After attending school in Finland and later the U.S., Belgium and the U.K., Stubb entered politics in 2004 as a member of the European Parliament. He hit the Finnish big time in 2008 when — to his own surprise — he was named foreign minister.
Praised by allies for his high-energy approach to politics, he was also criticized during his time in government for his occasionally hasty statements, and was forced to apologize after being accused of swearing at a meeting of the Nordic Council, a regional cooperation body.
During a difficult year as prime minister in 2014 he failed to reverse his NCP’s declining popularity, and lost a parliamentary election in 2015 amid an economic slump. After a subsequent spell as finance minister he quit Finnish politics in 2017, vowing never to return.
During the five-month presidential election campaign, observers say, Stubb earned the support of voters by demonstrating a calmer and more thoughtful demeanor during debates than had been his custom, and for being at pains to show respect for his rivals.
“However this election goes, it will be good for Finland,” he said in a debate with Haavisto earlier last week.
Stubb has said he intends to be a unifying force in Finnish society, something the country appears to need after a series of racism scandals involving government ministers and, more recently, strikes over work conditions and wages that paralyzed public services.
An increasingly belligerent Russian President Vladimir Putin could attack the NATO military alliance in less than a decade, Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warned.
“We hear threats from the Kremlin almost every day … so we have to take into account that Vladimir Putin might even attack a NATO country one day,” Pistorius told German outlet Der Tagesspiegel in an interview published Friday.
While a Russian attack is not likely “for now,” the minister added: “Our experts expect a period of five to eight years in which this could be possible.”
Following the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has upped its aggressive rhetoric against some of its neighbors — including the Baltic countries and Poland, which are all members of NATO, and Moldova — prompting top European defense officials to warn of the risk of a major conflict.
On Wednesday, the chair of NATO’s military committee of national chiefs Admiral Rob Bauer said the military alliance faced “the most dangerous world in decades” and called for a “warfighting transformation of NATO.”
Earlier this month, Sweden’s commander-in-chief General Micael Bydén similarly called on Swedes to “prepare themselves mentally” for war.
The same day, Sweden’s Minister for Civil Defense Carl-Oskar Bohlin also warned that “war could come to Sweden.”
In his interview with Der Tagesspiegel, Pistorius said the Swedish warnings were “understandable from a Scandinavian perspective,” adding that Sweden faced “an even more serious situation,” given its proximity to Russia. It is also not yet a member of the NATO alliance, waiting for approval from Turkey and Hungary to join.
“But we also have to learn to live with danger again and prepare ourselves — militarily, socially and in terms of civil defense,” Pistorius warned.
Poland, which is spending more than 4 percent of its GDP on defense this year, is also worried about Russia’s unpredictability following the unexpected attack on Ukraine in 2022.
“Russia is defying logic. What happened in 2022 seemed impossible. We must be ready for any scenario,” Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz said in a television interview earlier this week.
Late last year, Germany revamped its military and strategic doctrine for the first time since 2011, aiming to turn the Bundeswehr into a war-capable military.
“War has returned to Europe. Germany and its allies once again have to deal with a military threat. The international order is under attack in Europe and around the globe. We are living in a turning point,” said the first paragraph of the new doctrine.
Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, an outspoken Putin critic who has been one of the loudest voices in support of Ukraine in the EU, on Thursday called on Europe to speed up preparations for more Russian aggression.
“There’s a chance that Russia might not be contained in Ukraine,” Landsbergis told French newswire AFP at the World Economic Forum in Davos. “There is no scenario in this that if Ukraine doesn’t win, that could end well for Europe,” he warned.
BULBOACA, Moldova — European leaders mounted a powerful show of defiance — and support for Ukraine — as they gathered Thursday for a historic summit in the ex-Soviet country of Moldova just kilometers from the Ukrainian border.
But even as over 40 leaders pledged their solidarity with Ukraine at the second gathering of the so-called European Political Community, the difficulty in maintaining that unity was on display. Before and during the summit, leaders hedged and staked out competing positions on an increasingly contentious issue — what security guarantees the Western alliance can give Kyiv to ensure that if Russia is ever pushed out, it won’t return.
French President Emmanuel Macron set the tone on Wednesday, imploring allies to offer Kyiv “tangible and credible” security guarantees — a shift in the French position. His German counterpart, Olaf Scholz, was more hesitant on Thursday, declining to provide any details and indicating it might be a question for after the war.
Against this backdrop, Ukraine’s own leader, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, joined the leaders in a surprise appearance. Under a crisp blue sky, Zelenskyy made two explicit demands: One, a “clear invitation” to join NATO — another subject that divides allies — and “security guarantees on the way to NATO membership.”
Both, he said, “are needed.”
The divergent positions illustrate the fraught questions that lie ahead as the West strives to hold together against Russia and the war grinds on. Yet, for now, unity is still the predominant rhetorical theme when European leaders gather.
“Today’s summit showed us how valuable the European Political Community is,” Moldovan President Maia Sandu said as the summit drew to a close. “We have shown that we are a family, a strong and united family of European nations acting together to make the continent stronger — more united and more peaceful.”
Zelenskyy’s plea
The summit at Castle Mimi, a vineyard only 20 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, kicked off on an emotional note with Zelenskyy’s arrival.
Sandu welcomed the Ukrainian president ahead of the other leaders, thanking him profusely for “keeping Moldova safe.” The side-by-side image of the two leaders, whose countries have both been battling Russian aggression to various degrees, was a powerful symbol.
But with Kyiv under an intensifying hail of Russia’s bombs, Zelenskyy moved swiftly to his plea, asking allies to give Ukraine firm security guarantees and a commitment to NATO membership at an upcoming NATO summit in Lithuania. NATO agreed in 2008 that Ukraine would eventually become a member, but it has never offered a firm promise or timeline.
While Zelenskyy is unlikely to get everything he wants at the July gathering, both issues are being hotly debated at the moment.
Macron set the stage on Wednesday when he turned heads with his most forthcoming remarks yet about security guarantees.
“I’m in favor — and it will be the topic of collective discussions in the coming weeks — of giving tangible and credible security guarantees for two reasons: Ukraine protects Europe today and she gives Europe security guarantees,” he said.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy joined the leaders in a surprise appearance | Daniel Mihailescu/AFP via Getty Images
But on Thursday, Scholz, the German chancellor, was more guarded.
“One thing is very clear: We are now making our contribution to supporting Ukraine,” he said. “We have always said that there must also be guarantees for a peace order after the war. Germany will make a contribution to this.”
Scholz then refused to be drawn into the details of the discussion, even as it moved to center stage.
Still, both Scholz and Macron confirmed that allies are actively discussing the subject, and working to coordinate their approaches ahead of the NATO summit.
Speaking in Oslo on Thursday, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg was similarly careful when addressing the touchy subject.
“When the war ends, we need to ensure that history doesn’t repeat itself, that this pattern of Russian aggression against Ukraine really stops and therefore, we need to have in place frameworks to provide guarantees for Ukrainian security after the end of the war, so history doesn’t repeat itself,” he said.
Leaders pose for the family photo at the European Political Community summit | Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images
The lack of clarity reflects the complexity of offering — or even defining — “security guarantees” for another country. Europe may also be waiting to take its cue from the U.S. One option on the table may reflect the security model binding the U.S. and Israel, which prioritizes arms transfers and long-term support commitments.
Nonetheless, Scholz, speaking at the conclusion of the summit, was keen to stress that helping Ukraine defend itself was “the task at hand.” And he ruled out NATO membership for Ukraine at this juncture.
“There are clear criteria for membership. You can’t have border conflicts for instance,” he said — an obvious reference to Ukraine.
Scholz’s remarks reflect the broad understanding that Ukraine cannot join NATO so long as it’s actively at war with Russia. But Ukrainian officials want NATO leaders to offer a concrete political gesture that Kyiv is at least on the membership path.
Some NATO allies are willing to be far blunter than Scholz on the subject, most notably those representing the Baltic countries, highlighting yet another fissure that separates allies.
“The only security guarantee that works … is NATO membership,” Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said Thursday, echoing Zelenskyy’s message.
It’s an hour before dawn breaks over the North Sea. Aboard the KV Bergen, the officer of the watch is wide awake.
The 93-meter long Norwegian Navy Coast Guard vessel is on patrol, 50 miles out to sea. The sky is dark, the sea darker. But off the starboard bow, bright lights gleam through the rain and mist. Something huge and incongruous is looming out of the water, lit like a Christmas display.
“Troll A,” says Torgeir Standal, 49, the ship’s second in command, who is taking the watch on this bleak March morning.
It’s a gas platform — a big one.
When it was transported out to this desolate spot nearly 30 years ago, Troll A — stretching 472 meters from its seabed foundations to the tip of its drilling rig — became the tallest structure ever moved by people across the surface of the Earth. Last year, Troll, the gas field it taps into, provided 10 percent of the EU’s total supply of natural gas — heating homes, lighting streets, fueling industry.
“There are many platforms here,” says Standal, standing on the dark bridge of the Bergen, his face illuminated by the glow from the radar and satellite screens on his control panel. “And thousands of miles of pipeline underneath.”
And that’s why the Bergenhas come to this spot today.
