him. DeSantis’s choice to run to Trump’s right created a vacuum that Haley, largely through effective performances at the early debates, has filled with the elements of the GOP coalition that have always been most dubious of Trump: moderates, suburbanites, college-educated voters. But that isn’t a coalition nearly big enough to win. And she has walked on eggshells in trying to reach beyond that universe to the Republican voters who are generally favorable toward Trump but began the race possibly open to an alternative—what the veteran GOP pollster Whit Ayres calls the “maybe Trump” constituency.

    The most notable thing in how Haley talks about Trump is that she almost always avoids value judgments. It’s time for generational change, she will say, or I will be a stronger general-election candidate who will sweep in more Republican candidates up and down the ballot.

    At last week’s CNN debate, Haley turned up the dial when she that said of course Trump lost the 2020 election; that January 6 was a “terrible day”; and that Trump’s claims of absolute immunity were “ridiculous.” Those pointed comments probably offered a momentary glimpse of what she actually thinks about him. But in the crucial days before the caucus, Haley has reverted to her careful, values-free dissents. At one town hall conducted over telephone late last week, she said the “hard truths” Republicans had to face were that, although “President Trump was the right president at the right time” and “I agree with a lot of his policies,” the fact remained that “rightly or wrongly, chaos follows him.” Talk about taking off the gloves.

    Jennifer Horn, the former Republican Party chair in New Hampshire who has become a fierce Trump critic, told me, “There’s no moral or ethical judgment against Trump from her. From anyone, really, but we’re talking about her. She says chaos follows him ‘rightly or wrongly.’ Who cares? Nobody cares about chaos. That’s not the issue with Trump. He’s crooked; he’s criminal; he incited an insurrection. That’s the case against Trump. And if his so-called strongest opponent won’t make the case against Trump, why should voters?”

    Gross, the longtime GOP activist, is supporting Haley, but even he is perplexed by her reluctance to articulate a stronger critique of the front-runner. “I don’t know what her argument is,” Gross told me. “I guess it’s: Get rid of the chaos. She’s got to make a strong case about why she’s the alternative, and it’s got to include some element of judgment.”

    The reluctance of DeSantis and Haley to fully confront the former president has created an utterly asymmetrical campaign battlefield because Trump has displayed no hesitation about attacking either of them. The super PAC associated with Trump’s campaign spent months pounding DeSantis on issues including supporting statehood for Puerto Rico and backing cuts in Social Security, and in recent weeks, Trump’s camp has run ads accusing Haley of raising taxes and being weak on immigration. In response, DeSantis and Haley have spent significantly more money attacking each other than criticizing, or even rebutting, Trump. Rob Pyers, an analyst with the nonpartisan California Target Book, has calculated that the principal super PAC supporting Trump has spent $32 million combined in ads against Haley and DeSantis; they have pummeled each other with a combined $38 million in negative ads from the super PACs associated with their campaigns. Meanwhile, the Haley and DeSantis super PACs have spent only a little more than $1 million in ads targeting Trump, who is leading them by as much as 50 points in national polls.

    Haley’s sharpest retort to any of Trump’s attacks has been to say he’s misrepresenting her record. During the CNN debate, Haley metronomically touted a website called DeSantislies.com, but if she has a similar page up about Trump, she hasn’t mentioned it. (Her campaign didn’t respond to a query about whether it plans to establish such a site.)

    “Calling him a liar right now is her strongest pushback, but I just don’t think GOP voters care about liars,” Horn told me. “If she engaged in a real battle with him for these last days [before New Hampshire], that would be fascinating to see. The fact that she’s not pushing back, the fact that she’s not running the strongest possible campaign as she’s coming down the stretch here, makes me wonder if she is as uncertain of her ability to win as I am.”

    Some Republican strategists are sympathetic to this careful approach to Trump, especially from Haley. A former top aide to one of Trump’s main rivals in the 2016 race told me that “nobody has found a message you can put on TV that makes Republicans like Trump less.” Some other veterans of earlier GOP contests believe that Haley and DeSantis were justified in initially trying to eclipse the other and create a one-on-one race with Trump. And for Haley, there’s also at least some argument for preserving her strongest case against Trump for the January 23 New Hampshire primary, where a more moderate electorate may be more receptive than the conservative, heavily evangelical population that usually turns out for the caucus.

    “She has to draw much sharper contrasts,” Gross told me. “And to be fair to her, once she gets out of here, maybe she will. What she strikes me as is incredibly disciplined and calculating. So, I do think you’re going to see modulation.”

    DeSantis has the most to lose in Iowa, because a poor showing will almost certainly end his campaign, even if he tries to insist otherwise for a few weeks. For Haley, the results aren’t as important because whatever happens here, she will have another opportunity to create momentum in New Hampshire, where polls have shown her rising even as DeSantis craters. Still, if Haley is unable or unwilling to deliver a more persuasive argument against Trump, she too will quickly find herself with no realistic hope of overtaking the front-runner, whose lead in national polls of Republican voters continues to grow. That’s one thing common to winter in both Iowa and New Hampshire: It gets dark early.

    Ronald Brownstein

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  • The Republican Lab-Leak Circus Makes One Important Point

    The Republican Lab-Leak Circus Makes One Important Point

    For more than three hours yesterday, the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic grilled a pair of virologists about their participation in an alleged “cover-up” of the pandemic’s origins. Republican lawmakers zeroed in on evidence that the witnesses, Kristian Andersen and Robert Garry, and other researchers had initially suspected that the coronavirus spread from a Chinese lab. “Accidental escape is in fact highly likely—it’s not some fringe theory,” Andersen wrote in a Slack message to a colleague on February 2, 2020. When he laid out the same concern to Anthony Fauci in late January, that some features of the viral genome looked like they might be engineered, Fauci told him to consider going to the FBI.

    But days later, Andersen, Garry, and the other scientists were starting to coalesce around a different point of view: Those features were more likely to have developed via natural evolution. The scientists wrote up this revised assessment in an influential paper, published in the journal Nature Medicine in March 2020, called “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2.” The virus is clearly “not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus,” the paper said; in fact, the experts now “did not believe that any type of laboratory-based scenario is plausible,” and that the pandemic almost certainly started with a “zoonotic event”—which is to say, the spillover of an animal virus into human populations. That analysis would be cited repeatedly by scientists and media outlets in the months that followed, in support of the idea that the lab-leak theory had been thoroughly debunked.

    The researchers’ rapid and consequential change of heart, as revealed through emails, witness interviews, and Slack exchanges, is now a wellspring for Republicans’ suspicions. “All of a sudden, you did a 180,” Representative Nicole Malliotakis of New York said yesterday morning. “What happened?”

    Based on the available facts, the answer seems clear enough: Andersen, Garry, and the others looked more closely at the data, and decided that their fears about a lab leak had been unwarranted; the viral features were simply not as weird as they’d first thought. The political conversation around this episode is not so easily summarized, however. Yesterday’s hearing was less preoccupied with the small, persistent possibility that the coronavirus really did leak out from a lab than with the notion of a conspiracy—a cover-up—that, according to Republicans, involved Fauci and others in the U.S. government swaying Andersen and Garry to leave behind their scientific judgment and endorse “pro-China talking points” instead. (Fauci has denied that he tried to disprove the lab-leak theory.)

    Barbed accusations of this kind have only added headaches to the question of how the pandemic really started. For all of its distractions, though, the House investigation still serves a useful purpose: It sheds light on how discussions of the lab-leak theory went so very, very wrong, and turned into an endless, stultifying spectacle. In that way, the hearing—and the story that it tells about the “Proximal Origin” paper—gestures not toward the true origin of COVID, but toward the origin of the origins debate.

    From the start, the problem has been that a “lab leak” could mean many things. The term may refer to the release of a manufactured bioweapon, or to an accident involving basic-science research; it could involve a germ with genes deliberately inserted, or one that was rapidly evolved inside a cage or in a dish, or even a virus from the wild, brought into a lab and released by accident (in unaltered form) in a city like Wuhan. Yet all these categories blurred together in the early days of the pandemic. The confusion was made plain when Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas, a hard-core China hawk, aired a proto-lab-leak theory in a February 16, 2020 interview with Fox News. “This virus did not originate in the Wuhan animal market,” he told the network. He later continued, “just a few miles away from that food market is China’s only biosafety-level-4 super-laboratory that researches human infectious diseases. Now, we don’t have evidence that this disease originated there, but because of China’s duplicity and dishonesty from the beginning, we need to at least ask the question.”