In September 2022, an explosion on another undersea gas pipeline nearly 600 miles away shook the world. Despite three ongoing investigations, there is still no official answer to the question of who blew up the Nord Stream pipe. But the fact that it could happen at all triggered a Europe-wide alert.
The Norwegian Navy’s KV Bergen, seen in the background, after departing from the port of Bergen
Against a backdrop of growing confrontation with Moscow over its brutal invasion of Ukraine and its willingness to use energy as a weapon, the vulnerability of the undersea pipes and cables that deliver gas, electricity and data to the Continent — the vital arteries of comfortable, modern European life — has been starkly exposed.
In response, Norway, alongside NATO allies, increased naval patrols in the North Sea — an area vital for Europe’s energy security. The presence of the Bergen, day and night, in these unforgiving waters, is part of the effort to remain vigilant. The task of the men and women on board is to keep watch on behalf of Europe — and to stop the next Nord Stream attack before it happens.
The officers of the watch
But what are they looking for?
In recent weeks the Bergen has tracked the movements of a Russian military frigate through the North Sea — something that it has to do “several times every year,” says Kenneth Dyb, 47, the skippsjef, or commander of the ship.
The Russians have a right to sail through these seas out to the Atlantic, and it is very unlikely Moscow would be so brazen as to openly attack a gas platform or a pipeline. But, says Dyb, as his ship steams west to another gas and oil field, Oseberg, “it’s important to show that we are present. That we are watching.”
Recent reports that Russian naval ships — with their trackers turned off — were present near the site of the Nord Stream blasts in the months running up to the incident have reinforced the importance of having extra eyes on the water itself.
The Oseberg oil and gas field, 130 kilometers north-west of Bergen
Of course, the gas didn’t come for free. Norway has profited hugely from the spike in gas and oil prices that followed Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The state-owned energy giant Equinor made a record $75 billion profit in 2022. Oslo is sensitive to accusations of war profiteering — and keen to show Europe that it cares about its neighbors’ energy security as much as it cares about their cash.
But the threat to the pipelines could also be more low-key. One of the many theories about the Nord Stream attack is that it was carried out by a small group of divers, operating from an ordinary yacht. In such a scenario, something as seemingly innocent as a ship suddenly going stationary, or following an unaccustomed course through the water, could be suspicious. The Bergen’s crew have the authority to board and inspect vessels that its crew consider a cause for concern.
Russia’s covert presence in these waters has been acknowledged by Norway’s intelligence services in recent weeks. A joint investigation by the public broadcasters in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland uncovered evidence of civilian vessels, such as fishing ships, being used for surveillance activities. This is something that has been “going on forever,” according to Ståle Ulriksen, a researcher at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, but it has increased in intensity in recent years.
“We always look for oddities, anything that is unusual, like new ships in the area that have not been here before,” says Magne Storebø, 26, senior petty officer, as he takes the afternoon watch on the bridge later that day.
The sky is leaden and the horizon lost in cloud. Coffee in hand, Storebø casts his eye over the radar and satellite screens as giant windscreen wipers whip North Sea spray from the floor-to-ceiling windows. There are few ships around, all of them familiar to the crew; service vessels plying back and forth from the gas and oil platforms.
The Nord Stream incident and the new security situation has changed the way Storebø thinks about his work, he says.
He is “more aware of the consequences suspicious vessels could have,” he says. “More awake, you could say.”
Senior Petty Officer Magne Storebø keeps watch from the bridge
Soft-spoken and calm beyond his years, Storebø is philosophical about the potential dangers of his work. He has been in the Navy for four years, in which time war has broken out on the European continent and the threat to his home waters has come into sharp focus.
“If you are going to put a rainy cloud over your head and bury yourself down, I don’t think the Navy or the coastguard is the right place to work in,” he says in conversation with two shipmates later that day. “You need to adjust and to look in a positive direction — and to be ready in case things don’t go that way.”
Energy war round two
As Europe emerges from the first winter of its energy war with Russia, its gas supplies have held up better than almost anyone expected.
But as the Continent braces for next winter, the risk of another Nord Stream-style attack to a key pipeline is taken seriously at the highest levels of leadership.
“Things look OK for gas security now,” said one senior European Commission official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters of energy security. “But if Norway has a pipeline that blows up, we are in a different situation.”
EU policymakers see four key risks to gas security going into next winter, the senior official added: exceptionally cold weather; a stronger-than-expected Chinese economic recovery hoovering up global gas supply; Russia cutting off the remaining gas it sends to Europe; and last but not least, an “incident” affecting energy infrastructure.
Such an event might not only threaten supply but could potentially spark panic in the gas market, as seen in 2022, driving up prices and hitting European citizens and industries in the wallet. And nowhere is the potential for harm greater than in the North Sea.
Norway is now Europe’s biggest single supplier of gas. After Russian President Vladimir Putin and the energy giant Gazprom shut off supply via Nord Stream and other pipelines, Norway stepped up its own production in the North Sea, delivering well over 100 billion cubic meters to the EU and the U.K. in 2022. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Troll A herself in March this year — the first visit of a Commission president to Norway since 2011 — to personally thank the country’s president, Jonas Gahr Støre, for supplies that “helped us through the winter.”
“We have a huge responsibility, supplying the rest of Europe with energy,” Defense Minister Bjørn Arild Gram told POLITICO. “To be a stable, reliable producer of energy, of gas, is an important role for us and we take that very seriously. That is why we are also doing so much to protect this infrastructure.”
The vast majority of that gas is transported into northwest Europe via a complex network of seabed pipes — more than 5,000 miles of them in Norway’s jurisdiction alone. The North Sea has an average depth of just 95 meters. That’s not much deeper than the Nord Stream pipes at the location they were attacked.
“It actually doesn’t take a particularly sophisticated capability to attack a pipeline in relatively shallow waters,” says Sidharth Kaushal, research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank in the U.K. A small vessel, “some divers and an [explosive] charge” are all it could take, Kaushal says.
The navy chief
After the Nord Stream incident in September, suspicion instantly fell on Russia. Moscow has a record of operating in the so-called gray zone — committing hostile acts short of warfare, often covertly.
To date, the three investigations looking into the incident have yet to confirm that suspicion. But European governments — and their militaries — are not taking any chances.
In the days immediately following the explosions, NATO navy chiefs started calling each other to try to coordinate efforts to protect energy infrastructure, says Rune Andersen, the chief of Norway’s navy, speaking to POLITICO at Haakonsvern naval base, before the KV Bergen’svoyage.
Everyone had the same thought, he says. “If that happens in the North Sea, we will have a problem.”
Andersen joined the Navy as a young man in 1988, in the last days of the Cold War. Now 54, he is used to the Russian threat overshadowing Norway’s and Europe’s security.
“After decades of attempts to integrate or cooperate with Russia, we now have war in Europe. We see that our neighbor is brutal and willing to use military force,” he says grimly. “I worked in the Navy in the ’90s when it was enduring peace and partnership on the agenda. We are back to a situation where our job feels more meaningful — and necessary.”
Kenneth Dyb, the skippsjef, or commander of the ship
However, he points out, his own forces have so far not seen any Russian movements or operations “that are different to what they were before” the Nord Stream attacks. “The job we are doing is precautionary, rather than tailored to any specific threat,” he adds.
Even so, those early discussions with NATO allies have now formalized into daily coordination via the Allied Maritime Command headquarters in the U.K., to ensure there are always NATO ships on hand that can act as “first responders” to potential incidents. British, German and French ships have joined their Norwegian counterparts in the monitoring and surveillance effort.
It is “by nature challenging” to protect every inch of pipeline, all of the time, Andersen says.
The role of the Bergen and ships like it, he adds, is just “one bit of the puzzle.” Simply by their presence at sea, these ships increase the chances of catching would-be saboteurs in the act, and hopefully deter them from trying in the first place.
The goal, in other words, is to reduce the size of the “gray zone” — or to “increase the resolution” of the navy’s picture of the activity out on the North Sea, as Andersen puts it.
In collaboration with the energy companies and pipeline operators, unmanned underwater vehicles — drones — using cameras and high-resolution sonar have been used, Andersen says, to “map the micro-terrain” around pipelines. These are sensitive enough to spot an explosive charge or other signs of foul play.
Equinor, alongside the pipeline operator Gassco, has carried out a “large inspection survey” of its undersea pipeline infrastructure, a company spokesperson says. The survey revealed “no identified signs of malicious activities” but pipeline inspections are ongoing “continuously.”
Senior Petty Officer Simen Strand speaks to the crew. “We haven’t had much to fear in the past. We are probably less naïve nowadays,” he says.
Perhaps understandably, the heightened level of alert has led to the occasional false alarm. A spate of aerial drone sightings near Norwegian energy infrastructure around the time of the Nord Stream attacks last year included a report of a suspicious craft circling above Haakonsvern naval base itself.
“After a while, we concluded it was a seagull,” says Andersen, with the shadow of a grin.
Europe on alert
The navy chief is nonetheless deadly serious about the potential threat. A Nord Stream-style attack in the North Sea is possible. Anderson will not be drawn on the most vulnerable points in the network, saying only that “easy to access” places and “key hubs” are “two things in the back of mind when we think [about] risk.”