    Cotton did not specifically suggest that the Chinese “super-laboratory” was weaponizing viruses, nor did he say that any laboratory accident would necessarily have involved a genetically engineered virus, as opposed to one that had been cultured or collected from a bat cave. Nevertheless, The New York Times and The Washington Post reported that the senator had repeated a “fringe theory” about the coronavirus that was going around in right-wing circles at the time, that it had been manufactured by the Chinese government as a bioweapon. It was hard for reporters to imagine that Cotton could have been suggesting anything but that: The idea that Chinese scientists might have been collecting wild viruses, and doing research just to understand them, was not yet thinkable in that chaotic, early moment of pandemic spread. “Lab leak” was simply understood to mean “the virus is a bioweapon.”

    Scientists knew better. On the same day that Cotton gave his interview, one of Andersen and Garry’s colleagues posted the “Proximal Origin” paper on the web as an unpublished manuscript. (“Important to get this out,” Garry wrote in an email sent to the group the following morning. He included a link to the Washington Post article about Cotton described above.) In this version, the researchers were quite precise about what, exactly, they were aiming to debunk: The authors said, specifically, that their analysis clearly showed the virus had not been genetically engineered. It might well have been produced through cell-culture experiments in a lab, they wrote, though the case for this was “questionable.” And as for the other lab-leak possibilities—that a Wuhan researcher was infected by the virus while collecting samples from a cave, or that someone brought a sample back and then accidentally released it—the paper took no position whatsoever. “We did not consider any of these scenarios,” Andersen explained in his written testimony for this week’s hearing. If a researcher had indeed been infected in the field, he continued, then he would not have counted it as a “lab leak” to begin with—because that would mean the virus jumped to humans somewhere other than a lab.

    Rather than settling the matter, however, all this careful parsing only led to more confusion. In the early days of the pandemic, and in the context of the Cotton interview and its detractors, too much specificity was deemed a fatal flaw. On February 20, Nature decided to reject the manuscript, at least partly on account of its being too soft in its debunking. A month later, when their paper finally did appear in Nature Medicine, a new sentence had been added near the end: the one discounting “any type of laboratory-based scenario.” At this crucial moment in the pandemic-origins debate, the researchers’ original, narrow claim—that SARS-CoV-2 had not been purposefully assembled—was broadened to include a blanket statement that could be read to mean the lab-leak theory was wrong in all its forms.

    Over time, this aggressive phrasing would cause problems of its own. At first, its elision of several different possible scenarios served the mainstream narrative: We know the virus wasn’t engineered; ergo, it must have started in the market. More recently, the same confusion has served the interests of the lab-leak theorists. Consider a report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on pandemic origins, declassified last month. American intelligence agencies have determined that SARS-CoV-2 was not developed as a bioweapon, it explains, and they are near-unanimous in saying that it was not genetically engineered. (This confirms what Andersen and colleagues said in the first version of their paper, way back in February 2020.) “Most” agencies, the report says, further judge that the virus was not created through cell-culture experiments. Yet the fact that two of the nine agencies nonetheless believe that “a laboratory-associated incident” of any kind is the most likely cause of the first human infection has been taken as a sign that all lab-leak scenarios are still on the table. Thus Republicans in Congress can rail against Facebook for removing posts about the “lab-leak theory,” while ignoring the fact that the platform’s rules only ever prohibited one particular and largely discredited idea, that SARS-CoV-2 was “man-made or manufactured.” (In any case, that prohibition was reversed some three months later.)

    Where does this leave us? The committee’s work does not reveal a cover-up of COVID’s source. At the same time, it does show that the authors of the “Proximal Origin” paper were aware of how their work might shape the public narrative. (In a Slack conversation, one of them referred to “the shit show that would happen if anyone serious accused the Chinese of even accidental release.”) At first they strived to phrase their findings as clearly as they could, and to separate the strong evidence against genetic engineering of the virus—and what Garry called “the bio weapon scenario”—from the lingering possibility that laboratory science might have been involved in some other way. In the final version of their paper, though, they added in language that was rather less precise. This may have helped to muffle the debate in early 2020, but the haze it left behind was noxious and long-lasting.

    Daniel Engber

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  • The COVID-Origins Debate Has Split Into Parallel Worlds

    The COVID-Origins Debate Has Split Into Parallel Worlds

    The lab-leak theory of COVID’s origin has always been a little squirrelly. If SARS-CoV-2 really did begin infecting humans in a research setting, the evidence that got left behind is mostly of the cloak-and-dagger type: confirmations from anonymous government officials about vague conclusions drawn in classified documents, for example; or leaked materials that lay out hypothetical research projects; or information gleaned from who-knows-where that certain people came down with who-knows-what disease at some crucial moment. In short, it’s all been messy human stuff, the bits and bobs of intelligence analysis. Simple-seeming facts emerge from a dark matter of sources and methods.