Throughout Europe, the alert has been raised. This month, NATO warned of a “significant risk” that Russia could target undersea pipelines or internet cables as part of its confrontation with the West.
Several countries are increasing patrols and underwater surveillance capabilities. The British Royal Navy accelerated the purchase of two specialist ocean surveillance ships, the first of which will be operational this summer. The EU and NATO have established a new joint task force focusing on critical infrastructure protection, and a “coordination cell” has been established at NATO headquarters in Brussels to improve “engagement with industry and bring key military and civilian stakeholders together” to keep the cables and pipelines secure.
Norway — and Europe — are in this struggle for the long haul, Andersen believes.
Indeed, even as Europe transitions from fossil fuels to green energy, the North Sea will remain a vital powerhouse of offshore wind energy, with plans for a huge expansion over the next 25 years. Earlier this year, the Netherlands’ intelligence services reported a Russian ship seeking to map wind farm infrastructure in the Dutch sector of the North Sea. “We think the Russians wanted to investigate the possibilities for potential future sabotage,” Jan Swillens, head of the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service tells POLITICO in an emailed statement. “This incident makes clear that these kinds of Russian operations are performed closer than one might think.”
At the same time in the Baltic, countries are shoring up security around their infrastructure, at sea and on land. Late last year, Estonia carried out an underwater inspection of the two Estlink power cables and the Baltic Connector gas pipeline linking it to Finland, the Estonian navy says. Lithuania, meanwhile, is paying “special attention” to security around its LNG terminal at Klaipėda and the gas cargoes that arrive there, a defense ministry spokesperson says.
Torgeir Standal, left, the KV Bergen’s second in command
It was in Lithuania that Europe had its first major false alarm since the Nord Stream incident, when a gas pipeline on land exploded on a Friday evening in January. Foul play was briefly considered a possibility in the immediate aftermath but was quickly ruled out. The pipe was 40 years old, and had been subject to a technical fault.
The danger posed by Russia to infrastructure throughout Europe should not be underestimated, says Vilmantas Vitkauskas, director of Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Centre and a former NATO intelligence official.
“We know their way of thinking, [the way] they send signals or apply pressure,” Vitkauskas says. “We understand Russia quite well, and we are quite worried by what we see — and how vulnerable our infrastructure is in Europe.”
The watchers on the water
Back aboard the Bergen, life for the sailors carries on as normal. It’s a young crew, with an average age of around 30. Some are conscripts. It’s still compulsory in Norway for 19-year-olds to present themselves for national service, but only around one in four are actually recruited for the mandated 19-month stint.
The days are long. Surveillance, maintenance and exercises in search and rescue are all part of the crew’s regular routine. A helicopter from one of the Oseberg oil and gas platforms soars overhead, and the crew are drafted into an exercise winching people on and off the deck of the Bergenin the dead of night, simulating a rescue operation.
The ship needs to be ready to respond to an incident should the call come in from naval headquarters that help is required, or a suspicious vessel has been identified in their patch of the North Sea. But in their downtime, the sailors head to the gym on the lower deck, or play FIFA on the X-box in the sparse games room. Three hearty meals a day are served in the galley kitchen. There is even a ship’s band, cheekily named “Dyb Purple” after their commander. Dyb “takes it well,” says Senior Petty Officer Storebø.
In the daily whirl of activity, most of the young sailors don’t think of their work in the grand strategic sense of protecting the energy security — the warmth, the light, the industry — of an entire continent.
But the context of the Ukraine war — and the precedent set by the Nord Stream attack — has added a note of solemnity just below the surface of the comradeship and bonhomie.
“We are probably less naïve nowadays,” says 33-year-old Senior Petty Officer Simen Strand, who has a wife and two children, a boy and a girl, back home in Bergen. “We haven’t had much to fear in the past, there hasn’t been a concrete threat.”
Storebø agrees but is characteristically sanguine. “Russia has always been there … I’ve not personally felt any more unease than before.”
The next day, Storebø has the night watch, from midnight to four in the morning, as the Bergen travels back to base for a short stop before heading out to sea again.
It’s dark up on the bridge, with the glow of the control panel screens the only light inside. Twenty miles away, little lights can be seen on the Norwegian coast. A lighthouse flares to the south, at Slåtterøy, not far from Storebø’s home island of Austevoll. Beneath the waves, unseen, gas flows from the Troll field back to the mainland, where it is processed. From there, it continues its journey south to light the dark of European nights.
All is quiet but Storebø can’t afford to lose focus. “Coffee and music help,” he says. “I like the night shifts.”
As the officer of the watch, he has to be ready, should the radar, the satellites, or his own eyes see something out of the ordinary — ready to call the captain and raise the alarm.
That’s the job, he says. “You always have it in the back of your mind.”
The Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are demanding an explanation from Beijing after China’s top envoy to France questioned the independence of former Soviet countries like Ukraine.
Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to France, said in an interview on Friday with French television network LCI that former Soviet countries have no “effective status” in international law.
Asked whether Crimea belongs to Ukraine, Lu said that “it depends how you perceive the problem,” arguing that it was historically part of Russia and offered to Ukraine by former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
“In international law, even these ex-Soviet Union countries do not have the status, the effective [status] in international law, because there is no international agreement to materialize their status as a sovereign country,” he said.
The comments sparked outrage among Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia — three former Soviet countries.
Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs said in a tweet that his ministry summoned “the authorized chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in Riga on Monday to provide explanations. This step is coordinated with Lithuania and Estonia.”
He called the comments “completely unacceptable,” adding: “We expect explanation from the Chinese side and complete retraction of this statement.”
Margus Tsahkna, Estonia’s foreign minister, called the comments “false” and “a misinterpretation of history.”
Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania’s foreign minister, shared the interview on Twitter with the comment: “If anyone is still wondering why the Baltic States don’t trust China to “broker peace in Ukraine,” here’s a Chinese ambassador arguing that Crimea is Russian and our countries’ borders have no legal basis.”
Kyiv also pushed back strongly against the ambassador’s comments.
“It is strange to hear an absurd version of the ‘history of Crimea’ from a representative of a country that is scrupulous about its thousand-year history,” Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office, said in a tweet on Sunday. “If you want to be a major political player, do not parrot the propaganda of Russian outsiders.”
France in a statement on Sunday stated its “full solidarity” with all the allied countries affected, which it said had acquired their independence “after decades of oppression,” according to Reuters. “On Ukraine specifically, it was internationally recognized within borders including Crimea in 1991 by the entire international community, including China,” a foreign ministry spokesperson was quoted as saying.
The foreign ministry spokesperson also called on China to clarify whether the ambassador’s statement reflects its position or not.
The row comes ahead of a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg on Monday, where relations with China are on the agenda.
Not even a war has succeeded in pushing Europe’s biggest powers to reach their defense spending targets.
The Continent’s largest economies all fell short of a common goal of spending 2 percent of economic output on defense, according to a NATO report published Tuesday.
And across the entire military alliance, only seven out of 30 members spent at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense last year.
And although that amounts to billions, officials and experts warn the organization’s members will need to spend much more to assure its security.
The figures, all NATO estimates for 2022, show that while allies have been pouring significantly more money into their militaries for years, many are still largely lagging behind an alliance spending target, set in 2014, to spend 2 percent on defense within a decade.
Of 30 members, only Greece, Poland, the Baltic states, the United Kingdom and the United States spent more than 2 percent of their economic output on defense last year, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s annual report shows.
Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, whose country reached 2.12 percent last year according to the report, said on Tuesday that she was “quite shocked” when looking at who is and is not fulfilling the target.
“Come on, it’s not possible — I think everybody should understand, knowing and seeing what is happening in Ukraine, that we don’t have that time,” she told POLITICO.
The report does underscore, however, how NATO allies have been continuously investing and are now spending significantly more than when the target was first agreed.
“European Allies and Canada have increased defence spending for the eighth consecutive year,” the report said. “In total, over the last eight years, this increase added USD 350 billion for defence,” it added.
Plans to boost investment
Nevertheless, America remains NATO’s moneybags.
While the U.S. represents 54 percent of the alliance’s economic output, it contributes 70 percent of defense expenditure, the report noted.
The next-biggest spender, the U.K., amounted to about 6 percent of the alliance’s total spending, while Germany stood at around 5 percent.
A senior European diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive alliance dynamics, said that what matters is the positive trajectory, and that many allies have plans in motion to boost investment.
“Some nations already announced at least 2.5 percent, several even higher … there are nations that have not met the ambition, but at least have a plan,” the diplomat said.
“The trend has been positive,” they said, although “we need to invest more.”
Indeed, there is an understanding within the alliance that promising to boost defense spending and actually doing it are not the same thing.
“Political proclamations about boosting defense capacities are welcome,” said a senior Central European defense official. Making pledges is easy, they added.
“But spending substantial extra money on defense is very difficult in practice,” the official said, pointing to numerous bottlenecks impacting European countries.
These include inefficient defense planning, a shortage of raw materials for production of weapons and ammunition, long procurement processes and limited production capacity that could take years to expand.
“Real defense spending will increase at some point, but it will take at least several years — provided the existing political will is sustained,” the official added.
Speaking on Tuesday, Stoltenberg praised allies for progress since 2014 — but told reporters that new pledges must now turn into real cash, contracts and equipment. The NATO chief also said that he will advocate for the alliance to agree on a more ambitious target that sets 2 percent as a minimum.
Multifaceted security challenges
Experts caution that percentages are far from the only measure that matters as the alliance grapples with developing security threats.
The debate over 2 percent “places greater focus on the inputs to the alliance’s collective security rather than the outputs,” said Seamus P. Daniels, a fellow focusing on defense budget analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.
“NATO members need to invest the appropriate funding for defense,” he said, “but we should focus more on whether allies are providing modern capabilities and forces necessary for collective security efforts.”
Another European diplomat acknowledged hurdles on that front, such as Germany not yet having touched its new €100 billion military modernization fund. And some allies have been investing in costly equipment while lacking sufficient forces for possible operations.
But the diplomat also pointed out several factors pushing forward European investment in defense — including the economic benefits of spending money on defense and possible political shifts in the U.S.
And while officials and experts expect Washington to continue playing a leading role within NATO, there is a recognition that regardless of who is in the White House, America’s attention will be shifting ever more to Asia.
While the current U.S. administration has been highly supportive of NATO and is spending vast sums to help Ukraine, some voices — including Republican presidential contenders — have been questioning the outlay.
Russia’s war in Ukraine “has changed perceptions and everyone gets that [the] US has other priorities than Europe,” the second European diplomat noted.
There are “fears,” the diplomat said, linked to a possible “Republican comeback.”
BRUSSELS — Add NATO’s military planners to the list of those concerned about having enough shells.
In the comingmonths,the alliance will accelerate efforts to stockpile equipment along the alliance’s eastern edge and designate tens of thousands of forces that can rush to allies’ aid on short notice — a move meant to stop Russia from expanding its war beyond Ukraine.
To make that happen, though, NATO must convince individual countries to contribute various elements: Soldiers, training, better infrastructure — and, most notably, extensive amounts of pricey weapons, equipment and ammunition.
With countries already worried about their own munitions stockpiles and Ukraine in acute need of more shells and weapons from allies, there is a risk that not all NATO allies will live up to their promises to contribute to the alliance’s new plans.
“If there’s not somebody hosting the potluck and telling everybody what to bring, then everyone would bring potato chips because potato chips are cheap, easy to get,” said James J. Townsend Jr., a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy.
“Nations,” he added, “would rather bring potato chips.”
It’s a challenge NATO has faced in the past, and one that experts fear could become a persistent problem for the Western alliance as Russia’s war drags into a second year. While the U.S. and EU are making plans to source more weapons — fast — the restocking process will inevitably take time.
That could run into NATO’s aspirations. Military leaders this spring will submit updated regional defense plans intended to help redefine how the alliance protects its 1 billion citizens.
The numbers will be large, with officials floating the idea of up to 300,000 NATO forces needed to help make the new model work. That means lots of coordinating and cajoling.
“I think you need forces to counter a realistic Russia,” said one senior NATO military official, underscoring the need for significantly “more troops” and especially more forces at “readiness.”
A push for ‘readiness’
There are several tiers of “readiness.”
The first tier — which may consist of about 100,000 soldiers prepared to move within 10 days — could be drawn from Poland, Norway and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), said Heinrich Brauß, a former NATO assistant secretary general for defense policy and force planning. It may also include multinational battlegroups the alliance has already set up in the eastern flank.
Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army Europe in Orzysz, Poland | Wojtek Radwanski/AFP via Getty Images
A second tier of troops would then back up those soldiers, ready to deploy from countries like Germany in between 10 to 30 days.
But the process could get tricky. Why? Because moving so quickly, even given a month, requires lots of people, equipment and training — and lots of money.
Some militaries will have to up their recruitment efforts. Many allies will have to increase defense spending. And everyone will have to buy more weapons, ammunition and equipment.
Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army Europe, said that “readiness” is “basically, do you have all the stuff you’re supposed to have to do the mission assigned to a unit of a particular size?”
“An artillery battalion needs to shoot X number of rounds per year for planning purposes in order to maintain its level of proficiency,” he said. A tank battalion needs to hit targets, react to different situations and “demonstrate proficiency on the move, day and night, hitting targets that are moving.”
“It’s all very challenging,” he said, pointing to the need for training ranges and ammunition, as well as maintaining proficiency as personnel changes over time. “This obviously takes time and it’s also expensive.”
And that’s if countries can even find companies to produce quality bullets quickly.
“We have tended to try to stockpile munitions on the cheap … it’s just grossly inadequate,” said Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security. “I think the problems that our allies have in NATO are even more acute because many of them often rely on the U.S. as sort of the backstop.”
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, meanwhile, has repeatedly said that allies have stepped up work on production in recent months — and that the alliance is working on new requirements for ammunition stockpiles.
But he has also acknowledged the problem.
“The current rate of consumption compared to the current rate of production of ammunition,” he said in early March, “is not sustainable.”
The big test
Once NATO’s military plans are done, capitals will be asked to weigh in — and eventually make available troops, planes, ships and tanks for different parts of the blueprints.
A test for NATO will come this summer when leaders of the alliance’s 30 member countries meet in Lithuania.
German soldiers give directions to M983 HEMTT mounted with a Patriot launcher in Zamosc, Poland | Omar Marques via Getty Images
“We are asking the nations — based on the findings we have out of our three regional plans — what we need to make these plans … executable,” said the senior NATO military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive planning.
“I think the most difficult thing,” the official added, “is the procurement.”
Some allies have already acknowledged that meeting NATO’s needs will take far more investment.
“More speed is needed, whether in terms of material, personnel or infrastructure,” German Colonel André Wüstner, head of the independent Armed Forces Association, told the newspaper Bild am Sonntag.
The German military, for instance, is carrying out its assigned missions, he said, “but that is nothing compared to what we will have to contribute to NATO in the future.”
And while Berlin now has a much-touted €100 billion modernization fund for upgrading Germany’s military, not a single cent of the money has been spent so far, German Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Eva Högl said earlier this week.
Underpinning the readiness issue is a contentious debate over defense investments.
In 2014, NATO leaders pledged to aim to spend 2 percent of their economic output on defense within a decade. At the Vilnius summit in July, the leaders will have to decide on a new target.
“Two percent as floor” seems to be the “center of gravity” in the debate at the moment, said one senior NATO official, while cautioning that “2 percent would not be enough for everybody.”
A second issue is the contribution balance. Officials and experts expect the majority of high-readiness troops to come from European allies. But that means European capitals will need to step up as Washington contemplates how to address challenges from China.
The response will show whether NATO is serious about matching its ambitions.
“It’s hard to make sure you remain at the top of your military game during peace when there’s not a threat,” said Townsend, the former U.S. official. NATO, he said, is “in the middle” of a stress test.
“We’re all saying the right things,” he added. “But will we come through atthe end of the day and do the right thing? Or are we going to try to get away with bringing potato chips to the potluck? The jury’s out.”
Nearly six months on from the subsea gas pipeline explosions, which sent geopolitical shockwaves around the world in September, there is still no conclusive answer to the question of who blew up Nord Stream.
Some were quick to place the blame squarely at Russia’s door — citing its record of hybrid warfare and a possible motive of intimidation, in the midst of a bitter economic war with Europe over gas supply.
But half a year has passed without any firm evidence for this — or any other explanation — being produced by the ongoing investigations of authorities in three European countries.
Since the day of the attack, four states — Russia, the U.S., Ukraine and the U.K. — have been publicly blamed for the explosions, with varying degrees of evidence.
Still, some things are known for sure.
As was widely assumed within hours of the blast, the explosions were an act of deliberate sabotage. One of the three investigations, led by Sweden’s Prosecution Authority, confirmed in November that residues of explosives and several “foreign objects” were found at the “crime scene” on the seabed, around 100 meters below the surface of the Baltic Sea, close to the Danish Island of Bornholm.
Now two new media reports — one from the New York Times, the other a joint investigation by German public broadcasters ARD and SWR, plus newspaper Die Zeit — raised the possibility that a pro-Ukrainian group — though not necessarily state-backed — may have been responsible. On Wednesday, the German Prosecutor’s Office confirmed it had searched a ship in January suspected of transporting explosives used in the sabotage, but was still investigating the seized objects, the identities of the perpetrators and their possible motives.
In the information vacuum since September, various theories have surfaced as to the culprit and their motive:
Theory 1: Putin, the energy bully
In the days immediately after the attack, the working assumption of many analysts in the West was that this was a brazen act of intimidation on the part of Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin.
Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, spelt out the hypothesis via his Twitter feed on September 27 — the day after the explosions were first detected. He branded the incident “nothing more [than] a terrorist attack planned by Russia and act of aggression towards the EU” linked to Moscow’s determination to provoke “pre-winter panic” over gas supplies to Europe.
Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki also hinted at Russian involvement. Russia denied responsibility.
The Nord Stream pipes are part-owned by Russia’s Gazprom. The company had by the time of the explosions announced an “indefinite” shutdown of the Nord Stream 1 pipes, citing technical issues which the EU branded “fallacious pretences.” The new Nord Stream 2 pipes, meanwhile, had never been brought into the service. Within days of Gazprom announcing the shutdown in early September, Putin issued a veiled threat that Europe would “freeze” if it stuck to its plan of energy sanctions against Russia.