    So it goes again. The latest major revelation in this line emerged this week. Taken at face value, it’s extraordinary: Ben Hu, a high-level researcher at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and two colleagues, Yu Ping and Yan Zhu, could have been the first people on the planet to be infected with SARS-CoV-2, according to anonymous sources cited first in the newsletter Public and then in The Wall Street Journal. These proposed patient SARS-CoV-zeroes aren’t merely employees of the virology institute; they’re central figures in the very sort of research that lab-leak investigators have been scrutinizing since the start of the pandemic. Their names appear on crucial papers related to the discovery of new, SARS-related coronaviruses in bats, and subsequent experimentation on those viruses. (The Journal reached out to the three researchers, but they did not respond.)

    Is this the “smoking gun,” at last, as many now insist? Has the Case of the Missing COVID Origin finally been solved? If it’s true these were the very first infected people, then their professional activities mean they almost certainly caught the virus in the lab, not a market stall full of marmots and raccoon dogs. The origins debate has from the start revolved around a pair of dueling “coincidences.” The fact that the pandemic just happened to take off at a wet market suggests that the virus spilled over into humans from animals for sale there. But the fact that it also just happened to take off not too far away from one of the world’s leading bat-coronavirus labs suggests the opposite. This week’s information seems to tip the balance very heavily toward the latter interpretation.

    The only problem is, we don’t know whether the latest revelations can be trusted, or to what extent. The newly reported facts appear to stem from a single item of intelligence, furnished by a foreign source, that has bounced around inside the U.S. government since sometime in 2020. Over the past two and a half years, the full description of the sickened workers in Wuhan has been revealed with excruciating slowness, in sedimenting clauses, through well-timed leaks. This glacial striptease has finally reached its end, but is the underlying information even true? Until that question can be answered (which could be never), the origins debate will be stuck exactly where it’s been for many months: always moving forward, never quite arriving.

    The story of these sickened workers has been in the public domain, one way or another, since the start of 2021. Officials in the Trump administration’s State Department, reportedly determined to go public with their findings, put out a fact sheet about various events and circumstances at the Wuhan Institute of Virology around the beginning of the pandemic. Included was a quick description of alleged illnesses among the staff. The fact sheet didn’t name the sickened scientists or what they did inside the lab, or when exactly their illnesses occurred. It didn’t specify their symptoms, nor did it say how many scientists had gotten sick. If you boiled it down, the fact sheet’s revelations could be paraphrased like this:

    Several researchers at WIV became ill with respiratory symptoms in autumn 2019.

    That vague stub did little to budge consensus views. The lab-leak theory had been preemptively “debunked” in early 2020, and broad disregard of the idea—contempt of it, really—hadn’t yet abated. The day before the State Department fact sheet was released, a team of 17 international experts dispatched by the World Health Organization arrived in Wuhan to conduct (with the help of Chinese scientists) a comprehensive study of the pandemic’s origins. By the time of their return in February 2021, they’d come out with their conclusions: The lab-leak theory was “extremely unlikely” to be true, they said.

    The next month, while the WHO team was preparing to release its final report, further details of the sick-researchers story began to trickle out. In a panel discussion of COVID origins and then in an interview with the Daily Mail, David Asher, a former State Department investigator who’s now a senior fellow at a conservative think tank, filled in a few more specifics, including that the researchers had been working in a coronavirus laboratory and that the wife of one of them later died. The intel had arrived from a foreign government, he said. Now the facts that were revealed could be summarized like so:

    Three coronavirus researchers at WIV became severely ill with respiratory symptoms in the second week of November 2019.

    Pressure for a more serious appraisal of the lab-leak theory grew throughout that spring. In May 2021, more than a dozen prominent virologists and biosafety experts published a letter in the journal Science calling for “a proper investigation” of the matter. A week later, The Wall Street Journal published a leak from anonymous current and former U.S. officials: According to a “previously undisclosed US intelligence report,” the paper said, the sickened researchers had been treated for their sickness at a hospital. In other words, they probably weren’t suffering from common colds. This new aspect of the narrative was making headlines now, like this:

    Three coronavirus researchers at WIV became severely ill with respiratory symptoms in the second week of November 2019 and sought hospital care.