But why blow up the pipeline, if gas blackmail via shutdowns had already proved effective? Why end the possibility of gas ever flowing again?
Simone Tagliapietra, energy specialist and senior fellow at the Bruegel think tank, said it was possible that — if it was Russia — there may have been internal divisions about any such decision. “At that point, when Putin had basically decided to stop supplying [gas to] Germany, many in Russia may have been against that. This was a source of revenues.” It is possible, Tagliapietra said, that “hardliners” took the decision to end the debate by ending the pipelines.
Blowing up Nord Stream, in this reading of the situation, was a final declaration of Russia’s willingness to cut off Europe’s gas supply indefinitely, while also demonstrating its hybrid warfare capabilities. In October, Putin said that the attack had shown that “any critical infrastructure in transport, energy or communication infrastructure is under threat — regardless of what part of the world it is located” — words viewed by many in the West as a veiled threat of more to come.
Theory 2: The Brits did it
From the beginning, Russian leaders have insinuated that either Ukraine or its Western allies were behind the attack. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said two days after the explosions that accusations of Russian culpability were “quite predictable and predictably stupid.” He added that Moscow had no interest in blowing up Nord Stream. “We have lost a route for gas supplies to Europe.”
Then a month on from the blasts, the Russian defense ministry made the very specific allegation that “representatives of the U.K. Navy participated in planning, supporting and executing” the attack. No evidence was given. The same supposed British specialists were also involved in helping Ukraine coordinate a drone attack on Sevastopol in Crimea, Moscow said.
The U.K.’s Ministry of Defence said the “invented” allegations were intended to distract attention from Russia’s recent defeats on the battlefield. In any case, Moscow soon changed its tune.
Theory 3: U.S. black ops
In February, with formal investigations in Germany, Sweden and Denmark still yet to report, an article by the U.S. investigative journalist Seymour Hersh triggered a new wave of speculation. Hersh’s allegation: U.S. forces blew up Nord Stream on direct orders from Joe Biden.
The account — based on a single source said to have “direct knowledge of the operational planning” — alleged that an “obscure deep-diving group in Panama City” was secretly assigned to lay remotely-detonated mines on the pipelines. It suggested Biden’s rationale was to sever once and for all Russia’s gas link to Germany, ensuring that no amount of Kremlin blackmail could deter Berlin from steadfastly supporting Ukraine.
Hersh’s article also drew on Biden’s public remarks when, in February 2022, shortly before Russia’s full-scale invasion, he told reporters that should Russia invade “there will be no longer Nord Stream 2. We will bring an end to it.”
The White House described Hersh’s story as “utterly false and complete fiction.” The article certainly included some dubious claims, not least that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has “cooperated with the American intelligence community since the Vietnam War.” Stoltenberg, born in 1959, was 16 years old when the war ended.
Russian leaders, however, seized on the report, citing it as evidence at the U.N. Security Council later in February and calling for an U.N.-led inquiry into the attacks, prompting Germany, Denmark and Sweden to issue a joint statement saying their investigations were ongoing.
Theory 4: The mystery boatmen
The latest clues — following reports on Tuesday from the New York Times and German media — center on a boat, six people with forged passports and the tiny Danish island of Christiansø.
According to these reports, a boat that set sail from the German port of Rostock, later stopping at Christiansø, is at the center of the Nord Stream investigations.
Germany’s federal prosecutor confirmed on Wednesday that a ship suspected of transporting explosives had been searched in January — and some of the 100 or so residents of tiny Christiansø told Denmark’s TV2 that police had visited the island and made inquiries. Residents were invited to come forward with information via a post on the island’s Facebook page.
Both the New York Times and the German media reports suggested that intelligence is pointing to a link to a pro-Ukrainian group, although there is no evidence that any orders came from the Ukrainian government and the identities of the alleged perpetrators are also still unknown.
Podolyak, Zelenskyy’s adviser, tweeted he was enjoying “collecting amusing conspiracy theories” about what happened to Nord Stream, but that Ukraine had “nothing to do” with it and had “no information about pro-Ukraine sabotage groups.”
Meanwhile, Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warned against “jumping to conclusions” about the latest reports, adding that it was possible that there may have been a “false flag” operation to blame Ukraine.
The Danish Security and Intelligence Service said only that their investigation was ongoing, while a spokesperson for Sweden’s Prosecution Authority said information would be shared when available — but there was “no timeline” for when the inquiries would be completed.
The Baltic states and Poland want to make it easier to sanction the family members and entourage of Russia’s richest men and women but are facing resistance from Hungary, several EU diplomats told POLITICO.
Under its current rules, the EU can freeze the assets and impose visa bans on “leading businesspersons operating in Russia.” Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland now want to expand this definition, according to their proposal seen by POLITICO, to include “their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them.”
The EU has sanctioned more than 1,400 people in relation to Russia’s activities in Ukraine, many of who are Russian oligarchs. An additional 96 people could be added to the EU’s next sanctions package, draft documents seen by POLITICO indicate. Including oligarchs’ family members and other associates of oligarchs would make it possible to sanctions thousands more people without having to prove that they are directly involved in the war in Ukraine or acting in the economic interest of the Russian state.
This could, for example, apply to the ex-wife of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lyudmila Ocheretnaya, whose daughters have been sanctioned but has not been herself, and other members of the oligarchs’ entourage.
While some countries had doubts, legal experts are on board, said one of the diplomats.
Yet, in a meeting on Tuesday, at which EU ambassadors discussed the bloc’s next round of sanctions, Hungary resisted such plans, the diplomats said. Budapest argued that this is not part of the 10th sanctions package, said one of the diplomats. Hungary has long been skeptical of including too many names on the list.
Hungary also pushed to strike four people out the already existing sanctions list, two of the diplomats said.
It was not immediately possible to learn the identity of the four individuals.
That request is igniting tensions, and will be likely subject to another heated debate during a meeting of EU ambassadors on Wednesday. During that meeting, they will not only discuss the new package of sanctions against Russia, but also the so-called rollover of the 1,400-plus names already on the list to keep them sanctioned.
That’s because the regime is subject to a six-month review, which has hitherto been more or less a formality. Now, Hungary is using this extension review as leverage by insisting that four specific people have to be struck from the EU’s existing sanctions list before it will agree to the rollover. If Hungary blocks the rollover and refuses to compromise, all 1,400 people would be de-listed, the two diplomats warned.
One of the diplomats didn’t hide his frustration: “It shows Hungary’s disregard for unity and European values that they are willing to risk this in the week where we commemorate one year since the Russian invasion,” he said.
And those aren’t the only measure that Hungary takes issue with. It also is chiefly against sanctioning personnel working in the nuclear sector.
But a Hungarian official poured water on this last point, saying that “the only open issue for Hungary is with the length of the rollover and not with the listings.”
On the oligarchs issue and the proposal of the Baltics and Poland, the same Hungarian official said that this is not part of the 10th package.
As all EU countries have to agree to the proposal, any country could veto the move even if all other 26 EU countries were in favor. Time is running out, with the EU wanting to adopt the 10th sanctions package before the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Friday.
“I woke at 5 o’clock,” the Estonian prime minister recalled recently. The phone was ringing. Her Lithuanian counterpart was on the line.
“Oh my God, it’s really happening,” came the ominous words, according to Kallas. Another call came in. This time it was the Latvian prime minister.
It was February 24, 2022. War had begun on the European continent.
The night before, Kallas had told her Cabinet members to keep their phones on overnight in anticipation of just this moment: Russia was blitzing Ukraine in an attempt to decapitate the government and seize the country. For those in Estonia and its Baltic neighbors, where memories of Soviet occupation linger, the first images of war tapped into a national terror.
“I went to bed hoping that I was not right,” Kallas said.
Across Europe, similar wakeup calls rolled in, as Russian tanks barrelled into Ukraine and missiles pierced the early morning sky. In recent weeks, POLITICO spoke with prime ministers, high-ranking EU and NATO officials, foreign ministers and diplomats — nearly 20 in total — to reflect on the war’s early days as it reaches its ruinous one-year mark on Friday. All described a similar foreboding that morning, a sense that the world had irrevocably changed.
Within a year, the Russian invasion would profoundly reshape Europe, upending traditional foreign policy presumptions, cleaving it from Russian energy and reawakening long-dormant arguments about extending the EU eastward.
But for those centrally involved in the war’s buildup, the events of February 24 are still seared in their memories.
In an interview with POLITICO, Charles Michel — head of the European Council, the EU body comprising all 27 national leaders — recalled how he received a call directly from Kyiv as the attacks began.
“I was woken up by Zelenskyy,” Michel recounted. It was around 3 a.m. The Ukrainian president told Michel: “The aggression had started and that it was a full-scale invasion.”
Michel hit the phones, speaking to prime ministers across the EU throughout the night.
Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell speak to the press on February 24, 2022 | Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty Images
By 5 a.m., EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell was in his office. Three hours later, he was standing next to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as the duo made the EU’s first major public statement about the dawning war. Von der Leyen then convened the 27 commissioners overseeing EU policy for an emergency meeting.
Elsewhere in Brussels, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg was on the phone with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who were six hours behind in Washington, D.C. He then raced over to NATO headquarters, where he urgently gathered the military alliance’s decision-making body.
The mood that morning, Stoltenberg recalled in a recent conversation with reporters, was “serious” but “measured and well-organized.”
In Ukraine, missiles had begun raining down in Kyiv, Odesa and Mariupol. Volodymyr Zelenskyy took to social media, confirming in a video that war had begun. He urged Ukrainians to stay calm.
These video updates would soon become a regular feature of Zelenskyy’s wartime leadership. But this first one was especially jarring — a message from a president whose life, whose country, was now at risk.
It would be one of the last times the Ukrainian president, dressed in a dove-gray suit jacket and crisp white shirt, appeared in civilian clothes.
Europe’s 21st-century Munich moment
February 24, 2022 is an indelible memory for those who lived through it. For many, however, it felt inevitable.
Five days before the invasion, Zelenskyy traveled to the Munich Security Conference, an annual powwow of defense and security experts frequented by senior politicians.
It was here that the Ukrainian leader made one final, desperate plea for more weapons and more sanctions, hitting out at Germany for promising helmets and chiding NATO countries for not doing enough.
“What are you waiting for?” he implored in the highly charged atmosphere in the Bayerischer Hof hotel. “We don’t need sanctions after bombardment happens, after we have no borders, no economy. Why would we need those sanctions then?”
The symbolism was rife — Munich, a city forever associated with appeasement following Neville Chamberlain’s ill-fated attempt to swap land for peace with Adolf Hitler in 1938, was now the setting for Zelenskyy’s last appeal to the West.
Zelenskyy, never missing a moment, seized the historical analogy.
Five days before the invasion, Zelenskyy traveled to the Munich Security Conference, where he made one final, desperate plea for more weapons and more sanctions | Pool photo by Ronald Wittek/Getty Images
“Has our world completely forgotten the mistakes of the 20th century?” he asked. “Where does appeasement policy usually lead to?”
But his calls for more arms were ignored, even as countries began ordering their citizens to evacuate and airlines began canceling flights in and out of the country.
A few days later, Zelenskyy’s warnings were coming true. On February 22, Vladimir Putin inched closer to war, recognizing the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine. It was a decisive moment for the Russian president, paving the way for his all-out assault less than 48 hours later.
The EU responded the next day — its first major action against Moscow’s activities in Ukraine since the escalation of tensions in 2021. Officials unveiled the first in what would be nine sanction packages against Russia (and counting).
In an equally significant move, a reluctant Germany finally pulled the plug on Nord Stream 2, the yet unopened gas pipeline linking Russia to northern Germany — the decision, made after months of pressure, presaged how the Russian invasion would soon upend the way Europeans powered their lives and heated their homes.
Summit showdown
As it happened, EU leaders were already scheduled to meet in Brussels on February 24, the day the invasion began. Charles Michel had summoned the leaders earlier that week to deal with the escalating crisis, and to sign off on the sanctions.
Throughout the afternoon, Brussels was abuzz — TV cameras from around the world had descended on the European quarter. Helicopters circled overhead.
European leaders gathered in Brussels following the invasion | Pool photo by Olivier Hoslet/AFP via Getty Images
Suddenly, the regular European Council meeting of EU leaders, oftena forum for technical document drafting as much as political decision-making, had become hugely consequential. With war unfolding, the world was looking at the EU to respond — and lead.
The meeting was scheduled to begin at 8 p.m. As leaders were gathering, news came that Russia had seized the Chernobyl nuclear plant, Moldova had declared a state of emergency and thousands of people were pouring out of Ukraine. Later that night, Zelenskyy announced a general mobilization:every man between the ages of 18 and 60 was being asked to fight.
Many leaders were wearing facemasks, a reminder that another crisis, which now seemed to pale in comparison, was still ever-present.
Just before joining colleagues at the Europa building in Brussels, Emmanuel Macron phoned Putin — the French president’s latest effort to mediate with the Russian leader. Macron had visited Moscow on February 7 but left empty-handed after five hours of discussions. He later said he made the call at Zelenskyy’s request, to ask Putin to stop the war.
“It did not produce any results,” Macron said of the call. “The Russian president has chosen war.”
Arriving at the summit, Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš captured the gravity of the moment. “Europe is experiencing the biggest military invasion since the Second World War,” he said. “Our response has to be united.”
But inside the room, divisions were on full display. How far, leaders wondered, could Europe go in sanctioning Russia, given the potential economic blowback? Countries dug in along fault lines that would become familiar in the succeeding months.
The realities of war soon pierced the academic debates. Zelenskyy’s team had set up a video link as missile strikes encircled the capital city, wanting to get the president talking to his EU counterparts.
One person present in the room recalled the percolating anxiety as the video feed beamed through — the image out of focus, the camera shaky. Then the picture sharpened and Zelenskyy appeared, dressed in a khaki shirt and looking deathly pale. His surroundings were faceless, an unknown room somewhere in Kyiv.
“Everyone was silent, the atmosphere was completely tense,” said the official who requested anonymity to speak freely.
Zelenskyy, shaken and utterly focused, told leaders that they may not see him again — the Kremlin wanted him dead.
Black smoke rises from a military airport in Chuguyev near Kharkiv on February 24, 2022 | Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images
“If you, EU leaders and leaders of the free world, do not really help Ukraine today, tomorrow the war will also knock at your door,” he warned, invoking an argument he would return to again and again: that this wasn’t just Ukraine’s war — it was Europe’s war.
Within hours, EU leaders had signed off on their second package of pre-prepared sanctions hitting Russia. But a fractious debate had already begun about what should come next.
The Baltic nations and Poland wanted more — more penalties, more economic punishments. Others were holding back. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi aired their reluctance about expelling Russian banks from the global SWIFT payment system. It was needed to pay for Russian gas, after all.
How quickly that would change.
Sanctions were not the only pressing matter. There was a humanitarian crisis unfolding on Europe’s doorstep. The EU had to both get aid into a war zone and prepare for a mass exodus of people fleeing it.
Janez Lenarčič, the EU’s crisis management commissioner, landed in Paris on the day of the invasion, returning from Niger. Officials started making plans to get ambulances, generators and medicine into Ukraine — ultimately comprising 85,000 tons of aid.
“The most complex, biggest and longest-ever operation” of its kind for the EU, he said.
By that weekend, there was also a plan for the refugees escaping Russian bombs. At a rare Sunday meeting, ministers agreed to welcome and distribute the escaping Ukrainians — a feat that has long eluded the EU for other migrants. Days later, they would grant Ukrainians the instant right to live and work in the EU — another first in an extraordinary time. Decisions that normally took years were now flying through in hours.
Looming over everything were Ukraine’s repeated — and increasingly dire — entreaties for more weapons. Europe’s military investments had lapsed in recent decades, and World War II still cast a dark shadow over countries like Germany, where the idea of sending arms to a warzone still felt verboten.
There were also quiet doubts (not to mention intelligence assessments). Would Ukraine even have its own government next week? Why risk war with Russia if it was days away from toppling Kyiv?
“What we didn’t know at that point was that the Ukrainian resistance would be so successful,” a senior NATO diplomat told POLITICO on condition of anonymity. “We were thinking there would be a change of regime [in Kyiv], what do we do?”
That, too, was all about to change.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed Germany on the night of Russia’s invasion | Pool photo by Hannibal Hanschke/Getty Images
By the weekend, Germany had sloughed off its reluctance, slowly warming to its role as a key military player. The EU, too, dipped its toe into historic waters that weekend, agreeing to help reimburse countries sending weapons to Ukraine — another startling first for a self-proclaimed peace project.
“I remember, saying, ‘OK, now we go for it,’” said Stefano Sannino, secretary-general of the EU’s diplomatic arm.
Ironically, the EU would refund countries using the so-called European Peace Facility — a little-known fund that was suddenly the EU’s main vehicle to support lethal arms going to a warzone.
Over at NATO, the alliance activated its defense plans and sent extra forces to the alliance’s eastern flank. The mission had two tracks, Stoltenberg recounted — “to support Ukraine, but also prevent escalation beyond Ukraine.”
Treading that fine line would become the defining balancing act over the coming year for the Western allies as they blew through one taboo after another.
Who knew what, when
As those dramatic, heady early days fade into history, Europeans are now grappling with what the war means — for their identity, for their sense of security and for the European Union that binds them together.
The invasion has rattled the core tenets underlying the European project, said Ivan Krastev, a prominent political scientist who has long studied Europe’s place in the world.
“For different reasons, many Europeans believed that this is a post-war Continent,” he said.
Post-World War II Europe was built on the assumption that open economic policies, trade between neighbors and mild military power would preserve peace.
“For the Europeans to accept the possibility of the war was basically to accept the limits of our own model,” Krastev argued.
The disbelief has bred self-reflection: Has the war permanently changed the EU? Will a generation that had confined memories of World War II and the Cold War to the past view the next conflict differently?
And, perhaps most acutely, did Europe miss the signs?