    After all of this publicity, President Joe Biden ordered the intelligence community to redouble efforts to analyze the evidence. While that work was going on, the leaks kept coming. In a 12,000-word story for Vanity Fair, the investigative journalist Katherine Eban gave some backstory on the sick-research intelligence, claiming that it had been gathered in 2020 and then inexplicably file-drawered until State Department investigators rediscovered it. (One former senior official described this as a “holy shit” moment in an interview with Eban.) Her article contained another seemingly important detail, too: The sickened researchers were doing not simply coronavirus research, her sources told her, but the very sort of research that could produce amped-up versions of a pathogen—an approach known as “gain of function.” Later in the summer, Josh Rogin, a Washington Post columnist, added that, according to his unnamed sources, the sickened researchers had lost their sense of smell and developed ground-glass opacities in their lungs. By this point, in the middle of 2021, the expanded piece of intel amounted to the following:

    Three gain-of-function coronavirus researchers at WIV became severely ill with COVID-like symptoms in the second week of November 2019 and sought hospital care.

    The latest revelations are coming at just the moment when Republicans are lambasting the Biden administration for failing to declassify COVID-origins intelligence in accordance with a law that the president signed. The Sunday Times quoted an anonymous former State Department investigator who said they were “rock-solid confident” that the three sick researchers had been sick with COVID, because people as young as the researchers would rarely be hit so hard by a mere seasonal illness. A few days later, someone spilled the researchers’ names to Public. On Tuesday, The Wall Street Journal matched the scoop, and it seemed that every detail of the once-secret information was now exposed:

    Ben Hu, Yu Ping, and Yan Zhu, three gain-of-function coronavirus researchers at WIV, became severely ill with COVID-like symptoms in the second week of November 2019 and sought hospital care.

    However vivid this may sound, its credibility remains unknown. Did Hu, Ping, and Zhu really get sick, as the intel claims? If so, was it really COVID? Two years ago, the Journal cited two anonymous sources on this question: One, the Journal wrote, called the intelligence “potentially significant but still in need of further investigation and corroboration”; the other said it was “of exquisite quality” and “very precise.” Just this week, anonymous officials in the Biden administration told The New York Times that intelligence analysts had already “dismissed the evidence,” by August 2022, about the sickened workers at WIV for lack of relevance. Which secret source should be trusted to explain the significance of this secret intelligence? Readers are left to sort that out themselves.

    In the meantime, over the past two years, even as the sickened-worker intel was revealed, a very different sort of evidence was mounting, too. A new research paper, published just days after Eban’s feature in Vanity Fair, revealed that live wild animals, including raccoon dogs, had been for sale at the Huanan market in Wuhan shortly before the pandemic started. In early 2022, scientists put out two detailed analyses of early case patterns and viral genome data, which argued in favor of the animal-spillover theory. Another study involving many of the same researchers came out this past spring, noting the presence of genetic material from raccoon dogs in early samples from the market; its authors described their findings as providing strong evidence for an animal origin. But other scientists were quick to challenge the study’s importance. A further study of the same data by Chinese scientists made a point of not ruling out the hypothesis that the pandemic had started with a case of tainted frozen seafood; yet another study, released in May, argued that the original work provided no useful information whatsoever on the question of COVID’s origins.

    So it goes with the animal-spillover theory. The evidence in favor has always been highly esoteric, knotted with data and interpretation. Scientific points are made—a particular run of viral nucleotides is a “smoking gun” for genetic engineering, one famous scholar said in 2021—and then they are re-argued and occasionally walked back. Long-hidden sample data from the market suddenly appear, and their meaning is subjected to vituperative, technical debate. If the evidence for a lab leak tends to come from messy human stuff, the evidence for animal spillover emerges from messy data. Simple-seeming claims are draped across a sprawl of numbers.

    In this way, the origins question has broken down into a pair of rival theories that don’t—and can’t—ever fully interact. They’re based on different sorts of evidence, with different standards for evaluation and debate. Each story may be accruing new details—fresh intelligence about the goings-on at WIV, for example, or fresh genomic data from the market—but these are only filling out a picture that will never be complete. The two narratives have been moving forward on different tracks. Neither one is getting to its destination.

    Daniel Engber

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