Ukrainian refugees gather and rest upon their arrival at the main railway station in Berlin | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images
“The start of that war has changed our lives, that’s for sure,” said Romanian Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu. It wasn’t, however, unexpected, he argued. “We are very attentive to what happens in our region,” he said. “The signs were quite clear.”
Aurescu pointed back to April 2021 as the moment he knew: “It was quite clear that Russia was preparing an aggression against Ukraine.”
Not everyone in Europe shared that assessment, though — to the degree that U.S. officials became worried. They started a public and private campaign in 2021 to warn Europe of an imminent invasion as Russia massed its troops on the Ukrainian border.
In November 2021, von der Leyen made her first trip to the White House. She sat down with Joe Biden in the Oval Office, surrounded by a coterie of national security and intelligence officials. Biden had just received a briefing before the gathering on the Russia battalion buildup and wanted to sound the alarm.
“The president was very concerned,” said one European official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive conversations. “This was a time when no one in Europe was paying any attention, even the intelligence services.”
But others disputed the narrative that Europe was unprepared as America sounded the alarm.
“It’s a question of perspective. You can see the same information, but come to a different conclusion,” said one senior EU official involved in discussions in the runup to the war, while conceding that the U.S. and U.K. — both members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance — did have better information.
Even if those sounding the alarm proved right, said Pierre Vimont, a former secretary-general of the EU’s diplomatic wing and Macron’s Russia envoy until the war broke out, it was hard to know in advance what, exactly, to plan for.
“What type of military operation would it be?” he recalled people debating. A limited operation in the east? A full occupation? A surgical strike on Kyiv?
Here’s where most landed: Russia’s onslaught was horrifying — its brutality staggering. But the signs had been there. Something was going to happen.
“We knew that the invasion is going to happen, and we had shared intelligence,” Stoltenberg stressed. “Of course, until the planes are flying and the battle tanks are rolling, and the soldiers are marching, you can always change your plans. But the more we approached the 24th of February last year, the more obvious it was.”
Then on the day, he recounted, it was a matter of dutifully enacting the plan: “We were prepared, we knew exactly what to do.”
“You may be shocked by this invasion,” he added, “but you cannot be surprised.”
Clea Caulcutt and Cristina Gallardo contributed reporting.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal has a tight two-year timetable for securing EU membership that is bound to dominate discussions at this week’s historic EU-Ukraine summit, the first to take place on Ukrainian soil.
The problem? No one within the EU thinks this is realistic.
When EU commissioners travel to Kyiv later this week ahead of Friday’s summit with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the heads of the European Commission and Council, their main task is likely to involve managing expectations.
Shmyhal himself is imposing a tough deadline. “We have a very ambitious plan to join the European Union within the next two years,” he told POLITICO. “So we expect that this year, in 2023, we can already have this pre-entry stage of negotiations,” he said.
This throws down a gauntlet to the EU establishment, which is trying to keep Ukrainian membership as a far more remote concept.
French President Emmanuel Macron said last year it could be “decades” before Ukraine joins. Even EU leaders, who backed granting Ukraine candidate status at their summit last June, privately admit that the prospect of the country actually joining is quite some years away (and may be one reason they backed the idea in the first place.) After all, candidate countries like Serbia, Turkey and Montenegro have been waiting for many years, since 1999 in Ankara’s case.
Ukraine is a conundrum for the EU. Many argue that Brussels has a particular responsibility to Kyiv. It was, after all, Ukrainians’ fury at the decision of President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of a political and economic association agreement with the EU at Russia’s behest that triggered the Maidan uprising of 2014 and set the stage for war. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen put it: Ukraine is “the only country where people got shot because they wrapped themselves in a European flag.”
Ukraine’s close allies in the EU such as Poland and the Baltic countries strongly support Kyiv’s membership push, seeing it as a democracy resisting an aggressor. Many of the EU old guard are far more wary, however, as Ukraine — a global agricultural superpower — could dilute their own powers and perks. Ukraine and Poland — with a combined population of 80 million — could team up to rival Germany as a political force in the European Council and some argue Kyiv would be an excessive drain on the EU budget.
Short-term deliverables
Friday’s summit in Kyiv — the first EU meeting of its kind to take place in an active war zone — will be about striking the right balance.
Though EU national leaders will not be in attendance, European Council officials have been busy liaising with EU member states about the final communiqué.
Some countries are insisting the statement should not stray far from the language used at the June European Council — emphasizing that while the future of Ukraine lies within the European Union, aspirant countries need to meet specific criteria. “Expectation is quite high in Kyiv, but there is a need to fulfill all the conditions that the Commission has set out. It’s a merit-based process,” said one senior EU official.
Ukraine is a conundrum for the EU. Many argue that Brussels has a particular responsibility to Kyiv | Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images
Still, progress is expected when Zelenskyy meets with von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel.
Shmyhal told POLITICO he hopes Ukraine can achieve a “substantial leap forward” on Friday, particularly in specific areas — an agreement on a visa-free regime for industrial goods; the suspension of customs duties on Ukrainian exports for another year; and “active progress” on joining the SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) payments scheme and the inclusion of Ukraine into the EU’s mobile roaming area.
“We expect progress and acceleration on our path towards signing these agreements,” he said.
Anti-corruption campaign
The hot topic — and one of the central question marks over Ukraine’s EU accession — will be Ukraine’s struggle against corruption. The deputy infrastructure minister was fired and deputy foreign minister stepped down this month over scandals related to war profiteering in public contracts.
“We need a reformed Ukraine,” said one senior EU official centrally involved in preparations for the summit. “We cannot have the same Ukraine as before the war.”
Shmyhal insisted that the Zelenskyy government is taking corruption seriously. “We have a zero-tolerance approach to corruption,” he said, pointing to the “lightning speed” with which officials were removed this month. “Unfortunately, corruption was not born yesterday, but we are certain that we will uproot corruption,” he said, openly saying that it’s key to the country’s EU accession path.
He also said the government was poised to revise its recent legislation on the country’s Constitutional Court to meet the demands of both the European Commission and the Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe. Changes could come as early as this week, ahead of the summit, Shmyhal said.
Though Ukraine has announced a reform of the Constitutional Court, particularly on how judges are appointed, the Venice Commission still has concerns about the powers and composition of the advisory group of experts, the body which selects candidates for the court. The goal is to avoid political interference.
Shmyhal said these questions will be addressed. “We are holding consultations with the European Commission to see that all issued conclusions may be incorporated into the text,” he told POLITICO.
Nonetheless, the symbolic power of this week’s summit is expected to send a strong message to Moscow about Ukraine’s European aspirations.
European Council President Michel used his surprise visit to Kyiv this month to reassure Ukraine that EU membership will be a reality for Ukraine, telling the Ukrainian Rada (parliament) that he dreams that one day a Ukrainian will hold his job as president of the European Council.
“Ukraine is the EU and the EU is Ukraine,” he said. “We must spare no effort to turn this promise into reality as fast as we can.”
The key question for Ukrainians after Friday’s meeting will be how fast the rhetoric and promises can become a reality.
Tensions between Russia and Baltic EU member countries Estonia and Latvia escalated Monday after Moscow told Estonia’s ambassador to leave.
The Russian foreign ministry said it had asked Estonia’s ambassador to depart on February 7, citing “Russophobia” and Tallinn’s reduction of Russian embassy staff in the country.
“The Estonian leadership has been deliberately destroying the entire set of relations with Russia in recent years. Total Russophobia and the cultivation of animosity with regards to our country have been elevated by Tallinn to the rank of a state policy,” the Russian ministry said in a statement.
Earlier this month, Estonia told Russia to cut the number of diplomats in Tallinn to eight to match the number of Estonian diplomats in Moscow. Because of this, the Russian foreign ministry said Monday it would downgrade diplomatic relations with Tallinn and each country would be represented by an interim charge d’affaires instead of an ambassador.
Estonia responded in kind by saying the Russian ambassador in Tallinn must also leave the country on February 7.
“Russia’s steps will not deter us from providing continued support to Ukraine, which has been fighting for its sovereignty and the security of us all for nearly a year now,” said Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu. “We will continue to support Ukraine as Russia is planning large-scale attacks, and we call on other like-minded countries to increase their assistance to Ukraine.”
Neighboring Latvia’s Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs later said his country would follow Estonia and also lower the level of diplomatic relations with Russia, effective February 24, “demanding Russia to act accordingly.”
Lithuania’s foreign ministry voiced “full solidarity” with Estonia and said Russia’s “unfounded and unjustified” move was “a sign of simple desperation.” Vilnius already expelled its Russian ambassador in April after reports of atrocities by Russian soldiers in the Ukrainian town of Bucha.
The diplomatic row came as EU foreign ministers met in Brussels to discuss Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, among other topics. The three Baltic countries have been vocal about demanding tougher sanctions for Russia as well as better assistance for Ukraine, with the trio urging Germany over the weekend to provide Leopard tanks to Kyiv.
The European Commission is exploring legal options to confiscate Russian state and private assets as a way to pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction, according to a document seen by POLITICO.
The goal would be “identifying ways to strengthen the tracing, identification, freezing and management of assets as preliminary steps for potential confiscation,” according to the document.
The potential bounty would consist of nearly $300 billion frozen Russian central bank assets, as well as assets and revenues of individuals and entities on the EU’s sanctions list. The idea was floated already in May, and is supported by Kyiv, as well as Poland, the Baltics and Slovakia. EU leaders in October tasked the Commission to look into legal options to seize Russian assets currently frozen under sanctions.
But the conundrum is that there’s currently no legal mechanism to confiscate Russian assets — as pointed out by U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen back in May. It would need to be created.
“There may be a path for the EU to validly confiscate frozen assets under international law, but it is likely a narrow, a long and an untested path,” said Jan Dunin-Wasowicz, a lawyer at Hughes Hubbard & Reed.
That isn’t deterring the Commission from looking into it.
With regards to private assets belonging to sanctioned people or entities, Brussels is readying proposals to make sanctions evasion an EU crime, a step which would facilitate their confiscation — but only in case of a criminal conviction. Even then, the EU would need to argue each case in court, likely having to litigate for years.
That’s because a lot of these assets would be considered foreign investments, which enjoy protection against expropriation without compensation and a right to fair and equitable treatment under international treaties that Russia has with a lot of EU countries.
The confiscating authority would also need to draw a clear link between the property owner and the conflict in Ukraine.
“To ensure proportionality, you would need to look at who are the owners, what did they do, et cetera,” said Stephan Schill, professor of international and economic law and governance at the University of Amsterdam.
With regards to frozen foreign reserves of the central bank, the largest money pot, the EU executive writes in the document that “these are generally considered to be covered by immunity,” with a footnote pointing to a U.N. convention on jurisdictional immunities of foreign states and their property, which is however not yet in force.
“From an international law perspective, it’s pretty clear that without Russia’s consent you can’t use Russian central bank assets,” said Schill.
As for assets of Russian-owned state enterprises, the paper notes that these wouldn’t be “in principle” covered by such convention, but grabbing them may raise problems linked to the confiscation of private assets, “in addition to the need to demonstrate a sufficient connection to the Russian state.”
The EU is also mulling an “exit tax” on the assets or proceeds from assets of sanctioned individuals that want to transfer their property out of the EU. This could run into legal problems of its own, as it would target a specific group of individuals — which runs counter to non-discrimination provisions in international law — and they in turn could invoke the human right to property as a defence.
To Schill’s knowledge, there is no recent and valid precedent for any of these options.
“The EU and member states are trying to introduce new criminal law,” he said.
The British Navy stands accused by the Russian government, without evidence, of blowing up the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, a claim the U.K. rejected as “false.”
“According to available information, representatives … of the British Navy took part in the planning, provision and implementation of a terrorist attack in the Baltic Sea on September 26 this year — blowing up the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines,” the Russian Defense Ministry said on Saturday, according to media reports.
The accusation did not include any further information or evidence to support claims of state sabotage. The Russian government also said that U.K. operatives helped plan a drone attack on its fleet at the Black Sea port of Sevastopol in Crimea on Saturday.
The U.K. Defense Ministry quickly denied Moscow’s claim.
“To detract from their disastrous handling of the illegal invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Ministry of Defense is resorting to peddling false claims of an epic scale,” the British ministry said in a tweet. “This invented story says more about arguments going on inside the Russian government than it does about the West.”
Russia had already blamed the West in general terms for undersea explosions that damaged the Nord Stream pipes last month. Those blasts have likely rendered the energy infrastructure unusable, according to the German government.
An investigation by Danish and Swedish authorities is ongoing into the explosions, which took place inside the two countries’ exclusive economic zones close to the Baltic Sea island of Bornholm.
Russia had already stopped gas transit through the pipeline sparking concerns earlier this year that it would use gas supply to blackmail Europe as its brutal war on Ukraine continues.
While the first phase of Nord Stream had been operating for nearly 11 years, the second phase of the project — dubbed Nord Stream 2 — had not yet been brought into commercial operation.
The apparent sabotage of both Nord Stream gas pipelines may be one of the worst industrial methane accidents in history, scientists said Wednesday, but it’s not a major climate disaster.
Methane — a greenhouse gas up to 80 times more powerful than carbon dioxide — is escaping into the atmosphere from three boiling patches on the surface of the Baltic Sea, the largest of which the Danish military said was a kilometer across.
On Tuesday evening, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen condemned the “sabotage” and “deliberate disruption of active European energy infrastructure.”
Here are eight key questions on the impact of the leaks.
1. How much methane was in the pipelines?
No government agency in Europe could say for sure how much gas was in the pipes.
“I cannot tell you clearly as the pipelines are owned by Nord Stream AG and the gas comes from Gazprom,” said a spokesperson for the German climate and economy ministry.
The two Nord Stream 1 pipelines were in operation, although Moscow stopped delivering gas a month ago, and both were hit. “It can be assumed that it’s a large amount” of gas in those lines, the German official said. Only one of the Nord Stream 2 lines was struck. It was not in operation but was filled with 177 million cubic meters of gas last year.
Estimates of the total gas in the pipelines that are leaking range from 150 million cubic meters to 500 million cubic meters.
2. How much is being released?
Kristoffer Böttzauw, the director of the Danish Energy Agency, told reporters on Wednesday that the leaks would equate to about 14 million tons of CO2, about 32 percent of Denmark’s annual emissions.
Germany’s Federal Environment Agency estimated the leaks will lead to emissions of around 7.5 million tons of CO2 equivalent — about 1 percent of Germany’s annual emissions. The agency also noted there are no “sealing mechanisms” along the pipelines, “so in all likelihood the entire contents of the pipes will escape.”
Because at least one of the leaks is in Danish waters, Denmark will have to add these emissions to its climate balance sheet, the agency said.
But it is not clear whether all of the gas in the lines would actually be released into the atmosphere. Methane is also consumed by ocean bacteria as it heads through the water column.
3. How does that compare to previous leaks?
The largest leak ever recorded in the U.S. was the 2015 Aliso Canyon leak of roughly 90,000 tons of methane over months. With the upper estimates of what might be released in the Baltic more than twice that, this week’s disaster may be “unprecedented,” said David McCabe, a senior scientist with the Clean Air Task Force.
Jeffrey Kargel, a senior scientist at the Planetary Research Institute in Tucson, Arizona, said the leak was “really disturbing. It is a real travesty, an environmental crime if it was deliberate.”
4. Will this have a meaningful effect on global temperatures?
“The amount of gas lost from the pipeline obviously is large,” Kargel said. But “it is not the climate disaster one might think.”
Annual global carbon emissions are around 32 billion tons, so this represents a tiny fraction of the pollution driving climate change. It even pales in comparison to the accumulation of thousands of industrial and agricultural sources of methane that are warming the planet.
“This is a wee bubble in the ocean compared to the huge amounts of so-called fugitive methane that are emitted every day around the world due to things like fracking, coal mining and oil extraction,” said Dave Reay, executive director of the Edinburgh Climate Change Institute.
Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, said it was roughly comparable to the amount of methane leaked from across Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure on any given working week.
A leak was reported near the Nord Stream 2 pipeline off the coast of Denmark’s Bornholm island | Danish Defence Command
5. Is the local environment affected?
While the gas is still leaking, the immediate vicinity is an extremely dangerous place. Air that contains more than 5 percent methane can be flammable, said Rehder, so the risk of an explosion is real. Methane is not a toxic gas, but high concentrations can reduce the amount of available oxygen.
Shipping has been restricted from a 5 nautical mile radius around the leaks. This is because the methane in the water can affect buoyancy and rupture a vessel’s hull.
Marine animals near the escaping gas may be caught up and killed — especially poor swimmers such as jellyfish, said Rehder. But long-term effects on the local environment are not anticipated.
“It’s an unprecedented case,” he said. “But from our current understanding, I would think that the local effects on marine life in the area is rather small.”
6. What can be done?
Some have suggested that the remaining gas should be pumped out, but a German economy and climate ministry spokesperson on Wednesday said this wasn’t possible.
Once the pipeline has emptied, “it will fill up with water,” the spokesperson added. “At the moment, no one can go underwater — the danger is too great due to the escaping methane.”
Any repair would be the responsibility of pipeline owner Nord Stream AG, the Germans said.
7. Should they set it on fire?
Not only would it look impressive, setting the gas on fire would hugely slash the global warming impact of the leak. Methane is made of carbon and hydrogen, when burned it creates carbon dioxide, which is between 30 and 80 times less planet-warming per ton than methane. Flaring, as it is known, is a common method for reducing the impact of escaping methane.
From a pure climate perspective, setting the escaping methane on fire makes sense. “Yes, definitely — it will help,” said Piers Forster, director of the Priestley International Centre for Climate at the University of Leeds.
But there would be safety issues and potential environmental concerns, including air pollution from the combustion. “With land — in particular the inhabited and touristic island of Bornholm — nearby, you would not venture into this,” said Rehder.
No government has yet indicated that this is under consideration.
8. How long will it last and what next?
“We expect that gas will flow out of the pipes until the end of the week. After that, first of all, from the Danish side, we will try to get out and investigate what the cause is, and approach the pipes, so that we can have it investigated properly. We can do that when the gas leak has stopped,” Danish Energy Agency director Böttzauw told local media.
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